Chapter III: Preface: VII (1)

INTRODUCTORY XIII

CHESS GENERALSHIP 3

GRAND RECONNAISSANCE 23
Military Examples 28

ORGANIZATION 45
Military Examples 59

TOPOGRAPHY 73
Military Examples 85

MOBILITY 97
Military Examples 116

NUMBERS 123
Military Examples 127

TIME 139
Military Examples 142

POSITION 147
Military Examples 158

PRIME STRATEGETIC MEANS 169

PRIME STRATEGETIC PROPOSITION 185

_“The progress of Science universally is retarded, because
sufficient attention is not paid to explaining essentials in
particular and exactly to define the terms employed.”--Euclid._

* * * * *

_“The first care of the sage should be to discover the true
character of his pupils. By his questions he should assist them
to explain their own ideas and by his answers he should compel
them to perceive their falsities. By accurate definitions he
should gradually dispel the incongruities in their earlier
education and by his subtlety in arousing their doubts, he should
redouble their curiosity and eagerness for information; for the
art of the instructor consists in inciting his pupils to that
point at which they cannot endure their manifest ignorance._

_“Many, unable to undergo this trial and confounded by offended
self-conceit and lacking the fortitude to sustain correction,
forsake their master, who should not be eager to recall them.
Others who learn from humiliation to distrust themselves should
no longer have snares spread for their vanity. The master should
speak to them neither with the severity of a censor nor with
the haughtiness of a sophist, nor deal in harsh reproaches nor
importunate complaints; his discourse should be the language of
reason and friendship in the mouth of experience.”--Socrates._

INTRODUCTORY

_“The test is as true of cerebral power, as if a hundred thousand
men lay dead upon the field; or a score of hulks were swinging
blackened wrecks, after a game between two mighty admirals.”--Dr.
Oliver Wendell Holmes._

(Opening Address at Morphy Banquet, Boston, 1859.)

_Men whose business it is to understand war and warfare often are amused by senseless comparisons made by writers who, as their writings show, are ignorant even of the rudiments of military art and science. Of course a certain license in expression of thought is not to be denied the layman; he cannot be expected to talk with the exactness of the man who knows. At the same time there is a limit beyond which the non-technical man passes at his peril, and this limit is reached when he poses as a critic and presumes to dogmatize on matters in regard to which he is uninformed._

The fanciful conjectures of such people, well are illustrated by the following editorial _faux pas_, perpetrated by a leading metropolitan daily, viz.:

“_Everyone knows now that a future war between states having
similar and substantially equal equipments will be a different
affair from any war of the past; characterized by a different
order of generalship and a radically novel application of the
principles of strategy and tactics._”

Many in the struggle to obtain their daily bread, are tempted to essay the unfamiliar, and for a stipulated wage to pose as teachers to the public.

Such always will do well to write modestly in regard to sciences which they have not studied and of arts which they never practiced, and especially in future comments on Military matters, such people may profit by the appended modicum of that ancient history, which newspaper men as a class so affect to despise, and in regard to which, as a rule, they are universally and lamentably, ignorant.

What orders of Generalship can exist in the future, different from those which always have existed since war was made, viz.: good generalship and bad generalship?

Ability properly to conduct an army is a concrete thing; it does not admit of comparison. Says Frederic the Great:

“There are only two kinds of Generals--those who know their trade and those who do not.”

Hence, “a different order of Generalship,” suggested by the editorial quoted, implies either a higher or a lesser degree of ability in the “general of the future”; and as obviously, it is impossible that he can do worse than many already have done, it is necessary to assume that the commander of tomorrow will be an improvement over his predecessors.

Consequently, to the military mind it becomes of paramount interest to inquire as to the form and manner in which such superiority will be tangibly and visibly manifested, viz.:

Will the general of the future be a better general than Epaminondas, Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Eugene, Frederic, Washington, Napoleon, Von Moltke?

Will he improve upon that application of the principles of strategy and tactics to actual warfare which comes down to us of today, stamped with the approval of these superlative military geniuses?

Will the general of the future know a better way for making war than acting against the enemy’s communications?

Will he devise a better method of warfare than that whose motive is the concentration of a superior force upon the strategetic objective?

Will the processes of his prime logistic operations be preferable to those of men who won their victories before their battles were fought, by combining with their troops the topography of the country, and causing rivers and mountains to take the place of corps d’armee?

Will the general of the future renounce as obsolete and worthless that military organization founded centuries before the Christian Era, by the great Theban, Epaminondas, the father of scientific warfare; that system adopted by every captain of renown and which may be seen in its purity in the greater military establishments from the days of Rome to the present Imperial North German Confederation?

Will the general of the future renounce as obsolete and worthless that system of Minor Tactics utilized by every man who has made it his business to conquer the World? Will he propose to us something more perfect than the primary formation of forces depicted in Plate XIII of the Secret Strategical Instructions of Frederic II?

Will the general of the future renounce as obsolete and worthless those intricate, but mathematically exact, evolutions of the combined arms, which appertain to the Major Tactics of men who are remembered to this day for the battles that they won?

Will he invent processes more destructive than those whereby Epaminondas crushed at Leuctra and Mantinea the power of Sparta, and the women of Lacedaemon saw the smoke of an enemy’s camp fire for the first time in six hundred years?

Than those whereby Alexander, a youth of eighteen, won Greece for his father at Chaeronea and the World for himself at Issus and Arbela? Than those whereby Hannibal destroyed seriatim four Roman armies at Trebia, Thrasymenus, Cannae and Herdonea?

Will he find out processes more sudden and decisive than those whereby Caesar conquered Gaul and Pompey and the son of Mithridates, and which are fitly described only in his own language; “Veni, vidi, vici”?

What will the general of the future substitute for the three contiguous sides of the octagon whereby Tamerlane the Great with his 1,400,000 veterans at the Plains of Angora, enveloped the Emperor Bajazet and 900,000 Turks in the most gigantic battle of record?

Will he eclipse the pursuit of these latter by Mizra, the son of Tamerlane, who with the Hunnish light cavalry rode two hundred and thirty miles in five days and captured the Turkish capital, the Emperor Bajazet, his harem and the royal treasure?

Will he excel Gustavus Adolphus, who dominated Europe for twenty years, and Turenne, the military Atlas who upheld that magnificent civilization which embellishes the reign of Louis XIV?

Will he do better than Prince Eugene, who victoriously concluded eighteen campaigns and drove the Turks out of Christendom?

Will he discover processes superior to those whereby Frederic the Great with 22,000 troops destroyed at Rosbach a French army of 60,000 regulars in an hour and a half, at the cost of three hundred men; and at Leuthern with 33,000 troops, killed, wounded or captured 54,000 out of 93,000 Austrians, at a cost of 3,900 men?

Will he improve on those processes whereby Napoleon with 40,000 men, destroyed in a single year five Austrian armies and captured 150,000 prisoners? Will he improve on Rivoli, Austerlitz, Jena, Friedland, Wagram, Dresden, and Ligny?

Will the general of the future renounce as obsolete and worthless that system of Grand Tactics, by means of which the mighty ones of Earth have swept before them all created things?

Will his system surpass in grandeur of conception and exactness of execution the march of Alexander to the Indus? Will he reply to his rival’s prayers for peace and amity as did the great Macedonian; “There can be but one Master of the World”; and to the dissuasions of his friend; “So would I do, were I Parmenio”?

Will he do things more gigantic than Hannibal’s march across the Alps?

Than the operation of Alesia by Caesar; where the Romans besieging one Gallic army in a fortified city, and themselves surrounded by a second Gallic army, single handed destroyed both? Than the circuit of the Caspian Sea by the 200,000 light cavalry of Tamerlane, a feat of mountain climbing which never has been duplicated? Than that marvelous combination of the principles of tactics and of field fortification, whereby in the position of Bunzelwitz, Frederic the Great, with 55,000 men, successfully upheld the last remaining prop of the Prussian nation, against 250,000 Russian and Austrian regular troops, commanded by the best generals of the age?

Will he conceive anything more scientific and artistic than the manoeuvre of Trenton and Princeton by Washington? Than the capture of Burgoyne at Saratoga and Cornwallis at Yorktown? Than the manoeuvres of Ulm, of Jena, of Landshut? Than the manoeuvres of Napoleon in 1814? Than the manoeuvre of Charleroi in 1815, declared by Jomini to be Napoleon’s masterpiece? Will he excel the manoeuvres of Kutosof and Wittsengen in 1812-13 and of Blucher on Paris in 1814 and on Waterloo in 1815; each of which annihilated for the time being the military power of France?

Will he devise military conceptions superior to those whereby Von Moltke overthrew Denmark in six hours, Austria in six days, and France in six weeks?

* * * * *

The sapient race of quill-drivers ever has hugged to its breast many delusions; some of which border upon the outer intellectual darkness. One of these delusions is that most persistently advertised, least substantial, but forever darling first favorite of timid and inexperienced minds: “_The pen is mightier than the sword._”

Explanation of the invincible ignorance of the penny-a-liner is simple, viz.:

Of the myriad self-appointed educators to the public, few are familiar even with the rudimentary principles of Military Science and almost none are acquainted even with the simplest processes of Strategetic Art. Hence, like all who discourse on matters which they do not understand, such writers continually confound together things which have no connection.

Ignorant of war and the use of weapons; bewildered by the prodigious improvements in mechanical details, they immoderately magnify the importance of such improvements, oblivious to the fact that these latter relate exclusively to elementary tactics and in no way affect the system of Strategy, Logistics, and the higher branches of Tactics.

Of such people, the least that can be said and that in all charity, is, that before essaying the role of the pedagogue, they should endeavor to grasp that most obvious of all truths:

“_A man cannot teach what he never has learned._”

Says Frederic the Great: “Improvements and new discoveries in implements of warfare will be made continually; and generals then alive must modify tactics to comply with these novelties. But the Grand Art of taking advantage of topographical conditions and of the faulty disposition of the opposing forces, ETERNALLY WILL REMAIN UNCHANGED in the military system.”

* * * * *

Naturally, the student now is led to inquire:

What then is this immutable military system? What are its text books, where is it taught and from whom is it to be learned?

In answer it may be stated:

At the present day, private military schools make no attempt to teach more than elementary tactics. Even the Governmental academy curriculum aims little higher than the school of the battalion.

Scientific Chess-play begins where these institutions leave off, and ends at that goal which none of these institutions even attempt to reach.

Chess teaches to conduct campaigns, to win battles, and to move troops securely and effectively in the presence of and despite the opposition of an equal or superior enemy.

Military schools graduate boys as second-lieutenants commanding a platoon. Chess graduates Generals, able to mobilize Corps d’armee, whatever their number or location; to develop these into properly posted integers of a grand Strategic Front and to manoeuvre and operate the army as a Strategetic Unit, in accordance to the laws of the Strategetic art and the principles of the Strategetic science.

By precept and by actual practice, Chess teaches what is _NOT_ taught in any military school--that least understood and most misunderstood; that best guarded and most invaluable of all State Secrets--

The profession of

GENERALSHIP.

* * * * *

_“Books will speak plain when counsellors blanch. Therefore it
is good to be conversant with them; especially the books of such
as themselves have been actors upon the stage.”--Sir Francis
Bacon._

* * * * *

_“At this moment, Europe, which fears neither God nor devil,
grovels in terror before a little man hardly five feet in height;
who, clad in a cocked hat and grey great-coat and mounted upon a
white horse, plods along through mud and darkness; followed by
the most enthusiastic, most devoted and most efficient band of
cut-throats and robbers, the world has ever seen.”_

* * * * *

_“Many good soldiers are but poor generals.”--Hannibal._

* * * * *

_“No soldier serving under a victorious commander, ever has
enough of war.”--Caesar._

* * * * *

_“Officers always should be chosen from the nobility and never
from the lower orders of society; for the former, no matter how
dissolute, always retain a sense of honor, while the latter,
though guilty of atrocious actions, return to their homes
without compunction and are received by their families without
disapprobation.”--Frederic the Great._

* * * * *

At the terrible disaster of Cannae, the Patrician Consul Aemilius
Paulus and 80,000 Romans died fighting sword in hand; while
the Plebian Consul, Varro, fled early in the battle. Upon the
return of the latter to Rome, the Senate, instead of ordering his
execution, with withering sarcasm formally voted him its thanks
and the thanks of the Roman people, “that he did not despair of
the Republic.”

* * * * *

_“Among us we have a man of singular character--one Phocion.
He seems not to know that he lives in our modern age and at
incomparable Athens. He is poor, yet is not humiliated by his
poverty; he does good, yet never boasts of it; and gives advice,
though he is certain it will not be followed. He possesses talent
without ambition and serves the state without regard to his own
interest. At the head of the army, he contents himself with
restoring discipline and beating the enemy. When addressing the
assembly, he is equally unmoved by the disapprobation or the
applause of the multitude._

_“We laugh at his singularities and we have discovered an
admirable secret for revenging ourselves for his contempt. He
is the only general we have left--but we do not employ him; he
is the most upright and perhaps the most intelligent of our
counsellors--but we do not listen to him. It is true, we cannot
make him change his principles, but, by Heaven, neither shall he
induce us to change ours; and it never shall be said that by the
example of his superannuated virtues and the influence of his
antique teachings, Phocion was able to correct the most polished
and amiable people in the world.”--Callimedon._

GENERALSHIP

CHESS GENERALSHIP

_“In Chess the soldiers are the men and the General is the mind
of the player.”--Emanuel Lasker._

* * * * *

_“It is neither riches nor armies that make a nation formidable;
but the courage and genius of the Commander-in-Chief.”--Frederic
the Great._

* * * * *

_“Ho! Ye Macedonians! Because together we have conquered the
World, think ye to give law to the blood of Achilles and to
withstand the dictates of the Son of Jupiter?_

_“Choose ye a new commander, draw yourselves up for battle; I
will lead against you those Persians whom ye so despise, and if
you are victorious, by Mehercule, I will do everything that you
desire.”--Alexander the Great._

* * * * *

_“It is I and I alone, who give you your glory and your
success.”--Napoleon._

* * * * *

_“My thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways, My
ways, saith the Lord.”--Holy Bible._

_By authority indisputable, the ex-cathedra dictum of the greatest of the Great Captains, we have been informed that the higher processes of the military system, eternally will remain unchanged._

_As a necessary corollary, it follows that these processes always have been and always will be comprehended and employed by every great Captain._

_Equally, it is self-evident, that capability to comprehend these higher processes, united with ability properly to utilize them to win battles and campaigns, constitutes genius for Warfare._

Moreover, we are further informed by the same unimpeachable authority, that so irresistible is genius for warfare, that united to courage, it is formidable beyond the united financial and military resources of the State. In corroboration of this, we have the testimony of well-qualified judges. Says the Count de Saxe:

“Unless a man is born with talent for war and this talent is brought to perfection, it is impossible for him to be more than an indifferent general.”

* * * * *

In these days, more or less degenerate from the soldierly standpoint, the fantastic sophistries of Helvetius have vogue, and most people believe book-learning to be all-in-all.

Many are so weak-minded, as really to believe, that because born in the Twentieth Century, they necessarily are the repository of all the virtues, and particularly of all the knowledge acquired by their ancestors from remotest generations. Few seem to understand that the child, even of ultra-modern conditions, is born just as ignorant and often invincibly so, as were the sons of Ham, Shem and Japhet, and most appear to be unaware, that:

_Only by intelligent reflection upon their own experience and upon the experiences of others, can one acquire knowledge._

The triviality of crowding the memory with things that may or may not be true, is the merest mimicry of education.

Real education is nothing more than the fruit of experience; and he who acts in conformity to such knowledge, alone is wise. Thus to act, implies ability to comprehend. But there are those in whom capability is limited; hence, all may not be wise who wish to be so, and these necessarily remain through life very much as they are born.

The use of knowledge would be infinitely more certain, if our understanding of its accurate application were as extensive as our needs require. We have only a few ideas of the attributes of matter and of the laws of mechanics, out of an infinite number of secrets which mankind never can hope to discover. This renders our feeble adaptations in practice of the knowledge we possess, oftimes inadequate for the result we desire; and it seems obvious that if Nature had intended man to attain to the superlative, she would have endowed him with intelligence and have communicated to him information, infinitely superior to that we possess.

The universal blunder of mankind arises from an hallucination that all minds are created equal; and that by mere book-learning, _i.e._, simply by memorizing what somebody says are facts it is possible for any man to attain to superior and even to superlative ability.

* * * * *

Such profoundly, but utterly mis-educated people, not unnaturally may inquire, by what right speaks the eminent warrior previously quoted. These properly may be informed in the words of Frederic the Great:

“_The Count de Saxe is the hero of the bravest action ever done
by man._” viz.,

A great battle was raging.

Within a magnificent Pavilion in the centre of the French camp, the King, the nobility and the high Ecclesiastics of the realm were grouped about a plain iron cot.

Prone upon this cot, wasted by disease, lay the Count de Saxe, in that stupor which often precedes and usually presages dissolution.

The last rites of the Church had been administered, and the assemblage in silence and apprehension, awaited the approach of a victorious enemy and the final gasp of a general who had never lost a battle.

The din of strife drawing nearer, penetrated the coma which enshrouded the soul of the great Field-Marshal.

Saxe opened his eyes. His experienced ear told him that his army, routed and disordered, was flying before an exultant enemy.

The giant whose pastime it was to tear horseshoes in twain with his bare hands and to twist nails into corkscrews with his fingers, staggered to his feet, hoarsely articulating fierce and mandatory ejaculations.

Hastily clothed, the Count de Saxe was placed in a litter and borne out of his pavilion into that chaos of ruin and carnage which invariably accompanies a lost battle. Around him, behind and in front, swarmed his broken battalions and disorganized squadrons; while in pursuit advanced majestically in solid column, the triumphant English.

Saxe demanded his horse and armor.

Clad in iron and supported in the saddle on either hand, this modern Achilles galloped to the front of his army; then, at the head of the Scotch Guards, the Irish Brigade, and French Household troops, Saxe in person, led that series of terrific hand-to-hand onslaughts which drove the English army from the field of battle, and gained the famous victory of Fontenoy.

* * * * *

“Furthermore,” declares this illustrious Generalissimo of Louis XIV;

“_It is possible to make war without trusting anything to
accident; this is the highest point of skill and perfection
within the province of a general._”

“Most men,” writes Vergetius, “imagine that strength and courage are sufficient to secure victory. Such are ignorant that when they exist, stratagem vanquishes strength and skill overcomes courage.”

In his celebrated work, _Institutorum Rei Militaris_, that source from whence all writers derive their best knowledge of the military methods of the ancients; and by means of which, he strove to revive in his degenerate countrymen that intelligent valor which distinguishes their great ancestors--the famous Roman reiterates this solemn warning:

“Victory in war depends not on numbers, nor on courage; skill and
discipline only, can ensure it.”

The emphasis thus laid by these great warriors on genius for warfare is still further accentuated by men whose dicta few will dispute, viz.,

“The understanding of the Commander,” says Frederic the Great,
“has more influence on the outcome of the battle or campaign,
than has the prowess of his troops.”

Says Napoleon:

“The general is the head, the whole of an army. It was not the
Roman army that subjugated Gaul, it was Caesar; nor was it the
Carthagenian army that made the Republic tremble to the gates
of Rome, it was Hannibal; it was not the Macedonian army which
reached the Indus, it was Alexander; it was not the French army
which carried war to the Weser and the Inn, it was Turenne; it
was not the Prussian army which for seven years defended Prussia
against the three strongest powers of Europe, it was Frederic the
Great.”

From such opinions by men whose careers evince superlative knowledge of the subject, it is clear, that:

I. _There exists a system of Strategetics common to all great
commanders_;

II. _That understanding of this system is shown by the skillful
use of it_;

III. _That such skill is derived from innate capability_;

IV. _That those endowed by Nature with this talent, must bring
their gifts to perfection, by intelligent study_.

So abstruse are the processes of this greatest of all professions, that comprehension of it has been evidenced by eleven men only, viz.:

Epaminondas, Alexander, Caesar, Hannibal, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Eugene, Frederic, Washington, Napoleon, Von Moltke.

Comprehension of this system can be attained, only by innate capability brought to perfection by intelligent study of the words and achievements of these great Captains.

For life is so short and our memories in general so defective, that we ought to seek instruction only from the purest sources.

None but men endowed by Nature with the military mind and trained in the school of the great Captains, are able to write intelligently on the acts and motives of generals of the first order. All the writings of mere literati relative to these uncommon men, no matter how excellent such authors may be, never can rise to anything more than elegant phraseology.

It is of enlightened critics, such as the former, that the youthful student always is first in need. Such will guide him along a road, in which he who has no conductor may easily lose himself. They will correct his blunders considerately, recollecting that should these be ridiculed or treated with severity, talent might be stifled which might hereafter bloom to perfection.

It is a difficult matter to form the average student, and to impart to him that degree of intelligent audacity and confident prudence which is requisite for the proper practice of the Art of Strategetics.

To secure proficiency, the student from the beginning must cheerfully submit himself to a mental discipline, which properly may be termed severe; in order to make his faculties obedient to his will.

Secondly, he must regularly exercise these faculties, in order to make them active and to acquire the habit of implicitly conforming to the laws of the Art; to make himself familiar with its processes, and to establish in his mind that confidence in its practice which can come only through experience.

The student daily should exercise his mind in the routine of deployments, developments, evolutions, manoeuvres, and operations, both on the offensive and on the defensive. These exercises should be imprinted on the memory by closely reviewing the lesson of the previous day.

Even with all this severe and constant effort, time is necessary for practical tactics to become habitual; for the student must become so familiar with these movements and formations that he can execute them instantly and with precision.

To acquire this degree of perfection, much study is necessary; it is a mistake to think otherwise. But this study is its own sufficient reward, for the student soon will find that it has extended his ideas, and _that he is beginning to think in the GREAT_.

At the same time the student should thoroughly instruct himself in military history, topography, logic, mathematics, and the science of fortification. With all of these the strategist must be familiar.

But his chief aim must be to perfect his judgment and to bring it to the highest degree of broadness and exactness.

This is best done by contemplation of the works of the Great Masters.

The past history of Chess-play, is the true school for those who aspire to precedence in the Royal Game. It is their first duty to inform themselves of the processes of the great in every age, in order to shun their errors and to avail of their methods.

It is essential to grasp that system of play common to the Masters; to pursue it step by step. Particularly is it necessary to learn that he who can best deduce consequences in situations whose outcome is in doubt, is the competitor who will carry off the prize from others who act less rationally than himself.

Especially, should the student be wary in regard to what is termed chess analysis, as applied to the so-called “openings” and to the mid-game. Most chess analysts are compilers of falsities occasionally interspersed with truth. Among the prodigious number of variations which they pretend to establish or refute, none may be implicitly relied on in actual play; few are of value except for merely elementary purposes, and many are fallacies fatal to the user.

The reason for this is: whenever men invited by curiosity, seek to examine circumstantially even the less intricate situations on the Chess-board, they at once become lost in a labyrinth abounding in obscurities and contradictions. Those, who ignorant of the synthetic method of calculation, are compelled to depend upon their analytic powers, quickly find that these, on account of the number of unknown quantities, are utterly inadequate.

Any attempt to calculate the true move in Chess-play by analysis, other than in situations devoid of unknown quantities, is futile.

Yet it is of such folly that the mediocre mind is most enamoured. Content with seeing much, it is oblivious to what it cannot see; and the analytical system consists merely in claiming that there is nothing to see, other than what it does see.

This is that slender reed upon which the so-called “chess-analyst” hangs his claims, oblivious to the basic truth that in analysis, unless all is known, nothing is known.

Many delude themselves to the contrary and strive to arrive at correct conclusions without first having arranged clearly before their minds all the facts.

Hence, their opinions and judgments, being founded in ignorance of all the facts, are to that extent defective; and their conclusions necessarily wrong.

Through action taken upon incomplete knowledge, men are beguiled into error; and it is to such unreason that most human catastrophes are to be attributed.

* * * * *

Most of those who attempt to write on Strategetics, and whether applied to Chess-play or to Warfare, very quickly are compelled to seek refuge in vague phrases; in order to conceal their uncertain grasp on the subject discussed. The uninformed believe in them, because of their reputation, and are satisfied that the thing is so, without understanding _WHY_.

Words intended to convey instruction, should not be used except in their proper meaning. Each word should be defined for the student and its use regulated. The true use of words being established, there is no longer danger from a play upon them; or, from different and confused ideas annexed to them, either by the persons who read, or who employ them.

By means of this warning, the student easily may detect the empty mouthings of enthusiastic inexperience, and equally so, the casuistries of the subtle expert; who often uses language merely to conceal from youthful talent, knowledge which if imparted, might be fatal to his domination.

As the student progresses toward proficiency, he, sooner or later, will come to realize, that of all disgusting things, to a mind which revolts at nonsense, reasoning ill is the worst.

It is distressing, to be afflicted with the absurdities of men, who, victims of the fancy, confound enthusiasm with capability and mistake mania for talent. The world is full of such people, who, in all honesty thinking themselves philosophers, are only visionaries enamoured of their own lunatic illusions.

The true discipline for the student who aspires to proficiency at Chess-play, is, in every succeeding game, to imitate more closely the play of the Great Masters; and to endeavor to take his measures with more attention and judgment than in any preceding.

Every player at Chess has defects; many have very great ones. In searching for these one should not treat himself tenderly, and when examining his faults, he should grant himself no quarter.

Particularly should the student cultivate confidence in and rigidly adhere to the standard of skill, as interpreted by that immutable System of Chess-play, of which Morphy is the unapproachable and all-sufficient exponent.

Observing the lack of method displayed by the incompetent Chess-commander, the student of this system will remark with astonishment, the want of plan and the entire absence of co-operation between the various Chessic corps d’armee, which under such leadership are incapable of a general effort.

How dense is such a leader in the selection of a project, how slow and slovenly in its execution; how many opportunities does he suffer to escape him and how many enormous faults does he not commit? To such things, the numerically weaker but more skillful opponent, often is indebted for safety and ultimately for success.

One who is opposed by such blockheads, necessarily must gain advantages continually; for conduct so opposite to all the laws of the Art, is, in itself, sufficient to incur ruin. It is for such negligence on his own part that one often has cause bitterly to reproach himself. But such errors, especially on the part of great players, are exemplary lessons for the student, who from them may learn to be more prudent, circumspect, and wise.

* * * * *

Those who make a mere pastime of Chess, who have no desire for the true benefit of the game, do not deserve information.

Such people are more numerous than may be supposed. They have few coherent ideas and are usually influenced by mere chatter and by writers whose sole excuse is enthusiasm.

These players at the game cannot benefit by example. The follies of others afford them no useful lesson. Each generation of such “wood-shifters,” has blindly followed in the footsteps of those preceding and daily is guilty of errors which times innumerable have been fully exposed.

It is the darling habit of such folk to treat the great things in Chess with levity and to dignify those insignificant matters which appertain to the game when used as a plaything.

Such people are merely enthusiastic; usually they are equally frivolous. They do everything from fancy, nothing from design. Their zeal is strong, but they can neither regulate nor control it.

Such bear about their Chessic disabilities in their character. Inflated in good fortune, groveling in adversity, these players never attain to that sage contemplation, which renders the scientific practice of Chess so indescribably beautiful.

There is another class of Chess-players who from mere levity of mind are incapable of steadily pursuing any fixed plan; but who overturn, move by move, even such advantages as their good fortune may have procured. There are others, who, although possessed of great vivacity of mind and eager for information, yet lack that patience necessary to receive instruction.

Lastly, there are not a few whose way of thinking and the validity of whose calculations, depend upon their good or ill digestion.

It is in vain that such people endeavor to divine things beyond their understanding. Hence it is, that among those incapable of thought, or too indolent for mental effort, the game proceeds in easy fashion until routine is over. Afterward, at each move, the most probable conjecture passes for the best reason and victory ultimately rests with him whose blunders are least immediately consequential.

* * * * *

Understanding of high art is dispensed only to the few; the great mass neither can comprehend nor enjoy it. In spite of the good natured Helvetius, all are not wise who wish to be so and men ever will remain what Nature made them. It is impossible for the stream to rise higher than its source.

“The progress of human reason,” writes the great Frederic, “is more slow than is imagined; the true cause of which is that most men are satisfied with vague notions of things and but few take time for examination and deep inquiry.

“Some, fettered by prejudice from their infancy, wish not, or are unable to break their chains; others, delighting in frivolity know not a word of mathematics and enjoy life without allowing their pleasures to be interrupted by a moment of reflection. Should one thinking man in a thousand be discovered it will be much; and it is for him that men of talent write.

“The rest naturally are offended, for nothing so enrages the mediocre mind as to be compelled to admit to itself its own inferiority. Consequently, they consign book, author, and reader conjointly to Satan. So much easier is it to condemn than to refute, or to learn.”

* * * * *

The early success of many young students does not permit them to observe that they often have departed from the rules of the Art. As they have escaped punishment for their errors, they remain unacquainted with the dangers to which they were exposed. Constant good fortune finally makes them over-confident and they do not suspect it necessary to change their measures, even when in the presence of an able foe.

Thus, the youthful tyro, inconsiderate, inconsistent, and turbulent, and oblivious to the innumerable dangers by which he is surrounded, plays his pieces hither and thither, as fancy and inclination dictate, culling bouquets of the most gorgeous flowers of the imagination; thoughtless of the future and perfectly happy because he cannot reflect.

To reason exactly, the student first must rid his mind of all preconceived notions; he must regard the matter under consideration as a blank sheet of paper, upon which nothing is to be written save those things which by the processes of logic and demonstration, are established as facts.

There is much difference between the Art of Logic and mere conjecture.

The calculations of arithmeticians, though rigorous and exact, are never difficult; because they relate to known quantities and to the palpable objects of nature. But when it is required to argue from combining circumstances, the least ignorance of uncertain and obscure facts breaks the chain and we are deceived every moment.

This is no defect of the understanding, but error arising from plausible ideas, which wear the face of and are too quickly accepted for truth. A long chapter can be written on the different ways in which men lose themselves in their conjectures. Innumerable examples of this are not wanting, and all because they have suffered themselves to be hurried away and thus to be precipitate in drawing their conclusions.

The part that the General, whether in Chess-play or in Warfare, has to act, always is more difficult because he must not permit himself the least mistake, but is bound to behave with prudence and sagacity throughout a long series of intricate processes. A single false deduction, or a movement of the enemy unintelligible to a commander, may lead him to commit an irremediable error; and in cases wherein the situation is beyond comprehension, his ignorance is invincible.

For however extensive the human mind may be, it never is sufficiently so to penetrate those minute combinations necessary to be developed in order to foresee and regulate events, the sequence, utility and even existence of which, depend upon future contingencies.

Incidents which are past, can be explained clearly, because the reasons therefor are manifest. But men easily deceive themselves concerning the future, which, by a veil of innumerable and impenetrable secondary causes, is concealed from the most prying inspection.

In such situations, how puerile are the projects even of the greatest Strategist. To him, as much as to the tyro, is the future hidden; he knows not what shall happen, even on the next move. How then may he foresee those situations which secondary causes later may produce?

Circumstances most often oblige him to act contrary to his wishes; and in the flux and reflux of fortune, it is the part of prudence to conform to system and to act with consistency. It is impossible to foresee all events.

* * * * *

“It is not possible,” writes the Count de Saxe, “to establish a system without first being acquainted with the _principles_ that must necessarily support it.”

In corroboration of this is the opinion of Frederic the Great:

“Condemned by my unfortunate stars to philosophies on contingencies and on probabilities I employ my whole attention to examine the _principle_ on which my argument must rest and to procure all possible information on that point. Deprived of such precaution, the edifice I erect, wanting a base, would fall like a house of cards.”

Everyone who does not proceed on principle, is inconsistent in his conduct. Equally so, whenever the principle on which one acts is false, _i.e._, does not apply to the existing situation; all deductions based thereon, if applied to the existing situation, necessarily are false.

“Those principles which the Art of Warfare prescribes, never should be departed from,” writes Frederic the Great, “and generals rigidly should adhere to those circumspections and never swerve from implicit obedience to laws, upon whose exact observance depends the safety of their armies and the success of their projects.”

Thus the student will clearly see that all other calculations, though never so ingeniously imagined, are of small worth in comparison with comprehension of the use of Strategetic principles. By means of these latter, we are taught to control the raging forces which dominate in the competitive arts and to compel obedience from friend and foe alike.

“To the shame of humanity it must be confessed,” writes Frederic the Great, “that what often passes for authority and consequence is mere assumption, used as a cloak to conceal from the layman the extreme of official indolence and stupidity.

“To follow the routine of service, to be busied concerning food and clothing, and to eat when others eat, to fight when others fight, are the whole warlike deeds of the majority and constitute what is called having seen service and grown grey in arms.

“The reason why so many officers remain in a state of mediocrity, is because they neither know, nor trouble themselves to inquire into the causes either of their victories or defeats, although such causes are exceedingly real.”

In this connection, writes Polybius, the friend and biographer of Hannibal:

“Having made ourselves masters of the subject of Warfare, we shall no longer ascribe success to Fortune and blindly applaud mere conquerors, as the ignorant do; but we shall approve and condemn from Principle and Reason.”

To the Chess-student nothing can be more conclusive than the following:

“My success at Chess-play,” writes Paul Morphy, “is due to rigid adherence to fixed rules and Principles.”

* * * * *

_“Chess is best fought on Principles, free from all deception and trickery.”--Wilhelm Steinitz._

GRAND RECONNAISSANCE

_“Man can sway the future, only by foreseeing through a clear
understanding of the present, to what far off end matters are
tending.”--Caesar._

* * * * *

_“From the erroneous ideas they form in regard to good and evil,
the ignorant, the mis-educated and the inexperienced always act
without precisely knowing what they ought to desire, or what they
ought to fear; and it is not in the end they propose, but in the
choice of means, that most deceive themselves.”--Aristotle._

GRAND RECONNAISSANCE

_“In every situation the principal strategical requirements must
clearly be defined and all other things must be subordinated to
these considerations.”--Frederic the Great._

* * * * *

_“One should seek to obtain a knowledge of causes, rather than
of effects; and should endeavor to reason from the known, to the
unknown.”--Euclid._

_The province of Grand Reconnaissance is exactly to determine the relative advantages and disadvantages in time, numbers, organization, topography, mobility and position, which appertain to hostile armies contained in the same strategetic plane; and to designate those Corps d’armee by which such advantages are materially expressed._

Those processes which appertain to the making of Grand Reconnaissance, necessarily are argumentative; inasmuch as all the facts never are determinate.

Consequently, talent of the highest order is required for the deducing of conclusions which never can be based upon exact knowledge, and which always must contemplate the presence of numerous unknown quantities.

The responsibilities inherent to Grand Reconnaissance never are to be delegated to, nor thrust upon subordinates. Scouts, spies, and informers of every kind, have their manifold and proper uses, but such uses never rise above furnishing necessary information in regard to topographical, tactical, and logistic details.

The Commander-in-chief alone is presumed to possess knowledge and skill requisite to discern what strategetically is fact and what is not fact; and to ascribe to each fact its proper place and sequence.

Lack of military talent and of Strategetic knowledge, never is more strikingly shown than by negligence or inability in this regard.

Incompetents, ignorant of this truth, and oblivious to its importance, devolve such vital responsibility upon subordinates; and later, these legalized murderers palliate the slaughter of their troops and the national shame by publicly reprimanding men serving at shillings per month, for failing in a service, which were the latter able to perform, would entitle them to the gold epaulets and general’s pay, of which their commander is the unfit recipient.

* * * * *

Knowledge of the number, organization, position and movements of the enemy’s troops is the basic element for correct calculation in campaign and battle.

Such things to be accurately estimated must be closely inspected. All speculation and all conjecture in regard to these matters is but frivolity.

It is by being precipitate and hasty in making such conclusions, that men are deceived, for to judge rightly of things before they become clearly shown is most difficult.

_To act on uncertainty is WRONG._

We do not know all the facts and a single iota of light later on may oblige us to condemn that which we previously have approved.

* * * * *

In the making of Grand Reconnaissance, one always must be wary of placing too much confidence in appearances and in first impressions. Especially must care be taken not to magnify the weaknesses of the hostile army, nor the efficacy of the kindred position.

Also, one never should underrate:

1. The talents of the opposing commander; nor

2. The advantages possessed by the opposing army:

(a) In numbers,

(b) In organization,

(c) In position,

(d) In topography,

(e) In time,

(f) In mobility.

It is a first essential, constantly to note the movements of the enemy, in order to detect his plans and the exact location of his corps.

These things are the only reliable guides for determining the true course of procedure. It must be left to the enemy to show by his movements and the posts which he occupies, the measures he projects for the future, and until these are known, it is not proper to _ACT_. Hence:

PRINCIPLE

_All movements of Corps Offensive should be governed by the POSITION of the hostile army, and all movements of Corps Defensive should be governed by the MOVEMENTS of the hostile army._

As soon as the enemy begins a movement, his intentions become clear. It is then possible to make precise calculations.

But be not hasty to build conclusions upon uncertain information and do not take any resolutions until certain what are the numbers, the position, the objectives, and the projects of the enemy.

However interesting an undertaking may appear, one should not be seduced by it while ill-informed of the obstacles to be met and the possibility of not having sufficient force in the theatre of action.

Chimerical schemes should be abandoned at their inception. Reason, instead of extravagancies of the fancy, always must be the guide. Men, most courageous, often undertake fearful difficulties, but impracticable things they leave to lunatics.

In all situations, one must beware of venturing beyond his depth. It is wiser to keep within the limits which the knowledge we possess shall prescribe.

Especially in crises, one must proceed most cautiously until sure information is acquired; for over-haste is exceedingly dangerous, when exact knowledge is lacking of the enemy’s numbers, position, and movements.

PRINCIPLE

_Situations always should be contemplated as they EXIST, never as they OUGHT to be, or, perhaps, MAY be._

In every important juncture, each step must be profoundly considered; as little as possible should be left to chance.

Particularly, must one never be inflated and rendered careless and negligent by success; nor made spiritless and fearful by reverses. At all times the General should see things only as they are and attempt what is dictated by that Strategetic Principle which dominates the given situation. Fortune often does the rest.

* * * * *

_“Napoleon bending over and sometimes lying at full length upon his map, with a pair of dividers opened to a distance on the scale of from 17 to 20 miles, equal to 22 to 25 miles over country, and marking the positions of his own and of the hostile armies by sticking into the map pins surmounted by little balls made of diverse colored sealing wax; in the twinkling of an eye calculated those wonderful concentrations of his Corps d’armee upon decisive points and dictated those instructions to his Marshals which in themselves are a title to glory.”--Baron de Jomini._

MILITARY EXAMPLES

_“Phillip, King of Macedonia, is the single confidant of his
own secrets, the sole dispenser of his treasure, the most able
general of all Greece, the bravest soldier in his army. He
foresees and executes everything himself; anticipates events,
derives all possible advantages from them and yields to them when
to yield is necessary._

_His troops are extremely well disciplined, he exercises them
incessantly. Always himself at their head, they perform with
arms and baggage marches of three hundred stadia with alarming
expedition and making no difference between summer or winter,
between fatigue and rest._

_He takes no step without mature reflection, nor proceeds to a
second until he is assured of the success of the first and his
operations are always dominated by considerations of time and
place.”--Apollodorus._

The facility with which one familiar with the Strategetic Art may make Grand Reconnaissance, even of an invisible theatre of action, and may evolve accurate deductions from a mass of inexact and contradictory reports is illustrated by the following practical examples, viz.:

FIRST EXAMPLE.

(From the _New York Journal_, Dec. 26, 1899 By =Franklin K. Young=.)

“The position of the British armies is deplorable.

“With the single exception of Gen. Buller’s force, the situation of these bodies of British troops, thus unfortunately circumstanced, is cause for the greatest anxiety.

“Strong indications point to a grand offensive movement on the part of the Boers, with the object of terminating the war in one campaign and by a single blow.

“True, this movement may be but a feint, but if it be a true movement, it is difficult to over-estimate the gravity of the situation of the British in South Africa.

“For if this movement is a true military movement, it shows as clearly as the sun in the sky to those who know the Strategetic Art, that the Boer armies are in transition from the defensive to an offensive plan of campaign, with the purpose of capturing DeArr and from thence advancing in force against the chief British depot, Capetown.”

* * * * *

The United States War Department, _Report on the British-Boer War_, published June 14, 1901, contains the following:

(By =Capt. S. L’H. Slocum=, December 25, 1899. U. S. Military Attache with the British Army.)

“I consider the present situation to be the most critical for the English forces, since hostilities began. Should the Boers assume offensive operations, the English armies with their long and thinly guarded lines of communication, would be placed in great jeopardy.”

* * * * *

(By =Chas. S. Goldmann=, war correspondent with Gen. Buller and Lord Roberts in the South African Campaign. MacMillan & Co., 1902.)

“Had the defence (of Cape Colony) been entrusted to less capable hands than those of Gen. French, who, with a mere handful of troops succeeded not only in checking the Boer advance, but in driving them back on Colesberg, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the enemy would have been able to push on south and west to Craddock and Hex River range and thus bring about a state of affairs which might have shaken British rule in South Africa to its foundation.”

SECOND EXAMPLE.

(_Boston Globe_, Jan. 12, 1900. By =Franklin K. Young=.)

“Lord Roberts’ first object will be the rescue of Lord Methuen’s army now blockaded near Magersfontein by Gen. Conje.

“As the first step to effect this, the British commander-in-chief at once and with all his force, will occupy the line from Naauwpoort to De Arr. There, he will await the arrival of twenty-two transports now en route from England.

“With these reinforcements, he will advance directly to the Modder River by the route previously taken by Lord Methuen.”

* * * * *

(By =Chas. S. Goldmann=, Sp. Cor. British Army.)

“Slow to recognize their opportunities, the enemy were still in the midst of preparation, when Gen. French reached De Arr. Meanwhile a detachment under Major McCracken occupied Naauwpoort, to which place thirty days’ supplies for 3000 men and 1100 animals had been ordered.

“In the ten weeks of fighting which ensued, prior to the arrival of the British main army, Gen. French by his skillful tactics held a powerful force of Boers at bay, checked their descent into the southern part of the colony, defeated their attempt to display the Vierkleur across the cape peninsular, and materially influenced, if not absolutely determined, the entire future of the campaign.”

* * * * *

(By =Chas. S. Goldmann=, Sp. Cor. with British Army.)

“Arriving at Capetown on Jan. 10, Lord Roberts decided that the line of march should lead by way of Bloemfontein to Pretoria, initiating the operation by the concentration of large forces on the Modder River, forming there an advanced base.”

THIRD EXAMPLE.

(_Boston Globe_, Jan. 21, 1900. By =Franklin K. Young=.)

“It is plain that when the Boers took position at Colenso they prepared their plan for the protection of their flanks; to deny this would be to assume that men who had displayed superb military sagacity were ignorant of the simplest processes of warfare.