Chess Generalship, Vol. I. Grand Reconnaissance

Chapter VI: Preface: VII (4)

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After giving his final instructions to his officers, Tamerlane, it is recorded, betook himself to his tent and played at Chess until the crisis of the battle arrived, whereupon he proceeded to the decisive point and in person directed those evolutions which resulted in the destruction of the Ottoman army.

The assumption that the great Asiatic warrior was playing at Chess during the earlier part of the battle of Angora, undoubtedly is erroneous. Most probably he followed the progress of the conflict by posting chess-pieces upon the Chessboard and moving these according to reports sent him momentarily by his lieutenants.

Obviously, in the days when the field telegraphy and telephone were unknown, such method was entirely feasible and satisfactory to the Master of Strategetics and far superior to any attempt to overlook such a confused and complicated concourse.

* * * * *

At Bannockburne (June 24, 1314), Robert Bruce, King of Scotland, with 30,000 Scots annihilated the largest army that England ever put upon a battlefield.

This army was led by Edward II and consisted of over 100,000 of the flower of England’s nobility, gentry and yeomanry. The victory established the independence of Scotland and cost England 30,000 troops, which could not be replaced in that generation.

* * * * *

Gustavus Adolphus invaded Germany with an army of 27,000 men, over one-half of whom were Scots and English. At that time the Catholic armies in the field aggregated several hundred thousand trained and hardened soldiers, led by brave and able generals.

At Leipsic, after 20,000 Saxon allies had fled from the battlefield, Gustavus Adolphus with 22,000 Swedes, Scots and English routed 44,000 of the best troops of the day, commanded by Gen. Tilly. This victory delivered the Protestant princes of Continental Europe from Catholic domination.

* * * * *

At Zentha (Sept. 11, 1697), Prince Eugene with 60,000 Austrians routed 150,000 Turks, commanded by the Sultan Kara-Mustapha, with the loss of 38,000 killed, 4,000 prisoners and 160 cannon. This victory established the military reputation of this celebrated French General.

* * * * *

At Turin (Sept. 7, 1706) Prince Eugene with 30,000 Austrians routed 80,000 French under the Duke of Orleans. Gen. Daun, whose brilliant evolutions decided the battle, afterward, as Field-Marshal of the Austrian armies, was routed by Frederic the Great at Leuthern.

* * * * *

At Peterwaradin (Aug. 5, 1716) Prince Eugene with 60,000 Austrians destroyed 150,000 Turks. This victory delivered Europe for all time from the menace of Mahometan dominion.

* * * * *

At Belgrade (Aug. 26, 1717) Prince Eugene with 55,000 Austrians destroyed a Turkish army of 200,000 men.

* * * * *

At Rosbach (Nov. 5, 1757) Frederic the Great with 22,000 Prussians, in open field, destroyed a French army of 70,000 regulars commanded by the Prince de Soubisse.

* * * * *

At Leuthern (Dec. 5, 1757) Frederic the Great with 33,000 Prussians destroyed in open field, an Austrian army of 93,000 regulars, commanded by Field-Marshal Daun. The Austrians lost 54,000 men and 200 cannon.

* * * * *

At Zorndorf (Aug. 25, 1758) Frederic the Great with 45,000 Prussians destroyed a Russian army of 60,000 men commanded by Field-Marshal Fermor. The Russians left 18,000 men dead on the field.

* * * * *

At Leignitz (Aug. 15, 1760) Frederic the Great with 30,000 men out-manoeuvred, defeated with the loss of 10,000 men and escaped from the combined Austrian and Russian armies aggregating 130,000 men.

* * * * *

At Torgau (Nov. 5, 1760) Frederic the Great with 45,000 Prussians destroyed an Austrian army of 90,000 men, commanded by Field-Marshal Daun.

* * * * *

Washington, with 7,000 Americans, while pursued by 20,000 British and Hessians under Lord Cornwallis, captured a Hessian advance column at Trenton (Dec. 25, 1776) and destroyed a British detachment at Princeton, (Jan. 3, 1777).

* * * * *

Bonaparte, with 30,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry and 40 cannon, invaded Italy, (March 26, 1796) which was defended by 100,000 Piedmontese and Austrian regulars under Generals Colli and Beaulieu. In fifteen days he had captured the former, driven the latter to his own country and compelled Piedmont to sign a treaty of peace and alliance with France.

At Castiglione, Arcole, Bassano and Rivoli, with an army not exceeding 40,000 men Bonaparte destroyed four Austrian armies, each aggregating about 100,000 men.

* * * * *

At Wagram, Napoleon, with less than 100,000 men, overthrew the main Austrian army of 150,000 men, foiled the attempts at succor of the secondary Austrian army of 40,000 men, and compelled Austria to accept peace with France.

In the campaign of 1814, Napoleon, with never more than 70,000 men, twice repulsed from the walls of Paris and drove backward nearly to the Rhine River an allied army of nearly 300,000 Austrians, Prussians and Russians.

* * * * *

In the year 480 B.C., Xerxes, King of Persia, invaded Greece with an army, which by Herodotus, Plutarch and Isocrates, is estimated at 2,641,610 men at arms and exclusive of servants, butlers, women and camp followers.

Arriving at the Pass of Thermopolae, the march of the invaders was arrested by Leonidas, King of Sparta, with an army made up of 300 Spartans, 400 Thebans, 700 Thespians, 1,000 Phocians and 3,000 from various Grecian States, posted behind a barricade built across the entrance.

This celebrated defile is about a mile in length. It runs between Mount Oeta and an impassible morass, which forms the edge of the Gulf of Malia and at each end is so narrow that a wagon can barely pass.

Xerxes at once sent a herald who demanded of the Grecians the surrender of their arms, to which Leonidas replied:

“_Come and take them._”

On the fifth day the Persian army attacked, but was unable to force an entrance into the pass. On the sixth day the Persian Immortals likewise were repulsed, and on the seventh day these troops again failed.

That night Ephialtes, a Malian, informed Xerxes of a foot path around the mountains to the westward, and a Persian detachment was sent by a night march en surprise against the Grecian rear. On the approach of this hostile body, the Phocians, who had been detailed by Leonidas to guard this path, abandoned their post without fighting and fled to the summit of the mountains, leaving the way open to the enemy, who, wasting no time in pursuit, at once marched against the rear of the Grecian position.

At the command of Leonidas, all his allies, with the exception of the 700 Thespians, who refused to leave him, abandoned Thermopolae in haste and returned safely to their own countries.

Xerxes waited until day was well advanced and his detachment had taken post upon the Grecian rear. Then both Persian columns attacked simultaneously. The first part of this final conflict was fought outside and to the north of the barricade. Leonidas being slain and their numbers reduced over half, the remaining Greeks retired behind the barricade and took post upon a slight elevation, where one after another they were killed by arrows and javelins. The four days of fighting cost the Persians over 20,000 of their best troops.

Upon the summit of the hill where the Spartans perished a marble lion was erected, bearing the inscription:

“Go tell the Lacedymonians, O, Stranger,
That we died here in obedience to the law.”

A second inscription engraved upon a stone column erected upon the scene of conflict read:

“Upon this spot four thousand Pelleponesians contended against
three hundred myriads.”

* * * * *

The largest army commanded by Epaminondas was about 70,000 men. Alexander the Great, after Arbela, had 135,000 trained troops. Hannibal never led more than 60,000 men in action, nor Caesar more than 80,000. Gustavus Adolphus, just before Lutzen, marshalled 75,000 of the best soldiers in the world under the banners of Protestantism. Turenne never fought with more than 40,000 troops; Prince Eugene often had 150,000 in hand, and Frederic the Great several times commanded 200,000 men. At Yorktown, Washington had 16,000 Continentals, 6,000 French regulars and 18,000 Provincial volunteers: Napoleon’s largest army, that of the Austerlitz campaign, consisted of 180,000 men, while von Moltke personally directed at Sadowa, 250,000 men; at Gravelotte, 211,000 men and at Sedan, 200,000 men.

* * * * *

_Perfection in Numbers is attained whenever the kindred army has the most troops in the theatre of decisive action._

TIME

_“You lose the time for action in frivolous deliberations. Your
generals instead of appearing at the head of your armies, parade
in processions and add splendor to public ceremonies. Your armies
are composed of mercenaries, the dregs of foreign nations, vile
robbers, a terror only to yourselves and your allies. Indecision
and confusion prevail in your counsels; your projects have
neither plan nor foresight. You are the slaves of circumstance
and opportunities continually escape you. You hurry aimlessly
hither and thither and arrive only in time to witness the success
of your enemy.”--Demosthenes._

TIME

_“That greatest of all advantages--TIME!”--Frederic the Great._

* * * * *

_“Ask me for anything except--TIME.”--Napoleon._

* * * * *

_“Time is the cradle of hope, the grave of ambition, the solitary
counsel of the wise and the stern corrector of fools. Wisdom
walks before it, opportunities with it and repentance behind it.
He that hath made it his friend hath nothing to fear from his
enemies, but he that hath made it his enemy hath little to hope
even from his friends.”--Anon._

_The absolute advantage of Time consists in being able to move while the adversary must remain stationary._

_The conditioned advantage in Time i.e., the Initiative, consists in artificially restricting the adverse ability to move._

Advantage in Time is divided into two classes:

I. The Initiative.

II. Absolute.

The Initiative treats of restrictions to the movements of an army, due to the necessity of supporting, covering or sustaining Points or corps d’armee, menaced with capture by adverse corps offensive.

The absolute advantage in Time is the ability to move, while the adverse army must remain immovable.

Whenever the right to move is unrestricted, any desired Piece may be moved to any desired Point.

But whenever the right to move is restricted it follows that the Piece desired cannot be moved; or, that if moved it cannot be moved to the desired Point; or, that a piece not desired, must be moved and usually to a Point not desired.

Such restrictions of the right to move, quickly produce fatal defects in the kindred Formation; and from the fact that such fatal defects in Formation can be produced by restricting the right to move, arises the inestimable value of the advantage in Time.

Perfection in Time is attained whenever the kindred army is able to move while the hostile army must remain stationary.

The object of the active or absolute advantage in Time always is to remain with the Initiative, or Passive Advantage in Time; which consists in operating by the movement made, such menaces, as compel the enemy:

1. To move corps d’armee which he otherwise would not move and

2. Prevents him from moving corps d’armee which he otherwise would move.

PRINCIPLE

_Given superior brute strength and no matter how blunderingly and clumsily it be directed, it always will end by accomplishing its purpose, unless it is opposed by Skill._

Skill is best manifested by the proper use of Time. Such ability is acquired only through study and experience, guided by reflection, and it can be retained only by systematic and unremitting practice.

Most people imagine that Skill is to be attained merely from study; many believe it but the natural and necessary offshoot of long experience; and there are some of the opinion that dilettante dabbling in book lore is an all-sufficient substitute for that sustained and laborious mental and physical effort, which alone can make perfect in the competitive arts.

Only by employing his leisure in reflection upon the events of the Past can one get to understand those things which make for success in Warfare and in Chessplay, and develop that all-essential ability to detect equivalents in any situation.

For in action there is no time for such reflection, much less for development.

Then, moments of value inestimable for the achieving of results are not to be wasted in the weighing and comparison of things, whose relative importance should be discerned in the twinkling of an eye, by reason of prior familiarity with similar conditions.

The relative advantage in time possessed by one army over an opposing army always can be determined by the following, viz.:

RULE

1. _That army which is in motion while the opposing army must remain stationary has the absolute advantage in Time._

2. _That army which although at rest can dictate the movement of an opposing army in motion has the conditioned advantage in Time, i.e., the Initiative._

* * * * *

_“One may lose more by letting slip a decisive opportunity than afterwards can be gained by ten battles.”--Gustavus Adolphus._

_“It is the exact moment that must be seized; one minute too soon or too late and the movement is utterly futile.”--Napoleon._

MILITARY EXAMPLES

_“The movements of an army should be characterized by decision
and rapidity.”--Hannibal._

* * * * *

_“In order to escape from a dilemma it first of all is necessary
to gain Time.”--Napoleon._

Thebes having revolted, Alexander the Great marched 400 miles in fourteen days; attacked and captured the city and razed it to the ground (335 B.C.) sparing only the house and family of Pindar, the poet; massacred all males capable of bearing arms and sold 30,000 women and children into slavery.

* * * * *

To gain time to occupy the Strategic center and to cut the communications with Rome of the army of the Consul Flaminius, Hannibal marched his army for three days and nights through the marshes of the Po.

* * * * *

Caesar marched from Rome to Sierra-Modena in Spain, a distance of 1350 miles in twenty-three days.

* * * * *

Frederic the Great in order to gain time usually marched at midnight.

* * * * *

Bonaparte finished his first Italian campaign by winning the battles of St. Michaels, Rivoli and Mantua, marching 200 miles and taking 20,000 prisoners, all in less than four days. In 1805, the French infantry in the manoeuvres which captured 60,000 Austrians, marched from 25 to 30 miles a day. In 1806 the French infantry pursued the Prussians at the same speed. In 1814, Napoleon’s army marched at the rate of 30 miles per day, besides fighting a battle every 24 hours. Retrograding for the succor of Paris, Napoleon marched 75 miles in thirty-six hours. On the return from Elba, 1815, the Imperial Guard marched 50 miles the first day, 200 miles in six days and reached Paris, a distance of 600 miles, in twenty days.

* * * * *

_“The fate of a battle always is decided by the lack of the few minutes required to bring separated bodies of troops into co-operation.”--Napoleon._

POSITION

_“War is a business of position.”--Napoleon._

By the term Position is signified those relative advantages and disadvantages in location, which appertain to the aggregate posts occupied by the kindred army, as compared with the aggregate posts occupied by the adverse army.

Advantages and disadvantages in Position are of three classes, viz.:

(a) Those which appertain to the Column of Attack

(b) Those which appertain to the Column of Support.

STRATEGETIC SITUATIONS

A Strategic Situation, and whether in warfare or in Chess-play, is produced by the presence, in any Strategetic Plane, _i.e._, theatre of conflict, of two or more opposing Strategetic Entireties, _i.e._, contending armies.

These latter are of four classifications and are denominated as follows:

(a) The Kindred Determinate Force.

(b) The Adverse Determinate Force.

(d) The Adverse Hypothetical Force.

RULE I

_Given the Strategetic Entireties present in a given Strategetic Situation, designate the opposing Prime Strategetic Factors and express the relative values of each in the terms of the Strategic Syllogism._

THE STRATEGIC SYLLOGISM

Having classified the existing Strategetic Situation, it is necessary next to designate the opposing Columns of Attack, of Support, and of Manoeuvre.

Then, by comparing these Prime Strategetic Factors, to determine the net advantage, disadvantage, or equality that exist between them and to express this condition in the terms of the resulting Strategic Syllogism.

In the construction of a Strategic Syllogism, the Strategic, _i.e._, the positional value of each of the opposing Prime Strategetic Factors contained in a given Strategetic Situation, is expressed in terms made up of letters and symbols, viz.,

A Signifies Column of Attack.
S ” Column of Support.
M ” Column of Manoeuvre.
+ ” Advantage in Position.
- ” Disadvantage in Position.
= ” Equality in Position.

The positional values of the several Prime Strategetic Factors are obtained as follows:

COLUMN OF ATTACK

That Column of Attack which is posted upon the superior Strategic front as compared to the front occupied by the immediately opposing formation (cf, Grand Tactics, pp. 117 to 275), has the advantage in position.

This relative advantage and disadvantage in position of the Column of Attack is expressed by the first term of the Strategic Syllogism, viz.:

(I.)
+A
----
-A

(II.)
-A
-----
+A

In the first instance (I), the White Column of Attack has the advantage and the Black formation has the disadvantage; in the second case (II), this condition is reversed.

COLUMN OF SUPPORT

A Column of Support has the superiority in position, as compared with the adverse Column of Support, whenever it contains more than the latter of the following advantages, viz.:

I. One, or more, Passed Pawns.

II. Two united Pawns, overlapping an adverse Pawn.

III. Two isolated Pawns adjacent to a single adverse Pawn.

IV. Three, or more, united Pawns at their fifth squares, opposed
by a like number of adverse Pawns posted on their Normal Base
Line.

V. A majority of kindred Pawns on that side of the Board farthest
from the adverse King.

The relative advantage and disadvantage of one Column of Support, over the opposing Column of Support, is expressed by the second term of the Strategic Syllogism, thus:

(I.)
+S
----
-S

(II.)
-S
-----
+S

In the first case (I), White has the advantage and Black has the disadvantage. In the second case (II), this condition is reversed.

COLUMN OF MANOEUVRE

Columns of Manoeuvre are not compared with each other. The advantage of one over another is determined by comparing their respective powers of resistance to the attack of the corresponding adverse Columns of Support.

That Column of Manoeuvre which longest can debar the adverse promotable Factors from occupying a point of junction on the kindred Strategetic Rear, has the advantage.

The relative advantage and disadvantage of the column of Manoeuvre is expressed by the third term of the Strategic Syllogism, viz.:

(I.)
+M
----
-M

(II.)
-M
-----
+M

In the first case (I), White, has the advantage and Black the disadvantage. In the second case (II), this condition is reversed.

In recording the values of the opposing Prime Strategetic Factors, the terms relating to White are written above and those relating to Black, below the line.

The terms expressing the relative values of the Columns of Attack always are placed at the left; those for the Columns of Support in the center, and those for the Columns of Manoeuvre at the right.

The Strategic Syllogisms are twenty-seven in number and are formulated, viz.:

TABLE OF STRATEGIC SYLLOGISMS

No. 1. +A+S+M
------
-A-S-M

No. 2. +A+S=M
------
-A-S=M

No. 3. +A+S-M
------
-A-S+M

No. 4. +A=S+M
------
-A=S-M

No. 5. +A=S=M
------
-A=S=M

No. 6. +A=S-M
------
-A=S+M

No. 7. +A-S+M
------
-A+S-M

No. 8. +A-S=M
------
-A+S=M

No. 9. +A-S-M
------
-A+S+M

No. 10. =A+S+M
------
=A-S-M

No. 11. =A+S=M
------
=A-S=M

No. 12. =A+S-M
------
=A-S+M

No. 13. =A=S+M
------
=A=S-M

No. 14. =A=S=M
------
=A=S=M

No. 15. =A=S-M
------
=A=S+M

No. 16. =A-S+M
------
=A+S-M

No. 17. =A-S=M
------
=A+S=M

No. 18. =A-S-M
------
=A+S+M

No. 19. -A+S+M
------
+A-S-M

No. 20. -A+S=M
------
+A-S=M

No. 21. -A+S-M
------
+A-S+M

No. 22. -A=S+M
------
+A=S-M

No. 23. -A=S=M
------
+A=S=M

No. 24. -A=S-M
------
+A=S+M

No. 25. -A-S+M
------
+A+S-M

No. 26. -A-S=M
------
+A+S=M

No. 27. -A-S-M
------
+A+S+M

_STRATEGIC ELEMENTALS._

_Each of the terms contained in the Strategic Syllogism should have its counterpart in a tangible and competent mass of troops._

This principle of Strategetics, when applied to warfare, is absolute, and admits of no exception. The catastrophies sustained by the French armies in the campaigns of 1812, 1813, 1814 and 1815 are each and every one directly due to the persistent violation by Napoleon of this basic truth, in devolving the duties of a column of support and a column of manoeuvre upon a single Strategic Elemental.

In solemn contrast to that fatal and indefensible rashness which cost Napoleon five great armies and ultimately his crown, is the dictum by one whose transcendent success in warfare, is the antithesis of the utter ruination which terminated the career of the famous Corsican.

Says Frederic the Great:

“_I adhere to those universal laws which all the elements obey;
these, for me are sufficient._”

Singularly enough, it seemingly has escaped the notice of the great in warfare, owing to the subtle mathematical construction of the Chess-board, its peculiar relations to the moves of the Chess-pieces, and of the latter to each other, that:

PRINCIPLE

I. _The functions of all three terms contained in a Strategic Syllogism may be combined in a single chess Pawn, and, that:_

II. _All three functions are contemplated in and should be expressed by every movement of every Chess-piece; and every move upon the Chess-board is weak and unscientific, to the extent that it disregards either of these obligations._

* * * * *

Those advantages in position, which are denoted by the plus signs of the Strategic Syllogism, have their material manifestation upon the surface of the earth by Corps d’armee, and by Pieces which are equivalents of these latter, upon the Chess-board.

The _sign +A in the Strategic Syllogism_ denotes the superior Strategic Front. That point whose occupation by a kindred piece demonstrates such superiority in position is termed the _Key of Position_. The kindred Corps occupying such point constitutes a _Corps en Line_, and is termed the _First Strategic Elemental_.

The _sign +S in the Strategic Syllogism_ denotes the _larger number_ of pawn altitudes open to the kindred promotable factors. Those points occupied by such kindred promotable factors are termed _Logistic Origins_. The kindred Corps which occupy such points constitute _Corps en Route_ and collectively are termed the _Second Strategic Elemental_. The objective of Corps en Route always is the Kindred Logistic Horizon.

The _sign +M in the Strategic Syllogism_ denotes that the _shortest_ open pawn altitude is occupied by a kindred promotable factor. Such kindred promotable factor is termed the _Corps en Touch_, and the point occupied by such Corps is termed the _Point of Proximity_. The Objective of such Corps always is a designated Point of Junction in the Kindred Logistic Horizon, and such Corps constitutes the _Third Strategic Elemental_.

In Warfare it is imperative that each of these Strategic Elementals be represented by one or more Corps d’armee. But it is a second peculiarity of the Chessic mechanism that a single Chessic Corps d’armee may represent in itself, one, two or three Strategic Elementals and thus constitute even the entire _Strategic Ensemble_.

Hence, in Chess play, the Strategic Ensemble may be either single, double, or triple, viz.:

A Single Strategic Ensemble consists either of:

(a) 1. Major Vertex.

2. Grand Vertex.

(b) Logistic Origin.

A _Double Strategic Ensemble_ consists of either:

(a) 1. Major Vertex, plus a Kindred Logistic Origin.

2. Grand Vertex, plus a Kindred Logistic Origin.

(b) 1. Major Vertex, plus a Kindred Point of Proximity.

2. Grand Vertex, plus a Kindred Point of Proximity.

A _Triple Strategic Ensemble_ consists of:

1. Major Vertex, plus a Kindred Logistic Origin, plus a Kindred
Point of Proximity.

2. Grand Vertex, plus a Kindred Point of Proximity, plus a
Kindred Logistic Origin.

PRINCIPLE

_The relative positional advantage expressed by the plus signs of the Strategic Syllogism decreases as the number of plus signs in the Strategic Syllogism exceeds the number of corresponding Strategic Elementals._

Failure to observe the amalgamation of the duties of the three Grand Columns in each and every move upon the Chess-board, and to note that the tangible and material expression of these powers and advantages may be expressed either by three, by two, or even by a single Chessic Corps d’armee, has caused doubt of the exact analogy between Chess and War; and hence a like doubt of the utility of Chess-play.

Recognizing the truth of the foregoing, the Asiatic conqueror, Tamerlane, sought to rectify this discrepancy between the mechanism of Chess and that of War, by increasing the size of the Chess-board to one hundred and forty-four squares, and the number of pieces to forty-eight.

By this innovation the geometric harmony existing between the Dynamic and the Static surfaces of the Chess-board was destroyed; and this without substituting therefor another like condition of mathematic perfection. Ultimately, this remedy was abandoned, a fate which sooner or later, has overtaken all attempts to improve that superlative intellectual exercise of which says Voltaire:

“Of all games, Chess does most honor to the human mind.”

The reason why the scheme devised by Tamerlane did not satisfy even himself, and why all attempted alterations in the machinery of Chess prove unacceptable in practice, is due to the present perfect adaptation of the Board and the Pieces for exemplifying the processes of Strategetic Art.

Any change in the construction of the Chess-board and the Chess-pieces, to be effective, must largely increase the number of Chessmen, correspondingly increase the number of squares, and equally so, increase the number of moves permitted to each player at his turn to play.

That is to say: Such innovation to be correct must permit each player at his turn to play to move one of the Corps d’armee contained in the Column of Attack, a second in the Column of Support, and a third in the Column of Manoeuvre. Necessarily, the number of pieces must be increased in order to provide Corps d’armee for the make-up of each Grand Column, and obviously, the Board must be sufficiently enlarged to accommodate not merely this increased mass, but also to permit full scope for the increased number of possible movements.

_The student thus readily will perceive, that it is only one step
from such an elaboration of Chess, to an army and the theatre of
actual campaigning._

* * * * *

Perfection in Position is attained whenever the kindred army is acting or is posted as a unit, while the hostile army is not so posted nor able so to act.

MILITARY EXAMPLES

COLUMN OF ATTACK

_“Frontal attacks are to be avoided, and the preference always is
to be given to the assault of a single wing, with your center and
remaining wing held back; because if your attack is successful
you equally destroy the enemy without the risk of being routed if
you fail.”--Frederic the Great._

At Leuctra and Mantinea, Epaminondas won by the oblique or Strategic order of battle. Alexander the Great won by the same order at Issus and the Haspades. Cyrus won at Thymbra and Hannibal won at Trebia, Thrasymene, Cannae and Herdonea, by the three sides of an octagon or enveloping formation. Caesar won by the oblique order at Pharsaleus.

* * * * *

Gustavus Adolphus won at Leipsic by acting from the Tactical Center and Turenne and Prince Eugene gained their victories by the same means.

* * * * *

Frederic the Great won at Hohenfriedberg, Sohr, Rosbach, Leuthern, Zorndorf and Leignitz by the oblique order and at Torgau by acting from the tactical center.

* * * * *

Washington won at Trenton and Princeton acting by three contiguous sides of an octagon.

Bonaparte won at Montenotte, Castiglione, Arcola, Rivoli, Ulm, Austerlitz, Jena, Friedland, Wagram and Ligny, by acting from the tactical center. Never did he attack by the oblique order of battle.

* * * * *

Von Moltke’s victories all were won by acting in strict accord with the system laid down for the use of the Prussian army by Frederic the Great.

COLUMN OF SUPPORT

The most magnificent illustration both of the proper and of the improper use of the Column of Support is found in that Grand Operation executed by the Roman consuls, Claudius Nero and Marcus Livius, whereby the Carthagenian Army under Hasdrubal was destroyed at the river Metaurus 207 B.C.

Hannibal, with the main Carthagenian army, posted in the south of Italy near Canusium, was observed by Nero and his troops; while in the west, Hasdrubal, observed by Livius was slowly advancing southward to form a junction with his brother, a most unscientific procedure.

Livius permitted Hasdrubal to penetrate into Italy to a point a few miles south of the Metaurus River; whereupon Nero, taking 7,000 of his best troops, by a rapid march of 200 miles united with Livius; and the two consuls at once falling upon Hasdrubal utterly annihilated the Carthagenian army. Nero returned at all speed and the first news of his march and of the death blow to the Carthagenian projects against Rome was furnished by the sight of his brother’s head, which Nero cast into Hannibal’s camp from a military machine.

The true method for uniting the Columns of Support to a Column of Attack is thus shown by Gustavus Adolphus:

“We encamped about Nuremberg the middle of June, the army after
so many detachments was not above 11,000 infantry and 8,000 horse
and dragoons. The King posted his army in the suburbs and drew
intrenchments around the circumference so that he begirt the
whole city with his army. His works were large, the ditch deep,
planked by innumerable bastions, ravelins, horn-works, forts,
redoubts, batteries and palisades, the incessant labor of 8000
men for fourteen days.

“On the 30th of June the Imperialists, joined to the Bavarian
army arrived and sat down 60,000 strong, between the city and the
friendly states; in order to intercept the King’s provisions and
to starve him out.

“The King had three great detachments and several smaller ones,
acting abroad, reducing to his power the castles and towns of the
adjacent countries and these he did not hasten to join him until
their work was done.

“The two chief armies had now lain for five or six weeks in
sight of each other and the King thinking all was ready, ordered
his generals to join him. Gustavus Horn was on the Moselle,
Chancellor Oxenstern about Mentz and Cologne and Dukes William
and Bernard and Gen. Bannia in Bavaria.

“Our friends were not backward in obeying the King’s command, and
having drawn together their forces from various parts and _ALL_
joined the chancellor Oxenstern, they set out in full march for
Nuremburg, where they arrived Aug. 21, being 30,000 old soldiers
commanded by officers of the greatest conduct and experience in
the world.”

* * * * *

Only once, at the battle of Torgau, (Nov. 5, 1760) did Frederick the Great rely upon the co-operation of his Columns of Support for victory.

As the result, his Column of Attack of 25,000 men fought the entire battle and was so ruined by the fire and sabres of 90,000 enemies and 400 pieces of artillery that, as the sun went down the King charged at the head of two battalions, his sole remaining troops. At this moment Gen. Zeithen, with the Column of Support, of 22,000 men occupied Siptka Hill, the tactical key of the battlefield, and fired a salvo of artillery to inform the King of their presence. The astonished Austrians turned and fled; the King’s charge broke their line of battle and Frederic grasped a victory, “for which” says Napoleon, “he was indebted to Fortune and the only one in which he displayed no talent.”

This comment of course is not true. Frederic displayed magnificent talent that day, by holding in check a force of thrice his numbers and so shattering it by his incessant attacks that it crumbled to pieces before the mere presence and at sight of his fresh and vigorous Column of Support. Had Napoleon displayed such talent in the personal conduct of battles during 1813, 1814 and 1815 it is possible that he would have terminated his career at some other place than at St. Helena.

The experience, however, was enough to fully satisfy Frederic, and never again did he attempt a Logistic battle.

* * * * *

The capture of Lord Cornwallis at Yorktown is perhaps the nearest approach to the achievement of Nero and Livius in the annals of the military art. Decoyed by the retrograde movements of Gen. Greene, the British army was deluded into taking up a position at Yorktown, having the unfordable James River in rear, and within striking distance of the main American army under Washington about New York City.

Lafayette was ordered to reinforce Greene; Count d’Esting was induced to bring the French fleet from the West Indies to Chesapeake Bay to prevent the rescue of Cornwallis by British coming by the ocean, and Count Rochambeau was requested to join Washington with the French army then in Rhode Island.

All this took time, but everything was executed like clockwork. The French fleet arrived in the Chesapeake; the next day came a British fleet to rescue the Earl’s army. In the naval fight which ensued, the British were driven to sea and so damaged as to compel their return to New York. By a swift march, Washington, with his Continentals and the French, joined Greene and Lafayette, and two of his redoubts being taken by storm, Lord Cornwallis surrendered. This victory established the independence of the American Colonies.

* * * * *

The Logistic Battle, _i.e._, the combination of the Columns of Attack and of Support was first favorite with Napoleon and to his partiality for this particular form of the tactical offensive was due both the spectacular successes and the annihilating catastrophes which mark his astonishing career.

The retrieving of his lost battle of Marengo, by the fortuitous arrival of Dessaix column, seems to have impressed Napoleon to the extent that he ever after preferred to win by such process, rather than by any other.

The first attempt to put his new hypothesis into practice was at Jena. Single handed his column of attack destroyed the Prussian main body, while Davoust with the column of manoeuvre held in check over three times his numbers.

The French Column of Support under Bernadotte did not arrive in season to fire a shot.

* * * * *

At Eylau, the French Column of Support under Davoust was four hours in advancing six miles against the opposition of the Russian general Doctoroff. The second French Column of Support under Ney did not reach the field until the battle was over.

* * * * *

In the retreat from Russia, the French Column of Support under the Duke of Belluno was driven from its position at Smolensko, thus permitting the Russians under Kutosof to occupy the Strategic center, which disaster cost Napoleon 30,000 men in clearing his communications.

* * * * *

In 1813, the Column of Support under Ney at Bautzen was misdirected and the battle rendered indecisive by its lack of co-operation with the French Column of Attack.

* * * * *

In 1814, Napoleon conformed to the Art by acting in three columns, but yielding to his besetting military sin, he joined his Column of Support to his Column of Attack and through the open space thus created in the French Strategetic Front, Blucher advanced triumphantly to Paris.

* * * * *

In the Waterloo campaign, Napoleon properly began with three Grand Columns. At the battle of Ligny, his Column of Support arrived upon Blucher’s left flank and then without firing a shot, wheeled about and marched away.

At Waterloo, by uniting his Columns of Attack and of Support prematurely, Napoleon permitted Blucher to penetrate the French Strategetic Front and to win in the same manner and as decisively as he did at Paris.

* * * * *

Von Moltke won the battle of Sadowa by the arrival of the Prussian Column of Support, commanded by Prince Frederic William. But in the interim, the German main army was driven in several miles by the Austrians, and Prince Bismark’s first white hairs date from that day.

COLUMN OF MANOEUVRE

_“A small body of brave and expert men, skillfully handled and
favored by the ground, easily may render difficult the advance of
a large army.”--Frederic the Great._

At the river Metaurus, the Roman Consul Livius gave a fine example of the duties of a Column of Manoeuvre which are slowly and securely to retreat before an advancing enemy and never to be induced into a pitched battle until the arrival of the kindred main body.

* * * * *

Frederic the Great made great use of Columns of Manoeuvre. In the Seven Years War he constantly maintained such a column against the armies of each State with whom Prussia was at war; while himself and his brother Henry operated as Columns of Attack.

* * * * *

In the Revolutionary War, Washington maintained a Column of Manoeuvre against the British in Rhode Island, another against the British in the south and a third against the hostile Indian tribes of the southwest.

* * * * *

Napoleon constantly used Columns of Manoeuvre in all his campaigns; notably at Montenotte, Castiglione, Arcole, Rivoli, Ulm, Austerlitz, Jena, in 1812, 1813, 1814 and at Ligny and Waterloo in 1815.

PRIME STRATEGETIC MEANS

_“It is necessary exactly to weigh the means we possess in
opposition to the enemy in order to determine beforehand which
must ultimately predominated.”--Frederic the Great._

_Those elemental quantities whose comparative values are determined by Grand Reconnaissance and which are termed: Organization, Topography, Mobility, Numbers, Time, and Position, collectively constitute Prime Strategetic Means whose proper employment is the basis of every true Prime Strategetic Process._

POLICY OF CAMPAIGN

That relative advantage in Numbers expressed by the larger aggregate of Chess-pieces is materially manifested upon the Chess-board by additional geometric and sub-geometric symbols.

Excess or deficiency in Numbers determines the policy of Campaign. The policy of the inferior force is:

1. To preserve intact its Corps d’armee, and

2. To engage in battle only when victory can be assured by other
advantages in Strategetic means, which nullify the adverse
advantage in Numbers; and even then only when such victory is
decisive of the Campaign.

Hence, the policy of Campaign of that army superior in Numbers, is:

Incessantly to proffer battles which:

(a) Accepted, constantly reduces the inferior army and increases
its disproportion in numbers, or,

(b) Evaded, compels the inferior army to abandon important posts,
for whose defence it cannot afford the resulting loss of troops;
thus permitting to the numerically superior army a continually
increasing advantage in Position.

PRINCIPLE

_All else being equal the advantage of Numbers is decisive of victory in battle and Campaign._

_Things being unequal, the advantage in Numbers may be nullified by adverse advantages in Organization, Topography, Mobility, Time and Position._

_Victory resulting from advantage in Numbers is achieved by simultaneously attacking two or more Tactical Keys from a Kindred Strategic Key and two or more Kindred Points of Command._

TO LOCATE THE AREA OF CONCENTRATION

That _relative advantage in Mobility_ expressed by the situation of the Strategic Front upon the Strategetic Center is materially manifested upon the Chess-board by Kindred Chess-pieces posted upon that great central diagonal which extends towards the Objective Plane. Such advantage determines those points which should be occupied in the proper development of the front so posted; and consequently designates the direction and location of that battlefield upon which the kindred army may concentrate in overwhelming force, despite all possible resistance by the enemy.

MOST FAVORABLE BATTLEFIELD

That _relative advantage in Organization_ expressed by superior potential totality, is materially manifested upon the Chess-board by the geometric and sub-geometric symbols of those Chess-pieces possessed of the superior potential complement. Such symbols taken in combination, describe that field of battle most favorable for the execution of those Major Tactical evolutions which appertain to the Chess-pieces of superior organization.

POSTS OF MAXIMUM SECURITY

That _relative defensive advantage in Topography_ expressed by inaccessibility to hostile attack is materially manifested upon the Chess-board by Corps of Position, posted upon points of different color to that occupied by the adverse Bishop; and this advantage designates those posts situated on a projected field of battle which may be occupied with the maximum of security.

That _relative offensive advantage in Topography_ expressed by accessibility to kindred attack is materially manifested upon the Chess-board by Corps of Position posted upon points of the same color as that occupied by the kindred Bishop; and this advantage designates those posts situated on a projected field of battle which may be attacked with the maximum facility.

CHARACTER OF THE MOST FAVORABLE BATTLE

That _relative advantage in Position with the Column of Attack_, expressed:

1. By superior location, direction and development of the Kindred
Strategic Front of Operations; and

2. By the occupation of Points of Departure, of Manoeuvre, of
Command and of the Strategic Key of a True Strategic Horizon,
indicates that a Strategic Grand Battle in the first instance;
and in the second case that a Tactical Grand Battle is most
favorable in the existing situation.

That _relative advantage in Position with the Column of Support_, expressed by superior facilities for occupying with the Kindred Promotable Factors their corresponding Points of Junction in the Kindred Logistic Horizon, is materially manifested upon the Chess-board by the larger number of Pawn Altitudes which either are open, or may be opened, despite all possible resistance by the enemy; and such advantage designates those adverse Points of Impenetrability and Points of Resistance to the march of the Kindred Promotable Factors, which it is necessary to nullify.

That _relative advantage in Position with the Column of Manoeuvre_, expressed by the security of the Kindred and the exposure of the adverse Strategetic Rear to attack by the Kindred Column of Support, is materially manifested upon the Chess-board by the occupation by a Kindred Promotable Factor of the Point of Proximity; and such advantage indicates that the advance with all possible celerity of such Promotable Factor and Point of Proximity toward the corresponding Point of Junction is a dominating influence in the existing situation.

PROJECTED GRAND BATTLE

From the advantage in Position appertaining to the three Grand Columns is deduced the character of the Grand Battle properly in sequence.

_Advantage in Position with the Column of Attack_ indicates the opportunity, all else being equal, to engage in a victorious Strategic Grand Battle against the hostile Formation in Mass, or in a Tactical Grand Battle against the hostile Formation by Wings.

_Advantage in Position with the Column of Support_ indicates the opportunity to engage effectively in a series of minor battles, as though having the advantage in Numbers.

_Advantage in Position with the Column of Manoeuvre_ indicates the opportunity to engage in a victorious Logistic Grand Battle against the adverse Formation by Grand Columns.

LEAST FAVORABLE ADVERSE CONDITION

That _relative advantage in Time_ expressed by restrictions of the adversary’s choice of movements at his turn to play, is materially manifested upon the Chess-board by Feints operated by Kindred Chess-pieces against adverse vital points; and such advantage of the Initiative dictates the next move of the opposing army.

The _advantage of the Initiative_ determines which of the adverse corps d’armee may and may not move.

The material expression of this advantage always is a Feint by a Kindred Corps against a vital point either occupied or unoccupied, which necessitates that upon his next move, the enemy either evacuate, support, cover or sustain the post so menaced.

Such feint, therefore, restricts the move of the enemy to those of his corps as are able to obviate the threatened loss and proportionately reduces the immediate activity of his army.

RELATIVE ADVANTAGES IN LOCATION

_“It is only the force brought into action that avails in battles
and campaigns--the rest does not count.”--Napoleon._

_The distance which separates opposing Corps d’armee always modifies the values of the Prime Strategetic Means._

Hence in the making of Grand Reconnaissance, it is next in sequence to determine whether the Chess-pieces are:

I. In Contact.

II. In Presence.

III. At Distance.

Corps d’armee are _in Contact_ with each other whenever their logistic radii intersect; or, their radii offensive and the corresponding adverse radii defensive are opposed to each other.

Corps d’armee are _in Presence_ whenever the posts which they occupy are contained within the same Strategic front, the same Strategetic Horizon, or are in communication with their corresponding posts of mobilization, development, or manoeuvre.

Corps d’armee are _at Distance_ when the posts which they occupy are not in communication with Kindred Corps d’armee posted upon the strategic front adopted, or with posts of mobilization or development contained within the corresponding Primary Base of Operations, or, within the True Strategetic Horizon.

REQUISITES FOR SUCCESSFUL CAMPAIGNING

Every Campaign, whether upon the surface of the Earth or upon the Chess-board is decided and usually is terminated by a Grand Battle.

Those movements of opposing Grand Columns, whereby such decisive conflict is brought about under circumstances which ensure victory, by reason of superior advantages in Strategetic Means, are termed Grand Manoeuvres; and a proper series of Grand Manoeuvres, combined with their corresponding feints, strategems, ambuscades and minor battles, the whole terminated by a resulting Grand Battle, is termed a Grand Operation.

Those processes of Grand Manoeuvre, which produce an opportunity to victoriously engage in battle, are the most subtle and difficult known to the Strategetic Art.

_Successful application of these processes in practice depends wholly upon proper use of the MEANS at hand and the doing of the utmost that can be done in the TIME available._

Nothing can be more repugnant to high art in Strategetics than those crudities termed in the specious mouthings of pretentious mediocrity “waiting moves,” “delayed strokes,” “defensive-offensives,” “masterly inactivities,” and the like.

“Time past is gone and cannot be regained; time future is not and may never be; time present is” and with it Opportunity, which an instant later may be gone.

The gain of but “a foot of ground and a minute of time” would have saved the French army at Rosbach and have cost Frederic the Great one of his most lustrous victories and perhaps his army and his crown.

PRINCIPLE

_In Strategetics there is but a single method whereby Opportunity may be availed of, and that is by so augmenting kindred advantages and so depreciating adverse advantages as to acquire for the kindred army that particular advantage of Strategetic means which in the given situation is the proper basis of the Strategetic movement next in sequence._

* * * * *

_At Distance._

_The chief requisite for success when acting against an adverse army at Distance, is the advantage in MOBILITY._

The primary process is that of a Grand Manoeuvre against an adverse army acting in the formation by Grand Columns, and the object of such Grand Manoeuvre always is, by superior celerity of movement, to occupy:

1. The Strategic Center by the Kindred Column of Attack, thus intersecting the Route of Communication between the adverse main body and its Base of Operation; or to occupy:

2. The Logistic Center with the Kindred Columns of Support and of Manoeuvre, thus intersecting the Route of Communication between the adverse main body and its Chief Supporting Column and clearing the way for the advance of the Kindred Column of Support against the flank and rear of the adverse Main Body.

Obviously, the united Kindred Columns of Attack and of Support always will constitute an overwhelming superiority in Numbers as compared with the adverse main body.

_In Presence._

_The chief requisite for success when acting against an adverse Grand Column in Presence, is the advantage in POSITION._

The primary process is that of a Grand Manoeuvre against an adverse army acting in the Formation by Wings, and the object of such Grand Manoeuvre always is, by availing to the uttermost of its situation upon the Tactical Center, _i.e._, upon the area midway between the adverse Wings thus isolated from each other; to act in overwhelming Numbers, first against one and then against the other hostile bodies.

_In Contact._

_The chief requisite for success when acting offensively against an adverse Grand Column, or Wing, or Corps d’armee, in Contact, is the advantage in NUMBERS._

The primary process is that of a Grand Battle in which the kindred army has an overwhelming superiority in Numbers in contact, and at least the equality in all other Prime Strategetic Means.

In this circumstance, the object of such Grand Battle always is:

1. To attack the hostile Formation in Mass frontally at the center, and upon both wings obliquely; all three attacks being made simultaneously and the evolutions so executed that the hostile army never is able to penetrate between either kindred wing and the kindred center, nor to outflank that kindred wing which may be in the air.

2. In case the kindred army has the equality or inferiority in all other Prime Strategetic Means, then the object of a Grand Battle on the Offensive is to attack the hostile Formation in Mass obliquely with the whole kindred army, and preferably upon that wing which covers the route of communication of the adverse army with its Base of Operations, but always upon that wing which contains the Tactical Key of the actual Battlefield.

Obviously, the concentration of the entire kindred army against a single adverse wing always will constitute an overwhelming superiority in Numbers.

In making such attack obliquely against a single adverse wing, the center and remaining wing of the kindred army must not engage until the kindred Van and Corps of Position of the attacking wing first have formed the _center_ of three sides of an octagon; of which the Kindred Corps of Evolution will form the _farthest_ side and the Kindred Center and left wing Corps d’armee will form the _nearest_ and latest constructed side.

* * * * *

_The chief requisite for success when acting defensively against a Grand Column, or Wing, or Corps d’armee is the advantage in TOPOGRAPHY._

The primary process is that of a Grand Battle in which the kindred army, decidedly inferior in Numbers in the aggregate, has the advantage in Topography and equality in all other Prime Strategetic Means.

In this case the object is to support both flanks of the inferior army upon impassable natural barriers, strengthening both wings at the expense of the center, both in quantity and in quality of troops.

If the Tactical Defensive be selected, the center should retire before the oncoming of the hostile army in order to enclose it between the Kindred Wings, which will then overwhelm it by superior Numbers, while the natural barriers on the flanks being impassable will prevent the remaining hostile corps from participating in the battle otherwise than as spectators.

Should the Tactical Offensive be selected, that kindred wing best adapted for attack should engage supported by all kindred Corps of Evolution, while advancing the Kindred Center in reserve and holding the remaining wing refused and in observation.

All else being equal, relative advantage in either branch of Prime Strategetic Means is sufficient to ensure victory in battle, and the proper use of such advantage for securing victory is outlined thus:

PRINCIPLE

_Utilize advantage in Prime Strategetic Means to obtain the superiority in Numbers at the Point of Contact in an Offensive Battle; and to nullify the adverse superiority in Numbers at the point of contact in a Defensive Battle._

* * * * *

Between War and Chess there is a seeming incongruity, which is the basis of that doubt of the utility of Chess-play, so commonly held by laymen, and which fallacy few, even among proficients, are competent to combat.

This doubt most frequently is voiced by the query:

If Chess and War are analagous, why was not Napoleon a Master
Chess-player and Morphy a great military Commander?

This query readily is answered in the words of Frederic the Great, viz.:

“To be possessed of talent is not sufficient. Opportunity to
display such talent and to its full extent is necessary. All
depends on the time in which we live.”

The Strategetic talent possessed in common by Morphy and Napoleon, in both was brought to perfection by long and expert training.

But circumstances placed the twelve year old Napoleon in the midst of soldiers and in an era of war, while circumstances placed the twelve year old Morphy in the midst of Chess-players and in an era of Peace.

Napoleon was educated a General; Morphy was educated a lawyer.

To develop his self-evident and superlative Strategetic talent, Napoleon’s education was of the best; to develop his self-evident and superlative Strategetic talent, Morphy’s education was of the worst.

Napoleon succeeded as a General; Morphy failed as a lawyer.

The innate capability of Napoleon for Strategetics was developed in the direction of Warfare; the innate capability of Morphy for Strategetics was developed in the direction of Chess-play.

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Chess Generalship, Vol. I. Grand ReconnaissanceChapter VI: Preface: VII (4)

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