Chapter VII: Corruption and Notoriety (6)

From this point of view one may undertake an outline of the form of corruption connected with political control. All the preceding forms of political corruption may be considered the obverse, this is the reverse of the die. None of the practices earlier considered can be carried on without danger; the corruption of political control is the crooked means of avoiding the cumulative effects of these practices. It is not popular, it is not good politics even in the narrowest practical acceptance of that term, for a political organisation to grant corrupt favours to business, to wink at the violation of the law by vice, to allow its partisans in office to sell government property cheap and buy government supplies dear. If any of these things are permitted the organisation, like the common criminal, must take care to lay aside “fall money” against a day of trial.

One might feel greater confidence in the restraining influence of party centralisation were it not for the fact that the more dangerous to party success are the forms of corruption which an organisation tolerates the more lucrative they are apt to be. Though its sins be as scarlet still they produce funds sufficient to buy indulgences and to leave a handsome profit over. In connection with business regulation, for example, bribery in any considerable amount is not possible until legislation is enacted or close at hand. And legislation of this kind is not likely to be passed or threatened unless a strong public sentiment demands action. Political manipulation which attempts to frustrate regulation at such a juncture must sooner or later prepare itself to reckon with the public sentiment which it has flouted. Vice cannot be tolerated except in contravention of laws against it, and to do so means to offend the moral sentiment in the community which placed such laws on the statute books. Franchise grabbing is not profitable on a large scale until the experience of earlier public service corporations has impressed upon the public mind the great value of such grants. If, nevertheless, grabs are permitted by the machine, the boodle must be sufficient to pay both for the personal services involved and to repair any resulting damage to party prestige at the next election. Of course many citizens are apathetic with regard to such abuses or even ignorant of their existence, and there are others who are so involved in corrupt practices, particularly in connection with tax dodging, meter fixing, and the protection of vice, that they feel themselves allied in interest with the party organisation and accordingly vote its ticket. Always, however, there is a contingent, and frequently it is large enough to hold the balance of power, which is neither ignorant nor apathetic, and which, although perhaps too quiescent ordinarily, will rise in revolt against any organisation which grafts too boldly and too widely.

The situation of the venal machine is, therefore, substantially this: more money can be obtained at any time if certain practices dangerous from the point of view of party expediency are tolerated. If they are tolerated greater expenditures of money and of other party resources must be made when the final accounting with public sentiment takes place. To put the matter in another way: the forms of political corruption earlier described, _i.e_., corruption in connection with the regulation of business and of vice and corruption in connection with the buying and selling operations of the state, are for the most part sources of income, whereas corruption in the form of political control is mainly expenditure. Under George III., according to Mr. Dorman B. Eaton, a “Patronage Secretary of the Treasury” was appointed

“whose duty it was to stand between members and partisan managers appealing for places for their favourites, on the one side, and the heads of offices who needed to have these places filled with competent persons, on the other side. This Secretary measured the force of threats and took the weight of influence; he computed the political value of a member’s support and deducted from it the official appraisement of patronage before awarded to him. It is said that actual accounts, Dr. and Cr., were kept with members by this Patronage Secretary.”[66]

Whether or not “accounts Dr. and Cr.” are kept by our political organisations, a calculus of essentially the same character must underlie the determination of their policy.

On the spending, or political control, side of their ledgers the various heads are comparatively simple. Office holders must be kept in line, and to this end patronage, promotion, and the control of primaries are important. The direct use of money for bribes may play only a small part in this process; opportunities for auto-corruption may be left open in special cases, but personal and party loyalty and ambition can be relied on to a large extent. Back of the office holders of the hour, however, there are the constantly recurring necessities of election day. Party organisation must be kept up continuously, involving the reward in some way of swarms of assistants and hangers-on who cannot all be remunerated directly at public expense. At times votes must be bought, and repeaters, thugs, and ballot-box stuffers must be paid for their services. A heavy toll is apt to be taken out of the funds used for such purposes by every hand through which they pass on their way down. In addition to the expenditures already noted there are many other occasions, some of them quite legitimate in character, and others unobjectionable or even laudable, for the lavish use of money to secure party success and party control.

The situation which has just been described is so common that the only justification for repeating its description here is the necessity of completing an outline the other parts and interrelations of which are somewhat more obscure. In the gradual awakening of the American people to corrupt conditions existing in their government the first evils clearly seen were the abuses of the patronage and the defilement of the ballot-box. Civil service reform and corrupt practices acts (the latter term seems lamentably narrow in its original usage to the present somewhat more sophisticated generation) were the result. Later the presence of purveyors of vice immediately behind much of the prevailing electoral corruption was clearly discerned, and the battle on that score is still being waged. It is beyond question that our present local option movement is directed against the saloon not so much because it is a place where intoxicating liquor is sold, as because it is a political centre which did not know how to be moderate in its exercise of power during the days of its ascendancy. Still later the more secret relationship between grafting business and political corruption was laid bare. Renewed determination to impose the necessary measures of state regulation and, more specifically, the campaign contribution issue were the results. The problems presented by corrupt practices in connection with political control are still far from adequate solution. Reforms already achieved in the right direction, and still more the determination to press for further reforms, are the most hopeful features of the present situation. In our national government, for example, the civil service movement has reached a gratifyingly high development, but it still needs much extension and strengthening in our states and cities. We have some stringent legislation against ballot-box crimes, but, an election once settled, our tolerance on this subject is amazing and deplorable. Every act which simplifies our governmental machinery, which places responsibility squarely upon a few shoulders and provides means for enforcing it, which shortens our cumbersome ballots, which makes the primary accessible to independent voters, will help in the solution of the problem of honest party control.

Without undertaking a summary of the argument on the various forms of business and political corruption the same point may be made with regard to them that was made with reference to the corruption in the professions, journalism, and the higher education,—namely that the major forms of evil are recognised and savagely criticised. To an even greater extent legislative action has been secured against the primarily political forms of corruption. The fight for the regulation of business is the great unsolved problem of our time, but so far as it is successful we may expect not only more honest business practices but also a favourable reaction upon political life. A great many means may be brought to bear to secure honesty in the buying and selling operations of the state and to prevent the corrupt toleration of vice. Their success will mean that the corrupt political manager will find himself deprived of some of his most lucrative sources of income. A strong impression prevails at the present time that corruption funds in general are much smaller in amount than a few years ago. In part this is perhaps due to a change of heart, in part to the fear, intensified by recent events, of exposure. Perhaps, however, it is still more largely the result of a conviction that the “goods” could not, or would not, in the present state of public opinion, be delivered by the politicians. It is evident that the more successful we are in thus drying up the income sources of venal political organisations the smaller will be the resources available in their hands for the extension and perpetuation of their power of control.

FOOTNOTES:

[53] “Sin and Society,” p. 78.

[54] “Back to Beginnings,” Commencement Address, Oberlin College, June 28, 1905.

[55] “The Nature of Political Corruption,” p. 46, _supra._

[56] Limitation of the scope of this study to the internal forms of corruption makes it impossible to discuss this very interesting topic. It may be noted, however, that in international cases certain peculiarities occur regarding the personal element of corruption. When the military secrets of one government are purchased by another, the faithless official of the former who makes the sale is, of course, corrupt in the highest degree. What shall be said of the nation making the purchase? Personal interest on its side is merged in the collective interest of a commonwealth numbering millions of inhabitants it may be. The case is not entirely unlike those in which group interest rather than self interest impels to corrupt action (see p. 65), except that in the latter the groups are subordinate and not sovereign. If, however, the state which buys the secrets of another government runs counter to international law or morality in so doing, it may be held to be pursuing a relatively narrow interest regardless of the broader interest of humanity as a whole. From this point of view the state which uses money for such ends is guilty of corruption although, of course, it is a highly socialised form of corruption.

[57] “Law and Opinion in England,” p. 216.

[58] _Cf._ H. C. Adams, “Public Debts,” pt. iii, ch. iv, for a very able discussion of the influence of the commercial spirit on public officials.

[59] _Cf._ sec. vii, “Die Organisation als Klassenerhöhungsmaschine,” in Robert Michel’s very thorough and illuminating study of the organisation of the German social-democracy. _Archiv. f. Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik_, Bd. xxiii, Heft 2 (September, 1906).

[60] For an overwhelmingly convincing presentation of materials on this point _cf._ the “Digest of Report by the Bureau of Municipal Research on the Administration of the Water Revenues, Manhattan,”—_Efficient Citizenship Leaflet_, no. 145. Corruption of this sneaking sort resembles tax dodging in that it is so largely indulged in by otherwise respectable people. _Cf._ p. 192.

[61] “Enough Money to Uplift the World,” p. 6, by William H. Allen, Director, Bureau of Municipal Research, reprinted as a pamphlet by the Bureau from the _World’s Work_ of May, 1909.

[62] _Cf._ p. 5, _supra_, for a discussion of the consequences of the corrupt protection of vice and crime.

[63] _Cf_ p. 61, _supra_.

[64] _Cf._ especially No. 3 of the Taxation Series published by the Board, entitled, “Cincinnati an Independent Assessment District,” by Allen Ripley Foote.

[65] The assumption is not extreme. In the pamphlet referred to it is held that by the various means proposed, Cincinnati’s (then) rate of 2.96 per cent. might be reduced to 0.75 per cent. “When the real estate of the state of Kansas was revalued by the Tax Commission,” according to Mr. Foote, “the valuation was increased 484 per cent.” Of course real increase of property values through considerable periods of time accounts in part for such totals whenever assessment periods are a number of years apart.

[66] “Civil Service in Great Britain,” p. 154.

CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS AND THE THEORY OF PARTY SUPPORT

VI

CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS AND THE THEORY OF PARTY SUPPORT

A party, according to Burke, “is a body of men united, for promoting by their joint endeavours the national interest, upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed.”[67] One must admit that the definition is admirable in that it lays emphasis upon the ideal end of party action,—the promotion of the national interest. It is adroit in that it evades the question so constantly thrust upon one in practical politics as to how far the real motive powers of party are class interest and personal greed and ambition. Applied to the simpler conditions of England where the single great object of political strife is the capture of a parliamentary majority, Burke’s definition may be accepted as sufficient even to-day. But it would need considerable amplification before it could be regarded as an adequate description of the vital activities of an American political party.

While the threshing out of reforms proposed in the public interest and their translation into law is with us, as in England, the most important single function of party, still it is but one among a number of functions actually performed. Our adherence to the “check and balance” system involves the possibility of clashes between the legislative, executive, and judicial powers, and these clashes would certainly be both more frequent and more violent were it not for the party control which seeks to maintain harmony among the three great departments of government. The relation between our state and city governments is also such that conflict is chronic except where a party organisation secures concerted action. In the state and city governments themselves administration is so poorly organised that authorities would constantly be falling afoul of each other were it not for the intervention of party managers who realise the necessity of maintaining harmony. Our elections involve a tremendous volume of labour most of which is performed by party workers. Not only legislative, but also frequently executive and judicial candidates must be voted for; national, state, and local offices must be filled. Back of the elections is a complex convention or primary system which must be kept in running order. Referendum and latterly initiative and recall elections require servants and machinery. The ordinary good citizen who experiences a deep feeling of personal satisfaction if he casts his vote, and who until recently considered himself little less than a civic hero if he also attended his primary, seldom has an adequate conception of the enormous volume of detailed work which a popular government such as ours involves. By those persons who are not so fortunately situated the political worker is called upon for all manner of services,—for aid in securing naturalisation papers, for assistance in obtaining employment, for advice in every emergency of life, for charitable relief. No doubt a _quid pro quo_ is exacted in all these cases, but so long as philanthropy fails to provide other and better agencies the social value of such work must be admitted.[68] Considering these various and exacting party activities it is altogether probable, as Professor Henry Jones Ford maintains, that “the machinery of control in American government requires more people to tend and work it than all other political machinery in the rest of the civilised world.”[69]

Under our present system the performance of this tremendous volume of work is essential. In connection with it many grave abuses have developed, but in the final balance there must be some surplus of good over evil. Moreover the division of labour which places the major portion of our political work in the hands of the much maligned politician is at bottom economic. By so doing we enable our “good” citizen to devote a larger share of attention to his business, his family, and the other more immediate affairs of life. No doubt he has taken too great an advantage of this opportunity, and thereby enabled the political class to run things with a high hand. The future of democracy in America will depend largely upon the extent of the activity and intelligence manifested by our citizens. But at the very best the great mass can give only a limited portion of its time to public affairs. Too much politics and too little business, as in South America, is also bad.

So far as can be foreseen at present, therefore, the political worker and party machinery bid fair to remain functional and efficient in America for an indefinite period. Reforms harmonising and simplifying the departments and spheres of government may reduce to some extent the volume of our necessary political work. On the other hand our growth in population and the increase of governmental functions tend constantly to increase it. Whatever the future may bring forth present conditions clearly require the co-operation of strong parties with a complex governmental organisation. “In America,” wrote Mr. Bryce, “the government goes for less than in Europe, the parties count for more. The great moving forces are the parties.” Students of political science generally have recognised that parties constitute an integral and very vital part of our political system. It would perhaps not be putting it too strongly to maintain that our government is divided into what may be called an “official” part, consisting of the legally constituted political structure and actual office holders, and an “unofficial” part, consisting of the party organisations and their workers. As things are now the co-operation of the two is absolutely essential to efficiency. Nothing is so helpless or so certain to disappear promptly from the political arena as an “official” group which has lost the support of its complementary “unofficial” organisation.

Now while the utility and necessity of co-operation between official and unofficial political forces is generally recognised by careful students we have, singularly enough, provided regular and legitimate means of subsistence only for the former, leaving the latter to shift for itself as best it may. Our unofficial political forces, _i.e._, the party organisations and their workers, are, as we have seen, burdened with tasks of enormous magnitude. Under simpler conditions Burke’s “body of men joined together for the purpose of promoting the national interest upon some particular principle” might indeed “by their joint endeavour” alone succeed in performing this work in a patriotic and disinterested spirit. With the growth of American population and the development of our very complex government, however, this became impossible. Steady professional work by a large body of men is demanded under present conditions. Much of this work the politician knows to be necessary and useful even if the full measure of its social utility seldom dawns upon him. Naturally he thinks the labourer worthy of his hire, or, at any rate, he is keenly conscious of his own bread and butter necessities. No regular income being provided for the politician as such, he proceeds to collect it in various ways, some of them perfectly open and even praiseworthy, as in the case of campaign contributions made by disinterested persons, and others distinctly furtive or even corrupt and criminal. Under the old régime if his party was successful at the polls there was, of course, the possibility of a job,—that is of a translation from the unofficial to the official governmental sphere. Even in the hey-day of the spoils system, however, there were never jobs enough to supply the faithful and those who received appointments were consequently “assessed” large sums to pay for the labours of their less fortunate companions in arms. And the politicians of the beaten party went bare although their social service in arousing the people on the issues of the campaign was probably as valuable in proportion to their numbers as that rendered by the workers of the victorious party. Under the circumstances it was inevitable that the party worker in office would pay more attention to the requirements of the machine than to his public duties, and the evils thus occasioned naturally gave rise to civil service reform. Wherever it has been applied the merit system has done much to discourage the collection of party revenues from office holders. As sources of income there remain, however, the manifold possibilities of the sale of political influence ranging all the way from permission to violate a municipal ordinance up to the sale of a franchise or the grant of legislative favours to large private interests. Many of the forms of corruption dealt with in the preceding studies are cases in point.

Whatever means may be employed to collect funds the total cost of party maintenance in the United States is extremely heavy. Referring to this frequently unreckoned burden, Professor Ford remarks: “It is a fond delusion of the people that our republican form of government is less expensive than the monarchical forms which obtain in Europe. The truth is that ours is the costliest government in the world.”[70] Turn the matter about as one will it is inevitable that these costs of parties must be paid. Our present method of paying them is indirect, furtive, fraught with grave moral consequences, and it is tremendously extravagant. We do not perceive the latter point clearly because we seldom get an insight into the total amount demanded or into the many and devious ways by which it is collected. What is exacted of us in the final analysis is not to be reckoned in money alone but also in bad and inefficient government with all the harm that it entails upon business, health, security, and morality. And we must continue to pay in our present wasteful and foolish manner until we devise a better method or make some arrangement to dispense largely with the services of party organizations.

What the ultimate lines of the solution may be it is too early to inquire. It is only very recently that we have become aware of the existence and magnitude of the problem. Indeed in its present form the problem is itself of recent origin. Not until the presidential campaign in 1876 was money used on a scale which could be described as lavish. The interest which has been shown recently in campaign contributions is gratifying evidence that our former neglect of the sources of party support is giving way to lively interest. Such contributions, however, represent a part only of the total expenses of political management. Party organisations must be kept up permanently and politicians, in or out of office, have a large amount of party work to perform between elections. As a matter of fact campaign funds may be regarded as a form of provision for the surplus demand occasioned by the election time necessity of running the machine at full blast with a large number of supernumerary workers under employment. The size of the total sums contributed at such periods, the influences behind some of the contributions, and the new interest of the public in these influences make it desirable, however, to consider the matter as a single but very important section of the broader subject of party support in general.

Admitting the necessity and utility under present conditions of party organisation and party work it is certainly not unreasonable to suggest that part of the burden of campaign management should be borne by the state. In his message at the beginning of the first session of the Sixtieth Congress, December, 1907, President Roosevelt said on this subject:

“The need for collecting large campaign funds would vanish if Congress provided an appropriation for the proper and legitimate expenses of each of the great national parties, an appropriation ample enough to meet the necessity for thorough organisation and machinery, which requires a large expenditure of money. Then the stipulation should be made that no party receiving campaign funds from the Treasury should accept more than a fixed amount from any individual subscriber or donor; and the necessary publicity for receipts and expenditures could without difficulty be provided.”

It was frankly admitted that this proposal was “very radical” and that until the people had time to familiarise themselves with it they would not be willing to consider its adoption. Indeed popular feeling nowadays, whether rightly or wrongly, is strongly averse to the granting of aid to party organisations and is manifestly bent on cutting off some of their sources of supply rather than on providing others. Many objections may be made to President Roosevelt’s proposal, some of them technical in character, others on the basis of principle. “Legitimate expenses” might be hard to define, but the attempt has been made already by several state legislatures.[71] Congress would either have to vote the same sum to each of the two principal parties, or else devise some scheme of _pro rata_ distribution. How minor political parties would fare under the former arrangement is not discussed. Colorado met this question in 1909, by providing that the state should pay twenty-five cents for each vote cast at the preceding contest for governor. The money is distributed to the state party chairmen in proportion to the votes cast by each party. One-half of it must be handed over to the county chairmen in proportion to the number of votes cast in each county. Other contributions to campaign funds are prohibited, except from candidates, who, however, may not give sums in excess of twenty-five per cent of their first year’s salary. What the practical outcome of the plan may be it is, of course, impossible to predict. Just how a new minor party is to get itself started, apart from the limited contributions of its candidates, does not appear. Objection might also be raised to this _pro rata_ arrangement on the ground that it bases the financial support of parties almost entirely upon their showing at the preceding election. So far as the strength of parties is determined by their money income the effect of the law will manifestly be to maintain the _status quo ante_. Theoretically party support ought to depend on the present actual standing of a party, that is, the comparative value to the state of its policies at the election for which its expenses are to be paid. Of course no agreement is possible as to just what this standing is in given cases. None the less it would seem clear that there might be a wide divergence between the relative showing made by a party at the polls two or more years ago and its present deserts. Possibly also a system of voluntary giving with restrictions of corporate contributions and other abuses might more correctly measure the current merit of parties than the _pro rata_ state appropriation system.

The Colorado plan, with the exception of the limited contributions it permits from candidates, places the burden of election expenses entirely upon the state, and therefore prohibits contributions both from corporations and individuals. President Roosevelt’s suggestion is not so radical, involving as it clearly did the raising of funds by contributions in addition to the proposed congressional appropriations. If, however, the latter were made sufficient to provide for the “proper and legitimate expenses of each of the great national parties,” one might inquire for what other purposes the campaign managers would need money. Waiving this question, a mixed system of state subsidies and private contributions has certain distinct advantages. There is considerable force in President Roosevelt’s argument that publicity and the restriction of large contributions could be more easily obtained under a plan combining the two kinds of support. Public appropriations for campaign purposes would place the state in a stronger position logically to exercise supervision over the whole process of gathering and spending money for political purposes. However, it remains to be demonstrated that publicity and the restriction of objectionable contributions cannot be secured without the payment of party subsidies. Evidently, also, there would be difficulties in connection with the supervision of party activities necessary to determine whether or not the proposed congressional appropriations should be granted. Democratic campaign managers would certainly feel that no Republican congress could deal fairly with them in such matters, although a bi-partisan supervisory board appointed by Congress might escape this suspicion.

Any appropriation of state funds for campaign purposes would also be objected to on grounds of principle. It is not considered a misfortune, for example, that a philanthropic, educational, or religious association must appeal to the public for contributions. On the contrary this very necessity forces the managers of such organisations to keep the service of the public constantly in view. Fully endowed charities, schools, and churches, on the other hand, have a notorious tendency to develop the dry rot or to degenerate into positive nuisances. It is possible that even if our two great parties were guaranteed support from state funds the keen rivalry between them might preserve them from deterioration. Still the logic of events may at any time demand the disbandment of a given political party. If at such a juncture it were assured a large subsidy, equal to or approximating that of the majority party, it might outlive its usefulness indefinitely, maintaining its organisation and a numerous body of adherents simply in order to devour the congressional appropriation provided for its useless campaign work.

There is one form of campaign expenditure, however, which the state may well assume and seek to extend, namely that incurred for performing any service offered equally to all parties. Already public provision is made for the rent of polling places, the salaries of election officials, the printing of ballots, and some other expenditures of a similar character. Legal regulation of the primary and convention system, such as has been undertaken on a large scale within the last decade, offers opportunities for the payment of certain preliminary expenses in the same way. In connection with its referendum elections Oregon has begun to print and distribute at public expense documents containing the substance of the laws to be voted on, supplemented by brief arguments drawn up by adherents of both sides.[72] So far as this principle can be extended the real need for campaign contributions from private citizens or corporations will be reduced. Thus without going the length of placing the whole burden of campaign expenditures upon the state, experimentation may well be undertaken with various combinations of the mixed system. If found advisable the relative amount of the state’s contribution may then be increased from time to time.

While the work of parties at the present time must be conceded to be essential and on the whole useful, the argument for their entire support by the state is still far from being made out. There is, as we have seen, a certain virtue in the very necessity under which parties labour of applying to the people for contributions. Normally it should have the effect of keeping the parties closer in interest to the people. It is highly improbable that the question of campaign funds would ever have been raised in American politics if party contributions were habitually made by a large number of persons each giving a relatively small amount. If in addition the donors were inspired by patriotic motives only and never sought to procure corrupt favours through their contributions such a system would be well nigh ideal. With all the abuses that have sprung up in this connection it is probably true that by far the larger number of the contributors to our campaign funds have been of the better type just described, although, of course, the same judgment would hardly be expressed with regard to the greater portion of the total amounts contributed. Under a system of small contributions from a large number of people it would matter little even if some of the contributors were not wholly disinterested. The relatively small proportion of the total sum represented by any individual subscription would make it absurd for the donor to claim corrupt favours of importance. It is not so much the campaign contribution itself that has fallen into disrepute among us as the secrecy involving the whole subject and the belief that large corporate contributions have been repaid by corrupt favours. Short of public subsidies, therefore, most of the advocates of reform in this field content themselves with the demand for publicity and certain restrictions as to the collection and expenditure of campaign funds.

The movement for publicity was preceded by much vigorous legislation against the bribery of voters and other abuses at the ballot-box, but as these subjects have been abundantly discussed elsewhere they need only incidental mention here. New York led in the movement for publicity proper with a law passed in 1890 (ch. 94), requiring candidates to file statements of their expenditures. This act was very ineffective, no publicity being required for the expenses of election committees. Most of the laws subsequently passed have brought campaign committees as well as candidates specifically under regulation.[73] By the end of 1908, more than twenty states altogether had taken some action looking toward the publicity of expenditures. The earlier laws of this character were very loosely drawn. In many cases they simply required “statements,” and the results obtained were distinguished chiefly by gross inadequacy and heterogeneity. Later statutes and amendments, however, have fixed the form of reports precisely, itemising them in considerable detail. Wisconsin, for example, furnishes blanks especially prepared for this purpose. Vouchers for all sums exceeding five or ten dollars are required in a number of states. Publicity of receipts is not so commonly prescribed as publicity of expenditures. Reports of contributions were first required by Colorado and Michigan in 1891, followed by Massachusetts in 1892, California in 1894, Arizona in 1895, Ohio in 1896. Repeals of the laws first passed in Ohio and Michigan indicate that they were somewhat ahead of public sentiment at the time, although they would hardly be so regarded now. In this connection the New York law of 1906 (ch. 502), was an event of first class importance. It compels political committees to file detailed statements of receipts as well as expenditures, and provides for judicial investigation to enforce correct statements. The great weight of the name of the Empire State is thus placed squarely behind the demand for real publicity of receipts.[74] Under this act, voluntarily accepted by the national chairmen in 1908, publicity was given to the finances of a presidential campaign for the first time in the history of the country.

In the national field the nearest approach to legislation prescribing publicity for campaign contributions was made by a bill (H. R. 20112) introduced into the House of Representatives in 1908. Briefly this bill covered both expenditures and contributions of the national and the congressional campaign committees of all parties, and of “all committees, associations, or organisations which shall in two or more states influence the result or attempt to influence the result of an election at which Representatives in Congress are to be elected.” Treasurers of such committees were required to file itemised detailed statements with the Clerk of the House of Representatives “not more than fifteen days and not less than ten days before an election,” and also final reports within thirty days after such elections. These statements were to include the names and addresses of contributors of $100 or more, the total of contributions under $100, disbursements exceeding $10 in detail, and the total of disbursements of less amount. The bill also contained provisions, which will be referred to later, designed to cover the use of money by persons or associations other than those mentioned above. Unfortunately a provision was tacked on to the foregoing raising the question of the restriction of colored voting in the South and hinting at a reapportionment of congressional representation under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. As a consequence an embittered opposition was made by the Democrats who charged that the latter provision was deliberately introduced in bad faith with the intention of making the passage of the bill impossible. In the House it was carried by a solid Republican vote of 161 in its favour to 126 Democratic votes in opposition, but was allowed to expire in the Senate Committee on Privileges and Elections for fear that it would become the object of a Democratic filibuster.

Whatever may be the merits of the proposal to readjust congressional representation it is clearly a question which is logically separable from that of campaign contributions. If this separation is effected there would seem to be reason to hope that a publicity bill similar in its main outlines to that of 1908 can pass Congress. While a platform plank of this sort was voted down in the Republican National Convention of that year, Mr. Taft in his speech of acceptance said:—

“If I am elected President I shall urge upon Congress, with every hope of success, that a law be passed requiring a filing in a Federal office of a statement of the contributions received by committees and candidates in elections for members of Congress, and in such other elections as are constitutionally within the control of Congress.”[75]

The manœuvring for position between the parties in 1908 which resulted in the voluntary acceptance by each of high standards of publicity is too fresh in the public mind to require rehearsal here. For the first time in the history of presidential elections some definite information was made available regarding campaign finances. The Republican National Committee reported contributions of $1,035,368.27. This sum, however, does not include $620,150 collected in the several states by the finance committees of the Republican National Committee and turned over by them to their respective state committees. The Democratic National Committee reported contributions amounting to $620,644.77. The list of contributors to the Republican National Fund contained 12,330 names.[76] The Democratic National Committee filed a “list of over 25,000 names representing over 100,000 contributors who contributed through newspapers, clubs, solicitors, and other organisations, whose names are on file in the office of the chairman of the Democratic National Committee at Buffalo.”[77]

On many points, unfortunately, the two reports, while definite to a degree hitherto unknown, are not strictly comparable. Some species of “uniform accounting” applicable to this subject is manifestly necessary before any detailed investigation can be undertaken. One big fact stands out with sufficient clearness, however, namely that the national campaign of 1908 was waged at a money cost far below that of the three preceding campaigns.

Basing his estimate upon what is said to have been spent in 1896, 1900, and 1904, Mr. F. A. Ogg placed the total cost of a presidential election to both parties, including the state and local contests occurring at the same time, at $15,000,000.[78] One-third to one-half of this enormous sum, in his opinion, must be attributed to the presidential campaign proper. Compared with this estimate of from five to seven and a half millions the relatively modest total of something more than two and a quarter millions shown by the figures of 1908 must be counted a strong argument in favour of publicity.

The most important single issue raised by the policies of the two parties during the last presidential campaign was that of publicity before or after election. Early in the campaign the Democratic National Committee decided to publish on or before October 15th all individual contributions in excess of $100; contributions received subsequent to that date to be published on the day of their receipt. Following the principle of the New York law both parties made post-election statements. It is manifest that complete statements of expenditures, or for that matter of contributions as well, can be made only after election. Every thorough provision for publicity must, therefore, require post-election reports. Shall preliminary statements also be required? As against the latter it is urged that contributors whose motives are of the highest character will be deterred by the fear of savage partisan criticism. If publicity is delayed until after the election campaign bitterness will have subsided and a juster view of the whole situation will be possible. In favour of publicity before the election it is said that two main ends are aimed at by all legislation of this sort;—first to prevent the collection and expenditure of enormous sums for the bribery of voters and other corrupt purposes, and, second, by revealing the source of campaign funds to make it difficult or impossible for the victorious party to carry out corrupt bargains into which it may have entered in order to obtain large contributions. Publicity after the election will, indeed, serve the second of these ends, but publicity before would be much more effective in preventing corrupt collection and expenditure of funds. Moreover it might prevent the victory of the party pursuing such a policy and thus, by keeping it out of power, render it incapable of paying by governmental favour for its contributions.

In attempting to arrive at a conclusion on this issue it is difficult to assign it such practical importance as it received during the campaign of 1908. Publicity after election simply delays the time of exposure. The knowledge that it is bound to come must exert a very powerful influence over intending contributors. That this was the case in 1908 is pretty convincingly demonstrated by a comparison of the figures of that year with the figures for earlier presidential campaigns. It is certain that publicity pure and simple, whether before or after election, will seldom show on the face of the returns any facts seriously reflecting upon party integrity. If there is to be difficulty in administering laws of this character it will come in the way of getting at real, complete statements, going back of the names and figures on the return if necessary. On the other hand it is not altogether to be deplored that before election publicity may result in rather bitter criticism of some contributors. Gifts in general, as we have already noted,[79] stand in especial need of criticism, and this principle applies with maximum force to campaign gifts. Designed as they are to affect public policy a plea for privacy cannot be set up on their behalf. If the criticism of contributors should go to extremes it will hurt the party making it more than the individuals assailed. Contributors who know their own motives to be honourable ought not to allow themselves to be deterred by baseless clamour. If, however, such criticism is just, both the individual making, and the party receiving the suspicious contribution deserve to suffer. By deterring other contributions of a similar questionable character a distinct public service will be rendered by such ante-election criticism. Knowledge of the sources of the financial support of a party is certainly not the only nor the best basis to be employed by an elector in determining the way he shall cast his vote, but under present conditions it is certainly a matter which he is entitled to take into consideration. While admitting, therefore, that there is room for honest difference of opinion on the question of publicity before or after election, the weight of the argument would seem to fall distinctly in favour of the former. It is sincerely to be regretted that the question became in a sense a matter of party record in 1908. Going back to the congressional bill of the same year, however, it is worth noting that the Republican majority in the House once placed itself solidly and squarely on record in favour of publicity before the election. Looking at the matter solely from the lower standpoint of expediency that party is now in a most enviable position to revert to its earlier attitude and, by enacting the principle of ante-election publicity into law, to secure for itself the credit of a popular reform. This would place the two parties on a uniform legal basis for the future, and make it impossible for the Democrats to assume voluntarily a higher standard regarding publicity which they could then use as a campaign argument against the Republicans.[80]

There is one form of publicity before election, if it may be considered such, which while not a matter of public discussion would seem advisable in any event. Laws should require that all candidates must be furnished with daily accounts of the financial operations both as to receipts and expenditures of campaign committees and others acting in their interest. Even under the old régime of secrecy scandalous exposures sometimes occurred. Confronted by such untoward circumstances partisans always urged in defence that the candidate himself was the soul of honesty and that he was as ignorant as a new-born babe of the dirty work carried on by a handful of irresponsible and corrupt friends. No doubt there have been many cases where the moral insulation thus alleged really existed. On the other hand some of these pleas in defence and extenuation were abject farces. They should be prevented once for all by providing that every candidate must be fully and promptly informed regarding the financial conditions of his campaign. Indeed he is entitled to this information in advance of the public, for his personal honour is at stake. If, then, he should disapprove of the measures employed in his behalf he can take such action as may seem desirable to clear his reputation. If, on the other hand, he is willing that dubious methods should be resorted to, let him not attempt to play upon the credulity of the public in case of exposure.[81] It is notorious that the last refuge of a discredited machine is the nomination of a man whose personal honesty is above suspicion, and his election by every possible crooked device. While the campaign is going on the “irreproachable candidate” is kept carefully in ignorance of the methods of his more “practical” managers. After the election he may be told of them if it is necessary to force his compliance to corrupt bargains made in his behalf. Pre-election campaign publicity for the particular information of candidates ought to make it more difficult for a machine _in extremis_ to save itself by the nomination of “irreproachables.” Or if they are nominated they will at least be able to insist on the “irreproachable” conduct of their campaign. In any event such publicity would provide the voters with candidates of whom it might be assumed in every case that they knew exactly what sort of methods were being used to secure their election.

The question of campaign publicity involves, of course, the further question as to what organisations and officials shall make reports of contributions and expenditures. In a general way this duty, which originally was laid only upon candidates has been extended sweepingly to party committees and similar bodies. The language of the congressional bill referred to above is extremely broad, but it does not settle all the questions that may arise on this point. Associations may be formed which without nominating candidates of their own or undertaking other definitely partisan activities may nevertheless profoundly affect the outcome of an election. A curious illustration of this point may be found in the Missouri law of 1907,[82] which provided that civic leagues making reports on the fitness of candidates for public office must also publish the basis of their information and file statements of their expenses. It is manifest that leagues of this character, which seldom if ever nominate candidates of their own, may nevertheless come under the control of contributing interests and use their considerable influence to affect elections corruptly. Other illustrations are supplied by large organisations devoted to the propaganda of a given cause. In a tariff campaign, for example, both free trade and protectionist leagues might raise and expend enormous sums in a way that would materially affect the result at the polls. There is at least the possibility of evasion and trouble in this direction, mitigated, however, by the fact that in general the work of propagandist leagues will be educational and free from grosser offences such as bribery of voters. Finally there is the possibility of large direct individual expenditures by warm friends or near relatives in favour of a given candidacy. This was met in the congressional bill by requiring reports of expenditures by persons other than members of campaign committees in excess of $50, not, however, including travelling expenses or postage, telegraph, and telephone charges.[83] Legislation compelling all contributors to make their contributions through campaign committees,[84] or forbidding the direct use of money by individuals may suffice to overcome this difficulty if it should ever become threatening.

Publicity laws have done something to fix responsibility for collections by specifying the nature of organisations which are compelled to report and further by requiring the appointment of certain financial officials in such organisations. It would seem difficult to go further in a legal way. There is, however, a manifest impropriety in the appointment of persons to do this work who through the exercise of their own official power or because of knowledge gained while in office could use threats express or implied in approaching prospective contributors. At its worst this amounts to a subtle sort of corrupt blackmail which is only slightly veiled; at its best it may be condoned as a political device formerly considered clever but now so generally reprobated as to be dangerous. The general recognition of the purpose of such appointments should be sufficient to prevent the naming as party collectors of officials who come, have come, or are to come into contact with the business world through the exercise of the taxing or supervisory powers of government.

Closely associated with the subject of publicity is the question of the prohibition or limitation of contributions from various sources. Absolute prohibition, of course, could come only as a corollary to a system of government appropriations for campaign expenses. Under a mixed system of support or with wholly voluntary support, prohibition or limitation of certain kinds of contributions may be attempted by law. Of course there is a possibility that with publicity fully secured obnoxious contributions may become, through fear of criticism, extremely rare. Quite a number of states, however, have deemed it necessary to supplement their publicity acts with acts prohibiting or restricting certain kinds of contributions.

The most common objects of such prohibitions are, of course, the corporations. As early as 1894, Mr. Elihu Root, speaking in the New York Constitutional Convention in favour of an amendment prohibiting contributions from such sources, said:—“It strikes at a constantly growing evil which has done more to shake the confidence of the plain people of small means of this country in our political institutions than any other practice which has ever obtained since the foundation of our government.” Even now that the turning point has been passed and we are clearly on the way to better things there are few students of our public life who would dissent from Mr. Root’s judgment of the seriousness of the question raised by corporate contributions to campaign funds. Missouri, Nebraska, Tennessee, and Florida, were pioneers in acting on this conviction, all four having passed laws in 1897 absolutely forbidding such gifts.[85] Several states followed in a desultory fashion until in 1907 a sudden burst of legislative activity occurred as a result of the New York insurance revelations. In that one year no fewer than eleven states passed laws forbidding life insurance companies to contribute, and five other states forbade all corporations of whatever sort to make contributions to campaign funds.

It is frequently objected to laws of this character that they are worthless because they can readily be evaded. A corporation may secretly direct one of its officials to make a large contribution with the understanding that the money is to be returned to him later, concealed, it may be, in the price paid for some property which he sells the corporation. No doubt evasion of this sort is possible, but it will hardly become common because it involves the collusion of so many men not only in the management of the corporation but also in the party management, all of whom will fully understand the criminal nature of the transaction. On the corporation side, moreover, the act remains a gift, and withal a gift of a much more hazardous nature and one much less certain to bring returns than such gifts are reputed to have been in the past. Now even under the most favourable circumstances giving, whether by corporations or by individuals, is a somewhat painful process. The absence of souls in the case of the former does not seem to make their feeling of sacrifice any the less keen. It is highly improbable, therefore, that in addition to this natural obstacle and other disadvantages corporations are likely to run the risks of penal law frequently in order that they may bestow their surplus wealth upon party organisations.

Of course there are corporations so largely owned by individuals and so thoroughly identified with the latter that a contribution from them may seem to amount to the same thing as a contribution from the corporation. Technically, however, the money must be offered as a personal gift, and party managers might defend themselves on this score in case the contributor afterwards demanded a corrupt favour in the interest of his corporation. If the public remains suspicious of such large personal contributions by corporate managers the further step may be taken of fixing by law the maximum amount to be contributed by any individual.