Chapter VII: Corruption and Notoriety (7)

Considering the special disabilities which have been laid upon corporations in the matter of campaign contributions it is indeed remarkable that similar restrictions have not been suggested for other associations. Either by gradually extending this policy or by a single sweeping measure the right of contribution may finally be brought to as purely individual a basis as the right of suffrage itself. Some partnerships, particularly in manufacturing and the express business, have been notorious seekers after special privileges, but not being corporations there is nothing to prevent them from contributing largely to campaign funds. Labour unions might be developed into very heavy contributors to campaign funds. Although in the latter case the contributions would come from a great number of individuals giving relatively small amounts each, yet the machinery of organisation and the emulation it could excite among the members might prove potent in producing very large sums in the aggregate. The same considerations apply to clubs, whether purely social or propagandist in character, which can contribute great sums without revealing the identity of large donors among their members,—except perhaps privately to the financial officers of a campaign committee. If publicity reveals any such abuses legislation to correct them along the same lines as our present corporate prohibitions may prove desirable.

Next to contributions by corporations political contributions from candidates would seem to stand most in need of restriction. The English Corrupt and Illegal Practice Prevention Act is very explicit and drastic on this subject. It even goes to the length of forbidding contributions for charitable purposes subsequent to the public announcement of the candidate’s intention to stand for a borough. Our own legislation, however, has been very fragmentary except in so far as candidates were affected by the general publicity requirements. By an act which went into effect, August, 1892, Massachusetts prohibited political committees from soliciting contributions from candidates who, however, might “make a voluntary payment of money—for the promotion of the principles of the party which the committee represents, and for the general purposes of the committee.” While doubtless excellent as a statement of ideal relations it is questionable whether this enactment materially increased the obstacles intervening between campaign committees and candidates’ pocketbooks. At least the legislature of the same state found it necessary in 1908 to provide that political committees should not solicit money from a candidate as a prerequisite to giving him his nomination papers.[86] A new departure was made by the Ohio law of 1896, known as the Garfield Act,[87] which endeavoured to grade candidates’ expenses according to the number of votes cast, limiting them to $100 for five thousand voters or less, and providing that they should not exceed $650 in any case.[88] In case of violation the office of a successful candidate could be declared vacant at any time during his term. California, Missouri, Montana, Minnesota, and New York, have also attempted the limitation of candidates’ contributions or expenditures.[89] In 1895, Connecticut and New York forbade contributions by candidates except to authorised committees or party agents.[90] California, in 1907, adopted the rather doubtful expedient of limiting contributions from candidates according to the length of term and salary of the office for which they are contesting.[91] Perhaps the most significant step that has been taken in this direction was the action of New York which in 1906 prohibited contributions from candidates for judicial offices.[92]

With these exceptions contributions by candidates are in general free from legal regulation. There have been comparatively few great exposures to awaken the public conscience to the abuses that have grown up in this connection, but as to the widespread and extremely scandalous nature of these abuses no one who is in the least familiar with practical politics can have the slightest doubt. Broadly considered any large contribution by a candidate toward his own election is manifestly indelicate, not to say frankly improper. Custom has rendered us so familiar with this practice, however, that we are inclined to accept it as a matter of course. There is a certain gambling spirit inherent in politics which is profoundly potent for evil. Primarily this is due, of course, to the inevitable uncertainties of campaigning. No single factor contributes to it more largely than the habit of “assessing” candidates for office. Honest and able men are frequently repelled from politics when they encounter this system. Some of them may hesitate to make the material sacrifices involved and are consequently deemed miserly by the politicians, although it is not the amount of money demanded but rather the uses to which these men know the money will be put that leads them to withdraw. It is not too much to maintain that the conditions now existing in many places are worse than the property qualifications once required by law to make one eligible to hold office. Our present “voluntary” contribution system, rendered practically obligatory by party authorities, is more burdensome on the candidate than a property qualification because it requires him not only to have property but also to sacrifice a considerable part of it to obtain office or the chance of office. The old property qualifications were really lighter and more democratic since they merely required prospective office holders to own so much, and all who possessed more than this fixed sum were eligible equally. The existing system which allows voluntary contributions by candidates unlimited as to amount is equivalent to a property qualification interpreted in the light of the prospective generosity of the candidate. Party managers are continually under temptation to name the man who has the more money and can be expected to make the larger contribution. Of course this does not mean that the man with the biggest “bar’l” is always nominated. Other qualifications such as the man’s education, character, and equipment for campaigning, must be taken into account as well as his ability and inclination to pay. Or if one candidate is placed on the ticket solely because of his liberality the general average must be raised by a larger admixture of brains and character on the part of his running mates. So long as candidates’ contributions are unlimited as to amount we are, nevertheless, openly tolerating conditions which give the maximum effect to wealth as a qualification for public office. True we wish to encourage our men of wealth to go into politics, but we desire them to do so on the basis of their brains and character, not on the basis of their dollars. Even without the use of money in their own interest they enjoy a tremendous advantage for candidacy in their leisure and freedom from material cares. On the other hand the multi-millionaire backed almost solely by his own wealth and unlimited as to the amount he can spend on his campaigning has already caused considerable annoyance in our political life and is likely to become an unmitigated nuisance if checks are not applied betimes. Although cases of this sort are relatively infrequent as yet they are likely to occur more commonly in the future. Business prizes have been so large until recently that they have absorbed the attention of most of our men of wealth. To our captains of industry the money rewards of an office were as nothing, and the honour it conferred added little to their importance. Washington’s recently acquired prominence as a winter residence for wealthy families may appear to be nothing more than a whim of gilded society, but the relationships thus established are certain to stimulate political ambitions in new quarters. With increasing power and social prestige attached to office,[93] more owners of great fortunes are likely to enter politics in the future. In general we have every reason to rejoice that this is the case, but we should also endeavour to adjust the terms of competition so that no undue political weight shall be given to the brute force of millions.

Underlying the system of contributions by candidates is the uncritical view that the latter should pay largely because they are to enjoy personally the honours and emoluments of office. Nominees, at least successful nominees, are deemed to be the special favourites of the party, and hence morally obligated to contribute generously to its support. Little consideration is given by those holding such views to the tremendous tax laid upon the vitality of candidates by the strenuous modern methods of campaigning, certainly a burden large enough in most cases to justify their exemption from heavy financial contributions in addition. But there are other and more serious logical defects in the theory justifying such impositions upon candidates. Normally, of course, assessments of this character must be recouped out of the earnings of the office, although it is said sometimes to happen that the sum demanded for campaign expenses is larger than the salary for the entire term of occupancy. One of our states, as we have seen, attempts to limit candidates’ contributions to a certain ratio of official earnings.[94] The clear implication of all this is that the salary of office is considered to represent first, a payment for the public services rendered by the office holder, and second, a surplus over the preceding which should be devoted to campaign expenses. If we accept this view we virtually accept the principle of the payment of campaign expenses in part at least by the state. One who repudiated this principle might therefore consistently demand the reduction of all official salaries by the amount of the campaign surplus which they contain over and above the value of services actually rendered by incumbents. As a matter of fact such a reduction would be most unfortunate, the truth being, as we have already had occasion to note, that most official salaries in the United States are too low. And, finally, a consistent believer in the principle of the payment of campaign contributions by the state might object to its realisation through the underhanded and coercive method of assessments levied upon candidates. Some perfectly frank and legal method of administering the subsidy would be far preferable.

Both in practice and theory, therefore, grave objections may be urged against a _laisser faire_ policy in regard to campaign contributions by candidates. Effective publicity may possibly suffice to bring the abuses which have developed in this connection within bounds. The existing system, however, is old, widespread, and deeply entrenched. Public sentiment against it is far from being so strong as the facts warrant. Particularly significant in this connection is the recent action of New York in prohibiting contributions from judicial candidates. Doubtless the reason for this special limitation was the peculiar sanctity and impartiality which we associate with the functions of the judiciary. Yet in ideal at least these high qualities should attach to other public offices. So far, therefore, as the sanctity and impartiality of public office in general can be cultivated by prohibiting or limiting campaign contributions we should apply the reform to the legislative and administrative branches of government as well as to the judiciary.

It is worth noting that complete prohibition of such contributions, as in the New York instance, will probably involve the limitation of contributions by others than candidates. A judicial or other nominee prohibited by law from using money on his own behalf might, for example, knowingly or unknowingly, owe his election largely to a few rich supporters who perhaps would not hesitate at some later time to try to use the influence which they had thus obtained. Indeed it is one of the redeeming features of the present system that men of ample means have sometimes bought independence in office by financing their own campaigns. If, therefore, it should prove desirable to restrict candidates’ contributions in the future, care should also be taken to limit the contributions of third parties. Otherwise the latter, by assuming the financial burden taken from the shoulders of nominees might attempt to purchase political influence on which they could realise after those whom they assisted had obtained office.

While the foregoing argument has been directed chiefly to the case of candidates for elective office it is also applicable in some particulars to the campaign contributions of officials under civil service rules. Usually efforts are made with a considerable degree of success to protect the latter from the assessment system. The old abuse of extortion by officials of higher rank is in a fair way to be obliterated, although sporadic cases of this sort still occur even in the federal service. Unfortunately it is easy to appoint collectors who themselves hold no office under civil service rules, but whose intimate personal relations with high officials are widely known to subordinates. Civil service employees of higher grades are probably too well informed of their rights to submit to extortion veiled in this or any other guise, but there are doubtless considerable numbers of the less intelligent and poorly paid civil servants, at least in some of our state and local governments, who are really being assessed frequently and heavily under the pretence, of course, of “voluntary” contributions. Probably it is true everywhere that those who suffer worst from this despicable malpractice are precisely those who are least able to bear it. Even this, however, is not the chief evil of the system. Absolute non-partisanship in their official work can hardly be expected of a body of men who are constantly being approached for campaign contributions, and in effect being reminded thereby that, civil service or no civil service, they are deemed to be subject in a peculiar degree to party taxation. Moreover one of the great weaknesses of the civil service establishment is the conviction on the part of the opposition party, inevitable whether or not it be justifiable, that civil service employees are being exploited for contributions by the party in power. Publicity may dispel both this abuse, so far as it exists, and also the misconceptions based upon it. If not it may prove desirable in the future to prohibit absolutely all campaign contributions from employees under civil service rules. Administration will certainly be much easier and suspicion more difficult when no contribution whatever is legally permissible than under any system which permits “voluntary” offerings.

In addition to the prohibition or limitation of campaign contributions from certain specified sources the suggestion has been touched upon that it may prove desirable in the end to limit the campaign contributions of individuals. Just what theoretical basis might be found for fixing the exact amount of such limitation is not clear. Possibly the number of voters, the number of candidates, and the estimated legitimate costs of a given campaign could be combined in some way to give a definite result. In practice, however, the question of fixing a satisfactory limit to individual contributions will hardly present any great difficulty. Evasion of such limitations by means of dummy contributors is, as we have seen,[95] not very probable. There ought, however, to be a very stringent penalty against the custom of handing considerable sums to campaign treasurers personally with the understanding that the amount shall be turned in as the individual contribution of the treasurer himself. Limitation of the amount of individual contributions, together with the other safeguards that have been discussed, may prove a very effective substitute for ante-election publicity. If we are assured that corporation contributions are barred, that the contributions of candidates and civil service employees are either prohibited or strictly limited, and finally that the contributions of others are limited to relatively small amounts, it becomes a matter of distinctly minor importance to know who are the financial supporters on either side. Given these conditions the publication of such information would scarcely attract any notice even during the heat of a campaign.

As a first effect the restriction of contributions according to all or a part of the various propositions discussed above would probably reduce the aggregate of campaign funds considerably. It remains to be seen whether this will have an unfavourable influence upon our political life. Shocked by the magnitude of the sums recently employed many of our social doctors would advise rigorous starvation and copious bloodletting as essential to the radical cure of our campaign diseases. In spite of the necessity of parties under the conditions of American government public prejudice is strongly inclined to underestimate the value of party work. Yet considering the size of the country and the magnitude of the interests involved it is doubtful if the amount expended in the last presidential election, to cite a specific instance, was uneconomical. Certainly an even larger sum could be spent profitably along educational lines in our greater campaigns. One trouble now is that quite apart from the illegal or immoral practices charged against American campaign managers the latter have in too many cases carried on their activities in a conventional fashion which is rather ineffective and wasteful. Thousands of dollars are spent in circulating documents and speeches. Yet printed matter of this character is so cheap and nasty in appearance, so unattractive in form, so devoid of illustration, and often so dry and prolix that it is promptly and deservedly thrust into the waste-basket by practically all recipients. Progressive business men have learned the value of modern forms of advertising in newspapers, magazines, street cars, etc., but the political manager seldom employs it with any effect. In many districts illustrated lectures would be an enormous improvement over the cheap mouthings of the ordinary cart-tail spell-binder. Campaign text-books, as the term is at present understood, are at best dry and formal arsenals of fact fit only for the higher grade of speakers and leaders, or, at worst, mere hodge-podge collections of sensational clippings useful only to equip already convinced partisans with a few accusations and arguments which they can then monotonously parrot forth from the beginning to the end of the campaign. Constructed with some regard to pedagogical principles and popular requirements such books might be made extremely influential. By these and other improved methods our campaigns may finally come to be worth what they cost. Certainly few services are of more importance in a democracy than rousing the people to political issues, instructing them as to men and policies, leading them out from narrow personal concerns to participation in the broad life of the state. Even with all the restrictions on the collection of campaign funds which have been mentioned above it is improbable that sufficient funds for all legitimate purposes will in the long run be denied. If any shortage threatens, campaign managers may better their situation by the same policy which any institution dependent upon public support must follow under similar circumstances,—that is, they must so impress the value of the work they are doing upon the people that ample material support will be freely offered. If this cannot be done they will simply have to get along with less, the probability being, of course, that the smaller amount is quite as much as is necessary and certainly as much as they deserve.

One certain consequence of the prohibition of large contributions will be greater activity on the part of campaign collectors to secure contributions in smaller amounts. This would seem desirable in every way. Until we commit ourselves to the principle of state subsidies it ought to be part of common school instruction everywhere to insist on the duty of the voter to contribute something toward party support. Possibly large contributions might be found unobjectionable in the future if given for some specific purpose, the circulation of a certain speech, for example, or some other educational form of political activity. Considering the abuses which have been charged against campaign managers the almost universal habit of making gifts to them on a _carte blanche_ basis is remarkable to say the least. Taking a suggestion from educational practice, large campaign contributions might be further legitimatised in case it were stipulated, that equal amounts should be raised in small sums by campaign managers. If the time be short in which to comply with a condition of this sort, the interest in such collections, on the other hand, would be very great. Certainly it could scarcely be argued that a sum thus collected represented nothing more than the selfish desire of a rich man to promote one of his personal interests.

Besides prohibiting or limiting contributions from certain sources it may also prove desirable to fix time limits within which large gifts may not be received. Among other conditions voluntarily accepted in 1908 the Democratic National Committee pledged itself to receive no contribution above $100 within three days of the election. The time limit in this case was scarcely long enough to be very impressive, but the principle involved is of some importance. Such facts as we possess with regard to the history of campaign funds indicate “fat-frying” of a most strenuous and compromising character during the last few days preceding an election. Alarmist and hysterical reports about doubtful states were prepared on both sides and presented tearfully and confidentially to men of wealth, to candidates, and to other persons from whom money might perchance be obtainable. The probability is very strong that the great sums thus raised and of necessity spent at the eleventh hour were more largely subject to waste, theft, and corrupt use, than any other money which was placed in the hands of campaign managers. Prohibition of contributions within a short period prior to election or their limitation in amount during such period ought to reduce this evil considerably, at least on the collecting side. If subjected to such a restriction campaign managers will, of course, seek to secure as large a sum as possible before the time limit expires, and they will also take care to keep a sufficient reserve on hand for the culminating needs of the campaign. Nevertheless they will be pretty effectually estopped from calamity howling at the last minute as a means of obtaining large additional “slush” funds.

A very important question is raised by one section of the Wisconsin law of 1897,[96] which provides that contributions to aid certain candidates may be made only by residents of their districts. So far as ascertainable this is the only case of a geographical limitation upon the gathering of campaign funds. It is a matter of common knowledge that in national contests very great sums collected on the outside are poured into doubtful states, sometimes with material influence upon the results. Large amounts of money are occasionally massed in a single district to elect a particularly strong, or to defeat a particularly obnoxious member of Congress. In state and local contests the same sort of financial manipulation is not unusual. Our laws, unlike those of England, do not permit plural voting. An American citizen votes where he resides. No matter how great may be his property holdings he cannot vote elsewhere. But he may spend his dollars anywhere in support of candidates and policies, or his contributions may be similarly employed by the party managers to whom they are handed. It is too early to discuss the equities of a situation the moral obliquity of which is as yet so dimly perceived. A principle of some importance, however, would seem to underlie the Wisconsin prohibition against invasion by foreign campaign contributions.

Assuming publicity and other necessary restrictions of campaign funds to have been put into effect, the question may be raised as to whether business interests could secure proper hearing for themselves in political affairs. It must be conceded at once that government should act always with due regard to economic factors. Many campaign contributions of times past, including even some of the most objectionable, were made by business men who felt that while by so doing they were pledging public officials in their favour they were at the same time pledging these officials to that course of conduct which was best for the prosperity and welfare of the country as a whole. Quite apart from all moral considerations such contributions were looked upon as a sort of business tax, made necessary by our democratic political conditions, and as such fundamentally justifiable. There is no excuse for not knowing better now; in a short time there will be absolutely no justification for tolerating contributions made on this basis. Business men who pursued the old policy were following what looked like a short and easy cut to their immediate ends. In reality they were piling up class hatred, restrictive legislation, obnoxious taxes, and various instalments of socialism. Fortunately this destructive process, so far as objectionable campaign contributions minister to it, is likely to be checked. But legitimate businesses, including big monopolistic concerns properly conducted, will not be debarred by publicity and the regulation of campaign contributions from the use of a great many open and effective means of bringing their interests to the attention of government. Of course grafting business will receive a set-back, but this is exactly what is desired. Our great economic interests would probably be in a far healthier condition to-day if they had employed legitimate agencies only in the past, and neglected altogether the short and dangerous cut to political influence offered by large campaign contributions. Business is now learning the value of frank and honest methods of dealing with the people, of publicity on its own account as contrasted with the old public-be-damned attitude. Internal reforms of business practices, the correction of abuses from within and by insiders, are seen to be much less costly than the application of legislative sledge-hammers. The American people is far from radical at heart. Given full and honest expositions of the case for business it is highly improbable that rash and destructive policies will triumph in the future, any more than they were wont to triumph in time past when business interests fought them in a manner scarcely less objectionable than the subversive policies themselves. And always back of the public opinion and temper of the people there are constitutional guaranties and the courts to maintain them,—safeguards stronger in all probability than those possessed by property in any other civilised nation in the world to-day.[97] Manifestly it will require much more than a reform of our present system of collecting campaign funds to prevent the proper and adequate hearing by governmental authorities of the legitimate business interests of the country.

By way of objection to such limitations of campaign contributions as have been proposed it might be urged that since gifts of services as well as gifts of money are made to campaign committees the former as well as the latter must logically be subjected to regulation. In certain cases it may be admitted that regulation of services is necessary. Particularly is this true of civil service employees. It is by no means improbable that it may be found advisable to enforce by law their complete abstention from all kinds of political work, leaving them nothing beyond the right to cast their vote. Certainly a very considerable amount of trouble is experienced at the present time in keeping them clearly within the legal, but not always self-evident, lines drawn by civil service acts and rulings. With this exception, perhaps, there would seem to be every reason to leave campaign contributions of services free from every restriction but publicity. No means should be neglected of encouraging the widest possible participation by amateurs in party activities and party management, and this is one such means. It is true, of course, that the services of some exceptionally able men may be equivalent to money gifts of tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars, and also that such gifts may not be equally or even proportionally divided among the parties. Normally, however, the differences between individuals as to their political abilities are not to be compared in magnitude to the existing enormous differences in wealth which have made regulation of money contributions a necessity. And if one party is pre-eminently the gainer through gifts of services by brilliant men certainly it would seem to deserve any advantage thus obtained. Its rivals may thereby learn the value of the enthusiastic support of men of talent, and bestir themselves to revise their own programmes so that such men may be induced to enlist in their fighting columns. It is possible that minor parties and reform movements are relatively more successful in this way than the great parties. If so no dislocation of the political balance of power is likely to be occasioned by a policy of regulation of monetary contributions coupled with _laisser faire_ as to contributions of services. Usually the strength of minor parties in enthusiastic personal support will still find itself more than outmatched by the strength of the old line parties in traditional fealty, in practical experience, and in greater monetary resources.

Whatever additional reform measures may be suggested by further experience with regard to the publicity and restriction of campaign contributions, two broad general principles would seem to apply in the application of all legislation of this character.

First, the subject is clearly one of state and local as well as of national politics. The two former are subject to the same abuses as the latter. State and local politics are immensely important in themselves. They touch the daily affairs of the great mass of the people much more closely than do national politics. Moreover there is danger that with campaign fund reform in national affairs only, no matter how thorough it might be, the neglect of similar reforms in state and local politics would facilitate the evasion of national law. At least it would seem to make it possible to use large funds in local and state contests in such a way as to help indirectly but very materially the national interests of one or the other party. Fortunately some of our most important states have already provided for a measure of publicity sufficient to reduce this possibility so far as they are concerned. The danger will not be much lessened, however, until their example has been followed generally. Still it is hardly to be regretted that at the present time the major public interest is centred in the great presidential contest. There is no danger that the object lesson voluntarily given by the two national parties in 1908 will be forgotten by the American people either in succeeding presidential campaigns or in our minor state and city elections. But while we are securing the great political front door let us remember that the horse may also be stolen if we neglect to lock the numerous side and back doors.

Secondly, our primary and convention system is subject to the same abuses in the use of money as the election system proper. Indeed in states solid one way or the other it is probable that corrupt practices are more common in connection with nominations, where there may be sharp fighting, than in the subsequent cut and dried election. Organic reforms of a most sweeping character are in process in this field,[98] and when the time is ripe it would seem to be an easy matter to graft upon them the requirement of publicity of nominating expenses and other restrictions upon primary contributions similar in a general way to the restrictions now being imposed upon campaign contributions. A start has already been made in this direction. By a law which went into effect in 1892, Massachusetts established publicity in respect to nominating as well as election expenses. The Garfield Corrupt Practices Act passed by the Ohio legislature of 1896,[99] and unfortunately repealed in 1902, required publicity and limited the expenditure of candidates before conventions and primaries as well as before elections. In 1906, Pennsylvania passed a law[100] containing a list of the legitimate forms of campaign expenditure and requiring statements from candidates for nomination in the primary as well as from candidates for election. Nebraska, Virginia, and Georgia, have also passed laws of this character.[101] In sharp contrast with these movements for better things within our states are the deplorable conditions currently alleged to exist in the greatest of all our nominating institutions,—the National Conventions. It would seem hardly possible to delay much longer reform measures designed to bring about improved conditions in this field.

Considering the many unsettled points with regard to the proper measures for regulating campaign contributions and the necessity for the extension of such reforms to many areas as yet untouched it is evident that we are dealing with a movement which has scarcely made more than a beginning. Even with satisfactory legislation on our statute books the fight will not be completely won. Fortunately it is believed that the argument of unconstitutionality cannot be employed against this movement.[102] Difficulties of administration will have to be met, however, although it is highly improbable that these will be so great as the difficulties occasioned by the execution of other parts of our corrupt practices acts, such for example as the manifold conditions which prevent the complete enforcement of laws against the bribery of voters. Bi-partisan state election boards may take over all ordinary official duties in connection with laws requiring the publicity of, or otherwise limiting, campaign contributions. In this work they may be somewhat aided by the mutual criticism of the parties themselves, although, unfortunately, this is a party function which is very imperfectly performed in the United States. Much good may be accomplished by such voluntary organisations as the New York _Association to Prevent Corrupt Practices at Elections_. With men of prominence in both of the leading parties in its directorate and membership the Association proposes:

“First, To ascertain whether any judicial proceedings should be brought by the Association’s initiative; that is to say, whether there is apparent evidence of bribery, or of deliberate falsification, concealment, and evasion in the statements [of campaign contributions and expenditures] such as would warrant a judicial inquiry to compel a proper accounting.”

“Second, To secure a permanent record for the Association of the important facts in connection with the statements filed, upon which an opinion may be based as to whether additional corrupt practices legislation ought to be recommended by the Association to the Legislature.”

The Association further intends to exercise the closest scrutiny over such items as “canvassers,” “watchers,” “expenditures for workers,” and so on. Particularly praiseworthy in its platform is the determination to prosecute violations before the courts. Unless some determined agency undertakes this function all campaign fund enactments will promptly sink to the level of those already too numerous American laws which adorn our statute books with ideal maxims but in practice are ignored by our administrators.[103]

Assuming both legislative and administrative activity in campaign fund reform still we must not overestimate the value of the probable results. Only a part of the problem of the support of party machinery and party workers will be solved thereby, but at least it may be said that an important contribution toward the ultimate complete solution of the problem will be made. Bribery and corruption will not be done away with by the reform. They are, as we have seen, much too persistent and extended to yield to any single reform effort. Indeed some forms of bribery may be encouraged by the new practice with regard to campaign contributions. Although it may be made impossible to place men under obligations while they are candidates it will still be possible to buy them, if they are purchasable, after they have been elected. One should remember, however, that if primaries and elections can be purged of corrupt financial influences it is probable that our successful candidates for office will be less open to venal influence than those who win out under the present vicious system. Thoroughgoing campaign fund reform will enable candidates to attain office without assuming financial burdens of such a character as to make it difficult for them to act in a perfectly honest and independent manner. By far the worst evil of the present system is the ease with which it enables men otherwise incorruptible to be placed tactfully, subtly, and—as time goes on—always more completely under obligations incompatible with public duty. Finally campaign fund reform will enable parties to become what democratic theory requires them to be, namely honest interpreters of the popular will instead of crooked agents of sinister influence into which they will otherwise degenerate. Taking the most moderate view of the benefits to arise from such reforms, therefore, it would seem a clear duty of all patriotic citizens and statesmen to work first for the publicity of campaign contributions and afterwards for such other restrictions upon their collection and use as experience may suggest.

FOOTNOTES:

[67] “Present Discontents,” Bohn ed. vol. i, p. 375.

[68] _Cf._ Jane Addams, “Democracy and Social Ethics,” ch. vii.

[69] _Cf._ “The Rise and Growth of American Politics,” p. 312.

[70] _Cf._ “The Rise and Growth of American Politics,” p. 323. He adds that: “No other nation in the world is rich enough for the political experimentation which the United States is carrying on; but when the end crowns the work, its cost may be found to have been small in comparison with the value of the recompense.”

[71] Nevada was the first state to enact legislation of this character. (L. 1895, ch. 103; repealed, 1899, ch. 108.) In the same year a Minnesota law (ch. 277) presented a very detailed definition of legitimate expenses. The laws of Pennsylvania (1906, ch. 17), and of New York (1906, ch. 503), are very significant. Professor Merriam sums them up as follows: “Both provide that no expenses shall be incurred except of the classes authorised in the act. The New York list, which is rather more liberal in this respect than that of Pennsylvania, includes rent of halls and compensation of speakers, music, and fireworks, advertisement and incidental expenses of meetings, posters, lithographs, banners, and literary material, payments to agents to supervise the preparation of campaign articles and advertisements, and furnish information to newspapers; for advertising, pictures, reading material, etc.; for rent of offices and club rooms, compensation of clerks and agents; for attorneys at law; for preparation of lists of voters; for necessary personal and travelling expenses of candidates and committeemen; for postage, express, telegraph, and telephone; for preparing nominating petitions; for workers and watchers at the polls, and food for the same; for transportation of the sick and infirm to the polls.” (“N. Y. State Library Review of Legislation, 1906,” p. 160.) _Cf._ also Virginia, L. 1903, ch. 98; South Dakota, L. 1907, ch. 146; and California, L. 1907, ch. 350.

In 1907, New York took the further step of limiting the amount of expenditure for a given purpose, ch. 398 of that year providing that not more than three carriages in a city district, nor more than six in other districts, should be used for the transportation of voters. Acting on the same principle Massachusetts in 1908 (ch. 85), prohibited the employment by political committees of more than six persons in a voting precinct or city ward. As the lavish expenditure of campaign funds for service, rents, and commodities may become nothing more than a veiled form of vote buying, the significance of the action of New York and Massachusetts is apparent. The English Act of 1883 contains similar provisions.

The New Jersey law of 1906 (ch. 208) contains a long list of _prohibited_ expenditures, including payments for entertainment, for fitting up club rooms for social or recreative purposes, or providing uniforms for any organised club, and the payment for insertion of articles in newspapers and magazines unless labelled as paid articles.

[72] _Cf._ also the Oregon law proposed by initiative petition and adopted June 1, 1908.

[73] New York now requires full reports from committees also (ch. 502, L. 1906).

[74] Iowa, L. 1907, ch. 50, followed New York’s example.

[75] “Republican Campaign Text Book,” 1908, p. 25. In his message at the beginning of the second (_i. e._, the first regular) session of the Sixty-first Congress on December 7, 1909, President Taft returns to the subject as follows:

“I urgently recommend to Congress that a law be passed requiring that candidates in elections of Members of the House of Representatives, and committees in charge of their candidacy and campaign, file in a proper office of the United States Government a statement of the contributions received _and of the expenditures incurred_ in the campaign for such elections, and that similar legislation be enacted in respect to all other elections which are constitutionally within the control of Congress.”

The passage in the foregoing, italicised by the writer, is noteworthy in that it indicates a step in advance by the president. His speech of acceptance referred to contributions only, whereas the message of December 7, 1909, demands publicity of expenditures as well as of party income.

[76] New York _Tribune_, November 24, 1908, p. 3. The Cincinnati _Enquirer_ of November 22, 1908, said that approximately 20,000 persons contributed to the Republican fund. Possibly the discrepancy is due to the inclusion in the latter figure of contributors to the finance committees of the Republican National Committee in the several states, which as noted above collected $620,150.

[77] Cincinnati _Commercial-Tribune_, November 23, 1908. According to the New York _Tribune_ of November 24, 1908, p. 3, in which is given a list of contributors to the Republican fund in sums of $500 and upward the larger contributors to the Republican fund were as follows: C. P. Taft, $110,000; Union League Club, New York, $34,377, Larz Anderson and G. A. Garrotson, each $25,000; Union League Club, Philadelphia, $22,500; Andrew Carnegie and J. P. Morgan each $20,000. In addition to these there were fifteen contributors of sums of between $6000 and $15,000 inclusive; twenty-four contributors of $5000 each; thirty-four of sums between $2500 and $4000 inclusive; twenty of $2000 each; twenty-eight of sums between $1250 and $1500 inclusive; one hundred and nineteen contributors of $1000 each; ten of between $750 and $900 inclusive; and two hundred and fifty contributors of $500 each.

The Democrats made a preliminary report of contributions on October 15, and daily reports thereafter until the election. As the newspapers did not state clearly whether the later figures regarding contributions were inclusive or additional it is difficult to summarise the larger contributions accurately. According to the New York _Times_ of October 14, Tammany Hall sent a check for $10,000 to the Democratic National Committee. The general report issued October 15, showed the following contributors in excess of $2000: C. J. Hughes, $5000; W. J. Bryan, Profits of the _Commoner_, $4046; Nathan Straus, $2500; National Democratic Club, $2500; Norman E. Mack, $2000; Sen. W. A. Clark, $2000; George W. Harris, $2000. Some of the foregoing were reported as making contributions after October 15, and if other contributions reported at various times were not repetitions the list of contributors of $2000 and over would be somewhat increased. On October 29, the New York _Times_ reported a gift of $10,000 from Herman Ridder, Treasurer of the Democratic Committee, and gifts of $9000 each from his three sons, Victor, Bernard, and Joseph. A contribution of $3000 from E. F. Goltra was also reported on this date. In addition to the foregoing, five contributions of between $1000 and $1500, and thirty-three of a thousand dollars each were reported. According to the Cincinnati _Commercial-Tribune_ of October 16, Democratic newspapers collected almost $100,000 out of the $248,000 obtained up to that date. The New York _Times_ of October 31, noted that one paper, _The New Orleans States_, had collected a total of $22,000, said to be the record contribution for any one newspaper.

[78] “The Dollars Behind the Ballots,” _World To-day_, vol. xv (1908), p. 946.

[79] _Cf._ p. 145, _supra_.

[80] As final corrections were being made upon these pages the continental press announces the passage of a publicity measure by Congress. Unfortunately the writer is unable to secure details upon which to base a judgment of the new law. That publicity before election was not provided for is, in his opinion, to be regretted. On the other hand the enactment as federal law of a measure of this character represents a decided victory for a principle capable of great expansion. In this connection the able and persistent propagandist work of the National Publicity Law Association under the presidency of Mr. Perry Belmont deserves the warmest commendation. Noteworthy also is the fact that the Association includes in its membership many of the most distinguished leaders of both political parties.—Paris, July 1, 1910.

[81] According to the English Corrupt and Illegal Practice Prevention Act of 1883, bribery as the unauthorised act of an agent renders the election invalid and disqualifies the candidate from representing the constituency in which the offence was committed for seven years. While the penalty may seem drastic it has the good effect of compelling candidates to scrutinise expenditures in their behalf with a degree of anxious care seldom duplicated on this side of the Atlantic.

[82] Missouri, L. 1907, p. 261. This law was declared unconstitutional in 1908, however, on the ground that it impaired liberty of press and speech. _Ex parte Harrison_, 110 S. W. 709.

[83] A similar provision was included in the Massachusetts law of 1892.

[84] A Michigan law which went into effect in 1892 (Repealed, ch. 61, 1901) provided that all expenditures on behalf of candidates, with few exceptions, should be made through the party committees.

[85] Following the four states which took action in 1897, Kentucky forbade corporate contributions in 1900. In 1905, Minnesota (ch. 291) made it a felony for an officer of a business corporation to vote money to a campaign fund. Wisconsin in the same year (ch. 492) made it a felony for a corporation to contribute to political parties for the purpose of influencing legislation or promoting or defeating the candidacy of persons for public office. New York in 1906, (ch. 239) prohibited political contributions by corporations and made violation of the act a misdemeanor. Alabama, Iowa, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Texas were the five states which forbade corporate contributions in 1907, and the following eleven were reported as specifically prohibiting contributions from life insurance companies in that year: Delaware, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Tennessee, and West Virginia. In 1908, Ohio, Georgia, Massachusetts, and Mississippi also forbade corporate contributions. Altogether to the end of 1908, seventeen states had forbidden corporate contributions in general, and eleven had specifically forbidden contributions from life insurance companies.

[86] Massachusetts, L. 1908, ch. 85.

[87] Ohio, L. 1896, p. 123; repealed, L. 1902, p. 77.

[88] Nebraska in L. 1899, ch. 29, fixed the same maxima and minima as the Garfield Act. The sliding scale principle was employed in the English Act of 1883.

[89] California, L., 1893, ch. 2; Missouri, L. 1893, p. 157; Montana, Penal Code, 1895, sec. 80 ff.; Minnesota, L. 1895, ch. 277; and New York, L. 1907, ch. 584.

[90] New York, L. 1895, 155; Connecticut, L. 1895, 338.

[91] California, L. 1907, ch. 350.

[92] New York, L. 1906, ch. 503.

[93] _Cf._ p. 177, _supra_.

[94] See p. 250, _supra_.

[95] _Cf._ p. 246, _supra_.

[96] Wisconsin, L. 1897, 358.

[97] _Cf._ President Arthur T. Hadley’s discussion of “The Constitutional Position of Property in America” in the _Independent_ of April 16, 1908.

[98] _Cf._ Professor C. Edward Merriam’s “Primary Elections.”

[99] Laws of 1896, p. 123. The repeal was due to minor defects in the law which could easily have been corrected by amendment.

[100] Laws of 1906, ch. 17.

[101] Nebraska, L. 1901, 30; Virginia L. 1903, ch. 98; Georgia, L. 1908, 63.

[102] An able argument on this point is presented by Mr. Perry Belmont in his “Publicity of Election Expenditures,” _North American Review_, vol. clxxx (1905), p. 166. For many of the most important facts cited in the preceding pages of this study the writer is indebted to Mr. Belmont’s valuable article.

[103] _Cf._ the Association’s searching “Report of Examination of Election Expense Statements, 1908;” also its leaflet on “Future Plans to Prevent Corrupt Practices.”

CORRUPTION AND NOTORIETY: THE MEASURE OF OUR OFFENDING

VII

CORRUPTION AND NOTORIETY: THE MEASURE OF OUR OFFENDING

Charges of corruption make up a large and important part of the stock in trade of the ordinary American journalist, politician, and reformer. One unfortunate result of this condition of affairs is that, taking us at our word, Europe is forming a very low estimate of the honesty of governmental and business practices on this side of the Atlantic. Even among ourselves corruption is coming to be thought of as an indefinite percentage of evil corroding the general service of the state, and this percentage is assumed to be much larger in the United States than abroad. Similar comparisons are drawn between the principal local and state governments of the country. One popular writer owes no small part of his vogue to the crisp and supposedly accurate tags which he has affixed to several of our municipalities and states, _e.g._, “corrupt and contented,” “half free and fighting on,” “a city ashamed,” “bad and glad of it,” “a traitor state,” “a state for sale,” and so on. Between actual corruption, however, and the notoriety attached to it no definite and known ratio can be said to exist. Much as it is to be regretted quantitative measures of this political and social evil are at present quite impossible. Many difficulties stand in the way even of approximations sufficiently exact for comparisons of any value. It may perhaps be as well worth while to consider the nature of these difficulties as to indulge in denunciation regardless of them.

In the first place a thoroughgoing policy of concealment and silence would seem absolutely essential on the part of those who engage in corrupt practices. Our most astute leaders and manipulators realise this fact. All observers agree, however, that among the initiated, which usually means a pretty large circle, corrupt transactions are discussed with comparative freedom. It is a matter of no great difficulty for an ordinarily capable reporter to learn in a general way what has been done by the boss or gang in certain instances, although this, of course, is sufficiently far from being legal evidence. And it is notorious that our politicians of the baser sort often indulge their cronies with boasting accounts of their own achievements in grafting. No one has commented upon this fact with greater vigour than Professor H. J. Ford of Princeton in his admirable review of Mr. Steffens’ _Shame of the Cities_.

“The facts with which Mr. Steffens deals,” writes Professor Ford, “are superficial symptoms. Hardly any disguise of them is attempted in the ordinary talk of local politicians. One of the first things which practical experience teaches is that the political ideals which receive literary expression have a closely limited range. One soon reaches strata of population in which they disappear, and the relation of boss and client appears to be proper and natural. The connection between grafting politicians and their adherents is such that ability to levy blackmail inspires the same sort of respect and admiration which Rob Roy’s followers felt for him in the times that provided a career for his particular talents. And as in Rob Roy’s day, intimate knowledge finds in the type some hardy virtues. For one thing, politicians of this type do not indulge in cant. They are no more shamefaced in talking about their grafting exploits to an appreciative audience than a mediæval baron would have been in discussing the produce of his feudal fees and imposts. Mr. Steffens has really done no more than to put together material lying about loose upon the surface of municipal politics and give it effective presentation. The general truth of his statement of the case is indisputable.”[104]

Possibly, however, Professor Ford underestimates the penetrating force of “political ideals which receive literary expression.” If by this phrase he means only the highest conclusions of philosophy clothed in the noblest language, it is apparent that a very small circle will be reached at first, although in time these ideals also are certain to be widely diffused by the schools, by journalism and by the learned professions. If, on the other hand, “literary expression” is understood to include the news and editorial columns and the cartoons of the daily newspaper, a great and constantly increasing body of readers are becoming amenable to ideals higher than those bred by the personal relation of “boss and client.” Tweed’s sensitiveness to the terribly cutting cartoons of Thomas Nast shows this process in the course of development. In spite of the fact, of which the Tammany chieftain had boasted, that most of his constituents could not read, he was nevertheless forced to exclaim:—“If those picture papers would only leave me alone I wouldn’t care for all the rest. The people get used to seeing me in stripes, and by and by grow to think I ought to be in prison.”[105] Even that portion of our foreign population which differs most widely in language and customs from the native American stock is being brought with amazing swiftness under the influence of the daily papers published in English.[106] That influence may not be all that we would like it, but at any rate it is much more broadening than the ethics of the clan.