Chapter VI: Part 6

[Sidenote: B.C. 325 (_a.u._ 429)] 2. The name and form of the office with which he was invested he shrank from changing, and when he was intending to spare Rullus,--for he observed the zeal of the populace,--he wished to resist him somewhat before granting the favor and to alter the attitude of the young men, so as to have his pardon come unexpectedly. Therefore he contracted his face, and darting a harsh frowning look at the populace, he raised his voice and spoke. The talking ceased, but still they were not quiet: instead, as generally happens in such a case, what with groaning over his fate and whispering one to another, in spite of their not uttering a single word they gave the impression that they desired the rescue of the cavalry commander. Papirius seeing this, in fear of their possibly taking hostile action, relaxed the extremely domineering manner which he had assumed (for purposes of their correction) in an unusual degree, and by showing moderation in the rest of his actions brought them once more to friendship and enthusiasm for him, so that they proved themselves men when they met their opponents. (Mai, p.160. Zonaras, 7, 26.)

3. ¶The Samnites after their defeat at the hands of the Romans, made proposals for truce to the Romans in the city. They sent them all the Roman captives that they held, together with the property of a man named Papius, [Footnote: _Papius Brutulus_.] who was esteemed among the foremost of his race and bore the entire responsibility for the war; his bones, since he anticipated them in committing suicide, they scattered abroad. Yet they did not obtain their peace; for they were regarded as untrustworthy and had the name of making truces according to events merely for the purpose of cheating any power that conquered them: hence they not only failed to obtain terms, but even brought a relentless war upon themselves. The Romans while accepting their prisoners voted to make war upon them without announcement. (Ursinus, p.374. Zonaras, 7, 26.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 321. (_a.u._ 433)] 4. Among the many events of human history that might give one cause for wonder must certainly be reckoned what occurred at this time. The Romans, who were so extremely arrogant as to vote that they would not again receive a herald from the Samnites in the matter of peace and hoped moreover to capture them all at the first blow, succumbed to a terrible disaster and incurred disgrace as never before; the others, who to begin with were badly frightened and thought the refusal to make peace a great calamity, seized their camp and entire force, and sent them all under the yoke. So great a reverse of fortune did they suffer. (Mai, p.161. Zonaras, 7, 26.)

5. Benefits lie rather within the actual choice of men and are not brought about by necessity, or by ignorance, or anger, or deceit, or anything of the sort, but are performed voluntarily by a willing and eager condition of spirit. And for this reason it is proper to pity, admonish, instruct those who commit any error and to admire, love, reward those who do right. Whenever men act in both of these two ways, it is decidedly more befitting our characters to remember their better than their less correct deeds. [Footnote: Sections 5, 6, and 7 appear to come from various speeches delivered at the Caudine Forks; section 8, however, is from the speech of Herennius Pontius.] (Mai, p.535.)

6. ¶Quarrels are checked by kindness. The greater the pitch of enmity to which a man has come when he unexpectedly obtains safety instead of severity, the more readily does he hasten voluntarily to abandon the quarrel and to acknowledge gladly the influence of kindness. B.C. 321 (_a.u._ 433) As in a random host of persons at variance from divers causes those who have passed from friendship to enmity hate each other with the more intense hatred, so in a random host of persons kindly treated do those who receive this considerate treatment after a state of strife love their benefactors the more. Romans, accordingly, are very anxious to surpass in war and at the same time they honor virtue; for this reason, compelled in both regards by their nobility of spirit, they verily earn the right to surpass, since they take pains to recompense fair treatment fairly, and even beyond its value. (Mai, p.161.)

7. For it is right to pride one's self upon requiting those who have done some wrong, but to feel more highly elated over recompensing such as have conferred some benefit. (Mai, p.536.)

8. ¶All men are by nature so constituted as to grieve more over any insults offered them than they rejoice over benefits conferred upon them: therefore they show hostility to persons who have injured them with less effort than they require for aiding in return persons who have shown them kindness; hence also they make no account, when their own advantage is concerned, of the ill reputation they will gain by not taking a friendly attitude toward their preserver, but indulge a spirit of wrath even when such behavior runs counter to their own interest.

Such was the advice he gave them out of his own inherent good sense and experience acquired in a long life, not looking to the gratification of the moment but to the possible regret of the future. (Mai, p.162.)

9. ¶The people of Capua, when the Romans after [Sidenote: B.C. 321 (_a.u._ 433)] their defeat arrived in that city, were guilty of no bitter speech or outrageous act, but on the contrary gave them both food and horses and received them like victors. They pitied in their misfortune the men whom they would have not wished to see conquer on account of the treatment those same persons had formerly accorded them. When the Romans heard of the event they were altogether possessed by doubt whether to be pleased at the survival of their soldiers or whether to continue displeased. When they thought of the depth of the disgrace their grief was extreme; for they deemed it unworthy of them to have met with defeat, and especially at the hands of the Samnites, so that they could wish that all had perished; when they stopped to reflect, however, that if such a calamity had befallen them all the rest as well would have incurred danger, they were not sorry to hear that the men had been saved. (Mai, p.162. Zonaras, 7, 26.) 10. ¶It is requisite and blameless for all men to plan for their own safety, and if they get into any danger to do anything whatsoever so as to be preserved. (Mai, p.163.)

11. ¶Pardon is granted both by gods and by men to such as have committed any act involuntarily. (Ib. Zonaras, 7, 26.)

12. Dio in Book 8: "I both take to myself the crime and admit the perjury." (Bekker, Anecd. p.165, 13.)

13. Dio in Book 8: "For in all such matters he was quite all-sufficient to himself." [Footnote: This is thought to refer to L. Papirius Cursor or possibly to Q. Fabius Maximus. Cp. Livy, X, 26.] (Ib. p.124, 1.)

14.[Sidenote: B.C. 321 (_a.u._ 433)] ¶The Samnites, seeing that neither were the oaths observed by them nor gratitude for favors manifested in any other way, and that few instead of many were surrendered, thus making void the oaths, became terribly angry and loudly called upon the gods in respect to some of these matters: moreover, they brought the pledges to their attention, demanded the captives, and ordered them to pass naked under the same yoke where through pity they had been released, in order that by experience they might learn to abide by terms which had been once agreed upon. The men that had been surrendered they dismissed, either because they did not think it right to destroy guiltless persons or because they wished to fasten the perjury upon the populace and not through the punishment of a few men to absolve the rest. This they did, hoping as a result to secure decent treatment. (Mai, p.163. Zonaras, 7, 26.) 15. ¶The Romans so far from being grateful to the Samnites for the preservation of the surrendered soldiers, actually behaved as if they had in this suffered some outrage. They showed anger in their conduct of the war, and, being victorious, treated the Samnites in the same way. For the justice of the battle-field does not fit the ordinary definition of the word, and it is not inevitable that the party which has been wronged should conquer: instead, war, in its absolute sway, adjusts everything to the advantage of the victor, often causing something that is the reverse of justice to go under that name. (Mai, p.163. Zonaras, 7, 26.)

16.[Sidenote: B.C. 321 (_a.u._ 433)] ¶The Romans after vanquishing the Samnites sent the captives in their turn under the yoke, regarding as satisfactory to their honor a repayment of similar disgrace. So did Fortune for both parties in the briefest time reverse her position and by treating the Samnites to the same humiliation at the hands of their outraged foes show clearly that here, too, she was all-supreme. (Mai, p. 164. Zonaras, 7, 26.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 319 (_a.u._ 435)] 17. ¶ Papirius made a campaign against the Samnites and having reduced them to a state of siege entrenched himself before them. At this time some one reproached him with excessive use of wine, whereupon he replied: "That I am not intoxicated is clear to every one from the fact that I am up at the peep of dawn and lie down to rest latest of all. But on account of having public affairs on my mind day and night alike, and not being able to obtain sleep easily, I take a little wine to lull me to rest." (Mai, ib.)

18. ¶ The same man one day while making the rounds of the garrison became angry on not finding the general from Præneste at his post. He summoned him and bade him hand the axe to the lictor. Alarm and consternation at this was evident on the part of the general, and his fear sufficed. Papirius harmed him no further but merely gave orders to the lictor to cut off some roots growing beside the tents, so that they should not injure passers-by. (Mai, ib.)

19. ¶ In numerous cases instances of good fortune are not at all constant, but lead many aside into paths of carelessness and ruin them.[Footnote: Cp. Livy, IX, 18, 8.] (Mai, p. 165.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 310 (_a.u._ 444)] 20. ¶ The men of the city put forward Papirius as dictator, and fearing that Rullus might be unwilling to name him on account of his own experiences while master of the horse, they sent for him and begged him to put the common weal before a private grudge. And he gave the envoys, indeed, no response, but when night had come (according to ancient custom it was quite necessary that the dictator be appointed at night), he named Papirius and secured by this act the greatest renown.(Valesius, p. 585.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 296 (_a.u._)] 21. ¶ Appius the Blind and Volumnius became at variance each with the other: and it was owing to this that Volumnius once, when Appius charged him in the assembly with showing no gratitude for the progress he had made in wisdom through Appius's instruction, answered that he had indeed grown wiser and was likewise ready to admit it, but that Appius had not advanced at all in matters pertaining to war. (Mai, p. 165.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 296 (_a.u._ 458)] 22. ¶ As regards the prophecy the multitude was not capable for the time being of either believing or disbelieving him.[Footnote: I.e., Manius, an Etruscan.] It neither wished to hope for everything, inasmuch as it did not desire to see everything fulfilled, nor did it dare to refuse belief in all points inasmuch as it wished to be victorious, but was placed in an extremely painful position, as it were between confusion and fear. As each single event occurred they applied the interpretation to it according to the actual result, and the man himself undertook to assume some reputation for skill with regard to the foreknowledge of the unseen. (Mai, p. 165. Cp. Zonaras, 8, 1.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 293 (_a.u._ 461)] 23. ¶ The Samnites, enraged at what occurred and deeming it highly disgraceful to be defeated, resorted to extreme daring and folly with the intention of either conquering or being utterly destroyed. They assembled all their men that were of military age, threatening with death all that should remain at home, and they bound themselves with frightful oaths to the effect that no man should flee from the contest but should slaughter any person that might undertake to do so. (Mai, ib. Zonaras, 8, 1.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 292 (_a.u._ 462)] 24. ¶ The Romans on hearing that their consul Fabius had been worsted in the war became terribly angry and summoned him to stand trial. A vehement denunciation of the man was made before the people,--and, indeed, he was depressed by the injury to his father's reputation even more than by the complaints,--and no opportunity was afforded the object of the attack for reply. Nor did the elder man make a set defence of his son, but by enumerating his own services and those of his ancestors, and by promising furthermore that his son would do nothing unworthy of them, he abated the people's wrath, especially since he urged his son's youth. Moreover, he joined him at once in the campaign, overthrew the Samnites in battle, though they were elated by their victory, and captured their camp and great booty. The Romans therefore extolled him and ordered that his son also should command for the future with consular powers, and still employ his father as lieutenant. The latter managed and arranged everything for him, sparing his old age not a whit, and the allied forces readily assisted the father in remembrance of his old-time deeds. He made it clear, however, that he was not executing the business on his own responsibility, but he associated with his son as if actually in the capacity of counselor and under-officer, while he moderated his temperament and assigned to him the glory of the exploits. (Valesius, p. 585. Zonaras, 8, 1.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 291 (_a.u._ 463)] 25. ¶ The soldiers with Junius who took the field along with Postumius fell sick on the way, and thought that their trouble was due to the felling of the grove. He was recalled for these reasons, but showed contempt for them even at this juncture, declaring that the senate was not his master but that he was master of the senate [lacuna] Envio [lacuna] and the [lacuna] men much [lacuna] ambition [lacuna] [Words of Postumius Megillus: Cp. Dionys. Hal. Ant. Rom. 16, [Footnote: The famous Apollonius of Tyana.]. (Mai, p. 167.)

[Frag. XXXIV]

¶ Gaius Fabricius in most respects was like Rufinus, but in incorruptibility far superior. He was very firm against bribes, and on that account did not please Rufinus, but was always at variance with him. Yet the latter chose Fabricius, thinking that he was a most proper person to meet the requirements of the war, and making his personal enmity of little account in comparison with the advantage of the commonwealth.

[Frag. XXXIV]

As a result he gained some reputation for having shown himself above jealousy, which springs up in the hearts of many of the best men by reason of emulation. Since he was a thorough patriot and did not practice virtue for a show he thought it a matter of indifference whether the State were benefited by him or through some other man, even if that man should be an opponent. (Valesius, p.586.)

[Frag. XXXV]

¶Cornelius Fabricius, when asked why he had entrusted the business to his foe, [lacuna][Footnote: See Niebuhr, Rh. Mus., 1828, p.600, or _Kleine Schriften_, 2, p.241.] the general excellence of Rufius and added that to be spoiled by the citizen is preferable to being bought and sold by the enemy. [This anecdote concerns Fabricius Luscinus, mentioned by Cicero, de orat. 2, 66, 268; Quintilian 12, 1, 43; Gellius 4, 48.]

[Frag. XXXVI]

[Sidenote: B.C. 290 (_a.u._ 464)] ¶Curius, in defence of his conduct in the popular assembly, said that he had acquired so much land [lacuna] and had hunted for so many men [lacuna] country [lacuna] [The person referred to is Manius Curius Dentatus. Cp. Auct. de Viris. Illustr., c. 33.

¶After Niebuhr, Rh. Mus. 1828, p.579.]

[Frag. XXXVII]

¶When the tribunes moved an annulment of debts, the law was often proposed without avail, since the lenders were by no means willing to accept it and the tribunes granted the nobles the choice of either putting this law to the vote or following that of Stolo, by which they were to reckon the previous interest toward the principal and receive the remainder in triennial payments. [Footnote: The opening portion of this fragment is based largely on conjectures of Niebuhr (Rhein. Mus., 1828, p.579ff.)] And for the time being the weaker party, dreading lest it might lose all, paid court to them, and the wealthier class, encouraged to think it would not be compelled to adopt either course, maintained a hostile attitude. But when the revolted [Footnote: A doubtful reading.] party proceeded to press matters somewhat, both sides changed their positions. The debtors were no longer satisfied with either plan, and the nobles thought themselves lucky if they should not be deprived of their principal. Hence the dispute was not decided immediately, but subsequently they prolonged their rivalry in a spirit of contentiousness, and did not act at all in their usual character. Finally the people made peace in spite of the fact that the nobles were unwilling to remit much more than they had originally expected; however, the more they beheld their creditors yielding, the more were they emboldened, as if they were successful by a kind of right; and consequently they regarded the various concessions almost as matters of course and strove for yet more, using as a stepping-stone to that end the fact that they had already obtained something. (Mai, p.167. Zonaras, 8,2.)

[Frag. XXXVIII]

¶When the opposite side [Footnote: The Tuscans, Senones, and Gauls appear to be meant.] saw also another general approaching, they ceased to heed the common interests of their force but each cast about to secure his individual safety, as a common practice of those who form a union uncemented by kindred blood, or who make a campaign without common grievances, or who have not one commander. While good fortune attends them their views are harmonious, but in disaster each one sees before him only matters of individual concern. They betook themselves to flight as soon as it had grown dark, without having communicated to one another their intention. In a body they thought it would be impossible for them to force their way out or for their defection to pass unnoticed, but if they should leave each on his own account and, as they believed, alone, they would more easily escape. And so, to his own party,--each one of them [lacuna] they will think that accomplishing their flight with the greatest security [lacuna] (Mai, p.167.)

[Frag. XXXIX]

[Sidenote: B.C. 283 (_a.u._ 471)] 1. The Romans had learned that the Tarentini and some others were making ready to war against them, and had despatched Fabricius as an envoy to the allied cities to prevent them from committing any revolutionary act: but they had him arrested, and by sending men to the Etruscans and Umbrians and Gauls they caused a number of them also to secede, some immediately and some a little later. (Ursinus, p.375. Zonaras, 8, 2-Vol. II, p.174, 4 sq.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 283 (_a.u._ 471)] 2. ¶The Tarentini, although they had themselves initiated the war, nevertheless were sheltered from fear. For the Romans, who understood what they were doing, pretended not to know it on account of temporary embarrassments. Hereupon the Tarentini, thinking that they either could mock [Footnote: Verb adopted from Boissevain's conjecture [Greek: _diasilloun_] (cp. the same word in Book Fifty-nine, chapter 25). at Rome or were entirely unobserved because they were receiving no complaints behaved still more insolently and involved the Romans even contrary to their own wishes in a war. This proved the saying that even good fortune, when a disproportionately large portion of it falls to the lot of any individuals, becomes the cause of disaster to them; it entices them on to a state of frenzy (since moderation refuses to cohabit with vanity) and ruins their greatest interests. So these Tarentini, too, after rising to an unexampled height of prosperity in turn met with a misfortune that was an equivalent return for their wantonness. (Mai, p.168 and 536.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 282 (_a.u._ 472)] 3. Dio in Book 9: "Lucius Valerius, [Footnote: Appian (Samnite Wars, VII, 1) gives the second name as Cornelius.] who was admiral of the Romans and had been despatched on some errand by them." (Bekker, Anecd. p.158, 25. Zonaras, 8, 2.)

4. ¶Lucius was despatched by the Romans to Tarentum. Now the Tarentini were celebrating the Dionysia, and sitting gorged with wine in the theatre of an afternoon suspected that he was sailing against them as an enemy. Immediately in a passion and partly under the influence of their intoxication they set sail in turn: so without any show of force on his part or the slightest expectation of any hostile act they attacked and sent to the bottom both him and many others. When the Romans heard of this they naturally were angry, but did not choose to take the field against Tarentum at once. However, they despatched envoys in order not to seem to have passed over the affair in silence and by that means render them more impudent. But the Tarentini, so far from receiving them decently or even sending them back with an answer in any way suitable, at once, before so much as granting them an audience, made sport of their dress and general appearance. It was the city garb, which we use in the Forum; and this the envoys had put on, either for the sake of stateliness or else through fear, thinking that this at least would cause the foreigners to respect their position. Bands of revelers accordingly jeered at them,--they were still celebrating the festival, which, although they were at no time noted for temperate behavior, rendered them still more wanton,--and finally a man planted himself in the road of Postumius and, with a forward inclination, threw him down and soiled his clothing. At this an uproar arose from all the rest, who praised the fellow as if he had performed some remarkable deed, and they sang many scurrilous anapæsts upon the Romans, accompanied by applause and capering steps. But Postumius cried: "Laugh, laugh while you may! For long will be the period of your weeping, when you shall wash this garment clean with your blood." (Ursinus, p.375. Mai, 168. Zonaras, 8, 2.)

5. Hearing this they ceased their jests but could accomplish nothing towards obtaining pardon for their insult: however, they took to themselves credit for a kindness in the fact that they let the ambassadors withdraw unharmed. (Mai, ib.)

6. ¶Meton, failing to persuade the Tarentini not to engage in hostilities with the Romans, retired unobserved from the assembly, put garlands on his head, and returned along with some fellow-revelers and a flute girl. At the sight of him singing and dancing the kordax, they gave up the business in hand to accompany his movements with shouts and hand-clapping, as is often done under such circumstances. But he, after reducing them to silence, spoke: "Now it is yours both to be drunken and to revel, but if you accomplish what you plan to do, we shall be slaves." (Mai, p.169.)

[Frag. XL]

[Sidenote: B.C. 281 (_a.u._ 473)] ¶King Pyrrhus was not only king of the district called Epirus, but had made the larger part of the Greek world his own, partly by kindness and partly by fear. The Ætolians, who at that period possessed great power, and Philip [Footnote: The son of Cassander, who ruled only four months in B. C. 296.] the Macedonian, and the chief men in Illyricum did his bidding. By natural brilliancy and force of education and experience in affairs he far surpassed all, so as to be esteemed far beyond what was warranted by his own powers and those of his allies, although these powers were great. (Valesius, p.589. Zonaras, 8, 2.)

2. ¶Pyrrhus, the king of Epirus, had a particularly high opinion of his powers in that he was deemed by foreign nations a match for the Romans: and he believed that it would be opportune to assist the fugitives who had taken refuge with him, especially as they were Greeks, and at the same time to anticipate the Romans with some plausible excuse before he received any damage at their hands. So careful was he about a fair pretext that though he had long had his eye on Sicily and had been considering how he could overthrow the Roman dominion, he shrank from taking the initiative in hostilities, when no wrong had been done him. (Mai, p.169. Zonaras, 8, 2.)

3. ¶King Pyrrhus was said to have captured more cities by Cineas than by his own spear. For the latter, says Plutarch, [Footnote: Cp. Plutarch, Life of Pyrrhus, chapter 14.] was skilled in speaking,--the only one in fact to be compared in skill with Demosthenes. Notwithstanding, as a sensible man, he spoke in opposition to Pyrrhus, pointing out to him the folly of the expedition. For the king intended by his prowess to rule the whole earth, whereas Cineas urged him to be satisfied with his own possessions, which were sufficient for enjoyment. But the man's fondness for war and fondness for leadership prevailed against the advice of Cineas and caused him to depart in disgrace from both Sicily and Italy, after losing in all of the battles many myriads of his own forces. (Valesius, p.586.)

4. ¶Pyrrhus sent to Dodona and enquired of the oracle about the expedition. And a response having come to him: "You, if you cross into Italy, Romans shall conquer," he construed it according to his wish (for desire has mighty power to deceive any one) and would not even await the coming of spring. (Mai, p.169.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 280 (_a.u._ 474)] 5. ¶The Rhegians had asked of the Romans a garrison, and Decius [Footnote: _Decius Vibellius_.] was the leader of it. The majority of these guards, accordingly, as a result of the excess of supplies and general easy habits,--for they enjoyed a far less strenuous existence than they had known at home,--through the persuasion of Decius formed the desire to kill the foremost Rhegians and occupy the city. It seemed as though they might be quite free to perform whatever they pleased, unconcerned about the Romans, who were busied with the Tarentini and with Pyrrhus. Decius was further enabled to persuade them by the fact that they saw Messana in the power of the Mamertines. The latter, who were Campanians and had been appointed to garrison it by Agathocles, the lord of Sicily, had slaughtered the natives and occupied the town.

The conspirators did not, however, make their attempt openly, since they were decidedly inferior in numbers. Letters were forged by Decius, purporting to have been written to Pyrrhus by some citizens with a view to the betrayal of the city. He next assembled the soldiers and read these to them, stating that they had been intercepted, and by his talk (the character of which may easily be conceived) excited them greatly. The effect was enhanced by the sudden announcement of a man (who had been assigned to the role) that a portion of Pyrrhus's fleet had anchored somewhere off the coast, having come for a conference with the traitors. Others, who had been instructed, magnified the matter, and shouted out that they must anticipate the Rhegians before some harm happened, and that the traitors, ignorant of what was being done, would find it difficult to resist them. So some rushed down to the landing places, and others broke into the houses and slaughtered great numbers,--save that a few had been invited to dinner by Decius and were slain there. (Valesius, p.589.)

6. ¶Decius, commander of the garrison, after slaying the Rhegians, ratified friendship with the Mamertines, thinking that the similar nature of their outrages would render them most trustworthy allies. He was well aware that a great many men find the ties resulting from some common transgression stronger to unite them than the obligations of lawful association or the bonds of kinship. (Mai, p.170.)

7. ¶The Romans suffered some reproach from them for a while, until such time as they took the field against them. For since they were busied with concerns that were greater and more urgent, what these men did seemed to some of comparatively little importance. (Mai, p.170.)

8. ¶The Romans, on learning that Pyrrhus was to come, stood in terror of him, since they had heard that he was a good warrior and had a large force by no means despicable as an adversary,--the sort of information, of course, that is always given to enquirers in regard to persons unknown to them who live at a very great distance. (Mai, p.170. Zonaras, 8,3.)

9. For it is impossible that persons not brought up under the same institutions, nor filled with the same ambitions, nor regarding the same things as base or noble, should ever become friends with one another. [Footnote: Nos. 9, 10, and 11 are thought to be possibly from the speech made by Lævinus to the soldiers (Zonaras, VIII, 3, 6).] (Mai, p. 537.)

10. ¶Ambition and distrust are always qualities of tyrants, and so it is inevitable that they should possess no real friend. A man who is distrusted and envied could not love any one sincerely. Moreover, a similarity of habits and a like station in life and the fact that the same objects are disastrous and beneficial to persons are the only forces that can create true, firm friends. Wherever any one of these conditions is lacking, you see a delusive appearance of comradeship, but find it to be without secure support. (Mai, p.170 and 537.)

11. ¶Generalship, if it is assisted by respectable forces of men, contributes greatly both to their preservation and their chances of victory, but by itself is worth nothing. Nor is there any other profession that is of weight without persons to coöperate and to aid in its administration. (Mai, p.171.)

12. ¶When Megacles was dead and Pyrrhus had cast off his cap the battle took an opposite turn. One side was filled with much greater boldness by his preservation and the fact that he had survived contrary to their fears than if the idea had never gained ground that he was dead: the other side, deceived, had no second fund of zeal to expend, but, since they had been cut short in their premature encouragement and because of the sudden change in their feelings to an expectation of less favorable results, had no hope that he might subsequently perish once more. (Mai, p.171. Zonaras, 8, 3.)

13. ¶When certain men congratulated Pyrrhus on his victory, he accepted the glory of the exploit, but said that if he should ever conquer again in like fashion, it would be his ruin. Besides this story, it is told of him that he admired the Romans even in their defeat and judged them superior to his own soldiers, declaring: "I should already have mastered the whole inhabited world, were I king of the Romans." (Mai, p.171. Zonaras, 8, 3.)

14. ¶Pyrrhus became famous for his victory and acquired a great reputation from it, to such an extent that many who were standing neutral came over to his side and that all the allies who had been watching the turn of events espoused his cause. He did not openly display anger towards them nor conceal entirely his suspicions; he rebuked them somewhat for their tardiness, but otherwise received them kindly. The result of showing excessive irritation would be, he feared, their open estrangement, while if he failed to reveal his real feelings at all, he thought that he would either be condemned by them for his simplicity in not comprehending what they had done, or would be suspected of harboring secret wrath. Such a surmise would breed in them either contempt or hatred, or would lead to a plot against him, due to the desire to anticipate injuries that they might suffer at his hands. For these reasons, then, he conversed affably with them and presented to them some of the spoils. (Mai, p.172. Zonaras, 8, 4.)

15. ¶Pyrrhus at first undertook to persuade the Roman captives (who were many) to join with him in a campaign against Rome; when, however, they refused, he treated them with the utmost consideration and did not put them in prison or harm them in any other way, his intention being to restore them voluntarily and through their agency to win over the city without a battle. (Valesius, p.590.)

16. ¶The Romans, who by reason of the elephants,--a kind of beast that they had never before seen,--had fallen into dismay, still, by reflecting on the mortal nature of the animals and the fact that no beast is superior to man, but that all of them in every way show inferiority if not as regards strength, at least in respect to understanding, they gradually became encouraged. (Mai, p.172.)

17. ¶The soldiers of Pyrrhus, also, both his native followers and the allies, showed tremendous eagerness for plunder, which seemed to lie ready before them and to be free from danger. (Mai, ib.)

18. ¶The Epirots dishonored the ties of friendship, through vexation that after making the campaign supported by high hopes they were getting nothing except trouble. And this happened very opportunely for the Romans: for the dwellers in Italy that had leagued themselves with him, on seeing that he ravaged the possessions of allies and enemies alike, withdrew. In other words, his acts made a greater impression upon them than his promises. (Mai, ib.)

19. ¶Pyrrhus dreaded being cut off on all sides by the Romans, while he was in unfamiliar regions. When his allies showed displeasure at this he told them that he could see clearly from the country itself what a difference existed between them and the Romans. The subject territory of the latter had all kinds of trees, vineyards and farms, and expensive agricultural machinery; whereas the property of his own friends had been so pillaged, that it was impossible to tell even whether it had ever been settled. (Mai, p.173. Zonaras, 8, 4.)

20. ¶The same man, when as he was retreating it occurred to him to wonder [Footnote: Gap supplied by van Herwerden.] how he beheld the army of Lævinus much larger than it was before, declared that the Roman troops when cut to pieces grew whole again, hydra-fashion. This did not, however, cause him to lose courage: he made preparations in his turn, but did not come to the issue of battle. (Mai, p.173. Zonaras, 8,4.)

21. ¶Pyrrhus, who learned that Fabricius and other envoys were approaching, to treat in behalf of the captives, sent a guard to them as far as the border, to the end that they should suffer no violence at the hands of the Tarentini, met them in due time, escorted them to the city, entertained them brilliantly and honored them in other ways, expecting that they would ask for a truce and make such terms as was proper for a defeated party. (Ursinus, p.376. Zonaras, 8, 4.)

22. ¶When Fabricius made this statement merely: "The Romans sent us to bring back the men captured in battle, and to pay ransoms of such size for them as shall be agreed upon by both of us," he was quite dumbfounded because the man did not say that he was commissioned to treat about peace; and after removing them he took counsel with the friends who were usually his advisers partly, to be sure, about the return of the captives, but chiefly about the war and its management, whether with vehemence or in some other way it [lacuna] (Four pages are lacking.) (Mai, p.173. Zonaras, 8, 4.)

23 [lacuna]. "to manage, or to run the risk of battles and combats, the outcome of which is doubtful. [Footnote: Cineas is the speaker.] Hence, if you heed me, Milo, and the old proverb, you will not employ violence for any purpose rather than skill, where the latter is feasible, since Pyrrhus knows precisely what he has to do and does not need to be enlightened by us regarding a single detail of his program." By this speech they were all brought to one decision, particularly because this course entailed neither loss nor danger, whereas the others were likely to bring both. And Pyrrhus, being of this mind, said to the ambassadors: "Not willingly, Romans, did I previously make war upon you, and I would not war against you now: I feel that it is of the highest importance to become your friend, and for this reason I release all the captives without ransom and make a treaty of peace." Privately, also, he did them favors, in order that, if possible, they might take his part, or at any rate obtain friendship for him. (Mai, p.173. Zonaras, 8, 4.)

24. Pyrrhus made friends of nearly all, and with Fabricius he conversed as follows: "Fabricius, I do not want to be at war with you any longer, and indeed I repent that I heeded the Tarentini in the first place and came hither, although I have beaten you badly in battle. I would gladly, then, become a friend to all the Romans, but most of all to you. For I see that you are a thoroughly excellent and reputable [Footnote: The two words "and reputable" are a conjecture of Bossevain's. Some ten letters in the MS. have faded out.] man. I accordingly ask you to help me in getting peace and furthermore to accompany me home. I want to make a campaign against Greece and need you as adviser and general." Fabricius replied: "I commend you for repenting of your expedition and desiring peace, and will cordially assist you in that purpose if it is to our advantage (for of course you will not ask me, a man who pretends to uprightness, as you say, to do anything against my country); but an adviser and general you must never choose from a democracy: as for me, I have no leisure whatever. Nor could I ever accept any of these things, because it is not seemly for an ambassador to receive gifts at all. I would fain know, therefore, whether you in very truth regard me as a reputable man or not. If I am a scoundrel, how is it that you deem me worthy of gifts? If, on the other hand, I am a man of honor, how can you bid me accept them? Let me assure you, then, of the fact that I have many possessions and am in no need of more: what I own supplies me and I feel no desire for what belongs to others. You, however, even if you believe yourself ever so rich, are in unspeakable poverty. For you would not have crossed over to this land, leaving behind Epirus and the rest of your dominions, if you had been content with them and had not been reaching out for more. Whenever a man is in this condition and sets no limit to his greed, he is the poorest of beggars. And why? Because he longs for everything not his own as if it were absolutely necessary, and with the idea that he could not live without it.

"Consequently I would gladly, since you call yourself my friend, afford you a little of my own wealth. It is far more secure and imperishable than yours, and no one envies it or plots against it, neither populace nor tyrant: best of all, the larger the number of persons who share it, the greater it will grow. In what, accordingly, does it consist? In using the little one has with as much satisfaction as if it were inexhaustible, in refraining from the goods of others as if they contained some mighty danger, in wronging no man, in doing well to many, and in numberless other details, which only a person of leisure could rehearse. I, for my part, should choose, if it were absolutely necessary to suffer either one or the other, to perish by violence rather than by deceit. The former falls to the lot of some by the decree of Fortune, but the latter only as a result of folly and great greed of gain: it is, therefore, preferable to fall by the crushing hand of Fate [Footnote: Omitting [Greek: ti], and reading [Greek: thehioy], which the MSS. give.] rather than by one's own baseness. In the former instance a man's body is laid low, but in the latter his soul is ruined as well,[lacuna] but in that case a man becomes to a certain extent the slayer of himself, because he who has once taught his soul not to be content with the fortune already possessed, acquires a boundless desire for increased advantages." (Mai, pp.174 and 538. Zonaras, 8, 4.)

25. And they presented themselves for the enlistment with the greatest zeal, believing, each man of them, that his own defection would mean the overthrow of the fatherland. [Footnote: Cp. Plutarch, Life of Pyrrhus, chapter 18 (early).] (Mai, p.176.)

26. Such is the nature of oratory and so great is its power that it led even them to change, causing courage and hatred to take the place respectively of the fear inspired by Pyrrhus and the estrangements his gifts had wrought. (Mai, ib.)

27. ¶Every force which, contrary to expectation, is humbled in spirit, suffers a loss also in strength. (Mai, p.177.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 279 (_a.u._ 475)] 28. ¶Pyrrhus sent to Decius, telling him that he would not succeed in accomplishing this even if he wished it [i. e., to die without being seized] and threatened besides that if he were taken alive he should perish miserably. To this the consuls answered that they were in no need of having recourse to such a proceeding as the one to which he alluded, since they were sure to conquer him in other ways. (Mai, ib. Zonaras, 8, 5.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 278 (_a.u._ 476)] 29. He did not know how he would repulse the one of them [Footnote: "They" are C. Fabricius Luscinus and Q. Aemilius Papus, Roman consuls.] first, nor how he should repel them both, and was in perplexity. To divide the army, which was smaller than that of his opponents, was something he feared to do, yet to allow one of them to ravage the country with impunity seemed to him almost out of the question. (Mai, p.177.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 277 (_a.u._ 477)] 30. However, he behaved in general toward them with great circumspection, and awarded greater credit for his safety to the fact that no one, even if he wished, could harm him, than to the probability that no one would have desired to inflict an injury. It was for this reason, too, that he expelled and slew many who held office and many who called him in to help in their disputes. This was partly because he was somewhat displeased with them, on account of their statements that he had secured the reins of power in the State through their influence, and partly because he was suspicious of them and thought that as they had come over to his side so they might go over to some one else's [lacuna] (Mai, p.178. Zonaras, 8, 5.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 276 (_a.u._ 479)] 31. ¶As the allies were unwilling to contribute anything for the support of Pyrrhus, he betook himself to the treasuries of Persephone, that were widely reputed for their wealth, despoiled them and sent the spoils on ships to Tarentum. And the men almost all perished through a storm, while the money and offerings were cast out on land. (Valesius, p.590.)

32. ¶All admired the following act of Pyrrhus. Some youths at a banquet had ridiculed him, and at first he wished to have them before a court and exact vengeance, but, afterward, when they declared: "We should have said a lot more things a good deal worse, if the wine hadn't failed us," he laughed and let them go. (Mai, ib. Zonaras, 8, 6.)

[Frag. XLI]

[Sidenote: B.C. 273 (_a.u._ 481)] ¶Ptolemy, nicknamed Philadelphus, king of Egypt, when he learned that Pyrrhus had fared poorly and that the Romans were growing, sent gifts to them and made a compact. The Romans, accordingly, pleased that a monarch living so very far away should have come to respect them, despatched ambassadors to him in turn. From him the envoys, too, received magnificent gifts; but when they had offered these to the treasury, they would not accept them. (Ursinus, p.374. Zonaras, 8, 6.)

[Frag. XLII]

[Sidenote: B.C. 266 (_a.u._ 488)]¶Though the Romans were faring in this manner and were constantly rising to greater heights they showed no haughtiness as yet: on the contrary, they surrendered to the Appolloniatians (Corinthian colonists on the Ionian Gulf) Quintus Fabius, a senator, because he had insulted some of their ambassadors. The people of this town, however, did him no harm, and even sent him home. (Valesius, p.590. Zonaras, 8, 7.)

[Frag. XLIII]

1. ¶The causes responsible for the dispute between the two were--on the side of the Romans that the Carthaginians had assisted the Tarentini, on the side of the Carthaginians, that the Romans had made a treaty of friendship with Hiero. But these they merely put forward as excuses, as those are inclined to do who in reality are desirous of advancing their own interests but pause before a reputation for such action. The truth is different. As a matter of fact, the Carthaginians, who had long been powerful, and the Romans, who were now growing rapidly, kept viewing each other with jealousy; and they were incited to war partly by the desire of continually getting more, according to the instinct of the majority of mankind, most active when they are most successful, and partly also by fear. Each alike thought that the one sure salvation for her own possessions lay in obtaining what the other held. If there had been no other reason, it was most difficult, nay, impossible, for two nations that were free, powerful, and proud, and separated from each other, so to speak, only a very short distance (considering the speed of voyages) to rule any outside tribes and yet keep their hands off each other. But a mere accident of the kind that befell broke the truce they had been keeping and dashed them together in war. (Mai, p.178. Zonaras, 8, 8.)

2. ¶The conflict, according to report, concerned Messana and Sicily, but in reality both parties perceived that from this region danger threatened their native land, and they thought that the island, lying, as it did, between them, would furnish to the side that conquered it a safe base for operations against the other party. (Mai, p.179. Zonaras, 8, 8.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 264 (_a.u._ 490)] 3. ¶Gaius Claudius came to the meeting, and among other remarks which he made to tempt them declared that the object of his presence was to free the city, since the Romans had no need of Messana; and that he would immediately sail away, as soon as he should set their affairs in order. Next he bade the Carthaginians also either to withdraw, or, if they had any just plea to offer, to submit to arbitration. Now when not one of the Mamertines (by reason of fear) opened his lips, and the Carthaginians since they were occupying the city by force of arms paid little heed to him, he stated that the silence on both sides afforded sufficient evidence: on the part of the invaders it showed that they were in the wrong, for they would have justified themselves if their purposes were at all honest, and on the part of the Mamertines that they desired freedom; they might have been quite free to speak, had they espoused the cause of the Carthaginians, especially as there was a force of the latter present. Furthermore he promised that he would aid them, both on account of their Italian origin and on account of the request for assistance they had made. (Mai, p.179. Zonaras, 8,8.)

4. ¶Gaius Claudius lost some of the triremes and with difficulty reached safety. Neither he nor the Romans in the City, however, were prevented from renewing attempts by sea through the fact that they had been worsted when first making a trial of it, although this is the ordinary course that people pursue who fail in the first undertaking and think that they can never again succeed, viewing the past in the light of an omen. On the contrary, they applied themselves to the watery element with an even greater zeal, and chiefly because they were ambitious and did not wish to appear to have been diverted from their purpose by the disaster. (Mai, p.180. Zonaras 8, 8, sq.) 5. ¶Hanno, who was in no wise disposed to make light of the war in case it were bound to occur, was particularly anxious to throw the responsibility for breaking the truce upon the other man, for fear it might be thought that he himself was taking the initiative. Accordingly, he sent back to him the ships and the captives, while he urged him to accept peace and exhorted him besides not to meddle with the sea. (Mai, p.180. Zonaras, 8, 9.)

6. ¶When he would accept nothing, he launched at him an arrogant and reprehensible threat. For he declared that he would never allow the Romans even to wash their hands in the sea: yet he lost not only the sea but also Messana not much later. (Mai, p.180. Zonaras, 8, 9.)

7. ¶Claudius, finding the Mamertines gathered at the harbor, called an assembly of their number and made the statement: "I have no need of arms but will leave it with you to decide everything." By this means he persuaded them to send for Hanno. As the latter refused to come down, he chid him soundly, inveighing against him and declaring that if he had even the slightest justification, he would certainly hold a conference with him and not persist in occupying the city by force. (Mai, p.180. Zonaras, 8, 9.)

8. ¶The consul Claudius exhorted the soldiers beforehand to be of good cheer and not to be cast down over the defeat of the tribune. He instructed them that in the first place victories fall to the lot of the better equipped, and that secondly their valor far surpassed the skill of their opponents. They would acquire, he said, the knowledge of seafaring in a short time, whereas the Carthaginians would never have bravery equal to theirs. Knowledge was something that could be obtained in a brief space by men who gave their minds to it and could be mastered by practice; but bravery, in case it were absent from a man's nature, could never be furnished by instruction. (Mai, p. 181.)

9. ¶ The Libyans, rejoicing in the idea that they had conquered not through the nature of their position, but by their own valor, sallied out. But Claudius made them so fearful that they would not even peep out of the camp. (Mai, p. 181. Zonaras, 8, 9.)

10. For it happens in the majority of instances that those who as a result of calculation fear something are successful by reason of their precaution against it, whereas those whose boldness rests on lack of forethought, are ruined on account of their unguarded condition. [Footnote: The Carthaginians are, in a general way, the subject of this section.] (Mai, p. 539.)

11. The quality of moderation both obtains victories and preserves them after they are won, whereas that of wantonness can prevail against nothing, and if it be at any time fortunate in some matter, very easily destroys it. And again, if it perchance preserves some conquest, it grows worse by the very fact of extraordinary good fortune and so far from being benefited by its success is actually ruined by it irretrievably.

Moreover, whenever there is boldness not in accord with reason, you may expect to find unreasoning fear. Calculation, bringing with it resolution strengthened by forethought, and a hope made confident by its own trustworthiness do not allow one to be either dejected or presumptuous. Unreasoning impulse, however, often elates men in the midst of good fortune and humbles them to dust in disasters, possessing, as it were, no support, but always copying the feature of the chance event. (Mai, p. 539 and p. 181.)