Chapter VII: Part 7

12. ¶ The Romans and Carthaginians when they entered upon war were equally matched in the number of ships and readiness to serve. [Sidenote: B.C. 260 (_a.u._ 494)] It was a naval battle soon after in which, with equal equipment, they first became engaged. They hoped that it would decide the whole war: Sicily lay before their eyes as the prize: they were contending in a matter of servitude or empire, resolved not to be beaten, lest they taste the former, but to conquer and obtain the latter. One side surpassed in the experience possessed by the crews of its triremes, since they had long been masters of the sea, and the other in the strength of its marines and its daring; for the rashness and audacity of their fighting was commensurate with their inexperience in naval affairs. In matters of experience practically all men make exact calculations and are imbued with wholesome fear, even if their judgment approves a particular course, but the untried renders them unreasonably bold, and draws them into conflict through lack of due consideration. (Mai, p.181.)

13. ¶The Carthaginians because of their defeat by the Romans in the sea-fight came near putting Hannibal to death. It is a trait of practically all people who send out armies on any mission to lay claims to advantage gained but to put the responsibility of defeat upon their leaders, and the Carthaginians were very ready to chastise those who failed in an enterprise.

He, however, was afraid and immediately after the defeat enquired of them whether if the business were still untouched they would bid him risk a sea-fight or not. When they declared in the affirmative, as he had doubtless expected, because they prided themselves on having such a superior navy, he added, by the mouths of the same messengers: "I, then, have done no wrong, for I went into the engagement with the same hopes as you. The decision was within my power but not the fortune of the battle." (Mai, p.182. Zonaras, 8, 11.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 258 (_a.u._ 496)] 14. Dio in Book 11: "When the storm continued and a mist arose besides, he brought about Hannibal's defeat through the agency of some deserters." (Bekker, Anecd. p.171, 26. Zonaras, 8, 12.)

15. But regarding the non-surrender of their native land and the acquirement of foreign territory as matters of equal importance, they [Footnote: I.e., The Carthaginians.] contended with courage and force. For whereas most men defend their own possessions to the very limit of their power but are unwilling to lay claim to the goods of others if it involves danger, these antagonists set a like value upon what they held fast and what they expected, and so were equally determined upon both points. Now the Romans thought it better to conduct the war no longer at a distance, nor to risk a first encounter in the islands, but to have the contest in the Carthaginians' own land. If they failed, they would lose nothing; and if they conquered they would obtain something besides hopes. Therefore, making their preparation follow their resolve, they took the field against Carthage. (Mai, p. 183. Cp. Zonaras, 8, 12.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 256 (_a.u._ 498)] 16. Their leaders were Regulus and Lucius, preferred before others for their excellence. Regulus was, indeed, in so great poverty that he did not readily consent, on that account, to take up the command; and it was voted that his wife and children should be furnished their support from the public treasury. (Valesius, p. 593. Zonaras, 8, 12.)

17. ¶ Hanno had been sent to the Romans by Hamilcar, as was pretended, in behalf of peace, but in reality for the sake of delay. And he, when some clamored for his arrest, because the Carthaginians by fraud [lacuna] Cornelius [lacuna] [Mai, p. 183.] Four pages of the MS. are lacking. (Zonaras, 8, 12.)

18. Dio the Roman, who wrote a history about the Empire and the Republic of Rome and describes the far-famed Carthaginian war, says that when Regulus,

[Sidenote: B.C. 256 (_a.u._ 498)] consul for Rome, was warring against Carthage, a serpent suddenly crept out of the palisade of the Roman army and lay there. By his command the Romans slew the reptile and having flayed it sent its skin, a great prodigy, to the Roman senate. And when measured by the same senate (as the same Dio says) it was found to have a length of one hundred and twenty feet. In addition to its length its thickness was also notable. (Ioannes Damascenus, On Serpents, vol. I, p. 472, A.B. Cp. Zonaras, 8, 13.)

19. ¶ The Carthaginians in fear of capture sent heralds to the consul to the end that by some satisfactory arrangement they might turn aside the danger of the moment, and so escape. But since they refused to withdraw from both Sicily and Sardinia, to release the Roman captives free of cost and to ransom their own, to make good all the expenses incurred by the Romans for the war and besides to pay more as tribute each year, they accomplished nothing. And in addition to the above mentioned, there were the following commands which displeased them: that they should make neither war nor treaties without the consent of the Romans, that they should employ not more than one warship but the Romans would come to their aid with fifty triremes as often as notice should be sent them, and that they would not be on an equal footing in conducting some other kinds of business. Considering these points they decided that the truce would mean their utter subjugation, and preferred rather to fight with the Romans. (Ursinus, p. 376. Zonaras, 8, 13.)

20. Dio in Book 11: "The Carthaginians kept watch for their ships homeward bound and captured several heavily laden with money." (Bekker, Anecd. p. 131, 12. Zonaras, 8, 14.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 251 (_a.u._ 503)] 21. ¶ They say the Carthaginians sent heralds to the Romans on account of the great number of the captives (among other causes), and most of all to see if they would be inclined to make peace on some moderate terms; if this could not be effected, their purpose still held to get back the captives. They say that Regulus, too, had been sent among the envoys because of his reputation and valor. The people assumed that the Romans would do anything whatever in the hope of getting him back, so that he might even be delivered up alone in return for peace, or at any rate in exchange for the captives. Accordingly, they bound him by mighty oaths and pledges to return without fail in case neither of their objects should be accomplished, and they despatched him as an envoy with others.

And he acted in all respects like a Carthaginian, not a Roman; for he did not even grant his wife leave to confer with him nor did he enter the city, although he was invited: instead, when the senate assembled outside of the walls, as their custom was in treating with the envoys of the enemy, he asked for permission to approach with the others--at least, so the story goes, [lacuna] (Ursinus, p. 377. Zonaras, 8, 15.)

22. Dio in Book 11: "Regulus paid no heed to them until the Carthaginians permitted him to do so." (Bekker, Anecd. p. 140, 20. Zonaras, 8, 15.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 251 (_a.u._ 503)] 23. Dio in Book 11: "For it is neither my duty nor that of any other upright man to give up aught that pertains to the public welfare." (Ib. p. 165, 23.)

24. In Book 11: "Any one else, wishing to console himself for the disaster which had happened in his own case, would have exalted the prowess of the enemy." (Ib. p. 165, 30.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 249 (_a.u._ 505)] 25. The second part of the augury is transmitted to us by Dio Cassius Cocceianus, who says that they keep tame birds which eat barley, and put barley grains in front of them when they seek an omen. If, then, in the course of eating the birds do not strike the barley with their beaks and toss it aside, the sign is good; but if they do so strike the grain, it is not good. (Io. Tzetzes, Exegesis of Homer's Iliad, p. 108, 2.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 244 (_a.u._ 510)] 26. He [sc. Mamilcar] thought it was requisite for a man who wished to accomplish anything by secret means not to make the matter known to anyone at all. There was no one, he believed, so self-possessed as to be willing, when he had heard, merely to observe operations and be silent. Just the reverse was true: the more strongly a man might be forbidden to mention anything, the greater would be his desire to speak of it, and thus one man learning the secret from another with the understanding that he was the only person to know it would reveal the story. [Footnote: Section 26 may refer to Hamilcar Barca's plans for seizing Mount Eryx.] (Mai, p. 540. Cp. Diodorus, 24, 7.)

27. In Book 11 of Dio: "He feasted the populace." [Footnote: Boissevain thinks that No. 27 may concern the banqueting of the populace during Metellus's triumph. Others have other opinions.] (Bekker, Anecd. p. 133, 24.)

28. In Book 11 of Dio: "You attack even such friends as have been guilty of any error, whereas I pardon even my enemies." (Ib. p.171, 29.)

29. In Book 12 of Dio: "By the one process [Footnote: Perhaps from the speech of Regulus to the senators.] he might have become to a certain extent estranged from you." (Ib. p.124, 4.) 30. In Book 12 of Dio: "Some are dead, and others who were deserving of some notice, have been captured." [Footnote: This may be likewise from the speech of Regulus and be said of the Carthaginian leaders.] (Ib. p. 133,25.)

[Frag. XLIV]

1. For the Ligurians occupy the whole shore from Etruria up to the Alps and as far as Gaul, according to Dio's statement. (Isaac Tzetzes, on Lycophron, 1312.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 236 (_a.u._ 518)] 2. The Romans at first sent Claudius to the Corsicans and gave him up. This was after he had made terms with them, but his countrymen, who claimed that the fault in breaking the compact rested on him and not on themselves, had waged war upon them and subdued them. When the Corsicans refused to receive him, the Romans drove him out. (Valesius, p.593. Zonaras, 8, 18.)

[Frag. XLV]

[Sidenote: B.C. 235 (_a.u._ 519)] 1. ¶The Romans after exacting also money from the Carthaginians, renewed the truce. And at first when an embassy from the latter arrived, they returned no proper answer, because they were aware of the state of their own equipment and because they were themselves still busied at that time with the war against the neighboring tribes. After this, however, Hanno, a man of youthful years who employed striking frankness of speech, was sent. He touched unreservedly on a number of other subjects and finally his appeal--"If you don't want to be at peace, restore to us both Sardinia and Sicily; for with these we purchased not a temporary respite but eternal friendship"--caused them to become milder and ashamed [lacuna] (Ursinus, p.378. Zonaras, 8, 18.)

2[lacuna] lest [Footnote: Preceding this fragment four pages of the MS. are missing.] they might suffer the same injuries in return, so that they were very glad to delay,--the one side choosing to preserve the prosperity that was an inheritance of the past, and the other to cling to the possessions which were still theirs. To judge by their threats they were no longer maintaining peace, but in fact they still deliberated about the matter, so that all could see that whichever of the two found it to his advantage to create the first disturbance would also be the one to begin war. Most men abide by their agreements just so long as suits their own convenience. If they have in view a greater resultant benefit to themselves, they deem it safe even to break some compact. (Mai, p.184.)

[Frag. XLVI]

[Sidenote: B.C. 231 (_a.u._ 523)] ¶Once in the consulship of Marcus Pomponius and Gaius Papirius they despatched envoys to investigate affairs in Spain, although none of the Spanish States had ever yet belonged to them. He, [Footnote: A reference to some previous proper name, outside this fragment.] besides showing them other honors, addressed them in suitable words, declaring that he was obliged to fight against the Spaniards in order that the money which was still owing to the Romans on the part of the Carthaginians might be paid; for it was impossible to obtain it from any other source. The envoys were consequently embarrassed to know how to censure him. (Mai, p.184)

[Frag. XLVII]

[Sidenote: B.C. 230 (_a.u._ 524)] 1. ¶The island of Issa surrendered itself voluntarily to the Romans. This was the first time the islanders were about to make the acquaintance of the latter, but they judged them more friendly and faithful than the powers which they then dreaded. Calculation caused them to place more dependence on the unknown than on the evident; for while the latter had aroused irritation through the dealings already had with it, the former afforded good hope, because its actions were as yet only matters of expectation. (Mai, ib. Zonaras, 8, 19.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 230 (_a.u._ 524)] 2. When the Issæans had attached themselves to the Romans, the latter, being ready and anxious to do them some favor in return forthwith, so as to get the reputation of aiding such as espoused their cause and also for the purpose of restraining the Ardiasans, who were annoying those that sailed from Brundusium,--for these reasons they sent messengers to Agro, who were to ask clemency for the Issæans and censure the king in that he was wronging them without previous cause. Now these men found Agro no longer in existence: he had died, leaving behind a child named Pineus. Teuta, Agro's wife and stepmother of Pineus, held the power over the Ardiæans,[lacuna] Being [lacuna] by boldness, she made no moderate response to their requests, but woman-like she showed a vanity (due to innate recklessness as well as to the power that she was holding) by casting some of the ambassadors into prison and killing others for speaking frankly. Such was her action at that time, and she actually took pride in it as if she had displayed some strength by her facile cruelty. In a very short space, however, she proved the weakness of the female sex, for as she had quickly flown into a passion through short-sightedness of judgment, so through cowardice she was quickly terrified. As soon as she learned that the Romans had voted for war against her she was panic-stricken, and promised to restore their men whom she held, while she tried to defend herself for the death of the others, declaring that they had been slain by some robbers. When the Romans were thus led to cease temporarily their campaign and demand the surrender of the murderers, she showed contempt again, because the danger was not yet at her doors, and declaring that she would not give anybody up despatched an army against Issa. When she learned that the consuls were at hand she grew terrified again, gave over her high spirit, and became ready to heed them in every minutest detail. She had not yet, however, been fully brought to her senses, for when the consuls had crossed over to Corcyra she felt imbued with new courage, revolted, and despatched an army against Epidamnus and Apollonia. After the Romans had rescued the cities and at the news of their capture of ships and treasures of hers she was on the point of again yielding obedience. Meanwhile in the course of scaling certain heights overlooking the sea they were worsted near the Atyrian hill and she now waited, hoping, in view of the fact that it was really winter already, for their withdrawal. But on perceiving that Albinus remained where he was and Demetrius as a result of her caprice as well as from fear of the Romans had transferred his allegiance, besides persuading some others to desert, she became utterly terrified and gave up her sovereignty. (Ursinus, p. 378. Zonaras, 8, 19.)

[Frag. XLVIII]

[Sidenote: B.C. 228 (_a.u._ 526)] In the time of Fabius Maximus Berucosus ("full of warts") the Romans did this, after burying in the middle Of the Forum a Greek and a Gallic couple, man and woman: they were frightened by a certain oracle which said that Greek and Gaul should occupy the city. (Isaac Tzetzes on Lycophron, 603, 1056. Cp. Zonaras, 8, 19.)

[Frag. XLIX]

1. ¶ The Romans were being frightened by an oracle of the Sibyl which urged the necessity of guarding against the Gauls when a thunderbolt should fall upon the Capitol near the temple of Apollo. (Mai, p. 185.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 225 (_a.u._ 529)] 2. ¶ The Gauls became dejected on seeing that the Romans had taken beforehand the most favorable locations. All men if they obtain the object of their first aim proceed more readily toward their subsequent goals, but if they miss it, lose interest in everything else. They, however, after the Gallic fashion and more than is usual with the rest of mankind, lay hold very eagerly of what they desire and cling most tenaciously to any success, but if they meet with the slightest obstacle have no hope left for the future. Folly makes them inclined to expect whatsoever they wish, and their spirited temperament ready to carry out whatsoever they undertake. They are given to violent anger and dash headlong into enterprises, and for that reason they have within themselves no quality of endurance (since it is impossible for reckless audacity to prevail for any time), and if they once suffer any setback they are unable (especially by reason of the fear to which they then fall a prey) to recover themselves: they are plunged into a state of panic corresponding to their previous fearless daring. In a brief period they rush vehemently to the most opposite extremes, since they can furnish no motive based on calculation for either action. (Mai, p. 185.)

3. ¶ Æmilius on conquering the Insubres celebrated a triumph and in it conveyed the foremost captives clad in armor up to the Capitol, making jests upon them because he had heard that they had sworn not to remove their breastplates before they had ascended the Capitol. (Mai, p. 186. Zonaras, 8, 20.)

[Frag. L]

¶ If any of the details, even the smallest, that were customary in festivals had been missed, they renewed the ceremonial proceedings at any rate a second and a third time, and even more times still, so far as was possible in one day, till everything seemed to them to have been done faultlessly. (Mai, p. 186. Zonaras, 8, 20.)

[Frag. LI]

[Sidenote: B.C. 219 (_a.u._ 535)] ¶ Demetrius, elated by his position as guardian of Pineus and by the fact that he had married the latter's mother Triteuta (Teuta was dead), was hateful to the natives and injured the property of neighboring tribes. So they summoned him before them (since it appeared that it was by misusing the friendship of the Romans that he was able to wrong those peoples) as soon as they heard of it. When he refused compliance and actually assailed their allies, they made a campaign against Issa, where he was. (Valesius, p.593. Zonaras, 8, 20.)

[Frag. LII]

1. ¶The Romans were at their prime in equipment for war and enjoyed absolute harmony among themselves. Whereas the majority of persons are led by unmixed good fortune to audacity but by a tremendous fear to proper behavior, they had quite a different experience at that time in those matters. The more successes they had the more sober it made them; against their enemies they displayed the kind of boldness that partakes of bravery, while toward one another they employed that right dealing which is closely connected with good order. [Footnote: The word for "good order" is conjectured by van Herwerden.] They held their power with a view to the practice of moderation and kept their orderliness for the acquirement of a true bravery: they did not allow their good fortune to develop into wantonness, nor their right dealing into cowardice. They believed that in case of such laxity temperance might be ruined by bravery and boldness by boldness; but that when people exercised care, as they did, moderation was made more secure by bravery and good fortune rendered surer by discipline. This was the reason for their vast superiority over the enemies that encountered them and for their excellent administration of both their own affairs and those of the allies. (Mai, p. 186.)

2. ¶ All who dwelt on the near side of the Alps revolted to join the Carthaginians, not because they preferred the Carthaginians to the Romans as leaders, but because they hated the force that ruled them and were for welcoming the untried. The Carthaginians had allies against the Romans from every one of the tribes that then existed; but Hannibal was worth nearly all of them. He could comprehend matters very quickly and plan the details of every project that he laid to heart, notwithstanding the fact that generally sureness is the product of slowness and only rash decisions result from hastiness of disposition. He was most [lacuna] when given the smallest margin of time, and most enduring with a very great degree of reliability. He managed in a safe way the affair of the moment and showed skill in considering the future beforehand: he proved himself a most capable counselor in ordinary events and a very accurate judge of the unusual. By these powers he handled the issue immediately confronting him very readily and in the shortest time, while by calculation he anticipated the future afar off and considered it as though it were actually present. Consequently he, more than any man, met each occasion with suitable words and acts, because he made no distinction between what he possessed and what he hoped for. He was able to conduct matters so for the reason that in addition to his natural capacity he was well versed in much Phoenician learning, common to his country, and likewise much Greek, and furthermore he understood divination by inspection of entrails. (Mai, p. 187 and Valesius, p. 593.)

3. With such intellectual qualities he had brought his body to a state of equal perfection, partly by nature, partly by practice, so that he could carry out easily everything that he took in hand. It was nimble and at the same time heavy to the utmost degree, and he could, therefore, run, fight, and ride safely at full speed. He never burdened himself with overmuch food, nor suffered annoyance by lack of it, but took more or less with equal grace, feeling that either was satisfactory. Hardship made him rugged, and on loss of sleep he grew strong.

Having these advantages of mind and body he universally administered affairs in a fashion now to be described. Since he saw that most men were trustworthy only in what concerned their own interest, he himself dealt with them in this manner and expected the same treatment of them, so that he very often succeeded by deceiving persons and very seldom failed by being the object of a plot. He regarded as hostile every force that could gain an advantage both among foreigners and among kinsmen alike, and did not wait to learn their intentions from their acts, but handled them quite unsparingly, assuming that they were anxious to commit a wrong when they could: he thought it better to be the first to act than the first to suffer, and resolved that the rest of the world should be dependent on him, and not he upon other persons. In fine, he paid attention to the nature of things, rather than to their reputed good points, as often as the two did not happen to coincide. He also, however, prized extravagantly whatever he needed. Slaves, most of them, he esteemed in that way, and beheld them willing to encounter danger for him even contrary to their own advantage. For these reasons he often himself refrained from opportunities for gain and other most delightful pleasures, but gave a share ungrudgingly to them. Hence he could get them to be not unwilling partners in hard work. He subjected himself not only to the same conditions of living as these men, but also to the same dangers and was the first to accomplish every task that he demanded of them. Likewise he was confident that they, too, without pretexts and with zeal,--since he showed his care for them not in words only,--would help him effect his projects.

Toward the rest he always behaved quite proudly; and the whole multitude, in consequence, felt either good-will or fear toward him because of their similar conditions of life, on the one hand, and because of his haughtiness on the other. Accordingly, he was fully able to bring low the towering head, to exalt humility, and to inspire all whom he pleased, in the shortest period, one with hesitation, another with boldness, with hope also and despair regarding most important matters.

And that this information about him is not false, but is truthful tradition, his works are proof. Much of Spain he won over in a short time, and from there carried the war into Italy through the country of the Gauls, most of whom were not only not in league with him, but actually unknown to him. He was the first of non-Europeans, so far as we know, to cross the Alps with an army, and after that he made a campaign against Rome itself, sundering from it almost all its allies, some by force and others by persuasion. This, however, he achieved by himself without the aid of the Carthaginian government. He was not sent forth in the beginning by the magistrates at home, nor did he later obtain any considerable assistance from them. While they were on the eve of enjoying the greatest glory and benefit through his efforts, they wished rather not to appear to be leaving him in the lurch than to coöperate effectively in any enterprise. (Valesius, p. 593.)

[Frag. LIII]

Dio Cocceianus calls the Narbonenses _Bebruces_, writing this: "To those who of old were Bebruces, but now Narbonenses, belongs the Pyrenees range. This range is the boundary between Spain and Gaul." (Isaac Tzetzes on Lycophron, 516. Zonaras, 8, 21.)

[Frag. LIV]

1. ¶ Peace both creates wealth and preserves it, but war both expends it and destroys it. [Footnote: The first eight sections of this fragment seem to be taken from speeches of Romans in the senate-house. Nos. 1 and 2 are apparently the words of an unknown individual discouraging the eagerness for war; Nos. 3 and 4 may be spoken by Lentulus, urging war; and Nos. 5 to 8 may contain the opposing arguments of Fabius.](Mai, p. 188.)

2. ¶Every human being is so constituted as to desire to lord it over such as yield, and to employ the turn of Fortune's scale against voluntary slaves. (Mai, ib.)

3. But do you who know the facts and have experienced them, think that propriety and humaneness are sufficient for your safety? And do you regard listlessly all the wrongs they have committed against us by stealth or deceit or violence? Are you not stimulated, are you not for paying them back or for defending yourselves? Then again, you have never reflected that such behavior is in place for you toward one another, but toward the Carthaginians is cowardly and base. Our citizens we must treat in a gentle and politic fashion; if one be preserved unexpectedly, he is of our possessions: but harsh treatment is for the enemy. We shall save ourselves not by our defeats as a result of sparing them, but by our victories that will come from abasing them. (Mai, p.188.)

4. ¶War both preserves men's own possessions and wins the property of others, whereas peace destroys not only what has been bestowed by war but itself in addition. (Mai, pp.188 and 541.)

[Frag. LIV]

5. ¶It is base to proceed to action ere arguments about the matter have been heard: for in such a case, if successful, you will be thought to have enjoyed good fortune rather than to have employed good counsel, and if worsted, to have taken your resolution without forethought, at a time when there was no profit in it. And yet who does not know this,--that to heap up reproaches and to accuse people that have once warred against us is very easy--any man can do it--whereas, to say what is advantageous for the State, not in anger over other men's deeds, but with a view to the State's benefit, is really the duty of the advising class? Do not irritate us, Lentulus, nor persuade us to begin war until you show us that it shall be really for our advantage. Reflect particularly (though there are other considerations) that speaking here about deeds of war is not the same sort of thing as their actual performance. (Mai, p.189.)

6. Men are often set on their feet by disasters, and many who use them wisely fare better than those who are completely fortunate and for that very reason wanton. Somehow ill luck seems to hold no inconsiderable portion of benefit, because it does not permit men to lose their senses or indulge in extreme wantonness. For naturally it is most advisable to set one's face steadfastly toward all the best things, and to make not possibility, but calculation, the measure of desire. And if a man be not able to prefer what is more excellent, it will still pay him to behave, even unwillingly, with moderation so as to regard in the light of happiness even the failure to be fortunate in all cases. (Mai, p.542.)

7. It is imperative to be on one's guard against any similar experience again,--that being the only benefit that can come from disasters. Repeated good fortune occasionally ruins those who unthinkingly base their hopes upon it, believing they are sure of another victory, whereas failures compel every one as a result of his past trouble to provide for the future carefully beforehand. (Mai, pp.189 and 542.)

8. ¶For securing the favor of the gods or a good reputation among men it is no small thing to escape the appearance of creating war, and seem to be compelled to defend the existing population. (Mai, p.189.)

9. After speeches of this character on both sides they determined to prepare for fighting: they would not vote that way however, but determined to send envoys to Carthage and denounce Hannibal; then, if the Carthaginians refrained from approving his exploits, they would arbitrate the matter, or if all responsibility were laid on his shoulders, they would demand his extradition; if he were given up, well; otherwise they would declare war. (Mai, p.190. Zonaras, 8, 22.)

10. ¶When the Carthaginians made no definite answer to the envoys and instead behaved contemptuously toward them, Marcus [Footnote: According to Livy (XXI, 18, 1) his name was _Quintus_. Willems suggests emending to Maximus here.] Fabius thrust his hands beneath his toga and holding them with palms upward said: "Here I bring to you, Carthaginians, both war and peace: do you choose unequivocally whichever of them you wish." Upon their replying to this challenge even then that they chose neither but would readily accept either that the Romans left with them, he declared war upon them. (Mai, p.190. Zonaras, 8, 22.)

[Frag. LV]

¶The Romans invited the Narbonenses to an alliance. But the latter declared that they had never suffered any harm from the Carthaginians or received any favor from the Romans that they should war against the one or defend the other, and were quite angry with them, charging that the Romans had often treated their kinsmen outrageously. (Mai, p.190.)

[Frag. LVI]

1. ¶From such an expectation, Dio says, already acquired from that source, the Romans and Carthaginians had reached a state in which they had formed the most different judgments regarding the administration of the war. For hopefulness, in that it leads all men to cheerfulness, renders them also more active and confident, possessed of a faith that they will be victorious; lack of hope casts them into dejection and despair, and deprives of strength even the naturally stout-hearted. (Mai, p.191.)

2. Just as matters at a great distance and quite unknown are accustomed to disturb many men, so now they struck no little fear to the hearts of the Spaniards. [Footnote: This refers to the Spaniards' refusing, at the start, to undertake a campaign. Cp. Livy, XXI, 23.] For the majority of the multitude that makes a campaign not for any reason of its own but ranking as an allied force is a strong force just so long as it has the hopes of obtaining some benefit without danger. But when the men reach the vicinity of the conflict, they are frightened out of their hopes of gain and lose their faith in promises. And the most of them have gotten it into their heads that they are by all means going to be successful in any case; consequently, even if they should meet with some reverse, they esteem it lightly in comparison with the hopes which have been offsetting it. (Mai, p.191. Cp. Zonaras, 8, 23.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 218 (_a.u._ 536)] 3. When the preparations failed to be sufficient in any respect for the size of Hannibal's army, and some one on this account suggested to him that the soldiers be fed on the flesh of their opponents, he did not take the idea amiss, but said he feared that some day through lack of bodies of that kind they might turn to eating one another. (Mai, p.191. Cp. Zonaras, 8, 23.)

4. ¶Hannibal before beginning operations called together the soldiers and brought in the captives whom he had taken by the way: he enquired of the latter whether they wished to undergo imprisonment in fetters and to endure a grievous slavery or to fight in single combat one with another on condition that the victors should be released. When they chose the second alternative, he set them to fighting. And at the end of the conflict he said: "Now is it not shameful, fellow-soldiers, that these men who have been captured by us are so disposed toward bravery as to be eager to die in place of becoming slaves, whereas we shrink from incurring a little toil and danger for the purpose of not being subservient to others,--yes, and ruling them besides?" (Mai, p.192. Zonaras, 8, 23.)

5. All the sufferings that we have endured when occasionally defeated by the enemy we will inflict upon them, if we are victorious. Be well assured that by conquering we shall obtain all the benefits that I mention, but if conquered we shall not even have a safe means of escape. The victor straightway finds everything friendly, even if possibly it hates him, and to the vanquished no one even of his own household pays any longer heed. (Mai, pp. 543 and 192.)

6. ¶To have once failed in an enterprise against some foes puts them forever out of countenance, and is a preventative of any future courage. (Mai, p. 192.)

7. For the whole Gallic race is naturally more or less eccentric and cowardly and faithless. Just as they are readily emboldened in the face of hopes, so (only more readily) when frightened do they fall into a panic. The fact that they were no more faithful to the Carthaginians will teach the rest of mankind a lesson never to dare to invade Italy. (Mai, p. 192. Cp. Zonaras, 8, 24.)

8. ¶Many portents, [Footnote: Cp. Livy XXI, 62, and XXII, I, 8-20.] some of which had actually occurred and others which were the product of idle talk, became the subject of conversation. For when persons get seriously frightened and those [lacuna] are in reality proven to have occurred to them, oftentimes others are imagined. And if once any of the former phenomena is believed, heedlessly at once the rest [lacuna]

Accordingly, the sacrifices were offered and all the other ceremonies were accomplished which men are in the habit of performing for the cure of their temporary terror and for escape from expected ruin. Yet the race of men is wont to trust such agencies, hoping in the line of improvement, and so now, even if because of the greatness of the danger awaited they thought that the harshest fate would fall upon them, still they kept hoping that they would not be defeated. (Mai, p. 192.)

9. ¶ The Romans proclaimed Fabius dictator, satisfied if they could themselves survive, and neither despatched any aid to the allies nor [lacuna] but learning that Hannibal had turned aside from Campania, they made sure of the former's safety through fear that they might change sides either willingly or under compulsion. (Mai, p. 193. Zonaras, 8, 25.)

10. ¶ Fabius continued to besiege him from a safe distance instead of in dangerous proximity; he would not venture to make a trial of men skilled in the art of war, and made the safety of the soldiers a matter of great circumspection because of the scarcity of the citizens, deeming it no disaster to fail of destroying the forces of the enemy but a great one to lose any of his troops. The Carthaginians, he believed, by means of their enormous multitude would encounter danger again even if once defeated, but if the smallest part of his own army met with failure he calculated that he should find himself in every extremity of evil; this would not be due to the number of the dead on any such occasion but to the previous setbacks endured. He was in the habit of saying that men with powers undiminished could often suffer without hurt the most dreadful losses, but those who were already exhausted might be harmed by the slightest reverses. Once, when his son advised him to run the risk and be done with it and said something about his not losing more than a hundred men, the above consideration led him to refuse assent, and he further inquired of the young man whether he would like to be one of the hundred men. (Mai, pp. 193 and 544. Zonaras, 8, 26.)

11. ¶ The Carthaginians, far from sending voluntarily any support to Hannibal, were rather disposed to make sport of him, because whereas he was continually writing of his splendid progress and his many successes he still asked money and soldiers of them. They said his requests did not agree with his successes: victors ought to find their existing army sufficient and to send money home instead of demanding additional funds from them. (Mai, p. 194. Zonaras, 8, 26.)

12. I am under accusation, not because I dash headlong into battles nor because I risk dangers in my office as general, purposing by losing many soldiers and killing many enemies to be named dictator and celebrate a triumph, but because I am slow and because I delay and because I always exercise extreme foresight for your preservation. (Mai, p.542.)

13. Is it not really absurd for us to be zealous for success in enterprises outside and far off before the city itself is really set upon a firm foundation? Is it not absolutely outrageous to be eager to conquer the enemy before we set our own affairs well in order? (Mai, p. 543.)

14 ¶ Hannibal either as a favor to Fabius, on the ground that he was an advantage to them or perhaps to create a prejudice against him, did not ravage any of his possessions. Accordingly, when an exchange of captives was made between the Romans and Carthaginians with the proviso that any number in excess on either side should be ransomed, and as the Romans were unwilling to ransom their men with money from the public treasury, Fabius sold the farms and paid their ransom. Therefore they did not depose him but they gave equal power to his master of the horse, so that both held their commands on a like footing. Fabius harbored no wrath against either the citizens or Rufus: he excused them for an act prompted by human nature and was for contenting himself if in any way they might survive. He desired the preservation and victory of the commonwealth rather than an individual reputation, and continued to believe that excellence depends not on decrees but on each man's spirit, and that a man is better or worse not as a result of any ordinance but as a result of his own wisdom or ignorance.

Rufus, however, who had not shown the right spirit in the first place was now more than ever puffed up and could not contain himself because he had obtained through his insubordination the further prize of equal authority with the dictator. And so he kept asking for the right to hold sole sway a day at a time, or for several days alternately. But Fabius, in the fear that he might work some harm if he should get possession of the undivided power, would not consent to either plan of his, but divided the army in such a way that they each, like the consuls, had a separate force. And immediately Rufus encamped apart, in order that he might give a practical illustration of the fact that he held sway in his own right and not subject to the dictator. (Valesius, p. 597. Zonaras, 8, 26.)

15. ¶ It is customary for men who are ruled to concur in opinion easily. Especially often do they join forces when the object is to slander men of good reputation, for the reason that it is their nature to help in augmenting any power just come to light but to bring low what has already obtained preëminence. And though one can not immediately measure one's self with men who surpass one through ampler resources, growth in an unexpected quarter brings hope of a like good fortune to others that dwell in obscurity. [Footnote: This may come from a speech of M. Terentius Varro in favor of equalizing the powers of dictator and of master-of-horse.](Mai, p. 194.) 16. ¶ Rufus, who obtained equal authority with the dictator, after a defeat by the Carthaginians altered his attitude (for disasters chasten somehow those who are not completely fools) and voluntarily gave up his leadership. And for this all praised him loudly. He was not held worthy of censure because he had failed to recognize at first what was fitting, but was commended for not hesitating to change his mind. They deemed it an act of good fortune for a man to choose right at the start a proper course of conduct, but they thoroughly approved the course of one, who, having learned from practical experience the better way, was not ashamed to face squarely about. From this episode, too, it was clearly shown how much one man differs from another and true excellence from the reputation therefor. What had been taken from Fabius by jealousy and prejudice of the citizens, he received back with good-will and even at the request of his colleague. (Mai, p. 194. Zonaras, 8, 26.) 17. ¶ The same man when about to retire from office sent for the consuls, surrendered his army to them, and advised them in addition very fully regarding all the details of what must be done. The safety of the city stood higher in his estimation than a reputation for being the only successful commander, and expecting that if they followed their own bent they would probably meet with failure, but if they heeded his counsel they would meet with a favorable outcome, he preferred to look to the second contingency for praise. And the consuls were not unduly bold but acted on the suggestion of Fabius, deeming it better not to accomplish any important result than to be ruined; hence they remained where they were throughout the entire period of their command. (Mai, p. 195. Zonaras, 8, 26.)

18. For the Iapygians and Apulians dwell around the Ionic Gulf. Of the Apulians the tribes according to Dio are the Peuketii Pediculi, Daunii, Tarentini. There is also Cannæ, the "plain of Diomed," near Daunian Apulia. Messapia was called also Iapygia, later Salentia, and then Calabria. Argyrippa, a Diomedian city, was renamed Arpi by the Apulians. (Isaac Tzetzes on Lycophron, 603 and 852. Cp. Zonaras, 9, 1.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 216 (_a.u._ 538)] 19. Later he was arrayed against the Romans at Cannæ, when the Roman generals were Paulus and Terentius. Now Cannæ is a level district of Argyrippa, where Diomed founded the city Argyrippa, that is to say "Argos the Horse-City" in the tongue of the Greeks. And this plain comes to belong later to the Daunii (of the Iapygians), then to the Salantii, and now to those that all call by the name Calauri. It is also the boundary between the Calauri and Longibardi, where the great war burst upon them. (Tzetzes, Hist., 1, 757-767. Cp. Zonaras, 9, 1.)

20. ¶ With regard to divination and astronomy Dio says: "I, however, can not form any opinion either about these events or about others that are foretold by divination. For what does foreshowing avail, if a thing shall certainly come to pass, and if there could be no averting of it either by human devices or by divine providence? Accordingly, let each man look at these matters in what way he pleases." (Mai, p. 195. Cp. Zonaras, 9, 1.)

21. ¶ The commanders were Paulus and Terentius, men not of similar temperament, but differing alike in family and in character. The former was a patrician, possessed of the graces of education, and esteemed safety before haste, being restrained partly, it might be said, as a result of the censure he had received for his former conduct in office. Hence he was not inclined to audacity, but was considering how he might keep from getting into trouble again rather than how he might achieve success by some desperate venture. Terentius, however, had been brought up among the rabble, was practiced in vulgar bravado, and so displayed lack of prudence in nearly all respects; for instance, he promised himself general direction of the war, kept constantly annoying the patricians, and thought that he alone should have the leadership in view of the quiet behavior of his colleague. Now they both reached the camp at a most opportune time: Hannibal had no longer any provender; Spain was in turmoil; the affection of the allies was being alienated from him: and if they had waited for even the briefest possible period, they would have conquered without trouble. As matters went, however, the heedlessness of Terentius and the submissiveness of Paulus, who always desired the proper course but assented to his colleague in most points--so sure is gentleness to be overcome by audacity,--compassed their defeat. (Mai, p. 196. Zonaras, 9, 1.)

22. ¶ In the mêlée of the war not even the boldest possessed a hope so buoyant as to rise above the fear that arose from its uncertainty. The surer they felt of conquering the more did they tremble for fear they might in some way come to grief. Those who are ignorant of a matter by reason of their very lack of perception are not awaiting anything terrible, but the boldness derived from calculation [lacuna] (Six pages are lacking.) (Mai, p. 196.)

23. At the time when burst this frightful war, a terrific earthquake occurred, so that mountains were cleft asunder and showers of great stones poured down from heaven. But they, fighting vigorously, perceived none of these things. At last so great a multitude of Roman warriors fell that Hannibal, the general, in sending to Sicily the finger-rings of the generals and the other men of repute filled many bushel and peck measures--so great a multitude that the noble, foremost Roman women ran lamenting to the temples in Rome and with the hairs of their heads cleansed the statues there;--and later had intercourse with both slaves and barbarians (because the Roman land had been utterly impoverished of men), to the end that their race might not be every whit extirpated. Rome at that time, after the utter loss of all her citizens, stood inglorious through many day-coursing cycles. Her old men sitting at her outer gates bewailed the disaster most grievous to be borne and asked ever and anon the passers-by whether any one perchance were left alive. (Tzetzes, Hist. 1, 767-785. (Cp. Fragm. LVI, 19, which precedes this.) Cp. Zonaras, 9, 1.)

24. ¶ Scipio, on learning that some of the Romans were prepared to abandon Rome, and indeed all Italy, because they felt it was destined to fall into the hands of the Carthaginians, yet found a way to restrain them. Sword in hand he sprang suddenly into the room where they were conferring, and after himself swearing to take all proper measures both of word and act he made them also devote themselves by oath to utter destruction, should they fail to keep their pledges to him. Later these men reached a harmonious decision and wrote to the consul that they were safe enough. He, however, did not at once write or despatch a messenger to Rome; on reaching Canusium he set in order affairs at that place, sent to the regions in proximity garrisons sufficient for immediate needs, and repulsed a cavalry attack upon the city. Altogether, he displayed neither dejection nor terror, but with an unbending spirit, as if no serious evil had befallen them, he both planned and executed all measures of immediate benefit. (Valesius, p. 598. Zonaras, 9, 2.)

25. Hannibal took possession of the Nucerini under an agreement that each man should leave the city carrying one change of clothing. As soon, however, as he was master of the situation he shut the senators into bath-houses and suffocated them, and in the case of the others, although he had granted them permission to go away where they pleased, he cut down many of them even on the road. Still, this course was of no profit to him, for the rest became afraid that they might suffer a similar fate, and so would not come to terms with him and resisted as long as they could hold out. (Valesius, p. 598. Zonaras, 9, 2.)

26. ¶ Marcellus showed great bravery, moderation, and justice. His demands on his subjects were not all rigorous or harsh, nor was he careful to see that they also should do what was needful. Those of them who committed any errors he pardoned humanely and, furthermore, was not angry if they failed to be like him. (Valesius, p. 601.)

27. ¶ When many citizens of Nola were dreading the men captured at Cannæ and later released by Hannibal, because they thought that such persons favored the invader's cause, and when they were even desirous of putting them to death, he opposed it. Furthermore, he concealed from this time on the suspicion that he felt toward them, and treated them in such a way that they chose his side by preference, and became extremely useful both to their native land and to the Romans. (Valesius, p. 601. Cp. Zonaras, 9, 2.)

28. ¶ The same Marcellus when he perceived that one of the Lucanian cavalrymen was in love with a woman permitted him to keep her in the camp, because he was a most excellent fighter: this in spite of the fact that he had forbidden any women to enter the ramparts. (Valesius, p. 601.)

29. ¶ He pursued the same course with the people of Acerræ as he had with those of Nucreia, except that he cast the senators into wells and not into bath-houses. (Valesius, p. 601. Zonaras, 9, 2.)

30. ¶ Fabius got back some of the men captured in former battles by exchanging man for man, while others he made a compact to ransom with money. When, however, the senate failed to confirm the expenditure, because it did not approve of their ransoming, he offered for sale, as I have said, [Footnote: Cp. section 14 (first paragraph) of this fragment.] his own farms and from the proceeds of them furnished the ransom for the men. (Valesius, p. 601.)