Chapter VIII: Appendix: III (1)

A TYPICAL COLLEGE FORENSIC

The forensic which follows is the one which was used by the State University of Iowa in its debates with the University of Wisconsin and the University of Minnesota in 1908. In the form in which it appears here it was given in a home contest a few evenings before the Inter-State Debate. It is quoted here with the permission of the Forensic League of the State University of Iowa.

_Resolved_, That American Cities Should Adopt a Commission Form of Government.

Mr. Clarence Coulter, the first speaker on the Affirmative, said:

It is not my purpose to picture the shame of American cities; that
is well known; but I am to consider only those evils due to the
present form of municipal government, an organization based on the
separation of the powers into the legislative, executive, and
judicial departments. The proper remedy for these evils will be
secured only by adopting a form which concentrates the entire
authority of city government in one definite and responsible body.

It is a significant fact, that during the last quarter of a century,
the tendency in municipal organization has been toward concentration
of powers. Certain of our cities have recognized the wisdom of such
action, but have unwisely attempted to concentrate only the
executive power whereas the real solution lies in concentrating all
governmental authority in one definite and responsible body.

New York City tried such a plan and it has failed; failed because
its separate legislative department has proved an obstruction to
effective action. Consequently, there has been a continual tendency
to deprive the council of all power, until today its only function
is to vote on franchises and issue certain licenses. So evident is
the imperative need of concentrating the legislative and
administrative powers in one body, that there is now a charter
revision committee meeting in New York whose great object is to
consider the advisability of entirely eliminating the separate
council, and creating in its place a small commission possessing
both legislative and administrative authority. Practically the same
condition obtains in the city of Boston.

What is true of New York and Boston is equally true of scores of
other cities. Memphis tried for years to reform her government with
an isolated council. Today she is clamoring at the doors of her
legislature for a commission charter. Within the past two years more
than a dozen states have provided for a commission form of
government, while within the past year more than a dozen cities have
actually thrown away their old forms and assumed the commission
system.

The success of a separate legislative body in state and national
government is the only excuse for its retention in our cities, yet
the failure, for over a century in all its different forms and
variations, proves that such a government is unsuited to them. There
are several important and fundamental characteristics of the city
that demand a different form of government and show conclusively
that there is no need of a separate legislative body. In the first
place, the city is not a sovereign government, but is subordinate to
state and nation. There is no reason for a distinct legislature to
determine the broad matters of policy, for they are determined for
the citizens of the city as well as those of the country, by the
state and national legislatures, in which both the city and country
are represented. In the second place, the work of a city is largely
administrative and of a business character, as my colleagues will
show, and there is no necessity for a separate council to legislate
when a commissioner is better able, as we shall show, to pass the
kind of legislation characteristic of the city.

In the third place, we do not find, as in the state, the necessity
of a large and separate body to represent the various localities.
The city has a large population living in a restricted territory; in
the state it is scattered. The city is unified by means of its rapid
communication and transportation facilities, and its interests are
common. These, Honorable Judges, are some general reasons why there
is no necessity for trying to maintain a separate legislative body
at the expense of efficiency in administration and the fixing of
individual responsibility.

But let us now examine as to wherein this principle of separation
fails to meet modern municipal conditions. In the first place we
find that this system has failed to produce efficiency, because, in
actual practice, it has been impossible to keep the legislative and
administrative branches within their proper spheres of action. To be
sure, such difficulty does not exist in state and national
governments where the work is naturally divided. But in city
government, where the work is of a peculiar kind, where it is
unified in character and is largely administrative and of a business
nature, it has been found impossible to maintain a separation. It is
not at all surprising to find that in some cities, the mayor is the
dominating factor in both legislation and administration. He is the
presiding officer of the council with the deciding vote, and, in
addition, is clothed with the veto power. On the other hand, there
are scores of instances where the council assumes administrative
functions. It names all appointments to office, and it creates and
controls all the departments of city government. Under such
circumstances the administrative department is subordinate to the
council, because its officers can be both appointed and removed by
that body and because it can carry on no work without the council's
authority. Thus there is an inevitable tendency to concentrate the
powers in one of the two branches, yet, at the same time, diffusing
responsibility between them. Such a condition only goes to show that
city government is gradually but surely working its way toward
concentration in one body. But the trouble lies in the fact that the
present system makes possible concentration of power, without a
corresponding concentration of responsibility. From such a condition
have grown two grave and inherent evils. First, it has entirely
eliminated the system of checks and balances, which is a fundamental
doctrine of the division of power. Secondly, it has utterly
destroyed all effective responsibility. It is apparent at once, that
when one branch of the government dominates, the checks and balances
between the departments are immediately lost, and facts bear out
what theory shows to be logically true. The system of checks and
balances failed absolutely in New York, where the mayor is supreme,
and where the city has been plundered of sums estimated at 7 per
cent of the total valuation of real estate. It has failed in St.
Louis, where the council dominated, and where "Boss Butler" paid
that body $250,000 to pass a street railway franchise. Neither did
it work in Philadelphia, which has been plundered of an amount equal
to 10 per cent of her real estate valuation; nor in San Francisco
under the disgraceful regime of Mayor Schmitz. So overwhelming is
the evidence on this point that it is needless to dwell further upon
it.

In the second place, this domination of one branch over the other
has resulted in a lack of responsibility and of co-ordination in
city affairs. These two elements are indispensable where the work to
be performed is of a local and business nature. We find that under
the present system, no matter which branch of government dominates,
there is always a notorious lack of responsibility. If the council
makes a blunder in legislation, it immediately lays the blame upon
the administrative officials, maintaining that it passed the measure
upon recommendation of the administrative branch, or that branch
failed to carry out its policy. If the administrative officials are
neglectful, they shift the blame onto the council, and insist that
the difficulty lies in insufficient legislation. Under such
conditions, the average citizen has no way of telling where the
blame really lies.

At present, there is no attempt at co-ordination between the
legislative, executive, and judicial departments. On the other hand,
there is often open rupture between them. For years before the
commission form of government was adopted in Galveston, there was
open warfare between the legislative and executive departments,
which saddled upon the city a bonded debt of many thousands of
dollars. In our state, there is a municipality in which the two
departments of government are defying each other. Both are
exercising legislative and administrative authority until the
citizens of that place are at a loss to know which is right. This is
admittedly a deplorable state of affairs, yet it is the logical
result of forcing upon the city a form of government entirely
unsuited for its needs. Moreover, this lack of co-ordination and
responsibility has resulted in the confusion of powers and the
creation of needless boards and committees. A recent investigation
in Philadelphia showed that it had four boards with power to tear up
the streets at will, but none to see that they were properly relaid.
Chicago finds herself possessed of eight different tax levying
bodies, while in New York City there are eighty different boards or
individuals who have power to create debt. Is it any wonder that
inefficiency and graft infest such a maze of boards, councils and
committees? We see, then, that the present system of separation of
powers produces inefficiency through a confusion of functions; it
does away completely with the system of checks and balances and
results in utter lack of responsibility and co-ordination of
departments.

Honorable Judges, if we are ever to arrive at a solution of our
municipal problem, we must concentrate municipal authority; we must
co-ordinate departments, eliminate useless boards and committees and
fix absolutely and completely individual responsibility. This, we
propose to do by establishing a commission form of government, where
all governmental authority is vested in one small body of men, who
individually act as the heads of administrative departments, but who
collectively pass the needed legislation. Thus, instead of a council
with restricted powers and divided authority, we have a few men
assuming positions of genuine responsibility, as regards both the
originating and enforcing of laws. My colleagues will show that such
a concentration of powers in one small body is necessary and
desirable, both from the legislative and administrative point of
view.

Such a concentration is desirable, since it is accompanied by a
corresponding concentration of personal responsibility. This is
secured in the commission system. Responsibility in administration
is secured, because each commissioner is at the head of a
department, for the efficient and honest conduct of which he alone
is held personally responsible. Responsibility in legislation is
secured, because, first, the body of legislators is comparatively
small. Second, the very fact that each commissioner possesses
information essential to intelligent action, places upon the
commission itself absolute responsibility. Such a system makes it
impossible to shift responsibility from one branch to the other, and
guarantees to us better and more efficient administration of our
municipal affairs for it eliminates all useless boards and
committees and fixes absolutely and completely individual
responsibility.

Mr. Earl Stewart, the first speaker on the Negative, said:

We wish it understood at the outset that no one deplores the useless
boards and complicated machinery in many of our American cities more
than do the Negative.

Before going a step farther let us get right as to what we mean by a
commission form. The gentlemen state that they are standing for a
concentration of all power in one small body. Honorable Judges, they
are standing for something different. It is possible to concentrate
all authority in one body and yet have the different functions
performed by separately constituted bodies. For example, the cabinet
system of Germany, where all governing power is vested in the
legislative body which in turn delegates all administrative
functions to the cabinet. Thus the legislative body is directly
responsible, having ultimate authority, yet the actual exercise of
power is done by distinct bodies. Now how is it with the commission?
There, not only does one body have ultimate authority, but it
actually conducts administration as well as legislation. Quoting
from Sec. 7 of the Des Moines charter, which is typical of every
commission form charter in this regard, it says: "All legislative,
executive, and judicial functions of the city shall be placed in the
hands of the commissioners who shall exercise those functions." The
Affirmative, then, are standing for fusion of functions, and not
concentration of powers.

The Negative do not defend the evils of present city organization.
The Negative believe that far-reaching reforms must be instituted
before we shall enjoy municipal success. The issue then is, does the
commission form, or do the reforms proposed by the Negative, offer
the more satisfactory solution of our municipal problems?

The Negative propose, first, that the form of organization shall
embody a proper correlation or departments.

In the early council system the functions of the legislative and
executive departments so overlapped that there was continual
conflict of authority. Under the board system the two departments
were almost disconnected, so that the legislative department could
not hold the executive accountable to the will of the people. In
many forms today, as the gentlemen have depicted, the relations
between the departments are such that responsibility cannot be
fixed.

But, Honorable Judges, these instances of failure do not show that
it is impossible to preserve a proper division of functions, for
every conspicuous example of municipal success in the world is based
upon the proper correlation between the legislative and
administrative departments. Municipal success in Europe is an
established fact. There we find the cabinet form. A similar form is
in vogue in Toronto, Canada, which Mayor Coatswain says is most
gratifying to the public. Says Rear Admiral Chadwick: "The city of
Newport, Rhode Island, has now a form of government that awakens the
interest of the citizens, keeps that interest awake, and conducts
its affairs in obedience to the wishes of the majority." Charleston,
S. C., Elmira, New York, Los Angeles, Cal., are but a few of the
typical American cities which have successfully adopted the ordinary
mayor and council form. Says Mayor Rhett, of Charleston: "I am the
executive of a city that has been under a mayor and council for over
one hundred years. It is quite as capable of prompt action on any
matter as any business corporation." The National Municipal League,
composed of such men as Albert Shaw, of New York City, and Professor
Rowe of the University of Pennsylvania, appointed a committee to
formulate a definite program of reform. This committee did not even
consider the abandoning of distinct legislative and administrative
bodies, but, after three years of unremitting effort, presented a
working system, embodying, in the words of the committee itself, the
"essential principle of all successful government," namely, the
proper correlation between the legislative and administrative
departments. That program has left marked traces in the constitution
of Virginia, Alabama, Colorado, New York, Wisconsin, Michigan, and
Delaware.

Proper correlation between departments is best facilitated in the
cabinet form, because all governing power is vested in the
legislative body, which in turn delegates all administrative
functions to the cabinet. However, many cities have properly
correlated mayor and council by utilizing the model charter of the
National Municipal League. The Negative, therefore, is here to
promulgate no specific form for all American cities: conditions in
Boston may require a different mechanism from that in San Francisco,
but whatever form, the underlying principle of a proper division of
functions must be embodied. The Affirmative must admit that proper
correlation of departments has brought about municipal success, as
far as mere organization can do so, yet, notwithstanding that, after
fifteen years of misrule under the commission form in Sacramento the
freeholders by unanimous choice again adopted distinct legislative
and administrative bodies; and that the commission form has lately
operated but a few years in a few small cities, amid aroused civic
interest. The Affirmative would abolish at one blow the working
principle of successful city organization in France, Germany,
England, Canada, and unnumbered cities in the United States.

In the second place, evils in our cities are due to bad social and
economic conditions. Harrisburg, Pa., was notoriously corrupt. A
spirit of reform aroused the citizens, and Harrisburg stands today
as a remarkable example of efficient government, yet the form of
organization has been unchanged.

In many of our large cities there is a feeble civic spirit, due, in
part, to undesirable immigrants, the prey to the boss, and utterly
lacking in inherited traditions so essential to the capacity of
self-government. Another instance: the mutual taxing system has
fostered public extravagance and loss of interest on the part of the
taxpayer. Again, favor-seeking corporations have continually
employed corrupt methods. James Bryce says that in the development
of a stronger sense of civic duty rather than any change in the form
of government lies the ultimate hope of municipal reform.

A third cause of municipal ills is that of poor business methods.
First, unjust election laws and lack of proper primaries have
permitted the corrupt arts of the caucus politician. Second, lack of
a uniform system of accounting has served only to conceal the facts,
resulting in apathy on the part of the people, diffusion of
responsibility, and widespread corruption among officials. Third,
lack of publicity of proceedings has protected graft. Fourth, lack
of civil service has perpetuated the spoils system.

All these can and are being remedied. The Bureau of Municipal
Research shows plainly that it is not necessary to change
fundamental principles to secure business efficiency. It reorganized
the Real Estate Bureau of New York that eluded all graft charges and
made 100 per cent profits. The Department of Finance, heretofore
unable to tell whether taxes were collected, is reorganized from top
to bottom. Through the glaring light of publicity, the bureau
collected more than a million dollars for paving done at the
public's expense between the street-car company's rails. The old
conditions, where examination of the books of any department
involved weeks of labor, have given way to a uniform system of
public accounting. In the words of the Springfield, Mass.,
_Republican_, "The work of the Bureau of Public Research is far more
fundamental than the question of substituting city organization with
a commission."

A fourth cause of evils is that of state interference in purely
local affairs.

In the United States the city may not act except where authorized
expressly and especially by the state. In Europe the city may do
anything it is not forbidden to do, and municipal success there is
based on this greater freedom. The European city, though subject to
general state law, makes its own local laws, not in conflict with,
but in addition to, state law. But in the United States the state
legislature, accustomed to interfere in matters of interest to the
state government, failed to distinguish between such matters and
those of exclusive interest to the cities themselves. To illustrate:
The Cleveland Municipal Association reported in 1900 that
legislators from an outside county had introduced radical changes in
almost every department of their city government. In Massachusetts
the police, water works, and park systems are directly under the
state, and the only part the cities have is to pay the bills. In
Pennsylvania for thirty-one years the state kept upon the statute
books an act imposing upon Philadelphia a self-perpetuating
commission, appointed without reference to the city's wishes, and
with all power to erect a city hall and levy taxes to collect the
twenty-million-dollar cost.

State and national political parties, controlling the legislature,
have meddled in the private affairs of the city, resulting in the
decay of the city council and the destruction of the local autonomy.
Professor Goodnow says that under these conditions a scientific
solution of the vexed question of municipal organization has been
impossible.

The remedy lies in restoring to the city its proper field of
legislation. Already thirty states have passed constitutional
amendments granting greater legislative powers to the cities. Five
states now allow cities to amend their own charters. But in direct
opposition to this movement for municipal home rule, the commission
form takes the last step in the destruction of the city's
legislative body and fosters continued state interference. President
Eliot says that the functions of the commissioners will be defined
and enumerated by the state.

Now, Honorable Judges, the basic principle of city government the
world over is division of functions. It is the principle that the
commission form attempts to annihilate. But we have pointed out the
real causes of municipal evils and have shown they are to be
remedied without tampering with the fundamental principles which
time and experience have shown to be correct in every instance of
successful city organization. The Affirmative say: change the
fundamental principle; all changes in form and other remedies are
insufficient. The Negative say: retain the principle of distinct
legislative and administrative bodies, but observe a proper
correlation between them which is done in countless instances as we
have shown. We would remedy bad social and economic conditions,
introduce better business methods, and, most important of all, give
the city greater freedom in powers of local self-government.

Mr. Clyde Robbins, the second speaker of the Affirmative, said:

It should be understood at the outset that the Affirmative desire
all the local self-government for American cities that the Negative
can induce the state legislatures to give them. But just what is
home rule for cities? It is simply granting additional functions to
the city by the state legislature. The only possible way home rule
can affect the question under discussion is a consideration of which
form of government is best suited to perform additional functions
granted by the government. We maintain that the commission form can
do this better because, first, it furnishes superior legislation,
and second, it furnishes superior administration.

The gentleman blandly assumes that the commission form is
fundamentally wrong, because it fails to provide a separate
legislative body as do the governments of the state and nation. An
isolated legislative body is desirable for state and national
governments. Is that a reason for applying it to city government?
Here, social, economic, and political conditions are entirely
different from those of either state or nation. The city is not a
sovereign body. Its powers are exclusively those delegated to it by
the state legislature. They are confined wholly to matters of local
concern. Furthermore, we do not deny the legislative functions of
the city, nor does the plan we advocate contemplate the destruction
of the city's legislative body. It simply means that in place of the
present notoriously inefficient, isolated council, we establish a
commission council composed of the heads of the various
administrative departments. The question at issue is not whether we
shall have a city council, either system provides for that; but
whether a commission council, or an isolated council will furnish
better ordinances. We are contending that the commission council
must furnish superior measures, because in the making of city
ordinances there are at least three great essentials for which this
commission council alone makes adequate provision.

First the legislative and administrative work of the city must be
unalterably connected;

Second, the councilmen must have a direct and technical knowledge of
the city affairs;

Third, the councilman must be representative of the whole city.

Consider, first, how the legislative and administrative work are
connected. State and national legislation are general in their
nature and scope. The extent of territory, and the variety in local
needs have naturally created a separate law-making body. But in the
city such conditions do not exist. The legislative acts of the
council are specific in their nature. The very name reveals their
distinctive character. They are ordinances as distinguished from
other laws, and are designed to meet a particular kind of
administration. The specific act and the particular administration
of it go hand in hand. Hence, satisfactory measures can be enacted
only when they come from the hands of a commission council.

President Eliot recognized this fact when he said that the work of
the city council is not concerned with far-reaching policies of
legislation. There is no occasion for two or even one separate
legislative body. Dr. Albert Shaw writes, that so indistinguishably
blended are the legislative and administrative departments of the
city, that it is impossible to separate one from the other.

Second, a commission council is more effective because it furnishes
a direct and technical knowledge of city affairs. An investigation
in Des Moines showed that out of 370 acts performed by the council,
32 were granting of saloon licenses and similar permits; 338
concerned matters demanding technical knowledge. To have a street
paved, shall one body legislate; a second group administer; and a
third pass upon the validity of the whole thing? Rather the
councilmen should know good paving; they should know how to draw up
and enforce a business contract. These are the vital necessities.

The commission council secures such results. Its membership is
comparatively small. Its sessions are held daily. Its members have a
direct knowledge of the city's needs for each one serves as the head
of a department. Satisfactory legislation then becomes a mere
business proposition. It is but carrying forward the work of each
commissioner, for successful administration is impossible without
competent legislation. Hence, a city commissioner would no more
think of passing improper legislation than a bank director would
think of advising unsound loans.

The Cedar Rapids commission met to legislate on replacing an old
bridge. The commissioner of public safety told in what respects the
old structure was unsafe. The commissioner of public property knew
how much land the city owned abutting the bridge. The commissioner
of streets explained what alterations should be made in the
approaches, and the commissioner of finance knew in just what way
the city could best pay for the improvement. Honorable Judges, such
men are in a position to legislate with thoroughness. They are a
commission council, the very nature of which makes it inevitable
that they act with intelligence and efficiency.

Contrast now, the commission council with the isolated council. Here
we find positively no co-ordination between the legislative and
administrative branches, while a century of experience with the
scheme of checks and balances has proved conclusively that it can
not prevent municipal corruption. Moreover, legislation by the
isolated council is not only chaotic in form but it is
irresponsible, while in the case of the commission council the very
fact that the head of each department possesses necessary
information not only secures adequate legislation but fixes with
certainty the entire responsibility.

The isolated council is a large and unwieldy body. Each member of it
has his own private occupation. Without special preparation of any
kind he attends council not oftener than once a week. Intelligent
action under such conditions is simply impossible. The only way this
council has of securing reliable information is from the heads of
the administrative departments. But even then responsibility is
still divided between the legislative and administrative branches.
This deplorable state of affairs has been synchronous with the
growth of the isolated council in America.

Is it any wonder that the old Des Moines council voted to construct
a bridge only to find when the work was completed that the city did
not even own the approaches, or that the old Cedar Rapids council
let a similar contract at an exorbitantly high price, only to find,
when the work was completed, that the contract called for no
protecting wings or abutments, and the city was compelled to spend
many thousands of dollars additional in order to make the structure
safe? Such nonsensical legislation is a direct result of the
isolated council. It fails to provide information essential to
intelligent action. It does not permit a proper co-ordination of
departments so vitally necessary in successful city government.

Lastly, city legislation demands unbiased representation. In this
respect a commission council is superior to an isolated council.

In the commission council each member represents the entire city.
Hence, there is no incentive to favor one ward at the expense of
another. In fact, any such an attempt could result only in disaster
to the commissioner himself. Furthermore, each commissioner is held
individually responsible for his department. Consequently he is
forced to insist upon an impartial representation of the entire
city. This is well illustrated by the present situation in New York
City. The Bureau of Municipal Research, admittedly the most
practical organization of its kind in the country, is conducting its
work along the line of effective competency in city departments. As
a result of its investigations, the citizens of New York have been
forced to the conclusion to which my colleague has already referred,
namely, that the ultimate solution of their municipal difficulties
will be reached only when they have disposed of their present
inefficient and useless ward council and created in its place a
commission council.

Under the isolated council a member is elected to represent a
certain section of the city. He must do this, no matter what may be
the effect upon the rest of the city. For example, in legislating on
the annual budget, each ward boss brings pressure to bear upon his
own councilman to have certain levies reduced, and to secure
stipulated appropriations for his own ward. In New York City last
spring, Bird S. Coler, representing a part of Brooklyn, blocked
every appropriation until he secured certain selfish measures for
his own district. What is true of New York is an annual occurrence
in practically every other ward-ruled American city.

Furthermore, councilmen from one ward are shamefully unresponsive to
the needs and desires of citizens in other wards. Just this summer
the council of Duluth, Minn., granted saloon licenses for a ward in
which 90 per cent of its citizens signed a written protest against
such action. The councilmen representing that district were helpless
to prevent the legislation and the citizens themselves had no
recourse whatsoever. The grand jury in St. Louis reported that the
wards of that city were an actual menace to decency and good
government.

With these instances before us it is well to remember that the
scheme of ward representation is a necessary part of the practical
operation of the separation of powers in government. This is
exemplified in our national, state, and city organizations. In fact,
the principal reason for an isolated legislative body is that the
sentiments of the different localities may be expressed in
legislation. The practical result is that 95 per cent of our city
governments are based upon ward representation, nor can an instance
be cited in all American political theory which shows the creation
of a successful political organization based upon an isolated
legislative body in which there has not been an accompanying
representation by territorial districts. This principle is always
the same no matter whether it be a congressional district of the
national government or a ward of the city government. Hence, it is
for this principle that the gentlemen must contend if they wish to
argue for an isolated council in city government.

In conclusion, Honorable Judges, a commission council is superior to
an isolated council, because the work of city legislation and
administration must be unalterably connected; because the councilmen
must have a direct and technical knowledge of city affairs; and,
because the councilmen must be representative of the whole city.

Mr. Vincent Starzinger, the second speaker on the Negative, said:

The Affirmative continue to direct their attack against the "old
form." Yet my colleague has suggested substantial changes in present
city organization, changes which have brought about success
wherever tried. Moreover, we wish to make it clear that we are not
necessarily standing for a division of power. There may be
separately constituted departments of government, one primarily for
administration, the other primarily for legislation, yet a
concentration of authority in one of them, as in the case under the
cabinet system of Europe. The gentlemen of the opposition are
advocating not only a concentration of power, but a fusion of
functions as well. Their commission is at once the executive cabinet
and the legislative body.

We have heard much about the practical working of the new plan. Upon
this matter, the Negative shall have a few words to say before the
close of the debate. But granting for the sake of argument that the
commission form has operated with some degree of success in a few
small towns, especially when compared with the admitted inefficient
machinery of government in vogue before its adoption and when
favored by an aroused civic interest, nevertheless, it does not
follow that it is adapted to the needs of the typical American city.
There, administration is a matter of great complexity and of vital
importance. Boston has pay-rolls including 12,000 and annual
expenditure of $40,000,000. Successful administration under such
conditions has necessitated the growth of city departments. The
heads of the various departments constitute an executive cabinet.
Under the commission form, this cabinet is established by popular
election and made the single governmental body for the performance
of both the legislative and the administrative functions.

Such a fusion of functions must necessarily result: in poor
administration; in the sacrifice of legislation; and in the ultimate
destruction of local self-government.

Consider the problem of administration.

An efficient cabinet cannot, as a rule, be secured by popular
election. Men who possess the ability to direct a city department
acquire such capacity only after years of preparation, and such men
will not endure the uncertainties of a career dependent upon the
favor of the public. The commissioner of finance who understands the
intricate problems of accounting will not coddle the people to
insure his election. Popular judgment, no matter how enlightened,
cannot be entrusted with the selection of such men. The old board
system proves this conclusively. Here, the choosing of the heads of
the important city departments was placed in the hands of the
people. The system stands condemned.

A commission form makes the additional blunder of uniting completely
the two functions of legislation and administration in the same
body. This makes the commissioners representative in character. But
this condition is disastrous to successful administration. Whenever
the people desire even the slightest change in their local policy,
the stability and continuity of the city departments must be upset.
Representation is secured at the expense of efficiency.
Administration becomes saturated with politics.

Again, Honorable Judges, the management of a city should be
subjected to the criticism and control of a reviewing body. Both the
welfare of the people and the interests of good administration
demand it. Administrators, no matter how valuable their technical
knowledge, make poor legislators. Being interested in their work,
they very naturally exalt and magnify their departments. Just a few
years ago, the city of Cleveland found it necessary to take even the
preparation of the budget from the heads of the departments
concerned and to place it with a board which could view with
impartiality the demands of the various department chiefs. Think of
turning over all the functions of a city like St. Louis to an
executive cabinet without even the oversight or criticism of an
impartial body.

And, Honorable Judges, the whole experience of government proves the
absolute necessity for a separate legislative department. Look where
you will, and in each case there is an executive cabinet, based upon
appointment, untrammelled by the burdens of legislation, and
subjected to the criticism and control of a reviewing body. In
Europe, the city councils are elected by the people, and the
administrative departments are made up through a process of
selection and appointment, together with the assurance of reasonable
permanence of tenure, responsibility, and adequate support. Likewise
in America, the larger cities are already organizing their cabinets
upon a somewhat similar basis. The six largest cities of New York,
all of the cities of Indiana, Boston, Chicago, Baltimore, and many
others are securing their important administrative officials through
appointment by the mayor. This is the general plan advocated by the
National Municipal League. It centers responsibility for the
administration in one man. On the other hand, some of the cities of
Canada follow more closely to the German system. There the cabinet
is selected by a representative council. In practically all of these
instances, men of special ability have been obtained, the
departments of administration have been properly correlated,
responsibility has been concentrated, and the general principle,
that successful administration depends upon a separately constituted
legislative body, has been firmly established.

It is plain then that a commission form violates the fundamental
principles of successful administration. It first attempts to secure
a cabinet by popular vote. It then upsets the stability of the city
departments by completely uniting both the legislative and the
administrative functions. Finally, it destroys the responsibility of
that prime essential of successful administration, namely, a proper
reviewing body.

In the second place, Honorable Judges, the permanent adoption of a
commission form must necessarily mean a sacrifice of legislation and
the ultimate destruction of local self-government. Even though the
city may be subordinate to the state, nevertheless, it has a broad
field of independent action. Otherwise, why give it a separate
personality and a separate organization? Cities are permitted to
exercise vast powers of police and of taxation. It is idle to say
that a few commissioners can give satisfactory legislation. They
cannot represent community interests. Their executive functions will
naturally bias their judgment. Moreover, each commissioner, knowing
little of the needs of the other departments, will naturally take
the word of its administrative head, especially since he desires the
same freedom. This was actually the case in Sacramento, Cal., where
the commission plan was tried for fifteen years and given up as an
abject failure. Says the Hon. Clinton White of that city: "In almost
every instance, the board soon came to the understanding that each
man was to be let alone in the management of the department assigned
to him. This resulted in there being in fact no tribunals exercising
a supervisory power over the executive of a particular department."
Honorable Judges, a reviewing and legislative body is indispensable
in city government and a commission makes no such provision. Weak in
administration, wholly lacking in matters of legislation, dangerous
as a theory of government, it cannot help but result in the complete
subjection of local government to the state. The inevitable result
of its permanent adoption will be that the important local
legislative functions will become a mere administrative board with
discretionary power as in the case of Washington, D.C. In the words
of Professor Goodnow: "The destruction of the city council has not
destroyed council government. It has simply made local policy a
matter of state legislative determination." If we wish to destroy
the life of the city, make it impotent to discharge the functions
for which it was organized, then, and then only, it might be
feasible to place over it a commission.

But, Honorable Judges, authorities are agreed that cities must be
allowed greater freedom of action in local affairs, that municipal
home rule is indispensable. The governments of our large cities have
been dominated to such an extent by the state legislatures, usually
partisan and irresponsible to the locality concerned, that in many
cases self-government has become a term, hollow and without meaning.

The gentlemen condemn the city council, yet they pass over the real
cause for its decay. Restore to the city its proper legislative
powers, confine the work of the council to legislation instead of
allowing it to go into details of administration, reduce the number
of councilmen, if necessary, adjust the method of representation,
introduce needed electoral and primary reform, establish
responsibility by means of uniform municipal accounting and
publicity of proceedings, and we ask the gentlemen in all
earnestness why American city councils will not take on new life
just as the city councils of every other country have done in the
past.

The two great problems of American city government are: first,
administration; secondly, municipal home rule. The solution of both
depends upon the existence of two separately constituted departments
of government. This principle is being emphasized by the leading
scholars of political science, as illustrated by the program of the
National Municipal League. In fact, Honorable Judges, every
deep-seated reform in our large cities for the past quarter of a
century has tended toward this cardinal doctrine of municipal
success. The Ohio Municipal Code Commission, after two years of
careful study and observation, presented a bill based upon the
principles which we defend tonight, namely, a separation of
administration from legislation, and secondly, municipal home rule.

In direct opposition to this, the gentlemen present and advocate as
a permanent scheme for the organization of American cities, both
large and small, a commission form, a quasi-legislative and
administrative board patterned to give mediocrity in the performance
of both functions, success in neither; a form which destroys forever
the possibility of developing an efficient executive cabinet and is
entirely out of harmony with the advancing idea of municipal home
rule.

Mr. George Luxford, the third speaker on the Affirmative, said:

It has been made very clear by my colleagues that the present
shameful condition of many of our American cities is due in large
measure to the peculiar form of the government patterned after a
scheme which is adapted to a sovereign government like the state or
nation. The Negative demand an isolation which history shows, so far
as our American cities are concerned, leads to a complete confusion
of functions, with a consequent loss of responsibility. Knowing the
inadequacy of the scheme they then demanded municipal home rule; but
we have shown that the Affirmative are thoroughly committed to
municipal home rule which under the commission form alone can be
safely intrusted to cities. State interference in city government is
the child of the form of government for which our friends of the
Negative are sponsors. Thus far the gentlemen have failed to
disprove the points which we have presented that the theory of
checks and balances when applied to American cities has failed; that
the plan of concentrating municipal authority under one head as
advocated by the commission plan is in complete harmony with modern
industrial and social development, and that the plan is superior
from a legislative standpoint. It shall be my purpose to show that
it is superior from the standpoint of administration. We believe
this because the commission lends itself to the application of
business methods. The plan provides for a comparatively small body
of men who meet in daily session and who give their whole time to
the work of governing the city. At present, too often the real
business of the officials is anything else. They give their spare
time to the city and we have seen the results. Honorable judges, we
claim that there is a special virtue in the very smallness of the
number inasmuch as they are properly paid, devote all their time to
their work, and are made in fact governors of the city. They have a
great deal of work to do and they do it, while under our present
systems the councilmen have comparatively little to do and they fail
to do that little efficiently.

The reason why this small body can administer with dispatch and
efficiency is seen at a glance. Each commissioner is the head of a
department for which he is personally responsible. He is not
hindered as is the executive at present by an inefficient and
meddling council which has more power, often, than the executive
himself. He knows the laws for he has helped to make them. It is his
business to see that they are executed, and if they are not, he
cannot escape blame. He cannot plead ignorance, lack of
responsibility, or lack of power as do present administrative
officers.

Moreover, this body is admirably constituted for effective carrying
out of city business. It is larger than the single headed executive
and possesses, therefore, a division of work which makes the
administration far more effective. At the same time it is smaller
than the old council and for that reason is more efficient in
enacting the city's peculiar kind of legislation. In actual
practice, and that seems to be the real test of city government,
both administration and legislation are accomplished with accuracy
and dispatch. For instance, every spring for the last decade
carloads of "dagoes" with their dirt and disease have come to Cedar
Rapids. Every year protests have gone up to both mayor and council,
but without result. Cedar Rapids has adopted a commission form of
government. Last spring when the "dagoes" came the same complaints
went up as usual, that because of their insanitary methods these
people carried with them filth and disease. But the petitioners did
not go to the city council which met once in two weeks, nor were
they referred to a committee which met less often. They went
directly to the commissioners who had charge of the city health and
in less than twenty-four hours the "dagoes" had been notified to
either clean up or leave, and they left the city. But, say the
opponents of this plan, this could have been done under the old
system. To be sure, but the burning fact remains that in spite of
the protests of the people, it was not done.

In Houston the government was both inefficient and dishonest. For
years the annual expenditures had exceeded the income a hundred
thousand dollars. The city adopted a commission form and a four
hundred thousand dollar floating debt was paid off in one year out
of the ordinary income of the city. At the same time the city's
taxes were reduced ten per cent. In the health department alone
there is a saving of from $100 to $150 per month, while a
combination in the operation of the garbage crematory and pumping
station saves the city $6,000 annually. These results have been
accomplished under a commission plan by the application of common,
everyday business principles.

Galveston adopted a commission plan, and although its taxable values
were reduced twenty-five per cent by the storm of 1900, yet within
six years its commissioners not only put the city on a cash basis,
made improvements costing $1,000,000 annually, but actually paid off
a debt of $394,000 which had been incurred by the old council, and
all this was accomplished without borrowing a dollar, issuing a
bond, or increasing the rate of taxation. Other cities which have
adopted a commission plan are accomplishing equally as beneficial
results. Hence, we maintain that the commission form of city
government is superior from the standpoint of efficiency in
administration.

The commission plan is superior in administration for it is adapted
to the city's financial problem. The same body of men are held
responsible for the levying and collecting of taxes and for the
spending of the money. This is desirable because the administrative
body which is to spend money knows, accurately, the city's need of
revenue. They are in a position to know; it is their business. A
legislative body, whether council or a board, cannot know the city's
needs for money without getting the facts from the administrative
body. F.R. Clow says the council does not pretend to know the city's
revenue problem and they adopt the recommendation of the
administrative departments. The Negative's system of division of
powers simply divides the responsibility between the legislative and
administrative departments for the thing which in fact has been done
by the administrative department itself. Since the administrative
department really dictates the budget, it should be held directly
responsible for it. Therefore, we contend that the commissioners,
knowing best what the budget should contain because as
administrators they know the city's need for money, are the body of
men preeminently fitted to handle the city's budget.

The commission plan is adapted to the city's financial problem
because it fosters economy. Economy is the result of understanding.
The commissioners knowing the city's government, not from the
administrative side alone, but from the legislative side as well,
are in a position to economize and in practice they have done so.
The running expenses of Galveston under the commission plan have
been reduced one-third. In Houston it costs $12,800 a year less to
run the water and light plants than formerly, while by a combination
of work in the different departments there is a saving of $9,000
annually. In Cedar Rapids, since the adoption of the commission
plan, there has been a reduction in the paving contracts let of ten
and one-fifth per cent, in sewerage contracts, fourteen and
two-sevenths per cent, and in water contracts, twenty per cent.
Immediately after the adoption of the commission plan in Des Moines
the annual cost of each arc-light was reduced five dollars. Reports
from all the cities using the commission plan show that by the use
of business principles the commissioners have economized in the
administration of the city's government.

The commission plan is adapted to the city's finances because it
provides a superior safeguard. Legislative bodies in our cities have
been depended upon to represent the citizens' best interest. In
practice, as we have pointed out, they have not done so. Never in
the history of our municipal affairs, says Henry D.F. Baldwin, has a
legislative body stood out as the representatives of the people
against the administrative department. Why then continue a
representative body which does not in fact represent? Instead of the
withered form of a council or legislative body standing between the
citizen and his government the commission plan simply removes this
useless obstacle and allows the citizen to participate directly in
the government. This is directly in harmony with the
well-established economic principle that the self-interest of the
taxpayer will control where responsibility is fixed.

Mr. Charles Briggs, the third speaker on the Negative, said:

It will be well while the matter is fresh in our minds, Honorable
Judges, to make a brief examination of one matter of which the
Affirmative are making a feature, that the commission form affords
unusual safeguards for the financial and economic interests of the
city. Now, in all fairness to the scheme which is doing quite well
in a very few of our smaller cities, the question ought to be raised
as to what other form of city government could be devised which
would provide greater opportunities for graft and corruption. A
little group of autocrats is the ideal form for which the ardent
corruptionists might pray. They have it in the commission form.
Exemplary men in office or a constant civic interest, may prevent
the commissioners from becoming a band of robbers; but are these two
preventives likely always to exist? Human experience says "No." The
history of New Orleans and Sacramento confirm that decision. Civic
interest is bound to subside; corrupt men are sure to become
commissioners. Then the oligarchy advocated by the Affirmative
becomes not a "safeguard" but a band of raiders equipped by the very
form of government to loot the treasury. We must insist, at this
point, that our opponents have failed in their assault upon our main
contention:

First, that the evils in American city government are not
attributable to the fundamental principles of that government;
second, that the principles underlying the proposed form are in
themselves wrong and are not consonant generally with American
ideals. It remains to be shown that the commission form is
impracticable as a general scheme for the government of all American
cities.

We can very well agree that where the commission form of government
has been tried it has been productive of some good results, and
further, that in certain homogeneous communities of high culture and
intelligence it might work with considerable success; but that the
result obtained in cities where the commission form has been tried
would warrant the universal adoption of it by American cities we
must deny.

We deny the wisdom of adopting the commission form for it results in
inadequate responsibility; third, it could never work in the vast
majority of American cities. These reasons are apparent from
examinations of the commission form where it has been and is being
tried, and are inherent in the plan itself.