Chapter III: The Place of the “self” in Reality

§ 1. The “self” is (1) a teleological concept, (2) implies a
contrasted not-self (where this contrast is absent from
an experience there is no genuine sense of self); (3)
but the limits which divide self and not-self are not
fixed but fluctuating. The not-self is not a merely
external limit, but consists of discordant elements
within the individual, which are extruded from it by a
mental construction. (4) The self is a product of
development, and has its being in the time-series. (5)
The self is never given complete in a moment of actual
experience, but is an ideal construction; probably
self-hood implies some degree of _intellectual_
development. § 2. The Absolute or Infinite Individual,
being free from all internal discord, can have no
not-self, and therefore cannot properly be called a
self. § 3. Still less can it be a person. § 4. In a
_society_ of selves we have a more genuinely
self-determined individual than in the single self.
Hence it would be nearer the truth to think of the
Absolute as a Society, though no finite whole adequately
expresses the Absolute’s full nature. We must remember,
however, (_a_) that probably the individuals in the
Absolute are not all in _direct_ relation, and (_b_)
that in thinking of it as a Society we are not denying
its real individuality. § 5. The self is not in its own
nature imperishable; as to the particular problem of its
continuance after death, no decision can be arrived at
on grounds of Metaphysics. Neither the negative
presumption drawn from our inability to understand the
conditions of continuance, nor the lack of empirical
evidence, is conclusive; on the other hand, there is not
sufficient metaphysical reason for taking immortality as
certain 334