Chapter I: The Problem of the Metaphysician

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#§1. The generality and simplicity of the metaphysical
problem make it difficult to define the study. §2.
Problem is suggested by the presence of contradictions
in ordinary experience. §3.. By making a distinction
between reality and appearance the sciences remove some
of these contradictions, but themselves lead to further
difficulties of the same sort; hence the need for
systematic inquiry into the meaning of the distinction
between the real and the apparent, and the general
character of reality as such. §4.. Metaphysics, as an
inquiry into the ultimate meaning of “reality,” is akin
to poetry and religion, but differs from them in its
scientific character, from the mathematical and
experimental sciences in its method, from common
scepticism in the critical nature of its methods as well
as in its positive purpose. §5.. The study is difficult
(_a_) because of the generality of its problems, (_b_)
and because we cannot employ diagrams or physical
experiments. §6.. The objection that Metaphysics is an
impossibility may be shown in all its forms to rest upon
self-contradictory assumptions of a metaphysical kind.
§7.. The minor objections that, if possible, the science
is superfluous, or at least stationary, may be met with
equal ease. §8. Metaphysics is partly akin to the
mystical tendency, but differs from mysticism in virtue
of its positive interest in the world of appearances, as
well as by its scientific method. §9.. It agrees with
logic in the generality of its scope, but differs in
being concerned with the real, whereas logic is
primarily concerned with the inferrible. §10. The
problems of the so-called _Theory of Knowledge_ are
really metaphysical. 1