Chapter XXV: Section II: is a historical sketch in four parts tracing the main (6)

It was in Herbert Spencer, the triumphant "buccinator novi temporis," that the advocates of evolutionary ethics found their protagonist. Spencer looked to ideas derived from the biological sciences to provide a solution of all the enigmas of morality, as of most other departments of life; and he conceived it "to be the business of moral science to deduce from the laws of life and the conditions of existence what kinds of action necessarily tend to produce happiness and what kinds to produce unhappiness." It is clear, therefore, that any moral science which is to be of value must wait until the "laws of life" and "conditions of existence" have been satisfactorily determined, presumably by biology and the allied sciences; and there are few more melancholy instances of failure in philosophy than the paucity of the actual results attained by Spencer in his lifetime in his application of the so-called laws of evolution to human conduct--a failure recognized by Spencer himself. His own contribution to ethics was vitiated at the outset by the fact that he never shook himself free from the trammels of the philosophy which his own system was intended to supersede. He began by disclaiming any affinity to Utilitarianism on the part of his own philosophy. He pointed out that the principle of the greatest happiness of the greatest number is a principle without any definite meaning, since men are nowhere unanimous in their standard of happiness, but regard the conception of happiness rather as a problem to be solved than a test to be applied. Universal happiness would require omniscience to legislate for it and the "normal" or, as some would say, "perfect" man to desire it; neither of these conditions of its realization is at present in existence. Further, the principle that "everybody is to count for one, nobody for more than one," is equally unsatisfactory. It may be taken to imply that the useless and the criminal should be entitled to as much happiness as the useful and the virtuous. While it gives no rule for private as distinct from public conduct, it provides no real guidance for the legislator. For neither happiness, nor the concrete means to happiness, nor finally the conditions of its realization can be distributed; and in the end "not general happiness becomes the ethical standard by which legislative action is to be guided, but universal justice." Yet the implications of this latter conclusion Spencer never fully thought out. He accepted bodily without farther questioning the hedonistic psychology by which the Utilitarians sought to justify their theory while he rejected the theory itself. Good, e.g. defined by him "as conduct conducive to life," is also further defined as that which is "conducive to a surplus of pleasures over pains." Happiness, again, is always regarded as consisting in feeling, ultimately in pleasant feeling, and there is no attempt to apply the same principles of criticism which he had successfully applied to the Utilitarians' "happiness" to the conception of "pleasure." And, though he maintains as against the Utilitarians the existence of certain fundamental moral intuitions which have come to be quite independent of any present conscious experience of their utility, he yet holds that they are the results of accumulated racial experiences gradually organized and inherited. Finally, side by side with a theory of the nature of moral obligation thus fundamentally empirical and a posteriori in its outlook, he maintains in his account of justice the existence of the idea of justice as distinct from a mere sentiment, carrying with it an a priori belief in its existence and identical in its a priori and intuitive character with the ultimate criterion of Utilitarianism itself. The fact is that any close philosophical analysis of Spencer's system of ethics can only result in the discovery of a multitude of mutually conflicting and for the most part logically untenable theories. It is frequently impossible to discover whether he wishes by an appeal to evolutionary principles to reinforce the sanctions and emphasize the absolute character of the traditional morality which in the main he accepts without question from the current opinions about conduct of his age, or whether he wishes to discredit and disprove the validity of that morality in order to substitute by the aid of the biological sciences a new ethical code. The argument, for instance, that intuitive and a priori beliefs gain their absolute character from the fact that they are the result of continued transmission and accumulation of past nervous modifications in the history of the race would, if taken seriously, lead us to the belief that ultimate ethical sanctions are to be sought, not by an appeal to the moral consciousness, but by the investigation of brain tissue and the relation of man's bodily organism to its environment. Yet such a view would be totally at variance with much that Spencer says (especially in his treatment of justice) concerning the trustworthiness and inevitable character of men's constant appeal to the intuitions of their moral consciousness. Moreover, the very fact itself of the possibility of inheriting acquired moral characteristics is still hotly debated by those biologists with whom should rest the ultimate verdict. Again, the argument that "conduct is good or bad according as its total effects are pleasurable or painful," and that ultimately "pleasure-giving acts are life-sustaining acts," seems to involve Spencer in a multitude of unverified assumptions and contradictory theories. In the first place it is never clear whether Spencer regards the fact that a particular course of conduct is accompanied by a feeling of pleasure as a test of its life-preserving and life-sustaining character, or whether he wishes us to use as our criterion of what is pleasant in conduct the fact that the conduct in question seems conducive to the continued existence of man's organic life. He apparently passes from one criterion to the other as best suits the purpose of the moment. He does not prove the coincidence of life-sustaining and pleasant activities. He assumes throughout that the pleasant is the opposite of what is painful, and seems unaware of the difficulty of determining by means of terms so highly abstract the specific character of moral action. We find in his theory no satisfactory attempt to discriminate between the pleasure aimed at by the altruist and the immediate pleasure of egoistic action. Similarly he disregards the distinction between pleasant feeling as an immediate motive of conduct and the idea of the attainment of future pleasure whether by the race or by the individual. Spencer is involved in effect in most of the confusions and contradictions of hedonistic psychology.

Nor is his attempt to construct a scientific criterion out of data derived from the biological sciences productive of satisfactory results. He is hampered by a distinction between "absolute" and "relative" ethics definitely formulated in the last two chapters of The _Data of Ethics_. Absolute ethics would deal with such laws as would regulate the conduct of ideal man in an ideal society, i.e. a society where conduct has reached the stage of complete adjustment to the needs of social life. Relative ethics, on the other hand, is concerned only with such conduct as is advantageous for that society which has not yet reached the end of complete adaptation to its environment, i.e. which is at present imperfect. It is hardly necessary to say that Spencer does not tell us how to bring the two ethical systems into correlation. And the actual criteria of conduct derived from biological considerations are almost ludicrously inadequate. Conduct, e.g., is said to be more moral in proportion as it exhibits a tendency on the part of the individual or society to become more "definite," "coherent" and "heterogeneous." Or, again, we should recognize as a test of the "authoritative" character of moral ideas or feelings the fact that they are complex and representative, referring to a remote rather than to a proximate good, remembering the while that "the sense of duty is transitory, and will diminish as fast as moralization increases." In fact, no acceptable scientific criterion emerges, and the outcome of Spencer's attempt to ascertain the laws of life and the conditions of existence is either a restatement of the dictates of the moral consciousness in vague and cumbrous quasi-scientific phraseology, or the substitution of the meaningless test of "survivability" as a standard of perfection for the usual and intelligible standards of "good" and "right."

Leslie Stephen.

A similar criticism might fairly be passed upon the majority of philosophers who approach ethics from the standpoint of evolution. Sir Leslie Stephen, for instance, wishes to substitute the conception of "social health" for that of universal happiness, and considers that the conditions of social health are to be discovered by an examination of the "social organism" or of "social tissue," the laws of which can be studied apart from those laws by which the individuals composing society regulate their conduct. "The social evolution means the evolution of a strong social tissue; the best type is the type implied by the strongest tissue." But on the important question as to what constitutes the strongest social tissue, or to what extent the analogy between society as at present constituted and organic life is really applicable, we are left without certain guidance. The fact is that with few exceptions evolutionary moral philosophers evade the choice between alternatives which is always presented to them. They begin, for the most part, with a belief that in ethics as in other departments of human knowledge "the more developed must be interpreted by the less developed"--though frequently in the sequel complexity or posteriority of development is erected as a standard by means of which to judge the process of development itself. They are not content to write a _history_ of moral development, applying to it the principles by which Darwinians seek to explain the development of animal life. But the search of origins frequently leads them into theories of the nature of that moral conduct whose origin they are anxious to find quite at variance with current and accepted beliefs concerning its nature. The discovery of the so-called evolution of morality out of non-moral conditions is very frequently an unconscious subterfuge by which the evolutionist hides the fact that he is making a priori judgments upon the value of the moral concepts held to be evolved. To accept such theories of the origin of morality would carry with it the conviction that what we took for "moral" conduct was in reality something very different, and has been so throughout its history. The legitimate inference which should follow would be the denial of the validity of those moral laws which have hitherto been regarded as absolute in character, and the substitution for all customary moral terms of an entirely new set based upon biological considerations. But it is precisely this, the only logical inference, which most evolutionary philosophers are unwilling to draw. They cannot give up their belief in customary morality. Professor Huxley maintained, for example, in a famous lecture that "the ethical progress of society depends not on imitating the cosmic process, still less in running away from it, but in combating it" (_Romanes Lecture, ad fin_.). And very frequently arguments are adduced by evolutionists to prove that men's belief in the absolute character of moral precepts is one of the necessary means adopted by nature to carry out her designs for the social welfare of mankind. Yet the other alternative, to which such reasoning points, they are reluctant to accept. For the belief that moral obligation is absolute in character, that it is alike impossible to explain its origin and transcend its laws, would make the search for a scientific criterion of conduct to be deduced from the laws of life and conditions of existence meaningless, if not absurd.

Nietzsche.

Perhaps the one European thinker who has carried evolutionary principles in ethics to their logical conclusion is Friedrich Nietzsche. Almost any system of morality or immorality might find some justification in Nietzsche's writings, which are extraordinarily chaotic and full of the wildest exaggerations. Yet it has been a true instinct which has led popular opinion as testified to by current literature to find in Nietzsche the most orthodox exponent of Darwinian ideas in their application to ethics. For he saw clearly that to be successful evolutionary ethics must involve the "transvaluation of all values," the "demoralization" of all ordinary current morality. He accepted frankly the glorification of brute strength, superior cunning and all the qualities necessary for success in the struggle for existence, to which the ethics of evolution necessarily tend. He proclaimed himself, before everything else, a physiologist, and looked to physiology to provide the ultimate standard for everything that has value; and though his own ethical code necessarily involves the disappearance of sympathy, love, toleration and all existing altruistic emotions, he yet in a sense finds room for them in such altruistic self-sacrifice as prepares the way for the higher man of the future. Thus, after a fashion, he is able to reconcile the conflicting claims of egoism and altruism and succeed where most apostles of evolution fail. The Christian virtues, sympathy for the weak, the suffering, &c., represent a necessary stage to be passed through in the evolution of the _Ubermensch_, i.e. the stage when the weak and suffering combine in revolt against the strong. They are to be superseded, not so much because all social virtues are to be scorned and rejected, as because in their effects, i.e. in their tendency to perpetuate and prolong the existence of the weak and those who are least well equipped and endowed by nature, they are anti-social in character and inimical to the survival of the strongest and most vigorous type of humanity. Consequently Nietzsche in effect maintains the following paradoxical position: he explains the existence of altruism upon egoistical principles; he advocates the total abolition of all altruism by carrying these same egoistical principles to their logical conclusion; he nevertheless appeals to that moral instinct which makes men ready to sacrifice their own narrow personal interests to the higher good of society--an instinct profoundly altruistic in character--as the ultimate justification of the ethics he enunciates. Such a position is a _reductio ad absurdum_ of the attempt to transcend the ultimate character of those intuitions and feelings which prompt men to benevolence. Thus, though incidentally there is much to be learned from Nietzsche, especially from his criticism of the ethics of pessimism, or from the strictures he passes upon the negative morality of extreme asceticism or quietism, his system inevitably provides its own refutation. For no philosophy which travesties the real course of history and distorts the moral facts is likely to commend itself to the sober judgment of mankind however brilliant be its exposition or ingenious its arguments. Finally, the conceptions of strength, power and masterfulness by which Nietzsche attempts to determine his own moral ideal, become, when examined, as relative and unsatisfactory as other criteria of moral action said to be deduced from evolutionary principles. Men desire strength or power not as ends but as means to ends beyond them; Nietzsche is most convincing when the _Ubermensch_ is left undefined. Imagined as ideal man, i.e. as morality depicts him, he becomes intelligible; imagined as Nietzsche describes him he reels back into the beast, and that distinction which chiefly separates man from the animal world out of which he has emerged, viz. his unique power of self-consciousness and self-criticism, is obliterated.

T.H. Green.

It was upon this crucial difficulty, i.e. the transition in the evolution of morality from the stage of purely animal and unconscious action to specifically human action,--i.e. action directed by self-conscious and purposive intelligence to an end conceived as good,--that the polemic of T.H. Green and his idealistic followers fastened. And it is perhaps unfortunate that metaphysical doctrines enunciated chiefly for the purposes of criticism not in themselves vitally necessary to the theory of morality propounded should have been regarded as the main contribution to ethical theory of idealist writers, and as such treated severely by hostile critics. Green's principal objection to evolutionary moral philosophy is contained in the argument that no merely "natural" explanation of the facts of morality is conceivable. The knowing consciousness,--i.e. so far as conduct is concerned the moral consciousness,--can never become an object of knowledge in the sense in which natural phenomena are objects of scientific knowledge. For such knowledge implies the existence of a knowing consciousness as a relating and uniting intelligence capable of distinguishing itself from the objects to which it relates. And more particularly the existence of the moral consciousness implies "the transition from mere want to consciousness of wanted object, from impulse to satisfy the want to effort for the realization of the wanted objects, implies the presence of the want to a subject which distinguishes itself from it." Consequently the facts of moral development imply with the emergence of human consciousness the appearance of something qualitatively different from the facts with which physiology for instance deals, imply a stratum as it were in development which no examination of animal tissues, no calculation of consequences with regard to the preservation of the species can ever satisfactorily explain. However far back we go in the history of humanity, if the presence of consciousness be admitted at all, it will be necessary to admit also the presence to consciousness of an ideal which can be accepted or rejected, of a power of looking before and after, and aiming at a future which is not yet fully realized. But unfortunately the temporary exigencies of criticism made it necessary for Green to emphasize the metaphysic of the self, i.e. to insist upon the necessity of a critical examination of the pre-requisites of any form of self-consciousness and especially of the knowing consciousness, to such an extent that critics have lost sight of the real dependence of his metaphysic upon the direct evidence of the moral consciousness. The philosophic value, the sincerity, the breadth and depth of his treatment of moral facts and institutions have been fully recognized. What has not been adequately realized is that the metaphysical basis of his system of ethics--the argument, for example, contained in the introduction to the _Prolegomena_--is unfairly treated if divorced from his treatment of morals as a whole, and that it can be justly estimated only if interpreted as much as the conclusion as the starting-point of moral theory. The doctrine of the eternity of the self, for instance, against which much criticism (e.g. Taylor, _The Problem of Conduct_, chap. ii.) has been directed, though it is chiefly expressed in the language of epistemology, has its roots nevertheless in the direct testimony of moral experience. For morality implies a power in the individual of rising above the interests of his own narrower self and identifying himself in the pursuit of a universal good with the true interests of all other selves. Similarly the conception of the self as a moral unity arises naturally out of the impossibility of finding the summum bonum in a succession of transient states of consciousness such as hedonism for example postulates. Good as a true universal can only be realized by a true self, and both imply a principle of unity not wholly expressible in terms of the particulars which it unifies. But whether the idealistic interpretation of the nature of universal good be the true one, i.e. whether we are justified in identifying that self-consciousness which is capable of grasping the principle of unity with the principle of unity which it grasps is a metaphysical and theistic problem comparatively irrelevant to Green's moral theory. It would be quite possible to accept his criticisms of naturalism and hedonism while rejecting many of the metaphysical inferences which he draws. A somewhat similar answer might be returned to those critics who find Green's use of the term "self-realization" or "self-development" as characteristic of the moral ideal unsatisfactory. It is quite easy to exhibit the futility of such a conception if understood formally for the practical purposes of moral philosophy. If the phrase be understood to mean the realization of some capacities of the self it does not appear to discriminate sufficiently between the good and bad capacities; while the realization under present conditions of all the capacities of a self is impossible. And to aim so far as is possible at all-round development would again ignore the distinction between vice and virtue. But used in the sense in which Green habitually uses it self-realization implies, as he puts it, the fulfilment by the good man of his rational capacity or the idea of a best that is in time, i.e. the distinction between the good and the bad self is never ignored, but is the fundamental assumption of his theory. And if it be urged that the expression is in any case tautological, i.e. that the good is defined in terms of self-realization and self-realization in terms of the good, it may be doubted whether any rational system of ethics can avoid a similar imputation. Green would admit that in a certain sense the conception of "good" is indefinable, i.e. that it can only be recognized in the particulars of conduct of which it is the universal form. Only, therefore, to those philosophers who believe in the existence of a criterion of morality, i.e. a universal test such as that of pleasure, happiness and the like, by which we can judge of the worth of actions, will Green's position seem absurd; since, on the contrary, such conceptions as those of "self-development" or "self-realization" seem to have a definite and positive value if they call attention to the metaphysical implications of morality and accurately characterize the moral facts. What ambiguity they possess arises from the ambiguity of morality itself. For moral progress consists in the actualization of what is already potentially in existence. The striking merit of Green's moral philosophy is that the idealism which he advocates is rooted and grounded in moral habits and institutions: and the metaphysic in which it culminates is based upon principles already implicitly recognized by the moral consciousness of the ordinary man. Nothing could be farther from Green's teaching than the belief that constructive metaphysics could, unaided by the intuitions of the moral consciousness, discover laws for the regulation of conduct.

Taylor.

But although Green's loyalty to the primary facts of the moral consciousness prevented him from constructing a rationalistic system of morals based solely upon the conclusions of metaphysics, it was perhaps inevitable that the revival of interest in metaphysics so prominent in his own speculations should lead to a more daring criticism of ethical first principles in other writers. Bradley's _Ethical Studies_ had presented with great brilliancy an idealist theory of morality not very far removed from that of Green's _Prolegomena_. But the publication of _Appearance and Reality_ by the same author marked a great advance in philosophical criticism of ethical postulates, and a growing dissatisfaction with current reconciliations between moral first principles and the conclusions of metaphysics. _Appearance and Reality_ was not primarily concerned with morals, yet it inevitably led to certain conclusions affecting conduct, and it was no very long time before these conclusions were elaborated in detail. Professor A.E. Taylor's _Problem of Conduct_ (1901) is one of the most noteworthy and independent contributions to Moral Philosophy published in recent years. But it nevertheless follows in the main Bradley's line of criticism and may therefore be regarded as representative of his school. There are two principal positions in Professor Taylor's work:--(1) a refusal to base ethics upon metaphysics, and (2) the discovery of an irreconcilable dualism in the nature of morality which takes many shapes, but may be summarized roughly as consisting in an ultimate opposition between egoism and altruism. With regard to the first of these Taylor says (_op. cit._ p. 4) that his object is to show that "ethics is as independent of metaphysical speculation for its principles and methods as any of the so-called 'natural sciences'; that its real basis must be sought not in philosophical theories about the nature of the Absolute or the ultimate constitution of the Universe, but in the empirical facts of human life as they are revealed to us in our concrete everyday experience of the world and mankind, and sifted and systematized by the sciences of psychology and sociology.... Ethics should be regarded as a purely 'positive' or 'experimental' and not as a 'speculative' science." With regard to the second position one quotation will suffice (_op. cit._ p. 183). "Altruism and egoism are divergent developments from the common psychological root of primitive ethical sentiment. Both developments are alike unavoidable, and each is ultimately irreconcilable with the other. Neither egoism nor altruism can be made the sole basis of moral theory without mutilation of the facts, nor can any higher category be discovered by the aid of which their rival claims may be finally adjusted."

Professor Taylor expounds these two theories with great brilliance of argument and much ingenuity, yet neither of them will perhaps carry complete conviction to the minds of the majority of his critics. It is curious, in the first place, to find the independence of moral philosophy upon metaphysics supported by metaphysical arguments. For whatever may be the real character of the interrelation of moral and metaphysical first principles it is obvious that Taylor's own dissatisfaction with current moral principles arises from an inability to believe in their ultimate rationality, i.e. a belief that they are untenable from the standpoint of ultimate metaphysics; and perhaps the most interesting portion of his book is the chapter entitled "Beyond Good and Bad," in which the highest and final form of the ethical consciousness of mankind is subjected to searching criticism. But further, it is becoming increasingly apparent that psychology (upon which Taylor would base morality) itself involves metaphysical assumptions; its position in fact cannot be stated except as a metaphysical position, whether that of subjective idealism or any other. And the need which most philosophers have felt for some philosophical foundation for morality arises, not from any desire to subordinate moral insight to speculative theory, but because the moral facts themselves are inexplicable except in the light of first principles which metaphysics alone can criticize.

Taylor himself attempts to find the roots of ethics in the moral sentiments of mankind, the moral sentiments being primarily feelings or emotions, though they imply and result in judgments of approval and disapproval upon conduct. But it may be doubted whether he succeeds in clearly distinguishing ethical feelings from ethical judgments, and if they are to be treated as synonymous it seems difficult to avoid the conclusion that the implications of moral "judgment" must involve a reference to metaphysics.

Moreover, it is obvious that a great part of Taylor's quarrel with current moral ideals arises from the fact that they do not commend themselves to the moral judgment, i.e. from the standpoint of real goodness they are unsatisfactory, being tainted with evil. Hence it appears difficult to reconcile what is in effect a belief in the validity of the judgments of the moral consciousness with a belief that the real source and justification of that consciousness are to be found in the very sentiments and vague mass of floating feelings upon which it pronounces. Scepticism seems to be the only possible result of such a position. Taylor's polemic against metaphysical systems of ethics is based throughout upon an alleged discrepancy and separation between the facts of moral "experience," the judgments of the moral consciousness, and theories as to the nature of these which the philosophers whom he attacks would by no means accept. There is no doubt a distinction between morality as a form of consciousness and reflection upon that morality. But such a distinction neither corresponds to, nor testifies to, the existence of a distinction between morality as "experience" and morality as "theory" or "idea."

Taylor is more persuasive when he is developing his second main thesis--that of the alleged existence of an ultimate dualism in the nature of morality. His accounts of the genesis of the conceptions of obligation and responsibility as of most of the ultimate conceptions with which moral philosophy deals will be accepted or rejected to the extent to which the main contention concerning the psychological basis of ethics commends itself to the reader. But in his exposition of the fundamental contradiction involved in morality elaborated with much care and illustrative argument he appeals for the most part to facts familiar to the unphilosophical moral consciousness. He begins by finding an ultimate opposition between the instincts of self-assertion and instincts which secure the production and protection of the coming generation even in the infra-ethical world with which biology deals. He traces this opposition into the forms in which it appears in the social life of mankind (as, e.g., in the difficulty of reconciling the conflicting claims of individual self-development and self-culture and social service), and finds "a hidden root of insincerity and hypocrisy beneath all morality" (p. 243), inasmuch as it is not possible to pursue any one type of ideal without some departure from singleness of purpose. And he finds all the conceptions by which men have hoped to reconcile admitted antagonisms and divergencies between moral ideals claiming to be ultimate and authoritative alike unsatisfactory (p. 285). Progress is illusory; there is no satisfactory goal to which moral development inevitably tends; religion in which some take refuge when distressed by the inexplicable contradictions of moral conduct itself "contains and rests upon an element of make believe" (p. 489).

With Taylor's presentation of the difficulties with which morality is expected to grapple probably few would be found seriously to disagree, though they might consider it unduly pessimistic. But when he turns what is in effect a statement of certain forms of moral difficulty into an attack upon the logical and coherent character of morality itself, he is not so likely to command assent. For the difficulty all men meet with in realizing goodness, or in being moral, is not in itself evidence of an inherent contradiction in the nature of goodness as such. And what perhaps would first strike an unprejudiced critic in Taylor's examples of conflicting ideals or antagonistic yet ultimate moral judgments would be the perception that they are not necessarily moral ideas or judgments at all, and hence necessarily not ultimate.

The claims of self-culture and of social service may when considered in the abstract or in some hypothetical case appear antagonistic and irreconcilable. But when they present themselves to the individual moral consciousness it may be safely asserted (1) that there can be only one moral choice possible, i.e. that their opposition (where they are opposed) involves no conflict of duties; and (2) that whichever ideal is in the end preferred, opportunities will nevertheless be provided within its realization for the concurrent realization of activities and capacities ordinarily associated with the ideal alleged to be contradictory. For just as there is no self-realization which does not involve self-sacrifice, so there is no room for that species of egoism within the confines of morality which is incompatible with social service.

It will be clear from the foregoing account of Taylor's work that the tendency of his thought, as of that of Bradley, is by no means directed to the confirmation or re-establishment of those principles of conduct recognized by the ordinary moral consciousness. Psychology or metaphysics tend in their systems to usurp the place of authority formerly assigned to ethics proper.

Martineau.

It would be true on the whole to assert that evolutionary systems of ethics such as those of Herbert Spencer, Sir Leslie Stephen or Professor S. Alexander (_Moral Order and Progress_, 1899), together with the metaphysical theories of morals of which T.H. Green and Bradley and Taylor are the chief representatives, have dominated the field of ethical speculation since 1870. Nevertheless it is only necessary to mention such a work as Martineau's _Types of Ethical Theory_ to dispel the notion that the type of moral philosophy most characteristically English, i.e. consisting in the patient analysis of the form and nature of the moral consciousness itself, has given way or is likely to give way to more ambitious and constructive efforts. Martineau's chief endeavour was, as he himself says, to interpret, to vindicate, and to systematize the moral sentiments, and if the actual exhibition of what is involved, e.g., in moral choice is the vindication of morality Martineau may be said to have been successful. It is with his interpretation and systematization of the moral sentiments that most of Martineau's critics have found fault. It is impossible, e.g., to accept his ordered hierarchy of "springs of action" without perceiving that the real principle upon which they can be arranged in order at all must depend upon considerations of circumstances and consequences, of stations and duties, with which a strict intuitionalism such as that of Martineau would have no dealing.[50] Similarly the notion of Conscience as a special faculty giving its pronouncements immediately and without reflection cannot be maintained in the face of modern psychological analysis and is untrue to the nature of moral judgment itself. And Martineau is curiously unsympathetic to the universal and social aspect of morality with which evolutionary and idealist moral philosophers are so largely occupied. Nevertheless there have been few moral philosophers who have, apart from the idiosyncrasies of their special prepossessions, set forth with clearer insight or with greater nobility of language the essential nature of the moral consciousness.

Sidgwick.

Equal in importance to Martineau's work is Professor Sidgwick's _Methods of Ethics_ which appeared in 1874. The two works are alike in loftiness of outlook and in the fact that they are devoted to the re-examination of the nature of the moral consciousness to the exclusion of alien branches of inquiry. In most other respects they differ. Martineau is much more in sympathy with idealism than Sidgwick, whose work consists in a restatement from a novel and independent standpoint of the Utilitarian position. And Sidgwick has been far more successful than any other moral philosopher with the exception of T.H. Green and Bradley in founding a school of thought. Many of his most acute critics would be the first to admit how much they owe to his teaching. Chief among the more recent of these is G.E. Moore, whose book _Principia Ethica_ is an important original contribution to ethical thought. And although Dr Hastings Rashdall (_The Theory of Good and Evil_ Oxford, 1907) is not in agreement with Sidgwick's own particular type of hedonistic theory in his own philosophical position, he occupies a point of view somewhat similar to that of Sidgwick's main attitude of Rational Utilitarianism. Rashdall's two volumes exhibit also a welcome return on the part of English thought to the proper business of the moral philosopher--the examination of the nature of moral conduct. Other works, such as Professor L.T. Hobhouse's _Morals in Evolution_ or Professor E.A. Westermarck's _Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas_, testify to a continued interest in the history of morality and in the anthropological inquiries with which moral philosophy is closely connected.

Much that is of importance for moral philosophy has recently been written upon problems that more properly belong to the philosophy of religion and the theory of knowledge. J.F. M'Taggart's _Studies in Hegelian Cosmology_, and his later work, _Some Dogmas of Religion_, contain interesting contributions to the theory of pleasure and of the problem of free will and determinism. A notable instance of this tendency is seen in the developments of the theory of pragmatism (q.v.), for which F.C.S. Schiller has proposed the general term "humanism." Such aspects as concern ethics include, for example, the limited indeterminism involved in the theory, the attitude of the religious consciousness expressed by William James (_Will to Believe_ and _Pragmatism_), and the pragmatic conception of the good. And the widespread interest in social problems has produced a revival of speculation concerning questions partly political and party ethical in character, e.g. the nature of justice. Finally it has become apparent that many problems hitherto left for political economy to solve belong more properly to the moralist, if not to the moral philosopher, and it may be confidently expected that with the increased complexity of social life and the disappearance of many sanctions of morality hitherto regarded as inviolable, the future will bring a renewed and practical interest in the theory of conduct likely to lead to fresh developments in ethical speculation.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.--The literature of the subject is so large in all
languages that only a small selection can be given here. For further
works reference may be made to subsidiary articles. See also Baldwin's
_Dict. of Philos. and Psychol._ vol. iii. (1905), pp. 812 foll.
(bibliography).

I. _Historical._--Sir L. Stephen, _History of English Thought in the
18th Century_ (1876, 3rd ed. 1892); W.E.H. Lecky, _History of European
Morals from Augustus to Charlemagne_ (1869, many editions); works of
Ed. Zeller (q.v.); G.H. Lewes, _History of Philosophy_ (1880); W.
Gass, _Geschichte der christlichen Ethik_ (1881); A.W. Benn, _The
Greek Philosophers_ (1882); F. Jodl, _Geschichte der Ethik in der
neueren Philos_. (2 vols., 1882-1889); L. Schmidt, _Ethik der alten
Griechen_ (1882); E. Howley, _The Old Morality traced Historically_
(1885); J. Martineau, _Types of Ethical Theory_ (Oxford, 1885, 3rd ed.
1891); Th. Ziegler, _Gesch. d. christl. Ethik_ (1886); Ch.
Letourneaux, _L'Evolution de la morale_ (1887); K. Kostlin, _Gesch.
der Ethik_ (1887); C.E. Luthardt, _Die antike Ethik in ihrer
geschichtlichen Entwicklung_ (1887), and _Hist. of Christian Ethics_
(1888); C.M. Williams, _A Review of the Systems of Ethics founded on
the Theory of Evolution_ (1893); J. Watson, _Hedonistic Theories from
Aristippus to Spencer_ (1895); L.A. Selby-Bigge, _British Moralists_
(1897); R. Mackintosh, _From Comte to Benjamin Kidd_ (1899); S.
Patten, _The Development of English Thought_ (1899); A.B. Bruce, _The
Moral Order of the World in Ancient and Modern Thought_ (1899); Sir L.
Stephen, _The English Utilitarians_ (1901); Henry Sidgwick, _Outlines
of the History of Ethics_ (5th ed., 1902); Paul Janet, _History of the
Problems of Philosophy_ (1902-1903), Eng. trans. Ada Monahan, vol. ii.
"Ethics"; W.R. Sorley, _Recent Tendencies in Ethics_ (1904).

II. _Constructive and Critical._--Besides the works mentioned above
the following may be mentioned:--J.M. Guyau, _La Morale anglaise_
(1879), _Education et heredite_ (1889; Eng. trans. Greenstreet, with
introd. by G.F. Stout, 1891), _Esquisse d'une morale sans obligation
ni sanction_ (Eng. trans., 1898); G.H. Lewes, _Problems of Life and
Mind_ (1879); Sir L. Stephen, _Science of Ethics_ (1882); P. Janet,
_The Theory of Morals_ (Eng. trans., 1884); W.R. Sorley, _On the
Ethics of Naturalism_ (1885); W.L. Courtney, _Constructive Ethics_
(1886); Wilson and Fowler, _Principles of Morals_ (1886); H. Hoffding,
_Ethik_ (1888), _Psychologie_ (1882, 1892; trans. Lowndes, 1892); W.
Wundt, _Ethik_ (1886; trans. Titchener and others, 1897); F. Paulsen,
_Ethik_ (1889, 1893; trans. Thilly, 1899); H. Sidgwick, _Method of
Ethics_ (1890); J.T. Bixby, _The Crisis in Morals: An Examination of
Rational Ethics_ (1891); J. Seth, _Freedom an Ethical Postulate_
(1891); J.H. Muirhead, _Elements of Ethics_ (1892); G. Simnel,
_Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft_ (1892, 1893); T. Ziegler,
_Social Ethics_ (1892); T.H. Huxley, _Evolution and Ethics_ (1893); W.
Knight, _The Christian Ethic_ (1893); J.S. Mackenzie, _Manual of
Ethics_ (1893); F. Ryland, _Ethics_ (1893); J. Seth, _A Study of
Ethical Principles_ (1894, 6th ed. 1902); C.F. D'Arcy, _Short Study of
Ethics_ (1895); J.H. Hyslop, _The Elements of Ethics_ (1895); J. Kidd,
_Morality and Religion_ (1895); Sir L. Stephen, _Social Rights and
Duties_ (1896); J.M. Baldwin, _Social and Ethical Interpretations in
Mental Development_ (1897); Th. Ribot, _Psychology of Emotions_
(1897); A. Seth Pringle-Pattison, _Man's Place in the Cosmos_ (1897);
H.R. Marshall, _Instinct and Reason_ (1898); W. Wallace, _Natural
Theology and Ethics_ (1898); F. Paulsen, _Partei-politik und Moral_
(1900); A.E. Taylor, _Problem of Conduct_ (1901); G.T. Ladd,
_Philosophy of Conduct_ (1902); H. Sidgwick, _Ethics of Green,
Spencer, Martineau_ (1902); D. Irons, _Study in Psychology of Ethics_
(1903); G.E. Moore, _Principia Ethica_ (1903); R. Eucken, _Geistige
Stromungen der Gegenwart_ (1904), and other works (see EUCKEN,
RUDOLF); works of A. Fouillee (q.v.); G. Santayana, _Life of Reason_
(1905); E.A. Westermarck, _Origin and Development of Moral Ideas_
(1906); George Gore, _Scientific Basis of Morality_ (1899), and _New
Scientific Basis of Morality_ (1906), containing an interesting if
unconvincing attempt to explain ethics on purely physical principles.
(H. H. W.)

FOOTNOTES:

[1] This well-known phrase was originally attributed to the
Pythagoreans.

[2]
It is highly characteristic of Platonism that the issue in this
dialogue, as originally stated, is between virtue and vice, whereas,
without any avowed change of ground, the issue ultimately discussed
is between the philosophic life and the life of vulgar ambition or
sensual enjoyment.

[3] This cardinal term is commonly translated "happiness"; and it
must be allowed that it is the most natural term for what we (in
English) agree to call "our being's end and aim." But happiness so
definitely signifies a state of feeling that it will not admit the
interpretation that Aristotle (as well as Plato and the Stoics)
expressly gives to [Greek: eudaimonia]; the confusion is best avoided
by rendering the word by the less familiar "well-being."

[4] Aristotle follows Plato and Socrates in identifying the notions
of [Greek: kalos] ("fair," "beautiful") and [Greek: agathos] ("good")
in their application to conduct. We may observe, however, that while
the latter term is used to denote the virtuous man, and (in the
neuter) equivalent to End generally, the former is rather chosen to
express the quality of virtuous acts which in any particular case is
the end of the virtuous agent. Aristotle no doubt faithfully
represents the common sense of Greece in considering that, in so far
as virtue is in itself good to the virtuous agent, it belongs to that
species of good which we distinguish as beautiful. In later Greek
philosophy the term [Greek: kalon] ("honestum") became still more
technical in the signification of "morally good."

[5] The above account is considerably expanded in H. Sidgwick's
_Hist. of Ethics_ (5th ed., 1902), pp. 59-70.

[6] There is a certain difficulty in discussing Aristotle's views on
the subject of practical wisdom, and the relation of the intellect to
moral action, since it is most probable that the only accounts that
we have of these views are not part of the genuine writings of
Aristotle. Still books vi. and vii. of the _Nicomachean Ethics_
contain no doubt as pure Aristotelian doctrine as a disciple could
give, and appear to supply a sufficient foundation for the general
criticism expressed in the text.

[7] It has been suggestively said that Cynicism was to Stoicism what
monasticism was to early Christianity. The analogy, however, must not
be pressed too far, since orthodox Stoics do not ever seem to have
regarded Cynicism as the more perfect way.

[8] The Stoics were not quite agreed as to the immutability of
virtue, but they were agreed that, when once possessed, it could only
be lost through the loss of reason itself.

[9] Hence some members of the school, without rejecting the
definition of virtue = knowledge, also defined it as "strength and
force."

[10] It is apparently in view of this union in reason of rational
beings that friends are allowed to be "external goods" to the sage,
and that the possession of good children is also counted a good.

[11] The Stoics seem to have varied in their view of "good repute,"
[Greek: eudoxia]; at first, when the school was more under the
influence of Cynicism, they professed an outward as well as an inward
indifference to it; ultimately they conceded the point to common
sense, and included it among [Greek: proegmena].

[12] It is noted of him that he did not disdain the co-operation
either of women or of slaves in his philosophical labours.

[13] The last charge of Epicurus to his disciples is said to have
been, [Greek: ton dogmaton memnesthai].

[14] Epictetus.

[15] Marcus Aurelius.

[16] E.g. Justin Martyr, Origen, Tertullian, Cyprian.

[17] Citra sanguinis effusionem.

[18] To show the crudity of the notion of redemption in early
Christianity, it is sufficient to mention that many fathers represent
Christ's ransom as having been paid to the devil; sometimes adding
that by the concealment of Christ's divinity under the veil of
humanity a certain deceit was (fairly) practised on the great
deceiver.

[19] It is to be observed that Augustine prefers to use "freedom" not
for the power of willing either good or evil, but the power of
willing good. The highest freedom, in his view, excludes the
possibility of willing evil.

[20] Cicero's works are unimportant in the history of ancient ethics,
as their philosophical matter was entirely borrowed from Greek
treatises now lost; but the influence exercised by them (especially
by the _De officiis_) over medieval and even modern readers was very
considerable.

[21] Abelard afterwards retracted this view, at least in its extreme
form; and in fact does not seem to have been fully conscious of the
difference between (1) unfulfilled intention to do an act objectively
right, and (2) intention to do what is merely believed by the agent
to be right.

[22] He was condemned by two synods, in 1121 and 1140.

[23] _Synderesis_ (Gr. [Greek: sunteresis], from [Greek: sunterein],
to watch closely, observe) is used in this sense in Jerome (_Com. in
Ezek_. i. 4-10).

[24] The refusal of the council of Constance to condemn Jean Petit's
advocacy of assassination is a striking example of this weakness. Cf.
Milman, _Lat. Christ_. book xiii. c. 9.

[25] As the chief English casuists we may mention Perkins, Hall,
Sanderson, as well as the more eminent Jeremy Taylor, whose _Ductor
dubitantium_ appeared in 1660.

[26] This influence was not exercised in the region of ethics.
Bacon's brief outline of moral philosophy (in the _Advancement of
Learning_, ii. 20-22) is highly pregnant and suggestive. But Bacon's
great task of reforming scientific method was one which, as he
conceived it, left morals on one side; he never made any serious
effort to reduce his ethical views to a coherent system, methodically
reasoned on an independent basis. The outline given in the
_Advancement_ was never filled in, and does not seem to have had any
effect on the subsequent course of ethical speculation.

[27] He even identifies the desire with the pleasure, apparently
regarding the stir of appetite and that of fruition as two parts of
the same "motion."

[28] In spite of Hobbes's uncompromising egoism, there is a
noticeable discrepancy between his theory of the ends that men
naturally seek and his standard for determining their natural rights.
This latter is never Pleasure simply, but always Preservation--though
on occasion he enlarges the notion of "preservation" into
"preservation of life so as not to be weary of it." His view seems to
be that in a state of nature _most_ men _will_ fight, rob, &c., "for
delectation merely" or "for glory," and that hence all men must be
allowed an indefinite right to fight, rob, &c., "for preservation."

[29] It should be noticed, however, that it is only in his treatment
of Equity and Benevolence that he really follows out the mathematical
analogy (cf. Sidgwick's _History of Ethics_, 5th ed., pp. 180-181).

[30] It should be observed that, while Clarke is sincerely anxious to
prove that most principles are binding independently of Divine
appointment, he is no less concerned to show that morality requires
the practical support of revealed religion.

[31] Three classes of impulses are thus distinguished by
Shaftesbury:--(1) "Natural Affections," (2) "Self-affections," and
(3) "Un-natural Affections." Their characteristics are further
considered in the _History of Ethics_, p. 186 seq.

[32] In a remarkable passage near the close of his eleventh sermon
Butler seems even to allow that conscience would have to give way to
self-love, if it were possible (which it is not) that the two should
come into ultimate and irreconcilable conflict.

[33] It is worth noticing that Hutcheson's express definition of the
object of self-love includes "perfection" as well as "happiness"; but
in the working out of his system he considers private good
exclusively as happiness or pleasure.

[34] Hume's ethical view was finally stated in his _Inquiry into the
Principles of Morals_ (1751), which is at once more popular and more
purely utilitarian than his earlier work.

[35] Hume remarks that in some cases, by "association of ideas," the
rule by which we praise and blame is extended beyond the principle of
utility from which it arises; but he allows much less scope to this
explanation in his second treatise than in his first.

[36] In earlier editions of the _Inquiry_ Hume expressly included all
approved qualities under the general notion of "virtue." In later
editions he avoided this strain on usage by substituting or adding
"merit" in several passages--allowing that some of the laudable
qualities which he mentions would be more commonly called "talents,"
but still maintaining that "there is little distinction made in our
internal estimation" of "virtues" and "talents."

[37] It is to be observed that whereas Price and Stewart (after
Butler) identify the object of self-love with happiness or pleasure,
Reid conceives this "good" more vaguely as including perfection and
happiness; though he sometimes uses "good" and happiness as
convertible terms, and seems practically to have the latter in view
in all that he says of self-love.

[38] E.g. Reid proposes to apply this principle in favour of
monogamy, arguing from the proportion of males and females born;
without explaining why, if the intention of nature hence inferred
excludes occasional polygamy, it does not also exclude occasional
celibacy.

[39] We may observe that some recent writers, who would generally be
included in this school, avoid in various ways the difficulty of
constructing a code of external conduct. Sometimes they consider
moral intuition as determining the comparative excellence of
conflicting motives (James Martineau), or the comparative quality of
pleasures chosen (Laurie), which seems to be the same view in a
hedonistic garb; others hold that what is intuitively perceived is
the rightness or wrongness of individual acts--a view which obviously
renders ethical reasoning practically superfluous.

[40] The originality--such as it is--of Paley's system (as of
Bentham's) lies in its method of working out details rather than in
its principles of construction. Paley expressly acknowledges his
obligations to the original and suggestive, though diffuse and
whimsical, work of Abraham Tucker (_Light of Nature Pursued_,
1768-1774). In this treatise, as in Paley's, we find "every man's own
satisfaction, the spring that actuates all his motives," connected
with "general good, the root whereout all our rules of conduct and
sentiments of honour are to branch," by means of natural theology
demonstrating the "unniggardly goodness of the author of nature."
Tucker is also careful to explain that satisfaction or pleasure is
"one and the same in kind, however much it may vary in degree, ...
whether a man is pleased with hearing music, seeing prospects,
tasting dainties, performing laudable actions, or making agreeable
reflections," and again that by "general good" he means "quantity of
happiness," to which "every pleasure that we do to our neighbour is
an addition." There is, however, in Tucker's theological link between
private and general happiness a peculiar ingenuity which Paley's
common sense has avoided. He argues that men having no free will have
really no desert; therefore the divine equity must ultimately
distribute happiness in equal shares to all; therefore I must
ultimately increase my own happiness most by conduct that adds most
to the general fund which Providence administers.

But in fact the outline of Paley's utilitarianism is to be found a
generation earlier--in Gay's dissertation prefixed to Law's edition
of King's _Origin of Evil_--as the following extracts will
show:--"The idea of virtue is the conformity to a rule of life,
directing the actions of all rational creatures with respect to each
other's happiness; to which every one is always obliged....
Obligation is the necessity of doing or omitting something in order
to be happy.... Full and complete obligation which will extend to all
cases can only be that arising from the authority of God.... The will
of God [so far as it directs behaviour to others] is the immediate
rule or criterion of virtue ... but it is evident from the nature of
God that he could have no other design in creating mankind than their
happiness; and therefore he wills their happiness; therefore that my
behaviour so far as it may be a means to the happiness of mankind
should be such; so this happiness of mankind may be said to be the
criterion of virtue once removed."

The same dissertation also contains the germ of Hartley's system, as
we shall presently notice.

[41] It must be allowed that Paley's application of this argument is
somewhat loosely reasoned, and does not sufficiently distinguish the
consequence of a single act of beneficent manslaughter from the
consequences of a general permission to commit such acts.

[42] This list gives twelve out of the fourteen classes in which
Bentham arranges the springs of action, omitting the religious
sanction (mentioned afterwards), and the pleasures and pains of
self-interest, which include all the other classes except sympathy
and antipathy.

[43] In the _Deontology_ published by Bowring from MSS. left after
Bentham's death, the coincidence is asserted to be complete.

[44] It should be observed that Austin, after Bentham, more
frequently uses the term "moral" to connote what he more distinctly
calls "positive morality," the code of rules supported by common
opinion in any society.

[45] In the before-mentioned dissertation. Cf. note 2 to p. 835.
Hartley refers to this treatise as having supplied the starting-point
for his own system.