Chapter XV: Part 15

The beginning of the logic is an illustration of this. The logical
idea is treated under the three heads of being (_Seyn_), essence
(_Wesen_) and notion (_Begriff_). The simplest term of thought is
being; we cannot think less about anything than when we merely say
that it is. Being--the abstract "is"--is _nothing_ definite, and
nothing at least is. Being and not being are thus declared
identical--a proposition which in this unqualified shape was to most
people a stumbling-block at the very door of the system. Instead of
the mere "is" which is as yet nothing, we should rather say "becomes,"
and as "becomes" always implies "something," we have determinate
being--"a being" which in the next stage of definiteness becomes
"one." And in this way we pass on to the quantitative aspects of
being.

The terms treated under the first head, in addition to those already
mentioned, are the abstract principles of quantity and number, and
their application in measure to determine the limits of being. Under
the title of essence are discussed those pairs of correlative terms
which are habitually employed in the explanation of the world--such as
law and phenomenon, cause and effect, reason and consequence,
substance and attribute. Under the head of notion are considered,
firstly, the subjective forms of conception, judgment and syllogism;
secondly, their realization in objects as mechanically, chemically or
teleologically constituted; and thirdly, the idea first of life, and
next of science, as the complete interpenetration of thought and
objectivity. The third part of logic evidently is what contains the
topics usually treated in logic-books, though even here the province
of logic in the ordinary sense is exceeded. The first two
divisions--the "objective logic"--are what is usually called
metaphysics.

The characteristic of the system is the gradual way in which idea is
linked to idea so as to make the division into chapters only an
arrangement of convenience. The judgment is completed in the
syllogism; the syllogistic form as the perfection of subjective
thought passes into objectivity, where it first appears embodied in a
mechanical system; and the teleological object, in which the members
are as means and end, leads up to the idea of life, where the end is
means and means end indissolubly till death. In some cases these
transitions may be unsatisfactory and forced; it is apparent that the
linear development from "being" to the "idea" is got by transforming
into a logical order the sequence that has roughly prevailed in
philosophy from the Eleatics; cases might be quoted where the
reasoning seems a play upon words; and it may often be doubted whether
certain ideas do not involve extra-logical considerations. The order
of the categories is in the main outlines fixed; but in the minor
details much depends upon the philosopher, who has to fill in the gaps
between ideas, with little guidance from the data of experience, and
to assign to the stages of development names which occasionally deal
hardly with language. The merit of Hegel is to have indicated and to a
large extent displayed the filiation and mutual limitation of our
forms of thought; to have arranged them in the order of their
comparative capacity to give a satisfactory expression to truth in the
totality of its relations; and to have broken down the partition which
in Kant separated the formal logic from the transcendental analytic,
as well as the general disruption between logic and metaphysic. It
must at the same time be admitted that much of the work of weaving the
terms of thought, the categories, into a system has a hypothetical and
tentative character, and that Hegel has rather pointed out the path
which logic must follow, viz. a criticism of the terms of scientific
and ordinary thought in their filiation and interdependence, than
himself in every case kept to the right way. The day for a fuller
investigation of this problem will partly depend upon the progress of
the study of language in the direction marked out by W. von Humboldt.

Philosophy of nature.

The Philosophy of Nature starts with the result of the logical
development, with the full scientific "idea." But the relations of
pure thought, losing their inwardness, appear as relations of space
and time; the abstract development of thought appears as matter and
movement. Instead of thought, we have perception; instead of
dialectic, gravitation; instead of causation, sequence in time. The
whole falls under the three heads of mechanics, physics and
"organic"--the content under each varying somewhat in the three
editions of the _Encyklopadie_. The first treats of space, time,
matter, movement; and in the solar system we have the representation
of the idea in its general and abstract material form. Under the head
of physics we have the theory of the elements, of sound, heat and
cohesion, and finally of chemical affinity--presenting the phenomena
of material change and interchange in a series of special forces which
generate the variety of the life of nature. Lastly, under the head of
"organic," come geology, botany and animal physiology--presenting the
concrete results of these processes in the three kingdoms of nature.

The charges of superficial analogies, so freely urged against the
"Natur-philosophie" by critics who forget the impulse it gave to
physical research by the identification of forces then believed to be
radically distinct, do not particularly affect Hegel. But in general
it may be said that he looked down upon the mere natural world. The
meanest of the fancies of the mind and the most casual of its whims he
regarded as a better warrant for the being of God than any single
object of nature. Those who supposed astronomy to inspire religious
awe were horrified to hear the stars compared to eruptive spots on the
face of the sky. Even in the animal world, the highest stage of
nature, he saw a failure to reach an independent and rational system
of organization; and its feelings under the continuous violence and
menaces of the environment he described as insecure, anxious and
unhappy.

His point of view was essentially opposed to the current views of
science. To metamorphosis he only allowed a logical value, as
explaining the natural classification; the only real, existent
metamorphosis he saw in the development of the individual from its
embryonic stage. Still more distinctly did he contravene the general
tendency of scientific explanation. "It is held the triumph of science
to recognize in the general process of the earth the same categories
as are exhibited in the processes of isolated bodies. This is,
however, an application of categories from a field where the
conditions are finite to a sphere in which the circumstances are
infinite." In astronomy he depreciates the merits of Newton and
elevates Kepler, accusing Newton particularly, a propos of the
distinction of centrifugal and centripetal forces, of leading to a
confusion between what is mathematically to be distinguished and what
is physically separate. The principles which explain the fall of an
apple will not do for the planets. As to colour, he follows Goethe,
and uses strong language against Newton's theory, for the barbarism of
the conception that light is a compound, the incorrectness of his
observations, &c. In chemistry, again, he objects to the way in which
all the chemical elements are treated as on the same level.

Philosophy of mind. 1. Psychology.

The third part of the system is the Philosophy of Mind. Its three
divisions are the "subjective mind" (psychology), the "objective mind"
(philosophic jurisprudence, moral and political philosophy) and the
"absolute mind" (the philosophy of art, religion and philosophy). The
subjects of the second and third divisions have been treated by Hegel
with great detail. The "objective mind" is the topic of the
_Rechts-Philosophie_, and of the lectures on the Philosophy of
History; while on the "absolute mind" we have the lectures on
Aesthetic, on the Philosophy of Religion and on the History of
Philosophy--in short, more than one-third of his works.

The purely psychological branch of the subject takes up half of the
space allotted to _Geist_ in the _Encyklopadie_. It falls under the
three heads of anthropology, phenomenology and psychology proper.
Anthropology treats of the mind in union with the body--of the natural
soul--and discusses the relations of the soul with the planets, the
races of mankind, the differences of age, dreams, animal magnetism,
insanity and phrenology. In this obscure region it is rich in
suggestions and rapprochements; but the ingenuity of these
speculations attracts curiosity more than it satisfies scientific
inquiry. In the Phenomenology consciousness, self-consciousness and
reason are dealt with. The title of the section and the contents
recall, though with some important variations, the earlier half of his
first work; only that here the historical background on which the
stages in the development of the ego were represented has disappeared.
Psychology, in the stricter sense, deals with the various forms of
theoretical and practical intellect, such as attention, memory, desire
and will. In this account of the development of an independent, active
and intelligent being from the stage where man like the Dryad is a
portion of the natural life around him, Hegel has combined what may be
termed a physiology and pathology of the mind--a subject far wider
than that of ordinary psychologies, and one of vast intrinsic
importance. It is, of course, easy to set aside these questions as
unanswerable, and to find artificiality in the arrangement. Still it
remains a great point to have even attempted some system in the dark
anomalies which lie under the normal consciousness, and to have traced
the genesis of the intellectual faculties from animal sensitivity.

2. Law and history.

The theory of the mind as objectified in the institutions of law, the
family and the state is discussed in the "Philosophy of Right."
Beginning with the antithesis of a legal system and morality, Hegel,
carrying out the work of Kant, presents the synthesis of these
elements in the ethical life (_Sittlichkeit_) of the family and the
state. Treating the family as an instinctive realization of the moral
life, and not as the result of contract, he shows how by the means of
wider associations due to private interests the state issues as the
full home of the moral spirit, where intimacy of interdependence is
combined with freedom of independent growth. The state is the
consummation of man as finite; it is the necessary starting-point
whence the spirit rises to an absolute existence in the spheres of
art, religion and philosophy. In the finite world or temporal state,
religion, as the finite organization of a church, is, like other
societies, subordinate to the state. But on another side, as absolute
spirit, religion, like art and philosophy, is not subject to the
state, but belongs to a higher region.

The political state is always an individual, and the relations of
these states with each other and the "world-spirit" of which they are
the manifestations constitute the material of history. The _Lectures
on the Philosophy of History_, edited by Gans and subsequently by Karl
Hegel, is the most popular of Hegel's works. The history of the world
is a scene of judgment where one people and one alone holds for awhile
the sceptre, as the unconscious instrument of the universal spirit,
till another rises in its place, with a fuller measure of liberty--a
larger superiority to the bonds of natural and artificial
circumstance. Three main periods--the Oriental, the Classical and the
Germanic--in which respectively the single despot, the dominant order,
and the man as man possess freedom--constitute the history of the
world. Inaccuracy in detail and artifice in the arrangement of
isolated peoples are inevitable in such a scheme. A graver mistake,
according to some critics, is that Hegel, far from giving a law of
progress, seems to suggest that the history of the world is nearing an
end, and has merely reduced the past to a logical formula. The answer
to this charge is partly that such a law seems unattainable, and
partly that the idealistic content of the present which philosophy
extracts is always an advance upon actual fact, and so does throw a
light into the future. And at any rate the method is greater than
Hegel's employment of it.

3. Art, religion and philosophy.

But as with Aristotle so with Hegel--beyond the ethical and political
sphere rises the world of absolute spirit in art, religion and
philosophy. The psychological distinction between the three forms is
that sensuous perception (_Anschauung_) is the organon of the first,
presentative conception (_Vorstellung_) of the second and free thought
of the third. The work of art, the first embodiment of absolute mind,
shows a sensuous conformity between the idea and the reality in which
it is expressed. The so-called beauty of nature is for Hegel an
adventitious beauty. The beauty of art is a beauty born in the spirit
of the artist and born again in the spectator; it is not like the
beauty of natural things, an incident of their existence, but is
"essentially a question, an address to a responding breast, a call to
the heart and spirit." The perfection of art depends on the degree of
intimacy in which idea and form appear worked into each other. From
the different proportion between the idea and the shape in which it is
realized arise three different forms of art. When the idea, itself
indefinite, gets no further than a struggle and endeavour for its
appropriate expression, we have the symbolic, which is the Oriental,
form of art, which seeks to compensate its imperfect expression by
colossal and enigmatic structures. In the second or classical form of
art the idea of humanity finds an adequate sensuous representation.
But this form disappears with the decease of Greek national life, and
on its collapse follows the romantic, the third form of art; where the
harmony of form and content again grows defective, because the object
of Christian art--the infinite spirit--is a theme too high for art.
Corresponding to this division is the classification of the single
arts. First comes architecture--in the main, symbolic art; then
sculpture, the classical art _par excellence_; they are found,
however, in all three forms. Painting and music are the specially
romantic arts. Lastly, as a union of painting and music comes poetry,
where the sensuous element is more than ever subordinate to the
spirit.

The lectures on the Philosophy of Art stray largely into the next
sphere and dwell with zest on the close connexion of art and religion;
and the discussion of the decadence and rise of religions, of the
aesthetic qualities of Christian legend, of the age of chivalry, &c.,
make the _Asthetik_ a book of varied interest.

The lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, though unequal in their
composition and belonging to different dates, serve to exhibit the
vital connexion of the system with Christianity. Religion, like art,
is inferior to philosophy as an exponent of the harmony between man
and the absolute. In it the absolute exists as the poetry and music of
the heart, in the inwardness of feeling. Hegel after expounding the
nature of religion passes on to discuss its historical phases, but in
the immature state of religious science falls into several mistakes.
At the bottom of the scale of nature-worships he places the religion
of sorcery. The gradations which follow are apportioned with some
uncertainty amongst the religions of the East. With the Persian
religion of light and the Egyptian of enigmas we pass to those faiths
where Godhead takes the form of a spiritual individuality, i.e. to the
Hebrew religion (of sublimity), the Greek (of beauty) and the Roman
(of adaptation). Last comes absolute religion, in which the mystery of
the reconciliation between God and man is an open doctrine. This is
Christianity, in which God is a Trinity, because He is a spirit. The
revelation of this truth is the subject of the Christian Scriptures.
For the Son of God, in the immediate aspect, is the finite world of
nature and man, which far from being at one with its Father is
originally in an attitude of estrangement. The history of Christ is
the visible reconciliation between man and the eternal. With the death
of Christ this union, ceasing to be a mere fact, becomes a vital
idea--the Spirit of God which dwells in the Christian community.

The lectures on the History of Philosophy deal disproportionately with
the various epochs, and in some parts date from the beginning of
Hegel's career. In trying to subject history to the order of logic
they sometimes misconceive the filiation of ideas. But they created
the history of philosophy as a scientific study. They showed that a
philosophical theory is not an accident or whim, but an exponent of
its age determined by its antecedents and environments, and handing on
its results to the future. (W. W.; X.)

_Hegelianism in England._--On the continent of Europe the direct
influence of Hegelianism was comparatively short-lived. This was due
among other causes to the direction of attention to the rising science
of psychology, partly to the reaction against the speculative method.
In England and Scotland it had another fate. Both in theory and
practice it here seemed to supply precisely the counter-active to
prevailing tendencies towards empiricism and individualism that was
required. In this respect it stood to philosophy in somewhat the same
relation that the influence of Goethe stood to literature. This
explains the hold which it had obtained upon both English and Scottish
thought soon after the middle of the 19th century. The first impulse
came from J. F. Ferrier and J. H. Stirling in Edinburgh, and B. Jowett
in Oxford. Already in the seventies there was a powerful school of
English thinkers under the lead of Edward Caird and T. H. Green
devoted to the study and exposition of the Hegelian system. With the
general acceptance of its main principle that the real is the
rational, there came in the eighties a more critical examination of
the precise meaning to be attached to it and its bearing on the
problems of religion. The earlier Hegelians had interpreted it in the
sense that the world in its ultimate essence was not only spiritual
but self-conscious intelligence whose nature was reflected
inadequately but truly in the finite mind. They thus seemed to come
forward in the character of exponents rather than critics of the
Western belief in God, freedom and immortality. As time went on it
became obvious that without departure from the spirit of idealism
Hegel's principle was susceptible of a different interpretation.
Granted that rationality taken in the sense of inner coherence and
self-consistency is the ultimate standard of truth and reality, does
self-consciousness itself answer to the demands of this criterion? If
not, are we not forced to deny ultimate reality to personality whether
human or divine? The question was definitely raised in F. H. Bradley's
_Appearance and Reality_ (1893; 2nd ed., 1897) and answered in the
negative. The completeness and self-consistency which our ideal
requires can be realized only in a form of being in which subject and
object, will and desire, no longer stand as exclusive opposites, from
which it seemed at once to follow that the finite self could not be a
reality nor the infinite reality a self. On this basis Bradley
developed a theory of the Absolute which, while not denying that it
must be conceived of spiritually, insisted that its spirituality is of
a kind that finds no analogy in our self-conscious experience. More
recently J. M. E. McTaggart's _Studies in Hegelian Dialectic_ (1896),
_Studies in Hegelian Cosmology_ (1901) and _Some Dogmas of Religion_
(1906) have opened a new chapter in the interpretation of Hegelianism.
Truly perceiving that the ultimate metaphysical problem is, here as
ever, the relation of the One and the Many, McTaggart starts with a
definition of the ideal in which our thought upon it can come to rest.
He finds it where (a) the unity is for each individual, (b) the whole
nature of the individual is to be _for_ the unity. It follows from
such a conception of the relation that the whole cannot itself be an
individual apart from the individuals in whom it is realized, in other
words, the Absolute cannot be a Person. But for the same reason--viz.
that in it first and in it alone this condition is realized--the
individual soul must be held to be an ultimate reality reflecting in
its inmost nature, like the monad of Leibniz, the complete fulness and
harmony of the whole. In reply to Bradley's argument for the unreality
of the self, Hegel is interpreted as meaning that the opposition
between self and not-self on which it is founded is one that is
self-made and in being made is transcended. The fuller our knowledge
of reality the more does the object stand out as an invulnerable
system of ordered parts, but the process by which it is thus set in
opposition to the subject is also the process by which we understand
and transform it into the substance of our own thought. From this
position further consequences followed. Seeing that the individual
soul must thus be taken to stand in respect to its inmost essence in
complete harmony with the whole, it must eternally be at one with
itself: all change must be appearance. Seeing, moreover, that it is,
and is maintained in being, by a fixed relation to the Absolute, it
cannot fail of immortality. No pantheistic theory of an eternal
substance continuously expressing itself in different individuals who
fall back into its being like drops into the ocean will here be
sufficient. The ocean is the drops. "The Absolute requires each self
not to make up a sum or to maintain an average but in respect of the
self's special and unique nature." Finally as it cannot cease, neither
can the individual soul have had a beginning. Pre-existence is as
necessary and certain as a future life. If memory is lacking as a link
between the different lives, this only shows that memory is not of the
substance of the soul.

In view of these differences (amounting almost to an antinomy of
paradoxes) in interpretation, it is not surprising to find that recent
years have witnessed a violent reaction in some quarters against
Hegelian influence. This has taken the direction on the one hand of a
revival of realism (see METAPHYSICS), on the other of a new form of
subjective idealism (see PRAGMATISM). As yet neither of these
movements has shown sufficient coherence or stability to establish
itself as a rival to the main current of philosophy in England. But
they have both been urged with sufficient ability to arrest its
progress and to call for a reconsideration and restatement of the
fundamental principle of idealist philosophy and its relation to the
fundamental problems of religion. This will probably be the main work
of the next generation of thinkers in England (see IDEALISM).

Among Italian Hegelians are A. Vera, Raffaele Mariano and B. Spaventa
(1817-1883); see V. de Lucia, _L'Hegel in Italia_ (1891). In Sweden,
J. J. Borelius of Lund; in Norway, G. V. Lyng (d. 1884), M. J. Monrad
(1816-1897) and G. Kent (d. 1892) have adopted Hegelianism; in France,
P. Leroux and P. Prevost.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.--Shortly after Hegel's death his collected works were
published by a number of his friends, who combined for the purpose.
They appeared in eighteen volumes in 1832, and a second edition came
out about twelve years later. Volumes i.-viii. contain the works
published by himself; the remainder is made up of his lectures on the
Philosophy of History, Aesthetic, the Philosophy of Religion and the
History of Philosophy, besides some essays and reviews, with a few of
his letters, and the Philosophical Propaedeutic.

For his life see K. Rosenkranz, _Leben Hegels_ (Berlin, 1844); R. R.
Haym, _Hegel und seine Zeit_ (Berlin, 1857); K. Kostlin, _Hegel in
philosophischer, politischer und nationaler Beziehung_ (Tubingen,
1870); Rosenkranz, _Hegel als deutscher National-Philosoph_ (Berlin,
1870), and his _Neue Studien_, vol. iv. (Berlin, 1878); Kuno Fischer,
_Hegels Leben und Werke_.

For the philosophy see A. Ruge's _Aus fruherer Zeit_, vol. iv.
(Berlin, 1867); Haym (as above); F. A. Trendelenburg (in _Logische
Untersuchungen_); A. L. Kym (_Metaphysische Untersuchungen_) and C.
Hermann (_Hegel und die logische Frage_ and other works) are
noticeable as modern critics. Georges Noel, _La Logique de Hegel_
(Paris, 1897); Aloys Schmid, _Die Entwickelungsgeschichte der
Hegelschen Logik_ (Regensburg, 1858). Vera has translated the
_Encyklopadie_ into French, with notes; C. Benard, the _Asthetik_. In
English J. Hutcheson Stirling's _Secret of Hegel_ (2 vols., London,
1865) contains a translation of the beginning of the _Wissenschaft der
Logik_; the "Logic" from the _Encyklopadie_ has been translated, with
Prolegomena, by W. Wallace (Oxford, 1874). W. Wallace also translated
the third part of the _Encyklopadie in Hegel's Philosophy of Mind_
(1894); R. B. Haldane the _History of Philosophy_ (1896); E. B.
Speirs, lectures on the _Philosophy of Religion_ (1895); J. Sibree,
lectures on _The Philosophy of History_ (1852); B. Bosanquet,
_Philosophy of Fine Art_, Introduction (1886); W. Hastie, _The
Philosophy of Art_ (1886); S. W. Dyde, _The Philosophy of Right_
(1896). Other recent expositions and criticisms in addition to those
mentioned above are W. T. Harris, _Hegel's Logic_ (1890); J. B.
Baillie, _Origin and Significance of Hegel's Logic_ (1901), and
_Outline of the Idealistic Construction of Experience_ (1906); P.
Barth, _Die Geschichtsphilosophie Hegels_ (1890); J. A. Marrast, _La
Philosophie du droit de Hegel_ (1869); L. Miraglia, _I Principii
fondamentali e la dottrina eticogiuridica di Hegel_ (1873); _Hegel's
Philosophy of the State and History_ (Germ. Phil. Classics, 1887); G.
Bolland, _Philosophie des Rechts_ (1902), and _Hegels Philosophie der
Religion_ (1901); E. Ott, _Die Religionsphilosophie Hegels_ (1904); J.
M. Sterrett, _Studies in Hegel's Philosophy of Religion_ (1891); M.
Ehrenhauss, _Hegels Gottesbegriff_ (1880); E. Caird, Hegel (1880); A.
Seth Pringle-Pattison, _Hegelianism and Personality_ (1893); Millicent
Mackenzie, _Hegel's Educational Theory and Practice_ (1909), with
biographical sketch; J. M. E. McTaggart, _Commentary on Hegel's Logic_
(1910). (J. H. Mu.)

HEGEMON OF THASOS, Greek writer of the old comedy, nicknamed [Greek: Phake] from his fondness for lentils. Hardly anything is known of him, except that he flourished during the Peloponnesian War. According to Aristotle (_Poetics_, ii. 5) he was the inventor of a kind of parody; by slightly altering the wording in well-known poems he transformed the sublime into the ridiculous. When the news of the disaster in Sicily reached Athens, his parody of the _Gigantomachia_ was being performed; it is said that the audience were so amused by it that, instead of leaving to show their grief, they remained in their seats. He was also the author of a comedy called _Philinne_ (_Philine_), written in the manner of Eupolis and Cratinus, in which he attacked a well-known courtesan. Athenaeus (p. 698), who preserves some parodic hexameters of his, relates other anecdotes concerning him (pp. 5, 108, 407).

Fragments in T. Kock, _Comicorum Atticorum fragmenta_, i. (1880); B.
J. Peltzer, _De parodica Graecorum poesi_ (1855).

HEGEMONY (Gr. [Greek: hegemonia], leadership, from [Greek: hegeisthai], to lead), the leadership especially of one particular state in a group of federated or loosely united states. The term was first applied in Greek history to the position claimed by different individual city-states, e.g. by Athens and Sparta, at different times to a position of predominance (_primus inter pares_) among other equal states, coupled with individual autonomy. The reversion of this position was claimed by Macedon (see GREECE: _Ancient History_, and DELIAN LEAGUE).

HEGESIAS OF MAGNESIA (in Lydia), Greek rhetorician and historian, flourished about 300 B.C. Strabo (xiv. 648), speaks of him as the founder of the florid style of composition known as "Asiatic" (cf. TIMAEUS). Agatharchides, Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Cicero all speak of him in disparaging terms, although Varro seems to have approved of his work. He professed to imitate the simple style of Lysias, avoiding long periods, and expressing himself in short, jerky sentences, without modulation or finish. His vulgar affectation and bombast made his writings a mere caricature of the old Attic. Dionysius describes his composition as tinselled, ignoble and effeminate. It is generally supposed, from the fragment quoted as a specimen by Dionysius, that Hegesias is to be classed among the writers of lives of Alexander the Great. This fragment describes the treatment of Gaza and its inhabitants by Alexander after its conquest, but it is possible that it is only part of an epideictic or show-speech, not of an historical work. This view is supported by a remark of Agatharchides in Photius (_cod._ 250) that the only aim of Hegesias was to exhibit his skill in describing sensational events.

See Cicero, _Brutus_ 83, _Orator_ 67, 69, with J. E. Sandys's note,
_ad Att._ xii. 6; Dion. Halic. _De verborum comp._ iv.; Aulus Gellius
ix. 4; Plutarch, _Alexander_, 3; C. W. Muller, _Scriptores rerum
Alexandri Magni_, p. 138 (appendix to Didot ed. of Arrian, 1846);
Norden, _Die antike Kunstprosa_ (1898); J. B. Bury, _Ancient Greek
Historians_ (1909), pp. 169-172, on origin and development of
"Asiatic" style, with example from Hegesias.

HEGESIPPUS, Athenian orator and statesman, nicknamed [Greek: Krobylos] ("knot"), probably from the way in which he wore his hair. He lived in the time of Demosthenes, of whose anti-Macedonian policy he was an enthusiastic supporter. In 343 B.C. he was one of the ambassadors sent to Macedonia to discuss, amongst other matters, the restoration of the island of Halonnesus, which had been seized by Philip. The mission was unsuccessful, but soon afterwards Philip wrote to Athens, offering to resign possession of the island or to submit to arbitration the question of ownership. In reply to this letter the oration De _Halonneso_ was delivered, which, although included among the speeches of Demosthenes, is generally considered to be by Hegesippus. Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Plutarch, however, favour the authorship of Demosthenes.

See Demosthenes, _De falsa legatione_ 364, 447, _De corona_ 250,
_Philippica_ iii. 129; Plutarch, _Demosthenes_ 17, _Apophthegmata_,
187D; Dionysius Halic. _ad Ammaeum_, i.; Grote, _History of Greece_,
ch. 90.

HEGESIPPUS (fl. A.D. 150-180), early Christian writer, was of Palestinian origin, and lived under the Emperors Antoninus Pius, Marcus Aurelius and Commodus. Like Aristo of Pella he belonged to that group of Judaistic Christians which, while keeping the law themselves, did not attempt to impose on others the requirements of circumcision and Sabbath observance. He was the author of a treatise ([Greek: hypomnemata]) in five books dealing with such subjects as Christian literature, the unity of church doctrine, paganism, heresy and Jewish Christianity, fragments of which are found in Eusebius, who obtained much of his information concerning early Palestinian church history and chronology from this source. Hegesippus was also a great traveller, and like many other leaders of his time came to Rome (having visited Corinth on the way) about the middle of the 2nd century. His journeyings impressed him with the idea that the continuity of the church in the cities he visited was a guarantee of its fidelity to apostolic orthodoxy: "in each succession and in every city, the doctrine is in accordance with that which the Law and the Prophets and the Lord [i.e. the Old Testament and the evangelical tradition] proclaim." To illustrate this opinion he drew up a list of the Roman bishops. Hegesippus is thus a significant figure both for the type of Christianity taught in the circle to which he belonged, and as accentuating the point of view which the church began to assume in the presence of a developing gnosticism.

HEGESIPPUS, the supposed author of a free Latin adaptation of the _Jewish War_ of Josephus under the title _De bello Judaico et excidio urbis Hierosolymitanae_. The seven books of Josephus are compressed into five, but much has been added from the Antiquities and from the works of Roman historians, while several entirely new speeches are introduced to suit the occasion. Internal evidence shows that the work could not have been written before the 4th century A.D. The author, who is undoubtedly a Christian, describes it in his preface as a kind of revised edition of Josephus. Some authorities attribute it to Ambrose, bishop of Milan (340-397), but there is nothing to settle the authorship definitely. The name Hegesippus itself appears to be a corruption of Josephus, through the stages [Greek: Iosepos], Iosippus, Egesippus, Hegesippus, unless it was purposely adopted as reminiscent of Hegesippus, the father of ecclesiastical history (2nd century).

Best edition by C. F. Weber and J. Caesar (1864); authorities in E.
Schurer, _History of the Jewish People_ (Eng. trans.), i. 99 seq.; F.
Vogel, _De Hegesippo, qui dicitur, Josephi interprete_ (Erlangen,
1881).

HEGIUS [VON HEEK], ALEXANDER (c. 1433-1498), German humanist, so called from his birthplace Heek in Westphalia. In his youth he was a pupil of Thomas a Kempis, at that time canon of the convent of St Agnes at Zwolle. In 1474 he settled down at Deventer in Holland, where he either founded or succeeded to the headship of a school, which became famous for the number of its distinguished alumni. First and foremost of these was Erasmus; others were Hermann von dem Busche, the missionary of humanism, Conrad Goclenius (Gockelen), Conrad Mutianus (Muth von Mudt) and pope Adrian VI. Hegius died at Deventer on the 7th of December 1498. His writings, consisting of short poems, philosophical essays, grammatical notes and letters, were published after his death by his pupil Jacob Faber. They display considerable knowledge of Latin, but less of Greek, on the value of which he strongly insisted. Hegius's chief claim to be remembered rests not upon his published works, but upon his services in the cause of humanism. He succeeded in abolishing the old-fashioned medieval textbooks and methods of instruction, and led his pupils to the study of the classical authors themselves. His generosity in assisting poor students exhausted a considerable fortune, and at his death he left nothing but his books and clothes.

See D. Reichling, "Beitrage zur Charakteristik des Alex. Hegius," in
the _Monatsschrift fur Westdeutschland_ (1877); H. Hamelmann, _Opera
genealogico-historica_ (1711); H. A. Erhard, _Geschichte des
Wiederaufbluhens wissenschaftlicher Bildung_ (1826); C. Krafft and W.
Crecelius, "Alexander Hegius und seine Schuler," from the works of
Johannes Butzbach, one of Hegius's pupils, in _Zeitschrift des
bergischen Geschichtsvereins_, vii. (Bonn, 1871).

HEIBERG, JOHAN LUDVIG (1791-1860), Danish poet and critic, son of the political writer Peter Andreas Heiberg (1758-1841), and of the famous novelist, afterwards the Baroness Gyllembourg-Ehrensvard, was born at Copenhagen on the 14th of December 1791. In 1800 his father was exiled and settled in Paris, where he was employed in the French foreign office, retiring in 1817 with a pension. His political and satirical writings continued to exercise great influence over his fellow-countrymen. Johan Ludvig Heiberg was taken by K. L. Rahbek and his wife into their house at Bakkehuset. He was educated at the university of Copenhagen, and his first publication, entitled _The Theatre for Marionettes_ (1814), included two romantic dramas. This was followed by _Christmas Jokes and New Year's Tricks_ (1816), _The Initiation of Psyche_ (1817), and _The Prophecy of Tycho Brahe_, a satire on the eccentricities of the Romantic writers, especially on the sentimentality of Ingemann. These works attracted attention at a time when Baggesen, Ohlenschlager and Ingemann possessed the popular ear, and were understood at once to be the opening of a great career. In 1817 Heiberg took his degree, and in 1819 went abroad with a grant from government. He proceeded to Paris, and spent the next three years there with his father. In 1822 he published his drama of _Nina_, and was made professor of the Danish language at the university of Kiel, where he delivered a course of lectures, comparing the Scandinavian mythology as found in the _Edda_ with the poems of Ohlenschlager. These lectures were published in German in 1827.

In 1825 Heiberg came back to Copenhagen for the purpose of introducing the vaudeville on the Danish stage. He composed a great number of these vaudevilles, of which the best known are _King Solomon and George the Hatmaker_ (1825); _April Fools_ (1826); _A Story in Rosenborg Garden_ (1827); _Kjoge Huskors_ (1831); _The Danes in Paris_ (1833); _No_ (1836); and _Yes_ (1839). He took his models from the French theatre, but showed extraordinary skill in blending the words and the music; but the subjects and the humour were essentially Danish and even topical. Meanwhile he was producing dramatic work of a more serious kind; in 1828 he brought out the national drama of _Elverhoi_; in 1830 _The Inseparables_; in 1835 the fairy comedy of _The Elves_, a dramatic version of Tieck's _Elfin_; and in 1838 _Fata Morgana_. In 1841 Heiberg published a volume of _New Poems_ containing "A Soul after Death," a comedy which is perhaps his masterpiece, "The Newly Wedded Pair," and other pieces. He edited from 1827 to 1830 the famous weekly, the _Flyvende Post_ (The Flying Post), and subsequently the _Interimsblade_ (1834-1837) and the _Intelligensblade_ (1842-1843). In his journalism he carried on his warfare against the excessive pretensions of the Romanticists, and produced much valuable and penetrating criticism of art and literature. In 1831 he married the actress Johanne Louise Paetges (1812-1890), herself the author of some popular vaudevilles. Heiberg's scathing satires, however, made him very unpopular; and this antagonism reached its height when, in 1845, he published his malicious little drama of _The Nut Crackers_. Nevertheless he became in 1847 director of the national theatre. He filled the post for seven years, working with great zeal and conscientiousness, but was forced by intrigues from without to resign it in 1854. Heiberg died at Bonderup, near Ringsted, on the 25th of August 1860. His influence upon taste and critical opinion was greater than that of any writer of his time, and can only be compared with that of Holberg in the 18th century. Most of the poets of the Romantic movement in Denmark were very grave and serious; Heiberg added the element of humour, elegance and irony. He had the genius of good taste, and his witty and delicate productions stand almost unique in the literature of his country.

The poetical works of Heiberg were collected, in 11 vols., in
1861-1862, and his prose writings (11 vols.) in the same year. The
last volume of his prose works contains some fragments of
autobiography. See also G. Brandes, _Essays_ (1889). For the elder
Heiberg see monographs by Thaarup (1883) and by Schwanenflugel (1891).

HEIDE, a town of Germany, in the Prussian province of Schleswig-Holstein, on a small plateau which stands between the marshes and moors bordering the North Sea, 35 m. N.N.W. of Gluckstadt, at the junction of the railways Elmshorn-Hvidding and Neumunster-Tonning. Pop. (1905), 8758. It has an Evangelical and a Roman Catholic church, a high-grade school, and tobacco and cigar manufactories and breweries. Heide in 1447 became the capital of the Ditmarsh peasant republic, but on the 13th of June 1559 it was the scene of the complete defeat of the peasant forces by the Danes.

HEIDEGGER, JOHANN HEINRICH (1633-1698), Swiss theologian, was born at Barentschweil, in the canton of Zurich, Switzerland, on the 1st of July 1633. He studied at Marburg and at Heidelberg, where he became the friend of J. L. Fabricius (1632-1696), and was appointed _professor extraordinarius_ of Hebrew and later of philosophy. In 1659 he was called to Steinfurt to fill the chair of dogmatics and ecclesiastical history, and in the same year he became doctor of theology of Heidelberg. In 1660 he revisited Switzerland; and, after marrying, he travelled in the following year to Holland, where he made the acquaintance of Johannes Cocceius. He returned in 1665 to Zurich, where he was elected professor of moral philosophy. Two years later he succeeded J. H. Hottinger (1620-1667) in the chair of theology, which he occupied till his death on the 18th of January 1698, having declined an invitation in 1669 to succeed J. Cocceius at Leiden, as well as a call to Groningen. Heidegger was the principal author of the _Formula Consensus Helvetica_ in 1675, which was designed to unite the Swiss Reformed churches, but had an opposite effect. W. Gass describes him as the most notable of the Swiss theologians of the time.

His writings are largely controversial, though without being bitter, and are in great part levelled against the Roman Catholic Church. The chief are _De historia sacra patriarcharum exercitationes selectae_ (1667-1671); _Dissertatio de Peregrinationibus religiosis_ (1670); _De ratione studiorum, opuscula aurea_, &c. (1670); _Historia papatus_ (1684; under the name Nicander von Hohenegg); _Manuductio in viam concordiae Protestantium ecclesiasticae_ (1686); _Tumulus concilii Tridentini_ (1690); _Exercitationes biblicae_ (1700), with a life of the author prefixed; _Corpus theologiae Christianae_ (1700, edited by J. H. Schweizer); _Ethicae Christianae elementa_ (1711); and lives of J. H. Hottinger (1667) and J. L. Fabricius (1698). His autobiography appeared in 1698, under the title _Historia vitae J. H. Heideggeri_.

See the articles in Herzog-Hauck's _Realencyklopadie_ and the
_Allgemeine deutsche Biographie_; and cf. W. Gass, _Geschichte der
protestantischen Dogmatik_, ii. 353 ff.

HEIDELBERG, a town of Germany, on the south bank of the Neckar, 12 m. above its confluence with the Rhine, 13 m. S.E. from Mannheim and 54 m. from Frankfort-on-Main by rail. The situation of the town, lying between lofty hills covered with vineyards and forests, at the spot where the rapid Neckar leaves the gorge and enters the plain of the Rhine, is one of great natural beauty. The town itself consists practically of one long, narrow street--the Hauptstrasse--running parallel to the river, from the railway station on the west to the Karlstor on the east (where there is also a local station) for a distance of 2 m. To the south of this is the Anlage, a pleasant promenade flanked by handsome villas and gardens, leading directly to the centre of the place. A number of smaller streets intersect the Hauptstrasse at right angles and run down to the river, which is crossed by two fine bridges. Of these, the old bridge on the east, built in 1788, has a fine gateway and is adorned with statues of Minerva and the elector Charles Theodore of the Palatinate; the other, the lower bridge, on the west, built in 1877, connects Heidelberg with the important suburbs of Neuenheim and Handschuchsheim. Of recent years the town has grown largely towards the west on both sides of the river; but the additions have been almost entirely of the better class of residences. Heidelberg is an important railway centre, and is connected by trunk lines with Frankfort, Mannheim, Karlsruhe, Spires and Wurzburg. Electric trams provide for local traffic, and there are also several light railways joining it with the neighbouring villages. Of the churches the chief are the Protestant Peterskirche dating from the 15th century and restored in 1873, to the door of which Jerome of Prague in 1460 nailed his theses; the Heilige Geist Kirche (Church of the Holy Ghost), an imposing Gothic edifice of the 15th century; the Jesuitenkirche (Roman Catholic), with a sumptuously decorated interior, and the new Evangelical Christuskirche. The town hall and the university buildings, dating from 1712 and restored in 1886, are commonplace erections; but to the south of the Ludwigsplatz, upon which most of the academical buildings lie, stands the new university library, a handsome structure of pink sandstone in German Renaissance style. In addition to the Ludwigsplatz with its equestrian statue of the emperor William I. there are other squares in the town, among them being the Bismarckplatz with a statue of Bismarck, and the Jubilaumsplatz.

The chief attraction of Heidelberg is the castle, which overhangs the east part of the town. It stands on the Jettenbuhl, a spur of the Konigsstuhl (1800 ft.), at a height of 330 ft. above the Neckar. Though now a ruin, yet its extent, its magnificence, its beautiful situation and its interesting history render it by far the most noteworthy, as it certainly is the grandest and largest, of the old castles of Germany. The building was begun early in the 13th century. The elector palatine and German king Rupert III. (d. 1410) greatly improved it, and built the wing, Ruprechtsbau or Rupert's building, that bears his name. Succeeding electors further extended and embellished it (see ARCHITECTURE, Plate VII., figs. 78-80); notably Otto Henry "the Magnanimous" (d. 1559), who built the beautiful early Renaissance wing known as the Otto-Heinrichsbau (1556-1559); Frederick IV., for whom the fine late Renaissance wing called the Friedrichsbau was built (1601-1607); and Frederick V., the unfortunate "winter king" of Bohemia, who on the west side added the Elisabethenbau or Englischebau (1618), named after his wife, the daughter of James I. of Great Britain and ancestress of the present English reigning family. In 1648, at the peace of Westphalia, Heidelberg was given back to Frederick V.'s son, Charles Louis, who restored the castle to its former splendour. In 1688, during Louis XIV.'s invasion of the Palatinate, the castle was taken, after a long siege, by the French, who blew part of it up when they found they could not hope to hold it (March 2, 1689). In 1693 it was again captured by them and still further wrecked. Finally, in 1764, it was struck by lightning and reduced to its present ruinous condition.

Apart from the outworks, the castle forms an irregular square with round towers at the angles, the principal buildings being grouped round a central courtyard, the entrance to which is from the south through a series of gateways. In this courtyard, besides the buildings already mentioned, are the oldest parts of the castle, the so-called Alte Bau (old building) and the Bandhaus. The Friedrichsbau, which is decorated with statues of the rulers of the Palatinate, was elaborately restored and rendered habitable between 1897 and 1903. Other noteworthy objects in the castle are the fountain in the courtyard, decorated with four granite columns from Charlemagne's palace at Ingelheim; the Elisabethentor, a beautiful gateway named after the English princess; the beautiful octagonal bell-tower at the N.E. angle; the ruins of the Krautturm, now known as the Gesprengte Turm, or blown-up tower, and the castle chapel and the museum of antiquities in the Friedrichsbau. In a cellar entered from the courtyard is the famous Great Tun of Heidelberg. This vast vat was built in 1751, but has only been used on one or two occasions. Its capacity is 49,000 gallons, and it is 20 ft. high and 31 ft. long. Behind the Friedrichsbau is the Altan (1610), or castle balcony, from which is obtained a view of great beauty, extending from the town beneath to the heights across the Neckar and over the broad luxuriant plain of the Rhine to Mannheim and the dim contours of the Hardt Mountains behind. On the terrace of the beautiful grounds is a statue of Victor von Scheffel, the poet of Heidelberg.

The university of Heidelberg was founded by the elector Rupert I., in 1385, the bull of foundation being issued by Pope Urban VI. in that year. It was constructed after the type of Paris, had four faculties, and possessed numerous privileges. Marselius von Inghen was its first rector. The electors Frederick I., the Victorious, Philip the Upright and Louis V. respectively cherished it. Otto Henry gave it a new organization, further endowed it and founded the library. At the Reformation it became a stronghold of Protestant learning, the Heidelberg catechism being drawn up by its theologians. Then the tide turned. Damaged by the Thirty Years' War, it led a struggling existence for a century and a half. A large portion of its remaining endowments was cut off by the peace of Luneville (1801). In 1803, however, Charles Frederick, grand-duke of Baden, raised it anew and reconstituted it under the name of "Ruperto-Carola." The number of professors and teachers is at present about 150 and of students 1700. The library was first kept in the choir of the Heilige Geist Kirche, and then consisted of 3500 MSS. In 1623 it was sent to Rome by Maximilian I., duke of Bavaria, and stored as the Bibliotheca Palatina in the Vatican. It was afterwards taken to Paris, and in 1815 was restored to Heidelberg. It has more than 500,000 volumes, besides 4000 MSS. Among the other university institutions are the academic hospital, the maternity hospital, the physiological institution, the chemical laboratory, the zoological museum, the botanical garden and the observatory on the Konigsstuhl.

The other educational foundations are a gymnasium, a modern and a technical school. There is a small theatre, an art and several other scientific societies. The manufactures of Heidelberg include cigars, leather, cement, surgical instruments and beer, but the inhabitants chiefly support themselves by supplying the wants of a large and increasing body of foreign permanent residents, of the considerable number of tourists who during the summer pass through the town, and of the university students. A funicular railway runs from the Korn-Markt up to the level of the castle and thence to the Molkenkur (700 ft. above the town). The town is well lighted and is supplied with excellent water from the Wolfsbrunnen. Pop. (1885), 29,304; (1905), 49,527.

At an early period Heidelberg was a fief of the bishop of Worms, who entrusted it about 1225 to the count palatine of the Rhine, Louis I. It soon became a town and the chief residence of the counts palatine. Heidelberg was one of the great centres of the reformed teaching and was the headquarters of the Calvinists. On this account it suffered much during the Thirty Years' War, being captured and plundered by Count Tilly in 1622, by the Swedes in 1633 and again by the imperialists in 1635. By the peace of Westphalia it was restored to the elector Charles Louis. In 1688 and again in 1693 Heidelberg was sacked by the French. On the latter occasion the work of destruction was carried out so thoroughly that only one house escaped; this being a quaintly decorated erection in the Marktplatz, which is now the Hotel zum Ritter. In 1720 the elector Charles II. removed his court to Mannheim, and in 1803 the town became part of the grand-duchy of Baden. On the 5th of March 1848 the Heidelberg assembly was held here, and at this meeting the steps were taken which led to the revolution in Germany in that year.

See Oncken, _Stadt, Schloss und Hochschule Heidelberg; Bilder aus
ihrer Vergangenheit_ (Heidelberg, 1885); Ochelhauser, _Das
Heidelberger Schloss, bau- und kunstgeschichtlicher Fuhrer_
(Heidelberg, 1902); Pfaff, _Heidelberg und Umgebung_ (Heidelberg,
1902); Lorentzen, _Heidelberg und Umgebung_ (Stuttgart, 1902); Durm,
_Das Heidelberger Schloss, eine Studie_ (Berlin, 1884); Koch and
Seitz, _Das Heidelberger Schloss_ (Darmstadt, 1887-1891); J. F. Hautz,
_Geschickte der Universitat Heidelberg_ (1863-1864); A. Thorbecke,
_Geschichte der Universitat Heidelberg_ (Stuttgart, 1886); the
_Urkundenbuch der Universitat Heidelberg_, edited by Winkelmann
(Heidelberg, 1886); Bahr, _Die Entfuhrung der Heidelberger Bibliothek
nach Rom_ (Leipzig, 1845); and G. Weber, _Heidelberger Erinnerungen_
(Stuttgart, 1886).

HEIDELBERG, a town and district of the Transvaal. The district is bounded S. by the Vaal river and includes the south-eastern part of the Witwatersrand gold-fields. The town of Heidelberg is 42 m. S.E. of Johannesburg and 441 m. N.W. of Durban by rail. Pop. (1904), 3220, of whom 1837 were white. It was founded in 1865, is built on the slopes of the Rand at an elevation of 5029 ft., and is reputed the best sanatorium in the colony. It is the centre of the eastern Rand goldmines.

HEIDELBERG CATECHISM, THE, the most attractive of all the catechisms of the Reformation, was drawn up at the bidding of Frederick III., elector of the Palatinate, and published on Tuesday the 19th of January 1563. The new religion in the Palatinate had been largely under the guidance of Philip Melanchthon, who had revived the old university of Heidelberg and staffed it with sympathetic teachers. One of these, Tillemann, Heshusius, who became general superintendent in 1558, held extreme Lutheran views on the Real Presence, and in his desire to force the community into his own position excommunicated his colleague Klebitz, who held Zwinglian views. When the breach was widening Frederick, "der fromme Kurfurst," came to the succession, dismissed the two chief combatants and referred the trouble to Melanchthon, whose guarded verdict was distinctly Swiss rather than Lutheran. In a decree of August 1560 the elector declared for Calvin and Zwingli, and soon after he resolved to issue a new and unambiguous catechism of the evangelical faith. He entrusted the task to two young men who have won deserved remembrance by their learning and their character alike. Zacharias Ursinus was born at Breslau in July 1534 and attained high honour in the university of Wittenberg. In 1558 he was made rector of the gymnasium in his native town, but the incessant strife with the extreme Lutherans drove him to Zurich, whence Frederick, on the advice of Peter Martyr, summoned him to be professor of theology at Heidelberg and superintendent of the _Sapientiae Collegium_. He was a man of modest and gentle spirit, not endowed with great preaching gifts, but unwearied in study and consummately able to impart his learning to others. Deposed from his chair by the elector Louis in 1576, he lived with John Casimir at Neustadt and found a congenial sphere in the new seminary there, dying in his 49th year, in March 1583.