Chapter VI: Marine Insurance (2)

The usual procedure in the offer and acceptance of a risk is as
follows: The intending insured (principal or broker) offers the risk
by showing to the underwriter a brief description of the venture in
question, called in Great Britain a slip, in America an application.
The underwriter signifies his acceptance of the whole or of a part of
the value exposed to perils by signing or initialling the slip,
putting down the amount for which he accepts liability. Or he may sign
and issue to the insured (principal or broker) a similar document made
out in his own office, called a covering note or insurance note. These
documents are simply first sketches of the contract, _memoires pour
servir_, so imperfect that they can be explained only in conjunction
with the contract in its completed form (the policy). In America it is
not at all rare for insurances to be effected through applications
alone without any policy existing. In Great Britain the existence of a
policy is essential, slips and covering notes being merely provisional
agreements, binding in honour only, to issue policies on certain terms
and conditions on receipt of the necessary information. One reason for
insisting on a policy being issued for every risk is that a means of
raising revenue by stamp taxes is thus created. In Great Britain the
stamp duties under the Stamp Act 1891 are as follows:--

Where the premium does not exceed 1/8% of the amount
insured 1d.

Where the premium exceeds 1/8% of amount insured:--
(a) On any voyage, per L100 or per any fractional
part of L100 1d.
(b) For any time not exceeding six months, per
L100, &c., as above 3d.
(c) For any time exceeding six months, and not
exceeding twelve months, per L100, &c., as
above 6d.

In consequence of this regulation, no time policy can be issued for a
period exceeding twelve months. Policies or certificates of insurance
coming from abroad are subject to the same duties, which should be
paid within ten days after receipt in the United Kingdom. The
shortness of the time allowed for stamping often prevents payment of
the tax. These stamp regulations are very troublesome, and produce
only a comparatively insignificant revenue. On small premium
insurances the tax is so excessive that it drives business out of the
country. A uniform tax per policy has been several times suggested,
but these proposals have not yet been accepted by the Treasury.

The documents required to establish a claim for total loss are: (1)
Protest of master. (2) Set of bills of lading (endorsed if necessary,
so as to be available to the underwriter). (3) Policy or certificate
of insurance (endorsed if necessary). (4) In the United States:
Statement of loss in detail. In the United States certified copies of
Nos. (1), (2), and (3) are taken; but as none of these copy-documents
can transfer possession to the underwriter, there is necessary for
that purpose another document, viz. (5) Bill of sale and abandonment
with subrogation to underwriter--that is, an assignment of all
interest to the underwriter. In the absence of the _full_ set of bills
of lading, a similar document should be taken in Great Britain,
especially in all cases in which salvage operations are likely to be
undertaken. Such a document handed to a salvage association or a
manager of salvage (whether acting for shipowner or for underwriter)
settles the ownership of salved goods, and ensures that any claim for
salvage expenses will be sent directly to the underwriter. This is
from the insured's point of view desirable, and it greatly simplifies
the management of salvage cases. As a claim for total loss cannot
extend beyond the full amount insured in the policy, it follows that
the documents required to substantiate such a claim must be supplied
to the underwriter free of charge.

For the substantiation of a claim for particular average the following
documents are required: (1) Protest of master or logbook. (2) Set of
bills of lading (cargo claims). (3) Policy or certificate of insurance
(endorsed if necessary). (4) Certified statements in detail of actual
cash value at destination of goods in _damaged_ state, all charges
paid. Certified statements in detail of sound value at destination of
goods on same day, all charges paid. Or original vouchers of costs of
repair of ship, all discounts, rebates, allowances and returns
deducted. (5) In the United States, subrogation to underwriters of
damaged goods.

AUTHORITIES.--E. K. Allen, _Stamp Duties on Sea Insurances_ (2nd ed.,
London, 1903); Th. Andresen, _Seeversicherung_ (Hamburg, 1888); Joseph
Arnould, _Treatise on the Law of Marine Insurance and Average_ (2
vols., 2nd edition, London, 1857); eighth edition by de Hart and Simey
(London, 1909); Laurence R. Baily, _Perils of the Seas_ (London,
1860); William Barber, _Principles of the Law of Insurance_ (San
Francisco, 1887); W. G. Black, _Digest of Decisions in Scottish
Shipping Cases, 1865-1890_ (Edinburgh, 1891); Sir M. D. Chalmers and
Douglas Owen, _Marine Insurance Act 1906_ (London, 1906); Alfred de
Courcy, _Commentaire des polices francaises d'assurances maritimes_
(2nd edition, Paris, 1888); E. L. de Hart and R. I. Simey, _The Marine
Insurance Act 1906_ (London, 1907); R. R. Douglas, _Index to Maritime
Law Decisions_ (London, 1888); John Duer, _Law and Practice of Marine
Insurance_ (2 vols., New York, 1845, 1846); William Gow, _Marine
Insurance_ (3rd corrected edition, London, 1909); Victor Jacobs,
_Etude sur les assurances maritimes et les avaries_ (Brussels, 1885);
Richard Lowndes, _Practical Treatise on the Law of Marine Insurance_
(2nd edition, London, 1885); _Law of General Average, English and
Foreign_ (4th edition, London, 1888); Charles M'Arthur, _Contract of
Marine Insurance_ (2nd edition, London, 1890); D. Maclachlan, _Arnould
on the Law of Marine Insurance_ (2 vols., 6th edition, London, 1887);
Reginald G. Marsden, _Admiralty Cases, 1648 to 1860_ (London, 1885);
_Law of Collisions at Sea_ (5th edition, London, 1904), Douglas Owen,
_Marine Insurance Notes and Clauses_ (3rd edition, 1890); Theophilus
Parsons, _Law of Marine Insurance and General Average_ (2 vols.,
Boston, 1868); G. G. Phillimore, "Marine Insurance" in _Encyclopaedia
of the Laws of England_, vol. viii. (London, 1907); Willard Phillips,
_Treatise on the Law of Insurance_ (2 vols., 5th edition, New York,
1867); C. R. Tyser, _Law relating to Losses under a Policy of Marine
Insurance_ (London, 1894); Rudolph Ulrich, _Grosse Haverei_ (2nd ed.,
3 vols., Berlin, 1903, 1905, 1906); G. Denis Weil, _Des assurances
maritimes et des avaries_ (Paris, 1879). (W. Go.)

FOOTNOTES:

[1] _On the Effects of Selection_, by Emory McClintock (New York,
1892), p. 94.

[2] As a result of investigation into the affairs of various American
insurance companies in 1905 by a committee appointed by the state
legislature of New York, a new law regulating life insurance down to
the minutest details was passed in 1906 (ch. 326). The surrender
value of a policy is to be the amount of insurance which the reserve,
computed on the 4(1/2)% mortality table, standing to its credit, will
purchase as a single premium. Other important features of the
legislation are that no New York company may hold a contingency
reserve beyond a fixed proportion of the net value of its policies;
the limiting of types of policies permitted, the defining of the
nature of investments permitted, and provisions for state
supervision, valuation, and annual division of profits.

[3] An important addition to the marine insurance law of the United
Kingdom was made by the Marine Insurance (Gambling Policies) Act
1909, which made void policies taken out by persons uninterested in
ships or cargo, who only gain by the loss of the vessel. Such
policies are known as "policies proof of interest." (P. P. I.).

[4] Lord Mansfield expressed it: "The warranty in a contract of
insurance is a condition or a contingency, and unless that be
performed there is no contract" (_Hibbert_ v. _Pigou_, _apud_
Marshall, 3rd ed., p. 375).

INTAGLIO (an Ital. word, from _intagliare_, to incise, cut into), a form of engraving or carving, in which the pattern or design is sunk below the surface of the material thus treated, opposed to "cameo" or "relievo"--carving or engraving where the design is raised. Intaglio is thus applied to incised gems, as cameo (q.v.) to gems cut in relief (see GEMS).

INTELLECT (Lat. _intellectus_, from _intelligere_, to understand), the general term for the mind in reference to its capacity for knowing or understanding. It is very vaguely used in common language. A man is described as "intellectual" generally because he is occupied with theory and principles rather than with practice, often with the further implication that his theories are concerned mainly with abstract matters: he is aloof from the world, and especially is a man of training and culture who cares little for the ordinary pleasures of sense. "Intellect" is thus distinguished from "intelligence" by the field of its operations, "intelligence" being used in the practical sphere for readiness to grasp a situation. (The employment of the word as a synonym for "news" is mere journalese; such phrases as "Intelligence Department" in connexion with newspapers and public offices are more justifiable.) In philosophy the "intellect" is contrasted with the senses and the will; it sifts and combines sense-given data, which otherwise would be only momentary, lasting practically only as long as the stimuli continued to operate. It thus includes the cognitive processes, and is the source of all real knowledge. Various attempts have been made to narrow the use of the term, e.g. to the higher regions of knowledge entirely above the region of sense (so Kant), or to conceptual processes; but no agreement has been reached. "Intellection" (i.e. the process as opposed to the capacity) has similarly been narrowed (e.g. by Professor James Ward) to the sphere of concepts; other writers, however, give it a much wider meaning. "Intellectualism" is a term given to any system which emphasizes the cognitive function; thus aesthetic intellectualism is that view of aesthetics which subordinates the sensual gratification or the delight in purely formal beauty to what may be called the ideal content.

INTELLIGENCE IN ANIMALS.[1] Professor G. J. Romanes, in his work on _Animal Intelligence_ (1881), used the term "intelligence" as synonymous with "reason," and defined it as follows: "Reason or intelligence is the faculty which is concerned in the intentional adaptation of means to ends. It therefore implies the conscious knowledge of the relation between means employed and ends attained, and may be exercised in adaptation to circumstances novel alike to the experience of the individual and that of the species." There is here some ambiguity as to the exact psychological significance of the words "intentional adaptation" and of the phrase "conscious knowledge of the relation between the means employed and the ends attained." A chick a day or two old learns to leave untouched nauseous caterpillars, and Romanes would certainly have regarded this as a case of intelligent profiting by experience; but how far there is intentional adaptation and whether the chick has conscious knowledge of the relation of means to ends, is doubtful, and, to say the least of it, open to discussion. St George Mivart, the acute dialectical opponent of Romanes, denied that animals are capable of the exercise of reason or intelligence. He urged that according to traditional views reason should denote and include all intellectual perception, whether it be direct and intuitive or indirect and inferential (_sensu stricto_), and contended that under neither head are to be included the sensuous perceptions and merely practical inferences of animals. Wasmann, who argues on similar grounds, regards such behaviour as that of the chicken as instinctive in the wider sense (see INSTINCT) and not intelligent; man alone, he contends, is intelligent, that is to say has the power of perceiving the relations of concepts to each other, and of drawing conclusions therefrom. It is clear that the discussion largely turns on the definition of terms; but more than this lies behind it. Both Mivart and Wasmann are emphatic in their assertions that instinctive modes of behaviour in the wider sense or the sensuous perceptions and practical inferences of animals differ fundamentally in kind from the rational or intelligent conduct of human folk, and that by no conceivable process of evolution could the one pass upwards into the other.

Psychological definition.

Wasmann regards the inclusion of those activities which result from sense-experience under the term "intelligence" as pseudo-psychological. To modern psychologists of standing we must therefore turn. Under the heading "Intellect or Intelligence," in the _Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology_, G. F. Stout and J. Mark Baldwin say: "There is a tendency to apply the term intellect more especially to the capacity for conceptual thinking. This does not hold in the same degree of the connected word intelligence. We speak freely of 'animal intelligence,' but the phrase 'animal intellect' is unusual. However, the restriction of the term to conceptual process is by no means so fixed and definite as to justify us in including it in the definition." With respect to the word intellection again: "There is a tendency to restrict the term to conceptual thinking. Ward does so definitely and consistently. Croom-Robertson, on the other hand, gives the word the widest possible application, making it cover all forms of cognitive process. On the whole, if the term is to be employed at all, Robertson's usage appears preferable, as corresponding better to the generality of the words intellect and intelligence." It does not seem to be pseudo-psychological, therefore, to apply the term intelligence to the capacity, unquestionably possessed by animals, of profiting by sensory experience. The present writer has suggested that the term may be conveniently restricted to the capacity of guiding behaviour through perceptual process, reserving the terms intellect and reason for the so-called faculties which involve conceptual process. There are, however, advantages, as Stout and Baldwin contend, in employing the word in a somewhat wide and general sense. It is probably best for strictly psychological purposes to define somewhat strictly perceptual and conceptual (or ideational) process and to leave to intelligence the comparative freedom of a word to be used in general literature and therein defined by its context. It may be helpful, however, to place in tabular form the different uses above indicated:--

_Perceptual Process._ _Conceptual Process._

1. Instinct (wider sense). Intelligence (e.g. Wasmann).
2. Sense-perception Intelligence (e.g. Mivart).
\_______ _______/
\/
3. Intelligence (e.g. Stout and Baldwin).
4. Intelligence. Intellect and Reason
(e.g. Lloyd Morgan).

From this table it may be seen at a glance that, with such divergence of usage, the application of the word "intelligent" to any given case of animal behaviour has in itself little psychological significance. If the psychological status of the animal is to be seriously discussed, the question to be answered is this: Are the observed activities explainable in terms of perceptual process only, or do they demand also a supplementary exercise of conceptual process? Granting that they are intelligent in the broad acceptation of the word, are they only perceptually intelligent or also conceptually intelligent?

Perceptual process.

Conceptual process.

It would require more space than is at our command to make the distinction which is drawn by those who use these terms clear and distinct; but enough may perhaps be said to enable the general reader to grasp the salient points. It will be convenient to take a concrete case. A chick in the performance of its truly instinctive activities pecks at all sorts of small objects. In doing so it gains a certain amount of initial experience. Very soon it may be observed that some grubs and caterpillars are seized with avidity whenever occasion offers; while others are after a few trials let alone. Broadly speaking, we have here intelligent selection and rejection. Psychologically interpreted what is believed to take place is somewhat as follows. Each grub or caterpillar affords a visual impression or sensation. This as such is just a presentation to sight and nothing more. But in virtue of previous experience it suggests what was formerly presented to consciousness in that experience. It has meaning. An impression which carries meaning begotten of previous experience is raised to the level of a percept; and behaviour which is influenced and guided by such percepts, that is to say by impressions _and_ the meaning for behaviour they suggest, is the outcome of perceptual process. If a dog learns to open a gate by lifting the latch, this may be due to perceptual process. Through previous experience the sight of the latch may suggest meaning for practical behaviour. His action may be simply due to the fact that the visual presentation has been directly associated with the appropriate bodily activities, and now by suggestion reinstates like activities; he may not, though on the other hand he may, exercise conceptual thought. Let us suppose that the chick which selects certain caterpillars and rejects others does form concepts. What does this imply from the standpoint of psychology? Stout and Baldwin define conception as the "cognition of a universal as distinguished from the particulars which it unifies. The universal apprehended in this way is called a concept." If then the chick apprehends the universal "good-for-eating" as exemplified in the particular maggot, and the maggot as a concrete case of the abstract and universal "good-for-eating," it has a capacity for conceptual thought. "There is one point in our definition," say Stout and Baldwin, "which requires to be specially emphasized. Conception is the cognition of a universal as distinguished from the particulars which it unifies. The words "as distinguished from" are of essential importance. The mere presence of a universal element in cognition does not constitute a concept. Otherwise all cognition would be conceptual. The simplest perception includes a universal.... The universal must be apprehended in antithesis to the particulars which it unifies." The general, or in technical phraseology, the universal characteristic "good-for-eating" is present in all that the chick practically finds to be edible; but the chick may just eat the nice caterpillars without thinking for a moment of edibility.

Their value.

Few would dream of contending that the chick a few days old is capable of conceptual thought. Naive perceptual process pretty obviously suffices for an explanation of the behaviour of the little bird. But so too, it may be said, does it suffice for the explanation of much of the practical behaviour of men. If a great number of the actions of animals are only perceptually intelligent, so too are a great number of the actions of men and women. This is unquestionably the case; and it serves to bring out the distinction in value which may be assigned to the percept and the concept respectively. The value of the percept is for simple direct practical behaviour; the value of the concept is for the elaboration of systematic knowledge. Any given impression may have meaning for behaviour in a given situation which is like that which has previously developed in a certain manner; but it may also have significance for the interpretation of such situations in a conceptual scheme of thought. The sight of the sage-blossom may have meaning for the bee which has sucked the sweets contained in such flowers; the sight of the bee in this situation may have significance for scientific interpretation as an example of the fertilization of flowers by insects. The bee may be only perceptually intelligent; the man who observes its action may or may not be conceptually intelligent.

A good deal of human behaviour may be interpreted in terms of perceptual intelligence, and a far larger proportion of animal behaviour may be so interpreted. But some human conduct cannot be explained save as the outcome of conceptual intelligence. The question is, whether any carefully observed and well-authenticated cases of animal procedure are inexplicable in the absence of conceptual thought, and if so what concepts are necessarily involved? It is now conceded that the mere collection of anecdotes which result from casual as opposed to systematic observation can afford no satisfactory basis for an answer to this question. A solution can only be obtained by well-planned observations conducted by those who have an adequate psychological training. Even under these conditions a criterion of the presence or absence of conceptual factors is needed; and such a criterion is not easy to formulate or to apply.

Development of concept.

If we institute inquiries with a view to ascertaining how the conceptual factor originates, it appears to be the result of analysis and abstraction, and to be reached by a process of comparison which becomes intentional and deliberate. If, for example, in educational procedure, we seek to assist children in forming concepts of colour, shape and material, we place before them a number of objects, some round, some square, some triangular; some red, some yellow, some blue; some made of paper, some of wood, some of flannel. Any given object is both red and square and made of flannel, blue and round and made of wood, and so on. We teach the child to group the objects, to put all the blues, yellows and reds together irrespective of shape or material; then all the rounds, squares and triangles together; then all which are made of like material. We thus help the children to grasp that though shape, colour and material are combined in each object, yet for the immediate purpose in hand one matters and the others do not matter. That which does matter is abstracted from the rest. The child has to analyse his experience and fix his attention on some given factor therein. He has to compare the objects intentionally, that is, for a definite end. He reaches, for example, the concept "blue" and realizes that the word may be applied to a number of particular objects differing in other respects, and that each is an example of what he understands by the word blue. Whether he could reach the concept without words is a question on which opinions differ.

Are animals conceptually intelligent?

Locke held that animals are incapable of the abstraction which is implied in such procedure. Dr Stout considers that observation of their behaviour shows little if any evidence of intentional comparison. And it is open to discussion whether they are able to analyse the situations opened up by their perceptual behaviour. The matter cannot be fully considered here. It must suffice if enough has been said to show the nature of the distinction between perceptual and conceptual process.

An example may, however, be given of the kind of observation which, since it was carefully planned and carried out, is of evidential value. Dr Alexander Hill's fox terrier was "taught" to open the side door of a large box by lifting a projecting latch. When the door swung open he was never allowed to find anything in the box, but was given a piece of biscuit from the hand. Then a warm chop-bone was put inside the box, which was placed in a courtyard so that the dog would pass it when no one was near, though he could be watched from the window. Details of the terrier's behaviour are given by Dr Hill in _Nature_ (lxvii. 558, April 1903). The net result was that the dog failed to apply at once his quite familiar experience of lifting the latch in the usual way. Here two situations were presented; first the box with people around and a piece of biscuit to be obtained from one of them by lifting the latch; secondly the box with no one near and a redolent chop-bone inside. To us it is obvious enough that the lifted latch is the key to the development of both situations; we analyse them so as to get the essential factor which matters. The dog apparently did not do so. He seemingly was incapable of this modest amount of analysis and abstraction.

Ambiguity of phrase "conscious knowledge of means."

We can now see more clearly what was meant by saying that Romanes' phrase (that intelligence "implies a conscious knowledge of the relation between means employed and ends attained") is ambiguous. The dog which lifts the latch of a gate and goes out when the gate swings open undoubtedly employs means to reach an end; he need not analytically think the means as conducive to the end and the end as reached by the means; he need not conceive this relationship as exemplified in a number of particular cases; he need not cognize the universal as distinguished from the particulars. Perceptual experience, therefore, does not imply what Romanes states if his words are interpreted in terms of conception; it does, however, imply that the relationship is contained within the unanalysed whole of experience and is a factor contributing to an acquired mode of behaviour.

Opinions differ as to how far, if at all, animals show what we are bound to interpret as the rudiments of conceptual thinking. It is perhaps best to regard the question as still _sub judice_. The evolutionist school, but not without exception, incline to the view that we find in animals the beginnings of conceptual experience; some are, however, of opinion that, in the absence of language, conceptual analysis is well-nigh impossible, and in any case cannot be carried far. To an evolutionist the assertion that conceptual intelligence could not conceivably have had a natural genesis from perceptual experience, appears to be made on grounds other than scientific. Few if any psychologists contend, on strictly psychological grounds, for a distinction of kind such as Mivart and Wasmann postulate. Conscious experience is indeed _sui generis_ and is distinct in kind from the energy with which the physicist or the physiologist has to deal; but within conscious experience from its earliest manifestation to its latest development scientific psychology only recognizes differences of mode.

Stages of development.

In individual development the earliest manifestation of experience is the conscious accompaniment or concomitant of that type of organic behaviour which includes all reflex and instinctive acts. This affords the primordial tissue of experience, including a conscious awareness of the stimulating presentations which initiate organic behaviour and the kinaesthetic presentations which accompany it. Thus arises an awareness of the development of the instinctive situation. Perceptual intelligence depends upon associative re-presentation--the earlier phases of a presented situation calling up a revival of the whole previous experience before its later phases are again actually presented. Through the process of inhibition, to the clearer understanding of which physiology is daily contributing fresh data, the actual development through behaviour of the later phases of the situation is checked, and an acquired modification of the behaviour results. The whole range of perceptual intelligence in animals illustrates the manner in which accommodation to varied circumstances is reached. On these foundations in varied experience conceptual intelligence is developed. The early stages of its development, whether in the child, in whom it unquestionably occurs, or in the higher animals, in which it is not improbably incipient, are difficult to determine on the basis of observation of its expression in behaviour or conduct. But the distinguishing features of conceptual as contrasted with perceptual intelligence are the comparison of situations with a view to their analysis, the disentangling of factors which are of importance for some purpose of interpretation or of conduct, and the attitude of mind which is expressed by saying that the particular case is an example of what experience has shown to be, in technical phrase, universal, and is realized as such. Under the comprehensive phrase, intelligence in animals, this may or may not be included.

For literature, see under INSTINCT. (C. Ll. M.)

FOOTNOTE:

[1] For a discussion of human intelligence, see PSYCHOLOGY.

INTENDANT (from Lat. _intendens_, pres. part. of _intendere_, to apply the mind to, to watch over; cf. "superintendent"), the name used in early times in France to designate a functionary invested by the king with an important and durable commission.[1] As early as the 14th century the title of _intendentes_ or _superintendentes financiarum_ was given to the commissaries appointed by the king to levy the _aides_, or temporary subsidies. In the 16th century Francis I. created the _intendants des finances_, permanent functionaries who formed the central and superior administration in financial matters. They took the place of the _generaux des finances_ and the "treasurers of France," who became provincial functionaries in the various _generalites_. The _intendants des finances_ existed until the end of the _ancien regime_; they were at first under the authority of the _surintendant_, and subsequently under that of the _controleur general des finances_. The _intendants des provinces_ date from the last thirty years of the 16th century. They were commissaries sent by the king with wide powers to restore order in the provinces after the civil wars. Their functions were at first extraordinary and temporary, but a few were retained as permanent state officials, and in course of time they came to be fairly generally distributed over the whole kingdom. The existing territorial divisions were not disturbed, each _intendant_ being placed over a _generalite_, save in some cases where slight modifications were necessary for administrative purposes. In their functions, however, there is another element worthy of notice. In the 13th and 14th centuries the monarchy had organized a species of inspection (_chevauchee_) over the provincial functionaries, which was performed by the _maitres des requetes_, and this the reform ordinances of the 16th century sought to revive. This inspectorate passed to the _intendant_, who became the resident local inspector and supervisor of all the other functionaries in his district; its connexion with the old _chevauchee_ is plainly shown by the fact that the intendants were almost invariably selected from the _maitres des requetes_. The early intendants had naturally been largely concerned with the troops; eventually special military intendants (the only ones that exist in modern French law) were created, but the _intendants des provinces_ retained certain military duties, notably those relating to the housing of the troops.

The early intendants were called indifferently _intendants de justice_ or _intendants de finances_, their full official title being _intendants de justice, police et finances, et commissaires, departis dans les generalites du royaume pour l'execution des ordres de Sa Majeste_. This title shows the wide range of their duties, the word "_police_" in this connexion connoting general administration. Not being officers of the king, but merely commissaries, they could always be recalled, and their powers were fixed by the commission they received from the king. As their functions became pre-eminently administrative the laws of the 17th and 18th centuries referred many questions to their decision, and, in this respect, their powers were determined by law. They became the direct general representatives of the king in each _generalite_, with authority over the other officials, whom they were empowered to censure, suspend or sometimes even replace. They were in constant touch with the king's council, with which they were connected by their original rights as _maitres des requetes_. In the first half of the 17th century they encountered some opposition from the governors of provinces, who had formerly been the direct political representatives of the crown, and also from the parliaments, which traditionally intervened in the administration, especially by means of _arrets de reglement_ (decisions, from which there was no appeal, regulating questions of procedure, civil law or custom). The intendants, however, were energetically supported, and so complete was their triumph that in the 18th century governors of provinces could not enter upon their duties without formal _lettres de residence_.

The intendants had wide powers in the drawing by lot of the militia and in the royal _corvees_ for the making and repair of the high roads, and were largely concerned with the administration of the _taille_, in which they effected useful reforms. They were the sole administrators of the principal direct and indirect imposts created in the second half of the 17th century and in the 18th century, and had full powers to settle disputes arising out of these taxes. Owing to the vast size of the districts allotted to the intendants (there were no more than thirty-two intendants in 1788), they often felt the need of assistants. As commissaries of the king, they could delegate their powers to _sub-delegues_, who were, however, not royal officials, but merely mandatories of the intendant. Decisions of the intendant could be carried to the king's council, and those of the _sub-delegue_ to the intendant.

See Gabriel Hanotaux, _Origines de l'institution des intendants des
provinces_ (1884); D'Arbois de Jubainville, _L'Administration des
intendants d'apres les archives de l'Aube_ (1880); P. Ardascheff,
_Provintzalnaya administratsiya vo Frantsii ve poshednoyo porou
starago poryadka: provintsialny Intendanty_ (St Petersburg,
1900-1906). (J. P. E.)

FOOTNOTE:

[1] In Germany the title _Intendant_ is applied to the head of public
institutions, more particularly to the high officials in charge of
court theatres, royal gardens, palaces and the like. The director of
certain civic theatres is now also sometimes styled Intendant. The
title _Generalintendant_ implies the same official duties, but higher
rank. In the German army the _Intendantur_ corresponds to the British
quartermaster-general's and financial departments of the War Office,
the French _intendance militaire_. Subordinate to these are the
_intendances_ (_Intendanturen_) under general officers commanding,
the heads of which are in Germany called _Korpsintendanten_, and in
France _intendants-generaux_, _intendants militaires_, &c. (see ARMY,
S 58).

INTENT (from Lat. _intendere_, to stretch out, extend, particularly in the phrase _intendere animum_, to turn one's mind to, purpose), in law, the purpose or object with which an act is done. The question of intent is important with reference both to civil and criminal responsibility. Briefly, it may be said that in criminal law the constituent element of an offence is the _mens rea_ or the guilty intent. The commission of an act without the intent is not, as a general rule, sufficient to constitute a crime, nor, on the other hand, does the existence of a guilty intent without commission of the act amount to the legal conception of a crime (see CRIMINAL LAW). In the case of civil wrongs, in general, the opposite holds good. A wrongful act done to the person or property of another carries with it legal liability, irrespective of the motive with which the act was done (see TORT). In reference to the construction of contracts, wills and other documents, the question of intention is material as showing the sense and meaning of the words used, and what they were intended to effect.

INTERAMNA LIRENAS, an ancient town of Italy in the Volscian territory near the modern Pignataro Interamna, 5 m. S.E. of Aquinum; the additional name distinguishes it from Interamna Praetuttianorum (mod. Teramo) and Interamna Nahartium (mod. Terni). It was founded by the Romans as a Latin colony in 312 B.C. as a military base in the war against Samnium, no fewer than 4000 colonists being sent thither. It was among the Latin colonies which in 209 B.C. refused to supply further contingents or money for the Hannibalic war. It became a _municipium_ with the other Latin colonies, but we hear no more of it--mainly, no doubt, because it lay off the Via Latina. Livy's description of it as on the Via Latina is not strictly accurate, and cannot be used as an indication that the former course of the Via Latina was through Interamna. The city lay on a hill on the N. bank of the Liris, between two of its tributaries, thus lacking natural defences on the N. side alone. Many inscriptions have been found, and there are considerable remains of antiquity. One inscription bears the date A.D. 408, and the site was occupied in the middle ages by a castle called Terame or Termine. (T. As.)

INTERCALARY (from Lat. _intercalare_, to proclaim, _calare_, the insertion of a day in the calendar), a term applied to a month, day or days inserted between other months or days in order to adjust the reckoning of time, based on the revolution of the earth round the sun, the day, and of the moon round the earth, the lunar month, to the revolution of the earth round the sun, the solar year (see CALENDAR). From the meaning of something inserted or placed between, intercalary is used for something which interrupts a series, or comes between two types. In botany, the term is used of growth which is not apical but somewhere between the apex and base of an organ, such as the growth in length of an Iris leaf, or of the internode of a grass-haulm.

INTERCOLUMNIATION, in architecture, the distance between the columns of a peristyle, generally referred to in terms of the lower diameter of the column. They are thus set forth by Vitruvius (iii. 2): (a) Pycnostyle, equal to 1(1/2) diameters; (b) Systyle, 2 diameters; (c) Eustyle, 2(1/4) diameters (which was the proportion preferred by him); (d) Diastyle, 3 diameters; and (e) Araeostyle or wide spaced, 4 diameters, a span only possible when the architrave was in wood. Vitruvius's definition would seem to apply only to examples with which he was acquainted in Rome, or to Greek temples described by authors he had studied. In the earlier Doric temples the intercolumniation is sometimes less than one diameter, and it increases gradually as the style developed; thus in the Parthenon it is 1(1/4), in the Temple of Diana Propylaea at Eleusis, 1(1/4); and in the portico at Delos, 2(1/2). The intercolumniations of the columns of the Ionic Order are greater, averaging 2 diameters, but then the relative proportion of height to diameter in the column has to be taken into account, as also the width of the peristyle. Thus in the temple of Apollo Branchidae, where the columns are slender and over 10 diameters in height, the intercolumniation is 1(3/4), notwithstanding its late date, and in the Temple of Apollo Smintheus in Asia Minor, in which the peristyle is pseudodipteral, or double width, the intercolumniation is just over 1(1/2). Temples of the Corinthian Order follow the proportions of those of the Ionic Order.

INTERDICT (Lat. _interdictum_, from _interdicere_, to forbid by decree, lit., interpose by speech), in its full technical sense as an ecclesiastical term, a sentence by a competent ecclesiastical authority forbidding all celebration of public worship, the administration of some sacraments (baptism, confirmation and penance are permitted) and ecclesiastical burial. From general interdicts, however, are excepted the feast days of Christmas, Easter, Whitsunday, the Assumption and Corpus Christi. An interdict may be either local, personal or mixed, according as it applies to a locality, to a particular person or class of persons, or to a particular locality as long as it shall be the residence of a particular person or class of persons. Local interdicts again may be either general or particular; in the latter instance they refer only to particular buildings set apart for religious services. An interdict is a measure which seeks to punish a population or a religious body (e.g. a chapter) for the fault of some only of its members, who cannot be reached separately. It is a penalty directed against society rather than against individuals. In 869 Hincmar of Laon laid his entire diocese under an interdict, a proceeding for which he was severely censured by Hincmar of Reims. In the _Chronicle_ of Ademar of Limoges (_ad ann._ 994) it is stated that Bishop Alduin introduced there "a new plan for punishing the wickedness of his people; he ordered the churches and monasteries to cease from divine worship and the people to abstain from divine praise, and this he called excommunication" (see Gieseler, _Kirchengesch_. iii. 342, where also the text is given of a proposal to a similar effect made by Odolric, abbot of St Martial, at the council of Limoges in 1031). It was not until the 11th century that the use of the interdict obtained a recognized place among the means of discipline at the disposal of the Roman hierarchy, which used it, without great success, to bring back the secular authorities to obedience. Important historical instances of the use of the interdict occur in the cases of Scotland under Pope Alexander III. in 1181, of France under Innocent III. in 1200, and of England under the same pope in 1209. So far as the interdict is "personal," that is to say, applied to a particular individual, it may be regarded as a kind of partial excommunication; for instance, a bishop may, for certain faults, be interdicted from entering the church (_ab ingressu ecclesiae_), that is, without being excommunicated, he must not celebrate or assist at the celebration of divine offices. Interdicts cease at the expiration of the term, or by removal (_relaxatio_). General and local interdicts are no longer in use.

See the canonists in tit. 39 _lib._ v., _De sententia excommun_., &c.;
L. Ferraris, _Prompta bibliotheca canonica_, &c., s.v. "Interdictum."

_Interdict_, in Scots law, is an order of court pronounced on cause shown for stopping any proceedings complained of as illegal or wrongful. It may be resorted to as a remedy against all encroachments either on property or possession. For the analogous English practice see INJUNCTION.

INTERDICTION, in Scots law, a process of restraint applied to prodigals and others who, "from weakness, facility or profusion, are liable to imposition." It is either voluntary or judicial. Voluntary interdiction is effected by the prodigal himself, who executes a bond obliging himself to do no deed which may affect his estate without the assent of certain persons called the "interdictors." This may be removed by the court of session, by the joint act of the interdictors and the interdicted, and by the number of interdictors being reduced below the number constituting a quorum. Judicial interdiction is imposed by order of the court, either moved by an interested party or acting in the exercise of its _nobile officium_, and can only be removed by a similar order. Deeds done by the interdicted person, so far as they affect or purport to affect his heritable estate, are reducible, unless they have been done with the consent of the interdictors. Interdiction has no effect, however, on movable property.

INTERESSE TERMINI (Lat. for "interest in a term"), in law, an executory interest, being the right of entry which the grant of a lease confers upon a lessee. Actual entry on the lands by the lessor converts the right into an estate. If the lease, however, has been created by a bargain and sale or by any other conveyance under the Statute of Uses, which does not require an entry, the term vests in the lessee at once. An _interesse termini_ gives a cause of action against any person through whose action entry by the lessee or delivery of possession to him may have been prevented. An _interesse termini_ is a right _in rem_, alienable at common law, and transmissible to the executors of the lessee.

INTEREST, etymologically a state or condition of being concerned in or having a share in anything, hence a legal or other claim to or share in property, benefits or advantages. Further developments of meaning are found in the application of the word to the benefits, advantages, matters of importance, &c., in which "interest" or concern can be felt, and to the feeling of concern so excited; hence also the word is used of the persons who have a concern in some common "interest," e.g. the trading or commercial interest, and of the personal or other influence due to a connexion with specific "interests." The word is derived from the Latin _interesse_ (literally "to be between"), to make a difference, to concern, be of importance. The form which the word takes in English is a substantival use of the 3rd person singular of the present indicative of the Latin verb, and is due to a similar use in French of the older _interest_, modern _interet_. The earlier English word was _interess_, which survived till the end of the 17th century; the earliest example of "interest" in the _New English Dictionary_ is from the _Rolls of Parliament_ of 1450.

These meanings of "interest" are plainly derived from the ordinary uses of the Latin _interesse_. The origin of the application of the word to the compensation paid for the use of money or for the forbearance of a debt, with which, as far as present English law is concerned, this article deals, forms part of the history of USURY and MONEY-LENDING (q.v.). By Roman law, where one party to a contract made default, the other could enforce, over and above the fulfilment of the agreement, compensation based on the difference (_id quod interest_) to the creditor's position caused by the default of the debtor, which was technically known as _mora_, delay. This difference could be reckoned according as actual loss had accrued, and also on a calculation of the profit that might have been made had performance been carried out. Now this developed the canonist doctrine of _damnum emergens_ and _lucrum cessans_ respectively, which played a considerable part in the breaking down of the ecclesiastical prohibition of the taking of usury. The medieval lawyers used the phrase _damna et interesse_ (in French _dommages et interets_) for such compensation by way of damages for the non-fulfilment of a contract, and for damages and indemnity generally. Thus _interesse_ and _interet_ came to be particularly applied to the charge for the use of money disguised by a legal fiction under the form of an indemnity for the failure to perform a contract.

At English common law an agreement to pay interest is not implied unless in the case of negotiable instruments, when it is supported by mercantile usage. As a general rule therefore debts certain, payable at a specified time, do not carry interest from that time unless there has been an express agreement that they should do so. But when it has been the constant practice of a trade or business to charge interest, or where as between the parties interest has been always charged and paid, a contract to pay interest is implied. It is now provided by the Civil Procedure Act 1833 that, "upon all debts or sums certain payable at a certain time or otherwise, the jury on the trial of any issue or in any inquisition of damages _may_ if they shall think fit allow interest to the creditor at a rate not exceeding the current rate of interest, from the time when such debts or sums certain were payable, if such debts or sums be payable by virtue of some written instrument at a certain time; or if payable otherwise, then from the time when demand of payment shall have been made in writing, so as such demand shall give notice to the debtor that interest will be claimed from the date of such demand until the term of payment: provided that interest shall be payable in all cases in which it is now payable by law." Compound interest requires to be supported by positive proof that it was agreed to by the parties; an established practice to account in this manner will be evidence of such an agreement. When interest is awarded by a court it is generally at the rate of 4%; under special circumstances 5% has been allowed.

INTERFERENCE OF LIGHT. S 1. This term[1] and the ideas underlying it were introduced into optics by Thomas Young. His Bakerian lecture on "The Theory of Light and Colours" (_Phil. Trans._, 1801) formulated the following hypotheses and propositions, and thereby laid the foundations of the wave theory:--

_Hypotheses._

(i.) A luminiferous aether pervades the universe, rare and elastic in
a high degree.

(ii.) Undulations are excited in this aether whenever a body becomes
luminous.

(iii.) The sensation of different colours depends on the different
frequency of vibrations excited by the light in the retina.

(iv.) All material bodies have an attraction for the aethereal medium,
by means of which it is accumulated in their substance, and for a
small distance around them, in a state of greater density but not of
greater elasticity.

_Propositions._

(i.) All impulses are propagated in a homogeneous elastic medium with
an equable velocity.

(ii.) An undulation conceived to originate from the vibration of a
single particle must expand through a homogeneous medium in a
spherical form, but with different quantities of motion in different
parts.

(iii.) A portion of a spherical undulation, admitted through an
aperture into a quiescent medium, will proceed to be further
propagated rectilinearly in concentric superfices, terminated
laterally by weak and irregular portions of newly diverging
undulations.

(iv.) When an undulation arrives at a surface which is the limit of
mediums of different densities, a partial reflection takes place,
proportionate in force to the difference of the densities.

(v.) When an undulation is transmitted through a surface terminating
different mediums, it proceeds in such a direction that the sines of
the angles of incidence and refraction are in the constant ratio of
the velocity of propagation in the two mediums.

(vi.) When an undulation falls on the surface of a rarer medium, so
obliquely that it cannot be regularly refracted, it is totally
reflected at an angle equal to that of its incidence.

(vii.) If equidistant undulations be supposed to pass through a
medium, of which the parts are susceptible of permanent vibrations
somewhat slower than the undulations, their velocity will be somewhat
lessened by this vibratory tendency; and, in the same medium, the
more, as the undulations are more frequent.

(viii.) When two undulations, from different origins, coincide either
perfectly or very nearly in direction, their joint effect is a
combination of the motions belonging to each.

(ix.) Radiant light consists in undulations of the luminiferous
aether.

In the _Philosophical Transactions_ for 1802, Young refers to his discovery of "a simple and general law." The law is that "wherever two portions of the same light arrive at the eye by different routes, either exactly or very nearly in the same direction, the light becomes most intense where the difference of the routes is a multiple of a certain length, and least intense in the intermediate state of the interfering portions; and this length is different for light of different colours."

This appears to be the first use of the word _interfering_ or _interference_ as applied to light. When two portions of light by their co-operation cause darkness, there is certainly "interference" in the popular sense; but from a mechanical or mathematical point of view, the superposition contemplated in proposition viii. would more naturally be regarded as taking place without interference. Young applied his principle to the explanation of colours of striated surfaces (gratings), to the colours of thin plates, and to an experiment which we shall discuss later in the improved form given to it by Fresnel, where a screen is illuminated simultaneously by light proceeding from two similar sources. As a preliminary to these explanations we require an analytical expression for waves of simple type, and an examination of the effects of compounding them.

S 2. _Plane Waves of Simple Type._--Whatever may be the character of
the medium and of its vibration, the analytical expression for an
infinite train of plane waves is

/ 2[pi] \
A cos ( -------- (Vt - x) + [alpha] ) (1),
\[lambda] /

in which [lambda] represents the wave-length, and V the corresponding
velocity of propagation. The coefficient A is called the amplitude,
and its nature depends upon the medium and may here be left an open
question. The phase of the wave at a given time and place is
represented by [alpha]. The expression retains the same value whatever
integral number of wave-lengths be added to or subtracted from x. It
is also periodic with respect to t, and the period is

[tau] = [lambda]/V (2).

In experimenting upon sound we are able to determine independently
[tau], [lambda], and V; but on account of its smallness the periodic
time of luminous vibrations eludes altogether our means of
observation, and is only known indirectly from [lambda] and V by means
of (2).

There is nothing arbitrary in the use of a circular function to
represent the waves. As a general rule this is the only kind of wave
which can be propagated without a change of form; and, even in the
exceptional cases where the velocity is independent of wave-length, no
generality is really lost by this procedure, because in accordance
with Fourier's theorem any kind of periodic wave may be regarded as
compounded of a series of such as (1), with wave-lengths in harmonical
progression.

A well-known characteristic of waves of type (1) is that any number of
trains of various amplitudes and phases, but of the _same
wave-length_, are equivalent to a single train of the same type. Thus

/ 2[pi] \
[Sigma]A cos ( --------(Vt - x) + [alpha] )
\[lambda] /

2[pi] 2[pi]
= [Sigma]A cos[alpha].cos --------(Vt - x) - [Sigma]A sin[alpha].sin --------(Vt - x)
[lambda] [lambda]

/ 2[pi] \
= P cos ( --------(Vt - x) + [phi] ) (3),
\[lambda] /

where P^2 = ([Sigma]A cos [alpha])^2 = [Sigma](A sin[alpha])^2 (4),

[Sigma](A sin[alpha])
tan[phi] = --------------------- (5).
[Sigma](A cos[alpha])

An important particular case is that of two component trains only.

/ 2[pi] \ / 2[pi] \
A cos ( --------(Vt - x) + [alpha] ) + A' cos ( --------(Vt - x) + [alpha]' )
\[lambda] / \[lambda] /

/ 2[pi] \
= P cos ( --------(Vt - x) + [phi] ),
\[lambda] /

where P^2 = A^2 + A'^2 + 2AA' cos ([alpha] - [alpha]') (6).