Chapter V: Act I: , SCENE 1.--Cabinet Council discovered; Naval and Military (1)

Officers attending._

_First Cabinet Minister._ We now are met in grave deliberation
Upon the plan for Antwerp’s subjugation,
That we may not despatch this expedition
Without due caution, knowledge and precision.
Ye officers of military fame,
We wish for your opinion of the same.
_1st Mil. Officer._ I wrote before my reasons in detail,
Why I esteem your plan quite sure to fail.
_Lord C--gh._ You think ’twill fail?
_2nd Mil. Officer._ And so do I.
_3rd Mil. Officer._ And I.
_Lord C--gh._ All of you think so: better go and try.
But, ere our army sails, ’tis fit we know
Something about the place to which they’ll go.
Pray, sirs, is Antwerp fortified or no?
_1st Mil. Officer._ Rumour reports it fortified full well,
But I, not having been there, cannot tell.
_2nd Mil. Officer._ I know no more.
_3rd Mil. Officer._ Nor I, I do declare.
_Lord C--gh._ Well, well--they’ll see directly they get there.
_Lord M--ve._ But as the chief design of this great feat,
Captain, will be to take the Antwerp fleet;
Say, can the frigates, or can any ship,
Sail up above, and so give us the slip?
_Naval Officer._ Had I been there, I could have told you what
The water’s depth; but having ne’er, cannot.
_Lord M--ve._ This is no cause our plan should be forsaken,
It will be known as soon as Antwerp’s taken.
_Lord E--n._ But shan’t we lose the fleet? Then there’ll be laughter.
_Lord M--ve._ Lose it? If they go up, mayn’t we go after?
_Lord E--n._ Our friend the smuggler says the troops are few;
And then the garrison--Pray what think you?
_1st Mil. Officer._ Few on the coast may be, and in the town;
But from the country they can soon bring down
A force too large for us to hope to lick;
And all that’s done must be done very quick.
_Lord Ch--m._ Fear not: delay was ne’er a fault of mine;
And every morning I’ll get up at nine--
Dressed, breakfast done by twelve--no speed I’ll lack,
And do it all completely in a crack.
_1st Cab. Min._ Brave warriors, your advice and information
Has now received our full consideration.
[_Exeunt Mil. and Naval Officers._
_Lord C--gh._ As secrecy’s the soul of expeditions,
I see no use in telling the physicians
Whither it’s going; but desire they would
Send plenty of what physic they think good.

_Enter_ SIR LUCAS PEPYS.

(_To Sir L. P._) Prepare (I can’t tell rightly against when)
Physic enough for forty thousand men,
But do it quick; what’s proper you can tell.
[_Exit_ SIR L. P.
_Mr. P--l._ Now there’s no fear but all will answer well;
So excellent we’ve made each preparation,
And all so accurate our information.
When Parliament meets next how fine a story
Shall we not have to tell of wars and glory.
[_Exeunt._
_Manet_, MR. C--G, _Solus_.
_Mr. C--g._ Most of this plan is gibberish to me,
But I shall quietly lie by and see
How it goes on; and then, if all succeeds,
I share the praise; but if it ill proceeds
I’ll try what, leaving this ungoverned crew,
Setting up statesmen for myself will do.

[END OF ACT FIRST.]

The rest of the play is of so very tragic and horrible a cast, that we think the author will not be justified in bringing it forward, and we decline publishing any further extracts at present.

B.--DEBATE ON THE EXPEDITION.

=Source.=--_Diary of Lord Colchester_, 1861. Vol. ii., p. 243.

_[March] 30th._--House of Commons. Resumed Walcheren debate. At four in the morning divided four times.

I. To censure the policy, 227; against it, 275.

II. To justify it, 272; against it, 232.

III. To censure the retention, 224; against the censure, 275.

IV. To excuse the delay in evacuating it, 253; against that, 232.

Adjourned after seven o’clock.

The second division, the largest in this Parliament except that of June 1807, upon the address of the change of Ministry.

N.B.--It was the general opinion that the only resolution upon this business which was _indisputably untrue_ was the _unanimous vote_ that the failure was not imputable to any misconduct of the officers by sea or land.

My own opinion certainly was contrary to any such resolution. For, first, it was in evidence that the wind and weather did not prevent Lord Huntley from landing in Cadsand, in good time to have destroyed the batteries of Breskens, and opened a passage for the fleet up the Wieling Channel, clear of Flushing. And, secondly, there was no evidence to prove that the whole fleet might not have gone up that channel with Lord Gardner’s squadron, instead of going originally into the Stonediep: the further deviation into the Roompot, which ruined the whole prospect of getting to Antwerp up the West Scheldt, was probably inevitable after the fleet had once missed their entrance by Cadsand and the Wieling Channel.

It suited the Opposition to exculpate the land and naval service, _because_ then the failure (by their reasoning) exclusively followed from _the plan_, and the plan only. It also _suited the Ministers_, partly because they had advised the King to tell the City of London that there was no ground for military inquiry (they then not knowing of Lord Chatham’s narrative); and partly from a proper desire to avoid throwing blame upon those who served under them by their own appointment.

WELLINGTON’S DIFFICULTIES IN SPAIN (1810).

=Source.=--_Selections from the Wellington Despatches._ Gurwood. P. 409.

I. _To the Right Hon. H. Wellesley._

CARTAXO, _2nd Dec., 1810_.

I am afraid that the Spaniards will bring us all to shame yet. It is scandalous that in the third year of their war, and having been more than a year in a state of tranquillity, and having sustained no loss of importance since the battle of Ocaña, they should now be depending for the safety of Cadiz, the seat of their Government, upon having one or two more or less British regiments; and that after having been shut in for 10 months, they have not prepared the works necessary for their defence, notwithstanding the repeated remonstrances of General Graham and the British officers on the danger of omitting them. The Cortes appear to suffer under the national disease in as great a degree as the other authorities, that is, boasting of the strength and power of the Spanish nation, till they are seriously convinced they are in no danger, and then sitting down quietly and indulging their national indolence.

II. _To the Right Hon. H. Wellesley._

CARTAXO, _16th Dec., 1810_.

I have had some difficulties lately with the Spanish muleteers attached to the British army, in consequence of the general requisition which is said to be made of all individuals of the military ages for the army.

I doubt very much whether this requisition is or can be enforced; and I believe that the magistrates in the different districts are very glad to show the activity and steadiness with which they execute the law, by calling for these people who they know will quit with reluctance the lucrative business in which they are engaged, to serve as soldiers. However, I cannot encourage them to stay away when they are called for; and I very much apprehend that the army will be reduced to the greatest distress if they should leave us, notwithstanding the pains which I have taken, and the expense which I have incurred, to have it equipped as it ought to be with the means of transport.

It appears to me that the production of a certificate from me, or Colonel Alava, or Colonel O’Lawlor, that a man is employed as a muleteer with the British army, might exempt him from service as a soldier, without any great violation of principle or any inconvenience. I do not believe that the whole number of persons of this description exceeds 500; and of these many cannot be of the military ages.

I hope some arrangement will be adopted upon this subject; and I can only say that if something is not done, and I am to be deprived of all those persons of this description who have until now been attached to this army, I shall be entirely crippled, and it will be a question whether we ought not to quit the Peninsula entirely. I doubt that even here we could exist one day without their assistance.

III. _To the Earl of Liverpool._

CARTAXO, _21st Dec., 1810_.

I did not know what to say about the reduction of the number of our transports in the Tagus: I have no apprehension that we shall be obliged to embark, and no idea that the enemy will for a length of time be in a situation to oblige us to think of such an operation; but I cannot, as an Officer, be so certain of the course of events as to tell you that the transports may be withdrawn.

It may be necessary to request your attention for a few moments to explain our situation in reference to that of the enemy, and the general state of affairs in the Peninsula as affecting this question. I have no doubt that the enemy is not, and does not consider himself, able to force the position of the allies in this country. Indeed, I believe I have the means of beating the force now opposed to me, in their own position, of course with the sacrifice of a certain loss of men.

I think that the paper published in the _Moniteur_ of the 23rd November shows that our position in front of Lisbon is considered so strong, that it ought not to be attacked in front; and, from the perusal of that paper, I am of opinion that the enemy will endeavour to maintain a position in this country with the troops now in it, probably reinforced by some of those now on the frontier, and will endeavour to dislodge us by occupying the countries north of the Douro and south of the Tagus, and thus distress us for supplies. The accomplishment of this plan will require an enormous force and some length of time; but when I recollect that in the last year the whole of the north of Spain, and of Old Castille, were abandoned by the enemy, even before the battle of Talavera, I cannot doubt that they will abandon those countries likewise upon the existing emergency, which will give them a part of the force they require.

I am also certain that, if the British army should not be obliged to evacuate Portugal, the French army must withdraw from Andalusia. I think it not improbable, therefore, that a large part of it, if not the whole of the French army in Andalusia, will be introduced into the southern parts of this kingdom.

I do not despair of holding my ground against this accumulation of force, and I have taken measures to prevent the only inconvenience which it can produce, viz., a deficiency of supplies. But as these troops are all within a few marches of me, and an order from Paris would not only put them in motion, but they could be in this country almost before the transports could arrive in England, I cannot think it advisable, in the existing situation of affairs, to send them out of my reach.

The question whether I should attack the enemy in the position which he now occupies has been well considered by me. I have a superior army, I think, by 10,000 men, or one sixth, including the Spaniards; and, notwithstanding some defects in its composition, I think I should succeed. But the loss must necessarily be very great in killed and wounded; and the necessity which would exist of exposing the troops to the weather for some days and nights would throw a great proportion of this convalescent army into the hospital. Then what is to be gained in this action, in which failure would be the loss of the whole cause? Nothing at present that I know of, excepting to relieve the northern provinces and Andalusia from the presence of the enemy; which relief it is probable that the course of events will bring about, without the risk and loss of an action.

But there is another view of this question, which is a very serious one, and has made much impression upon my mind. If the northern provinces of Spain and Andalusia should be relieved from the pressure and presence of the enemy by the course of events, or by exertions in Portugal, what will the cause gain by this relief? In the last year I cannot forget that I brought upon myself and General Cuesta not less than 5 _corps d’armée_, and the King’s guards and reserve, more than equal to a 6th corps; and that when the whole of Castille and the north of Spain was cleared of the enemy, not a man was put in the field by those provinces, nor even one raised!

In this year I have had 3 _corps d’armée_, the most numerous and efficient in Spain, upon my hands for 8 months. The kingdom of Galicia has been entirely free from the enemy, and Castille partially relieved. The Spanish army in Galicia have made no movement whatever, as General Mahy says, for want of great coats; but in fact, because they want pay, clothing, means of subsistence, transport, discipline, and every thing which can keep a body of men together in an operation. In Castille nothing has been done, excepting that the guerrillas have been more daring and successful in their robberies.

The relief of Andalusia would, I fear, make no difference in the situation of affairs there. I do not think it quite certain that the enemy would be obliged to raise the siege of Cadiz, although it is probable that he would. But if the siege of Cadiz were not raised, the general cause would derive no advantage from the relief of Andalusia; and even if the raising the siege of Cadiz were the consequence of the relief of Andalusia, I doubt that there are means at Cadiz of putting into the field the troops now composing the garrison of that place, so as to render them a disposable force for the cause of their allies, or that any benefit would be derived from that event, excepting that it would place at the disposal of the allies the means which the enemy have collected for the siege of Cadiz, and retard, and probably prevent, the operation.

Your Lordship will probably deem this a melancholy picture of prospect, in the Peninsula, but you may rely upon its truth. This state of affairs in Spain is the result of some defects in the national character, aggravated by the false principles on which all the affairs of the country have been conducted since it attempted to shake off the yoke of France. The Spaniards have consequently no army; no means of raising one; no authority to discipline an army if they could raise one; no means to arm, equip, clothe, or feed anything which could be collected under that name. The war in the Peninsula, therefore, as far as the Spaniards are concerned in it, cannot take a regular shape. It must be confined to the operations of the guerrillas, upon which the calculations are very different from those which would be made in respect to the operations of a more regular force.

If all this be true, our business is not to fight the French army, which we certainly cannot beat out of the Peninsula, but to give occupation to as large a portion of it as we can manage, and to leave the war in Spain to the guerrillas. As long as the French do not interfere with our supplies, or the resources of the Portuguese Government, or any point of our security, I think it very immaterial whether they are in Spain or Portugal. Indeed, adverting to the greater difficulties they have in subsisting in the latter country and in keeping up their communications, I believe it is more advantageous that they should be where they are. Their numbers are certainly diminishing daily, while they do us no mischief; on the contrary, we are nearer to our resources than ever we were, and they leave the whole of the north of Spain open to the operations of the guerrillas.

But if the army now in Portugal is to be assisted by other corps, operating north of the Douro and south of the Tagus, before I can have secured the supplies of provisions I require, I must then seek to dislodge them by more determined means than I have tried hitherto. These means, God knows, may fail; or I may be prevented from trying them by the weather, or by other circumstances over which I can have no control. In all these cases it would be terrible not to have transports at hand, and I cannot advise they should be sent away.

It is certainly astonishing that the enemy have been able to remain in this country so long; and it is an extraordinary instance of what a French army can do. It is positively a fact that they brought no provisions with them, and they have not received even a letter since they entered Portugal. With all our money, and having in our favour the good inclinations of the country, I assure you that I could not maintain one division in the district in which they have maintained not less than 60,000 men and 20,000 animals for more than 2 months. This time last year I was obliged to move the British cavalry only from the district which they now occupy with their whole army, because it could not be subsisted. But they take everything, and leave the unfortunate inhabitants to starve.

THE REGENCY (1811).

=Source.=--_Diary of Lord Colchester_, 1861. Vol. ii., p. 316.

[_Feb._] _5th_.--Perceval showed me the following letter which he had just received from the Prince of Wales:

CARLTON HOUSE, _Feb. 4th, 1811_.

The Prince of Wales[12] considers the moment to be arrived which calls for his decision with respect to the persons to be employed by him in the administration of the executive government of the country, according to the powers vested in him by the Bill passed by the two Houses of Parliament, and now on the point of receiving the sanction of the Great Seal.

The Prince feels it incumbent upon him at this precise juncture to communicate to Mr. Perceval his intention not to remove from their situations those whom he finds there as His Majesty’s official servants. At the same time the Prince owes it to the truth and sincerity of character, which, he trusts, will appear in every action of his life, in whatever situation he may be placed, explicitly to declare that the irresistible impulse of filial duty and affection to his beloved and afflicted father, leads him to dread that any act of the Regent might, in the smallest degree, have the effect of interfering with the progress of his sovereign’s recovery.

This consideration alone dictates the decision now communicated to Mr. Perceval.

Having thus performed an act of indispensable duty, from a just sense of what is due to his own consistency and honour, the Prince has only to add that, among the many blessings to be derived from His Majesty’s restoration to health, and to the personal exercise of his royal functions, it will not, in the Prince’s estimation, be the least, that that most fortunate event will at once rescue him from a situation of unexampled embarrassment, and put an end to a state of affairs, ill calculated, he fears, to sustain the interests of the United Kingdom in this awful and perilous crisis; and most difficult to be reconciled to the general principles of the British Constitution.

MR. PERCEVAL’S ANSWER.

DOWNING STREET, _Feb. 5th, 1811_.

Mr. Perceval presents his humble duty to Your Royal Highness, and has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Royal Highness’s letter of last night, which reached him this morning.

Mr. Perceval feels it his duty to express his humble thanks to Your Royal Highness for the frankness with which Your Royal Highness has condescended explicitly to communicate the motives which have induced Your Royal Highness to honour his colleagues and him with your commands for the continuance of their services in the stations entrusted to them by the King. And Mr. Perceval begs leave to assure Your Royal Highness that in the expression of Your Royal Highness’s sentiments of filial and loyal attachment to the King, and of anxiety for the restoration of His Majesty’s health, Mr. Perceval can see nothing but additional motives for their most anxious exertions to give satisfaction to Your Royal Highness, in the only manner in which it can be given, by endeavouring to promote Your Royal Highness’s views for the security and happiness of the country.

Mr. Perceval has never failed to regret the impression of Your Royal Highness with regard to the provisions of the Regency Bill which His Majesty’s servants felt it to be their duty to recommend to Parliament. But he ventures to submit to Your Royal Highness that, whatever difficulties the present awful crisis of the country and the world may create in the administration of the executive government, Your Royal Highness will not find them in any degree increased by the temporary suspension of the exercise of those branches of the Royal prerogative which has been introduced by Parliament, in conformity to what was intended on a former similar occasion. And that whatever Ministers Your Royal Highness might think proper to employ, would find in that full support and countenance which, as long as they were honoured with Your Royal Highness’s commands, they would feel confident that they would continue to enjoy, ample and sufficient means to enable Your Royal Highness effectually to maintain the great and important interests of the United Kingdom.

And Mr. Perceval humbly trusts that, whatever doubts Your Royal Highness may entertain with respect to the constitutional propriety of the measures which have been adopted, Your Royal Highness will feel assured that they could not have been recommended by His Majesty’s servants, nor sanctioned by Parliament, but upon the sincere, though possibly erroneous conviction, that they in no degree trenched upon the true principles and spirit of the Constitution.

Mr. Perceval feels it his duty to add that he holds himself in readiness at any moment to wait upon Your Royal Highness, and to receive any commands with which Your Royal Highness may be graciously pleased to honour him.

FÊTE AT CARLTON HOUSE (1811).

=Source.=--_Diary of Lord Colchester_, 1861. Vol. ii., p. 336.

[_June_] _19th_.--Went to the fête at Carlton House. By previous inquiry I managed both going and coming without the smallest difficulty; I drove up Warwick Street to within a few paces of the small gate at which the chairs come _out_, and by walking that length I was in the house in a few moments. I went in at ten minutes past nine, and came away by the same road at about twenty minutes past four in the morning.

At the top of the hall steps I found Colonel Palmer and other aides-de-camp, waiting to receive the company. They took my ticket, and Lord Moira, who was close by, told me in which way I could best see the apartments before the company filled them; and he would have gone with me, but was in waiting at the head of the first steps to receive the royal family of France.

The great rooms lie all on the right side of the building; the smaller apartments on the left; and in them the Prince waited to receive the King of France, etc.

About ten they arrived; and the Prince, after seating the King of France in one of the small rooms, hung with _fleur de lys_ furniture; and paying his compliments to him _as King_, released his French Majesty from all further ceremony, and conducted him as a private person with the rest of the French court, through the different apartments. Having done this once he left them to themselves, and for the rest of the evening walked about alone, in every direction, and into every room.

He passed me several times; and I think once made a slight acknowledgment of me by look. At other periods during the evening I had long and marked conversations with the Duke of York and Duke of Cumberland; also with the Duke of Clarence and Duke of Gloucester.

The Duchess of York and Princess Sophia of Gloucester also recognized and talked to me.

Lord Yarmouth, upon finding that I had no ticket for supping at the Regent’s table, gave me one, as a person who ought to be of that party (viz. one of that 200), from which, however, many of the highest rank were excluded.

At a quarter to two the card marked that we were to assemble in the gilt room; and so did 500 other persons who had nothing to do with the Regent’s party. This was the only thing ill managed, for with this enormous crowd, and waiting there one hour before the doors were opened to go down to supper, everybody was heartily tired; and the King of France, who (as Lord St. Helens says all kings do) must have been heartily tired of _swinging from one foot to the other_.

At length the doors opened, four aides-de-camp stood inside, and as soon as the Prince had handed down the Duchess d’Angoulême, and the King of France handed the Duchess of York, Monsieur with Princess Sophia of Gloucester, &c., all other persons were stopped at the door who did not present their tickets.

Luckily for me, during the hour of waiting, I found myself close to Lord Chichester; and upon communication we found ourselves ticketed, and without any lady attached to either, so we agreed to make common cause. Lady Chichester not being in a state of bustle, had by the Prince’s gracious permission, seen all the preparations in the morning.

Upon descending into the conservatory, Perceval, Lord Chichester, and myself, after some difficulty of finding places, separated, and it ended in my going with Lord Chichester to the vacant end of the Prince’s long table, which could not be less than 200 feet long. My children would have been amused with the river of water and the little gudgeons swimming about in the whole length of this table; and all the _grown_ children were equally delighted.

Tierney said to me in the course of the evening that he had previously seen and admired the whole spectacle, except that Sadler’s Wells business of the rivulet and the swimming fishes.

Nevertheless it was oriental and fanciful, towards the Prince’s end particularly; for in that part the table widened, and the water also, and fell by a succession of cascades into a circular lake surrounded with architectural decorations, and small vases, burning perfumes, which stood under the arches of the colonnade round the lake.

Behind the Prince’s end of the table there was a magnificent sideboard of gilt plate three stories high.

A band in the garden, not seen by the company, played the whole time.

After the supper was well ended, and before the company rose to go upstairs, there was a grand crowd from the supper room beyond the brass railing, of fine ladies and gentlemen, who came to lean against and look over the railing at our superior lot, and to endeavour at descrying the gudgeons in our river. “There, I see them;” “Look, look;” “Don’t you?” &c., by all the Misses and company, old and young, not to mention Lady Mansfield, Lady Buckingham’s niece, old Mr. Hastings, and many other souls old and young, whose eager and ridiculous curiosity was very entertaining.

At length the royals all rose and went upstairs; Lord Chichester had undertaken to pilot me all round the rest of the supper apartments; Lady Chatham and a young lady of her family were tacked on to us, and so we proceeded.

A few minutes so completely filled the conservatory in which the Prince’s table was placed, that before we got fairly round, the crowd and pressing was beyond anything I ever saw or felt; until, not without an intolerable cram and jam, we made our way with one tide which bore down another tide, and thus we saw the other six rooms all in continuation of the same line as the conservatory. The furthest room was seven or eight steps higher than the rest, and commanded a long but indistinct view of tables and tables not less than 500 feet in distance.

Besides these rooms there was supper under tents in the gardens. Certainly, the supply, waiting, and arrangements seemed to be admirable. No delays in arrivals, no difficulties, no accidents.

WEAVING MACHINES (1812).

=Source.=--Byron’s _Works_, 1898. Letters and Journals. Vol. ii., p. 424.

_Debate on the Framework Bill, in the House of Lords, February 27, 1812._

The order of the day for the second reading of this Bill being read,

Lord Byron rose, and (for the first time) addressed their Lordships as follows:--

My Lords,--The subject now submitted to your Lordships for the
first time, though new to the House, is by no means new to the
country. I believe it had occupied the serious thoughts of all
descriptions of persons, long before its introduction to the notice
of that legislature, whose interference alone could be of real
service. As a person in some degree connected with the suffering
county, though a stranger not only to this House in general, but to
almost every individual whose attention I presume to solicit, I
must claim some portion of your Lordships’ indulgence, whilst I
offer a few observations on a question in which I confess myself
deeply interested.

To enter into any detail of the riots would be superfluous: the
House is already aware that every outrage short of actual bloodshed
has been perpetrated, and that the proprietors of the frames
obnoxious to the rioters, and all persons supposed to be connected
with them, have been liable to insult and violence. During the
short time I recently passed in Nottinghamshire, not twelve hours
elapsed without some fresh act of violence; and on the day I left
the county I was informed that forty frames had been broken the
preceding evening, as usual, without resistance and without
detection.

Such was then the state of that county, and such I have reason to
believe it to be at this moment. But whilst these outrages must be
admitted to exist to an alarming extent, it cannot be denied that
they have arisen from circumstances of the most unparalleled
distress: the perseverance of these miserable men in their
proceedings tends to prove that nothing but absolute want could
have driven a large, and once honest and industrious, body of the
people, into the commission of excesses, so hazardous to
themselves, their families, and the community. At the time to which
I allude, the town and county were burdened with large detachments
of the military; the police were in motion, the magistrates
assembled; yet all the movements, civil and military, had led
to--nothing. Not a single instance had occurred of the apprehension
of any real delinquent actually taken in the fact, against whom
there existed legal evidence sufficient for conviction. But the
police, however useless, were by no means idle: several notorious
delinquents had been detected,--men, liable to conviction, on the
clearest evidence, of the capital crime of poverty; men, who had
been nefariously guilty of lawfully begetting several children,
whom, thanks to the times! they are unable to maintain.
Considerable injury has been done to the proprietors of the
improved frames. These machines were to them an advantage, inasmuch
as they superseded the necessity of employing a number of workmen,
who were left in consequence to starve. By the adoption of one
species of frame in particular, one man performed the work of many,
and the superfluous labourers were thrown out of employment. Yet it
is to be observed, that the work thus executed was inferior in
quality; not marketable at home, and merely hurried over with a
view of exportation. It was called, in the cant of the trade, by
the name of “Spider-work.” The rejected workmen, in the blindness
of their ignorance, instead of rejoicing at these improvements in
arts so beneficial to mankind, conceived themselves to be
sacrificed to improvements in mechanism. In the foolishness of
their hearts they imagined that the maintenance and well-doing of
the industrious poor were objects of greater consequence than the
enrichment of a few individuals by any improvement, in the
implements of trade, which threw the workmen out of employment, and
rendered the labourer unworthy of his hire. And it must be
confessed that although the adoption of the enlarged machinery in
that state of our commerce which the country once boasted might
have been beneficial to the master without being detrimental to the
servant; yet, in the present situation of our manufactures, rotting
in warehouses, without a prospect of exportation, with the demand
for work and workmen equally diminished, frames of this description
tend materially to aggravate the distress and discontent of the
disappointed sufferers. But the real cause of these distresses and
consequent disturbances lies deeper. When we are told that these
men are leagued together not only for the destruction of their own
comfort, but of their very means of subsistence, can we forget that
it is the bitter policy, the destructive warfare of the last
eighteen years, which has destroyed their comfort, your comfort,
all men’s comfort? that policy, which, originating with “great
statesmen now no more,” has survived the dead to become a curse on
the living, unto the third and fourth generation! These men never
destroyed their looms till they were become useless, worse than
useless; till they were become actual impediments to their
exertions in obtaining their daily bread. Can you, then, wonder
that in times like these, when bankruptcy, convicted fraud, and
imputed felony are found in a station not far beneath that of your
Lordships, the lowest, though once most useful portion of the
people, should forget their duty in their distresses, and become
only less guilty than one of their representatives? But while the
exalted offender can find means to baffle the law, new capital
punishments must be devised, new snares of death must be spread for
the wretched mechanic, who is famished into guilt. These men were
willing to dig, but the spade was in other hands: they were not
ashamed to beg, but there was none to relieve them: their own means
of subsistence were cut off, all other employments preoccupied; and
their excesses, however to be deplored and condemned, can hardly be
subject of surprise.

BADAJOZ (1812).

=Source.=--_Selections from the Wellington Despatches._ Gurwood. P. 581.

_To the Earl of Liverpool._

BADAJOZ, _7th April, 1812_.

My dispatch of the 3rd instant will have apprised your Lordship of the state of the operations against Badajoz to that date; which were brought to a close on the night of the 6th, by the capture of the place by storm.

The fire continued during the 4th and 5th against the face of the bastion of La Trinidad, and the flank of the bastion of Sta Maria; and on the 4th, in the morning, we opened another battery of 6 guns in the second parallel against the shoulder of the ravelin of San Roque, and the wall in its gorge.

Practicable breaches were effected in the bastions above mentioned on the evening of the 5th; but as I had observed that the enemy had entrenched the bastion of La Trinidad, and the most formidable preparations were making for the defence, as well of the breach in that bastion as of that in the bastion of Sta Maria, I determined to delay the attack for another day, and to turn all the guns in the batteries in the second parallel on the curtain of La Trinidad; in hopes that by effecting a third breach, the troops would be enabled to turn the enemy’s works for the defence of the other two; the attack of which would besides be connected by the troops destined to attack the breach in the curtain. This breach was effected in the evening of the 6th, and the fire of the face of the bastion of Sta Maria and of the flank of the bastion of La Trinidad being overcome, I determined to attack the place that night.

I had kept in reserve in the neighbourhood of this camp, the 5th division under Lieut.-General Leith, which had left Castille only in the middle of March, and had but lately arrived in this part of the country; and I brought them up on that evening. The plan for the attack was that Lieut.-General Picton should attack the castle of Badajoz by escalade with the 3rd division; and a detachment from the guard in the trenches furnished that evening by the 4th division, under Major Wilson of the 48th regt., should attack the ravelin of San Roque upon his left, while the 4th division under Major-General the Hon. C. Colville, and the Light division under Lieut.-Colonel Barnard, should attack the breaches in the bastions of La Trinidad and Sta Maria, and in the curtain by which they are connected. The 5th division were to occupy the ground which the 4th and Light divisions had occupied during the siege; and Lieut.-General Leith was to make a false attack upon the outwork called the Pardaleras; and another on the works of the fort towards the Guadiana, with the left brigade of the division under Major-General Walker, which he was to turn into a real attack, if circumstances should prove favourable; and Brig.-General Power, who invested the place with his Portuguese brigade on the right of the Guadiana, was directed to make false attacks on the _tête-de-pont_, the Fort San Christoval, and the new redoubt called Mon Cœur.

The attack was accordingly made at 10 at night; Lieut.-General Picton preceding by a few minutes the attack by the remainder of the troops. Major-General Kempt led this attack, which went out from the right of the first parallel. He was unfortunately wounded in crossing the river Rivillas below the inundation; but notwithstanding this circumstance, and the obstinate resistance of the enemy, the castle was carried by escalade, and the 3rd division established in it at about half-past 11. While this was going on, Major Wilson of the 48th carried the ravelin of San Roque by the gorge, with a detachment of 200 men of the guard in the trenches; and with the assistance of Major Squire, of the engineers, established himself within that work.

The 4th and Light divisions moved to the attack from the camp along the left of the river Rivillas, and of the inundation. They were not perceived by the enemy, till they reached the covered-way; and the advanced guards of the 2 divisions descended without difficulty into the ditch, protected by the fire of the parties stationed on the glacis for that purpose; and they advanced to the assault of the breaches led by their gallant officers, with the utmost intrepidity. But such was the nature of the obstacles prepared by the enemy at the top and behind the breaches, and so determined their resistance, that our troops could not establish themselves within the place. Many brave officers and soldiers were killed or wounded by explosions at the top of the breaches; others who succeeded to them were obliged to give way, having found it impossible to penetrate the obstacles which the enemy had prepared to impede their progress. These attempts were repeated till after 12 at night; when, finding that success was not to be attained, and that Lieut.-General Picton was established in the castle, I ordered that the 4th and Light divisions might retire to the ground on which they had been first assembled for the attack.

In the mean time, Lieut.-General Leith had pushed forward Major-General Walker’s brigade on the left, supported by the 38th regt. under Lieut.-Colonel Nugent, and the 15th Portuguese regt. under Colonel Do Rego, and he had made a false attack upon the Pardaleras with the 8th caçadores under Major Hill. Major-General Walker forced the barrier on the road of Olivença, and entered the covered way on the left of the bastion of San Vicente, close to the Guadiana. He there descended into the ditch, and escaladed the face of the bastion of San Vicente. Lieutenant-General Leith supported this attack by the 38th regt. and 15th Portuguese regt.; and our troops being thus established in the castle, which commands all the works of the town, and in the town; and the 4th and Light divisions being formed again for the attack of the breaches, all resistance ceased; and at daylight in the morning, the Governor, General Philippon, who had retired to Fort San Christoval, surrendered, together with General Vieland, and all the Staff, and the whole garrison. I have not got accurate returns of the strength of the garrison, or of the number of prisoners. But General Philippon has informed me that it consisted of 5,000 men at the commencement of the siege, of which 1,200 were killed or wounded during the operations; besides those lost in the assault of the place. There were 5 French battalions, besides 2 of the regiment of Hesse Darmstadt, and the artillery, engineers, &c.; and I understand there are 4,000 prisoners. It is impossible that any expressions of mine can convey to your Lordship the sense which I entertain of the gallantry of the officers and troops upon this occasion. The list of killed and wounded will show that the General officers, the Staff attached to them, the commanding and other officers of the regiments, put themselves at the heads of the attacks which they severally directed, and set the example of gallantry which was so well followed by their men.

Marshal Sir W. Beresford assisted me in conducting the details of this siege; and I am much indebted to him for the cordial assistance which I received from him, as well during the progress, as in the last operation which brought it to a termination. The duties in the trenches were conducted successively by Major-General the Hon. C. Colville, Major-General Bowes, and Major-General Kempt, under the superintendence of Lieut.-General Picton. I have had occasion to mention all these officers during the course of the operations; and they all distinguished themselves, and were all wounded in the assault. I am particularly obliged to Lieut.-General Picton for the manner in which he arranged the attack of the castle; for that in which he supported the attack, and established his troops in that important post.

Lieut.-General Leith’s arrangements for the false attack upon the Pardaleras, and that under Major-General Walker, were likewise most judicious; and he availed himself of the circumstances of the moment, to push forward and support the attack under Major-General Walker, in a manner highly creditable to him. The gallantry and conduct of Major-General Walker, who was also wounded, and that of the officers and troops under his command, were conspicuous.

The arrangements made by Major-General the Hon. C. Colville for the attack by the 4th division were very judicious; and he led them to the attack in the most gallant manner. In consequence of the absence, on account of sickness, of Major-General Vandeleur, and of Colonel Beckwith, Lieut.-Colonel Barnard commanded the Light division in the assault, and distinguished himself not less by the manner in which he made the arrangements for that operation, than by his personal gallantry in its execution.

I have also to mention Brig.-General Harvey of the Portuguese service, commanding a brigade in the 4th division, and Brig.-General Champelmond, commanding the Portuguese brigade in the 3rd division, as highly distinguished. Brig.-General Harvey was wounded in the storm.

MURDER OF PERCEVAL (1812).

=Source.=--_Diary of Lord Colchester_, 1861. Vol. ii., p. 379.

[_May_] _11th_.--The House of Commons being in Committee hearing evidence on the Orders in Council, at a few minutes after five, I was called down from my room into the House by a message that

Mr. Perceval was shot in the lobby.

As soon as I had taken the chair, the assassin, a bankrupt Liverpool merchant, John Bellingham, was forcibly brought to the bar. I detained him till a Magistrate was brought, who came almost instantly; and then the assassin was conducted to the prison room belonging to the Serjeant-at-Arms, where he was examined before Mr. White, a Westminster Justice; and Mr. Alderman Combe and Mr. Taylor, two Members who were also Justices, and thereupon committed to Newgate for murder.

Mr. Perceval’s body (for he fell lifeless after he had staggered a few paces into the lobby) was brought into my house, and remained in the first picture room till the family removed it (for privacy) at one o’clock in the morning to Downing Street.

_12th._--I wrote to invite Ponsonby, Whitbread, Lord Castlereagh, Ryder, Canning, Master of the Rolls, Wilberforce, &c. &c., to meet here at three o’clock, and consult upon the proper course of recommending Perceval’s family to the protection of the Crown. There came also Elliott, Adair, Wellesley Pole, &c. &c.: and Lord Castlereagh stated the Regent’s intention to send a message on the subject; in answer to which Ponsonby, Whitbread, Canning, and Bankes fully and at length declared their unqualified assent. Finding Tierney not present, I wrote to him before I went into the House to excuse the omission, on the score of believing that through Ponsonby or Whitbread I should have seen him; and that the scenes and thoughts which for the preceding eighteen hours had surrounded me and occupied me must be my apology for this and, I feared, many other omissions.

I found afterwards that he had taken the omission heinously ill; but on Wednesday when he came into the House he appeared to be quite appeased by my letter.

In the House of Commons, by common consent, no other business was done. Lord Castlereagh presented the Message, and moved the Address. In most faces there was an agony of tears; and neither Lord Castlereagh, Ponsonby, Whitbread, nor Canning could give a dry utterance to their sentiments.

The House resolved by common acclamation to present the Address “as a House,” and not by Privy Councillors.

All other business was put off for distant or nominal days.

_13th._--House of Commons. Unanimous votes in Committee upon the Regent’s Message, to grant 50,000_l._ among the children, and 2,000_l._ a year to Mrs. Perceval for her life. A debate and division by which a further resolution was carried for 2,000_l._ a year to Mr. Perceval’s eldest son; but great ill-will towards this third proposition, which was moved by Mr. Sumner, and at first resisted by Ministers.

SHERIDAN’S LAST UTTERANCES IN THE HOUSE (1812).

=Source.=--Moore’s _Life of Sheridan_, 1825. P. 677.

My objection to the present Ministry is, that they are avowedly arrayed and embodied against a principle,--that of concession to the Catholics of Ireland,--which I think, and must always think, essential to the safety of this empire. I will never give my vote to any administration that opposes the question of Catholic Emancipation. I will not consent to receive a furlough upon that particular question, even though a Ministry were carrying every other that I wished. In fine, I think the situation of Ireland a paramount consideration. If they were to be the last words I should ever utter in this House, I should say, “Be just to Ireland, as you value your own honour;--be just to Ireland, as you value your own peace.”

His very last words in Parliament, on his own motion relative to the Overtures of Peace from France, were as follows:

“Yet, after the general subjugation and ruin of Europe, should
there ever exist an independent historian to record the awful
events that produced this universal calamity, let that historian
have to say,--‘Great Britain fell, and with her fell all the best
securities for the charities of human life, for the power and
honour, the fame, the glory, and the liberties, not only of
herself, but of the whole civilized world.’”

SIR STAPLETON COTTON’S MILITARY SERVICES (1813).

=Source.=--_Diary of Lord Colchester_, 1861. Vol. ii., p. 440.

[_March_] _9th_.--Sir Stapleton Cotton,[13] having on the 5th announced to me his arrival in London, I delivered to him the thanks of the House, in the following speech:

Lieutenant-General Sir Stapleton Cotton, in this interval between the active seasons of war, your proper sphere of duty is within these walls; and we hail with pride and pleasure your return among us, bringing with you fresh marks of royal[14] favour, the just reward of fresh services and triumphs.

Descended from a long line of ancestors, whose names are recorded in the earliest ages of our history, and characterized with those qualities of prudence, generosity, and valour, which have laid the foundations of English greatness, your race has exhibited many a model of that splendid worth which dignifies the gentlemen of England; always prompt to discharge the laborious duties of civil life, and never slow to take up arms at the call of their country. Such, in an eminent degree, was that venerated person from whom you have immediately derived your own hereditary honours, endeared by his active virtues to the public men of his own time, not unknown to some who still sit among us, and ever remembered by myself with the sincerest sentiments of respect and affection.

But, Sir, when the path of early life lay open to your choice, the then warlike state of the world called forth a congenial spirit, and your military ardour led you to encounter the toils and dangers of war in distant climes. Trained in the same camps, and animated by the same love of glory as the great captain who now commands our armies, and fills the world with his renown, you have bravely followed his brilliant career, and shared in his unexampled triumphs. Renouncing the charms of ease, and the seat of your ancestors, you have gallantly gone forth to the tented fields of Portugal and Spain, and, having reaped the harvest of our thanks for your achievements in the battle of Talavera, you now stand before us crowned with the never-fading laurels of Salamanca; your squadrons upon that memorable day, overthrowing the enemy’s embattled ranks, laid open the road to victory; and the work which your gallantry had commenced, your triumphant perseverance completed.

These heroic exploits have again entitled you to the public gratitude; and I do now, in the name and by the command of the Commons of Great Britain and Ireland, in Parliament assembled, deliver to you their unanimous thanks for your distinguished exertions in the battle of Salamanca, on the 22nd of July last, which terminated in a glorious and decisive victory over the enemy’s army.[15]

VITTORIA (1813).

=Source.=--_Selections from the Wellington Despatches._ Gurwood. P. 700.

_To Earl Bathurst._

SALVATIERRA, _22nd June, 1813_.

The enemy, commanded by King Joseph, having Marshal Jourdan as the Major-General of the army, took up a position, on the night of the 19th inst., in front of Vitoria; the left of which rested upon the heights which end at La Puebla de Arganzon, and extended from thence across the valley of the Zadorra, in front of the village of Ariñez. They occupied with the right of the centre a height which commanded the valley to the Zadorra. The right of their army was stationed near Vitoria, and was destined to defend the passages of the river Zadorra, in the neighbourhood of that city. They had a reserve in rear of their left, at the village of Gomecha. The nature of the country through which the army had passed since it had reached the Ebro had necessarily extended our columns, and we halted on the 20th, in order to close them up, and moved the left to Murguia, where it was most likely it would be required. I reconnoitred the enemy’s position on that day, with a view to the attack to be made on the following morning, if they should still remain in it. We accordingly attacked the enemy yesterday, and I am happy to inform your Lordship, that the Allied army under my command gained a complete victory, having driven them from all their positions; having taken from them 151 pieces of cannon, waggons of ammunition, all their baggage, provisions, cattle, treasure, &c., and a considerable number of prisoners.

The operations of the day commenced by Lieut.-General Sir R. Hill obtaining possession of the heights of La Puebla, on which the enemy’s left rested, which heights they had not occupied in great strength. He detached for this service one brigade of the Spanish division under General Morillo; the other brigade being employed in keeping the communication between his main body on the high road from Miranda to Vitoria, and the troops detached to the heights. The enemy, however, soon discovered the importance of these heights, and reinforced their troops there to such an extent, that Lieut.-General Sir R. Hill was obliged to detach, first, the 71st regt. and the light infantry battalion of General Walker’s brigade, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel the Hon. H. Cadogan, and successively other troops to the same point; and the Allies not only gained, but maintained possession of these important heights throughout their operations, notwithstanding all the efforts of the enemy to retake them.