Chapter III: Part 3

On the morning of July 1st the enemy issued in dense masses from the jungle to the right and front of the Golden Dagon Pagoda. Detaching to their left a column, which succeeded in setting fire to part of the village of Puzendown, their main body came boldly up to within half a mile of Rangoon, and commenced a spirited attack upon part of our line. But two field-pieces, served with grape and shrapnel, presently checked their advance, and then a brilliant charge by the 43rd Madras Native Infantry put them all to flight. In a very few minutes not a man could be seen of the Burmese host, except the killed and wounded; nor could anything be heard of them except a wild screaming of baffled fury coming from the depths of the forest.

Their defeated commander was brought to book by the Golden Foot, and degraded. Then a still higher minister of state, named Soomba Wongee, who had arrived with reinforcements, took the command, and commenced stockading his army in the most difficult and intricate part of the forest, at Kummeroot, about five miles from the Great Pagoda, intending, chiefly under cover of night, to carry on such a system of desultory warfare as would harass, and ultimately destroy, our sickly, worn-out soldiers. He also fortified a commanding point on the river about Kemmendine, in communication with his stockaded camp, hoping by this means not only to obstruct the navigation of the river, but also to construct and employ numerous fire-rafts. But this new commander-in-chief had scarcely finished his works when he was driven from them with a terrible slaughter.

It was on July 8th that Sir Archibald Campbell embarked with one column for the attack of the position upon the river, and Brigadier-General MacBean, with a land column, marched upon the forest stockades at Kummeroot. The works on the river were found to be so formidable that it was judged necessary to employ breaching vessels; accordingly a brig and three Company's cruisers, manned by seamen of his Majesty's and the Company's navy, under the superintendence of Captain Marryat, soon opened a heavy cannonade and silenced the enemy's guns. Our troops then pushed across the river in boats, entered the practicable breach which the firing of our seamen had made, and carried all those works with comparatively trifling loss. The Burmese suffered severely in killed, and many of them were drowned in trying to escape across the river.

The operations of the land column, under MacBean, were equally successful. It was unprovided with artillery; but the storming parties, who escaladed stockade after stockade, consisted entirely of British troops. Here, again, the slaughter was dreadful. Soomba Wongee, and several chiefs of high rank, with 800 men, were killed within the stockades; and the neighbouring jungles were filled with the unhappy creatures who were wounded, and left to die from want of food and care. Some of these poor Burmese were found by the English soldiers, and brought into our hospitals; but, unfortunately, none of them recovered. The monsoon rains were now at their height. The adjacent country was almost wholly under water. Nothing was to be obtained from it. Again, disease spread so rapidly among our troops that the outlook was desperate.

Meanwhile an Expeditionary Force, consisting of his Majesty's 89th Regiment and the 7th Madras Native Infantry, under the command of Colonel Miles, was detached from Rangoon, with a considerable naval force, to subdue the maritime possessions of his Burmese Majesty to the eastward, in the hope that their loss might induce him to sue for peace. The success of the expedition was complete: Tavoy surrendered. Mergui was taken by storm, and British protection was welcomed by the inhabitants of the entire coast of Tenasserim.

Some few weeks later Sir Archibald Campbell attempted to release such of the inhabitants of Rangoon as were desirous of returning to their houses; and, by means of the sudden, unexpected, and, to the natives, inexplicable movement of our steamboats, a few families who had been driven to the villages at the heads of the numerous creeks which branch off from the Rangoon river were released from their guard, and joyfully took the opportunity of returning to their city. It was to the report of these people of the kind treatment they met with that our army was afterwards indebted for the return of the great body of the men whose services and exertions contributed to the final success of the war.

Having, so far, failed in all his undertakings, the Lord of the White Elephant now sent his two brothers, the Prince of Tonghoo and the Prince of Sarrawaddy, with a whole host of astrologers and a corps of "Invulnerables," to join the army and to direct the future operations of the war. The astrologers were to fix the lucky moment for attacking; the "Invulnerables" had some points of resemblance to the Turkish Delhis; they were the desperadoes, or madmen, of the army, and their madness was kept up by enormous doses of opium. The corps consisted of several thousand men, divided into classes; the most select band of all being called the "King's Own Invulnerables."

The Prince of Tonghoo established his headquarters at Pegu, and the Prince of Sarrawaddy took post at Donoopew, upon the great river, about sixty miles from Rangoon. In the beginning of August the Prince of Sarrawaddy sent down a force to occupy a strong post at the mouth of the Pegu River, a few miles below Rangoon, giving his people strict orders to block up the channel of the river in our rear, so that not one of the "wild foreigners" or "captive strangers" might escape the punishment that was about to fall upon them. Brigadier Smelt was at once sent, with a small corps, to dislodge Sarrawaddy's force. Our land troops were brought to a standstill, when within musket-shot of the place, by a deep and impassable creek; but a party of sailors from his Majesty's ship _Larne_, under Captain Marryat, threw a bridge over the creek; and, as soon as the column of attack pushed forward, the enemy began to fly, leaving eight guns and a quantity of ammunition in their stockade. A strong pagoda, with a numerous garrison, and with cannons pointing down every approach, was next carried with equal facility. Other posts on the rivers and creeks were then attacked and taken. Such of the enemy as had had any experience of our way of fighting seldom stopped to fight in their stockades; but a new set of people from the interior made a good stand in a succession of stockades on one of the rivers, and cost us the loss of a good many brave men.

All this time the astrologers were busy casting the lucky moment. Finally they told the Prince of Sarrawaddy that the moment had come for a decisive action; and, on the night of August 30th, a body of the "King's Own Invulnerables" promised to attack and carry the Golden Dagon Pagoda, in order that the princes and the sages and pious men in their train might celebrate the usual annual festival in that sacred place--which was now crowded with English grenadiers. And, true so far to their promise, the "Invulnerables," at the hour of midnight, rushed in a compact body from the jungle under the pagoda armed with swords and muskets. A small picquet, thrown out in our front, retired in slow and steady order, skirmishing with the "Invulnerables" until they reached the flight of steps leading from the road up to the pagoda. The moon had gone down, and the night was so dark that the enemy could be distinguished only by a few glimmering lanterns in their front; but their noise and clamour and the volume of their threats and imprecations launched upon the impious strangers if they did not immediately evacuate the sacred temple proved their number to be very great.

"In a dense column," says the historian, "they rolled along the narrow pathway leading to the northern gate of the pagoda, wherein all seemed as silent as the grave. But hark! the muskets crash, the cannons roar along the ramparts of the British post, drowning the tumult of the advancing column; and see!--see by the flash of our guns, the column reels back, the 'Invulnerables' fall, mortally wounded, and the rest turn their backs on the holy place, and run with frantic speed for the covering of the jungle."

Our grape-shot and our musketry broke the spell--those "Invulnerables" ventured no more near any of our posts. But a far more terrible enemy came within the lines; the dysentery broke out among our troops, killing many of them, and reducing more to a most emaciated and feeble state. Scarcely three thousand duty soldiers were left to guard the lines. Floating hospitals were established at the mouth of the river; and bread was now furnished in sufficient quantities, but nothing except change of season or of climate could restore the sufferers to health. Mergui and Tavoy, portions of our conquest on the sea-coast, were represented by the medical officers who visited them as admirable convalescent stations; and thither a number of our soldiers were sent, and with the most beneficial result. Men who had for months continued in a most debilitated state at Rangoon, rapidly recovered on arriving at Mergui, and were soon restored to their duty in full health.

The Lord of the White Elephant now determined to call down from the mountains of Arracan his prime favourite, and to carry off the Governor-General in golden chains. Bandula obeyed the call, and led his reinforced army from the mountains of Arracan to the Irawaddi river. He had begun his march about the end of August, at a season of the year when none but Burmese could have kept the field for a week, much less have attempted to pass the unhealthy jungles and the pestilential marshes of the country. The distance, by the shortest route, was more than 200 miles; but Bandula, gathering fresh forces in the latter part of his long march, reached Donoopew before Sir Archibald Campbell knew that he had left Arracan. Happily, our troops, though woefully reduced in numbers, were now fast recovering their health and strength; and two fresh British regiments, some battalions of native infantry, a regiment of cavalry, and a troop of horse artillery arrived from Calcutta and Madras, together with some admirable trotting cattle of the true Mysore breed. Five hundred native boatmen came round from Chittagong, and were busily employed in preparing boats for river service.

The rains had now ceased at Rangoon; and Sir Archibald Campbell, strongly reinforced, was completing his preparations for the ascent of the Irawaddi, and for an attack upon Prome, when he learned that Bandula had reached Donoopew with 60,000 fighting men, a considerable train of artillery, and a body of Cassay horse, the best cavalry in this part of Asia. Bandula's musketeers were estimated at 35,000 men. Other numerous bodies were armed with gingals, which carried an iron ball of from six to twelve ounces, and were mounted on a light carriage easily dragged about by two men; and great numbers were attached to the guns which were transported on the backs of elephants. The rest of the host were armed with swords and spears, and scattered through the army were more of the "Invulnerables" who had not yet tasted the sour grape of English guns, and who were amply provided with charms, spells, opium, bhang, and betel-nuts. As Bandula proclaimed on all sides his intention of riding at the head of his invincible army, with horses and elephants and all manner of warlike stores, to capture and destroy the British at Rangoon, it was deemed proper to wait for him there with a view to a decisive battle.

The enemy came down to the neighbourhood of Rangoon in boats. Our posts, consisting of redoubts and fortified pagodas, were speedily constructed, connecting the great Golden Dagon Pagoda by two distinct lines with Rangoon and the river, and leaving a disposable force for moving to the support of any point that might require such support. The post at Kemmendine was also strongly occupied, and was supported on the river by his Majesty's sloop _Sophie_, Captain Ryves, a Company's cruiser, and a strong division of gunboats.

On November 30th Bandula's great army assembled in and behind the dense forest; and his line, extending from the river above Kemmendine in a semicircular direction towards Puzendown, might be distinguished by a curved line of smoke rising above the trees. During the ensuing night the low, continuous murmur and hum of voices proceeding from the enemy's encampment suddenly ceased, and were speedily succeeded by the distant but gradually approaching sounds of a multitude in slow and stealthy movement through the woods. Our troops soon became aware that the enemy's masses had approached to the very edge of the jungle, within musket-shot of the pagoda, apparently in readiness to rush from their cover to the assault at the break of day.

The day had scarcely dawned on December 1st when hostilities commenced with a heavy fire of musketry and cannon at Kemmendine, the reduction of that place being a preliminary to any general attack upon our line. The firing continued long and brisk, and from their commanding situation at the Great Pagoda, though nearly two miles distant from the scene of action, our men could distinctly hear the yells and shouts of the infuriated assailants, occasionally returned by the hearty cheer of the British seamen as they poured in their heavy broadsides upon the resolute and persevering masses. The thick forest which separated us from the river shut out all sight of what was going forward; and, when the firing ceased, we remained. There was a short period of anxiety, though little doubt as to the result of the long and spirited assault. At length, however, the thick canopy of smoke which lowered over the fierce and sanguinary conflict gradually dissolved, and there could be seen the masts of the vessels lying at their old station off the fort--a convincing proof that all had ended well on that side.

Meanwhile the enemy had been seen on the west side of the river, marching across the plains of Dalla towards Rangoon. They were formed in five or six different divisions, and moved with great regularity, led by numerous chiefs on horse-back--their gilt umbrellas glittering in the rays of the sun--with a sufficiently formidable and imposing effect. Opposite Rangoon the leading column of five or six Burmese divisions began entrenching and throwing up batteries, while their main body was stockading in the jungle. In the course of the day several heavy columns issued from the forest, and successively took up their ground along a woody ridge, gently sloping towards Rangoon. Here they commenced operations with their entrenching tools, and with such activity and good will that in the course of a couple of hours their whole line was covered; their flags and banners, which had been flying in profusion, all disappeared, and nothing was seen but a parapet of fresh-turned earth, gradually increasing in height. The moving masses, which had so very lately attracted anxious attention, had sunk into the ground; and, by anyone who had not witnessed the whole scene, the existence of these subterranean legions would not have been credited. The occasional movement of a chief with his gilt umbrella from place to place, superintending the progress of their labour, was the only thing that now attracted notice. By a distant observer the hills, covered with mounds of earth, would have been taken for anything rather than the approaches of an attacking army. Even to those who had watched the whole strange proceeding, it seemed the work of magic or enchantment. But, thus working like moles in the earth, the Burmese could no more see than they could be seen; and, in the afternoon, Major Sale, with his Majesty's 13th Regiment and a regiment of Madras Native Infantry, moving rapidly forward upon the busily employed and too confident enemy, fell upon them before they were well aware of the visit, and drove the whole line from their earthworks with considerable loss.

These Burmese trenches were found to be a succession of holes, capable of containing two men each, and excavated so as to afford shelter both from the weather and the fire of any enemy; even a shell lighting in the trench could at most kill but two men. As it was not the Burmese system to relieve their troops in making these approaches, each hole contained a sufficient supply of rice, water, and even fuel for its inmates; and under the excavated bank a bed of straw or brushwood was prepared, in which one man could sleep while his comrade watched. When one line of trench was completed, its occupiers, taking advantage of the night, would push forward to where the second line was to be opened, their places being immediately taken up by fresh troops from the rear, and so on, progressively. The Burmese understood this art of warfare, but our men--especially our Native Infantry--also understood that art, and the enemy's weaknesses as well.

Attacks were made on Kemmendine that day and were all repulsed by our troops or by the seamen of our little flotilla. But it was not until night that the Burmese made their last desperate effort to open their way down the river, and so get possession of the port of Rangoon. The soldiers had lain down to rest, when suddenly the heavens and the whole surrounding country became brilliantly illuminated. The enemy had launched their fire-rafts into the stream with the first of the ebb-tide, and had now applied the match to those huge masses of combustible materials, in the hope of driving the _Sophie_ and our other vessels from their stations off Kemmendine; and as these fire-rafts came down, it was seen by the light of their flames that they were followed by a vast fleet of war-boats, whose crew were ready to take advantage of the confusion which might ensue if any of our vessels should be set on fire. As the rafts floated rapidly down to Kemmendine with the ebbing tide, columns of attack moved once more by land against that well-defended post, with artillery, gingals, and musketry.

But the skill and intrepidity of British seamen proved more than a match for the numbers and devices of the Burmese; after gazing for a while at the red, blue, yellow and green flames of the mighty fireworks, our sailors leapt into their boats, pushed off to meet the flaming rafts, secured them with their grappling irons, and conducted them safely past our shipping or ran them ashore to finish their short but vivid life of fire and flame upon the river bank without injury to anyone. If these fire-rafts could have reached the harbour of Rangoon, which was now crowded with transports and vessels of all kinds, the effect might have been very tragic; but the British tars said that none should pass Kemmendine Point, and none did pass. Kemmendine, where the river makes a sudden turn, was the only point from which the rafts could have been launched with effect. Fully aware of this, Bandula ordered attack upon attack to be made, and for seven days no rest by night or by day was allowed to our troops or to our seamen there. But every effort of the enemy failed--even their land attack on Kemmendine.

On December 5th, when the stores of the Burmese left wing were brought forward from the jungle to their foremost entrenchment in front of Rangoon, and were fairly within our reach, Sir Archibald Campbell ordered a decisive attack to be made upon their army. Major Sale, with one column 800 strong, and a troop of British dragoons, who had only been landed the preceding day, was directed to fall upon their centre; and Major Walker, with 500 men, was sent to make a vigorous attack on their left wing. The operations of these two columns of troops were greatly facilitated by Captain Chads of the navy, who proceeded up the Creek to a point within gunshot of the rear of the enemy's line, with the man-of-war boats and a part of the flotilla, and began a heavy cannonade which distracted the attention of the Burmese and prevented their strengthening their front. Our two columns broke through the entrenchments, and completely routed both the centre and the left with vigorous bayonet charges; but Major Walker and a good many of his gallant comrades fell. The loss of the Burmese was appalling; they were driven from every part of their works into the jungle, leaving the ground behind them covered with dead and wounded, with all their guns, entrenching tools, gilt umbrellas, and a great number of small arms. On December 6th, Bandula tried to rally his defeated troops, and with some success. On the 7th the Burmese made their last and grand attack on the Great Pagoda, but they were beaten, driven back to their entrenchments by the British bayonet, and finally into the depths of the jungle.

Our troops at that post, worn out by seven days and nights of incessant fighting and watching, could not pursue the flying enemy, who left in the trenches a great number of dead--nearly all stout, tall, athletic fellows, who might almost have measured with English grenadiers, and who had evidently belonged to the flower of Bandula's army. During these seven busy and fiery days the Burmese, in addition to a prodigious loss of life, had lost every gun and their entire stores. The survivors fled towards Donoopew, but they were stopped in their flight by some great and terrible chiefs, who had been sent down with numerous reinforcements, and they rallied at Kokeen, about four miles beyond the Great Pagoda.

It is said that when Bandula counted his forces he found them reduced from more than 60,000 fighting men to less than 25,000. Nevertheless, this favourite of the Lord of the White Elephant was allowed to retain the chief command. His first move was to entrench and stockade himself at Kokeen, after which he employed incendiaries to burn the invaders out of Rangoon, and destroy all their stores and powder magazines. On the night of December 12th the cry of fire resounded through the town of Rangoon, and nearly the whole of that flimsy, bamboo-built place seemed to be immediately in a blaze. The incendiaries had placed their matches in various parts of the town, and had set fire to them all the same moment. One half of the town was burned; but the flames were prevented from reaching our depot of stores and ammunition. This attempt, which was very nearly successful, brought down a rapid attack upon Bandula's new position, and defeat and ruin upon himself. On December 15th--three days after the midnight fire at Rangoon--1,500 British troops and sepoys, unaided by artillery, under the command of Brigadier-General Willoughby Cotton, drove Bandula and his mighty host from all their entrenchments and stockades at Kokeen, and strewed the position with his dead in thousands.

BHURTPORE

(1826)

If any fortress in India could have been with good reason called impregnable, that fortress was Bhurtpore. In the early years of the nineteenth century the chiefs and rajahs of Hindustan were wont to say, "Yes, you may bully us, but go and take Bhurtpore!" Their belief in its impregnability was well founded, for in 1805 Lord Lake had attacked it vigorously, but had failed to reduce its well-fortified works manned by staunch and numerous defenders. After suffering terrible losses he was compelled to withdraw, leaving this Jat fortress with a still stronger claim to impregnability than it had ever possessed before.

When it was once decided by the British Government that Bhurtpore must fall, the question immediately arose, where was the man to take it? The East India Company Directors interviewed the Duke of Wellington, asking him to find a man capable of taking this fortress. The Duke gave them an answer. He said, "You can't do better than have Lord Combermere. He's the man to take Bhurtpore." "But," replied the directors with great surprise, "we thought that your Grace had not a very high opinion of Lord Combermere, and did not consider him a man of genius." "I don't care a tuppenny damn" (that was the Iron Duke's favourite par of exchange in hot words) "about his genius. _I tell you he is the man to take Bhurtpore!_" And the Duke was right.

There were 25,000 men in the Bhurtpore garrison, and they represented the most warlike races of India. When Lord Combermere set out with Bhurtpore as his objective, his army consisted of 30,000 men of very mixed quality. On reaching the fortress he began with heavy bombardment. Then for a week he carried forward his siege works, covered by Gurkha sharpshooters, whose eyes were so keen and whose aim so sure that no man of the enemy could show his head above the ramparts with impunity.

Point after point was won until, at last, a small breach was made by the artillery; and into this breach Lord Combermere flung a force in which were included 600 dismounted men from the various cavalry regiments--eighty from the 11th Light Dragoons, eighty from the 16th Lancers, 200 from Skinner's Horse, and forty from each regiment of native cavalry.

Skinner's Horse is one of the earliest formed of the many distinguished Native Irregular Cavalry Corps which have fought for Britain. They had been under Colonel Skinner for many years, and had served him in many wars; thus they had come to respect and love him as tribesmen do their chief. There is a touching story of their valour and faithfulness during the storming of Bhurtpore. A party was told off according to rota duty, for the whole regiment had volunteered for the dangerous service. Skinner placed at their head Shadull Khan, one of his oldest, most faithful, and trustworthy native officers. Then he spoke to them as follows: "This is the first time you are going into danger when I cannot accompany you; but such is my affection for you all that I cannot allow you to part from me without carrying with you something dear to me." Then, taking his son by the hand--the lad had only lately entered the corps--he continued: "See, here is my son. Take him and gain for him such honour as you have won for his father."

This shows clearly what Colonel Skinner thought of Skinner's Horse, and also what he knew they thought of him. Old Shadull Khan stepped forward, and, taking young Skinner by the arm, cried out, "Farewell, our commander! Trust in God, who never deserts those faithful servants who do their duty and who, please God, will now do their utmost to maintain the honour of the corps."

Although the assault on the breach had been planned, it was postponed for that day, as on further consideration Lord Combermere deemed it was not practicable. It took place later, after a great explosion of mines which the engineers had placed beneath the ramparts. On entering the widened breach our troops encountered fierce opposition. There was a hand-to-hand fight of the most desperate description, and it was not until after some hours of fierce fighting that the enemy surrendered.

The Iron Duke's words were justified; Lord Combermere had taken Bhurtpore, and that successful assault on a fortress long regarded as impregnable was one which yields in brilliancy and courage to few in the British annals of war. Its beneficial effect on British rule and influence in India was as striking as its place among battles is dramatic.

THE WAR IN SCINDE

(Meeanee, 1843)

"Let there be sixty or a hundred thousand," said Sir Charles Napier, "I will fight."

This was when he moved away from the banks of the Indus and found that an overwhelming force of the enemy was massing in his rear, while another large force held Meeanee in his front. In the spirit of his words he pushed forward with 2,600 of all arms, including officers fit for duty in the field, and the result was the important battle of Meeanee.

The positions of the Baluchis were formidable. In the first place they had a natural ravine in their front. Again, they had 5,000 cavalry and more than 30,000 infantry, with fifteen guns. Their wings rested on dense woods which extended on each side of the plain in front for a considerable distance, so as to flank the British lines on both sides when it should advance. But, in no mood to be intimidated by these natural advantages of the enemy, Sir Charles Napier and his little force fell impetuously on him by the front. The fighting which ensued was terrific. Our men gradually forced their way across the level plain, swept as it was by the Baluchi cannon and matchlocks, and finally crossed the ravine and began the ascent of the high, sloping bank beyond.

With matchlocks laid ready in rest along the summit, the Baluchis waited until the assailants were within twenty yards before they discharged a volley. But the active British offered an uncertain mark, and this, combined with the steepness of the declivity, accounted for the inconsiderable result of their fire.

Now the 22nd (the Cheshire Regiment) were on the top of the bank, thinking to bear down all before them, but "they staggered back in amazement at the forest of swords waving in their front. Thick as standing corn, and gorgeous as a field of flowers, stood the Baluchis in their many-coloured garments and turbans; they filled the broad, deep bed of the ravine, they clustered on both banks, and covered the plain beyond. Guarding their heads with their large dark shields, they shook their sharp swords, beaming in the sun, their shouts rolling like a peal of thunder, as with frantic gestures they dashed forward with demoniac strength and ferocity full against the front of the 22nd. But with shouts as loud, and shrieks as wild and fierce as theirs, and hearts as big, and arms as strong, the Irish soldiers met them with the queen of weapons--the musket--and sent their foremost masses rolling back in blood."

The Baluchis closed their dense masses, and again the shouts, the rolling fire of musketry, and the dreadful rush of their swordsmen were heard and seen along the whole line; and such a fight ensued as has seldom been recorded in the annals of war. These wild warriors continually advanced, sword and shield in hand, striving in all the fierceness of their valour to break into the opposing ranks; no fire of small-arms, no thrust of bayonets, no sweeping discharges of grape from the guns, which were planted in one fearful mass on the right, could drive the gallant soldiers back; they gave their breasts to be shot at, they leaped upon the guns by twenties at a time; their dead went down the slope by hundreds, but the gaps in their masses were continually filled up from the rear; the survivors of the front rank still pressed forward with unabated fury, and the bayonet and the sword clashed in full and frequent conflict.

Our loss in officers was heavy, and our native troops, deprived of leaders though not of gallantry, were several times forced into rearguard action; but at a given moment a charge made on the enemy's right by our entire but small body of horse, under the command of Colonel Pattle, won the day. The Baluchis had kept their ground for more than three hours, but now they began to retreat in masses, still keeping well together, with their broad shields slung over their backs and their heads half turned towards their pursuers. The victors followed closely, pouring in volley after volley, until tired of slaughtering. "Yet," says Napier, "those stern, implacable warriors preserved their habitual swinging stride, and would not quicken it to a run, though death was at their heels."

In this conflict our officers and men, together with our native troops, showed the greatest courage. The chief part of the battle was a hand-to-hand fight. "The noble soldier Pennefather," as Sir Charles Napier admiringly called him, fell on the top of the bank, to all appearance mortally wounded, and his place was instantly taken by Major Pool. Major Teesdale, followed by his sepoys, rode desperately over the ridge into the midst of the Baluchis, and was instantly killed by shot and sabre. Major Jackson followed the heroic example of Teesdale, and met the same fate. Two brave havildars kept close to them in advance of their regiment, and, like their leaders, they were also killed, but not until they had slain several of the fiercest of the enemy. Lieutenant M'Murdogh, of the General's staff, rode, like Teesdale and Jackson, into the very heart of the Baluchi mass; his horse was killed under him, yet he rose instantly, and meeting Jehan Mohabad, one of the most warlike of the chiefs, slew him in the midst of his clan. Then, while engaged with several in front, one came behind and struck at him, but a sergeant of the 22nd killed that enemy so instantly that his blow fell harmless.

M'Murdogh turned and did the same service for his preserver, cleaving the head of a Baluchi who was aiming at his back. Captain Jacob and Lieutenant Fitzgerald performed similar exploits. Six European officers and sixty sergeants and privates were killed, and fourteen officers and about 200 men wounded. The loss of the Baluchis was enormous; a careful computation gave it as 6,000--1,000 bodies were heaped in the ravine alone. What greater proof is wanting of the great courage and tenacity of the Baluchi warrior, who is now linking his glorious traditions with ours by deeds worthy of his ancient prowess?

THE FIRST SIKH WAR

(Moodkee, 1845)

It can hardly be said that when Sir H. Hardinge arrived in India in 1844 he found our frontier forces insufficient in numbers or unprepared for action. When the first Sikh War broke out in December, 1845, there were at Umballa 12,000 men with 32 guns, at Ferozepore 10,472 with 24 guns, and at Ludhiana 7,235 with 12 guns. Including the force of 1,800 at the hill stations this made a total of 32,479 men with 68 guns--a very respectable little British army.

On December 7th and 8th news came from Lahore to the effect that preparations were being made on a large scale for artillery, stores, and all the munitions of war, but as yet no infantry or artillery had been reported to have left Lahore, nor had a single Sikh soldier crossed the Sutlej. On the 9th, at night, Captain Nicholson, the assistant political agent at Ferozepore, reported that a portion of the Sikh army had approached within three miles of the river. On the 10th no intelligence was received from Lahore confirmatory of Captain Nicholson's report, and the opinion continued to prevail that the Sikh army would not cross the Sutlej. Our troops, however, moved on the 10th, 11th, 12th, in pursuance of orders given on the 7th and 8th; and the whole of the forces destined to move up to the Sutlej were in full march on the 12th. Some days later the whole of the Ludhiana force was moved up with the Umballa force, restricting the defence of Ludhiana to the fort, which could be securely garrisoned by the soldiers left at that post, unless attacked by heavy artillery, which was a very improbable contingency.

This fine body of men, by a rapid march on Busseean, an important point where the roads leading from Umballa and Kurnaul meet, formed the advanced column of the army, and secured the supplies which had been laid in at Busseean. Up to the morning of the 12th, the information from Lahore had not materially varied; but, by the reports received on that day, the general aspect of affairs appeared more warlike. Still no Sikh aggression had been committed, and no artillery had moved down to the river. On the 13th, however, Sir Henry Hardinge received precise information that the Sikh army had crossed the Sutlej, and was concentrating a great force on the left bank of the river. Sir Henry immediately ordered Brigadier Wheeler to march, with 4,500 men and twenty-one guns, early on the 14th from Ludhiana to Busseean, which place had been filled with provisions by arrangements made through Major Broadfoot with the native chiefs--provisions upon which the British army depended in its advance to Ferozepore. By the afternoon of the 14th, Brigadier Wheeler was in front of Busseean. The main column, under the Commander-in-Chief, from Umballa, did not reach Busseean until the 16th.

The Sikhs had not completed the passage of their heavy guns until the 16th, and, by the 17th, the advance of the force under the Commander-in-Chief began to tell upon them, for on the 17th the main body, consisting, according to the Sikh accounts, of 25,000 regulars and 88 guns, under Lal Singh, took possession of the wells around the village of Ferozeshah, whilst Tej Singh with 23,000 men and 67 guns remained opposite to Ferozepore. Now the only road by which an army can march from Busseean to Ferozepore (on account of the scarcity of water) passes through Moodkee, and is about twenty miles, Ferozeshah being mid-way. Knowing that the Commander-in-Chief must carry these works before he could relieve Ferozepore, the Sikhs commenced on December 17th to throw up entrenchments around the wells at Ferozeshah in order to stop the advance of the column under the Commander-in-Chief. Not knowing the strength of his column, and thinking it was only the advance guard of the British army, 12,000 Sikhs, chiefly cavalry, and 22 guns, under the command of Lal Singh, left the camp at Ferozeshah, early on the 18th, and had taken up their position at Moodkee before the arrival of the British army. No sooner had our troops arrived than a scout sent by the political agent brought the news that the enemy was only three miles away.

The British troops hastily got under arms and moved to their positions. Sir Hugh Gough immediately pushed forward the horse artillery and cavalry, and directed the infantry, accompanied by the field batteries, to move forward in support. Sir Hugh's own description is a good one. He says, "We had not proceeded beyond two miles when we found the enemy in position. To resist their attack, and to cover the formation of the infantry, I advanced the cavalry, under Brigadiers White, Gough, and Mactier, rapidly to the front in columns of squadrons, and occupied the plain. They were speedily followed by the five troops of horse artillery under Brigadier Brooke, who took up a forward position, having the cavalry then on his flank.

"The country is a dead flat, covered at short intervals with a low but in some places thick jhow jungle, and dotted with sandy hillocks. The enemy screened their infantry and artillery behind this jungle and such undulations as the ground afforded; and whilst our twelve battalions formed from echelon of brigade into line they opened a very severe cannonade upon our advancing troops, which was vigorously replied to by the battery of horse artillery under Brigadier Brooke, which was soon joined by the two light field batteries. The rapid and well-directed fire of our artillery appeared soon to paralyse that of the enemy; and as it was necessary to complete our infantry dispositions without advancing the artillery too near to the jungle, I directed the cavalry under Brigadiers White and Gough to make a flank movement on the enemy's left, with a view of threatening and turning that flank if possible. With praiseworthy gallantry, the 3rd Light Dragoons [now known as the 3rd (King's Own) Hussars], with the second brigade of cavalry, consisting of the Body-guard and 5th Light Cavalry, with a portion of the 4th Lancers,[A] turned the left of the Sikh army, and sweeping along the whole rear of its infantry and guns silenced for a time the latter and put their numerous cavalry to flight. Whilst this movement was taking place on the enemy's left, I directed the remainder of the 4th Lancers, the 9th Irregular Cavalry[2] under Brigadier Mactier, with a light field battery, to threaten their right.

"This manoeuvre was also successful. Had not the infantry and guns of the enemy been screened by the jungle, these brilliant charges of the cavalry would have been productive of greater effect.

"When the infantry advanced to the attack, Brigadier Brooke rapidly pushed on his horse artillery close to the jungle, and the cannonade was resumed on both sides. The infantry, under Major-Generals Sir Harry Smith, Gilbert, and Sir John M'Caskill, attacked in echelon of lines the enemy's infantry, almost invisible amongst wood and the approaching darkness of night. The opposition of the enemy was such as might have been expected from troops who had everything at stake, and who had long vaunted of being irresistible. Their ample and extended line, from their great superiority of numbers, far outflanked ours; but this was counteracted by the flank movements of our cavalry. The attack of the infantry now commenced, and the roll of fire from this powerful arm soon convinced the Sikh army that they had met with a foe they little expected; and their whole force was driven from position after position with great slaughter, and the loss of seventeen pieces of artillery, some of them of heavy calibre; our infantry using that never-failing weapon, the bayonet, whenever the enemy stood. Night only saved them from worse disaster, for this stout conflict was maintained during an hour and a half of dim starlight, amidst a cloud of dust from the sandy plain, which yet more obscured every object."

Our troops in this battle consisted of 3,850 Europeans and 8,500 natives, making a total of 12,350 rank and file, and 41 guns. Sixteen officers were killed and 200 men; forty-eight officers wounded and 609 men, of whom 153 died subsequently of their wounds, or were disabled. Amongst those who fell was the hero of Jellalabad, Sir Robert Sale; he had his left thigh shattered by grape-shot, and the wound proved mortal. Had there been more daylight, the rout of the enemy would have been more complete; as it was, seventeen of their guns out of twenty were captured, and their loss in killed and wounded was very severe. Yet it must be said that, in this battle of Moodkee, our friend the enemy fought bravely and well--so well that, casting a backward glance on that day of glorious deeds, we are now proud to claim him as a friend indeed.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 2: Native regiments.]

ALIWAL AND SOBRAON

(1846)

Badly beaten at Ferozeshah, the Sikhs naturally expected that the British troops would at once follow up their advantage by crossing the Sutlej and advancing on the capital; but in order to do this successfully it was necessary to wait the arrival of the powerful battering train now moving upwards with the Meerut force under Sir John Grey, consisting of the 9th Lancers, the 16th Lancers, and her Majesty's 10th and 53rd Regiments of Foot, with the 43rd and 59th Regiments of Native Infantry.

The Sikhs, mistaking this delay for irresolution, resolved to make another effort to maintain their position on the left bank of the Sutlej; and for this purpose they began to construct a new bridge of boats, not very far from the spot where they crossed the river after having been driven from Ferozeshah. Our Army of the Sutlej was stationed some distance from the river, and no opposition was offered by them. The bridge of boats was soon constructed, and works thrown up in front of it with much military skill, in a position very favourable to defence. The opposite banks were high, and the river, where the bridge was laid, made a slight curve inwards, so as to throw those banks sufficiently forward to afford protection to both flanks of the advanced position from heavy artillery placed in battery. Above the bridge, and not far from it, was a good ford, which facilitated the communications with the forces on the opposite bank. Advantage had also been taken of the slenderness of our troops at Ludhiana to effect a passage for a force of about 10,000 men of all arms, in the neighbourhood of that town. No attack was made either on the town or cantonment of Ludhiana; the object of this force appeared to be rather to entrench itself near the place at which it crossed, in order to obstruct our progress and to cut off the passage of supplies to Ferozepore, and to intercept the communication between the posts.

As soon as the Meerut force joined the Commander-in-Chief's camp, immediate measures were taken to reinforce the Ludhiana post and the station at Busseean. Some native infantry, some light cavalry, and some guns were sent thither, and the sick, the women, and the children were removed thence to Umballa. Meanwhile Sir Harry Smith had been detached to reduce Dhurmkote and keep open the communication for supplies and ammunition from our rear. Sir Harry was now reinforced, having with him 7,000 men and 24 guns, and it was confidently believed that he could at one and the same time relieve Ludhiana and protect the whole of our rear. Dhurmkote was evacuated at his approach. On the way from Jugraon to Ludhiana he lost a good deal of his baggage, and sustained some heavy fusilades, which he did not wait to return. His troops were much harassed when he reached Ludhiana, but his presence put an end to the consternation which was becoming general in that part of the country.

The Sirdar Runjur Singh had strongly entrenched himself at Aliwal, about eight miles to the westward of Ludhiana. He had 15,000 men and 56 guns, and on the evening of January 26th he received a reinforcement of 12 guns and 4,000 regular troops. Sir Harry Smith most gallantly attacked the Sikhs on January 28th with not more than 16,000 men in all. The right of the Sikh force rested on Bundree, and their left on Aliwal. When they had advanced a short distance from their entrenched camp, they cannonaded the British for half an hour, until our brave fellows stormed the village of Aliwal, the key of their position. The whole of the British line then began to advance. Her Majesty's 16th Lancers charged in the most gallant style, but the Sikhs lay down on the ground and the Lancers could not easily reach them. In this position the Sikhs did deadly work with their muskets and keen swords. The 16th Lancers had upwards of a hundred men killed or wounded. The great mass of Sikh infantry could be broken only by our artillery. One Sikh cannon after another was captured. So ably were the orders of attack conducted, each column and line arriving at its point of attack to the very moment, that the enemy was soon driven headlong back over the river, and all their guns were captured or destroyed. Only one gun was carried by the Sikhs to the opposite bank, and there it was spiked by Lieutenant Holmes, of the Irregular Cavalry, and Gunner Scott, of the Horse Artillery, who forded the river in pursuit. The victory was complete, and great was the confusion among the Sikhs.

After this complete and decisive victory there was a breathing space in the campaign. The Sikhs at Sobraon went on strengthening their position, while Sir Hugh Gough waited for his artillery and reinforcements. From January 14th till the beginning of February the enemy was industriously employed in building defences, under the direction, it is said, of a Spanish engineer. The army under Sir Charles Napier, which had been assembled at Sukkar by order of the Governor-General, consisting of 16,000 men, was moving up to the left bank of the Sutlej towards Ferozepore, and would have proved, had the war lasted, a most valuable reinforcement to the Army of the Sutlej. It had by this time reached Bhawalpur, opposite Mooltan, and as the Nawab of that place had intimated to the British Government his intention of remaining neutral, the Governor-General, feeling that the blow must be struck and the contest decided at Lahore, requested Sir Charles Napier to come on with his staff in advance of his army, and to join him without delay, being desirous of having the assistance of that distinguished officer in the pending struggle. Sir Charles Napier did not, however, arrive in time to add to the glories of Sobraon, but the heavy guns from Delhi reached the Commander-in-Chief's camp on February 9th.

Although on the first intelligence of the battle of Aliwal, and at sight of the numerous bodies which floated from the neighbourhood of that battlefield down to the bridge of boats at Sobraon, the Sikhs seemed much shaken and disheartened, they now appeared to be as confident as ever of being able to defy us in their entrenched position and to prevent our passage of the river. The soldiers were chiefly those who had been trained by the French and Italian officers. They had strong walls, only to be surmounted by scaling ladders, which afforded a secure protection for triple lines of musketry. In all they were 34,000 men with 70 pieces of artillery; their position was united by a good bridge to a reserve of 20,000 men on the opposite bank, on which was a considerable camp and some artillery, commanding and flanking our field-works.

Sir Hugh Gough's forces consisted of 6,533 Europeans and 9,691 natives, making a total of 16,224 rank and file, with 99 guns. Sir Hugh ordered this force to march at half-past three, on the morning of Tuesday, February 10th, when his men would be fresh and there would be a certainty of many hours of daylight. The troops began to move out of camp at the very moment appointed, and they marched in silence to their destination. Sir Hugh was now strong in cavalry and very strong in artillery. He at once put his battering and disposable artillery in position in an extended semicircle, embracing within its fire the works of the Sikhs.

It had been intended that the cannonade should commence at daybreak, but so heavy a mist hung over the plain and river that it was necessary to wait. It was half-past six before the whole of the artillery was developed. Dr. Macgregor, in his "History of the Sikhs," gives a graphic description of the opening of the action. He says: "Nothing could have been conceived grander than the effect of the batteries when they opened, as the cannonade passed along from the Sutlej to Little Sobraon in one continued roar of guns and mortars; while, ever and anon, the rocket like a spirit of fire winged its rapid flight high above the batteries in its progress towards the Sikh entrenchments. Well might the Commander-in-Chief call the opening of the cannonade 'most spirited and well directed.' The Sikh guns responded with shot and shell, but neither appeared to do much execution; the latter were seen bursting in mid-air ere they reached the British batteries, while some of the shot passed over Rhodawala, and struck the ground in front of General Gilbert's division. It now became a grand artillery concert, and the infantry divisions and brigades looked on with a certain degree of interest, somewhat allied, however, to vexation, lest the artillery should have the whole work to themselves. The Commander-in-Chief, however, was determined to give full play to an arm which he had not possessed to an efficient extent in other hard-fought battles. It was reported that the guns were to play for four hours at least; but there is some reason to believe that the rapid firing had nearly exhausted the ammunition before half that time had elapsed, and it was once more to be proved that the British Infantry were not to remain mute spectators of a battle. 'Notwithstanding,' wrote the Commander-in-Chief, 'the formidable calibre of our guns, mortars, and howitzers, and the admirable way in which they were served, and aided by a rocket battery, it would have been visionary to expect that they could have silenced the fire of seventy pieces behind well-constructed batteries of earth, planks, and fascines, or dislodge troops covered either by redoubts or epaulements or within a treble line of trenches.'"