Chapter V (2)

[389] See, for instance, his attempt to prove, from general reasonings
concerning the human mind, that there was a necessary relation in
regard to the order in which men promulgated the system of
concentric spheres and that of eccentric spheres and epicycles.
_History of Astronomy_, in _Smith's Philosophical Essays_, 1795,
4to. pp. 31, 36, which it may be convenient to compare with
_Whewell's Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences_, 1847, vol. ii.
pp. 53, 60, 61. This striking fragment of Adam Smith's is
probably little read now; but it is warmly praised by one of the
greatest living philosophers, M. A. Comte, in his _Philosophie
Positive_, vol. vi. p. 319.

[390] The two writers who have inquired most carefully into the method
which political economists ought to follow, are Mr. John Mill
(_Essays on Unsettled Questions of Political Economy_, 1844, pp.
120-164) and Mr. Rae (_New Principles of Political Economy_,
1834, pp. 328-351). Mr. Rae, in his ingenious work, objects to
Adam Smith that he transgressed the rules of the Baconian
philosophy, and thus prevented his inferences from being as
valuable as they would have been if he had treated his subject
inductively. But Mr. Mill, with great force of reasoning, has
proved that the deductive plan is the only one by which political
economy can be raised to a science. He says, p. 143, political
economy is 'essentially an _abstract_ science, and its method is
the method _a priori_;' and at p. 146, that the _a posteriori_
method is 'altogether inefficacious.' To this I may add, that the
modern theory of rent, which is now the corner-stone of political
economy, was got at, not by generalizing economical facts, but by
reasoning downwards after the manner of geometricians. Indeed,
those who oppose the theory of rent, always do so on the ground
that it is contradicted by facts; and then, with complete
ignorance of the philosophy of method, they infer that therefore
the theory is wrong. See, for instance, _Jones on the
Distribution of Wealth_, 8vo. 1831: a book containing some
interesting facts, but vitiated by this capital defect of method.
See also _Journal of Statistical Society_, vol. i. p. 317, vol.
vi. p. 322; where it is said that economical theories should be
generalized from statistical facts. Compare vol. xvii. p. 116,
vol. xviii. p. 101.

[391] A striking instance has lately come to light of the sagacity with
which Hume employed this method. See _Burton's Life and
Correspondence of Hume_, vol. ii. p. 486; where we find, that
immediately Hume had read the _Wealth of Nations_, he detected
Smith's error concerning rent being an element of price: so that
it now appears that Hume was the first to make this great
discovery, as far as the idea is concerned; though Ricardo has
the merit of proving it.

[392] The historical facts he introduces are merely illustrations; as
any one will see who will read _The Natural History of Religion_,
in _Hume's Philos. Works_, Edinb. 1826, vol. iv. pp. 435-513. I
may mention, that there is a considerable similarity between the
views advocated in this remarkable essay and the religious stages
of _Comte's Philosophie Positive_; for Hume's early form of
polytheism is evidently the same as M. Comte's fetichism, from
which both these writers believe that monotheism subsequently
arose, as a later and more refined abstraction. That this was the
course adopted by the human mind is highly probable, and is
confirmed by the learned researches of Mr. Grote. See his
_History of Greece_, vol. i. pp. 462, 497, vol. v. p. 22. The
opposite and more popular opinion, of monotheism preceding
idolatry, was held by most of the great earlier writers, and is
defended by many moderns, and among others by Dr. Whewell
(_Bridgewater Treatise_, p. 256), who expresses himself with
considerable confidence: see also _Letters from Warburton to
Hurd_, p. 239. Compare _Thirlwall's History of Greece_, vol. i.
p. 183, Lond. 1835, with the 'einige Funken des Monotheismus' of
Kant, _Kritik der reinen Vernunft_, in _Kant's Werke_, vol. ii.
p. 455.

[393] That is to say, he treated historical facts as merely illustrative
of certain general principles, which he believed could be proved
without the facts; so that, as M. Schlosser (_History of the
Eighteenth Century_, vol. ii. p. 76) well says, 'History with
Hume was only a subordinate pursuit, only a means by which he
might introduce his philosophy,' &c. Considering how little is
known of the principles which govern social and political
changes, there can be no doubt that Hume was premature in the
application of this method; but it is absurd to call the method
dishonest, since the object of his History was, not to _prove_
conclusions, but to _illustrate_ them: and he therefore thought
himself justified in selecting the illustrations. I am simply
stating his views, without at all defending them; indeed, I
believe that in this respect he was seriously in the wrong.

This is an outline of the plan I purpose to follow in the present Introduction, and by means of which I hope to arrive at some results of permanent value. For by studying different principles in those countries where they have been most developed, the laws of the principles will be more easily unfolded than if we had studied them in countries where they are very obscure. And, inasmuch as, in England, civilization has followed a course more orderly, and less disturbed, than in any other country, it becomes the more necessary, in writing its history, to use some resources like those which I have suggested. What makes the history of England so eminently valuable is, that nowhere else has the national progress been so little interfered with, either for good or for evil. But the mere fact that our civilization has, by this means, been preserved in a more natural and healthy state, renders it incumbent on us to study the diseases to which it is liable, by observing those other countries where social disease is more rife. The security and the durability of civilization must depend on the regularity with which its elements are combined, and on the harmony with which they work. If any one element is too active, the whole composition will be in danger. Hence it is, that although the laws of the composition of the elements will be best ascertained wherever we can find the composition most complete, we must, nevertheless, search for the laws of each separate element wherever we can find the element itself most active. While, therefore, I have selected the history of England, as that in which the harmony of the different principles has been longest maintained, I have, precisely on that account, thought it advisable to study each principle separately in the country where it has been most powerful, and where, by its inordinate development, the equilibrium of the entire structure has been disturbed.

By adopting these precautions, we shall be able to remove many of the difficulties which still beset the study of history. Before, however, entering that wide field which now lies in our way, it will be well to clear up some preliminary points, which I have not yet noticed, and the discussion of which may obviate certain objections that might otherwise be raised. The subjects to which I allude, are Religion, Literature, and Government: three topics of vast importance, and which, in the opinion of many persons, are the prime movers of human affairs. That this opinion is altogether erroneous will be amply proved in the present work; but as the opinion is widely spread, and is very plausible, it is necessary that we should at once come to some understanding respecting it, and inquire into the real nature of that influence, which these three great powers do actually exercise over the progress of civilization.

Now, in the first place, it is evident that if a people were left entirely to themselves, their religion, their literature, and their government would be, not the causes of their civilization, but the effects of it. Out of a certain condition of society certain results naturally follow. Those results may, no doubt, be tampered with by some external agency; but if that is not done, it is impossible that a highly civilized people, accustomed to reason and to doubt, should ever embrace a religion of which the glaring absurdities set reason and doubt at defiance. There are many instances of nations changing their religion, but there is no instance of a progressive country voluntarily adopting a retrogressive religion; neither is there any example of a declining country ameliorating its religion. It is of course true, that a good religion is favourable to civilization, and a bad one unfavourable to it. Unless, however, there is some interference from without, no people will ever discover that their religion is bad until their reason tells them so; but if their reason is inactive, and their knowledge stationary, the discovery will never be made. A country that continues in its old ignorance will always remain in its old religion. Surely nothing can be plainer than this. A very ignorant people will, by virtue of their ignorance, incline towards a religion full of marvels; a religion which boasts of innumerable gods, and which ascribes every occurrence to the immediate authority of those gods. On the other hand, a people whose knowledge makes them better judges of evidence, and who are accustomed to that most difficult task, the practice of doubting, will require a religion less marvellous, less obtrusive; one that taxes their credulity less heavily. But will you, therefore, say, that the badness of the first religion causes the ignorance; and that the goodness of the second religion causes the knowledge? Will you say, that when one event precedes another, the one which comes first is the effect, and the one which follows afterwards is the cause? This is not the way in which men reason on the ordinary affairs of life; and it is difficult to see why they should reason thus respecting the history of past events.

The truth is, that the religious opinions which prevail in any period are among the symptoms by which that period is marked. When the opinions are deeply rooted, they do, no doubt, influence the conduct of men; but before they can be deeply rooted, some intellectual change must first have taken place. We may as well expect that the seed should quicken in the barren rock, as that a mild and philosophic religion should be established among ignorant and ferocious savages. Of this innumerable experiments have been made, and always with the same result. Men of excellent intentions, and full of a fervent though mistaken zeal, have been, and still are, attempting to propagate their own religion among the inhabitants of barbarous countries. By strenuous and unremitting activity, and frequently by promises, and even by actual gifts, they have, in many cases, persuaded savage communities to make a profession of the Christian religion. But whoever will compare the triumphant reports of the missionaries with the long chain of evidence supplied by competent travellers, will soon find that such profession is only nominal, and that these ignorant tribes have adopted, indeed, the ceremonies of the new religion, but have by no means adopted the religion itself. They receive the externals, but there they stop. They may baptize their children; they may take the sacrament; they may flock to the church. All this they may do, and yet be as far removed from the spirit of Christianity as when they bowed the knee before their former idols. The rites and forms of a religion lie on the surface; they are at once seen, they are quickly learned, easily copied by those who are unable to penetrate to that which lies beneath. It is this deeper and inward change which alone is durable; and this the savage can never experience while he is sunk in an ignorance that levels him with the brutes by which he is surrounded. Remove the ignorance, and then the religion may enter. This is the only course by which ultimate benefit can be effected. After a careful study of the history and condition of barbarous nations, I do most confidently assert, that there is no well attested case of any people being permanently converted to Christianity, except in those very few instances where missionaries, being men of knowledge, as well as men of piety, have familiarized the savage with habits of thought, and, by thus stimulating his intellect, have prepared him for the reception of those religious principles, which, without such stimulus, he could never have understood.[394]

[394] A writer of great authority has made some remarks on this, which
are worth attending to: 'Ce fut alors que les Jésuites
pénétrèrent dans la Chine pour y prêcher l'évangile. Ils ne
tardèrent pas à s'apercevoir qu'un des moyens les plus efficaces
pour s'y maintenir, en attendant le moment que le ciel avoit
marqué pour éclairer ce vaste empire, étoit d'étaler des
connoissances astronomiques.' _Montucla_, _Histoire des
Mathématiques_, vol. i. p. 468; and see vol. ii. pp. 586, 587.
Cuvier delicately hints at the same conclusion. He says of Emery:
'Il se souvenait que l'époque où le christianisme a fait le plus
de conquêtes, et où ses ministres ont obtenu le plus de respect,
est celle où ils portaient chez les peuples convertis les
lumières des lettres, en même temps que les vérités de la
religion, et où ils formaient à la fois dans les nations l'ordre
le plus éminent et le plus éclairé.' _Cuvier_, _Eloges
Historiques_, vol. iii. p. 170. Even Southey (_History of
Brazil_, vol. ii. p. 378) says: 'Missionaries have always
complained of the fickleness of their converts; and they must
always complain of it, till they discover that some degree of
civilization must precede conversion, or at least accompany it.'
And see to the same effect, _Halkett's Notes on the North
American Indians_, pp. 352, 353; and _Combe's North America_,
vol. i. p. 250, vol. ii. p. 353.

It is in this way that, looking at things upon a large scale, the religion of mankind is the effect of their improvement, not the cause of it. But, looking at things upon a small scale, or taking what is called a practical view of some short and special period, circumstances will occasionally occur which disturb this general order, and apparently reverse the natural process. And this, as in all such cases, can only arise from the peculiarities of individual men; who, moved by the minor laws which regulate individual actions, are able, by their genius or their energy, to interfere with the operation of those greater laws which regulate large societies. Owing to circumstances still unknown, there appear, from time to time, great thinkers, who, devoting their lives to a single purpose, are able to anticipate the progress of mankind, and to produce a religion or a philosophy, by which important effects are eventually brought about. But, if we look into history, we shall clearly see that, although the origin of a new opinion may be thus due to a single man, the result which the new opinion produces will depend on the condition of the people among whom it is propagated. If either a religion or a philosophy is too much in advance of a nation, it can do no present service, but must bide its time, until the minds of men are ripe for its reception. Of this innumerable instances will occur to most readers. Every science and every creed has had its martyrs; men exposed to obloquy, or even to death, because they knew more than their contemporaries, and because society was not sufficiently advanced to receive the truths which they communicated. According to the ordinary course of affairs, a few generations pass away, and then there comes a period when these very truths are looked upon as commonplace facts; and a little later, there comes another period, in which they are declared to be necessary, and even the dullest intellects wonder how they could ever have been denied. This is what happens when the human mind is allowed to have fair play, and to exercise itself, with tolerable freedom, in the accumulation and diffusion of knowledge. If, however, by violent, and therefore by artificial, means, this same society is prevented from exercising its intellect, then the truths, however important they may be, can never be received. For why should certain truths be rejected in one age, and acknowledged in another? The truths remain the same; their ultimate recognition must, therefore, be due to a change in the society which now accepts what it had before despised. Indeed, history is full of evidence of the utter inefficiency even of the noblest principles, when they are promulgated among a very ignorant nation. Thus it was that the doctrine of One God, taught to the Hebrews of old, remained for many centuries altogether inoperative. The people to whom it was addressed had not yet emerged from barbarism; they were, therefore, unable to raise their minds to so elevated a conception. Like all other barbarians, they craved after a religion which would feed their credulity with incessant wonders; and which, instead of abstracting the Deity to a single essence, would multiply their gods until they covered every field, and swarmed in every forest. This is the idolatry which is the natural fruit of ignorance; and this it is to which the Hebrews were perpetually recurring. Notwithstanding the most severe and unremitting punishments, they, at every opportunity, abandoned that pure theism which their minds were too backward to receive, and relapsed into superstitions which they could more easily understand,--into the worship of the golden calf, and the adoration of the brazen serpent. Now, and in this age of the world, they have long ceased to do these things. And why? Not because their religious feelings are more easily aroused, or their religious fears more often excited. So far from this, they are dissevered from their old associations; they have lost for ever those scenes by which men might well have been moved. They are no longer influenced by those causes which inspired emotions, sometimes of terror, sometimes of gratitude. They no longer witness the pillar of cloud by day, or the pillar of fire by night; they no longer see the Law being given from Sinai, nor do they hear the thunder rolling from Horeb. In the presence of these great appeals, they remained idolaters in their hearts, and whenever an opportunity occurred, they became idolaters in their practice, and this they did because they were in that state of barbarism, of which idolatry is the natural product. To what possible circumstance can their subsequent change be ascribed, except to the simple fact, that the Hebrews, like all other people, as they advanced in civilization, began to abstract and refine their religion, and, despising the old worship of many gods, thus by slow degrees elevated their minds to that steady perception of One Great Cause, which, at an earlier period, it had been vainly attempted to impress upon them?

Thus intimate is the connexion between the opinions of a people and their knowledge; and thus necessary is it that, so far as nations are concerned, intellectual activity should precede religious improvement. If we require further illustrations of this important truth, we shall find them in the events which occurred in Europe soon after the promulgation of Christianity. The Romans were, with rare exceptions, an ignorant and barbarous race; ferocious, dissolute, and cruel. For such a people, Polytheism was the natural creed; and we read, accordingly, that they practised an idolatry which a few great thinkers, and only a few, ventured to despise. The Christian religion, falling among these men, found them unable to appreciate its sublime and admirable doctrines. And when, a little later, Europe was overrun by fresh immigrations, the invaders, who were even more barbarous than the Romans, brought with them those superstitions which were suited to their actual condition. It was upon the materials arising from these two sources that Christianity was now called to do her work. The result is most remarkable. For after the new religion seemed to have carried all before it, and had received the homage of the best part of Europe, it was soon found that nothing had been really effected. It was soon found that society was in that early stage in which superstition is inevitable; and in which men, if they do not have it in one form, will have it in another. It was in vain that Christianity taught a simple doctrine, and enjoined a simple worship. The minds of men were too backward for so great a step, and required more complicated forms, and a more complicated belief. What followed is well known to the students of ecclesiastical history. The superstition of Europe, instead of being diminished, was only turned into a fresh channel. The new religion was corrupted by the old follies. The adoration of idols was succeeded by the adoration of saints; the worship of the Virgin was substituted for the worship of Cybele;[395] Pagan ceremonies were established in Christian churches; not only the mummeries of idolatry, but likewise its doctrines, were quickly added, and were incorporated and worked into the spirit of the new religion; until, after a lapse of a few generations, Christianity exhibited so grotesque and hideous a form, that its best features were lost, and the lineaments of its earlier loveliness altogether destroyed.[396]

[395] This is curiously illustrated by the fact, that the 25th of March,
which is now called Lady-day, in honour of the Virgin Mary, was,
in Pagan times, called Hilaria, and was dedicated to Cybele, the
mother of the gods. Compare _Blunt's Vestiges of Ancient
Manners_, 8vo. 1823, pp. 51-55, with _Hampson's Medii Ævi
Kalendarium_, 8vo. 1841, vol. i. pp. 56, 177.

[396] On this interesting subject, the two best English books are,
_Middleton's Letter from Rome_, and _Priestley's History of the
Corruption of Christianity_; the former work being chiefly
valuable for ritual corruptions, the latter work for doctrinal
ones. _Blunt's Vestiges of Ancient Manners_ is also worth
reading; but is very inferior to the two treatises just named,
and is conceived in a much narrower spirit.

After some centuries were passed, Christianity slowly emerged from these corruptions; many of which, however, even the most civilized countries have not yet been able to throw off.[397] Indeed, it was found impossible to effect even the beginning of a reform, until the European intellect was, in some degree, roused from its lethargy. The knowledge of men, gradually advancing, made them indignant at superstitions which they had formerly admired. The way in which their indignation increased, until, in the sixteenth century, it broke out into that great event which is well called the Reformation, forms one of the most interesting subjects in modern history. But, for our present purpose, it is enough to keep in mind the memorable and important fact that, for centuries after Christianity was the established religion of Europe, it failed to bear its natural fruit, because its lot was cast among a people whose ignorance compelled them to be superstitious, and who, on account of their superstition, defaced a system which, in its original purity, they were unable to receive.[398]

[397] The large amount of Paganism which still exists in every Christian
sect, forms an argument against an ingenious distinction which M.
Bunsen has made between the change of a religion and that of a
language; alterations in a religion being, as he supposes, always
more abrupt than those in a language. _Bunsen's Egypt_, vol. i.
pp. 358, 359.

[398] It was necessary, says M. Maury, that the church 'se rapprochât
davantage de l'esprit grossier, inculte, ignorant du barbare.'
_Maury_, _Légendes Pieuses du Moyen Age_, p. 101. An exactly
similar process has taken place in India, where the Puranas are
to the Vedas what the works of the Fathers are to the New
Testament. Compare _Elphinstone's History of India_, pp. 87, 88,
98; _Wilson's Preface to the Vishnu Parana_, p. 7; and
_Transactions of Bombay Society_, vol. i. p. 205. So that as M.
Max Müller well expresses it, the Puranas are 'a secondary
formation of Indian mythology.' _Müller on the Languages of
India_, in _Reports of British Association for 1847_, p. 324.

Indeed, in every page of history, we meet with fresh evidence of the little effect religious doctrines can produce upon a people, unless preceded by intellectual culture. The influence exercised by Protestantism, as compared with Catholicism, affords an interesting example of this. The Catholic religion bears to the Protestant religion exactly the same relation that the Dark Ages bear to the sixteenth century. In the Dark Ages, men were credulous and ignorant; they therefore produced a religion which required great belief and little knowledge. In the sixteenth century, their credulity and ignorance, though still considerable, were rapidly diminishing, and it was found necessary to organize a religion suited to their altered circumstances: a religion more favourable to free inquiry; a religion less full of miracles, saints, legends, and idols; a religion of which the ceremonies were less frequent, and less burdensome; a religion which should discourage penance, fasting, confession, celibacy, and those other mortifications which had long been universal. All this was done by the establishment of Protestantism; a mode of worship which, being thus suited to the age, made, as is well known, speedy progress. If this great movement had been allowed to proceed without interruption, it would, in the course of a few generations, have overthrown the old superstition, and established in its place a simpler and less troublesome creed; the rapidity with which this was done, being, of course, proportioned to the intellectual activity of the different countries. But, unfortunately, the European governments, who are always meddling in matters with which they have no concern, thought it their duty to protect the religious interests of the people; and making common cause with the Catholic clergy, they, in many instances, forcibly stopped the heresy, and thus arrested the natural development of the age. This interference was, in nearly all cases, well intended, and is solely to be ascribed to the ignorance of rulers respecting the proper limits of their functions: but the evils caused by this ignorance it would be difficult to exaggerate. During almost a hundred and fifty years, Europe was afflicted by religious wars, religious massacres, and religious persecutions; not one of which would have arisen, if the great truth had been recognised, that the state has no concern with the opinions of men, and no right to interfere, even in the slightest degree, with the form of worship which they may choose to adopt. This principle was, however, formerly unknown, or at all events unheeded; and it was not until the middle of the seventeenth century that the great religious contests were brought to a final close, and the different countries settled down into their public creeds; which, in the essential points, have never since been permanently altered; no nation having, for more than two hundred years, made war upon another on account of its religion; and all the great Catholic countries having, during the same period, remained Catholic, all the great Protestant ones remained Protestant.

From this it has arisen, that, in several of the European countries, the religious development has not followed its natural order, but has been artificially forced into an unnatural one. According to the natural order, the most civilized countries should all be Protestants, and the most uncivilized ones Catholics. In the average of instances this is actually the case; so that many persons have been led into the singular error, of ascribing all modern enlightenment to the influence of Protestantism; overlooking the important fact, that until the enlightenment had begun, Protestantism was never required. But although, in the ordinary course of affairs, the advance of the Reformation would have been the measure, and the symptom, of that advance of knowledge by which it was preceded, still, in many cases, the authority of the government and of the church acted as disturbing causes, and frustrated the natural progress of religious improvement. And, after the treaty of Westphalia had fixed the political relations of Europe, the love of theological strife so greatly subsided, that men no longer thought it worth their while to raise a religious revolution, and to risk their lives in an attempt to overturn the creed of the state. At the same time, governments, not being themselves particularly fond of revolutions, have encouraged this stationary condition; and very naturally, and, as it appears to me, very wisely, have made no great alteration, but have left the national establishments as they found them; that is to say, the Protestant ones Protestant, and the Catholic ones Catholic. Hence it is, that the national religion professed by any country at the present moment, is no decisive criterion of the present civilization of the country; because the circumstances which fixed the religion occurred long since, and the religion remains endowed and established by the mere continuance of an impetus which was formerly given.

Thus far as to the origin of the ecclesiastical establishments of Europe. But, in their practical consequences, we see some results which are highly instructive. For many countries owing their national creed, not to their own proper antecedents, but to the authority of powerful individuals, it will be invariably found, that in such countries the creed does not produce the effects which might have been expected from it, and which, according to its terms, it ought to produce. Thus, for instance, the Catholic religion is more superstitious, and more intolerant, than the Protestant; but it by no means follows, that those countries which profess the former creed, must be more superstitious, and more intolerant, than those which profess the latter. So far from this, the French are not only quite as free from those odious qualities as are the most civilized Protestants, but they are more free from them than some Protestant nations, as the Scotch and the Swedes. Of the highly-educated class, I am not here speaking; but of the clergy, and of the people generally, it must be admitted, that in Scotland there is more bigotry, more superstition, and a more thorough contempt for the religion of others, than there is in France. And in Sweden, which is one of the oldest Protestant countries in Europe,[399] there is, not occasionally, but habitually, an intolerance and a spirit of persecution, which would be discreditable to a Catholic country; but which is doubly disgraceful when proceeding from a people who profess to base their religion on the right of private judgment.[400]

[399] The doctrines of Luther were first preached in Sweden in 1519;
and, in 1527, the principles of the Reformation were formally
adopted in an assembly of the States at Westeraas, which enabled
Gustavus Vasa to seize the property of the church. _Geijer's
History of the Swedes_, part i. pp. 110, 118, 119; _Mosheim's
Ecclesiastical History_, vol. ii. p. 22; _Crichton and Wheaton's
History of Scandinavia_, vol. i. pp. 399, 400. The apostasy
proceeded so favourably, that De Thou (_Histoire Univ._ vol.
xiii. p. 312) says, in 1598, 'Il y avoit déjà si long-tems que ce
culte étoit établi en Suède, qu'il étoit comme impossible de
trouver, soit parmi le peuple, soit parmi les seigneurs,
quelqu'un qui se souvînt d'avoir vu dans ce roïaume l'exercice
public de la religion catholique.'

[400] On the state of things in 1838, see some curious, and indeed
shameful, details in _Laing's Sweden_, 8vo. London, 1839. Mr.
Laing, though himself a Protestant, truly says, that in
Protestant Sweden there 'is inquisition law, working in the hands
of a Lutheran state-church, as strongly as in Spain or Portugal
in the hands of a Roman Catholic Church.' _Laing's Sweden_, p.
324. In the seventeenth century, it was ordered by the Swedish
Church, and the order was confirmed by government, that 'if any
Swedish subject change his religion, he shall be banished the
kingdom, and lose all right of inheritance, both for himself and
his descendants.... If any bring into the country teachers of
another religion, he shall be fined and banished.' _Burton's
Diary_, vol. iii. p. 387, 8vo. 1828. To this may be added, that
it was not till 1781 that Roman Catholics were allowed to
exercise their religion in Sweden. See _Crichton's History of
Scandinavia_, Edinb. 1838, vol. ii. p. 320. See also, on this
intolerant spirit, _Whitelocke's Journal of the Swedish Embassy_,
vol. i. pp. 164, 412, vol. ii. p. 312.

These things show, what it would be easy to prove by a wider induction, that when, from special, or, as they are called, accidental causes, any people profess a religion more advanced than themselves, it will not produce its legitimate effect.[401] The superiority of Protestantism over Catholicism consists in its diminution of superstition and intolerance, and in the check which it gives to ecclesiastical power. But the experience of Europe teaches us, that when the superior religion is fixed among an inferior people, its superiority is no longer seen. The Scotch and the Swedes,--and to them might be added some of the Swiss cantons,--are less civilized than the French, and are therefore more superstitious. This being the case, it avails them little that they have a religion better than the French. It avails them little that, owing to circumstances which have long since passed away, they, three centuries ago, adopted a creed to which the force of habit, and the influence of tradition, now oblige them to cling. Whoever has travelled in Scotland with sufficient attention to observe the ideas and opinions of the people, and whoever will look into Scotch theology, and read the history of the Scotch Kirk, and the proceedings of the Scotch Assemblies and Consistories, will see how little the country has benefited by its religion, and how wide an interval there is between its intolerant spirit and the natural tendencies of the Protestant Reformation. On the other hand, whoever will subject France to a similar examination, will see an illiberal religion accompanied by liberal views, and a creed full of superstitions professed by a people among whom superstition is comparatively rare.

[401] We see a good instance of this in the case of the Abyssinians, who
have professed Christianity for centuries; but, as no pains were
taken to cultivate their intellect, they found the religion too
pure for them: they, therefore, corrupted it, and, down to the
present moment, they have not made the slightest progress. The
accounts given by Bruce of them are well known; and a traveller,
who visited them in 1839, says: 'Nothing can be more corrupt than
the nominal Christianity of this unhappy nation. It is mixed up
with Judaism, Mahommedanism, and idolatry, and is a mass of rites
and superstitions which cannot mend the heart.' _Kraff's Journal
at Ankobar_, in _Journal of Geographical Society_, vol. x. p.
488; see also vol. xiv. p. 13: and for a similar state of things
in America, see the account of the Quiché Indians, in _Stephens's
Central America_, vol. ii. pp. 191, 192. Compare _Squier's
Central America_, vol. i. pp. 322, 323, with _Halkett's
North-American Indians_, pp. 29, 212, 268. For further
confirmation of this view, in another part of the world, see
_Tuckey's Expedition to the Zaire_, pp. 79, 80, 165.

The simple fact is, that the French have a religion worse than themselves; the Scotch have a religion better than themselves. The liberality of France is as ill suited to Catholicism, as the bigotry of Scotland is ill suited to Protestantism. In these, as in all similar cases, the characteristics of the creed are overpowered by the characteristics of the people; and the national faith is, in the most important points, altogether inoperative, because it does not harmonize with the civilization of the country in which it is established. How idle, then, it is to ascribe the civilization to the creed; and how worse than foolish are the attempts of government to protect a religion which, if suited to the people, will need no protection, and, if unsuited to them, will work no good!

If the reader has seized the spirit of the preceding arguments, he will hardly require that I should analyze with equal minuteness the second disturbing cause, namely, Literature. It is evident, that what has already been said respecting the religion of a people, is, in a great measure, applicable to their literature. Literature,[402] when it is in a healthy and unforced state, is simply the form in which the knowledge of a country is registered; the mould in which it is cast. In this, as in the other cases we have considered, individual men may of course take great steps, and rise to a great height above the level of their age. But if they rise beyond a certain point, their present usefulness is impaired; if they rise still higher, it is destroyed.[403] When the interval between the intellectual classes and the practical classes is too great, the former will possess no influence, the latter will reap no benefit. This is what occurred in the ancient world, when the distance between the ignorant idolatry of the people and the refined systems of philosophers was altogether impassable;[404] and this is the principal reason why the Greeks and Romans were unable to retain the civilization which they for a short time possessed. Precisely the same process is at the present moment going on in Germany, where the most valuable part of literature forms an esoteric system, which, having nothing in common with the nation itself, produces no effect on the national civilization. The truth is, that although Europe has received great benefit from its literature, this is owing, not to what the literature has originated, but to what it has preserved. Knowledge must be acquired, before it can be written; and the only use of books is, to serve as a storehouse in which the treasures of the intellect are safely kept, and where they may be conveniently found. Literature, in itself, is but a trifling matter; and is merely valuable as being the armory in which the weapons of the human mind are laid up, and from which, when required, they can be quickly drawn. But he would be a sorry reasoner, who, on that account, should propose to sacrifice the end, that he might obtain the means; who should hope to defend the armory by giving up the weapons, and who should destroy the treasure, in order to improve the magazine in which the treasure is kept.

[402] I use the word literature, not as opposed to science, but in its
larger sense, including everything which is written--'taking the
term literature in its primary sense, of an application of
letters to the records of facts or opinions.' _Mure's History of
the Literature of Greece_, vol. iv. p. 50.

[403] Compare _Tocqueville_, _Démocratie en Amérique_, vol. ii. p. 130,
with some admirable remarks on the Sophists in _Grote's History
of Greece_, vol. viii. p. 481. Sir W. Hamilton, whose learning
respecting the history of opinions is well known, says,
'Precisely in proportion as an author is in advance of his age,
is it likely that his works will be neglected.' _Hamilton's
Discussions on Philosophy_, p. 186. Thus, too, in regard to the
line arts, Sir Joshua Reynolds (_Fourth Discourse_, in _Works_,
vol. i. p. 363) says, 'Present time and future may be considered
as rivals; and he who solicits the one, must expect to be
discountenanced by the other.'

[404] Hence the intellectually exclusive and, as M. Neander well terms
it, 'aristocratic spirit of antiquity.' _Neander's History of the
Church_, vol. i. pp. 40, 97, vol. ii. p. 31. This is constantly
overlooked by writers who use the word 'democracy' loosely;
forgetting that, in the same age, democracies of politics may be
very common, while democracies of thought are very rare. For
proof of the universal prevalence formerly of this esoteric and
aristocratic spirit, see the following passages: _Ritter's
History of Ancient Philosophy_, vol. i. p. 338, vol. iii. pp. 9,
17; _Tennemann_, _Geschichte der Philosophie_, vol. ii. pp. 200,
205, 220; _Beausobre_, _Histoire Critique de Manichée_, vol. ii.
p. 41; _Matter_, _Histoire du Gnosticisme_, vol. i. p. 13, vol.
ii. pp. 83, 370; _Sprengel_, _Histoire de la Médecine_, vol. i.
p. 250; _Grote's History of Greece_, vol. i. p. 561, vol. iv. p.
544; _Thirlwall's History of Greece_, vol. ii. p. 150, vol. vi.
p. 95; _Warburton's Works_, vol. vii. pp. 962, 972, 4to. 1788;
_Sharpe's History of Egypt_, vol. ii. p. 174; _Cudworth's
Intellect. System_, vol. ii. pp. 114, 365, 443, vol. iii. p. 20.

Yet this is what many persons are apt to do. From literary men, in particular, we hear too much of the necessity of protecting and rewarding literature, and we hear too little of the necessity of that freedom and boldness, in the absence of which the most splendid literature is altogether worthless. Indeed, there is a general tendency, not to exaggerate the advantages of knowledge,--for that is impossible,--but to misunderstand what that is in which knowledge really consists. Real knowledge, the knowledge on which all civilization is based, solely consists in an acquaintance with the relations which things and ideas bear to each other and to themselves; in other words, in an acquaintance with physical and mental laws. If the time should ever come when all these laws are known, the circle of human knowledge will then be complete; and, in the interim, the value of literature depends upon the extent to which it communicates either a knowledge of the laws, or the materials by which the laws may be discovered. The business of education is to accelerate this great movement, and thus increase the fitness and aptitude of men, by increasing the resources which they possess. Towards this purpose, literature, so far as it is auxiliary, is highly useful. But to look upon an acquaintance with literature as one of the objects of education, is to mistake the order of events, and to make the end subservient to the means. It is because this is done, that we often find what are called highly educated men, the progress of whose knowledge has been actually retarded by the activity of their education. We often find them burdened by prejudices, which their reading, instead of dissipating, has rendered more inveterate.[405] For literature, being the depository of the thoughts of mankind, is full, not only of wisdom, but also of absurdities. The benefit, therefore, which is derived from literature, will depend, not so much upon the literature itself, as upon the skill with which it is studied, and the judgment with which it is selected. These are the preliminary conditions of success; and if they are not obeyed, the number and the value of the books in a country become a matter quite unimportant. Even in an advanced stage of civilization, there is always a tendency to prefer those parts of literature which favour ancient prejudices, rather than those which oppose them; and in cases where this tendency is very strong, the only effect of great learning will be, to supply the materials which may corroborate old errors, and confirm old superstitions. In our time such instances are not uncommon; and we frequently meet with men whose erudition ministers to their ignorance, and who the more they read, the less they know. There have been states of society in which this disposition was so general, that literature has done far more harm than good. Thus, for example, in the whole period from the sixth to the tenth centuries, there were not in all Europe more than three or four men who dared to think for themselves; and even they were obliged to veil their meaning in obscure and mystical language. The remaining part of society was, during these four centuries, sunk in the most degrading ignorance. Under these circumstances, the few who were able to read, confined their studies to works which encouraged and strengthened their superstition, such as the legends of the saints, and the homilies of the fathers. From these sources they drew those lying and impudent fables, of which the theology of that time is principally composed.[406] These miserable stories were widely circulated, and were valued as solid and important truths. The more the literature was read, the more the stories were believed; in other words, the greater the learning, the greater the ignorance.[407] And I entertain no doubt, that if, in the seventh and eighth centuries, which were the worst part of that period,[408] all knowledge of the alphabet had for a while been lost, so that men could no longer read the books in which they delighted, the subsequent progress of Europe would have been more rapid than it really was. For when the progress began, its principal antagonist was that credulity which the literature had fostered. It was not that better books were wanting, but it was that the relish for such books was extinct. There was the literature of Greece and Rome, which the monks not only preserved, but even occasionally looked into and copied. But what could that avail such readers as they? So far from recognizing the merit of the ancient writers, they were unable to feel even the beauties of their style, and they trembled at the boldness of their inquiries. At the first glimpse of the light, their eyes were blinded. They never turned the leaves of a pagan author without standing aghast at the risk they were running; and they were in constant fear, lest by imbibing any of his opinions, they should involve themselves in a deadly sin. The result was, that they willingly laid aside the great master-pieces of antiquity; and in their place they substituted those wretched compilations, which corrupted their taste, increased their credulity, strengthened their errors, and prolonged the ignorance of Europe, by embodying each separate superstition in a written and accessible form, thus perpetuating its influence, and enabling it to enfeeble the understanding even of a distant posterity.

[405] Locke has noticed this 'learned ignorance,' for which many men are
remarkable. See a fine passage in the _Essay on Human
Understanding_, book iii. chap. x. in _Locke's Works_, vol. ii.
p. 27, and similar remarks in his _Conduct of the Understanding_,
vol. ii. pp. 350, 364, 365, and in his _Thoughts on Education_,
vol. viii. pp. 84-87. If this profound writer were now alive what
a war he would wage against our great universities and public
schools, where innumerable things are still taught which no one
is concerned to understand, and which few will take the trouble
to remember. Compare _Condorcet_, _Vie de Turgot_, pp. 255, 256
note.

[406] The statistics of this sort of literature would prove a curious
subject for inquiry. No one, I believe, has thought it worth
while to sum them up; but M. Guizot has made an estimate that the
Bollandist collection contains more than twenty-five thousand
lives of saints; 'à en juger par approximation, ils contiennent
plus de 25,000 vies de saints.' _Guizot_, _Histoire de la
Civilisation en France_, vol. ii. p. 32. It is said (_Ledwich's
Antiquities of Ireland_, p. 62) that of St. Patrick alone, there
were sixty-six biographers before Joceline.

[407] For, as Laplace observes, in his remarks on the sources of error
in connexion with the doctrine of probabilities, 'C'est à
l'influence de l'opinion de ceux que la multitude juge les plus
instruits, et à qui elle a coutume de donner sa confiance sur les
plus importants objets de la vie, qu'est due la propagation de
ces erreurs qui, dans les temps d'ignorance, ont couvert la face
du monde.' _Bouillaud_, _Philosophie Médicale_, p. 218.

[408] M. Guizot (_Civilisation en France_, vol. ii. pp. 171, 172) thinks
that, on the whole, the seventh was even worse than the eighth;
but it is difficult to choose between them.

It is in this way that the nature of the literature possessed by a people is of very inferior importance, in comparison with the disposition of the people by whom the literature is to be read. In what are rightly termed the Dark Ages, there was a literature in which valuable materials were to be found; but there was no one who knew how to use them. During a considerable period, the Latin language was a vernacular dialect;[409] and, if men had chosen, they might have studied the great Latin authors. But to do this, they must have been in a state of society very different from that in which they actually lived. They, like every other people, measured merit by the standard commonly received in their own age; and, according to their standard, the dross was better than the gold. They, therefore, rejected the gold, and hoarded up the dross. What took place then is, on a smaller scale, taking place now. Every literature contains something that is true, and much that is false; and the effect it produces will chiefly depend upon the skill with which the truth is discriminated from the falsehood. New ideas, and new discoveries, possess prospectively an importance difficult to exaggerate; but until the ideas are received, and the discoveries adopted, they exercise no influence, and, therefore, work no good. No literature can ever benefit a people, unless it finds them in a state of preliminary preparation. In this respect, the analogy with religious opinions is complete. If the religion and the literature of a country are unsuited to its wants, they will be useless, because the literature will be neglected, and the religion will be disobeyed. In such cases, even the ablest books are unread, and the purest doctrines despised. The works fall into oblivion; the faith is corrupted by heresy.

[409] Some of the results of Latin being colloquially employed by the
monks are judiciously stated in _Herder's Ideen zur Geschichte
der Menschheit_, vol. iv. pp. 202, 203. The remarks on this
custom by Dugald Stewart refer to a later period. _Stewart's
Philosophy of the Mind_, vol. iii. pp. 110, 111.