Chapter I (2)

Of all offences, it might well be supposed that the crime of murder is one of the most arbitrary and irregular. For when we consider that this, though generally the crowning act of a long career of vice, is often the immediate result of what seems a sudden impulse; that when premeditated, its committal, even with the least chance of impunity, requires a rare combination of favourable circumstances for which the criminal will frequently wait; that he has thus to bide his time, and look for opportunities he cannot control; that when the time has come his heart may fail him; that the question whether or not he shall commit the crime may depend on a balance of conflicting motives, such as fear of the law, a dread of the penalties held out by religion, the prickings of his own conscience, the apprehension of future remorse, the love of gain, jealousy, revenge, desperation;--when we put all these things together, there arises such a complication of causes, that we might reasonably despair of detecting any order or method in the result of those subtle and shifting agencies by which murder is either caused or prevented. But now, how stands the fact? The fact is, that murder is committed with as much regularity, and bears as uniform a relation to certain known circumstances, as do the movements of the tides, and the rotations of the seasons. M. Quetelet, who has spent his life in collecting and methodizing the statistics of different countries, states, as the result of his laborious researches, that 'in everything which concerns crime, the same numbers re-occur with a constancy which cannot be mistaken; and that this is the case even with those crimes which seem quite independent of human foresight, such, for instance, as murders, which are generally committed after quarrels arising from circumstances apparently casual. Nevertheless, we know from experience that every year there not only take place nearly the same number of murders, but that even the instruments by which they are committed are employed in the same proportion.'[23] This was the language used in 1835 by confessedly the first statistician in Europe, and every subsequent investigation has confirmed its accuracy. For later inquiries have ascertained the extraordinary fact that the uniform reproduction of crime is more clearly marked, and more capable of being predicted, than are the physical laws connected with the disease and destruction of our bodies. Thus, for instance, the number of persons accused of crime in France between 1826 and 1844 was, by a singular coincidence, about equal to the male deaths which took place in Paris during the same period, the difference being that the fluctuations in the amount of crime were actually smaller than the fluctuations in the mortality; while a similar regularity was observed in each separate offence, all of which obeyed the same law of uniform and periodical repetition.[24]

[23] 'Dans tout ce qui se rapporte aux crimes, les mêmes nombres se
reproduisent avec une constance telle, qu'il serait impossible de
la méconnaître, même pour ceux des crimes qui sembleraient devoir
échapper le plus à toute prévision humaine, tels que les meurtres,
puisqu'ils se commettent, en général, à la suite de rixes qui
naissent sans motifs, et dans les circonstances, en apparence,
les plus fortuites. Cependant l'expérience prouve que non-seulement
les meurtres sont annuellement à peu près en même nombre, mais
encore que les instrumens qui servent à les commettre sont employés
dans les mêmes proportions.' _Quetelet sur l'Homme_, Paris, 1835,
vol. i. p. 7; see also vol. ii. pp. 164, 247.

[24] 'Thus in twenty years' observations, the number of persons accused
of various crimes in France, and registered under their respective
ages, scarcely varies at any age from year to year, comparing the
proportion per cent. under each age with the totals. The number of
persons accused in all France, in the years 1826 to 1844, was about
equal to the deaths of males registered in Paris; but singularly
enough, the former results are more regular than the latter,
notwithstanding the accidental causes which might affect
them;--notwithstanding even a revolution in Paris, which convulsed
society and brought in a new dynasty.' _Brown on the Uniform Action
of the Human Will_, in _The Assurance Magazine_, no. viii., July
1852, pp. 349, 350. That the variations in crime are less than
those of mortality, is also noticed in _Statistique Morale_,
pp. 18, 34, in _Mémoires de l'Académie de Belgique_, vol. xxi.,
Bruxelles, 1848, 4to.

This, indeed, will appear strange to those who believe that human actions depend more upon the peculiarities of each individual than on the general state of society. But another circumstance remains behind still more striking. Among public and registered crimes there is none which seems so completely dependent on the individual as suicide. Attempts to murder or to rob may be, and constantly are, successfully resisted; baffled sometimes by the party attacked, sometimes by the officers of justice. But an attempt to commit suicide is much less liable to interruption. The man who is determined to kill himself is not prevented at the last moment by the struggles of an enemy; and, as he can easily guard against the interference of the civil power,[25] his act becomes as it were isolated; it is cut off from foreign disturbances, and seems more clearly the product of his own volition than any other offence could possibly be. We may also add that, unlike crimes in general, it is rarely caused by the instigation of confederates; so that men, not being goaded into it by their companions, are uninfluenced by one great class of external associations which might hamper what is termed the freedom of their will. It may, therefore, very naturally be thought impracticable to refer suicide to general principles, or to detect anything like regularity in an offence which is so eccentric, so solitary, so impossible to control by legislation, and which the most vigilant police can do nothing to diminish. There is also another obstacle that impedes our view: this is, that even the best evidence respecting suicide must always be very imperfect. In cases of drowning, for example, deaths are liable to be returned as suicides which are accidental; while, on the other hand, some are called accidental which are voluntary.[26] Thus it is, that self-murder seems to be not only capricious and uncontrollable, but also very obscure in regard to proof; so that on all these grounds it might be reasonable to despair of ever tracing it to those general causes by which it is produced.

[25] The folly of lawgivers thinking that by their enactments they can
diminish suicide, is exposed by M. C. Comte in his _Traité de
Législation_, vol. i. p. 486. See also some good remarks by
Jefferson, in his observations on criminal law in _Appendix to
Jefferson's Memoirs, by Randolph_, vol. i. pp. 126, 127. Heber
(_Journey through India_, vol. i. pp. 389, 390) found that the
English Government had vainly attempted to check the suicides
frequently committed at Benares by drowning: and in our country
the interference of legislators is met by the perjury of jurors,
since, as Bentham says, English juries do not hesitate to violate
their oaths by declaring the suicide to be _non compos_.
_Principles of Penal Law_, in _Bentham's Works_, edit. Bowring,
1843, vol. i. pp. 479, 480. In regard to the determination of the
individual, and the impossibility of baffling his intention, there
are cases recorded of persons who, being deprived of the ordinary
means of destruction, put an end to life by holding their breath;
while others effected their purpose by turning back the tongue so
as to exclude air from the larynx. _Elliotson's Human Physiology_,
pp. 491, 492.

[26] This also applies to other cases besides those of drowning. See
_Taylor's Medical Jurisprudence_, 1846, pp. 587, 597; and on the
difficulty of always distinguishing a real suicide from an apparent
one, see _Esquirol_, _Maladies Mentales_, vol. i. p. 575. From a
third to a half of all suicides are by drowning. Compare _Dufau_,
_Traité de Statistique_, p. 304; _Winslow's Anatomy of Suicide_,
1840, p. 277; _Quetelet_, _Statistique Morale_, p. 66. But among
these, many are no doubt involuntary; and it is certain that
popular opinion grossly exaggerates the length of time during which
it is possible to remain under water. _Brodie's Surgery_, 1846,
pp. 89-92.

These being the peculiarities of this singular crime, it is surely an astonishing fact, that all the evidence we possess respecting it points to one great conclusion, and can leave no doubt on our minds that suicide is merely the product of the general condition of society, and that the individual felon only carries into effect what is a necessary consequence of preceding circumstances.[27] In a given state of society, a certain number of persons must put an end to their own life. This is the general law; and the special question as to who shall commit the crime depends, of course, upon special laws; which, however, in their total action, must obey the large social law to which they are all subordinate. And the power of the larger law is so irresistible, that neither the love of life nor the fear of another world can avail anything towards even checking its operation. The causes of this remarkable regularity I shall hereafter examine; but the existence of the regularity is familiar to whoever is conversant with moral statistics. In the different countries for which we have returns, we find year by year the same proportion of persons putting an end to their own existence; so that, after making allowance for the impossibility of collecting complete evidence, we are able to predict, within a very small limit of error, the number of voluntary deaths for each ensuing period; supposing, of course, that the social circumstances do not undergo any marked change. Even in London, notwithstanding the vicissitudes incidental to the largest and most luxurious capital in the world, we find a regularity greater than could be expected by the most sanguine believer in social laws; since political excitement, mercantile excitement, and the misery produced by the dearness of food, are all causes of suicide, and are all constantly varying.[28] Nevertheless, in this vast metropolis, about 240 persons every year make away with themselves; the annual suicides oscillating, from the pressure of temporary causes, between 266, the highest, and 213, the lowest. In 1846, which was the great year of excitement caused by the railway panic, the suicides in London were 266; in 1847 began a slight improvement, and they fell to 256; in 1848 they were 247; in 1849 they were 213; and in 1850 they were 229.[29]

[27] 'Tout semble dépendre de causes déterminées. Ainsi, nous trouvons
annuellement à peu près le même nombre de suicides, non-seulement
en général, mais encore en faisant la distinction des sexes, celle
des âges, ou même celle des instruments employés pour se détruire.
Une année reproduit si fidèlement les chiffres de l'année qui a
précédé, qu'on peut prévoir ce qui doit arriver dans l'année qui
va suivre.' _Quetelet_, _Statistique Morale_, 1848, p. 35; see
also p. 40.

[28] On the causes of suicides, see _Burdach's Traité de Physiologie_,
vol. v. pp. 476-478; and _Forry's Climate and its Endemic
Influences_, p. 329. The latest researches of M. Casper confirm
the statement of earlier statisticians, that suicide is more
frequent among Protestants than among Catholics. _Casper_,
_Denkwürdigkeiten zur medicinischen Statistik_, Berlin, 1846,
p. 139.

[29] See the tables in the _Assurance Magazine_, no. iv. p. 309, no.
v. p. 34, no. viii. p. 350. These are the only complete
consecutive returns of London suicides yet published; those issued
by the police being imperfect. _Assurance Magazine_, no. v. p. 53.
From inquiries made for me at the General Register Office, in
January 1856, I learnt that there was an intention of completing
the yearly returns, but I do not know if this has since been done.

Such is some, and only some, of the evidence we now possess respecting the regularity with which, in the same state of society, the same crimes are necessarily reproduced. To appreciate the full force of this evidence, we must remember that it is not an arbitrary selection of particular facts, but that it is generalized from an exhaustive statement of criminal statistics, consisting of many millions of observations, extending over countries in different grades of civilization, with different laws, different opinions, different morals, different habits. If we add to this, that these statistics have been collected by persons specially employed for that purpose, with every means of arriving at the truth, and with no interest to deceive, it surely must be admitted that the existence of crime according to a fixed and uniform scheme, is a fact more clearly attested than any other in the moral history of man. We have here parallel chains of evidence formed with extreme care, under the most different circumstances, and all pointing in the same direction; all of them forcing us to the conclusion, that the offences of men are the result not so much of the vices of the individual offender as of the state of society into which that individual is thrown.[30] This is an inference resting on broad and tangible proofs accessible to all the world; and as such cannot be overturned, or even impeached, by any of those hypotheses with which metaphysicians and theologians have hitherto perplexed the study of past events.

[30] 'L'expérience démontre en effet, avec toute l'évidence possible,
cette opinion, qui pourra sembler paradoxale au premier abord, que
_c'est la société qui prépare le crime, et que le coupable n'est
que l'instrument qui l'exécute_.' _Quetelet sur l'Homme_, vol. ii.
p. 325.

Those readers who are acquainted with the manner in which in the physical world the operations of the laws of nature are constantly disturbed, will expect to find in the moral world disturbances equally active. Such aberrations proceed, in both instances, from minor laws, which at particular points meet the larger laws, and thus alter their normal action. Of this, the science of mechanics affords a good example in the instance of that beautiful theory called the parallelogram of forces; according to which the forces are to each other in the same proportion as is the diagonal of their respective parallelograms.[31] This is a law pregnant with great results; it is connected with those important mechanical resources, the composition and resolution of forces; and no one acquainted with the evidence on which it stands, ever thought of questioning its truth. But the moment we avail ourselves of it for practical purposes, we find that in its action it is warped by other laws, such as those concerning the friction of air, and the different density of the bodies on which we operate, arising from their chemical composition, or, as some suppose, from their atomic arrangement. Perturbations being thus let in, the pure and simple action of the mechanical law disappears. Still, and although the results of the law are incessantly disturbed, the law itself remains intact.[32] Just in the same way, the great social law, that the moral actions of men are the product not of their volition, but of their antecedents, is itself liable to disturbances which trouble its operation without affecting its truth. And this is quite sufficient to explain those slight variations which we find from year to year in the total amount of crime produced by the same country. Indeed, looking at the fact that the moral world is far more abundant in materials than the physical world, the only ground for astonishment is that these variations should not be greater; and from the circumstance that the discrepancies are so trifling, we may form some idea of the prodigious energy of those vast social laws, which, though constantly interrupted, seem to triumph over every obstacle, and which, when examined by the aid of large numbers, scarcely undergo any sensible perturbation.[33]

[31] The diagonal always giving the resultant when each side represents
a force; and if we look on the resultant as a compound force, a
comparison of diagonals becomes a comparison of compounds.

[32] A law of nature being merely a generalization of relations, and
having no existence except in the mind, is essentially intangible;
and therefore, however small the law may be, it can never admit of
exceptions, though its operation may admit of innumerable
exceptions. Hence, as Dugald Stewart (_Philosophy of the Mind_,
vol. ii. p. 211) rightly says, we can only refer to the laws of
nature 'by a sort of figure or metaphor.' This is constantly lost
sight of even by authors of repute; some of whom speak of laws as
if they were causes, and therefore liable to interruption by larger
causes; while other writers pronounce them to be 'delegated
agencies' from the Deity. Compare _Prout's Bridgewater Treatise_,
pp. 318, 435, 495; _Sadler's Law of Population_, vol. ii. p. 67;
_Burdach's Physiologie_, vol. i. p. 160. Mr. Paget, in his able
work, _Lectures on Pathology_, vol. i. p. 481, vol. ii. p. 542,
with much greater accuracy calls such cases 'apparent exceptions'
to laws; but it would be better to say, 'exceptions to the
operations of laws.' The context clearly proves that Mr. Paget
distinctly apprehends the difference; but a slight alteration of
this kind would prevent confusion in the minds of ordinary readers.

[33] Mr. Rawson, in his _Inquiry into the Statistics of Crime in England
and Wales_ (published in the _Journal of the Statistical Society_,
vol. ii. pp. 316-344), says, p. 327, 'No greater proof can be given
of the possibility of arriving at certain constants with regard to
crime, than the fact which appears in the following table, that the
greatest variation which has taken place during the last three
years, in the proportion of any class of criminals at the same
period of life, has not exceeded a half per cent.' See also _Report
of British Association for 1839, Transac. of Sec._, p. 118. Indeed,
all writers who have examined the evidence are forced to admit this
regularity, however they may wish to explain it. M. Dufau (_Traité
de Statistique_, p. 144) says, 'Les faits de l'ordre moral sont,
aussi bien que ceux de l'ordre naturel, le produit de causes
constantes et régulières,' &c.; and at p. 367, 'C'est ainsi que le
monde moral se présente à nous, de ce point de vue, comme offrant,
de même que le monde physique, un ensemble continu d'effets dus à
des causes constantes et régulières, dont il appartient surtout à
la statistique de constater l'action.' See to the same effect
_Moreau-Christophe des Prisons en France_, Paris, 1838, pp. 53,
189.

Nor is it merely the crimes of men which are marked by this uniformity of sequence. Even the number of marriages annually contracted, is determined, not by the temper and wishes of individuals, but by large general facts, over which individuals can exercise no authority. It is now known that marriages bear a fixed and definite relation to the price of corn;[34] and in England the experience of a century has proved that, instead of having any connexion with personal feelings, they are simply regulated by the average earnings of the great mass of the people:[35] so that this immense social and religious institution is not only swayed, but is completely controlled, by the price of food and by the rate of wages. In other cases, uniformity has been detected, though the causes of the uniformity are still unknown. Thus, to give a curious instance, we are now able to prove that even the aberrations of memory are marked by this general character of necessary and invariable order. The post-offices of London and of Paris have latterly published returns of the number of letters which the writers, through forgetfulness, omitted to direct; and, making allowance for the difference of circumstances, the returns are year after year copies of each other. Year after year the same proportion of letter-writers forget this simple act; so that for each successive period we can actually foretell the number of persons whose memory will fail them in regard to this trifling and, as it might appear, accidental occurrence.[36]

[34] 'It is curious to observe how intimate a relation exists between
the price of food and the number of marriages.' ... 'The relation
that subsists between the price of food and the number of marriages
is not confined to our own country; and it is not improbable that,
had we the means of ascertaining the facts, we should see the like
result in every civilized community. We possess the necessary
returns from France; and these fully bear out the view that has
been given.' _Porter's Progress of the Nation_, vol. ii. pp. 244,
245, London, 1838.

[35] 'The marriage returns of 1850 and 1851 exhibit the excess which
since 1750 has been invariably observed when the substantial
earnings of the people are above the average.' _Journal of
Statistical Society_, vol. xv. p. 185.

[36] See _Somerville's Physical Geography_, vol. ii. pp. 409-411, which,
says this able writer, proves that 'forgetfulness as well as free
will is under constant laws.' But this is using the word 'free
will' in a sense different from that commonly employed.

To those who have a steady conception of the regularity of events, and have firmly seized the great truth that the actions of men, being guided by their antecedents, are in reality never inconsistent, but, however capricious they may appear, only form part of one vast scheme of universal order, of which we in the present state of knowledge can barely see the outline--to those who understand this, which is at once the key and the basis of history, the facts just adduced, so far from being strange, will be precisely what would have been expected and ought long since to have been known. Indeed, the progress of inquiry is becoming so rapid and so earnest, that I entertain little doubt that before another century has elapsed, the chain of evidence will be complete, and it will be as rare to find an historian who denies the undeviating regularity of the moral world, as it now is to find a philosopher who denies the regularity of the material world.

It will be observed, that the preceding proofs of our actions being regulated by law, have been derived from statistics; a branch of knowledge which, though still in its infancy,[37] has already thrown more light on the study of human nature than all the sciences put together. But although the statisticians have been the first to investigate this great subject by treating it according to those methods of reasoning which in other fields have been found successful; and although they have, by the application of numbers, brought to bear upon it a very powerful engine for eliciting truth--we must not, on that account, suppose that there are no other resources remaining by which it may likewise be cultivated: nor should we infer that because the physical sciences have not yet been applied to history, they are therefore inapplicable to it. Indeed, when we consider the incessant contact between man and the external world, it is certain that there must be an intimate connexion between human actions and physical laws; so that if physical science had not hitherto been brought to bear upon history, the reason is, either that historians have not perceived the connexion, or else that, having perceived it, they have been destitute of the knowledge by which its workings can be traced. Hence there has arisen an unnatural separation of the two great departments of inquiry, the study of the internal and that of the external: and although, in the present state of European literature, there are some unmistakable symptoms of a desire to break down this artificial barrier, still it must be admitted that as yet nothing has been actually accomplished towards effecting so great an end. The moralists, the theologians, and the metaphysicians, continue to prosecute their studies without much respect for what they deem the inferior labours of scientific men; whose inquiries, indeed, they frequently attack, as dangerous to the interests of religion, and as inspiring us with an undue confidence in the resources of the human understanding. On the other hand, the cultivators of physical science, conscious that they are an advancing body, are naturally proud of their own success; and, contrasting their discoveries with the more stationary position of their opponents, are led to despise pursuits the barrenness of which has now become notorious.

[37] Achenwall, in the middle of the eighteenth century, is usually
considered to be the first systematic writer on statistics, and is
said to have given them their present name. See _Lewis_, _Methods
of Observation and Reasoning in Politics_, 1852, vol. i. p. 72;
_Biographie Universelle_, vol. i. p. 140; _Dufau_, _Traité de
Statistique_, pp. 9, 10. Even so late as 1800, the Bishop of
Llandaff wrote to Sir John Sinclair, 'I must think the kingdom is
highly indebted to you for bringing forward a species of knowledge
(statistics) wholly new in this country, though not new in other
parts of Europe.' _Sinclair's Correspondence_, vol. i. p. 230.
Sinclair, notwithstanding his industry, was a man of slender
powers, and did not at all understand the real importance of
statistics, of which, indeed, he took a mere practical view.
Since then statistics have been applied extensively to medicine;
and still more recently, and on a smaller scale, to philology and
to jurisprudence. Compare _Bouillaud_, _Philosophie Médicale_,
pp. 96, 186; _Renouard_, _Hist. de la Médecine_, vol. ii. pp. 474,
475; _Esquirol_, _Maladies Mentales_, vol. ii. pp. 665-667;
_Holland's Medical Notes_, pp. 5, 472; _Vogel's Pathological
Anatomy_, pp. 15-17; _Simon's Pathology_, p. 180; _Phillips on
Scrofula_, pp. 70, 118, &c.; _Prichard's Physical Hist. of
Mankind_, vol. iv. p. 414; _Eschbach_, _Etude du Droit_,
pp. 392-394.

It is the business of the historian to mediate between these two parties, and reconcile their hostile pretensions by showing the point at which their respective studies ought to coalesce. To settle the terms of this coalition, will be to fix the basis of all history. For since history deals with the actions of men, and since their actions are merely the product of a collision between internal and external phenomena, it becomes necessary to examine the relative importance of those phenomena; to inquire into the extent to which their laws are known; and to ascertain the resources for future discovery possessed by these two great classes, the students of the mind and the students of nature. This task I shall endeavour to accomplish in the next two chapters: and if I do so with anything approaching to success, the present work will at least have the merit of contributing something towards filling up that wide and dreary chasm, which, to the hindrance of our knowledge, separates subjects that are intimately related, and should never be disunited.

* * * * *

NOTE A.

'Der Begriff der Freiheit ist ein reiner Vernunftbegriff, der eben darum für die theoretische Philosophie transcendent, d. i. ein solcher ist, dem kein angemessenes Beispiel in irgend einer möglichen Erfahrung gegeben werden kann, welcher also keinen Gegenstand einer uns möglichen theoretischen Erkenntniss ausmacht, und schlechterdings nicht für ein constitutives, sondern lediglich als regulatives, und zwar nur bloss negatives Princip der speculativen Vernunft gelten kann, im praktischen Gebrauche der selben aber seine Realität durch praktische Grundsätze beweist, die, als Gesetze, eine Causalität der reinen Vernunft, unabhängig von allen empirischen Bedingungen (dem Sinnlichen überhaupt), die Willkühr zu bestimmen, und einen reinen Willen in uns beweisen, in welchem die sittlichen Begriffe und Gesetze ihren Ursprung haben.' _Metaphysik der Sitten_, in _Kant's Werke_, vol. v. pp. 20, 21. 'Würden die Gegenstände der Sinnenwelt für Dinge an sich selbst genommen, und die oben angeführten Naturgesetze für Gesetze der Dinge an sich selbst, so wäre der Widerspruch' (_i.e._ between Liberty and Necessity) 'unvermeidlich. Ebenso, wenn das Subject der Freiheit gleich den übrigen Gegenständen als blose Erscheinung vorgestellt würde, so könnte ebensowohl der Widerspruch nicht vermieden werden; denn es würde ebendasselbe von einerlei Gegenständen in derselben Bedeutung zugleich bejaht und verneint werden. Ist aber Naturnothwendigkeit bloss auf Erscheinungen bezogen, und Freiheit bloss auf Dinge an sich selbst, so entspringt kein Widerspruch, wenn man gleich beide Arten von Causalität annimmt oder zugibt, so schwer oder unmöglich es auch sein möchte, die von der letzteren Art begreiflich zu machen.' ... 'Natur also und Freiheit eben demselben Dinge, aber in verschiedener Beziehung, einmal als Erscheinung, das andre Mal als einem Dinge an sich selbst ohne Widerspruch beigelegt werden können.' ... 'Nun kann ich ohne Widerspruch sagen: alle Handlungen vernünftiger Wesen, sofern sie Erscheinungen sind (in irgend einer Erfahrung angetroffen werden), stehen unter der Naturnothwendigkeit; eben dieselben Handlungen aber, bloss respective auf das vernünftige Subject und dessen Vermögen, nach blosser Vernunft zu handeln, sind frei.' _Prolegomena zu jeder künftigen Metaphysik_, in _Kant's Werke_, vol. iii. pp. 268-270. 'Denn ein Geschöpf zu sein und als Naturwesen bloss dem Willen seines Urhebers zu folgen; dennoch aber als freihandelndes Wesen (welches seinen vom äusseren Einfluss unabhängigen Willen hat, der dem ersteren vielfältig zuwider sein kann), der Zurechnung fähig zu sein, und seine eigene That doch auch zugleich als die Wirkung eines höheren Wesens anzusehen: ist eine Vereinbarung von Begriffen, die wir zwar in der Idee einer Welt, als des höchsten Gutes, zusammen denken müssen; die aber nur der einsehen kann, welcher bis zur Kenntniss der übersinnlichen (intelligiblen) Welt durchdringt und die Art einsieht, wie sie der Sinnenwelt zum Grunde liegt.' _Theodicee_, in _Kant's Werke_, vol. vi. p. 149. 'Nun wollen wir annehmen, die durch unsere Kritik nothwendig gemachte Unterscheidung der Dinge, als Gegenstände der Erfahrung, von eben denselben, als Dingen an sich selbst, wäre gar nicht gemacht, so müsste der Grundsatz der Causalität und mithin der Naturmechanismus in Bestimmung derselben durchaus von allen Dingen überhaupt als wirkenden Ursachen gelten. Von eben demselben Wesen also, z. B. der menschlichen Seele, würde ich nicht sagen können, ihr Wille sei frei, und er sei doch zugleich der Naturnothwendigkeit unterworfen, d. i. nicht frei, ohne in einen offenbaren Widerspruch zu gerathen; weil ich die Seele in beiden Sätzen in eben derselben Bedeutung, nämlich als Ding überhaupt (als Sache an sich selbst), genommen habe und, ohne vorhergehende Kritik, auch nicht anders nehmen konnte. Wenn aber die Kritik nicht geirrt hat, da sie das Object in zweierlei Bedeutung nehmen lehrt, nämlich als Erscheinung, oder als Ding an sich selbst; wenn die Deduction ihrer Verstandesbegriffe richtig ist, mithin auch der Grundsatz der Causalität nur auf Dinge im ersten Sinne genommen, nämlich so fern sie Gegenstände der Erfahrung sind, geht, eben dieselben aber nach der zweiten Bedeutung ihm nicht unterworfen sind, so wird eben derselbe Wille in der Erscheinung (den sichtbaren Handlungen) als dem Naturgesetze nothwendig gemäss und so fern nicht frei, und doch andererseits, als einem Dinge an sich selbst angehörig, jenem nicht unterworfen, mithin als frei gedacht, ohne dass hiebei ein Widerspruch vorgeht.' _Kritik der reinen Vernunft_, in _Kant's Werke_, vol. ii. p. 24. 'Und hier zeigt die zwar gemeine, aber betrügliche Voraussetzung der absoluten Realität der Erscheinungen sogleich ihren nachtheiligen Einfluss, die Vernunft zu verwirren. Denn sind Erscheinungen Dinge an sich selbst, so ist Freiheit nicht zu retten. Alsdann ist Natur die vollständige und an sich hinreichend bestimmende Ursache jeder Begebenheit, und die Bedingung derselben ist jederzeit nur in der Reihe der Erscheinungen enthalten, die sammt ihrer Wirkung unter dem Naturgesetze nothwendig sind. Wenn dagegen Erscheinungen für Nichts mehr gelten, als sie in der That sind, nämlich nicht für Dinge an sich, sondern blosse Vorstellungen, die nach empirischen Gesetzen zusammenhängen, so müssen sie selbst noch Gründe haben, die nicht Erscheinungen sind.' ... 'Hier habe ich nur die Anmerkung machen wollen, dass, da der durchgängige Zusammenhang aller Erscheinungen in einem Context der Natur ein unnachlässliches Gesetz ist, dieses alle Freiheit nothwendig umstürzen müsste, wenn man der Realität der Erscheinungen hartnäckig anhängen wollte. Daher auch diejenigen, welche hierin der gemeinen Meinung folgen, niemals dahin haben gelangen können, Natur und Freiheit mit einander zu vereinigen.' _Kritik_, in _Werke_, vol. ii. pp. 419, 420. Finally, at p. 433, 'Man muss wohl bemerken, dass wir hiedurch nicht die Wirklichkeit der Freiheit, als eines der Vermögen, welche die Ursache von den Erscheinungen unserer Sinnenwelt enthalten, haben darthun wollen. Denn ausser dass dieses gar keine transcendentale Betrachtung, die bloss mit Begriffen zu thun hat, gewesen sein würde, so könnte es auch nicht gelingen, indem wir aus der Erfahrung niemals auf Etwas, was gar nicht nach Erfahrungsgesetzen gedacht werden muss, schliessen können. Ferner haben wir auch gar nicht einmal die Möglichkeit der Freiheit beweisen wollen; denn dieses wäre auch nicht gelungen, weil wir überhaupt von keinem Realgrunde und keiner Causalität aus blossen Begriffen _a priori_ die Möglichkeit erkennen können. Die Freiheit wird hier nur als transcendentale Idee behandelt, wodurch die Vernunft die Reihe der Bedingungen in der Erscheinung durch das sinnlich Unbedingte schlechthin aufzuheben denkt, dabei sich in eine Antinomie mit ihren eigenen Gesetzen, welche sie dem empirischen Gebrauche des Verstandes vorschreibt, verwickelt. Dass nun diese Antinomie auf einem blossen Scheine beruhe, und dass Natur der Causalität aus Freiheit wenigstens nicht widerstreite, das war das Einzige, was wir leisten konnten, und woran es uns auch einzig und allein gelegen war.'

These passages prove that Kant saw that the phenomenal reality of Free Will is an indefensible doctrine: and as the present work is an investigation of the laws of phenomena, his transcendental philosophy does not affect my conclusions. According to Kant's view (and with which I am inclined to agree) the ordinary metaphysical and theological treatment of this dark problem is purely empirical, and therefore has no value. The denial of the supremacy of consciousness follows as a natural consequence, and is the result of the Kantian philosophy, and not, as is often said, the base of it.