Chapter IV (3)

[Footnote 362: The utterances of Justin do not clearly indicate whether the non-Christian portion of mankind has only a [Greek: sperma tou logon] as a natural possession, or whether this [Greek: sperma] has in some cases been enhanced by the inward workings of the whole Logos (inspiration). This ambiguity, however, arises from the fact that he did not further discuss the relation between [Greek: ho logos] and [Greek: to sperma tou logou] and we need not therefore attempt to remove it. On the one hand, the excellent discoveries of poets and philosophers are simply traced to [Greek: to emphuton panti genei anthrôpôn sperma tou logou] (Apol. II. 8), the [Greek: meros spermatikou logou] (ibid) which was implanted at the creation, and on which the human [Greek: heuresis kai theôria] depend (II. 10). In this sense it may be said of them all that they "in human fashion attempted to understand and prove things by means of reason;" and Socrates is merely viewed as the [Greek: pantôn eutonôteros] (ibid.), his philosophy also, like all pre-Christian systems, being a [Greek: philosophia anthrôpeios] (II. 15). But on the other hand Christ was known by Socrates though only [Greek: apo merous]; for "Christ was and is the Logos who dwells in every man." Further, according to the Apologist, the [Greek: meros tou spermatikou theiou logou] bestows the power of recognising whatever is related to the Logos ([Greek: to sungenes] II. 13). Consequently it may not only be said: [Greek: hosa para pasi kalôs eirêtai hêmôn, tôn Christianôn esti] (ibid.), but, on the strength of the "participation" in reason conferred on all, it may be asserted that all who have lived with the Logos ([Greek: meta logou])--an expression which must have been ambiguous--were Christians. Among the Greeks this specially applies to Socrates and Heraclitus (I. 46). Moreover, the Logos implanted in man does not belong to his nature in such a sense as to prevent us saying [Greek: upo logou dia Sôkratous êlegchthê k.t.l.] (I. 5). Nevertheless [Greek: autos ho logos] did not act in Socrates, for this only appeared in Christ (ibid). Hence the prevailing aspect of the case in Justin was that to which he gave expression at the close of the 2nd Apology (II. 15: alongside of Christianity there is only _human_ philosophy), and which, not without regard for the opposite view, he thus formulated in II. 13 fin.: All non-Christian authors were able to attain a knowledge of true being, though only darkly, by means of the seed of the Logos naturally implanted within them. For the [Greek: spora] and [Greek: mimêma] of a thing, which are bestowed in proportion to one's receptivity, are quite different from the thing itself, which divine grace bestows on us for our possession and imitation.]

[Footnote 363: "For the sake of man" (Stoic) Apol. I. 10: II. 4, 5; Dial. 41, p. 260, Apol I. 8: "Longing for the eternal and pure life, we strive to abide in the fellowship of God, the Father and Creator of all things, and we hasten to make confession, because we are convinced and firmly believe that that happiness is really attainable." It is frequently asserted that it is the Logos which produces such conviction and awakens courage and strength.]

[Footnote 364: Justin has destroyed the force of this argument in two passages (I. 44, 59) by tracing (like the Alexandrian Jews) all true knowledge of the poets and philosophers to borrowing from the books of the Old Testament (Moses). Of what further use then is the [Greek: sperma logos emphuton]? Did Justin not really take it seriously? Did he merely wish to suit himself to those whom he was addressing? We are not justified in asserting this. Probably, however, the adoption of that Jewish view of the history of the world is a proof that the results of the demon sovereignty were in Justin's estimation so serious that he no longer expected anything from the [Greek: sperma logos emphuton] when left to its own resources; and therefore regarded truth and prophetic revelation as inseparable. But this view is not the essential one in the Apology. That assumption of Justin's is evidently dependent on a tradition, whilst his real opinion was more "liberal."]

[Footnote 365: Compare with this the following passages: In Apol. I. 20 are enumerated a series of the most important doctrines common to philosophers and Christians. Then follow the words: "If we then in particular respects even teach something similar to the doctrines of the philosophers honoured among you, though in many cases in a divine and more sublime way; and we indeed alone do so in such a way that the matter is proved etc." In Apol. I. 44: II. 10. 13 uncertainty, error, and contradictions are shown to exist in the case of the greatest philosophers. The Christian doctrines are more sublime than all human philosophy (II. 15). "Our doctrines are evidently more sublime than any human teaching, because the Christ who appeared for our sakes was the whole fulness of reason" ([Greek: to logikon to holon], II. 10). "The principles of Plato are not foreign ([Greek: allotria]) to the teaching of Christ, but they do not agree in every respect. The same holds good of the Stoics" (II. 13). "We must go forth from the school of Plato" (II. 12). "Socrates convinced no one in such a way that he would have been willing to die for the doctrine proclaimed by him; whereas not only philosophers and philologers, but also artisans and quite common uneducated people have believed in Christ" (II. 10). These are the very people--and that is perhaps the strongest contrast found between Logos and Logos in Justin--among whom it is universally said of Christianity: [Greek: dunamis esti tou arrêtou patros kai ouchi anthrôpeiou logou kataskeuê] (see also I. 14 and elsewhere.)]

[Footnote 366: In Justin's estimate of the Greek philosophers two other points deserve notice. In the first place, he draws a very sharp distinction between real and nominal philosophers. By the latter he specially means the Epicureans. They are no doubt referred to in I. 4, 7, 26 (I. 14: Atheists). Epicurus and Sardanapalus are classed together in II. 7; Epicurus and the immoral poets in II. 12; and in the conclusion of II, 15 the same philosopher is ranked with the worst society. But according to II. 3 fin. ([Greek: adunaton Kunikô, adiaphoron to telos prothemenô, to agathon eidenai plên adikphorias]) the Cynics also seem to be outside the circle of real philosophers. This is composed principally of Socrates, Plato, the Platonists and Stoics, together with Heraclitus and others. Some of these understood one set of doctrines more correctly, others another series. The Stoics excelled in ethics (II. 7); Plato described the Deity and the world more correctly. It is, however, worthy of note--and this is the second point--that Justin in principle conceived the Greek philosophers as a unity, and that he therefore saw in their very deviations from one another a proof of the imperfection of their teaching. In so far as they are all included under the collective idea "human philosophy," philosophy is characterised by the conflicting opinions found within it. This view was suggested to Justin by the fact that the highest truth, which is at once allied and opposed to human philosophy, was found by him among an exclusive circle of fellow-believers. Justin showed great skill in selecting from the Gospels the passages (I. 15-17), that prove the "philosophical" life of the Christians as described by him in c. 14. Here he cannot be acquitted of colouring the facts (cf. Aristides) nor of exaggeration (see, for instance, the unqualified statement: [Greek: ha echomen eis koinon pherontes kai panti deomenô koinônountes]). The philosophical emperors were meant here to think of the "[Greek: philois panta koina]." Yet in I. 67 Justin corrected exaggerations in his description. Justin's reference to the invaluable benefits which Christianity confers on the state deserves notice (see particularly I. 12, 17.) The later Apologists make a similar remark.]

[Footnote 367: Dialogue 8. The dialogue takes up a more positive attitude than the Apology, both as a whole and in detail. If we consider that both works are also meant for Christians, and that, on the other hand, the Dialogue as well as the Apology appeals to the cultured heathen public, we may perhaps assume that the two writings were meant to present a graduated system of Christian instruction. (In one passage the Dialogue expressly refers to the Apology.) From Justin's time onward the apologetic polemic of the early Church appears to have adhered throughout to the same method. This consisted in giving the polemical writings directed against the Greeks the form of an introduction to Christian knowledge, and in continuing this instruction still further in those directed against the Jews.]

[Footnote 368: Dial. 2. sq. That Justin's Christianity is founded on theoretical scepticism is clearly shown by the introduction to the Dialogue.]

[Footnote 369: Dial. 8: [Greek: houtôs dê kai dia tauta philosophos egô].]

[Footnote 370: Dial., l.c.: [Greek: parestin soi ton Christon tou Theou epignonti kai teleiô genomenô eudaimonein].]

[Footnote 371: See particularly the closing chapter.]

[Footnote 372: Suppl. 2,]

[Footnote 373: Suppl. 4.]

[Footnote 374: Suppl. 5-7.]

[Footnote 375: Suppl. 24 (see also Aristides c. 13).]

[Footnote 376: Suppl, 7 fin. and many other places.]

[Footnote 377: _E.g._, Suppl. 8. 35 fin.]

[Footnote 378: The Crucified Man, the incarnation of the Logos etc. are wanting. Nothing at all is said about Christ.]

[Footnote 379: Suppl. 7.]

[Footnote 380: Cf. the arguments in c. 8 with c. 9 init.]

[Footnote 381: Suppl. 11.]

[Footnote 382: Suppl. 23.]

[Footnote 383: Suppl. 18, 23-27. He, however, as well as the others, sets forth the demon theory in detail.]

[Footnote 384: The Apology which Miltiades addressed to Marcus Aurelius and his fellow-emperor perhaps bore the title: [Greek: huper tês kata Christianous philosophias] (Euseb., H. E. V. 17. 5). It is certain that Melito in his Apology designated Christianity as [Greek: hê kath' hêmas philosophia] (l.c., IV. 26. 7). But, while it is undeniable that this writer attempted, to a hitherto unexampled extent, to represent Christianity as adapted to the Empire, we must nevertheless beware of laying undue weight on the expression "philosophy." What Melito means chiefly to emphasise is the fact that Christianity, which in former times had developed into strength among the barbarians, began to flourish in the provinces of the Empire simultaneously with the rise of the monarchy under Augustus, that as foster-sister of the monarchy, it increased in strength with the latter, and that this mutual relation of the two institutions had given prosperity and splendour to the state. When in the fragments preserved to us he twice, in this connection, calls Christianity "philosophy," we must note that this expression alternates with the other "[Greek: ho kath' hêmas logos]", and that he uses the formula: "Thy forefathers held this philosophy in honour along with the other cults" [Greek: pros tais allais thrêskeichis]. This excludes the assumption that Melito in his Apology merely represented Christian as philosophy (see also IV. 26. 5, where the Christians are called "[Greek: to tôn theosebôn genos]"). He also wrote a treatise [Greek: peri ktiseôs kai geneseôs Christou]. In it (fragment in the Chron. Pasch) he called Christ [Greek: Theou logos pro aiônôn].]

[Footnote 385: See my treatise "Tatian's Rede an die Griechen übers." 1884 (Giessener Programm). Daniel, Tatianus, 1837. Steuer, Die Gottes- und Logoslehre des Tatian, 1893.]

[Footnote 386: But see Orat. 4 init., 24 fin., 25 fin., 27 init.]

[Footnote 387: He not only accentuated the disagreement of philosophers more strongly than Justin, but insisted more energetically than that Apologist on the necessity of viewing the practical fruits of philosophy in life as a criterion; see Orat. 2, 3, 19, 25. Nevertheless Socrates still found grace in his eyes (c. 3). With regard to other philosophers he listened to foolish and slanderous gossip.]

[Footnote 388: Orat. 13, 15 fin., 20. Tatian also gave credence to it because it imparts such an intelligible picture of the creation of the world (c. 29).]

[Footnote 389: Orat. 12: [Greek: ta tês hêmeteras paideias estin anôterô tês kosmikês katalêpseôs]. Tatian troubled himself very little with giving demonstrations. No other Apologist made such bold assertions.]

[Footnote 390: See Orat. 12 (p. 54 fin.), 20 (p. 90), 25 fin., 26 fin., 29, 30 (p. 116), 13 (p. 62), 15 (p. 70), 36 (p. 142), 40 (p. 152 sq.). The section cc. 12-15 of the Oratio is very important (see also c. 7 ff); for it shows that Tatian denied the natural immortality of the soul, declared the soul (the material spirit) to be something inherent in all matter, and accordingly looked on the distinction between men and animals in respect of their inalienable natural constitution as only one of degree. According to this Apologist the dignity of man does not consist in his natural endowments: but in the union of the human soul with the divine spirit, for which union indeed he was planned. But, in Tatian's opinion, man lost this union by falling under the sovereignty of the demons. The Spirit of God has left him, and consequently he has fallen back to the level of the beasts. So it is man's task to unite the Spirit again with himself, and thereby recover that religious principle on which all wisdom and knowledge rest. This anthropology is opposed to that of the Stoics and related to the "Gnostic" theory. It follows from it that man, in order to reach his destination, must raise himself above his natural endowment; see c. 15: [Greek: anthrôpon legô ton porrô men anthrôptêtos pros auton de ton Theon kechôrêkota]. But with Tatian this conception is burdened with radical inconsistency; for he assumes that the Spirit reunites itself with every man who rightly uses his freedom, and he thinks it still possible for every person to use his freedom aright (11 fin., 13 fin., 15 fin.) So it is after all a mere assertion that the natural man is only distinguished from the beast by speech. He is also distinguished from it by freedom. And further it is only in appearance that the blessing bestowed in the "Spirit" is a _donum superadditum et supernaturale_. For if a proper spontaneous use of freedom infallibly leads to the return of the Spirit, it is evident that the decision and consequently the realisation of man's destination depend on human freedom. That is, however, the proposition which all the Apologists maintained. But indeed Tatian himself in his latter days seems to have observed the inconsistency in which he had become involved and to have solved the problem in the Gnostic, that is, the religious sense. In his eyes, of course, the ordinary philosophy is a useless and pernicious art; philosophers make their own opinions laws (c. 27); whereas of Christians the following holds good (c. 32): [Greek: logou tou dêmosiou kai epigeiou kechôrismenoi kai peithomenoi theou parangelmasi kai nomô patros aphtharsias hepomenoi, pan to en doxê keimenon anthrôpinê paraitoumetha].]

[Footnote 391: C. 31. init.: [Greek: hê hêmetera philosophia]. 32 (p. 128): [Greek: hoi boulomenoi philosophein par' hêmin anthrôpoi]. In c. 33 (p. 130) Christian women are designated [Greek: hai par hêmin philosophousai]. C. 35: [Greek: hê kath' hêmas barbaros philosophia]. 40 (p. 152): [Greek: hoi kata Môusea kai homoiôs autô philosophountes]. 42: [Greek: ho kata barbarous philosophôn Tatianos]. The [Greek: dogmata] of the Christians: c. 1 (p. 2), 12 (p. 58), 19 (p. 86), 24 (p. 102), 27 (p. 108), 35 (p. 138), 40, 42. But Tatian pretty frequently calls Christianity "[Greek: hê hêmetera paideia]", once also "[Greek: nomothesia]" (12; cf. 40: [Greek: hoi hêmeteroi nomoi]), and often [Greek: politeia].]

[Footnote 392: See, e.g., c. 29 fin.: the Christian doctrine gives us [Greek: ouch hoper mê elabomen, all' hoper labontes hupo tês planês echein ekoluthêmen].]

[Footnote 393: Tatian gave still stronger expression than Justin to the opinion that it is the demons who have misled men and rule the world, and that revelation through the prophets is opposed to this demon rule; see c. 7 ff. The demons have fixed the laws of death; see c. 15 fin. and elsewhere.]

[Footnote 394: Tatian also cannot at bottom distinguish between revelation through the prophets and through Christ. See the description of his conversion in c. 29. where only the Old Testament writings are named, and c. 13 fin., 20 fin.. 12 (p. 54) etc.]

[Footnote 395: Knowledge and life appear in Tatian most closely connected. See, e.g., c. 13 init.: "In itself the soul is not immortal, but mortal; it is also possible, however, that it may not die. If it has not attained a knowledge of that truth it dies and is dissolved with the body; but later, at the end of the world, it will rise again with the body in order to receive death in endless duration as a punishment. On the contrary it does not die, though it is dissolved for a time, if it is equipped with the knowledge of God."]

[Footnote 396: Barbarian: the Christian doctrines are [Greek: ta tôn barbarôn dogmata] (c. 1): [Greek: kath' hêmas barbaros philosophia] (c. 35); [Greek: hê barbarikê nomothesia] (c. 12); [Greek: graphai barbarikai] (c. 29); [Greek: kainotomein ta barbarôn dogmata] (c. 35); [Greek: ho kata barbarous philosophôn Tatianos] (c. 42); [Greek: Môusês pasês barbarou philosophias archêgos] (c. 31); see also c. 30, 32. In Tatian's view barbarians and Greeks are the decisive contrasts in history.]

[Footnote 397: See the proof from antiquity, c. 31 ff.]

[Footnote 398: C. 30 (p. 114): [Greek: toutôn oun tên katalêpsin memuêmenos].]

[Footnote 399: Tatian's own confession is very important here (c. 26): "Whilst I was reflecting on what was good it happened that there fell into my hands certain writings of the barbarians, too old to be compared with the doctrines of the Greeks, too divine to be compared with their errors. And it chanced that they convinced me through the plainness of their expressions, through the unartificial nature of their language, through the intelligible representation of the creation of the world, through the prediction of the future, the excellence of their precepts, and the summing up of all kinds under one head. My soul was instructed by God and I recognised that those Greek doctrines lead to perdition, whereas the others abolish the slavery to which we are subjected in the world, and rescue us from our many lords and tyrants, though they do not give us blessings we had not already received, but rather such as we had indeed obtained, but were not able to retain in consequence of error." Here the whole theology of the Apologists is contained _in nuce_; see Justin, Dial. 7-8. In Chaps. 32, 33 Tatian strongly emphasises the fact that the Christian philosophy is accessible even to the most uneducated; see Justin, Apol. II. 10; Athenag. 11 etc.]

[Footnote 400: The unknown author of the [Greek: Logos pros Ellênas] also formed the same judgment as Tatian (Corp. Apolog., T. III., p. 2 sq., ed. Otto; a Syrian translation, greatly amplified, is found in the Cod. Nitr. Mus. Britt. Add. 14658. It was published by Cureton, Spic. Syr., p. 38 sq. with an English translation). Christianity is an incomparable heavenly wisdom, the teacher of which is the Logos himself. "It produces neither poets, nor philosophers, nor rhetoricians; but it makes mortals immortal and men gods, and leads them away upwards from the earth into super-Olympian regions." Through Christian knowledge the soul returns to its Creator: [Greek: dei gar apokatatathênai othen apestê].]

[Footnote 401: Nor is Plato "[Greek: ho dokôn en autois semnoteron pephilosophêkenai]" any better than Epicurus and the Stoics (III. 6). Correct views which are found in him in a greater measure than in the others ([Greek: ho dokôn Hellênôn sophôteros gegenêsthai]), did not prevent him from giving way to the stupidest babbling (III. 16). Although he knew that the full truth can only be learned from God himself through the law (III. 17), he indulged in the most foolish guesses concerning the beginning of history. But where guesses find a place, truth is not to be found (III. 16: [Greek: ei de eikasmô, ouk ara alêthê estin ta hup' autou eirêmena]).]

[Footnote 402: Theophilus confesses (I. 14) exactly as Tatian does: [Greek: kai gar egô êpistoun touto esesthai, alla nun katanoêsas auta pisteuô, hama kai epituchôn hierais graphais tôn agiôn prophêtôn, hoi kai proeipon dia pneumatos Theou ti progegonota ô tropô gegonen kai ta enestôta tini tropô ginetai, kai ta eperchomena poia taxei apartisthêsetai. Apodeixin oun labôn tôn ginomenôn kai proanapephônêmenôn ouk apistô]; see also II. 8-10, 22, 30, 33-35: III. 10, 11, 17. Theophilus merely looks on the Gospel as a continuation of the prophetic revelations and injunctions. Of Christ, however, he did not speak at all, but only of the Logos (Pneuma), which has operated from the beginning. To Theophilus the first chapters of Genesis already contain the sum of all Christian knowledge (II. 10-32).]

[Footnote 403: See II. 8: [Greek: hupo daimonôn de empneusthentes kai hup' autôn phusiôthentes ha eipon di' autôn eipon].]

[Footnote 404: The unknown author of the work _de resurrectione_, which goes under the name of Justin (Corp. Apol., Vol. III.) has given a surprising expression to the thought that it is simply impossible to give a demonstration of truth. ([Greek: O men tês alêtheias logos estin eleutheroste kai autexousios, upo mêdemian basanon elegchou thelôn piptein mêde tên para tois akouousi di' apodeixeôs exetasin hupomenein. To gar eugenes autou kai pepoithos autô tô pempsanti pisteuesthai thelei]). He inveighs in the beginning of his treatise against all rationalism, and on the one hand professes a sort of materialistic theory of knowledge, whilst on the other, for that very reason, he believes in inspiration and the authority of revelation; for all truth originates with revelation, since God himself and God alone is the truth. Christ revealed this truth and is for us [Greek: tôn olôn pistis kai apodeixis]. But it is far from probable that the author would really have carried this proposition to its logical conclusion (Justin, Dial. 3 ff. made a similar start). He wishes to meet his adversaries "armed with the arguments of faith which are unconquered" (c. 1, p. 214), but the arguments of faith are still the arguments of reason. Among these he regarded it as most important that even according to the theories about the world, that is, about God and matter, held by the "so-called sages," Plato, Epicurus, and the Stoics, the assumption of a resurrection of the flesh is not irrational (c. 6, p. 228 f.). Some of these, viz., Pythagoras and Plato, also acknowledged the immortality of the soul. But, for that very reason, this view is not sufficient, "for if the Redeemer had only brought the message of the (eternal) life of the soul what new thing would he have proclaimed in addition to what had been made known by Pythagoras, Plato, and the band of their adherents?" (c. 10, p. 246.) This remark is very instructive, for it shows what considerations led the Apologists to adhere to the belief in the resurrection of the body. Zahn, (Zeitschrift fur Kirchengeschichte, Vol. VIII., pp. 1 f., 20 f.) has lately reassigned to Justin himself the fragment de resurr. His argument, though displaying great plausibility, has nevertheless not fully convinced me. The question is of great importance for fixing the relation of Justin to Paul. I shall not discuss Hermias' "Irrisio Gentilium Philosophorum," as the period when this Christian disputant flourished is quite uncertain. We still possess an early-Church Apology in Pseudo-Melito's "Oratio ad Antoninum Cæsarem" (Otto, Corp. Apol. IX., p. 423 sq.). This book is preserved (written?) in the Syrian language and was addressed to Caracalla or Heliogabalus (preserved in the Cod. Nitr. Mus. Britt. Add. 14658). It is probably dependent on Justin, but it is less polished and more violent than his Apology.]

[Footnote 405: Massebieau (Revue de l'histoire des religions, 1887, Vol. XV. No. 3) has convinced me that Minucius wrote at a later period than Tertullian and made use of his works.]

[Footnote 406: Cf. the plan of the "Octavius." The champion of heathenism here opposed to the Christian is a philosopher representing the standpoint of the middle Academy. This presupposes, as a matter of course, that the latter undertakes the defence of the Stoical position. See, besides, the corresponding arguments in the Apology of Tertullian, e.g., c. 17, as well as his tractate: "de testimonio animæ naturaliter Christianæ." We need merely mention that the work of Minucius is throughout dependent on Cicero's book, "de natura deorum." In this treatise he takes up a position more nearly akin to heathen syncretism than Tertullian.]

[Footnote 407: In R. Kühn's investigation ("Der Octavius des Min. Felix," Leipzig, 1882)--the best special work we possess on an early Christian Apology from the point of view of the history of dogma--based on a very careful analysis of the Octavius, more emphasis is laid on the difference than on the agreement between Minucius and the Greek Apologists. The author's exposition requires to be supplemented in the latter respect (see Theologische Litteratur-Zeitung, 1883, No. 6).]

[Footnote 408: C. 20: "Exposui opiniones omnium ferme philosophorum.... ut quivis arbitretur, aut nunc Christianos philosophos esse aut philosophos fuisse jam tunc Christianos."]

[Footnote 409: See Minucius, 31 ff. A quite similar proceeding is already found in Tertullian, who in his _Apologeticum_ has everywhere given a Stoic colouring to Christian ethics and rules of life, and in c. 39 has drawn a complete veil over the peculiarity of the Christian societies.]

[Footnote 410: Tertullian has done exactly the same thing; see Apolog. 46 (and de præscr. 7.)]

[Footnote 411: Tertull., de testim. I.: "Sed non eam te (animam) advoco, quæ scholis formata, bibliothecis exercitata, academiis et porticibus Atticis pasta sapientiam ructas. Te simplicem et rudem et impoliitam et idioticam compello, qualem te habent qui te solam habent... Imperitia tua mihi opus est, quoniam aliquantulæ peritiæ tuæ nemo credit."]

[Footnote 412: Tertull., Apol. 46: "Quid simile philosophus et Christianas? Græciæ discipulus et coeli?" de præscr. 7: "Quid ergo Athenis et Hierosolymis? Quid academiæ et ecclesiæ?" Minuc. 38.5: "Philosophorum supercilia contemnimus, quos corruptores et adulteros novimus... nos, qui non habitu sapientiam sed mente præferimus, non eloquimur magna sed vivimus, gloriamur nos consecutos, quod illi summa intentione quæsiverunt nec invenire potuerunt. Quid ingrati sumus, quid nobis invidemus, si veritas divinitatis nostri temporis ælate maturuit?"]

[Footnote 413: Minucius did not enter closely into the significance of Christ any more than Tatian, Athenagoras, and Theophilus; he merely touched upon it (9. 4: 29. 2). He also viewed Christianity as the teaching of the Prophets; whoever acknowledges the latter must of necessity adore the crucified Christ. Tertullian was accordingly the first Apologist after Justin who again considered it necessary to give a detailed account of Christ as the incarnation of the Logos (see the 21st chapter of the Apology in its relation to chaps. 17-20).]

[Footnote 414: Among the Greek Apologists the unknown author of the work "de Monarchia," which bears the name of Justin, has given clearest expression to this conception. He is therefore most akin to Minucius (see chap. I.). Here monotheism is designated as the [Greek: katholikê doxa] which has fallen into oblivion through bad habit; for [Greek: tês anthrôpinês phuseôs to kat' archên suzugian suneseôs kai sôtêrias labousês eis epignôsin alêtheias thrêskeias te tês eis ton hena kai pantôn despotên.] According to this, then, only an awakening is required.]

[Footnote 415: But almost all the Apologists acknowledged that heathendom possessed prophets. They recognise these in the Sibyls and the old poets. The author of the work "de Monarchia" expressed the most pronounced views in regard to this. Hermas (Vis. II. 4), however, shows that the Apologists owed this notion also to an idea that was widespread among Christian people.]

[Footnote 416: See Justin, Apol. I. 31, Dial. 7, p. 30 etc.]

[Footnote 417: See Tatian, c. 31 ff.]

[Footnote 418: In the New Testament the content of the Christian faith is now here designated as dogma. In Clement (I. 11.), Hermas, and Polycarp the word is not found at all; yet Clement (I. 20. 4, 27. 5) called the divine order of nature [Greek: ta dedogmatismena hupo Theou]. In Ignatius (ad Magn. XIII. 1) we read: [Greek: spoudazete oun bebaiôthênai en tois dogmasin tou kuriou kai tôn apostolôn], but [Greek: dogmata] here exclusively mean the rules of life (see Zahn on this passage), and this is also their signification in [Greek: Didachê] XI. 3. In the Epistle of Barnabas we read in several passages (I. 6: IX. 7: X. 1, 9 f.) of "dogmas of the Lord;" but by these he means partly particular mysteries, partly divine dispensations. Hence the Apologists are the first to apply the word to the Christian faith, in accordance with the language of philosophy. They are also the first who employed the ideas [Greek: theologein] and [Greek: theologia]. The latter word is twice found in Justin (Dial. 56) in the sense of "aliquem nominare deum." In Dial. 113, however, it has the more comprehensive sense of "to make religio-scientific investigations." Tatian (10) also used the word in the first sense; on the contrary he entitled a book of which he was the author "[Greek: pros tous apophênamenous ta peri Theou]" and not "[Greek: pros tous theologountas]". In Athenagoras (Suppl. 10) theology is the doctrine of God and of all beings to whom the predicate "Deity" belongs (see also 20, 22). That is the old usage of the word. It was thus employed by Tertullian in ad nat. II. 1 (the threefold division of theology; in II. 2, 3 the expression "theologia physica, mythica" refers to this); Cohort, ad Gr. 3, 22. The anonymous writer in Eusebius (H. E. V. 28. 4, 5) is instructive on the point. Brilliant demonstrations of the ancient use of the word "theology" are found in Natorp, Thema und Disposition der aristotelischen Metaphysik (Philosophische Monatshefte, 1887, Parts I and 2, pp. 55-64). The title "theology," as applied to a philosophic discipline, was first used by the Stoics; the old poets were previously called "theologians," and the "theological" stage was the prescientific one which is even earlier than the "childhood" of "physicists" (so Aristotle speaks throughout). To the Fathers of the Church also the old poets are still [Greek: hoi palaioi theologoi]. But side by side with this we have an adoption of the Stoic view that there is also a philosophical theology, because the teaching of the old poets concerning the gods conceals under the veil of myth a treasure of philosophical truth. In the Stoa arose the "impossible idea of a 'theology' which is to be philosophy, that is, knowledge based on reason, and yet to have positive religion as the foundation of its certainty." The Apologists accepted this, but added to it the distinction of a [Greek: kosmikê] and [Greek: theologikê sophia.]]

[Footnote 419: Christ has a relation to all three parts of the scheme, (1) as [Greek: logos]; (2) as [Greek: nomos, nomothetês], and [Greek: kritês]; (3) as [Greek: didaskalos] and [Greek: sotêr].]

[Footnote 420: In the reproduction of the apologetical theology historians of dogma have preferred to follow Justin; but here they have constantly overlooked the fact that Justin was the most Christian among the Apologists, and that the features of his teaching to which particular value is rightly attached, are either not found in the others at all (with the exception of Tertullian), or else in quite rudimentary form. It is therefore proper to put the doctrines common to all the Apologists in the foreground, and to describe what is peculiar to Justin as such, so far as it agree with New Testament teachings or contains an anticipation of the future tenor of dogma.]

[Footnote 421: Cicero's proposition (de nat. deor. II. 66. 167): "nemo vir magnus sine aliquo afflatu divino unquam fuit," which was the property of all the idealistic philosophers of the age, is found in the Apologists reproduced in the most various forms (see, e.g., Tatian 29). That all knowledge of the truth, both among the prophets and those who follow their teaching, is derived from inspiration was in their eyes a matter of certainty. But here they were only able to frame a theory in the case of the prophets; for such a theory strictly applied to all would have threatened the spontaneous character of the knowledge of the truth.]

[Footnote 422: Justin, Apol. I. 3: [Greek: Hêmeteron oun ergon kai biou kai mathêmatôn tên episkepsin pasi parechein].]

[Footnote 423: See the exposition of the doctrine of God in Aristides with the conclusion found in all the Apologists, that God requires no offerings and presents.]

[Footnote 424: Even Tatian says in c. 19: [Greek: Kosmou men gar ê kataskeuê kalê, to de en autô politeuma phaulon].]

[Footnote 425: Tatian 5: [Greek: Oute anarchos ê hulê kathaper ho Theos, oude dia to anarchon kai autê isodunamos tô Theô gennêtê de kai ouch hupo tou allou gegonuia monon de hupo tou pantôn dêmiourgou probeblêmenê]. 12. Even Justin does not seem to have taught otherwise, though that is not quite certain; see Apol. I. 10, 59, 64, 67: II. 6. Theophilus I. 4: II. 4, 10, 13 says very plainly: [Greek: ex ouk ontôn ta panta epoiêsen.... ti de mega, ei ho theos ex hupokeimenês hulês epoiei ton kosmon].]

[Footnote 426: Hence the knowledge of God and the right knowledge of the world are most closely connected; see Tatian 27: [Greek: hê Theou katalêpsis ên echô peri tôn holôn].]

[Footnote 427: The beginning of the fifth chapter of Tatian's Oration is specially instructive here.]

[Footnote 428: According to what has been set forth in the text it is incorrect to assert that the Apologists adopted the Logos doctrine in order to reconcile monotheism with the divine honours paid to the crucified Christ. The truth rather is that the Logos doctrine was already part of their creed before they gave any consideration to the person of the historical Christ, and _vice versâ_ Christ's right to divine honours was to them a matter of certainty independently of the Logos doctrine.]

[Footnote 429: We find the distinction of Logos (Son) and Spirit in Justin, Apol. I. 5, and in every case where he quotes formulæ (if we are not to assume the existence of interpolation in the text, which seems to me not improbable; see now also Cramer in the Theologische Studien, 1893. pp. 17 ff., 138 ff.). In Tatian 13 fin. the Spirit is represented as [Greek: ho diakonos tou peponthotos Theou]. The conception in Justin, Dial. 116, is similar. Father, Word, and prophetic Spirit are spoken of in Athenag. 10. The express designation [Greek: trias] is first found in Theophilus (but see the Excerpta ex Theodoto); see II. 15: [Greek: hai treis hêmerai tupoi heisin tês triados, tou Theou kai tou logou autou kai tês sophias autou]; see II. 10, 18. But it is just in Theophilus that the difficulty of deciding between Logos and Wisdom appears with special plainness (II. 10). The interposition of the host of good angels between Son and Spirit found in Justin, Apol. I. 5 (see Athenag.), is exceedingly striking. We have, however, to notice, provided the text is right, (1) that this interposition is only found in a single passage, (2) that Justin wished to refute the reproach of [Greek: atheotês], (3) that the placing of the Spirit after the angels does not necessarily imply a position inferior to theirs, but merely a subordination to the Son and the Father common to the Spirit and the angels, (4) that the good angels were also invoked by the Christians, because they were conceived as mediators of prayer (see my remark on I. Clem, ad Corinth. LVI. 1); they might have found a place here just for this latter reason. On the significance of the Holy Spirit in the theology of Justin, see Zahn's Marcellus of Ancyra, p. 228: "If there be any one theologian of the early Church who might be regarded as depriving the Holy Spirit of all scientific _raison d'etre_ at least on the ground of having no distinctive activity, and the Father of all share in revelation, it is Justin." We cannot at bottom say that the Apologists possessed a doctrine of the Trinity.]

[Footnote 430: To Justin the name of the Son is the most important; see also Athenag. 10. The Logos had indeed been already called the Son of God by Philo, and Celsus expressly says (Orig., c. Cels. II. 31); "If according to your doctrine the Word is really the Son of God then we agree with you;" but the Apologists are the first to attach the name of Son to the Logos as a proper designation. If, however, the Logos is intrinsically the Son of God, then Christ is the Son of God, not because he is the begotten of God in the flesh (early Christian), but because the spiritual being existing in him is the antemundane reproduction of God (see Justin, Apol. II. 6: [Greek: ho huios tou patros kai Theou, ho monos legomenos kuriôs huios])--a momentous expression.]

[Footnote 431: Athenag., 10; Tatian, Orat. 5.]

[Footnote 432: The clearest expression of this is in Tatian 5, which passage is also to be compared with the following: [Greek: Theos ên en archê, tên de archên logou dunamin pareilêphamen. Ho gar despotês tôn holôn, autos huparchôn tou pantos hê hupostasis, kata men tên mêdepô gegenêmenên poiêsin monos ên, katho de pasa dunamis, horatôn te kai aoratôn autos hupostasis ên, sun autô ta panta sun autô dia logikês dunameôs autos kai ho logos, hos ên auto, hupestêse. Thelêmati de tês aplotêtos autou propêda logos, ho de logos, ou kata kenou chôrêsas, ergon prôtotokon tou patros ginetai. Touton ismen tou kosmou tên archên. Gegone de kata merismon, ou kata apokopên to gar apotmêthen tou prôtou kechôristai, to de meriothen oikonomas tên hairesin proslabon ouk endea ton hothen eilêptai pepoiêken. Ôsper gar aro mias dados anaptetai men pura polla, tês de prôtês dados dia tên exapsin tôn pollôn dadôn ouk elattoutai to phôs, houtô kai ho logos proelthôn ek tês tou patros dunameôs ouk alogon pepoiêke ton gegennêkota]. In the identification of the divine consciousness, that is, the power of God, with the force to which the world is due the naturalistic basis of the apologetic speculations is most clearly shown. Cf. Justin, Dial. 128, 129.]

[Footnote 433: The word "beget" ([Greek: gennan]) is used by the Apologists, especially Justin, because the name "Son" was the recognised expression for the Logos. No doubt the words [Greek: exereugesthai, proballesthai, proerchesthai, propêdan] and the like express the physical process more exactly in the sense of the Apologists. On the other hand, however, [Greek: gennan] appears the more appropriate word in so far as the relation of the essence of the Logos to the essence of God is most clearly shown by the name "Son."]

[Footnote 434: None of the Apologists has precisely defined the Logos idea. Zahn, l.c., p. 233, correctly remarks: "Whilst the distinction drawn between the hitherto unspoken and the spoken word of the Creator makes Christ appear as the thought of the world within the mind of God, yet he is also to be something real which only requires to enter into a new relation to God to become an active force. Then again this Word is not to be the thought that God thinks, but the thought that thinks in God. And again it is to be a something, or an Ego, in God's thinking essence, which enters into reciprocal intercourse with something else in God; occasionally also the reason of God which is in a state of active exercise and without which he would not be rational." Considering this evident uncertainty it appears to me a very dubious proceeding to differentiate the conceptions of the Logos in Justin, Athenagoras, Tatian, and Theophilus, as is usually done. If we consider that no Apologist wrote a special treatise on the Logos, that Tatian (c. 5) is really the only one from whom we have any precise statements, and that the elements of the conception are the same in all, it appears inadvisable to lay so great stress on the difference as Zahn, for instance, has done in the book already referred to, p. 232 f. Hardly any real difference can have existed between Justin, Tatian, and Theophilus in the Logos doctrine proper. On the other hand Athenagoras certainly seems to have tried to eliminate the appearance of the Logos in time, and to emphasise the eternal nature of the divine relationships, without, however, reaching the position which Irenæus took up here.]

[Footnote 435: This distinction is only found in Theophilus (II. 10); but the idea exists in Tatian and probably also in Justin, though it is uncertain whether Justin regarded the Logos as having any sort of being before the moment of his begetting.]

[Footnote 436: Justin, Apol. II. 6., Dial. 61. The Logos is not produced out of nothing, like the rest of the creatures. Yet it is evident that the Apologists did not yet sharply and precisely distinguish between begetting and creating, as the later theologians did; though some of them certainly felt the necessity for a distinction.]

[Footnote 437: All the Apologists tacitly assume that the Logos in virtue of his origin has the capacity of entering the finite. The distinction which here exists between Father and Son is very pregnantly expressed by Tertullian (adv. Marc. II. 27): "Igitur quæcumque exigitis deo digna, habebuntur in patre invisibili incongressibilique et placido et, ut ita dixerim, philosophorum deo. Quæcumque autem ut indigna reprehenditis deputabuntur in filio et viso et audito et congresso, arbitro patris et ministro." But we ought not to charge the Apologists with the theologoumenon that it was an inward necessity for the Logos to become man. Their Logos hovers, as it were, between God and the world, so that he appears as the highest creature, in so far as he is conceived as the production of God; and again seems to be merged in God, in so far as he is looked upon as the consciousness and spiritual force of God. To Justin, however, the incarnation is irrational, and the rest of the Greek Apologists are silent about it.]

[Footnote 438: The most of the Apologists argue against the conception of the natural immortality of the human soul; see Tatian 13; Justin, Dial. 5; Theoph. II. 27.]

[Footnote 439: The first chapter of Genesis represented to them the sum of all wisdom, and therefore of all Christianity. Perhaps Justin had already written a commentary to the Hexaëmeron (see my Texte und Untersuchungen I. 1, 2, p. 169 f.). It is certain that in the second century Rhodon (Euseb., H. E. V. 13. 8), Theophilus (see his 2nd Book ad Autol.), Candidus, and Apion (Euseb., H. E. V. 27) composed such. The Gnostics also occupied themselves a great deal with Gen. I.-III.; see, e.g., Marcus in Iren. I. 18.]

[Footnote 440: See Theophilus ad Aut. II. 27: [Greek: Ei gar ho Theos athanaton ton anthrôpon ap' archês pepoiêkei, Theon auton pepoiêkei; palin ei thnêton auton pepoiêkei edokei an ho Theos aitios einai tou thanatou autou. Oute oun athanaton auton epoiêsen oute mên thnêton, alla dektikon amphoterôn, hina, ei rhepsê epi ta tês athanasias têrêsas tên entolên tou Theou, misthon komisêtai par' autou tên athanasian kai genêtai Theos, ei d' au trapê epi ta tou thanatou pragmata parakousas tou Theou, autos eautô aitios ê tou thanatou.]]

[Footnote 441: See Justin, Apol. I. 14 ff. and the parallel passages in the other Apologists.]

[Footnote 442: See Tatian, Orat. II. and many other passages.]

[Footnote 443: Along with this the Apologists emphasise the resurrection of the flesh in the strongest way as the specific article of Christian anticipation, and prove the possibility of realising this irrational hope. Yet to the Apologists the ultimate ground of their trust in this early-Christian idea is their reliance on the unlimited omnipotence of God and this confidence is a proof of the vividness of their idea of him. Nevertheless this conception assumes that in the other world there will be a return of the flesh, which on this side the grave had to be overcome and regarded as non-existent. A clearly chiliastic element is found only in Justin.]

[Footnote 444: No uniform conception of this is found in the Apologists; see Wendt, Die Christliche Lehre von der menschlichen Vollkommenheit 1882, pp. 8-20. Justin speaks only of a heavenly destination for which man is naturally adapted. With Tatian and Theophilus it is different.]

[Footnote 445: The idea that the demon sovereignty has led to some change in the psychological condition and capacities of man is absolutely unknown to Justin (see Wendt, l.c., p. 11 f., who has successfully defended the correct view in Engelhardt's "Das Christenthum Justin's des Märtyrers" pp. 92 f. 151. f. 266 f., against Stählin, "Justin der Märtyrer und sein neuester Beurtheiler" 1880, p. 16 f.). Tatian expressed a different opinion, which, however, involved him in evident contradictions (see above, p. 191 ff.). The apologetic theology necessarily adhered to the two following propositions: (1) The freedom to do what is good is not lost and cannot be. This doctrine was opposed to philosophic determinism and popular fatalism. (2) The desires of the flesh resulting from the constitution of man only become evil when they destroy or endanger the sovereignty of reason. The formal _liberum arbitrium_ explains the possibility of sin, whilst its actual existence is accounted for by the desire that is excited by the demons. The Apologists acknowledge the universality of sin and death, but refused to admit the necessity of the former in order not to call its guilty character in question. On the other hand they are deeply imbued with the idea that the sovereignty of death is the most powerful factor in the perpetuation of sin. Their believing conviction of the omnipotence of God, as well as their moral conviction of the responsibility of man, protected them in theory from a strictly dualistic conception of the world. At the same time, like all who separate nature and morality in their ethical system, though in other respects they do not do so, the Apologists were obliged in practice to be dualists.]

[Footnote 446: Death is accounted the worst evil. When Theophilus (II. 26) represents it as a blessing, we must consider that he is arguing against Marcion. Polytheism is traced to the demons; they are accounted the authors of the fables about the gods; the shameful actions of the latter are partly the deeds of demons and partly lies.]

[Footnote 447: The Old Testament therefore is not primarily viewed as the book of prophecy or of preparation for Christ, but as the book of the full revelation which cannot be surpassed. In point of content the teaching of the prophets and of Christ is completely identical. The prophetical details in the Old Testament serve only to attest the _one_ truth. The Apologists confess that they were converted to Christianity by reading the Old Testament. Cf. Justin's and Tatian's confessions. Perhaps Commodian (Instruct. I. 1) is also be understood thus.]

[Footnote 448: The _Oratio_ of Tatian is very instructive in this respect. In this book he has nowhere spoken _ex professo_ of the incarnation of the Logos in Christ; but in c. 13 fin. he calls the Holy Spirit "the servant of God who has suffered," and in c. 21 init. he says: "we are not fools and do not adduce anything stupid, when we proclaim that God has appeared in human form." Similar expressions are found in Minucius Felix. In no part of Aristides' Apology is there any mention of the pre-Christian appearance of the Logos. The writer merely speaks of the revelation of the Son of God in Jesus Christ.]

[Footnote 449: We seldom receive an answer to the question as to why this or that particular occurrence should have been prophesied. According to the ideas of the Apologists, however, we have hardly a right to put that question; for, since the value of the historical consists in its having been predicted, its content is of no importance. The fact that Jesus finds the she-ass bound to a vine (Justin, Apol. I. 32) is virtually quite as important as his being born of a virgin. Both occurrences attest the prophetic teachings of God, freedom, etc.]

[Footnote 450: In Justin's polemical works this must have appeared in a still more striking way. Thus we find in a fragment of the treatise [Greek: pros Markiôna], quoted by Irenæus (IV. 6. 2), the sentence "unigenitus filius venit ad nos, suum plasma in semetipsum recapitulans." So the theologoumenon of the _recapitulatio per Christum_ already appeared in Justin. (Vide also Dial. c. Tryph. 100.) If we compare Tertullian's _Apologeticum_ with his Antignostic writings we easily see how impossible it is to determine from that work the extent of his Christian faith and knowledge. The same is probably the case, though to a less extent, with Justin's apologetic writings.]

[Footnote 451: Christians do not place a man alongside of God, for Christ is God, though indeed a second God. There is no question of two natures. It is not the divine nature that Justin has insufficiently emphasised--or at least this is only the case in so far as it is a second Godhead--but the human nature; see Schultz, Gottheit Christi, p. 39 ff.]

[Footnote 452: We find allusions in Justin where the various incidents in the history of the incarnate Logos are conceived as a series of arrangements meant to form part of the history of salvation, to paralyse mankind's sinful history, and to regenerate humanity. He is thus a forerunner of Irenæus and Melito.]

[Footnote 453: Even the theologoumenon of the definite number of the elect, which must be fulfilled, is found in Justin (Apol. I. 28, 45). For that reason the judgment is put off by God (II. 7). The Apology of Aristides contains a short account of the history of Jesus; his conception, birth, preaching, choice of the 12 Apostles, crucifixion, resurrection, ascension, sending out of the 12 Apostles are mentioned.]

[Footnote 454: "To Justin faith is only an acknowledgment of the mission and Sonship of Christ and a conviction of the truth of his teaching. Faith does not justify, but is merely a presupposition of the justification which is effected through repentance, change of mind, and sinless life. Only in so far as faith itself is already a free decision to serve God has it the value of a saving act, which is indeed of such significance that one can say, 'Abraham was justified by faith.' In reality, however, this took place through [Greek: metanoia]." The idea of the new birth is exhausted in the thought: [Greek: Theos kalei eis metanoian], that of the forgiveness of sins in the idea: "God is so good that he overlooks sins committed in a state of ignorance, if man has changed his mind." Accordingly, Christ is the Redeemer in so far as he has brought about all the conditions which make for repentance.]

[Footnote 455: This is in fact already the case in Justin here and there, but in the main there are as yet mere traces of it: the Apologists are no mystics.]

[Footnote 456: If we consider how largely the demons bulked in the ideas of the Apologists, we must rate very highly their conviction of the redeeming power of Christ and of his name, a power continuously shown in the victories over the demons. See Justin Apol. II. 6, 8; Dial. II, 30, 35, 39, 76, 85, 111, 121; Tertull., Apol. 23, 27, 32, 37 etc. Tatian also (16 fin.) confirms it, and c. 12, p. 56, line 7 ff. (ed. Otto) does not contradict this.]

[Footnote 457: Von Engelhardt, Christenthum Justin's, p. 432 f., has pronounced against its genuineness; see also my Texte und Untersuchungen I. 1, 2, p. 158. In favour of its genuineness see Hilgenfeld, Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie, 1883, p. 26 f. The fragment is worded as follows: [Greek: Plasas ho Theos kat' archas ton anthrôpon tês gnômês autou ta tês phuseôs apêôrêsen entolê mia poiêsamenos tên diapeiran. Phulaxanta men gar tautên tês athantou lêxeôs pepoiêken esesthai, parabanta de tês enantias. Outô gegonôs ho anthrôpos kai pros tên parabasin euthus elthôn tên phthoran phusikôs eisedexato. Phusei de tês phthoras prosgenomenês anankaion ên hoti sôsai boulomenos ên tên phthoropoion ousian aphanisas. Touto de ouk ên heteros genesthai, ei mêper hê kata phusin zôê proseplakê tô tên phthoran dexamenô, aphanizousa men tên phthoran, athanaton de tou loipou to dexamenon diatêrousa. Dia touto ton logon edeêsen en sômati genesthai, hina (tou thanatou) tês kata phusin hêmas phthoras eleutherôsê. Ei gar, hôs phate, neumati monon ton thanaton hêmôn apekôlusen, ou prosêi men dia tên boulêsin ho thanatos, ouden de êtton phthartoi palin êmen phuikên en heautois tên phthoran peripherontes].]

[Footnote 458: Weizsäcker, Jahrbücher fur deutsche Theologie, 1867, p. 119, has with good reason strongly emphasised this element. See also Stählin, Justin der Martyrer, 1880, p. 63 f., whose criticism of Von Engelhardt's book contains much that is worthy of note, though it appears to me inappropriate in the main.]