Chapter VI (3)

[Footnote 678: In ecclesiastical antiquity all systematising was merely relative and limited, because the complex of sacred writings enjoyed a different authority from that which it possessed in the following period. Here the reference of a theologoumenon to a passage of Scripture was of itself sufficient, and the manifold and incongruous doctrines were felt as a unity in so far as they could all be verified from Holy Scriptures. Thus the fact that the Holy Scriptures were regarded as a series of divine oracles guaranteed, as it were, a transcendental unity of the doctrines, and, in certain circumstances, relieved the framer of the system of a great part of his task. Hitherto little justice has been done to this view of the history of dogma, though it is the only solution of a series of otherwise insoluble problems. We cannot for example understand the theology of Augustine, and necessarily create for ourselves the most difficult problems by our own fault, if we make no use of that theory. In Origen's dogmatic and that of subsequent Church Fathers--so far as we can speak of a dogmatic in their case--the unity lies partly in the canon of Holy Scripture and partly in the ultimate aim; but these two principles interfere with each other. As far as the Stromateis of Clement is concerned, Overbeek (l.c.) has furnished the explanation of its striking plan. Moreover, how would it have been conceivable that the riches of Holy Scripture, as presented to the philosophers who allegorised the books, could have been mastered, problems and all, at the first attempt.]

[Footnote 679: See the treatises of Huetius (1668) reprinted by Lommatzsch. Thomasius, Origenes 1837. Redepenning, Origenes, 2 Vols. 1841-46. Denis, de la philosophie d'Origène, Paris 1884. Lang, Die Leiblichkeit der Vernunftwesen bei Origenes, Leipzig, 1892. Mehlhorn, Die Lehre von der menschlichen Freiheit nach Origenes (Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte, Vol. II., p. 234 ff.). Westcott, Origenes, in the Dictionary of Christian Biography Vol. IV. Moller in Herzog's Real-Encyklopädie, 2nd ed., Vol. XI., pp. 92-109. The special literature is to be found there as well as in Nitzsch, Dogmengeschichte I., p. 151, and Ueberweg, Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, 5th ed, p. 62 f.]

[Footnote 680: See his letter in Eusebius, H. E. VI. 19. 11 ff.]

[Footnote 681: In the polemic against Celsus it seems to us in not a few passages as if the feeling for truth had forsaken him. If we consider, however, that in Origen's idea the premises of his speculation were unassailable, and if we further consider into what straits he was driven by Celsus, we will conclude that no proof has been advanced of Origen's having sinned against the current rules of truth. These, however, did not include the commandment to use in disputation only such arguments as could be employed in a positive doctrinal presentation. Basilius (Ep. 210 ad prim. Neocæs) was quite ready to excuse an utterance of Gregory Thaumaturgus, that sounded suspiciously like Sabellianism, by saying that the latter was not speaking [Greek: dogmatikôs], but [Greek: agônistikôs]. Jerome also (ad Pammach. ep 48, c. 13), after defending the right of writing [Greek: gymnastikôs], expressly said that all Greek philosophers "have used many words to conceal their thoughts, threaten in one place, and deal the blow in another." In the same way, according to him, Origen, Methodius, Eusebius, and Apollinaris had acted in the dispute with Celsus and Porphyry. "Because they are sometimes compelled to say, not what they themselves think, but what is necessary for their purpose; they do this only in the struggle with the heathen."]

[Footnote 682: See, above all, the systematic main work "[Greek: peri archôn]".]

[Footnote 683: Many writings of Origen are pervaded by arguments, evincing equal discretion and patience, against the Christians who contest the right of science in the Church. In the work against Celsus, however, he was not unfrequently obliged to abandon the simple Christians. C. Celsus III. 78: V. 14-24 are particularly instructive.]

[Footnote 684: In this point Origen is already narrower than Clement. Free judgments, such as were passed by Clement on Greek philosophy, were not, so far as I know, repeated by Origen. (See especially Clement, Strom. I. 5. 28-32: 13. 57, 58 etc.); yet he also acknowledges revelations of God in Greek philosophy (see, _e.g._, c. Cels. VI. 3), and the Christian doctrine is to him the completion of Greek philosophy (see the remains of Origen's lost Stromateis and Hom. XIV. in Genes. § 3; other passages in Redepenning II., p. 324 ff.).]

[Footnote 685: We must here content ourselves with merely pointing out that the method of scientific Scriptural exegesis also led to historico-critical investigations, that accordingly Origen and his disciples were also critics of the tradition, and that scientific theology, in addition to the task of remodelling Christianity, thus began at its very origin the solution of another problem, namely, the critical restoration of Christianity from the Scriptures and tradition and the removal of its excrescences: for these efforts, strictly speaking, do not come up for consideration in the history of dogma.]

[Footnote 686: The theory that justified a twofold morality in the Church is now completely legitimised, but the higher form no longer appears as Encratite and eschatological, but as Encratite and philosophical. See, for example, Clement, Strom. III. 12. 82: VI. 13. 106 etc. Gnosis is the principle of perfection. See Strom. IV. 7. 54: [Greek: prokeitai de tois eis teleiôsin speudousin hê gnôsis hê logikê hês themelios hê agia trias pistis, agapê, elpis].]

[Footnote 687: See the preface to the work [Greek: peri archôn].]

[Footnote 688: From the conclusion of Hippolytus' Philosophoumena it is also evident how the Socratic [Greek: Gnôthi seauton] was in that age based on a philosophy of religion and was regarded as a watchword in wide circles. See Clem. Pædag. III. 11. 1.]

[Footnote 689: See Gregory Thaumaturgus' panegyric on Origen, one of the most instructive writings of the 3rd century, especially cc. 11-18.]

[Footnote 690: Yet all excesses are repudiated. See Clem. Strom. IV. 22. 138: [Greek: Ouk egkratês outos eti, all' en hexei gegonen apatheias schêma theion ependusasthai anamenôn]. Similar remarks are found in Origen.]

[Footnote 691: In many passages of Clement the satisfaction in knowledge appears in a still more pronounced form than in Origen. The boldest expression of it is Strom. IV. 22. 136. This passage is quoted above on p. 328.]

[Footnote 692: See the beautiful prayer of the Christian Gnostic in Strom. IV. 23. 148.]

[Footnote 693: See Strom. IV. 26. 172: Origen's commentaries are continually interrupted by similar outbursts of feeling.]

[Footnote 694: On deification as the ultimate aim see Clem., Strom. IV. 23. 149-155: VII. 10. 56, 13. 82, 16. 95: [Greek: houtôs ho tô kuriô peithomenos kai tê dotheisê di' autou katakolouthêsas prophêteia teleôs ekteleitai kat' eikona tou didaskalou en sarki peripolôn Theos]. But note what a distinction Clement makes between [Greek: ho Theos] and the perfect man in VII. 15. 88 (in contradistinction to the Stoic identification); Origen does this also.]

[Footnote 695: Gregory (l.c., c. 13) relates that all the works of the poets and philosophers were read in Origen's school, and that every part of these works that would stand the test was admitted. Only the works of atheists were excluded, "because these overpass the limits of human thought." However, Origen did not judge philosophers in such an unprejudiced manner as Clement, or, to speak more correctly, he no longer valued them so highly. See Bigg, l.c., p. 133, Denis l.c. Introd.]

[Footnote 696: See, for example, c. Cels. V. 43: VII. 47, 59 sq. He compared Plato and other wise men to those doctors who give their attention only to cultured patients.]

[Footnote 697: See, for example, c. Cels. VI. 2.]

[Footnote 698: C. Cels. V. 43.]

[Footnote 699: One of Origen's main ideas, which we everywhere meet with, particularly in the work against Celsus (see, for example, VI. 2) is the thought that Christ has come to improve all men according to their several capacities, and to lead some to the highest knowledge. This conception appears to fall short of the Christian ideal and perhaps really does so; but as soon as we measure it not by the Gospel but by the aims of Greek philosophy, we see very clearly the progress that has been attained through this same Gospel. What Origen has in his eye is mankind, and he is anxious for the amendment not merely of a few, but of all. The actual state of things in the Church no longer allowed him to repeat the exclamations of the Apologists that all Christians were philosophers and that all were filled with the same wisdom and virtue. These exclamations were naïve and inappropriate even for that time. But he could already estimate the relative progress made by mankind within the Church as compared with those outside her pale, saw no gulf between the growing and the perfect, and traced the whole advance to Christ. He expressly declared, c. Cels. III. 78, that the Christianity which is fitted for the comprehension of the multitude is not the best doctrine in an absolute, but only in a relative, sense; that the "common man", as he expresses himself, must be reformed by the prospect of rewards and punishments; and that the truth can only be communicated to him in veiled forms and images, as to a child. The very fact, however, that the Logos in Jesus Christ has condescended so to act is to Origen a proof of the universality of Christianity. Moreover, many of the wonderful phenomena reported in the Holy Scriptures belong in his opinion to the veiled forms and images. He is very far from doing violence to his reason here; he rather appeals to mysterious powers of the soul, to powers of divination, visionary states etc. His standpoint in this case is wholly that of Celsus (see particularly the instructive disquisition in I. 48), in so far as he is convinced that many unusual things take place between heaven and earth, and that individual names, symbols etc. possess a mysterious power (see, for example, c. Cels. V. 45). The views as to the relationship between knowledge and holy initiation or _sacramentum_ are those of the philosophers of the age. He thinks, however, that each individual case requires to be examined, that there can be no miracles not in accordance with nature, but that on the contrary everything must fit into a higher order. As the letter of the precepts in both Testaments frequently contains things contrary to reason (see [Greek: peri archôn] IV. 2. 8-27) in order to lead men to the spiritual interpretation, and as many passages contain no literal sense at all (l.c. § 12), so also, in the historical narratives, we frequently discover a mythical element from which consequently nothing but the idea is to be evolved (l.c. § 16 sq.: "Non solum de his, quæ usque ad adventum Christi scripta sunt, hæc Spiritus sanctus procuravit, sed ... eadem similiter etiam in evangelistis et apostolis fecit. Nam ne illas quidem narrationes, quas per eos inspiravit, absque huiuscemodi, quam supra exposuimus, sapientiæ suæ arte contexuit. Unde etiam in ipsis non parva promiscuit, quibus historialis narrandi ordo interpolates, vel intercisus per impossibilitatem sui reflecteret atque revocaret intentionem legentis ad intelligentiæ interioris examen.") In all such cases Origen makes uniform use of the two points of view, that God wished to present something even to the simple and to incite the more advanced to spiritual investigations. In some passages, however, the former point of view fails, because the content of the text is offensive; in that case it is only the second that applies. Origen therefore was very far from finding the literal content of Scripture edifying in every instance, indeed, in the highest sense, the letter is not edifying at all. He rather adopted, to its widest extent, the critical method employed by the Gnostics particularly when dealing with the Old Testament; but the distinction he made between the different senses of Scripture and between the various legitimate human needs enabled him to preserve both the unity of God and the harmony of revelation. Herein, both in this case and everywhere else, lies the superiority of his theology. Read especially c. Celsum I. 9-12. After appealing to the twofold religion among the Egyptians, Persians, Syrians, and Indians--the mythical religion of the multitude and the mystery-religion of the initiated--he lays down exactly the same distinction within Christianity, and thus repels the reproach of Celsus that the Christians were obliged to accept everything without examination. With regard to the mythical form of Christianity he merely claims that it is the most suitable among religions of this type. Since, as a matter of fact, the great majority of men have neither time nor talent for philosophy, [Greek: poia an allê beltiôn methodos pros to tois pollois boêthêsai heuretheiê, tês apo tou Iêsou tois ethnesi paradotheisês] (l.c., 9). This thought is quite in the spirit of antiquity, and neither Celsus nor Porphyry could have any fault to find with these arguments in point of form: all positive religions have a mythical element; the true religion therefore lies behind the religions. But the novelty which neither Celsus nor Porphyry could recognise lies in the acknowledgment that the one religion, even in its mythical form, is unique and divine, and in the demand that all men, so far as they cannot attain the highest knowledge, must subject themselves to this mythical religion and no other. In this claim Origen rejected the ancient contrast between the multitude and the initiated just as he repudiated polytheism; and in this, if I see rightly, his historical greatness consists. He everywhere recognised gradations tending in the same direction and rejected polytheism.]

[Footnote 700: Bigg (l.c., p. 154) has rightly remarked: "Origen in point of method differs most from Clement, who not unfrequently leaves us in doubt as to the precise Scriptural basis of his ideas."]

[Footnote 701: Note, for example, § 8, where it is said that Origen adopted the allegorical method from the Stoic philosophers and applied it to the Jewish writings. On Origen's hermeneutic principles in their relation to those of Philo see Siegfried, l.c., pp. 351-62. Origen has developed them fully and clearly in the 4th Book of [Greek: peri archôn].]

[Footnote 702: See Overbeck, Theologische Literatur-Zeitung, 1878, Col. 535.]

[Footnote 703: A full presentation of Origen's theology would require many hundreds of pages, because he introduced everything worth knowing into the sphere of theology, and associated with the Holy Scriptures, verse by verse, philosophical maxims, ethical reflexions, and results of physical science, which would require to be drawn on the widest canvas, because the standpoint selected by Origen allowed the most extensive view and the most varied judgments. The case was similar with Clement before him, and also with Tertullian. This is a necessary result of "Scripture theology" when one takes it up in earnest. Tertullian assumes, for example, that there must be a Christian doctrine of dreams. Why? Because we read of dreams in the Holy Scriptures.]

[Footnote 704: In c. Cels. III. 61 it is said (Lommatzsch XVIII., p. 337): [Greek: epemphthê oun Theos logos katho men iatros tois hamartôlois, katho de didaskalos theiôn mustêrion tois êdê katharois kai mêketi hamartanousin.] See also what follows. In Comment. in John I. 20 sq. the crucified Christ, as the Christ of faith, is distinguished from the Christ who takes up his abode in us, as the Christ of the perfect. See 22 (Lomm. I. p. 43): [Greek: kai makarioi ge hosoi deomenoi tou huiou tou Theou toioutoi gegonasin, hôs mêketi autou chrazein iatrou tous kakôs hechontas therapeuontos, mêde poimenos, mêde apolutrôseôs, alla sophias kai logou kai dikaiosunês, hê ei ti allo tois dia teleiotêta chôrein autou ta kallista dunamenois.] Read also c. Cels. II. 66, 69: IV. 15, 18: VI. 68. These passages show that the crucified Christ is no longer of any account to the Gnostic, and that he therefore allegorises all the incidents described in the Gospels. Clement, too, really regards Christ as of no importance to Gnostics except as a teacher.]

[Footnote 705: Comment, in Joh. I. 9, Lomm. I. p, 20. The "mysteries" of Christ is the technical term for this theology and, at bottom, for all theology. For, in respect of the form given to it, revelation always appears as a problem that theology has to solve. What is revealed is therefore either to be taken as immediate authority (by the believer) or as a soluble problem. One thing, accordingly, it is not, namely, something in itself evident and intelligible.]

[Footnote 706: See Nitzsch, Dogmengeschichte, p. 136.]

[Footnote 707: To Origen the problem of evil was one of the most important; see Book III. of [Greek: peri archôn] and c. Cels. VI. 53-59. He is convinced (1) that the world is not the work of a second, hostile God; (2) that virtues and the works arising from them are alone good in the proper sense of the word, and that nothing but the opposite of these is bad; (3) that evil in the proper sense of the word is only evil will (see c. Cels. IV. 66: VI. 54). Accordingly he makes a very decided distinction between that which is bad and evils. As for the latter he admits that they partly originate from God, in which case they are designed as means of training and punishment. But he saw that this conception is insufficient, both in view of individual passages of Holy Scripture and of natural experience. There are evils in the world that can be understood neither as the result of sin nor as means of training. Here then his relative, rational view of things comes in, even with respect to the power of God. There are evils which are a necessary consequence of carrying out even the best intentions (c. Cels. VI. 53: [Greek: ta kaka ek parakolouthêseôs gegenêtai tês pros ta proêgoumena]): "Evils, in the strict sense, are not created by God; yet some, though but few in comparison with the great, well-ordered whole of the world, have of necessity adhered to the objects realised; as the carpenter who executes the plan of a building does not manage without chips and similar rubbish, or as architects cannot be made responsible for the dirty heaps of broken stones and filth one sees at the sites of buildings;" (l.c., c. 55). Celsus also might have written in this strain. The religious, absolute view is here replaced by a rational, and the world is therefore not the best absolutely, but the best possible. See the Theodicy in [Greek: peri archôn] III. 17-22. (Here, and also in other parts, Origen's Theodicy reminds us of that of Leibnitz; see Denis, l.c., p. 626 sq. The two great thinkers have a very great deal in common, because their philosophy was not of a radical kind, but an attempt to give a rational interpretation to tradition.) But "for the great mass it is sufficient when they are told that evil has not its origin in God" (IV. 66). The case is similar with that which is really bad. It is sufficient for the multitude to know that that which is bad springs from the freedom of the creature, and that matter which is inseparable from things mortal is not the source and cause of sin (IV. 66, see also III, 42: [Greek: to kuriôs miaron apo kakias toiouton esti. Phusis de sômatos ou miara ou gar hê phusis sômatos esti, to gennêtikon tês miarotêtos echei tên kakian]); but a closer examination shows that there can be no man without sin (III. 6l) because error is inseparable from growth and because the constitution of man in the flesh makes evil unavoidable (VII. 50). Sinfulness is therefore natural and it is the necessary _prius_. This thought, which is also not foreign to Irenæus, is developed by Origen with the utmost clearness. He was not content with proving it, however, but in order to justify God's ways proceeded to the assumption of a Fall before time began (see below).]

[Footnote 708: See Mehlhorn, Die Lehre von der menschlichen Freiheit nach Origenes (Zeitschrift fur Kirchengeschichte, Vol. II., p. 234 ff.)]

[Footnote 709: The distinction between Valentinus and Origen consists in the fact that the former makes an æon or, in other words, a part of the divine _pleroma_, itself fall, and that he does not utilise the idea of freedom. The outline of Origen's system cannot be made out with complete clearness from the work [Greek: peri archôn], because he endeavoured to treat each of the first three parts as a whole. Origen's four principles are God, the World, Freedom, Revelation (Holy Scripture). Each principle, however, is brought into relation with Christ. The first part treats of God and the spirits, and follows the history of the latter down to their restoration. The second part treats of the world and humanity, and likewise closes with the prospect of the resurrection, punishment in hell, and eternal life. Here Origen makes a magnificent attempt to give a conception of bliss and yet to exclude all sensuous joys. The third book treats of sin and redemption, that is, of freedom of will, temptation, the struggle with the powers of evil, internal struggles, the moral aim of the world, and the restoration of all things. A special book on Christ is wanting, for Christ is no "principle"; but the incarnation is treated of in II. 6. The teachers of Valentinus' school accordingly appear more Christian when contrasted with Origen. If we read the great work [Greek: peri archôn], or the treatise against Celsus, or the commentaries connectedly, we never cease to wonder how a mind so clear, so sure of the ultimate aim of all knowledge, and occupying such a high standpoint, has admitted in details all possible views down to the most naive myths, and how he on the one hand believes in holy magic, sacramental vehicles and the like, and on the other, in spite of all his rational and even empirical views, betrays no doubt of his abstract creations. But the problem that confronts us in Origen is that presented by his age. This we realise on reading Celsus or Porphyry (see Denis l.c., p. 613: "Toutes les théories d'Origène, même les plus imaginaires, représent l'état intellectuel et moral du siècle où il a paru"). Moreover, Origen is not a teacher who, like Augustine, was in advance of his time, though he no doubt anticipated the course of ecclesiastical development. This age, as represented by its greatest men, sought to gain a substructure for something new, not by a critical examination of the old ideas, but by incorporating them all into one whole. People were anxious to have assurance, and, in the endeavour to find this, they were nervous about giving up any article of tradition. The boldness of Origen, judged as a Greek philosopher, lies in his rejection of all polytheistic religions. This made him all the more conservative in his endeavours to protect and incorporate everything else. This conservatism welded together ecclesiastical Christianity and Greek culture into a system of theology which was indeed completely heterodox.]

[Footnote 710: The proof from prophecy was reckoned by Origen among the articles belonging to faith, but not to Gnosis (see for ex. c. Cels. II. 37); but, like the Apologists, he found it of great value. As far as the philosophers are concerned, Origen always bore in mind the principle expressed in c. Cels. VII. 46: [Greek: pros tauta d'êmeis phêsomen hoi meletêsantes mêdeni apechthanesthai tôn kalôs legomenôn; kan hoi hexô tês pisteôs legôusi kalôs.] In that same place it is asserted that God in his love has not only revealed himself to such as entirely consecrate themselves to his service, but also to such as do not know the true adoration and reverence which he requires. But as remarked above, p. 338, Origen's attitude to the Greek philosophers is much more reserved than that of Clement.]

[Footnote 711: See, for ex., c. Cels. VI. 6, Comment in Johann. XIII. 59, Lomm. II., p. 9 sq.]

[Footnote 712: [Greek: Peri archôn] preface.]

[Footnote 713: On Origen's exegetical method see Kihn, Theodor v. Mopsu. p. 20 ff., Bigg, l.c. p. 131 ff. On the distinction between his application of the allegorical method and that of Clement see specially p. 134 f. of the latter work.]

[Footnote 714: Origen noted several such passages in the very first chapter of Genesis. Examples are given in Bigg, p. 137 f.]

[Footnote 715: Bigg, l.c., has very appropriately named Origen's allegorism "Biblical alchemy".]

[Footnote 716: To ascertain the pneumatic sense, Origen frequently drew analogies between the domain of the cosmic and that of the spiritual. He is thus a forerunner of modern idealistic philosophers, for example, Drummond: "To Origen allegorism is only one manifestation of the sacramental mystery of nature" (Bigg, p. 134).]

[Footnote 717: See Hom in Luc. XXIX., Lomm. V., p. 193 sq.]

[Footnote 718: Since Origen does not, as a rule, dispute the literal meaning of the Scriptures, he has also a much more favourable opinion of the Jewish people and of the observance of the law than the earlier Christian authors (but see Iren. and Tertull.). At bottom he places the observance of the law quite on the same level as the faith of the simple Christians. The Apostles also kept the law for a time, and it was only by degrees that they came to understand its spiritual meaning. They were also right to continue its observance during their mission among the Jews. On the other hand, he considers the New Testament a higher stage than the Old both in its literal and its spiritual sense. See c. Cels. II. 1-4, 7, 75: IV. 31 sq: V. 10, 30, 31, 42 sq., 66: VII. 26.]

[Footnote 719: In opposition to the method for obtaining a knowledge of God, recommended by Alcinous (c. 12), Maximus Tyr. (XVII. 8), and Celsus (by analysis [apophat.], synthesis [kataphat.], and analogy), Origen, c. Cels. VII. 42, 44, appeals to the fact that the Christian knows God better, namely, in his incarnate Son. But he himself, nevertheless, also follows the synthetic method.]

[Footnote 720: In defining the superessential nature of the One, Origen did not go so far as the Basilidians (Philosoph. VII. 20, 21) or as Plotinus. No doubt he also regards the Deity as [Greek: epekeina tês ousias] (c. Cels. VII. 42-51; [Greek: peri archôn] I. 1; Clement made a closer approach to the heretical abstractions of the Gnostics inasmuch as he still more expressly renounced any designation of God; see Strom. V. 12, 13), but he is not [Greek: buthos] and [Greek: sigê], being rather a self-comprehending Spirit, and therefore does not require a hypostasis (the [Greek: nous]) before he can come to himself. Accordingly the human intellect is not incapable of soaring up to God as the later Neoplatonists assert; at least vision is by no means so decidedly opposed to thought, that is, elevated above it as something new, as is held by the Neoplatonists and Philo before them. Origen is no mystic. In accordance with this conception Origen and Clement say that the perfect knowledge of God can indeed be derived from the Logos alone (c. Cels VII. 48, 49: VI. 65-73; Strom. V. 12. 85: VI. 15. 122), but that a relative knowledge may be deduced from creation (c. Cels. VII. 46). Hence they also spoke of an innate knowledge of God (Protrept. VI. 68; Strom. V. 13. 78), and extended the teleological proof of God furnished by Philo ([Greek: peri archôn] I. 1. 6; c. Cels I. 23). The relatively correct predicates of God to be determined from revelation are his unity (c. Cels I. 23), his absolute spirituality ([Greek: pneuma asômatos, aulos, aschêmatistos])--this is maintained both in opposition to Stoicism and anthropomorphism; see Orig. [Greek: peri archôn] I. 1, Origen's polemic against Melito's conception of God, and Clem., Strom. V. 11. 68: V. 12. 82,--his unbegottenness, his immortality (this is eternity conceived as enjoyment; the eternity of God itself, however, is to be conceived, according to Clement, as that which is above time; see Strom. II. 2. 6), and his absolute causality. All these concepts together constitute the conception of perfection. See Fischer, De Orig. theologia et cosmologia, 1840.]

[Footnote 721: Orig. [Greek: peri archôn] II. 1. 3.]

[Footnote 722: C. Cels V. 23.]

[Footnote 723: L.c.]

[Footnote 724: [Greek: Peri archôn] II. 9. 1: "Certum est, quippe quod præfinito aliquo apud se numero creaturas fecit: non enim, ut quidam volunt, finem putandum est non habere creaturas; quia ubi finis non est, nec comprehensio ulla nec circumscriptio esse potest. Quod si fuerit utique nee contineri vel dispensari a deo, quæ facta sunt, poterunt. Naturaliter nempe quicquid infinitum fuerit, et incomprehensibile erit." In Matth., t. 13., c. 1 fin., Lomm. III., p. 209 sq.]

[Footnote 725: See above, p. 343, note 2.]

[Footnote 726: See c. Cels. II. 20.]

[Footnote 727: Clement also did so; see with respect to Origen [Greek: peri archôn] II. 5, especially § 3 sq.]

[Footnote 728: See Comment. in Johann. I. 40, Lomm. I. p. 77 sq. I cannot agree that this view is a _rapprochement_ to the Marcionites (contrary to Nitzsch's opinion, l.c., p. 285). The confused accounts in Epiph., H. 43. 13 are at any rate not to be taken into account.]

[Footnote 729: Clement's doctrine of the Logos, to judge from the Hypotyposes, was perhaps different from that of Origen. According to Photius (Biblioth. 109) Clement assumed two Logoi (Origen indeed was also reproached with the same; see Pamphili Apol., Routh, Reliq. S., IV., p. 367), and did not even allow the second and weaker one to make a real appearance on earth; but this is a misunderstanding (see Zahn, Forschungen III., p. 144). [Greek: Legetai men]--these are said to have been the words of a passage in the Hypotyposes--[Greek: kai ho huios logos homônumôs tô patrikô logô, all' ouch outos estin ho sarx genomenos, oude men ho patrôos logos, alla dynamis tis tou Theou, oion apporoia tou logou autou nous genomenos tas tôn anthrôpôn kardias diapephoitêke]. The distinction between an impersonal Logos-God and the Logos-Christ necessarily appeared as soon as the Logos was definitely hypostatised. In the so-called Monarchian struggles of the 3rd century the disputants made use of these two Logoi, who formed excellent material for sophistical discussions. In the Strom. Clement did not reject the distinction between a [Greek: logos endiathetos] and [Greek: prophorikos] (on Strom. V. 1. 6. see Zahn, l.c., p. 145 against Nitzsch), and in many passages expresses himself in such a way that one can scarcely fail to notice a distinction between the Logos of the Father and that of the Son. "The Son-Logos is an emanation of the Reason of God, which unalterably remains in God and is the Logos proper." If the Adumbrationes are to be regarded as parts of the Hypotyposes, Clement used the expression [Greek: homoousios] for the Logos, or at least an identical one (See Zahn, Forschungen III., pp. 87-138 f.). This is the more probable because Clement, Strom. 16. 74, expressly remarked that men are not [Greek: meros theou kai tô Theô homoousioi], and because he says in Strom. IV. 13. 91: [Greek: ei epi to katalusai thanaton aphikneitai to diapheron genos, ouch ho Christos ton thanaton katêrgêsen, ei mê kai autos autois homoousios lechtheiê]. One must assume from this that the word was really familiar to Clement as a designation of the community of nature, possessed by the Logos, both with God and with men. See Protrept. 10. 110: [Greek: ho theios logos, ho phanerôtatos ontôs Theos, ho tô despotê tôn holôn exisôtheis]). In Strom. V. I. 1 Clement emphatically declared that the Son was equally eternal with the Father: [Greek: ou mên oude ho patêr aneu huiou hama gar tô patêr huiou patêr] (see also Strom. IV. 7. 58: [Greek: hen mên to agennêton ho pantokratôr, en de kai to progennêthen di' ou ta panta egeneto], and Adumbrat. in Zahn, l.c., p. 87, where 1 John I. 1 is explained: "principium generationis separatum ab opificis principio non est. Cum enim dicit 'quod erat ab initio' generationem tangit sine principio filii cum patre simul exstantis." See besides the remarkable passage, Quis dives salv. 37: [Greek: Theô ta tês agapês mystêria, kai tote epopteuseis ton kolpon tou patros, hon ho monogenês huios Theos monos exêgêsato esti de kai autos ho Theos agapê kai di' agapên hêmin anekrathê kai to men arrêton autou patêr, to de hêmin sympathes gegone mêtêr agapêsas ho patêr ethêlunthê, kai toutou mega sêmeion, hon autos egennêsen ex autou kai ho techtheis ex agapês karpos agapê]. But that does not exclude the fact that he, like Origen, named the Son [Greek: ktisma] (Phot., l.c.). In the Adumbrat. (p. 88) Son and Spirit are called "primitivæ virtutes ac primo creatæ, immobiles exsistentes secundum substantiam". That is exactly Origen's doctrine, and Zahn (l.c., p. 99) has rightly compared Strom. V. 14. 89: VI. 7. 58; and Epit. ex Theod. 20. The Son stands at the head of the series of created beings (Strom. VII. 2. 5; see also below), but he is nevertheless specifically different from them by reason of his origin. It may be said in general that the fine distinctions of the Logos doctrine in Clement and Origen are to be traced to the still more abstract conception of God found in the former. A sentence like Strom. IV. 25. 156 ([Greek: ho men oun Theos anapodeiktos ôn ouk estin epistêmonikos, ho de huios sophia te esti kai epistêmê]) will hardly be found in Origen I think. Cf. Schultz, Gottheit Christi, p. 45 ff.]

[Footnote 730: See Schultz, l.c., p. 51 ff. and Jahrbuch fur protestantische Theologie I. pp. 193 ff. 369 ff.]

[Footnote 731: It is very remarkable that Origen [Greek: peri archôn] I. 2. 1 in his presentation of the Logos doctrine, started with the person of Christ, though he immediately abandoned this starting-point "Primo illud nos oportere scire", so this chapter begins, "Quod aliud est in Christo deitatis eius natura, quod est unigenitus filius patris, et alia humana natura, quam in novissimis temporibus pro dispensatione suscepit. Propter quod videndum primo est, quid sit unigenitus filius dei."]

[Footnote 732: [Greek: Peri archôn] I. 2. 2, 6.]

[Footnote 733: The expression was familiar to Origen as to Justin (see Dial. c. Tryph). See c. Cels. V. 39: [Greek: Kai deuteron oun legômen Theon istôsan, hoti ton deuteron Theon ouk allo ti legomen, hê tên periektikên pasôn aretôn aretên kai ton periektikon pantos houtinosoun logou tôn kata physin kai proêgoumenôs gegenêmenôn.]]

[Footnote 734: [Greek: Peri archôn] I. 2. 13 has been much corrupted by Rufinus. The passage must have been to the effect that the Son is indeed [Greek: agathos], but not, like the Father, [Greek: aparallaktôs agathos].]

[Footnote 735: Selecta in Psalm., Lomm. XIII., p. 134; see also Fragm. comm. in ep. ad Hebr., Lomm. V., p. 299 sq.]

[Footnote 736: L.c.: "Sic et sapientia ex deo procedens, ex ipsa substantia dei generatur. Sic nihilominus et secundum similitudinem corporalis aporrhoeæ esse dicitur aporrhoea gloriæ omnipotentis pura quædam et sincera. Quæ utræque similitudines (see the beginning of the passage) manifestissime ostendunt communionem substantiæ esse filio cum patre. Aporrhoea enim [Greek: homoousios] videtur, id est, unius substantiæ cum illo corpore, ex quo est vel aporrhoea vel vapor." In opposition to Heracleon Origen argues (in Joh. XIII. 25., Lomm. II., p. 43 sq.) that _we_ are not homousios with God: [Greek: epistêsômen de, ei me sphodra estin asebes homoousios tê agennêtô physei kai pammakaria einai legein tous proskunountas en pneumati tô Theô.] On the meaning of [Greek: homoousios] see Zahn, Marcell., pp. 11-32. The conception decidedly excludes the possibility of the two subjects connected by it having a different essence; but it says nothing about how they came to have one essence and in what measure they possess it. On the other hand it abolishes the distinction of persons the moment the essence itself is identified with the one person. Here then is found the Unitarian danger, which could only be averted by assertions. In some of Origen's teachings a modalistic aspect is also not quite wanting. See Hom. VIII. in Jerem. no. 2: [Greek: To men hupokeimenon hen esti, tais de epinoiais ta polla onomata epi diaphorôn]. Conversely, it is also nothing but an appearance when Origen (for ex. in c. Cels. VIII. 12) merely traces the unity of Father and Son to unity in feeling and in will. The charge of Ebionitism made against him is quite unfounded (see Pamphili Apol., Routh IV. p. 367).]

[Footnote 737: [Greek: Ouk estin ote ouk ên], de princip. I. 2. 9; in Rom. I. 5.]

[Footnote 738: [Greek: Peri archôn] I. 2. 2-9. Comm. in ep. ad. Hebr. Lomm. V., p. 296: "Nunquam est, quando filius non fuit. Erat autem non, sicut de æterna luce diximus, innatus, ne duo principia lucis videamur inducere, sed sicut ingenitæ lucis splendor, ipsam illam lucem initium habens ac fontem, natus quidem ex ipsa; sed non erat quando noa erat." See the comprehensive disquisition in [Greek: peri archôn] IV. 28, where we find the sentence: "hoc autem ipsum, quod dicimus, quia nunquam fuit, quando non fuit, cum venia audiendum est" etc. See further in Jerem. IX. 4, Lomm. XV., p. 212: [Greek: to apaugasma tês doxês ouchi hapax gegennêtai, kai ouchi gennatai ... kai aei gennatai ho sôtêr hupo tou patros]; see also other passages.]

[Footnote 739: See Caspari, Quellen, Vol. IV., p. 10.]

[Footnote 740: In [Greek: peri archôn] IV. 28 the _prolatio_ is expressly rejected (see also I. 2, 4) as well as the "conversio partis alicuius substantiæ dei in filium" and the "procreatio ex nullis substantibus."]

[Footnote 741: L.c. I. 2. 2].

[Footnote 742: L.c. I. 2. 3].

[Footnote 743: De orat. 15: [Greek: Eteros kat' ousian kai hupokeimenon ho huios esti tou patros]. This, however, is not meant to designate a deity of a hybrid nature, but to mark the parsonal distinction.]

[Footnote 744: C. Cels. VIII. 12.: [Greek: duo tê hypostasei pragmata]. This was frequently urged against the Monarchians in Origen's commentaries; see in Joh. X. 21: II. 6 etc. The Son exists [Greek: kat' idian tês ousias perigraphên]. Not that Origen has not yet the later terminology [Greek: ousia, hypostasis, hypokeimenon, prosôpon]. We find three hypostases in Joh. II. 6. Lomm. I., p. 109, and this is repeatedly the case in c. Cels.]

[Footnote 745: In Joh. I. 22, Lomm. I., p. 41 sq.: [Greek: ho Theos men oun pantê hen esti kai aploun ho de sôtêr hêmôn dia ta polla]. The Son is [Greek: idea ideôn, systêma theôrêmatôn en autô](Lomm. I., p. 127).]

[Footnote 746: See the remarks on the saying: "The Father is greater than I," in Joh. XIII. 25, Lomm. II., p. 45 sq. and other passages. Here Origen shows that he considers the homoousia of the Son and the Father just as relative as the unchangeability of the Son.]

[Footnote 747: [Greek: Peri archôn] II. 2. 6 has been corrupted by Rufinus; see Jerome ep. ad Avitum.]

[Footnote 748: See [Greek: Peri archôn] I. 2. 13 (see above, p. 354, note 3).]

[Footnote 749: Athanasius supplemented this by determining the essence of the Logos from the redeeming work of Christ.]

[Footnote 750: See [Greek: peri archôn] præf. and in addition to this Hermas' view of the Spirit.]

[Footnote 751: [Greek: Peri archôn] I. 3. The Holy Spirit is eternal, is ever being breathed out, but is to be termed a creature. See also in Job. II. 6, Lomm. I., p. 109 sq.: [Greek: to hagion pneuma dia tou logou egeneto, presbuterou] (logically) [Greek: par' auto tou logou tugchanontos]. Yet Origen is not so confident here as in his Logos doctrine.]

[Footnote 752: See [Greek: peri archôn] I. 3, 5-8. Hence Origen says the heathen had known the Father and Son, but not the Holy Spirit (de princip. I. 3: II. 7).]

[Footnote 753: L.c. § 7.]

[Footnote 754: See Hom. in Num. XII. I, Lomm. X, p. 127: "Est hæc trium distinctio personarum in patre et filio et spiritu sancto, quæ ad pluralem puteorum numerum revocatur. Sed horum puteorum unum est fons. Una enim substantia est et natura trinitatis."]

[Footnote 755: [Greek: Peri archôn] præf.]

[Footnote 756: From Hermas, Justin, and Athenagoras we learn how, in the 2nd century, both in the belief of uneducated lay-Christians and of the Apologists, Son, Spirit, Logos, and angels under certain circumstances shaded off into one another. To Clement, no doubt, Logos and Spirit are the only unchangeable beings besides God. But, inasmuch as there is a series which descends from God to men living in the flesh, there cannot fail to be elements of affinity between Logos and Spirit on the one hand and the highest angels on the other, all of whom indeed have the capacity and need of development. Hence they have certain names and predicates in common, and it frequently remains uncertain, especially as regards the theophanies in the Old Testament, whether it was a high angel that spoke, or the Son through the angel. See the full discussion in Zahn, Forschungen, III., p. 98 f.]

[Footnote 757: [Greek: Peri archôn] I. 5.]

[Footnote 758: So also Clement, see Zahn, l.c.]

[Footnote 759: [Greek: Peri archôn] I. 5. 2.]

[Footnote 760: It was of course created before the world, as it determines the course of the world. See Comm. in Matth. XV. 27, Lomm. III., p. 384 sq.]

[Footnote 761: See Comm. in Joh. XIII. 25, Lomm. II, p. 45: we must not look on the human spirit as [Greek: homoousios] with the divine one. The same had already been expressly taught by Clement. See Strom., II. 16. 74: [Greek: ho Theos oudemian echei pros hêmas physikên schesin hôs hoi tôn haireseôn ktistai thelousin]. Adumbr., p. 91 (ed. Zahn). This does not exclude God and souls having _quodammodo_ one substance.]

[Footnote 762: Such is the teaching of Clement and Origen. They repudiated the possession of any natural, essential goodness in the case of created spirits. If such lay in their essence, these spirits would be unchangeable.]

[Footnote 763: [Greek: Peri archôn] I. 2. 10: "Quemadmodum pater non potest esse quis, si filius non sit, neque dominus quis esse potest sine possessione, sine servo, ita ne omnipotens quidem deus dici potest, si non sint, in quos exerceat potentatum, et deo ut omnipotens ostendatur deus, omnia subsistere necesse est." (So the Hermogenes against whom Tertullian wrote had already argued). "Nam si quis est, qui velit vel sæcula aliqua vel spatia transisse, vel quodcunque aliud nominare vult, cum nondum facta essent, quæ facta sunt, sine dubio hoc ostendet, quod in illis sæculis vel spatiis omnipotens non erat deus et postmodum omnipotens factus est." God would therefore, it is said in what follows, be subjected to a [Greek: prokopê], and thus be proved to be a finite being. III. 5. 3.]

[Footnote 764: [Greek: Peri archôn] I. 8.]

[Footnote 765: Here, however, Origen is already thinking of the temporary wrong development that is of growth. See [Greek: peri archôn] I. 7. Created spirits are also of themselves immaterial, though indeed not in the sense that this can be said of God who can never attach anything material to himself.]

[Footnote 766: Angels, ideas (see Phot. Biblioth. 109), and human souls are most closely connected together, both according to the theory of Clement and Origen and also to that of Pantænus before them (see Clem. eclog. 56, 57); and so it was taught that men become angels (Clem. Strom. VI. 13. 107). But the stars also, which are treated in great detail in [Greek: peri archôn] I. 7, belong to the number of the angels. This is a genuinely Greek idea. The doctrine of the preëxistence of human souls was probably set forth by Clement in the Hypotyposes. The theory of the transmigration of souls was probably found there also (Phot. Biblioth. 109). In the Adumbrat., which has been preserved to us, the former doctrine is, however, contested and is not found in the Stromateis VI. 16. I. sq.]

[Footnote 767: Phot. Biblioth. 109: [Greek: Klêmês pollous pro tou Adam kosmous terateuetai]. This cannot be verified from the Strom. Orig., [Greek: peri archôn] II. 3.]

[Footnote 768: [Greek: Peri archôn] I. 5 and the whole 3rd Book. The Fall is something that happened before time began.]

[Footnote 769: The assumption of uncreated matter was decidedly rejected by Origen ([Greek: peri archôn] II. 1, 2). On the other hand Clement is said to have taught it in the Hypotyposes (Phot., l.c.: [Greek: hulên archronon doxazei]); this cannot be noticed in the Strom.; in fact in VI. 16. 147 he vigorously contested the view of the uncreatedness of the world. He emphasised the agreement between Plato and Moses in the doctrine of creation (Strom. II. 16. 74 has nothing to do with this). According to Origen, matter has no qualities and may assume the most diverse peculiarities (see, e.g., c. Cels. III. 41).]

[Footnote 770: This conception has given occasion to compare Origen's system with Buddhism. Bigg. (p. 193) has very beautifully said: "Creation, as the word is commonly understood, was in Origen's views not the beginning, but an intermediate phase in human history. Æons rolled away before this world was made; æons upon æons, days, weeks, months and years, sabbatical years, jubilee years of æons will run their course, before the end is attained. The one fixed point in this gigantic drama is the end, for this alone has been clearly revealed," "God shall be all in all." Bigg also rightly points out that Rom. VIII. and 1 Cor. XV. were for Origen the key to the solution of the problems presented by creation.]

[Footnote 771: The popular idea of demons and angels was employed by Origen in the most comprehensive way, and dominates his whole view of the present course of the world. See [Greek: peri archôn] III. 2. and numerous passages in the Commentaries and Homilies, in which he approves the kindred views of the Greeks as well as of Hermas and Barnabas. The spirits ascend and descend; each man has his guardian spirit, and the superior spirits support the inferior ([Greek: peri archôn] I. 6). Accordingly they are also to be reverenced ([Greek: therapeuesthai]); yet such reverence as belongs to a Gabriel, a Michael, etc., is far different from the adoration of God (c. Cels. VIII. 13).]

[Footnote 772: Clement wrote a special work [Greek: peri pronoias] (see Zahn, Forschungen III., p. 39 ff.), and treated at length of [Greek: pronoia] in the Strom.; see Orig. [Greek: peri archôn] III. 1; de orat. 6 etc. Evil is also subject to divine guidance; see Clem., Strom. I. 17. 81-87: IV. 12. 86 sq. Orig. Hom. in Num. XIV., Lomm. X., p. 163: "Nihil otiosum, nihil inane est apud deum, quia sive bono proposito hominis utitur ad bona sive malo ad necessaria." Here and there, however, Origen has qualified the belief in Providence, after the genuine fashion of antiquity (see c. Gels. IV. 74).]

[Footnote 773: [Greek: Peri archôn] II. 9. 2: "Recedere a bono, non aliud est quam effici in malo. Ceterum namque est, malum esse bono canere. Ex quo accidit, ut in quanta mensura quis devolveretur a bono, in tantam mensuram malitiæ deveniret." In the passage in Johann. II. 7, Lomm. I., p. 115, we find a closely reasoned exposition of evil as [Greek: anupostaton] and an argument to the effect that [Greek: ta ponêra] are--[Greek: mê onta].]

[Footnote 774: [Greek: Peri archôn] I. 5. 3: III. 6. The devil is the chief of the apostate angels (c. Cels. IV. 65). As a reasonable being he is a creature of God (l.c., and in Joh. II. 7, Lomm., l.c.).]

[Footnote 775: Origen defended the teleology culminating in man against Celsus' attacks on it; but his assumption that the spirits of men are only a part of the universal spirit world is, as a matter of fact, quite akin to Celsus' view. If we consider the plan of the work [Greek: peri archôn] we easily see that to Origen humanity was merely an element in the cosmos.]

[Footnote 776: The doctrine of man's threefold constitution is also found in Clement. See Pædag. III. 1. 1; Strom V. 14. 94: VI. 16. 134. (quite in the manner of Plato). Origen, who has given evidence of it in all his main writings, sometimes calls the rational part spirit, sometimes [Greek: psychê logikê], and at other times distinguishes two parts in the one soul. Of course he also professes to derive his psychology from the Holy Scriptures. The chief peculiarity of his speculation consists in his assumption that the human spirit, as a fallen one, became as it were a soul, and can develop from that condition partly into a spirit as before and partly into the flesh (see [Greek: peri archôn] III. 4. 1 sq.: II. 8. 1-5). By his doctrine of the preëxistence of souls Origen excluded both the creation and traducian hypotheses of the origin of the soul.]

[Footnote 777: Clement (see Strom. II. 22. 131) gives the following as the opinion of some Christian teachers: [Greek: to men kat' eikona eutheôs kata tên genesin eilêphenai ton anthrôpon, to kath' homoiôsin de usteron kata tên peleiôsin mellein apolambanein]. Orig. c. Cels. IV. 30: [Greek: epoiête d'o Theos ton anthrôpon kat' eikona Theos, all' ouchi kath' homoiôsin êdê].]

[Footnote 778: This follows from the fundamental psychological view and is frequently emphasised. One must attain the [Greek: sôphorsynê].]

[Footnote 779: This is emphasised throughout. The goodness of God is shown first in his having given the creature reason and freedom, and secondly in acts of assistance, which, however, do not endanger freedom. Clem.; Strom. VI. 12, 96: [Greek: hêmas ex hêmôn autôn bouletai sôzesthai].]

[Footnote 780: See above, p. 344, and p. 361, note 5. Origen continually emphasised the universality of sin in the strongest expressions: c. Cels. III. 61-66: VII. 50; Clem., Pæd. III. 12. 93: [Greek: to examartanein pasin emphyton].]

[Footnote 781: See Clem., Strom. VII. 16. 101: [Greek: myriôn goun ontôn kat' arithmon ha prassousin anthrôpoi schedon duo eisin archai pasês hamartias, agnoia kai astheneia, amphô de eph' hêmin, tôn mête ethelontôn manthanein mête au tês epithymias kratein]. Two remedies correspond to this (102): [Greek: hê gnôsis te kai hê tês ek tôn graphôn martyrias enargês apodeixis] and [Greek: hê kata logon askêsis ek pisteôs te kai phobou paidagôgoumenê], or otherwise expressed: [Greek: hê theôria hê epistêmonikê] and [Greek: hê praxis] which lead to perfect love.]

[Footnote 782: Freedom is not prejudiced by the idea of election that is found here and there, for this idea is not worked out. In Clem., Strom. VI. 9. 76, it is said of the friend of God, the true Gnostic, that God has destined ([Greek: proôrisen]) him to sonship before the foundation of the world. See VII. 17. 107.]

[Footnote 783: C. Cels. III. 69.]

[Footnote 784: It is both true that men have the same freedom as Adam and that they have the same evil instincts. Moreover, Origen conceived the story of Adam symbolically. See c. Cels. IV. 40; [Greek: peri archôn] IV. 16; in Levit. hom. VI. 2. In his later writings, after he had met with the practice of child baptism in Cæsarea and prevailed on himself to regard it as apostolic, he also assumed the existence of a sort of hereditary sin originating with Adam, and added it to his idea of the preëxisting Fall. Like Augustine after him, he also supposed that there was an inherent pollution in sexual union; see in Rom. V. 9: VII. 4; in Lev. hom. VIII. 3; in Num. hom. 2 (Bigg, p. 202 f.).]

[Footnote 785: Nevertheless Origen assumes that some souls are invested with flesh, not for their own sins, but in order to be of use to others. See in Joh. XIII. 43 ad fin; II. 24, 25; in Matth. XII. 30.]

[Footnote 786: Origen again and again strongly urged the necessity of divine grace.]

[Footnote 787: See on this point Bigg, pp. 207 ff., 223 f. Origen is the father of Joachim and all spiritualists.]

[Footnote 788: See Knittel, Orig. Lehre von der Menschwerdung (Tübinger Theologische Quartalschrift, 1872). Ramers, Orig. Lehre von der Auferstehung des Fleisches, 1851. Schultz, Gottheit Christi, pp. 51-62.]