Chapter XVI: Part 16

5. NATURALIST.—This word is used in two senses; an objective and a subjective. Naturalism, in the former, is the belief which identifies God with nature; in the latter, the belief in the sufficiency of natural as distinct from revealed religion. The former is Pantheism, the latter Deism. In the former sense it is applied to Spinoza and others; e.g. in Walch’s _Biblioth. Theol. Select._ i. 745 seq. In the latter sense it occurs as early as 1588 in France, in the writings of J. Bodin (_Colloq. Heptapl._ 31. Rem. 2); and towards the end of the seventeenth century both in Germany and England, e.g. in Kortholt’s _De Trib. Impost._ 1680; and the Quaker, Barclay’s _Apologia_, 1679, p. 28. At the end of the seventeenth century, and in the eighteenth, the name was applied in England to deists, (e.g. in Nichols’s _Conference with a Theist_, pref. § 15); and in Germany it became a commonly known word, owing to the spread of the Wolffian philosophy. Stapfer (_Instit. Theol. Polem._ 1744, vol. ii. p. 881), using Wolffian phraseology, divides this latter kind of naturalism into two kinds, viz. philosophical and theological. The philosophical kind maintains the sufficiency of natural religion, and disbelieves revealed; the theological kind holds the truth of revelation, but regards it as unnecessary, as being only a republication of natural religion. The adherent of the former is the “Naturalist” of Kant; the latter his “pure Rationalist” (_Verg. Religion Innerhalb, &c._); the former the Deist, the latter the Rationalist, of a school like that of Wegscheider, &c. (See Lect. VI.)

Cfr. Bretschneider’s _Handbuch der Dogmatik_; i. 72. note. Hahn, _De Rationalismi Indole_ (quoted by Rose on Rationalism, 2d ed. Introd. p. 20) names writers who make a third kind of naturalism, viz. Pelagianism; but this is rare.

6. FREETHINKER.—This term first appears toward the close of the seventeenth century. It is used of Toland, “a candid Freethinker,” by Molyneux, in a letter to Locke 1697 (_Locke’s Works_, fol. ed. iii. 624); and Shaftesbury in 1709 speaks of “our modern free-writers,” _Works_, vol. i. p. 65. But it was Collins in 1713, in his _Discourse of Freethinking_, who first appropriated the name to express the independence of inquiry which was claimed by the deists. The use of the word expressed the spirit of a nation like the English, in which, subsequently to the change of dynasty, freedom to think and speak was held to be every man’s charter. Lechler has remarked the absence of a parallel word in other languages. The French expression _Esprit fort_, the title of a work of La Bruyère, does not convey quite the same idea as _Freethinker_. _Esprit_ expresses the French liveliness, not the reflective self-consciousness of the English mind of the eighteenth century: the _fort_ is a relic of the pride of feudalism; whilst the _free_ of the English Freethinker implies the reaction against it. The English term smacks of democracy; the French carries with it the notion of aristocracy. (Lechler, _Gesch. des Engl. Deismus_, p. 458.) There is no word to express the English idea in foreign languages, except the literal translation of the English term. Even then, in French the expression _la libre pensée_ has changed its meaning; since it is now frequently used to describe the struggle, good as well as evil, of the human mind against authority. It thus loses the unfavourable sense which originally belonged to the corresponding English expression.

7. RATIONALIST.—The history of the term is hard to trace. The first technical use of the adjective _rational_ seems to have been about the seventeenth century, to express a school of philosophy. It had probably passed out of the old sense of _dialectical_ (cfr. Brucker’s _Hist. Phil._ iii. 60.), into the use just named; which we find in Bacon, to express rational philosophy, as opposed to empirical, (see a quotation from Bacon’s _Apophthegms_ in Richardson’s _Dictionary_, _sub voc._); or, as in North’s _Plutarch_, 1657, p. 984, for intellectual philosophy as opposed to mathematical and moral. The word Rationalist occurs in Clarendon, 1646 (_State Papers_, vol. ii. p. 40), to describe a party of presbyterians who appealed only to “what their reason dictates them in church and state.” Hahn (_De Rationalismi Indole_) states that Amos Comenius similarly used the term in 1661 in a depreciatory sense. The treatise of Locke on the _Reasonableness of Christianity_ caused Christians and Deists to appropriate the term, and to restrict it to religion. Thus, by Waterland’s time, it had got the meaning of false reasoning on religion. (_Works_, viii. 67.) And, passing into Germany, it appears to have become the common name to express philosophical views of religion, as opposed to supernatural. In this sense it occurs as early as 1708 in Sucro, quoted by Tholuck, _Vermischt. Schriften_, ii. pp. 25, 26, and in Buddeus, _Isagoge_, 1730, pp. 213 and 1151. It is also used often as equivalent to naturalism, or adherence to natural religion; with the slight difference that it rather points to mental than physical truth.

The name has often been appropriated to the Kantian or critical philosophy, in which rationalism was distinguished from naturalism in the mode explained under the latter word. (See Kant’s _Religion Innerhalb der Grenzen der Blossen Vernunft_, pp. 216, 17.) During the period when Rationalism was predominant as a method in German theology, the meaning and limits of the term were freely discussed. The period referred to is that which we have called in Lect. VI. p. 230 the second subdivision of the first of the three periods, into which the history of German theology is there divided; viz. from 1790-1810; occupying the interval when the Wolffian philosophy had given place to the Kantian, and the philosophy of Fichte and Jacobi had not yet produced the revival under Schleiermacher. This form of rationalism also continued to exist during the lifetime of its adherents, contemporaneously with the new influence created by Schleiermacher. (See Lect. VI.) The discussion was not a verbal one only, but was intimately connected with facts. The rationalist theologians wished to define clearly their own position, as opposed on the one hand to deists and naturalists, and on the other to supernaturalists. The result of the discussion seemed to show the following parties: (1) two kinds of Supernaturalists, (α) the Biblical, such as Reinhardt, resembling the English divines of the eighteenth century;(1065) (β) the Philosophical, sometimes called Rational Supernaturalists, as the Kantian theologian Staüdlin: (2) two kinds of Rationalists, (α) the Supernatural Rationalists, like Bretschneider, who held on the evidence of reason the necessity of a revelation, but required its accordance with reason, when communicated; (β) the pure Rationalists, like Wegscheider, Röhr, and Paulus, who held the sufficiency of reason; and, while admitting revelation as a fact, regarded it as the republication of the religion of nature. It is this last kind which answers to the “theological naturalist,” named above, under the word _Naturalist_. It is also the form which is called _Rationalismus vulgaris_ (as being opposed to the later _scientific_), though the term is not admitted by its adherents. This rationalism stands distinguished from naturalism, i.e. from “philosophical naturalism” or deism, by having reference to the Christian religion and church; but it differs from supernaturalism, in that reason, not scripture, is its formal principle, or test of truth: and virtue, instead of “faith working by love,” is its material principle, or fundamental doctrine. A further subdivision might be made of this last into the dogmatic (Wegscheider), and the critical (Paulus). Cfr. Bretschneider’s _Dogmatik_, i. 81, and see Lect. VI. Also consult on the above account Kahnis, p. 168, and Lechler’s _Deismus_, p. 193, note; Hagenbach’s _Dogmengesch_. § 279, note.

This account of the term being the result of the controversy as to the meaning of the words, it only remains to name some of the works which treated of it.

The dispute on the word _Rationalism_ is especially seen at two periods, (1) about the close of the last century, when the supernaturalists, such as Reinhardt and Storr, were maintaining their position against rationalism. One treatise, which may perhaps be considered to belong to this earlier period, is J. A. H. Tittmann’s _Ueber Supernaturalismus, Rationalismus, und Atheismus_, 1816; (2) in the disputes against the school of Schleiermacher, when supernaturalism was no longer thrown on the defensive. This was marked by several treatises on the subject, such as Staüdlin’s _Geschichte des Rationalismus und Supernaturalismus_ 1826, (see the definitions given in it, pp. 3 and 4;) Bretschneider’s remarks in his _Dogmatik_ (i. pp. 14, 71, 80 ed. 1838); and _Historische Bemerkungen Ueber den Gebrauch der Ausdrücke Rational. und Supernat._ (_Oppositions-Schrift._ 1829. 7. 1); A. Hahn, _De Rationalismi qui dicitur Verâ Indole_, 1827, in which he reviews the attempts of Bretschneider and Staüdlin to give the historic use of the word; Röhr’s _Briefe Ueber Rationalismus_, pp. 14-16; Paulus’s _Resultate aus den Neuesten Versuch des Supernat. Gegen den Rationalismus_, 1830; Wegscheider’s _Inst. Theol. Christianæ Dogmaticæ_ (7th ed. 1833. §§ 11, 12, pp. 49-67), which is full of references to the literature of the subject. The controversy was aggravated and in part was due to the translation of Mr. H. J. Rose’s _Sermons on Rationalism_. He was answered by Bretschneider in a tract, in which that theologian entered upon the defence of the rationalist position. Mr. Rose (_Introd._ to 2d ed. 1829, p. 17) enters briefly upon the history of the name. Krug (_Philos. Lexicon_) also gives many instances of its use in German theology.

To complete the account it is only necessary to add, that it is made clear by Lectures VI. and VII. that if subsequent theological thought in Germany to the schools now described, be called Rationalism for convenience by English writers, the term is then used in a different sense from that in which it is applied in speaking of the older forms.

8. SCEPTIC.—This term was first applied specifically to one school of Greek philosophers, about B.C. 300, followers of Pyrrho of Elis (see Ritter’s _Hist. of Phil._ E. T. iii. 372-398; Staüdlin’s _Geschichte des Scepticismus_, vol. i; Tafel’s _Geschichte und Kritik des Skepticismus_, 1836; Donaldson’s _Greek Lit._ ch. xlvii. § 5); and also to a revival of this school about A.D. 200. (See Ritter. Id. iii. 258-357; Donaldson, ch. lvi. § 3.) The tenet was a general disbelief of the possibility of knowing realities as distinct from appearances. The term thus introduced, gradually became used in the specific sense of theological as distinct from philosophical scepticism, often with an indirect implication that the two are united. Walch restricts the name Sceptic to the latter kind. Writing about those who are called Indifferentists (_Bibl. Theol. Select._ i. 976), he subdivides them into two classes; viz. those who are indifferent through liberality, and those who are so through unbelief. The former are the “Latitudinarians,” the latter the Sceptics above named. Cfr. also Buddeus, _Isagoge_, pp. 1208-10. In more recent times the term has gained a still more generic sense in theology, to express all kinds of religious doubt. But its use to express philosophical scepticism as distinct from religious has not died out. In this sense Montaigne, Bayle (cfr. Staüdlin’s _Gesch. des Scept._ p. 204), Huet, Berkeley, Hume, and De Maistre, were Sceptics; i.e. sceptical of the certitude of one or more branches of the human faculties. Sometimes also it is used to express systems of philosophy which teach disbelief in the reality of metaphysical science; e.g. the positive school of Comte; but this is an ambiguous use of the term. For philosophical scepticism may be of two kinds; viz. the disbelief in the possibility of the attainment of truth by means of the natural faculties of man; and the disbelief of the possibility of its attainment by means of metaphysical, as distinct from physical, methods. The former is properly called Philosophical Scepticism, the latter not so. Pyrrho in ancient times, and Hume in modern, represent the former; the Positivists of modern times, and perhaps the Sophists of the fifth century B.C., represent the latter. It is hardly necessary to repeat that the philosophical scepticism proper of Berkeley and Hume must not be confounded with religious. They may be connected, as in Hume, or disconnected, as in Berkeley or De Maistre. See on this subject Morell’s _Hist. of Philos._ i. p. 68, ii. ch. vi.

On the subject of the words explained in this note see, besides the works referred to, Walch’s _Bibl. Theol. Select._ i. ch. v. sect. 5, 6, 7, 11, and iii. ch. vii. sect. 10. § 4. 1757: Pfaff’s _Introd. in Hist. Theol._ lib. ii. b. iii. § 2. 1725: Stapfer’s _Inst. Theol. Polem._ ii. ch. vi, vii, x; iv. ch. xiii. 1744: Reimannus’ _Hist. Univ. Ath._ sectio i. 1725: J. F. Buddeus’s _De Atheismo_, 1737, ch. i. and ii: J. F. Buddeus’s _Isagoge_, 1730, pp. 1203-1211: Lechler’s _Gesch. des Deismus_, 1841; _Schlussbemerkungen_, p. 453 seq.: J. Fabricius, 1704, _Consid. Var. Controv._ p. 1: Staüdlin’s _Gesch. des Skepticismus vorzüglich in Rücksicht auf. Moral. und Religion_. 1794: J. F. Tafel’s _Gesch. und Kritik des Skepticismus und Irrationalismus_, with reference to Philosophy, 1834.

Note 22. p. 136. Woolston’s Discourses On Miracles.

In addition to the notice of these Discourses given in the text, it may be well to give a brief account of their contents.

In Discourse I. Woolston aims at showing (α) that healing is not a proper miracle for a Messiah to perform, and that the fathers of the church understood the miracles allegorically: (β) that a literal interpretation of miracles involves incredibility, as shown in the miracle of the expulsion of the buyers and sellers from the temple, the casting out devils from the possessed man of the tombs, the transfiguration, the marriage of Cana, the feeding the multitudes: (γ) the meaning of Jesus when he appeals to miracles. In Discourse II. he selects for examination the miracle of the woman with the issue of blood, and also her with the spirit of infirmity; also the narrative of the Samaritan woman, the triumphal entry into Jerusalem, the temptation, the appearance of the spirits of the dead at the resurrection. In Discourse III. he selects the cursing of the fig-tree, and the miracle of the pool of Bethesda. It may be allowable to give one illustration of the coarse humour with which he rationalizes the sacred narrative in his explanation of this last miracle. He says of the healed man, “The man’s infirmity was more laziness than lameness; and Jesus only shamed him out of his pretended idleness by bidding him to take up his stool and walk off, and not lie any longer like a lubbard and dissemble among the diseased.” It will be perceived, that if the coarseness be omitted, the system of interpretation is the naturalist system afterwards adopted by the old rationalism (_rationalismus vulgaris_). In Discourse IV. he selects the healing with eye-salve of the blind man, the water made into wine at Cana; where he introduces a Jewish rabbi to utter blasphemy, after the manner of Celsus; and the healing of the paralytic who was let down through the roof, which, as being one of the most characteristic passages of Woolston, Dean Trench has selected for analysis. (_Notes on Miracles_, Introduction, p. 81.) In Discourse V. he discusses the three miracles of the raising of the dead; and in Discourse VI. the miracle of Christ’s own resurrection.

His conclusion (in Disc. I.) is, that “the history of Jesus, as recorded in the evangelists, is an emblematical representation of his spiritual life in the soul of man; and his miracles figurative of his mysterious operations;” that the four Gospels are in no part a literal story, but a system of mystical philosophy or theology.

Lecture V.

Note 23. p. 178. The Literary Coteries Of Paris In The Eighteenth Century.

An account of these coteries may be seen in Schlosser’s _Hist. of Eighteenth Century_, (E. T.) vol. i. ch. ii. § 4; the particulars of which chapter he has gathered largely from the Autobiography of Marmontel, and from Grimm’s Correspondence. See also Sainte-Beuve’s Papers (_Portraits_, vol. ii.) on Espinasse and Geoffrin. These coteries were specially four: viz. (1) that of Madame De Tencin, mother of D’Alembert, which included Fontenelle, Montesquieu, Mairan, Helvetius, Marivaux, and Astruc; (2) of Madame Geoffrin, who took the place of De Tencin. It included, besides some of the above, Poniatowsky, Frederick the Great when in France, the Swedish Creutz, and Kaunitz, the whole of the Voltaire school, and at first Rousseau; (3) of Madame Du Deffant, contemporary with Geoffrin. This was less a coterie of fashion, and more entirely of intellect; and included Voltaire, D’Alembert, Hénault, and Horace Walpole when in Paris. Later Mlle. Espinasse took the place of Deffant, and this became the union-point for all the philosophical reformers, D’Alembert, Diderot, Turgot, and the Encyclopædists; (4) of D’Holbach, consisting of the most advanced infidels.

Note 24. p. 198. The Term Ideology.

As the term _Ideology_ has lately been employed in a novel theological sense, (e.g. _Essays and Reviews_, Ess. iv.), and as it is employed in these lectures in its ordinary sense, as known in metaphysical science, it may prevent ambiguity to state briefly the history of the term.

The word _Ideology_, as denoting the term to express metaphysical science, seems to have arisen in the French school of De Tracy at the close of the last century. Cfr. Krug’s _Philos. Lexicon_, sub voc.

As early as Plato’s time metaphysics was the science of ἰδέαι, i.e. of _forms_; but the word ἰδέα implied the objective form in the thing, not the subjective conception in the mind. It was Descartes who first appropriated the word Idea in the subjective sense of _notion_. This arose from the circumstance that in his philosophy he sought for the idea in the mind, instead of the essence in the thing contemplated, as had been the case in mediæval philosophy. In the following century Locke’s inquiries, together with Berkeley’s speculations, caused metaphysics to become _the science of ideas_. The representative theory of perception which was held, increased, if it did not cause, the confusion: all knowledge was restricted to ideas. The subsequent attempts of Condillac and others to carry forward the analysis of the formation of our ideas still farther, caused metaphysics to be restricted to them alone. This apparently was the reason why De Tracy gave the name of Ideology to the science of metaphysics in the _Elémens d’Idéologie_.(1066)

It was the sceptical notion of the unreality of the objects as distinct from the ideas, partly the offshoot of a sensational philosophy, like that of De Tracy, partly of the spiritual philosophy of Germany, which farther caused the term Ideological to slide into the sense of _ideal_; a meaning of the term which the employment of it in English in recent theological controversy seems likely to make common.

Note 25. p. 195. The Works Of Dr. Geddes.

Towards the end of the eighteenth century, free thought began to manifest itself in England under a rationalistic form, in a Roman catholic, Dr. Geddes, who lived 1737-1802. (See Life by Mason Good, 1804.) Vol. i. of his _Translation_ of the Bible appeared in 1792; vol. ii. in 1797; and his _Critical Remarks_ (vol. i.) in 1800. His free criticism is seen in discussing the character of Moses (pref. to vol. i. of _Transl._); the slaughter of the Canaanites (pref. to vol. ii.); Paradise (_Crit. Rem._ p. 35); the remarks on Genesis xlix. (Id. p. 142); on the Egyptian plagues (p. 182); on the passage of the Red sea (p. 200). As soon as the first volume was published the Catholic bishops silenced him. Geddes was a believer in Christianity; but felt so strongly the deist difficulties, that he sought to defend revelation by explaining away the supernatural from the Jewish history, and inspiration from the Jewish literature. His views, so far as they were not original, were probably derived from the incipient rationalistic speculations of Germany, though he quoted almost none of the German except Michaelis and Herder. His position in the history of doubt is with the early rationalists, not with the deists. A writer of somewhat similar character, Mr. Evanson, a unitarian, wrote a critical attack on the Gospels, _The Dissonance of the Four generally received Evangelists_, in 1805.

Note 26. p. 196. The Works Of Conyers Middleton.

Dr. Conyers Middleton lived from 1683 to 1750. In 1749 he published _A Free Inquiry into the Miraculous Powers of the Early Church_; “by which it is shown that we have no sufficient reason to believe, upon the authority of the primitive fathers, that any such powers were continued to the church after the days of the apostles.” He was attacked by Dodwell, Church, and Chapman, who described the work as discrediting miracles. The object of it was to place the church in the predicament of denying altogether the authority of the fathers, or else of admitting the truth of the Romish doctrine of miracles. Gibbon, when young, chose the latter horn of the dilemma. A list of Middleton’s works in chronological order will be found in vol. i. of his _Miscellaneous Works_ (1752). The one which created disputes in theology besides the above was, _An Anonymous Letter to Waterland_, 1731, in reference to his reply to Tindal’s work; which was answered by Bishop Pearce. His posthumous work on _The Variations or Inconsistencies which are found among the Four Evangelists_, (Works, vol. ii. p. 22); his essay on _The Allegorical Interpretation of the Creation and Fall_ (ii. 122); and his criticism in 1750 on bishop Sherlock’s _Discourses on Prophecy_, may cause Middleton to be regarded as a rationalist. See his Works, ii. 24, 131, and iii. 183.

Lecture VI.

Note 27. p. 213. On Pietism In Germany In The Seventeenth Century.

The person who commenced the religious movement afterwards called Pietism, was John Arndt (1555-1621), who wrote _The True Christian_, a work as useful religiously, as Bunyan’s _Pilgrim’s Progress_, or Doddridge’s _Religion in the Soul_.

Spener followed (1635-1705). The private religious meetings which he established about 1675, _Collegia Pietatis_, were the origin of the application of the name Pietism to the movement. One of his pupils was the saintly A. H. Francke, whose memoir was translated 1837. Paul Gerhardt, the well known author of the German hymns, also belonged to the same party. The university of Halle became the home of Pietism; and the orphan-house established in that town was renowned over Europe. The opposition of the old Lutheran party of other parts of Germany produced controversies which continued till about 1720; for an account of which, see Weismann, _Mem. Eccl. Hist. Sacr._ 1745, p. 1018 seq.

Pietism propagated its influence by means of Bengel in Würtemburg and the university of Tübingen, and in Moravia through Zinzendorf. Arnold and Thomasius belonged to this party at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Œtinger at Tübingen, Crusius at Leipsic, and, to a certain extent, Buddeus also, partook of the spirit of Pietism. It manifested a tendency to religious isolation; and in its nature combined the analogous movements subsequently carried out in England by Wesley and by Simeon respectively.

A brief account of it is given in Hase’s _Church History_, § 409: and for a fuller account, see Schröckh, _Chr. Kirchengesch._ vol. viii. pp. 255-91; Pusey on _German Theology_, part i. (67-113); part. ii. ch. x; Amand Saintes, _Crit. Hist. of Rationalism_, E. T. ch. vii. Spener’s character and life may be seen in Canstein’s memoir of him; and in Weismann, pp. 966-72. A philosophical view of Pietism, as a necessary stage in the development of German religious life, is given by Dorner in the _Studien und Kritiken_, 1840, part ii. 137, _Ueber den Pietismus_. Kahnis, who himself quotes it, (_Hist. of Germ. Prot._) E. T. p. 102, regards Pietism as ministering indirectly to rationalism; much in the same way as bishop Fitzgerald criticised the similar evangelical movement of England, _Aids to Faith_, p. 49, &c.

Note 28. p. 224. Classification Of Schools Of Poetry In Germany.

The materials for understanding the awakening of literary tastes in the last century in Germany, through Lessing’s influence, are furnished by Schlosser, _History of the Eighteenth Century_. See vol. i. ch. iii. E. T. for the period from the Pietists to Lessing; and ch. v. in reference to the Deutsche Bibliothek, and also vol. ii. ch. ii. § 3. See also Vilmar’s _History of German Literature_ (translated and abridged by Metcalfe).

It may facilitate clearness to name the classification of schools of German poetry and taste, which is given in the last-named work. They are divided into five classes: viz. I. that which was antecedent to Lessing, which is subdivided into (1) the Saxon school of Gottsched; and (2) the Swiss school of Bodmer, and of Wieland in his early manner; which was connected with the Gottingen school of Haller, Hagedorn, and Klopstock, together with the Stolbergs and Voss. II. Lessing, and writers influenced by him, such as (1) Kleist and the Prussian group; (2) Wieland in his second manner, and J. Paul Richter; (3) Kotzebue, who was a mixture of Wieland and Lessing. In these two periods Klopstock, Wieland, and Lessing, were the intellectual triumvirs. III. The “Sturm und Drang” period; the Weimar school with its second literary triumvirate, Herder, Goethe, Schiller. IV. The later schools: (1) the romantic, viz. the two Schlegels, Novalis, Tieck, Uhland, Fouqué; (2) the patriotic of the liberation wars, Arndt and Koerner. V. The modern school of disappointment and uneasy reaction against the absolute government, H. Heine and Grün.

It is an interesting psychological problem to trace the close analogy between the schools of poetical taste and the corresponding character in the contemporary criticism of ancient literature, the speculative philosophy, and the theology.

Note 29. p. 225. The Wolfenbüttel Fragments.

It has been stated in the text that these were Fragments, which Lessing published in 1774 and the following years, of a larger work which he professed to have found in the library of Wolfenbüttel, where he was librarian. They were published in the third of the series of works, _Beiträge zur Geschichte und Literatur aus den Schätzen der Herzoglichen Bibliothekzu Wolfenbüttel_, under the title, _Fragmente Eines Ungenannten Herausgegeben von G. E. Lessing_.

After Lessing’s death, C. A. E. Schmidt published further Fragments, under the title _Uebrige noch Ungedruckte Werke des Wolfenbüttelschen Fragmentisten. Ein Nachlass von G. E. Lessing_.

The authorship of the Fragments was suspected at the time by Hamann; but it remained generally unknown, and became as great a secret as the authorship of the Letters of Junius, until 1827, when the question was discussed by Gurlitt in the _Leipziger Literatur-Zeitung_, No. 55, and proof was offered that the author was Reimarus of Hamburg.

The result of this and subsequent investigations is as follows. The original work of Reimarus, from which the Fragments were taken, remains in MS. in the public library of Hamburg. It was entitled _Apologie oder Schutz-Schrift für die vernünftigen Verehrer Gottes_. When written, it was shown only to intimate friends. Lessing was allowed to take a copy, and showed the MS. to Mendelssohn in 1771. Lessing wished to publish it entire; but the censorship would not give the imprimatur. Consequently it came out in fragments among the series of contributions from the Wolfenbüttel library, which were free from the censorship. The pretended discovery of them in the library was a mere excuse; and there is proof in Lessing’s remains that he admitted the fact. See the statement of these facts in _Lessing’s Leben_, by Guhrauer, (of which, vol. i. is by Danzel; vol. ii. by Guhrauer,) vol. ii. b. iii. ch. iv. p. 133, note 3, and b. iv. p. 141.(1067)

Several writers, subsequently to Gurlitt’s examination of the question of authorship, have written, either on the question of the authorship of the Fragments, or on the contents of the larger work from which they are selections. In the _Zeitschrift für die Historische Theologie for 1839_, part iv. is an article composed from W. Körte’s life of Thaer, in reference to the former question. Also Dr. W. Klose examined the original MS. in the Hamburg library, and published an account of it, with considerable extracts, in several of the numbers of the same journal, Niedner’s _Zeitschrift_, 1850, (part iv; 1851, part iv; 1852, part iii.) It is in the preface (_Vorbericht_) to the first of these parts that the account of Reimarus’s own mental history is given, to which allusion was made in the text of Lecture VI. (p. 225.)

During the last year the question has been made the subject of a monograph by the celebrated Strauss. He had heard of the existence of a copy of the original MS. in private hands at Hamburg, and proceeded to collate it with the view of publication. He found it to differ in some respects from the Fragments published by Lessing and Schmidt. He did not consider the hitherto unpublished parts of the work sufficiently important, either in a literary or historical point of view, to merit publication _in extenso_; but contented himself with stating the results of his study of it in a small work, _H. S. Reimarus und seine Schutz-Schrift, &c._ 1861. It contains a brief account of the literary question of the Fragments, and of Reimarus’s life and stand-point; also an analysis of the unpublished parts of the work, written with the clearness which characterises all Strauss’s didactic works. It would appear from the analysis that the pieces printed by Lessing were not only some of the ablest, but some of the least offensive of the whole work. The concluding pages contain some very interesting remarks, in which Strauss contrasts the criticism of the eighteenth century with that of the present day; the characteristics of the former being, that it charges imposture on the scripture writers; that of the latter, that it admits their honesty, but explains away their statements and opinions by reference to psychological and historical phenomena.

In addition to the sources given above, information is contained in the following works: Schröckh’s _Christ Kirchengesch._ vi. 275; Schlosser’s _History of the Eighteenth Century_, E. T. vol. ii. 266 seq.; Hagenbach’s _Dogmengeschichte_, § 275 _notes_, (where reference is made to Guhrauer’s _Bodin’s Heptaplomeres_, 1841, p. 257 seq.); _Conversations-Lexicon_, art. _Reimarus_; Amand Saintes’ _History of Rationalism_, E. T. p. 84; Kahnis, _Id._ p. 145 seq.; K. Schwarz, _Lessing als Theolog_, of which ch. iv. is on the _Fragmenten-streit_; Strauss’s _Kleine Schriften_, 1861; Lessing’s _Werke_, xii. 508. (ed. Lachmann.)

Note 30. p. 242. Schleiermacher’s Early Studies.

It may be interesting to trace more fully the parallel noticed in the text between the development of Plato’s thoughts and Schleiermacher’s early studies.

Though it is impossible to arrange the dialogues of Plato in the chronological order in which they were composed, so as to be able to study the master in his successive styles, yet several systems of arrangement, founded on different principles, seem to coincide so far as to render it probable that Plato’s great theory of ideas or forms grew upon him through these stages: viz. (1) it was viewed as a fact of mind, an innate conception of forms (e.g. in Meno); (2) as useful in guiding perplexed minds to truth, and sifting philosophical doctrines by means of the dialectical process, e.g. in the Theætetus and Parmenides; (3) as representing an objective reality, a true cause in nature external to the mind, as well as an hypothesis in science (e.g. in the Republic); (4) as having a mystical connexion with divinity, and furnishing a cosmogony, Whether this passage, from the subjective conception to the objective reality, be really or only logically the order of development in Plato’s ideal theory, it is clear that the growth of Schleiermacher’s mind admits of comparison with this supposed order of development in Plato; though there is a slight variation in the steps of the process. Schleiermacher went through three stages, (1) the philosophy of Jacobi, (2) of Fichte, and probably (3) of Schelling; from which he learned respectively, (1) to have faith in our intuitions, (2) to construe the outward by the inward, (3) to believe in the power of the mind to pass beyond the inward, and apprehend absolute truth. If the resemblance to the above account of Plato were exactly perfect, the love of a philosophy like Fichte’s ought to have preceded that of Jacobi. Schelling’s influence, it ought to be noted, is very slight on Schleiermacher, compared with that of the others. The traces of it which appear are perhaps resolvable into a similarity to Jacobi’s system.

Note 31. p. 244. Schleiermacher’s Theological Works.

The theological works of Schleiermacher are doctrinal, critical, and pastoral. The latter consist chiefly of the sermons which he delivered in Berlin. The critical works are mentioned in a footnote to p. 248; but it may be useful to give a brief notice of his doctrinal works, of which some are referred to in the text.

The earliest was the _Reden über die Religion an die Gebildeten unter ihren Verächtern_, 1799, (Discourses on Religion addressed to the educated among its despisers,) which ought not to be read in earlier editions than the fourth (1829), the notes of which contain explanations. The object of these discourses was to direct attention away from the study of religion in its outward manifestations, to its inward essence; which he showed to lie neither in knowledge nor in action, but in feeling. See especially Discourse II. _Uber das Wesen der Religion_. For the effect which the discourses created, see Neanders testimony, quoted by Kahnis, _Hist. of Prot._ E. T. p. 208.

The works which succeeded the _Reden_ were the following: in 1800, the _Monologen_ (Soliloquies); in 1803, _Grundlinien einer Kritik der bisherigen Sittenlehre_ (Critique on previous Ethical teaching); in 1806, _Die Weinachtsfeier_ (Christmas Eve); in 1811, the _Kurze Darstellung des Theologischen Studiums_ (Plan of Theological Study;—lately translated), which gave rise to the branch now common in German universities, called _Theologische Encyclopädie_;(1068) in 1821, _Der Christliche Glaube nach den Grundsätzen der Evangelischen Kirche_ (the Christian Faith on the principles of the Evangelical Church), which was improved in the subsequent editions.

As the _Reden_ breathed the spirit of Jacobi, the _Monologen_ breathed that of Fichte. They study the ethical, as the former the religious side of man; the action of the personal will as distinct from the feelings of dependence. The dialogue of the _Weihnachtsfeier_ showed Christ as the means of effecting that oneness with the absolute which the two former works had shown to be necessary.

In the _Glaubens-lehre_, Schleiermacher gives a general view of dogmatic theology, viewed from the psychological side, i.e. its appropriation by the Christian consciousness. He studies (1) man’s consciousness of God, prior to experience of the opposition of sin and grace; next, after being aware of such an opposition, as (2) the subject of sin, and (3) the subject of grace; or, in theological language, the states of innocence, of sin, and of grace. Each of these is subdivided in spirit, even when not in form, in a threefold manner; describing respectively the condition of man, the attributes of God, and the constitution of the world, as they relate to the above three named states. The subjective and psychological character of the inquiry is seen in the fact, that when treating the second of these subdivisions,—the Divine attributes,—he does not study them as peculiarities of God’s nature, but as modifications of the mode in which we refer to God our own feeling of dependence. This subjective tendency illustrates the influence of Fichte and Jacobi on Schleiemiacher.

The contrast is an interesting one between a dogmatic treatise of the schoolmen, of the reformers, and of Schleiermacher. The first commences with the Deity and his attributes, and passes to man: the second generally begins with the rule of faith, the Bible; and then, passing to the Deity, proceeds mainly after the scholastic fashion: the third begins and ends with the human consciousness, and its contents.

Note 32. p. 252. On Some German Critical Theologians. (de Wette, Ewald, Etc.)

Some of the theologians of the critical school which is described in the text, deserve a more full notice than was possible in the foot-notes to the Lecture.

De Wette (1780-1849) was educated at Jena, under Griesbach. He was made Professor at Berlin in 1810, but was deprived in 1819, in consequence of the Prussian government having opened a letter of condolence written by him to the mother of Sand, the assassin of the dramatist Kotzebue. (For the history of the excited state of the German students at this time, see K. Raumer’s _Pädagogik_, vol. iv. translated.) In 1826 he was made Professor at Basle. An interesting life of him is given in the _Bibliotheca Sacra_ for 1850. His most important works are, his _Einleitung ins Alt. und Neu. Test.; Lehrbuch der Dogmatik_, 1819; his New Translation of the Bible (1839); and Commentaries on several parts of Scripture. On his doctrinal views see Kahnis, p. 231 seq. He is said to have been a man of sweet and amiable character; and indeed he appears to be so in his writings. It has been remarked, as a proof of his singular fairness, that he not only candidly states the opinions of an opponent, but even sometimes confesses his inability fully to refute them.

Along with De Wette ought to be classed a great number of distinguished men, most of whom wrote parts of the Commentary which he designed under the name of _Exegetisches Handbuch_. They were mostly critics rather than writers on doctrine, and represent the modified state of thought of his later life; but still maintain, for the most part, his critical stand-point in reference to the scriptures; and therefore, though contemporary with the new Tübingen and other schools described in Lecture VII, which have arisen since Strauss’s criticism, in that which we called the third period of our sketch, they really belong to the school of critics of the older or second period. Such are, or were, Gesenius, Knobel, Hirzel, Hitzig, Credner, Tuch, E. Meier, Hupfeld, and Stühelin. See Am. Saintes, part ii. ch. xi.

H. Ewald, born 1803, became Professor at Göttingen 1831. In 1837 he was one of the seven professors who sacrificed their position when the new king of Hanover, Ernest, interfered with the constitution. From 1838 to 1848 he was professor at Tübingen: since 1848 at Göttingen. His works are partly on the oriental languages, and partly on theology. Among the latter the chief are, _Die Poetischen Bücher des Alten Test._, 1835; _Die Propheten des Alten Bundes_, 1840; and the _Geschichte des Volkes Israel_, 1842-50; a work which, whatever may be thought of the theological aspects of it, if regarded in respect of scholarship, poetic appreciation, and grandeur of generalization, is one of the most remarkable books ever produced even in Germany. (Renan has based upon it the most brilliant of his essays, ess. ii. in the _Etudes d’Hist. Religieuse_.) His works on the New Testament are partly directed against the views of the new Tübingen school. He differs from the older critical school of De Wette, in applying himself more exclusively to the Semitic literature; and cannot be classed with them in any other way than that he represents the effort of independent criticism, linguistic and historic; removed from the dogmatic school, and also from the later forms of critical.

Note 33. p. 255. The Name Jehovah.

The name יהוה is written _Jehovah_, by transferring to it the vowel points of the word _Adonai_, אדני, which the pious scruples of the Jews led them to substitute for it. It was probably read _Yahveh_. In reference to the meaning of _El_, and _Jehovah_, see Gesenius’s _Lexicon_ on the words אל (p. 45. Engl. Transl.), and יהוה (p. 337); also the word _hajah_, היה, (p. 221.) See likewise Hengstenberg’s _Authentie. des Pentateuches_, i. 222 seq.; especially p. 230, where he shows that _jahveh_, יהוה, is derived by regular analogy from the future of the verb _hajah_, היה ( = _havah_, היה). See also M. Nicholas’s _Etudes Crit. sur la Bible_, pp. 115, 163; and the article _Jehovah_ in Smith’s _Biblical Dictionary_.

Note 34. p. 256. The Use Of The Names Of Deity In The Composition Of Hebrew Proper Names.

A curious list of these is given by Dr. Donaldson. (_Christian Orthodoxy_, pp. 235, 6.)

Examples of names before the age of Saul, compounded with _El_, are seen in _El_-kanah, _El_-i, Samu-_el_, Abi-_el_. When Saul reigns we find the name Jah or Jehovah appear, in _Jeho_-nathan, Ahi-_jah_, Jedid-_iah_; and during the regal period in the list of kings, Jos-_iah_, _Jeho_-abaz, _Jeho_-i-akim, Zedek-_iah_; and among the prophets, Isa-_iah_, Jerem-_iah_, Mica-_iah_, _Jeho_-sheah. After the fall of Judah we find the name El reappear; e.g. Ezeki-_el_ ( = Hezek-_iah_), Dani-_el_, Micha-_el_, Gabri-_el_, _El_-iashib, Shealti-_el_. After the captivity the name Jah recurs; e.g. Nehem-_iah_, Zephan-_iah_, Zechar-_iah_, Malach-_iah_. The name _El_-i-_jah_ ( = my God is Jah) is an instance of a word compounded with both names.

Donaldson tries to generalize from the above to the effect, that, previously to the age of the early kings, proper names compounded with _El_ were prevalent; and in the regal and prophetic age, those compounded with _Jah_; again, after the fall of Judah, and in the captivity, those with _El_; and after the captivity, with _Jah_. But the selection is too limited to admit of such a generalization being satisfactory. It does however prove the knowledge of the twofold conception implied by the use of the names.

Lecture VII.

Note 35. p. 264. The Hegelian Philosophy.

The purpose of this note is to supply references to sources for the study of Hegel’s philosophy; and also to point out the parallel and contrast in the central thought and tendency of the philosophies of Schelling and Hegel.

The most intelligible account of Hegel’s system is given by Morell, _History of Philosophy_, ii. 161-196; and the best general view of its tendencies, especially in reference to theology, is contained in an instructive article by E. Scherer, in the _Rev. des Deux Mondes_ for Feb. 15, 1861, from which assistance has been derived in this lecture. The student will also find great help in Chalybaüs’s _Hist. of Spec. Philos._ ch. xi-xvii (translated 1854); and A. Véra’s _Introduction à la Phil. de Hegel_, 1855; together with his French translation of Hegel’s _Logic_. (Véra is one of the few Italians who understand Hegel.) The _Philosophie der Geschichte_, and _Geschichte der Philosophie_ are the two most intelligible of Hegel’s works; the former of which is translated into English; but the study of his _Logic_ is indispensable, for seeing the applications of his method, as well as for appreciating his metaphysical ability and real position.

Schelling and Hegel both seek to solve the problems of philosophy, by starting _à priori_ with the idea of the absolute; but in Schelling’s case it is perceived by a _presentative_ power (intellectual intuition), and in Hegel’s by a _representative_. The former faculty perceives the absolute object; the latter the absolute relation, if such a term be not a contradiction. In each case the percipient power is supposed to be “above consciousness;” i.e. not trammelled by those limitations of object and subject which are the conditions of ordinary consciousness. In both systems a kind of threefold process is depicted, as the law or movement according to which the absolute manifests itself.(1069) Sir W. Hamilton has shown the inconsistencies of Schelling’s system, in criticising that of Cousin, who was his great exponent; see _Dissertations_, ess. i. (reprinted from the _Edinburgh Review_, 1829); and Mr. Mansel has extended a similar analysis to Fichte and Hegel. (_Bampton Lectures_, ii. and iii; and article _Metaphysic_ in _Encyclop. Britann._ 10th ed. p. 607, &c. See also Rémusat _De la Philosophie Allemande_, Introduction.) Yet a grand thought, even though, psychologically speaking, it be an unreal one, lies beneath the awkward terminology of the systems of Schelling and Hegel; and their _method_ has influenced many who do not consciously embrace their philosophy. The effect produced by Schelling is the desire to seize the prime idea, the _beau idéal_ of any subject, and trace its manifestations in the field of history; a method which is seen in the French historic and critical literature of the followers of Cousin in the reign of Louis Philippe. (See Note 9, and the references given in Note 44.) The spirit produced by Hegel, is the desire to realise the truth contained in opposite views of the same subject; to view each as a half truth, and error itself as a part of the struggle toward truth. This spirit and method are seen in such a writer as Renan, and is clearly described in the passages quoted from Scherer and others in Note 9.

Note 36. p. 271. The Christology Of Strauss.

The following extract from Strauss’s work conveys his Christology.

“This is the key to the whole of Christology, that, as subject of
the predicate which the church assigns to Christ, we place instead
of an individual, an idea; but an idea which has an existence in
reality, not in the mind only, like that of Kant. In an
individual, a God-man, the properties and functions which the
church ascribes to Christ contradict themselves; in the idea of
the race they perfectly agree. Humanity is the union of the two
natures;—God become man; the infinite manifesting itself in the
finite, and the finite spirit remembering its infinitude: it is
the child of the visible mother and the invisible father, Nature
and Spirit: it is the worker of miracles, in so far as in the
course of human history the spirit more and more completely
subjugates nature, both within and around man, until it lies
before him as the inert matter on which he exercises his active
power: it is the sinless existence, for the course of its
development is a blameless one, pollution cleaves to the
individual only, and does not touch the race or its history. It is
Humanity that dies, rises, and ascends to heaven; for, from the
negation of its phenomenal life, there ever proceeds a higher
spiritual life; from the suppression of its mortality as a
personal, rational, and terrestrial spirit, arises its union with
the infinite spirit of the heavens. By faith in this Christ,
especially in his death and resurrection, man is justified before
God; that is, by the kindling within him of the idea of humanity,
the individual man participates in the divinely human life of the
species. Now the main element of that idea is, that the negation
of the merely natural and sensual life, which is itself the
negation of the spirit, is the sole way to true spiritual life.
This alone is the absolute sense of Christology. That it is
annexed to the person and history of one individual is a necessary
result of the historical form which Christology has taken.” _Leben
Jesu_, vol. ii. § 151. (pp. 709, 10. 4th ed. 1840); in the English
translation, vol. iii. p. 433.

Note 37. p. 278. Strauss.

A few facts concerning the life and writings of Strauss may be interesting.

He was born in 1808, and was educated at Tübingen and Berlin. He was _Repetiteur_ at Tübingen in 1835, when he published his _Leben Jesu_, described in the text of Lect. VII. In 1837 he published his _Streit-schriften_, or replies to his critics. In 1839 he was elected Professor of theology at Zurich, an appointment which produced such popular indignation that it was cancelled, and a change of government was caused by it. In 1840 he published _Die Christliche Glaubenslehre im Kampfe mil der modernen Wissenschaft dargestellt_; in which, after an introduction concerning the history of opinions on the relation of the two, he discussed the principles of Christian doctrine, such as the Bible, Canon, Evidences, &c. and next the doctrines themselves; viz. (part i.) on the divine Being and His attributes, as an abstract conception; (part ii.) on the same, as the object of empirical conceptions in its manifestation in creation, &c. See _Foreign Quart. Rev._ No. 54. 1841; and C. Schwarz’s _Gesch. der n. Theol._ b. ii. ch. i. He published also _Monologen in dem Freihafen_, translated 1848; _Soliloquies on the Christian Religion, its Errors, and Everlasting Truth_.

In 1848, the revolutionary year, he was elected to the Wurtemburg Parliament; and took the conservative side, to the surprise of his constituents. He has subsequently lived chiefly at Heilbronn, engaged in literary labours; mostly writing the lives of sceptics, or persons connected with free thought whose fate has been like his own. Among these have been, a sketch of Julian, 1847, intended probably as a satire on the romantic reaction conducted by the late king of Prussia; a Life of Schubart, 1849, a Swabian poet of the last century; one of Maerklin 1851, his own early friend; one of N. Frischlin, 1856, a learned German of the sixteenth century; a life of Ulric von Hütten, 1858; and _Gespräche von Hütten_, 1861; also _Kleine Schriften_, 1861; and a work on _Reimarus_, 1862, concerning which see Note 29. Some of these works are reviewed in the _Nat. Rev._ Nos. 7 and 12.

Note 38. p. 273. The Replies To Strauss.

Schwarz gives an interesting account of the various replies to Strauss, and of the works written by various theologians to support their own point of view against his criticisms. _Gesch. der n. Theol._ p. 113 seq.

The work was criticised,—

I. From the old school of orthodoxy, (α) by Steudel, Strauss’s own teacher, in a work called _Vorlaüfig zu Beherzigenden zur Beruhigung der Gemüthen_. (β) From the new orthodoxy, by Hengstenberg, in the _Evangelische Kirchenzeitung_. (γ) From the school which formed the transition between this and that of Schleiermacher by Tholuck;, in _Glaubwürdigkeit der Evangelischen Geschichte_, 1837.

II. From the school of Schleiermacher, (α) in Neander’s _Leben Jesu_, (β) in Ullmann’s _Studien und Kritiken_, 1836. part iii. Reprinted as _Historisch oder Mythisch_.

III. By the Hegelians; 1. from the “right” of the party (using the illustration drawn from the distribution of political parties in the foreign parliaments), (α) by Göschel in the work _Von Gott, dem Menschen und dem GottesMenschen_, 1838; (β) by Dorner in the _Geschichte der Person Christi_, 1839. (γ) by Gabler and Bruno Bauer, who at that time was on the side of orthodoxy: 2. from the Hegelian “centre” in Schaller’s _Der Historischer Christus und die Philosophie_, 1838; 3. from the “left,” (α) by Weisse, _Die Evangelische Geschichte kritisch und philosophisch bearbeitet_, 1838: (β) by Wilke, _Der Ur-evangelist_; both of whom regard St. Mark’s as the primitive evangile; and (γ) by Bruno Bauer, _Kritik der Synoptiker_, 1842, when he had changed to the opposite side of the Hegelian school: (δ) by Luetzelberger; (ε) by A. Schweizer; both of whom wrote on St. John’s Gospel. Several of the latter were not intended to be replies to Strauss, but attempts to reconsider their own position in relation to him. This was particularly the case in reference to the works which were written by the Tübingen school, (see next note,) of which Schwarz gives a description, p. 153 seq.

Note 39. p. 278. The Tubingen School.

The leader of the historico-critical school which bears this name, was C. Baur (1792-1860), author of various works on the history of doctrine, and on church history both doctrinal and critical. His work against the Roman catholic theologian Moehler, which first made him noted, was _Gegensatz des Protestantismus und Katholicismus nach den principien und Haupt-dogmen der beiden Lehrbegriffe_, 1833. An account of his works is given in C. Schwarz’s _Gesch. der neuest. Theol._ p. 165. The following may be here specified: his work on the history of the doctrine of the atonement, _Die Lehre von der Versöhnung_, 1838; also _Lehrbuch der Christlichen Dogmengeschichte_, 1845, and _Die Christliche Kirche der drei ersten Jahrhunderte_, 1853; the last part of which has been published since his death. Some interesting remarks, comparing him with Strauss and Schleiermacher, (though hardly fair to the last,) appeared in the _National Rev._ Jan, 1861. See also the sketch by Nefftzer in the _Revue Germanique_, vol. xiii. parts 1 and 2.

The other members of the school besides Baur have been Schwegler, the commentator on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, and author of a Roman History (died 1857); Zeller, also a writer on Greek philosophy, now Professor of philosophy at Marburg; whose appointment to Berne in 1847 has been elsewhere stated to have caused a similar excitement to that of Strauss to Zurich; Koestlin, Professor of aesthetics at Tübingen; and Hilgenfeld, Professor of theology at Jena, who is the best living representative of the modified form which the school has now assumed. Respecting these theologians, see the notes which Stap has affixed, in the _Revue Germanique_, vol. ix. p. 560, &c. to a French translation of a part of Schwarz’s _Geschichte_.

Concerning this school see Baur’s _Die Tübinger Schule_, 1859. The organ of it from 1842-57 was the _Theologische Jahrbücher_, edited by Baur. Since it ceased to be published, Hilgenfeld has created a new journal, the _Zeitschrift für Wissenschaftliche Theologie_, which receives the support of critics not directly of the Tübingen school, such as Hitzig and Knobel. Perhaps Schneckenbürger ought to be ranked with the same school; and Gfrörer also, author of a work on Philo, 1831; but he differed in holding the authenticity of St. John’s Gospel; and in 1846 became a Roman catholic, and Professor at Freiberg. See also a paper in Von Sybel’s _Hist. Zeitschr._ for 1860, part iv. translated in _Biblioth. Sacr._, Jan. 1862. The Tübingen school has met with able opponents, e.g. Thiersch, Dorner, Ewald, Bleek, Reuss, and Hase.

Note 40. p. 281. The German Theologian Rothe.