Chapter II: Campaign on the Douro

After the victory at Amarante, Laborde was recalled to Oporto, but a brigade of cavalry and a regiment of infantry were left to keep up the communication with Loison; and as the insurgent general Bonthielo had reappeared on the Lima, general Lorge’s dragoons were directed on that side. Mermet’s division was then pushed towards the Vouga, and thus the French army was extended by detachments from that river to the Tamega; and the wings separated by the Douro and occupying two sides of a triangle, were without communication, except by the boat-bridge of Oporto. It required three days, therefore, to unite the army on its centre, and five days to concentrate it on either extremity.

The situation of the allies was very different;--sir Arthur Wellesley having, unknown to Soult, assembled the bulk of the troops at Coimbra, commanded the choice of two lines of operation; the one through Viseu and Lamego, by which, in four or five marches, he could turn the French left, and cut them off from Tras os Montes; the other by the roads leading upon Oporto, by which, in two marches, he could throw himself unexpectedly, and in very superior numbers, upon the enemy’s right, with a fair prospect of crushing it between the Vouga and the Douro.

In taking the first of these two lines, which were separated by the lofty ridges of the Sierra de Caramula, the march could be covered by Wilson’s corps, at Viseu, and by Sylveira’s, near Lamego. Along the second the movement could be screened by Trant’s corps on the Vouga.

[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations MSS.]

The duke of Dalmatia’s dispositions were made in ignorance of sir Arthur Wellesley’s position, numbers, and intentions. He was not even aware of the vicinity of such an antagonist, but sensible that to advance directly upon Lisbon was beyond his own strength, he already meditated to cross the Tamega, and then covered by that river and the Douro, to follow the great route of Bragança, and so enter the Salamanca country. It was in this view that Loison had been directed to get possession of Mezamfrio and Pezo de Ragoa, and the march of Mermet was only intended to support Franceschi’s retreat, when the army should commence its movement towards the Tamega.

The 9th of May, D’Argenton was arrested; the film fell from Soult’s eyes, and all the perils of his position broke at once upon his view. Treason in his camp, which he could not probe, a powerful enemy close in his front, the insurgents again active in his rear, and the French troops scattered from the Vouga to the Tamega, and from the Douro to the Lima, and commanded by officers, whose fidelity was necessarily suspected, while the extent of the conspiracy was unknown.

Appalling as this prospect was, the duke of Dalmatia did not quail at the view. The general officers assured him of the fidelity of the troops; and Loison was immediately ordered to keep Mezamfrio and Ragoa, if he could, but, under any circumstances, to hold Amarante fast. The greatest part of the guns and stores at Oporto were at the same time directed upon the Tamega, and the ammunition that could not be removed was destroyed. General Lorge was commanded to withdraw the garrison from Viana, and to proceed likewise to Amarante, and, while D’Argenton was closely, although vainly, pressed to discover the names of the conspirators, Soult prepared to execute his intended movement through the Tras os Montes. But the war was coming on with a full and swift tide; Loison, upon whose vigour the success of the operation depended, was already giving way; sir Arthur Wellesley was across the Vouga, and Franceschi and Mermet were struggling in his grasp.

The English general resolved to operate along both the routes before spoken of, but the greater facility of supplying the troops by the coast-line, and, above all, the exposed position of the French right wing, so near the allies and so distant from succour, induced him to make the principal attack by the high road leading to Oporto.

The army was formed in one division of cavalry and three of infantry, exclusive of Beresford’s separate corps.

The first division, consisting of two brigades of infantry and twelve guns, was commanded by lieut.-general Paget.

The second, consisting of three brigades of infantry and six guns, by lieut.-general Sherbrooke.

The third, consisting of two brigades of infantry and six guns, by major-general Hill.

The cavalry by lieut.-general Payne.

The whole amounted to about fourteen thousand five hundred infantry, fifteen hundred cavalry, and twenty-four guns, of which six were only three-pounders.

The 6th of May, Beresford, with six thousand Portuguese, two British battalions, five companies of riflemen, and a squadron of heavy cavalry, marched upon Lamego by the road of Viseu.

The 7th, the light cavalry and Paget’s division advanced towards the Vouga by the Oporto road, but halted, on the 8th, to give Beresford time to reach the Upper Douro, before the attack on the French right should commence.

The 9th, they resumed their march for the bridge of Vouga, and, at the same time, Hill’s division, taking the Aveiro road, the whole reached the line of the Vouga river that evening; but Paget’s division was not brought up until after dark, and then with caution, to prevent the enemy’s guards from seeing the columns, the intent being to surprise Franceschi the next morning.

That general, with all his cavalry, a regiment of Mermet’s division, and six guns, occupied a village, about eight miles beyond Vouga bridge, called Albergaria Nova; the remainder of Mermet’s infantry were at Grijon, one march in the rear, and on the main road to Oporto. Franceschi had that day informed Soult that the allied forces were collecting on the Mondego, and that Trant’s posts had closed upon the Vouga; but he was far from suspecting that the whole army was upon the last river, although, from the imprudent conversation of an English officer, bearing a flag of truce, he had reason to expect an attack of some kind.

Sir Arthur Wellesley’s plan was partly arranged upon the suggestion of the field-officer who had met D’Argenton. He had observed, during his intercourse with the conspirators, that the lake of Ovar was unguarded by the French, although it extended twenty miles behind their outposts, and that all the boats were at Aveiro, which was in possession of the allies. On his information it was decided to turn the enemy’s right by the lake.

Accordingly, general Hill embarked, the evening of the 9th, with one brigade, the other being to follow him as quickly as possible. The fishermen looked on at first with surprise; but, soon comprehending the object, they voluntarily rushed in crowds to the boats, and worked with such a will that the whole flotilla arrived at Ovar precisely at sunrise on the 10th, and the troops immediately disembarked. That day, also, marshal Beresford, having rallied Wilson’s corps upon his own, reached Pezo de Ragoa, and he it was that had repulsed Loison, and pursued him to Amarante.

Both flanks of the French army were now turned, and at the same moment sir Arthur, with the main body, fell upon Franceschi, for, while the flotilla was navigating the lake of Ovar, the attempt to surprise that general, at Albergaria Nova, was in progress. Sherbrooke’s division was still in the rear; but general Cotton, with the light cavalry, crossing the Vouga, a little after midnight, endeavoured to turn the enemy’s left, and to get into his rear; the head of Paget’s division, marching a little later, was to pass through the defiles of Vouga, directly upon Albergaria, and Trant’s corps was to make way between Paget’s division and the lake of Aveiro.

This enterprise, so well conceived, was baffled by petty events, such as always abound in war. Sir Arthur Wellesley did not perfectly know the ground beyond the Vouga; and, late in the evening of the 9th, colonel Trant, having ascertained that an impracticable ravine, extending from the lake to Oliveira de Azemis, would prevent him from obeying his orders, passed the bridge of Vouga, and carried his own guns beyond the defiles, in order to leave the bridge clear for the British artillery and for general Richard Stewart’s brigade.

Stewart was charged to conduct the guns through the defile; but the task was difficult, several carriages broke down, and Trant’s corps thus took the lead of Paget’s column, the march of which was impeded by the broken gun-carriages. Meanwhile the cavalry, under Cotton, were misled by the guides, and came, in broad daylight, upon Franceschi, who, with his flank resting upon a wood, garnished with infantry, boldly offered a battle that Cotton durst not, under such circumstances, accept. Thus, an hour’s delay, produced by a few trifling accidents, marred a combination that would have shorn Soult of a third of his infantry and all his light cavalry, for it is not to be supposed that, when Franceschi’s horsemen were cut off, and general Hill at Ovar, Mermet’s division could have escaped across the Douro.

When sir Arthur Wellesley came up to Albergaria with Paget’s infantry, Franceschi was still in position, skirmishing with Trant’s corps, and evidently ignorant of what a force was advancing against him. Being immediately attacked, and his foot dislodged from the wood, he retreated along the road to Oliveira de Azemis, and was briskly pursued by the allied infantry; but, extricating himself valiantly from his perilous situation, he reached Oliveira without any serious loss; and continuing his march during the night, by Feria, joined Mermet the next morning at Grijon.

Franceschi, in the course of the 10th, could see the whole of the English army, including the troops with Hill; and it may create surprise that he should pass so near the latter general without being attacked: but Hill was strictly obedient to his orders, which forbade him to act on the enemy’s rear; and those orders were wise and prudent, because the principle of operating with small bodies on the flanks and rear of an enemy is vicious; and, while the number of men on the left of the Douro was unknown, it would have been rash to interpose a single brigade between the advanced-guard and the main body of the French. General Hill was sent to Ovar, that the line of march might be eased, and the enemy’s attention distracted, and that a division of fresh soldiers might be at hand to follow the pursuit, so as to arrive on the bridge of Oporto pell mell with the flying enemy. The soldier-like retreat of Franceschi prevented the last object from being attained.

General Paget’s division and the cavalry halted the night of the 10th at Oliveira; Sherbrooke’s division passed the Vouga later in the day, and remained in Albergaria. But the next morning the pursuit was renewed, and the men, marching strongly, came up with the enemy at Grijon, about eight o’clock in the morning.

COMBAT OF GRIJON.

The French were drawn up on a range of steep hills across the road. A wood, occupied with infantry, covered their right flank; their front was protected by villages and broken ground, but their left was ill placed. The British troops came on briskly in one column, and the head was instantly and sharply engaged. The 16th Portuguese regiment, then quitting the line of march, gallantly drove the enemy out of the wood covering his right, and, at the same time, the Germans, who were in the rear, bringing their left shoulders forward, without any halt or check, turned the other flank of the French. The latter immediately abandoned the position, and, being pressed in the rear by two squadrons of cavalry, lost a few killed and about a hundred prisoners. The heights of Carvalho gave them an opportunity to turn and check the pursuing squadrons; yet, when the British infantry, with an impetuous pace, drew near, they again fell back; and thus, fighting and retreating, a blow and a race, wore the day away.

During this combat, Hill was to have marched by the coast-road towards Oporto, to intercept the enemy’s retreat; but, by some error in the transmission of orders, that general, taking the route of Feria, crossed Trant’s line of march, and the time lost could not be regained.

The British halted at dark, but the French, continuing their retreat, passed the Douro in the night, and at two o’clock in the morning the bridge was destroyed. All the artillery and baggage still in Oporto were immediately directed along the road to Amarante, and Mermet’s division without halting at Oporto followed the same route as far as Vallonga and Baltar, having instructions to secure all the boats, and vigilantly to patrole the right bank of the Douro. Loison, also, whose retreat from Pezo de Ragoa was still unknown, once more received warning to hold on by the Tamega without fail, as he valued the safety of the army. Meanwhile the duke of Dalmatia commanded all the craft in the river to be secured, and, having placed guards at the most convenient points, proposed to remain at Oporto during the 12th, to give time for Lorge’s dragoons and the different detachments of the army to concentrate at Amarante.

Soult’s personal attention was principally directed to the river in its course _below_ the city; for the reports of his cavalry led him to believe that Hill’s division had been disembarked at Ovar from the ocean, and he expected that the vessels would come round, and the passage be attempted at the mouth of the Douro. Nevertheless, thinking that Loison still held Mesamfrio and Pezo with six thousand men, and knowing that three brigades occupied intermediate posts between Amarante and Oporto, he was satisfied that his retreat was secured, and thought there was no rashness in maintaining his position for another day.

The conspirators, however, were also busy; his orders were neglected, or only half obeyed, and false reports of their execution transmitted to him; and, in this state of affairs, the head of the British columns arrived at Villa Nova, and, before eight o’clock in the morning of the 12th, they were concentrated in one mass, but covered from the view of the enemy by the height on which the convent of Sarea stands.

The Douro rolled between the hostile forces. Soult had suffered nothing by the previous operations, and in two days he could take post behind the Tamega, from whence his retreat upon Bragança would be certain, and he might, in passing, defeat Beresford, for that general’s force was feeble as to numbers, and in infancy as to organization; and the utmost that sir Arthur expected from it was that, vexing the French line of march, and infesting the road of Villa Real, it would oblige Soult to take the less accessible route of Chaves, and so retire to Gallicia instead of Leon; but this could not be, unless the main body of the allied troops followed the French closely. Now, Soult, at Salamanca, would be more formidable than Soult at Oporto, and hence the ultimate object of the campaign, and the immediate safety of Beresford’s corps, alike demanded that the Douro should be quickly passed. But, how force the passage of a river, deep, swift, and more than three hundred yards wide, while ten thousand veterans guarded the opposite bank? Alexander the Great might have turned from it without shame!

The height of Sarea, round which the Douro came with a sharp elbow, prevented any view of the upper river from the town; but the duke of Dalmatia, confident that all above the city was secure, took his station in a house westward of Oporto, whence he could discern the whole course of the lower river to its mouth. Meanwhile, from the summit of Sarea, the English general, with an eagle’s glance, searched all the opposite bank and the city and country beyond it. He observed horses and baggage moving on the road to Vallonga, and the dust of columns as if in retreat, and no large body of troops was to be seen under arms near the river. The French guards were few, and distant from each other, and the patroles were neither many nor vigilant; but a large unfinished building standing alone, yet with a short and easy access to it from the river, soon fixed sir Arthur’s attention.

This building, called the Seminary, was surrounded by a high stone wall, which coming down to the water on either side, enclosed an area sufficient to contain at least two battalions in order of battle; the only egress being by an iron gate opening on the Vallonga road. The structure itself commanded every thing in its neighbourhood, except a mound, within cannon-shot, but too pointed to hold a gun. There were no French posts near, and the direct line of passage from the height of Sarea, across the river to the building, being to the right hand, was of course hidden from the troops in the town. Here, then, with a marvellous hardihood, sir Arthur resolved, if he could find but one boat, to make his way, in the face of a veteran army and a renowned general.

PASSAGE OF THE DOURO.

A boat was soon obtained; for a poor barber of Oporto, evading the French patroles, had, during the night, come over the water in a small skiff; this being discovered by colonel Waters, a staff officer, of a quick and daring temper, he and the barber, and the prior of Amarante, who gallantly offered his aid, crossed the river, and in half an hour returned, unperceived, with three or four large barges. Meanwhile, eighteen or twenty pieces of artillery were got up to the convent of Sarea; and major-general John Murray, with the German brigade, some squadrons of the 14th dragoons, and two guns, reached the Barca de Avintas, three miles higher up the river, his orders being to search for boats, and to effect a passage there also, if possible.

Some of the British troops were now sent towards Avintas, to support Murray; while others came cautiously forwards to the brink of the river. It was ten o’clock; the enemy were tranquil and unsuspicious; and an officer reported to sir Arthur Wellesley that one boat was brought up to the point of passage, “_Well, let the men cross_,” was the reply; and upon this simple order, an officer and twenty-five soldiers, of the Buffs, entered the vessel, and in a quarter of an hour were in the midst of the French army.

The Seminary was thus gained without any alarm being given, and every thing was still quiet in Oporto: not a movement was to be seen; not a hostile sound was to be heard: a second boat followed the first, and then a third passed a little higher up the river; but scarcely had the men from the last landed, when a tumultuous noise of drums and shouts arose in the city; confused masses of the enemy were seen hurrying forth in all directions, and throwing out clouds of skirmishers, who came furiously down upon the Seminary. The citizens were descried gesticulating vehemently, and making signals from their houses; and the British troops instantly crowded to the bank of the river; Paget’s and Hill’s divisions at the point of embarkation, and Sherbrooke’s where the old boat-bridge had been cut away from Villa Nova.

Paget himself passed in the third boat, and, mounting the roof of the Seminary, was immediately struck down, severely wounded. Hill took Paget’s place; the musketry was sharp, voluble, and increasing every moment as the number accumulated on both sides. The enemy’s attack was fierce and constant; his fire augmented faster than that of the British, and his artillery, also, began to play on the building. But the English guns, from the convent of Sarea, commanded the whole enclosure round the Seminary, and swept the left of the wall in such a manner as to confine the French assault to the side of the iron gate. Murray, however, did not appear; and the struggle was so violent, and the moment so critical, that sir Arthur would himself have crossed, but for the earnest representations of those about him, and the just confidence he had in general Hill.

Some of the citizens now pushed over to Villa Nova with several great boats; Sherbrooke’s people begun to cross in large bodies; and, at the same moment, a loud shout in the town, and the waving of handkerchiefs from all the windows, gave notice that the enemy had abandoned the lower part of the city; and now, also, Murray’s troops were seen descending the right bank from Avintas. By this time three battalions were in the Seminary; and Hill, advancing to the enclosure wall, opened a destructive fire upon the French columns as they passed, in haste and confusion, by the Vallonga road. Five pieces of French artillery were coming out from the town on the left; but, appalled by the line of musketry to be passed, the drivers suddenly pulled up, and while thus hesitating, a volley from behind stretched most of the artillery-men on the ground; the rest, dispersing among the enclosures, left their guns on the road. This volley was given by a part of Sherbrooke’s people, who, having forced their way through the streets, thus came upon the rear. In fine, the passage was won; and the allies were in considerable force on the French side of the river.

To the left, general Sherbrooke, with the brigade of guards, and the 29th regiment, was in the town, and pressing the rear of the enemy, who were quitting it. In the centre, general Hill, holding the Seminary and the wall of the enclosure, with the Buffs, the 48th, the 66th, the 16th Portuguese, and a battalion of detachments, sent a damaging fire into the masses as they passed him; and his line was prolonged on the right, although with a considerable interval, by general Murray’s Germans, and two squadrons of the 14th dragoons. The remainder of the army kept passing the river at different points; and the artillery, from the height of Sarea, still searched the enemy’s columns as they hurried along the line of retreat.

If general Murray had then fallen boldly in upon the disordered crowds, their discomfiture would have been complete; but he suffered column after column to pass him, without even a cannon shot, and seemed fearful lest they should turn and push him into the river. General Charles Stewart and major Hervey, however, impatient of this inactivity, charged with the two squadrons of dragoons, and rode over the enemy’s rear-guard, as it was pushing through a narrow road to gain an open space beyond. Laborde was unhorsed, Foy badly wounded; and, on the English side, major Hervey lost an arm; and his gallant horsemen, receiving no support from Murray, were obliged to fight their way back with loss.

This finished the action; the French continued their retreat, and the British remained on the ground they had gained. The latter lost twenty killed, a general and ninety-five men wounded; the former had about five hundred men killed and wounded, and five pieces of artillery were taken in the fight; a considerable quantity of ammunition, and fifty guns (of which the carriages had been burnt) were afterwards found in the arsenal, and several hundred men were captured in the hospitals.

_Sketch Explanatory_
OF THE PASSAGE OF THE RIVER DOURO,
by
SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY,
_May 12^{th}, 1809_,
AND OF THE STORMING OF OPORTO,
by
_MARSHAL SOULT_,
_March 1809_.

_London. Published by T. & W. BOONE, July 1829._]

Napoleon’s veterans were so experienced, so inured to warfare that no troops in the world could more readily recover from such a surprise, and before they reached Vallonga their columns were again in order, with a regular rear guard covering the retreat. A small garrison at the mouth of the Douro was cut off, but, guided by some friendly Portuguese, it rejoined the army in the night; and Soult, believing that Loison was at Amarante, thought he had happily escaped a great danger and was still formidable to his enemies.

Sir Arthur Wellesley employed the remainder of the 12th, and the next day, in bringing over the rear of the army, together with the baggage, the stores, and the artillery. General Murray’s Germans, however, pursued, on the morning of the 13th, but not further than about two leagues on the road of Amarante. This delay has been blamed as an error in sir Arthur; it is argued that an enemy once surprised should never be allowed to recover, and that Soult should have been followed up, even while a single regiment was left to pursue. But the reasons for halting were, first, that a part of the army was still on the left bank of the Douro;--secondly, that the troops had out marched provisions, baggage, and ammunition, and having passed over above eighty miles of difficult country in four days, during three of which they were constantly fighting, both men and animals required rest; thirdly, that nothing was known of Beresford, whose contemporary operations it is time to relate.

The moment of his arrival on the Douro was marked by the repulse of Loison’s division, which immediately fell back, as I have already related, to Mezamfrio, followed by the Portuguese patroles only, for Beresford halted on the left bank of the river, because the British regiments were still in the rear. This was on the 10th. Sylveira, who was at Villa Real, had orders to feel towards Mezamfrio for the enemy, and the marshal’s force was thus, with the assistance of the insurgents, in readiness to turn Soult from the route of Villa Real to Bragança.

The 11th, Loison continued his retreat, and Beresford finding him so timid, followed, skirmishing with his rear guard, and at the same time Sylveira advanced from Villa Real. On the 12th, the French outposts, in front of Amarante were driven in, and the 13th Loison abandoned that town, and took the route of Guimaraens.

These events were unknown to sir Arthur Wellesley on the evening of the 13th, but he heard that Soult, after destroying his artillery and ammunition, near Penafiel, had passed over the mountain towards Braga; and judging this to arise from Beresford’s operations on the Tamega, he reinforced Murray with some cavalry, ordering him to proceed by Penafiel, and if Loison still lingered near Amarante, to open a communication with Beresford. The latter was at the same time directed to ascend the Tamega, and intercept the enemy at Chaves.

Meanwhile, the main body of the army marched in two columns upon the Minho, the one by the route of Barca de Troffa and Braga, the other by the Ponte d’Ave and Bacellos. But, on the evening of the 14th, the movements of the enemy about Braga gave certain proofs that not Valença and Tuy, but Chaves or Montalegre, would be the point of his retreat. Hereupon, the left column was drawn off from the Bacellos road and directed upon Braga, and Beresford was instructed to move by Monterey, upon Villa del Rey, if Soult took the line of Montalegre.

The 15th, sir Arthur reached Braga. Murray was at Guimaraens on his right, and Beresford, who had anticipated his orders, was near Chaves, having sent Sylveira towards Salamonde, with instructions to occupy the passes of Ruivaens and Melgassy. But at this time Soult was fifteen miles in advance of Braga, having, by a surprising effort, extricated himself from one of the most dangerous situations that a general ever escaped from. To understand this, it is necessary to describe the country through which his retreat was effected.

I have already observed that the Sierra de Cabreira and the Sierra de Catalina line the right bank of the Tamega; but, in approaching the Douro, the latter slants off towards Oporto, thus opening a rough but practicable slip of land, through which the road leads from Oporto to Amarante. Hence, the French in retreating to the latter town had the Douro on their right hand and the Sierra de Catalina on their left.

Between Amarante, and Braga which is on the other side of the Catalina, a route practicable for artillery, runs through Guimaraens, but it is necessary to reach Amarante to fall into this road. Thus, Soult, as he advanced along the narrow pass between the mountains and the Douro, rested his hopes of safety entirely upon Loison’s holding Amarante. Several days, however, had elapsed since that general had communicated, and an aide-de-camp was sent on the morning of the 12th to ascertain his exact position. Colonel Tholosé, the officer employed, found Loison at Amarante, but neither his remonstrances, nor the after coming intelligence that Oporto was evacuated, and the army in full retreat upon the Tamega, could induce that general to remain there, and, as we have seen, he marched towards Guimaraens, on the 13th, abandoning the bridge of Amarante, without a blow, and leaving his commander and two-thirds of the army to what must have appeared inevitable destruction.

The news of this unexpected calamity reached Soult at one o’clock on the morning of the 13th, just as he had passed the rugged banks of the Souza river, the weather was boisterous, the men were fatigued, voices were heard calling for a capitulation, and the whole army was stricken with dismay. Then it was that the duke of Dalmatia justified, by his energy, that fortune which had raised him to his high rank in the world. Being, by a Spanish pedlar, informed of a path that, mounting the right bank of the Souza, led over the Sierra de Catalina to Guimaraens, he, on the instant, silenced the murmurs of the treacherous or fearful in the ranks, destroyed the artillery, abandoned the military chest and baggage, and loading the animals with sick men and musket ammunition, repassed the Souza, and followed his Spanish guide with a hardy resolution.

The rain was falling in torrents, and the path was such as might be expected in those wild regions, but the troops made good their passage over the mountains to Pombeira, and, at Guimaraens, happily fell in with Loison. During the night they were joined by Lorge’s dragoons from Braga, and thus, almost beyond hope, the whole army was concentrated.

[Sidenote: Noble’s Campagne de Galice.]

If Soult’s energy in command was conspicuous on this occasion, his sagacity and judgement were not less remarkably displayed in what followed. Most generals would have moved by the direct route upon Guimaraens to Braga; but he, with a long reach of mind, calculated, from the slackness of pursuit after he passed Vallonga, that the bulk of the English army must be on the road to Braga, and would be there before him; or that, at best, he should be obliged to retreat fighting, and must sacrifice the guns and baggage of Loison’s and Lorge’s corps in the face of an enemy--a circumstance that might operate fatally on the spirit of his soldiers, and would certainly give opportunities to the malcontents; and already one of the generals (apparently Loison) was recommending a convention like Cintra.

But, with a firmness worthy of the highest admiration, Soult destroyed all the guns and the greatest part of the baggage and ammunition of Loison’s and Lorge’s divisions; then, leaving the high road to Braga on his left, and once more taking to the mountain paths, he made for the heights of Carvalho d’Este, where he arrived late in the evening of the 14th, thus gaining a day’s march, in point of time. The morning of the 15th he drew up his troops in the position he had occupied just two months before at the battle of Braga; and this spectacle, where twenty thousand men were collected upon the theatre of a former victory, and disposed so as to produce the greatest effect, roused all the sinking pride of the French soldiers. It was a happy stroke of generalship, an inspiration of real genius!

Soult now re-organised his army; taking the command of the rear-guard himself, and giving that of the advanced guard to general Loison. Noble, the French historian of this campaign, says “_the whole army was astonished_;” as if it was not a stroke of consummate policy that the rear, which was pursued by the British, should be under the general-in-chief, and that the front, which was to fight its way through the native forces, should have a commander whose very name called up all the revengeful passions of the Portuguese. _Maneta durst not surrender_; and the duke of Dalmatia dextrously forced those to act with most zeal who were least inclined to serve him: and, in sooth, such was his perilous situation, that all the resources of his mind and all the energy of his character were needed to save the army.

From Carvalho he retired to Salamonde, from whence there were two lines of retreat. The one through Ruivaens and Venda Nova, by which the army had marched when coming from Chaves two months before; the other, shorter, although more impracticable, leading by the Ponte Nova and Ponte Miserella into the road running from Ruivaens to Montalegre. But the scouts brought intelligence that the bridge of Ruivaens, on the little river of that name, was broken, and defended by twelve hundred Portuguese, with artillery; and that another party had been, since the morning, destroying the Ponte Nova on the Cavado river.

The destruction of the first bridge blocked the road to Chaves; the second, if completed, and the passage well defended, would have cut the French off from Montalegre. The night was setting in, the soldiers were harassed, barefooted, and starving; the ammunition was damp with the rain, which had never ceased since the 13th, and which was now increasing in violence, accompanied with storms of wind. The British army would certainly fall upon the rear in the morning; and if the Ponte Nova, where the guard was reported to be weak, could not be secured, the hour of surrender was surely arrived.

In this extremity, Soult sent for major Dulong, an officer justly reputed for one of the most daring in the French ranks. Addressing himself to this brave man, he said, “I have chosen you from the whole army to seize the Ponte Nova, which has been cut by the enemy. Do you choose a hundred grenadiers and twenty-five horsemen; endeavour to surprise the guards, and secure the passage of the bridge. If you succeed, say so, but send no other report; your silence will suffice.” Thus exhorted, Dulong selected his men, and departed.

Favoured by the storm, he reached the bridge unperceived of the Portuguese, killed the centinel before any alarm was given, and then, followed by twelve grenadiers, began crawling along a narrow slip of masonry, which was the only part of the bridge undestroyed. The Cavado river was in full flood, and roaring in a deep channel; one of the grenadiers fell into the gulph, but the noise of the storm and the river was louder than his cry; Dulong, with the eleven, still creeping onwards, reached the other side, and falling briskly on the first posts of the peasants, killed or dispersed the whole. At that moment, the remainder of his men advanced close to the bridge; and some crossing, others mounting the heights, shouting and firing, scared the Portuguese supporting-posts, who imagined the whole army was upon them; and thus the passage was gallantly won.

[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations MS.]

At four o’clock, the bridge being repaired, the advanced guards of the French commenced crossing; but as the column of march was long, and the road narrow and rugged, the troops filed over slowly; and beyond the Ponte Nova there was a second obstacle still more formidable. For the pass in which the troops were moving being cut in the side of a mountain, open on the left for several miles, at last came upon a torrent called the Misarella, which, breaking down a deep ravine, or rather gulph, was only to be crossed by a bridge, constructed with a single lofty arch, called the _Saltador_, or leaper; and so narrow that only three persons could pass abreast. Fortunately for the French, the _Saltador_ was not cut, but entrenched and defended by a few hundred Portuguese peasants, who occupied the rocks on the farther side; and here the good soldier Dulong again saved the army: for, when a first and second attempt had been repulsed with loss, he carried the entrenchments by a third effort; but, at the same instant, fell deeply wounded himself. The head of the column now poured over, and it was full time, for the English guns were thundering in the rear, and the Ponte Nova was choked with dead.

Sir Arthur Wellesley, quitting Braga on the morning of the 16th, had come, about four o’clock, upon Soult’s rear-guard, which remained at Salamonde to cover the passage of the army over the bridges. The right was strongly protected by a ravine, the left occupied a steep hill; and a stout battle might have been made, but men thus circumstanced, and momentarily expecting an order to retreat, will seldom stand firmly; and, on this occasion, when some light troops turned the left, and general Sherbrooke, with the guards, mounting the steep hill, attacked the front, the French made but one discharge, and fled in confusion to the Ponte Nova. As this bridge was not on the direct line of retreat, they were for some time unperceived, and gaining ground of their pursuers, formed a rear-guard; but, after a time, being discovered, some guns were brought to bear on them; and then man and horse, crushed together, went over into the gulph; and the bridge, and the rocks, and the defile beyond were strewed with mangled bodies.

This was the last calamity inflicted by the sword upon the French army in this retreat; a retreat attended by many horrid as well as glorious events; for the peasants in their fury, with an atrocious cruelty, tortured and mutilated every sick man and straggler that fell into their power; and on the other hand, the soldiers, who held together in their turn, shot the peasants; while the track of the columns might be discovered from afar by the smoke of the burning houses.

The French reached Montalegre on the 17th; and an English staff-officer, with some cavalry, being upon their rear, as far as Villella, picked up some stragglers; but sir Arthur, with the main body of the army, halted that day at Ruivaens. The 18th he renewed the pursuit, and a part of his cavalry passed Montalegre, followed by the guards; the enemy was, however, drawn up behind the Salas in force, and no action took place. Sylveira, indeed, had entered Montalegre, from the side of Chaves, before the British came up from Ruivaens; but instead of pursuing, he put his men into quarters; and a Portuguese officer of his division, who was despatched to marshal Beresford with orders to move from Villa Perdrices upon Villa del Rey, loitered on the road so long, that all chance of intercepting the French line of march was at an end; for though Beresford, on the 19th, pushed colonel Talbot with the 14th dragoons as far as Ginjo, Franceschi turned in force, and obliged that officer to retire; and thus the pursuit terminated, with the capture of a few stragglers on the Salas.

Soult himself crossed the frontier by Allaritz on the 18th; and on the 19th entered Orense, but without guns, stores, ammunition, or baggage; his men exhausted with fatigue and misery, the greatest part being without shoes, many without accoutrements, and in some instances even without muskets. He had quitted Orense seventy-six days before, with about twenty-two thousand men, and three thousand five hundred had afterwards joined him from Tuy. He returned with nineteen thousand five hundred, having lost by the sword and sickness, by assassination and capture, six thousand good soldiers; of which number above three thousand were taken in hospitals,[7] and about a thousand were killed by the Portuguese, or had died of sickness, previous to the retreat. The remainder were captured, or had perished within the last eight days. He had carried fifty-eight pieces of artillery into Portugal, and he returned without a gun; yet was his reputation as a stout and able soldier no wise diminished.

_Sketch Explanatory_
of the
OPERATIONS
between the
MINHO & DOURO,
_1809_.

_London. Published by T. & W. BOONE, July 1829._]

OBSERVATIONS.

The duke of Dalmatia’s arrangements being continually thwarted by the conspirators, his military conduct cannot be fairly judged of. Nevertheless, the errors of the campaign may, without injustice, be pointed out, leaving to others the task of tracing them to their true sources.

1º. The disposition of the army, on both sides of the Douro, and upon such extended lines, when no certain advice of the movements and strength of the English force had been received, was rash. It was, doubtless, right, that to clear the front of the army, and to gather information, Franceschi should advance to the Vouga; but he remained too long in the same position, and he should have felt Trant’s force more positively. Had the latter officer (whose boldness in maintaining the line of the Vouga was extremely creditable) been beaten, as he easily might have been, the anarchy in the country would have increased; and as Beresford’s troops at Thomar wanted but an excuse to disband themselves, the Portuguese and British preparations must have been greatly retarded.

[Sidenote: Noble’s Campagne de Galice.]

2º. That Soult, when he had secured, as he thought, all the boats on an unfordable river three hundred yards wide, should think himself safe from an attack for one day, is not wonderful. The improbability that such a barrier could be forced in half an hour might have rendered Fabius careless; but there were some peculiar circumstances attending the surprise of the French army which indicate great negligence. The commanding officer of one regiment reported, as early as six o’clock, that the English were crossing the river; the report was certainly premature, because no man passed before ten o’clock; but it reached Soult, and he sent general Quesnel, the governor of Oporto, to verify the fact. Quesnel stated, on his return, and truly, that it was an error, and Soult took no further precaution. The patroles were not increased; no staff-officers appear to have been employed to watch the river, and no signals were established; yet it was but three days since D’Argenton’s conspiracy had been discovered, and the extent of it was still unknown. This circumstance alone should have induced the duke of Dalmatia to augment the number of his guards and posts of observation, that the multiplicity of the reports might render it impossible for the malcontents to deceive him. The surprise at Oporto must, therefore, be considered as a fault in the general, which could only be atoned for by the high resolution and commanding energy with which he saved his army in the subsequent retreat.

3º. When general Loison suffered marshal Beresford to drive him from Pezo de Ragoa and Mezamfrio, he committed a grave military error; but when he abandoned Amarante, he relinquished all claim to military reputation, as a simple statement of facts will prove. The evening of the 12th he wrote to Soult that one regiment had easily repulsed the whole of the enemy’s forces; yet he, although at the head of six thousand men, cavalry, infantry, and artillery, that night and without another shot being fired, abandoned the only passage by which, as far as he knew, the rest of the army could escape from its perilous situation with honour. It was not general Loison’s fault if England did not triumph a second time for the capture of a French marshal.

MOVEMENTS OF THE BRITISH GENERAL.

1º. If sir Arthur Wellesley’s operation be looked at as a whole, it is impossible to deny his sagacity in planning, his decision and celerity in execution. When he landed at Lisbon, the nation was dismayed by previous defeats, distracted with anarchy, and menaced on two sides by powerful armies, one of which was already in possession of the second city in the kingdom. In twenty-eight days he had restored public confidence; provided a defence against one adversary; and having marched two hundred miles through a rugged country, and forced the passage of a great river--caused his other opponent to flee over the frontier, without artillery or baggage.

2º.--Such being the result, it is necessary to show that the success was due, not to the caprice of fortune, but to the talents of the general; that he was quick to see, and active to strike; and, first, the secresy and despatch with which the army was collected on the Vouga belongs entirely to the man; for, there were many obstacles to overcome; and D’Argenton, as the sequel proved, would, by his disclosures, have ruined sir Arthur’s combinations, if the latter had not providently given him a false view of affairs. The subsequent march from the Vouga to the Douro was, in itself, no mean effort, for, it must be recollected, that this rapid advance against an eminent commander, and a veteran army of above twenty thousand men, was made with a heterogeneous force, of which only sixteen thousand men were approved soldiers, the remainder being totally unformed by discipline, untried in battle, and, only three weeks before, were in a state of open mutiny.

3º.--The passage of the Douro, at Oporto, would, at first sight, seem a rash undertaking; but, when examined closely, it proves to be an example of consummate generalship, both in the conception and the execution. The careless watch maintained by the French may, indeed, be called fortunate, because it permitted the English general to get a few men over unperceived; but it was not twenty-five, nor twenty-five hundred, soldiers that could have maintained themselves, if heedlessly cast on the other side. Sir Arthur, when he so coolly said--“_let them pass_,” was prepared to protect them when they had passed. He did not give that order until he knew that Murray had found boats at Avintas, to ferry over a considerable number of troops, and, consequently, that that general, descending the Douro, could cover the right flank of the Seminary, while the guns planted on the heights of Sarea could sweep the left flank, and search all the ground enclosed by the wall round the building. If general Murray’s troops only had passed, they would have been compromised; if the whole army had made the attempt at Avintas, its march would have been discovered; but in the double passage all was secured: the men in the Seminary by the guns, by the strength of the building, and by Murray’s troops; the latter by the surprise on the town, which drew the enemy’s attention away from them. Hence, it was only necessary to throw a few brave men into the Seminary unperceived, and then the success was almost certain; because, while that building was maintained, the troops in the act of passing could neither be prevented nor harmed by the enemy. To attain great objects by simple means is the highest effort of genius!

4º.--If general Murray had attacked vigorously, the ruin of the French army would have ensued. It was an opportunity that would have tempted a blind man to strike; the neglect of it argued want of military talent and of military hardihood; and how would it have appeared if Loison had not abandoned Amarante? If Soult, effecting his retreat in safety, and reaching Zamora or Salamanca in good order, had turned on Ciudad Rodrigo, he would have found full occupation for sir Arthur Wellesley in the north; and he would have opened a free communication with the duke of Belluno. The latter must, then, have marched either against Seville or Lisbon; and thus the boldness and excellent conduct of the English general, producing no adequate results, would have been overlooked, or, perhaps, have formed a subject for the abuse of some ignorant, declamatory writer.

5º.--Sir Arthur Wellesley’s reasons for halting at Oporto, the 13th, have been already noticed, but they require further remarks. Had he followed Soult headlong, there is no doubt that the latter would have been overtaken on the Souza river, and destroyed; but this chance, arising from Loison’s wretched movements, was not to be foreseen. Sir Arthur Wellesley knew nothing of Beresford’s situation; but he naturally supposed that, following his instructions, the latter was about Villa Real; and that, consequently, the French would, from Amarante, either ascend the Tamega to Chaves, or taking the road to Guimaraens and Braga, make for the Minho. Hence, he remained where he could command the main roads to that river, in order to intercept Soult’s retreat and force him to a battle; whereas, if he had once entered the defile formed by the Douro and the Sierra de Catalina, he could only have followed his enemy in one column by a difficult route, a process promising little advantage. Nevertheless, seeing that he detached general Murray by that route at last, it would appear that he should have ordered him to press the enemy closer than he did; but there a political difficulty occurred.

[Sidenote: King Joseph’s captured Correspondence, MS.]

The English cabinet, although improvident in its preparations, was very fearful of misfortune, and the general durst not risk the safety of a single brigade, except for a great object, lest a slight disaster should cause the army to be recalled. Thus, he was obliged to curb his naturally enterprising disposition, and to this burthen of ministerial incapacity, which he bore even to the battle of Salamanca, may be traced that over-caution which has been so often censured as a fault, not only by military writers, but by Napoleon, who, judging from appearances, erroneously supposed it to be a characteristic of the man, and often rebuked his generals for not taking advantage thereof.

6º.--The marches and encounters, from the 14th to the 17th, were excellent on both sides. Like the wheelings and buffeting of two vultures in the air, the generals contended, the one for safety, the other for triumph; but there was evidently a failure in the operations of marshal Beresford. Soult did not reach Salamonde until the evening of the 15th, and his rear guard was still there on the evening of the 16th. Beresford was in person at Chaves on the 16th, and his troops reached that place early on the morning of the 17th. Soult passed Montalegre on the 18th, but from Chaves to that place is only one march.

Again, marshal Beresford was in possession of Amarante on the 13th, and as there was an excellent map of the province in existence, he must have known the importance of Salamonde, and that there were roads to it through Mondin and Cavez, shorter than by Guimaraens and Chaves. It is true that Sylveira was sent to occupy Ruivaens and Melgacy; but he executed his orders slowly, and Misarella was neglected. Major Warre, an officer of the marshal’s staff, endeavoured, indeed, to break down the bridges of Ponte Nova and Ruivaens; and it was by his exertions that the peasants, surprised at the former, had been collected; but he had only a single dragoon with him, and was without powder to execute this important task. The peasantry, glad to be rid of the French, were reluctant to stop their retreat, and still more to destroy the bridge of Misarella, which was the key of all the communications, and all the great markets of the Entre Minho e Douro; and therefore sure to be built up again, in which case the people knew well that their labour and time would be called for without payment. It is undoubted that Soult owed his safety to the failure in breaking those bridges; and it does appear that if major Warre had been supplied with the necessary escort and materials he would have effectually destroyed them.

Sylveira did not move either in the direction or with the celerity required of him by Beresford, there seems to have been a misunderstanding between them; but allowance must be made for the numerous mistakes necessarily arising in the transmission of orders by officers speaking different languages; and for the difficulty of moving troops not accustomed, or perfectly willing to act together.