Chapter III: Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations MS

The duke of Dalmatia halted at Orense the 20th, but on the 21st put his troops in motion upon Lugo, where general Fournier, of the 6th corps, with three battalions of infantry and a regiment of dragoons, was besieged by twelve or fifteen thousand Spaniards, under the command of general Mahi. But to explain this it is necessary to relate Romana’s operations, after his defeat at Monterey on the 6th of March.

Having re-assembled the fugitives at Puebla de Senabria, on the borders of Leon, he repaired his losses by fresh levies, and was soon after joined by three thousand men from Castile, and thus, unknown to Ney, he had, as it were, gained the rear of the sixth corps. Villa Franca del Bierzo was, at this time, occupied by two weak French battalions, and their nearest support was at Lugo: Romana resolved to surprise them, and, dividing his forces, sent Mendizabel with one division by the valley of the Syl to take the French in rear, and marched himself by the route of Calcabellos. The French, thus surrounded in Villa Franca, after a short skirmish, in which the Spaniards lost about a hundred men, surrendered, and were sent into the Asturias.

[Sidenote: Parl. Papers, 1810.]

Romana then detached a part of his forces to Orense and Ponte Vedra, to assist Morillo and the insurrection in the western parts of Gallicia, where, with the aid of the English ships of war, and notwithstanding the shameful neglect of the supreme central junta, the patriots were proceeding vigorously. The moveable columns of the sixth corps daily lost a number of men; some in open battle, but a still greater number by assassinations, which were rigorously visited upon the districts where they took place; and thus, in Gallicia, as in every other part of Spain, the war hourly assumed a more horrid character. Referring to this period, colonel Barios afterwards told Mr. Frere that, to repress the excesses of marshal Ney’s troops, he, himself, had, in cold blood, caused seven hundred French prisoners to be drowned in the Minho; an avowal recorded by Mr. Frere, without animadversion, but which, happily for the cause of humanity, there is good reason to believe was as false as it was disgraceful.

After the capture of Vigo, the Spanish force on the coast increased rapidly. Barios returned to Seville; Martin Carrera assumed the command of the troops near Orense, and the Conde Noroña of those near Vigo. General Maucune returned to St. Jago from Tuy, and Ney, apprized of the loss at Villa Franca, advanced to Lugo. Romana immediately abandoned Gallicia, and, entering the Asturias by the pass of Cienfuegos, marched along the line of the Gallician frontier, until he reached Navia de Suarna. Here he left Mahi, with the army, to observe Ney, but repaired, himself, to Oviedo, to redress the crying wrongs of the Asturians.

It is unnecessary to recapitulate the evil doings of the Asturian junta, which was notoriously corrupt and incapable. Romana, after a short inquiry, dismissed the members in virtue of his supreme authority, and appointed new men; but this act of justice gave great offence to Jovellanos and others. It appeared too close an approximation to Cuesta’s manner, in Leon, the year before; and as the central government, always selfish and jealous, abhorred any indication of vigour or probity in a general, Romana was soon afterwards deprived of his command. Meanwhile, he was resolutely reforming abuses, when his proceedings were suddenly arrested by an unexpected event.

As soon as Ney understood that the Spanish army was posted on the Gallician side of the Asturian frontier, and that Romana was likely to excite the energy of the Asturian people, he planned a combined movement, to surround and destroy, not only Romana and his army, but also the Asturian forces, which then amounted to about fifteen thousand men, including the _partida_ of Porlier, commonly called the Marquisetto. This force, commanded by general Ballasteros and general Voster, occupied Infiesta, on the eastern side of Oviedo, and Castropol on the coast. Ney, with the consent of Joseph, arranged that Kellerman, who was at Astorga, with six guns and eight thousand seven hundred men, composed of detachments, drawn together from the different corps, should penetrate the Asturias from the south east by the pass of Pajares; that Bonnet, who always remained at the town of St. Andero, should break in, from the north east, by the coast road; and that the sixth corps should make an irruption by the Concejo de Ibias, a short but difficult route leading directly from Lugo.

When the period for these combined movements was determined, Ney, appointing general Marchand to command in Gallicia during his own absence, left three battalions under Maucune at St. Jago, three others in garrison at Coruña under general D’Armagnac, one at Ferrol, and three with a regiment of cavalry under Fournier at Lugo; and then marched himself, with twelve battalions of infantry and three regiments of cavalry, against Mahi. The latter immediately abandoned his position at Navia de Suarna, and drawing off by his left, without giving notice to Romana, returned to Gallicia and again entered the valley of the Syl. Ney, either thinking that the greatest force was near Oviedo, or that it was more important to capture Romana than to disperse Mahi’s troops, continued his route by the valley of the Nareca, and with such diligence that he reached Cornellana and Grado, one march from Oviedo, before Romana knew of his approach. The Spanish general, thus surprized, made a feeble and fruitless endeavour to check the French at the bridge of Peñaflor, after which, sending the single regiment he had with him to Infiesta, he embarked on board an English vessel at Gihon, and so escaped.

The 18th of May, Ney entered Oviedo, where he was joined by Kellerman, and the next day pursued Romana to Gihon. Bonnet, likewise, executed his part, but somewhat later; and thus Vorster, being unmolested by Ney, had time to collect his corps on the coast. Meanwhile Ballasteros, finding that Bonnet had passed between him and Vorster, boldly marched upon St. Andero and retook it, making the garrison and sick men (in all eleven hundred) prisoners. The Amelia and Statira, British frigates, arrived off the harbour at the same moment, and captured three French corvettes and two luggers, on board of which some staff-officers were endeavouring to escape.

Bonnet, however, followed hard upon Ballasteros, and, the 11th of June, routed him so completely that he, also, was forced to save himself on board an English vessel, and the French recovered all the prisoners, and, amongst them, the men taken at Villa Franca, by Romana. But, before this, Ney, uneasy for his posts in Gallicia, had returned to Coruña by the coast-road through Castropol, and Kellerman, after several trifling skirmishes with Vorster, had also retired to Valladolid. This expedition proved that Asturia was not calculated for defence, although, with the aid of English ships, it might become extremely troublesome to the French.

While Ney was in Asturia, Carrera, advancing from the side of Orense, appeared in front of St. Jago di Compostella at the moment that colonel D’Esmenard, a staff-officer sent by the marshal to give notice of his return to Coruña, arrived with an escort of dragoons in Maucune’s camp. This escort was magnified by the Spaniards into a reinforcement of eight hundred men; but Carrera, who had been joined by Morillo, commanded eight thousand, and, on the 23d, having attacked Maucune, at a place called “_Campo de Estrella_,” totally defeated him, with a loss of six hundred men and several guns. The Spaniards did not pursue, but the French retreated in confusion to Coruña. Nor was this the only check suffered by the 6th corps; for Mahi, having united a great body of peasants to his army, drove back Fournier’s outposts, and closely invested him in Lugo on the 19th.

[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations MS.]

Such was the state of affairs in Gallicia when Soult arrived at Orense; and as the inhabitants of that town, from whom he got intelligence of these events, rather exaggerated the success of their countrymen, the French marshal immediately sent forward an advanced guard of his stoutest men to relieve Lugo, and followed himself, by the route of Monforte, with as much speed as the exhausted state of his troops would permit. The 22d, he reached Gutin, and, the same day, his van being descried on the mountains above Lugo, Mahi broke up his camp, and fell back to Mondenedo.

The 23d, Soult entered Lugo, where he heard of the emperor’s first successes in Austria, and, with renewed energy, prepared for fresh exertions himself. The 30th, he was joined by Ney, who, uninformed of Mahi’s position at Mondenedo, had missed a favourable opportunity of revenging the loss at St. Jago. Meanwhile Romana, disembarking at Ribadeo, joined Mahi at Mondenedo, and immediately marched along the line of the Asturias frontier, until he arrived at the sources of the Neyra, then, crossing the royal road, a little above Lugo, plunged, once more, into the valley of the Syl; and, having gained Orense, the 6th of June, opened a communication with Carrera at St. Jago, and with the insurgents at Vigo. This movement of Romana’s was able, energetic, and worthy of every praise.

In pursuance of an order from the emperor, Soult now sent eleven hundred men, composed of dismounted dragoons and skeletons of cavalry regiments, to France; and, having partially restored the artillery and equipments of the second corps, from the arsenals of Coruña and Ferrol, he, in concert with the duke of Elchingen, arranged a fresh plan for the destruction of Romana, the execution of which failed, as shall be hereafter noticed; but, at present, it is necessary to resume the narrative of

VICTOR’S OPERATIONS.

[Sidenote: Semelé’s Journal of Operations MSS.]

After the abortive effort to gain Badajos, the duke of Belluno, in obedience to the king’s orders, proceeded to recover Alcantara. His rear was still within two marches of Merida when the head of his columns, under Lapisse, drove back some cavalry posts, entered the town of Alcantara, and the next day attempted the passage of the bridge.

The Portuguese force consisted of two thousand infantry, fifty cavalry, and six guns; and some works of defence were constructed on the right bank of the river; but, on the 14th of May, Lapisse lining the rocks on the left bank of the river, skirmished so sharply that the militia regiment of Idanha gave way. Colonel Mayne then sprung a mine, but the explosion doing little injury to the bridge, the French made good the passage. The Portuguese, who had suffered considerably, retired to the Puente de Segura, and Lapisse immediately sent patroles towards Castello Branco, Salvatierra, and Idanha Nova.

Intelligence of this attack having reached general Mackenzie, he directed preparations to be made for destroying the boat-bridge at Abrantes, and marched, in person, by Cortiçada to Sobreira Formosa; this movement, and a rumour that Soult had retreated from Oporto, afforded an excuse to Victor for again abandoning Alcantara, and resuming his former camp. During his absence, Cuesta, true to the promise he had given, attacked the fort of Merida; but, on the return of the French advanced guard, re-crossed the Guadiana, and fell back to Zafra, having first ravaged all the flat country, and obliged the inhabitants to withdraw into the mountains.

Some time before this, king Joseph had received a despatch from the French minister of war, giving notice that reinforcements had sailed from England, and warning him to lose no time in marching against Lisbon, to create a useful diversion in favour of Soult. It might be supposed that the original plan of the emperor would then have been acted upon, and this was the first thought of Joseph himself; but other circumstances created doubt and hesitation in his councils, and, finally, induced him to abandon all thoughts of Portugal.

When Napoleon returned to Paris, he imagined hostilities with Austria, although certain, would not break out so suddenly, but that he should have time to organise a sufficient army in Germany, without drawing his veteran troops from Spain. Hence, he still left the imperial guards at Vittoria, and sending the prince of Neufchatel to command the troops on the Danube, he himself remained at Paris, to superintend the preparations for opening the campaign. The Austrians were, however, not inattentive observers of the perfidy which accompanied the invasion of Spain; and, aptly taking the hint, attacked the French outposts and published their own declaration of war at the same moment.

Berthier, incapable of acting a principal part, was surprised, and made a succession of false movements that would have been fatal to the French army, if the emperor, journeying day and night, had not arrived at the very hour when his lieutenant was on the point of consummating the ruin of the army. Then, indeed, was seen the supernatural force of Napoleon’s genius: in a few hours he changed the aspect of affairs, in a few days, maugre their immense number, his enemies, baffled and flying in all directions, proclaimed his mastery in an art which, up to that moment, was imperfect; for never, since troops first trod a field of battle, was such a display of military skill made by man.

But previous to these successes, so threatening had been the aspect of affairs in Germany, that the imperial guards had been recalled from Vittoria, and hurried to the Danube, the great reserve of infantry was, as we have seen, struck off the rolls of the army in Spain, and the skeletons of the fourth squadrons of every cavalry regiment were ordered to return to their depôts in France. Even the fifth corps, under Mortier, then on its way to Valladolid from Zaragoza, was directed to halt, and hold itself in readiness to march for Germany; and thus, while Victor was reluctant to move, while Ney was demanding more troops to preserve Gallicia, and while the fate of the second corps was unknown, the whole army was actually diminished by forty thousand men, and fifteen thousand more were paralysed with regard to offensive operations.

[Sidenote: Semelé’s Journal of Operations MS.]

These things rendered Joseph timid. Madrid, it was argued in his councils, was of more consequence than Lisbon. Soult might be already at the latter place; or, if not, he might extricate himself from his difficulties, for the capital of Spain must be covered. In pursuance of this reasoning, Sebastiani was forbidden any forward movement; and the duke of Belluno, whose army was daily wasting with the Guadiana fever, took a position at Torre-Mocha, a central point between Truxillo, Merida, and Alcantara. His cavalry posts watched all the passages over the Guadiana and the Tagus; and his communications with Madrid, between the Tietar and the Tagus, were protected by twelve hundred men, detached for that purpose by the king.

But one timid measure in war generally produces another. The neighbourhood of the English force at Castel Branco increased the energy of the Spanish insurgents, who infested the valley of the Tagus, and communicated secretly with those of the Sierra de Guadalupe; hence, Victor, alarmed for his bridge at Almaraz, sent a division there the 22d of May; and, as from that period until the 10th of June, he remained quiet: his campaign, which had opened so brilliantly, was annulled. He had neither assisted Soult, nor crushed Cuesta, nor taken Badajos nor Seville; yet he had wasted and lost, by sickness, more men than would have sufficed to reduce both Lisbon and Seville. The Spaniards were daily recovering strength and confidence; and sir Arthur Wellesley, after defeating Soult, had full leisure to return to the Tagus, and to combine his future operations with the Spanish armies in the south.

Information that Lapisse had forced the bridge of Alcantara reached the English general on the night of the 17th. That part of the army which was still behind Salamonde received immediate orders to retrace their steps to Oporto; and when the retreat of Soult by Orense was ascertained, the remainder of the troops, including three Portuguese brigades under Beresford, followed the same route. Colonel Trant was then appointed military governor of Oporto; and it was thought sufficient to leave Sylveira with some regular battalions and militia to defend the northern provinces; for Soult’s army was considered a crippled force, which could not for a long time appear again in the field; a conclusion drawn, as we shall see, from false data, and without due allowance being made for the energy of that chief.

As the army proceeded southward, the contracted scope of Lapisse’s movements was ascertained. Colonel Mayne was directed again to take post at Alcantara; and a reinforcement of five thousand men having landed at Lisbon, the rapidity of the march slackened. Passing by easy journeys through Coimbra, Thomar, and Punhete, the troops reached Abrantes the 7th of June, and encamped on the left bank of the Tagus; but there was sickness and a great mortality in his ranks.

[Sidenote: Sir A. Wellesley’s Correspondence, Parl. Papers, 1810.]

From the moment of his arrival in Portugal, sir Arthur Wellesley had looked to the defeat of Victor as the principal, and the operation against Soult as the secondary, object of the campaign; and the English government, acceding to his views, now gave him a discretionary power to enter the nearest provinces of Spain, if Portugal should not thereby be endangered. In his correspondence with the junta and with Cuesta, he had strongly urged the necessity of avoiding any serious collision with the enemy until the British troops could act in concert with the Spanish armies. This advice, approved of by the junta, was attended to by Cuesta; insomuch that he did not seek a battle, but he exposed his advanced posts, as if in derision of the counsel; and, disdainful of the English general’s abilities, expressed his belief that the latter had no desire to act heartily, “because,” said he, “the system of the British appears to be never to expose their troops; owing to which, they never gain decisive actions by land.”

Cuesta’s knowledge of the enemy’s strength and positions was always inaccurate, and his judgement false; hence he himself not only never gained any decisive action, but lost every army entrusted to his command. He was discontented with the movement against Soult, asserting that his hold of Gallicia would only be strengthened thereby, unless that favourite folly of all Spanish generals were adopted, namely, surrounding the enemy, without regarding whether the troops to be surrounded were more or less numerous than the surrounders. Sir Arthur Wellesley, however, affirmed that if Soult were first driven over the Minho, a combined attack afterwards made upon Victor would permanently deliver Gallicia; and this plan being followed, Gallicia was abandoned by the French, and they never returned to that province.

When the English army was again free to act, Cuesta was importunate that a joint offensive operation against Victor should be undertaken; but, obstinately attached to his own opinions, he insisted upon tracing the whole plan of campaign. Yet his views were so opposed to all sound military principles, that sir Arthur, although anxious to conciliate his humour, could scarcely concede the smallest point, lest a vital catastrophe should follow. Valuable time was thus lost in idle discussions which might have been employed in useful action; for the return of the British army from the Douro had falsified Victor’s position at Torremocha. That marshal, as late as the 10th of June, had only one division guarding the bridge at Almaraz; and it was difficult for him to ascertain the movements of sir Arthur Wellesley, covered, as they were, by the Tagus, the insurgents, and Mackenzie’s corps of observation: hence, by rapid marches, it was possible for the English general, while Victor was still at Torremocha, to reach the valley of the Tagus, and cutting the first corps off from Madrid, to place it between two fires.

[Sidenote: Semelé’s Journal of Operations MS.]

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 16.]

[Sidenote: Parliamentary Papers, 1810.]

This did not escape the penetration of either commander; but sir Arthur was forced to renounce the attempt, partly because of the sick and harassed condition of his troops, the want of shoes and money, and the difficulty of getting supplies; but chiefly that Cuesta’s army was scattered over the open country, between the defiles of Monasterio and the Guadiana, and, as he refused to concentrate or retire, Victor might have marched against and crushed him, and yet found time to meet the British on the Tietar. Early in June, however, marshal Beresford was, with three brigades, directed upon Castello Branco, and the duke of Belluno, immediately taking the alarm, and being also assured, by despatches from Madrid, of Soult’s retreat, resolved to re-cross the Tagus. But, previous to commencing this movement, he resolved to secure his flank, by causing the bridge of Alcantara to be destroyed.

Colonel Mayne, as I have already observed, had been again entrusted with that post; but, unfortunately, his first orders to blow up the bridge, if the enemy advanced, were not rescinded, although the return of the army from the north rendered such a proceeding unnecessary. Mayne did not keep his instructions secret; and Victor, hearing of them, sent a detachment to the bridge with no other view than to cause its destruction. He succeeded; and this noble monument of Trajan’s genius was overturned. But such is the nature of war that, not long afterwards, each army found its fall injurious to their interests, and, as a matter of taste and of military advantage, both sides alike sighed over the ruins of Alcantara.

Having completed this operation, Victor passed the Tagus, at Almaraz, on the 19th, without being molested by Cuesta, and, removing his boat-bridge, proceeded to take post at Plasencia. Meanwhile Beresford was obliged to return to the defence of the northern provinces of Portugal, which Soult was again menacing, for, during the forced inactivity of the British, at Abrantes, the cause of which I shall explain in another place, changes in the relative positions of the hostile armies were taking place; and it is important that these changes should be well understood, because on them the fate of the succeeding campaign hinged.

When Ney and Soult met at Lugo, they, although still on bad terms, agreed, after some discussion, that the first should march from Coruña, by the route of St. Jago and Vigo, against Carrera and the Conde de Noroña; and that the second, entering the valley of the Syl, should attack Romana, and drive him upon Orense, at which place it was expected that Ney, after taking or blocking Vigo, would be able to reach him, and thus the whole force of Gallicia be crushed at once. Soult was then to menace the Tras os Montes, by the side of Bragança, with the view of obliging sir Arthur Wellesley to remain in that province, while the second corps opened a direct communication with Madrid and with the first corps.

Ney returned to Coruña; and, on the 1st of June, two divisions of infantry and a brigade of dragoons, of the second corps, marched upon Monforte: they were followed, the next day, by two other divisions of infantry; and, at the same time, Franceschi, who was on the Fereira river, supported by La Houssaye’s dragoons, was directed, after scouring the road to St. Jago, to fall down the right bank of the Tambuga, towards Orense.

From the 2d to the 9th the main body halted at Monforte, to get up stores from Lugo, and to scour the country on the flanks; for Romana, in his passage, had again raised the peasantry of all the valleys. Loison also, with a division, entered the Val des Orres, having orders to feign a movement towards Villa Franca and Puente Ferrada, as if for the purpose of meeting a French column in that direction.

The 10th, Loison passed the Syl, and took post at the Puente de Bibey.

[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations MSS.]

The 12th, Franceschi, reinforced with a division of infantry, arrived at Monte Furada on the Syl, and, sending a detachment to Laronco, connected his division with Loison’s. The remainder of the infantry followed this movement, and detachments were sent up the course of the Syl, and towards Dancos, on the road from Villa Franca to Lugo. Loison also forced the passage of the Puente de Bibey, and drove the insurgents to Puebla de Tribes. The French army thus cleared all the valleys opening on the course of the Upper Minho, and Romana was confined to the lower part of that river.

The 13th, Franceschi, ascending the valley of the Bibey, took post at Bollo and the bridge of the Hermitage, and then pushed his patroles even to Gudina and Monterey on one side, and into the Sierra de Porto on the other, as far as the sources of the Bibey, with a view of ascertaining, first, the exact direction which Romana would take to avoid Loison’s column; secondly, to prevent the Spanish general from passing the left of the French army, and gaining the Asturias by the route of Puebla de Senabria. These precautions occupied the duke of Dalmatia till the 19th, when, being assured that Romana had fallen back to Monterey, he judged that the latter would attempt the same march towards Puebla de Senabria, by which he had escaped after the action in the month of March. The French army was therefore directed up the valley of the Bibey, upon Viana, where there was a bridge, and where many of the mountain roads united. The same day Franceschi fell in with the head of Romana’s army, and repulsed it; and the evening of the 20th the whole of the French troops were concentrated near Viana, intending to give battle to the Spaniards the next morning; but the latter retreated precipitately during the night, and many of the men dispersed.

Soult continued his movement by the left until he reached the great road running from Castile to Orense, and from thence, having sent Heudelet’s division to Villa Vieja to threaten the Tras os Montes frontier, and Mermet’s division and Lorge’s dragoons towards La Canda to observe the road of Puebla de Senabria, he marched himself, with an advanced guard, to La Gudina, leaving Laborde and La Houssaye in reserve between Gudina and Villa Vieja. These divers movements, through the rugged passes of Gallicia, led to a variety of slight skirmishes, the most important of which took place at the Puente de Bibey, a place of such prodigious strength that it is scarcely conceivable how men, with arms, could be brought to abandon such a post.

Romana’s situation was now nearly hopeless, but he was saved by a misunderstanding between the French marshals. It appears that Ney, having marched from Coruña, entered St. Jago with about ten thousand men, and Carrera fell back upon Ponte Vedra, where the Conde de Noroña joined him with some fresh troops, and, assuming the command, continued the retreat to the Octavem river, behind which he took post, placing his main body at the bridge of San Payo, and sending detachments to guard some secondary points. On the 7th of June, the French came up. The Spaniards had thirteen thousand men, two eighteen-pounders, and nine field-pieces. Of these forces, seven thousand men armed, three thousand unarmed, and the whole of the artillery, were in position to defend the passage at San Payo; the bridge was cut, and overlooked by a battery of two eighteen-pounders. Three thousand were in reserve at Redondela; and, at Vigo, about sixty stragglers, from sir John Moore’s army, were landed, and, in conjunction with a detachment of seamen and marines, occupied the forts. Some Spanish gun-boats, one of which was manned by English seamen, under captain Winter, also proceeded up the river to the bridge of San Payo.

During the 7th, a desultory and useless fire took place on both sides; but, on the 8th, the French were repulsed in some feeble attempts made to force a passage at San Payo and at Soto Mayor, higher up the river, the loss on either side being about a hundred men. These attacks were merely to keep the Spaniards employed until the reports of the officers, sent by Ney to ascertain the situation and projects of Soult’s army, were received, and, in the evening of the 8th, those officers returned with information, obtained from the peasants, that the second corps was retreating upon Castile. I have been assured by persons, then on marshal Ney’s staff, that he, amazed at these tidings, rashly concluded that Soult, swayed by personal feelings, wished to endanger the sixth corps, and filled with indignation, immediately retired to Coruña; while Soult, on the other hand, viewed this retreat as a breach of their engagements, and an underhand policy to oblige him to remain in Gallicia. Certain it is that by these ebullitions of temper, both Romana and Noroña were saved; for there was nothing to prevent Ney from sending a column against Orense, whilst he himself occupied Noroña, on the Octavem; and, however spirited the conduct of the Spaniards was at San Payo, it would be ridiculous to imagine that ten thousand of the best soldiers of France, led by an officer so quick and resolute as Ney, could have been resisted by an equal number of raw troops and peasants, one-third of whom were without arms. But the history of the quarrel between these marshals is involved in mystery, the clearing of which must be left to those who shall write the memoirs of the men. For the purposes of this history it is sufficient to know that there was ill-blood, and that therein the Gallicians found safety.

Soult, informed of Ney’s retreat and of sir Arthur Wellesley’s arrival on the Tagus, ceased to pursue Romana, and marched to Zamora, where his sick had been before sent, and where his brother, general Soult, had conducted three or four thousand stragglers and convalescents. Here, also, he requested the king to send the artillery and stores necessary to re-equip the second corps; and here he proposed to give his harassed troops some rest, for they had now been for eight months incessantly marching and fighting, and men and officers were alike dispirited by the privations they had endured, and by the terrible nature of a war in which the most horrid scenes were daily enacted.

[Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations MSS.]

To put the king in possession of his views, Soult sent general Franceschi to Madrid; but this celebrated officer, refusing an escort, fell into the hands of the _Capuchino_. Being transferred to Seville, the central junta, with infamous cruelty, treated him as if he had been a criminal instead of a brave soldier, and confined him in a dungeon at Carthagena. The citizens there, ashamed of their government, endeavoured to effect his escape; but he perished at the moment when his liberation was certain. When his young wife, a daughter of count Mathieu Dumas, heard of his fate, she refused all nourishment; and, in a few days, by her death, added one more to the thousand instances of the strength of woman’s affections.

The 25th of June, Soult reached Puebla de Senabria.

The 28th, he marched to Mombuey.

The 29th and 30th, he crossed the Esla, by the bridges of San Pelayo and Castro Gonzales.

The 2d of July, he entered Zamora, having previously rejected a proposition of Ney’s, that the two corps should jointly maintain Gallicia, a rejection which induced the duke of Elchingen to evacuate that province.

_Sketch Explanatory of
NEY & SOULT’S_,
OPERATIONS IN GALLICIA,
in June 1809.

_London. Published by T. & W. BOONE, July 1829._]

To effect this, Ney formed a camp near Betanzos; and, on the 22d of July, withdrew his garrisons from Coruña and Ferrol, having previously destroyed all the stores and arsenals and disabled the land defences. Nevertheless, his influence was still so powerful that captain Hotham, commanding the English squadron, off Coruña, seeing the hostile attitude maintained by the inhabitants, landed his seamen on the 24th, and spiked the guns on the sea-line; and, in like manner, compelled a Spanish garrison, left by Ney in the forts of Ferrol, to surrender on the 26th. The marshal, however, marched, unmolested, by the high road to Astorga, where he arrived on the 30th, having brought off all his own sick and those of the second corps also, who had been left in Lugo. Thus Gallicia was finally delivered.

This important event has been erroneously attributed to the exertions of the Spaniards. Those exertions were creditable to the Gallicians, although the most powerful motive of action was to protect their personal property; and, when the French withdrew, this same motive led them to repair their losses by resisting the payment of tithes and rents, a compensation by no means relished by the proprietors or the church. But it is certain that their efforts were only secondary causes in themselves, and chiefly supported by the aid of England, whose ships, and arms, and stores were constantly on the coast.

[Sidenote: Intercepted Despatches, Parl. Pap. 1810.]

How can the operations of the Spaniards be said to have driven the sixth corps from Gallicia, when Ney retained every important post in that province to the last; when single divisions of his army, at two different periods, traversed the country, from Coruña to Tuy, without let or hindrance; and when the Spaniards could not prevent him from over-running the Asturias without losing his hold of Gallicia? It is true, Soult, writing to Joseph, affirmed that the Gallicians would wear out the strongest army; that is, if a wrong system was pursued by the French, but he pointed out the right method of subduing them, namely, in pursuance of Napoleon’s views, to fortify some principal central points, from whence the moveable columns could overrun the country; and this, he estimated, would only require fifty thousand pounds and six weeks’ labour. It is plain the real causes of the deliverance were--First, The quarrels between the marshals, which saved Romana and Noroña from destruction.--Secondly, The movements of sir Arthur Wellesley on the Tagus; for, in an intercepted letter from Soult to Joseph, that marshal expressly assigns the danger hanging over Madrid and the first corps as the reason of his refusing to remain in Gallicia. Now, although Soult’s views were undoubtedly just, and his march provident, the latter necessarily drew after it the evacuation of Gallicia; because, it would have been absurd to keep the sixth corps cooped up in that corner of the Peninsula, deprived of communication, and estranged from the general operations.

The movement of the second corps, after quitting Monforte, being along the edge of the Portuguese frontier, and constantly threatening the northern provinces, drew marshal Beresford, as I have before stated, from Castello Branco; and all the regular Portuguese forces capable of taking the field were immediately collected by him round Almeida. The duke del Parque was at Ciudad Rodrigo; and as that part of Romana’s force, which had been cut off by Soult’s movement upon Gudina, fell back upon Ciudad Rodrigo, not less than twenty-five thousand men, Portuguese and Spaniards, were assembled, or assembling, round those two fortresses: and the change of situation thus brought about in the armies on the northern line was rendered more important by the events which were simultaneously taking place in other parts, especially in Aragon, where general Blake, whose army had been augmented to more than twenty thousand men, inflated with his success at Alcanitz, advanced to Ixar and Samper.

Suchet, himself, remained close to Zaragoza, but kept a detachment, under general Faber, at Longares and Villa Muel, near the mountains on the side of Daroca. Blake, hoping to cut off this detachment, marched, himself, through Carineña, and sent general Arisaga, with a column, to Bottorita; the latter captured a convoy of provisions on the Huerba; but Faber retired to Plasencia, on the Xalon.

The 14th of June, the advanced guards skirmished at Bottorita; and Blake, endeavouring to surround the enemy, pushed a detachment to Maria, in the plain of Zaragoza.

The excitement produced in that city, and in Aragon generally, by this march, was so great, that Suchet doubted if he should not abandon Zaragoza, and return towards Navarre. The peasantry had assembled on many points in the mountains around, and it required great vigilance to keep down the spirit of insurrection in the city itself. The importance of that place, however, made him resolve to fight a battle, for which the near approach of Blake, who came on in the full confidence that the French general would retreat, furnished an opportunity which was not neglected.

BATTLE OF MARIA.

The 14th, after some skirmishing, the Spanish army was concentrated at Bottorita.

[Sidenote: Suchet’s Memoirs.]

The 15th, Blake slowly and unskilfully formed his troops in order of battle, near the village of Maria, and perpendicular to the Huerba, of which he occupied both banks. Towards two o’clock in the day, he extended his left wing to outflank the right of the French; but Suchet, who had just then been rejoined by Faber, and by a brigade from Tudela, immediately stopped this evolution, by attacking the wing with some cavalry and light troops. The Spaniards then fell back to their line of battle; and Blake, drawing men from his right to reinforce his centre and left, was immediately engaged in a severe conflict. He repulsed the foremost of the enemy’s columns; but so violent a storm arose at the moment, that neither army could see the other, although close together, and the action ceased for a time. Blake’s position was so ill chosen, that he was surrounded by ravines, and had only one line of retreat, by the bridge of Maria, which was on the extremity of his right flank. Suchet, observing this error, when the storm had cleared off a little, briskly engaged the centre and left of the Spaniards, and forming his cavalry and two regiments of infantry in column, by one vigorous effort broke quite through the Spanish horse, and seized the bridge of Maria. Notwithstanding this, Blake, who was at all times intrepid, collected the infantry of his centre and left wing in a mass, and stood for the victory; but the French troops overthrew his with a great slaughter. A general, twenty-five guns, and many stands of colours were taken; yet few prisoners, for the darkness enabled the dispersed Spaniards to escape by the ravines; and Blake rallied them the next day at Bottorita. The French lost nearly a thousand men, and general Harispé was wounded.

During this action, a French brigade held the position of Monte Torrero, without mixing in the fight, lest the citizens of Zaragoza, being released from their presence, should rise against the garrison; but after the victory, this brigade marched down the Ebro to cut off Blake’s retreat. General Laval, who commanded it, did not, however, execute his orders; and the Spanish army retired on the night of the 16th.

The 17th, the rear guard suffered some loss at Torrecilla; and on the 18th, the two armies were again in presence at Belchite. Blake, reinforced by some detachments, was about fourteen thousand strong; but he had lost the greatest part of his artillery, and his men were dispirited. Suchet, on the contrary, having by the success at Maria awed the Aragonese, was able to bring twenty-two battalions and seven squadrons, or about fifteen thousand men, flushed with victory, into action.

BATTLE OF BELCHITE.

[Sidenote: Suchet’s Memoirs.]

[Sidenote: Blake’s Despatch.]

The Spaniards were drawn up on a range of hills half enclosing the town; their right, resting on a hermitage and some buildings, was inaccessible to cavalry; the left was also well covered; and behind the right, a hill with a building on it, overtopping all the position and occupied by a reserve, served as a rallying point, because there was an easy line of communication between it and the left wing. The centre, being on rough ground containing the town of Belchite which had a wall and gates, was also very strong; and the whole position was so compact, that Blake, after completely filling his line, had yet a considerable reserve in hand. His dispositions were made to fight by his centre and right, his left being rather in the nature of an advanced post.

A French battalion commenced the action, by skirmishing with the Spanish centre; but, at the same time, two columns of attack marched, the one against the right, the other against the left. The latter, which was the principal one, preceded by a fire of artillery, soon closed upon the Spanish troops, and Blake’s guns opened from his centre and right; but an ammunition-waggon blowing up was the signal for a panic, which, commencing on the left, reached to all parts of the line. The Spanish general then made a charge of cavalry, to retrieve the day, but it was easily repulsed, and the confusion that followed is thus described by himself:--“One regiment fled without firing a shot; it was followed by another, and a third, all flying without having discharged a gun; and, in a few moments, the whole position was abandoned.”--“Thus we, the generals and officers, were left alone, without being able to rally a body which could make any opposition; and I had the mortification to see our army dispersed, abandoning all its baggage, and throwing away its arms, and even its clothes, before a single corps of the enemy; nor were we able to avail ourselves of the defence of any strong place, as it was impossible to collect two hundred men to make head against the enemy.”

Blake, although a bad general, was a man of real courage: stung to the quick by this disgrace, he reproached his troops with bitterness, demanded an inquiry into his own conduct, and, with a strong and sincere feeling of honour, restored to the junta the estate which had been conferred upon him for the success at Alcanitz.

This battle and the pursuit, in which Suchet took about four thousand prisoners, and all the artillery, ammunition, and baggage of the Spaniards, not only made him master of the operations in Aragon, but also rendered the fifth corps, under Mortier, who were now at Valladolid, completely disposable for offensive operations. Thus, on the 1st of July, there were, exclusive of Kellerman’s and Bonnet’s divisions, three complete _corps d’armée_, furnishing six thousand cavalry and fifty thousand infantry, collected between Astorga, Zamora, and Valladolid. The inroad on Portugal had failed, and the loss of Gallicia followed; but Napoleon’s admirable system of invasion was unbroken. His troops, deprived of his presiding genius, had been stricken severely and shrunk from further aggression; they had been too widely spread for a secure grasp, but the reaction disclosed all the innate strength of his arrangements.