Chapter V: Battles of the Pyrenees (2)

Such were the leading events of this sanguinary struggle, which lord Wellington fresh from the fight with homely emphasis called “_bludgeon work_.” Two generals and eighteen hundred men had been killed or wounded on the French side, following their official reports, a number far below the estimate made at the time by the allies whose loss amounted to two thousand six hundred. These discrepancies between hostile calculations ever occur, and there is little wisdom in disputing where proof is unattainable; but the numbers actually engaged were, of French, twenty-five thousand, of the allies twelve thousand, and if the strength of the latter’s position did not save them from the greater loss their stedfast courage is to be the more admired.

The 29th the armies rested in position without firing a shot, but the wandering divisions on both sides were now entering the line.

General Hill, having sent all his baggage artillery and wounded men to Berioplano behind the Cristoval ridge, still occupied his strong ground between Lizasso and Arestegui, covering the Marcalain and Irurzun roads, and menacing that leading from Lizasso to Olague in rear of Soult’s right. His communication with Oricain was maintained by the seventh division, and the light division was approaching his left. Thus on Wellington’s side the crisis was over. He had vindicated his position with only sixteen thousand combatants, and now, including the troops still maintaining the blockade, he had fifty thousand, twenty thousand being British, in close military combination. Thirty thousand flushed with recent success were in hand, and Hill’s troops were well-placed for retaking the offensive.

Soult’s situation was proportionably difficult. Finding that he could not force the allies’ position in front, he had sent his artillery part of his cavalry and his wounded men back to France immediately after the battle, ordering the two former to join Villatte on the Lower Bidassoa and there await further instructions. Having shaken off this burthen he awaited D’Erlon’s arrival by the valley of Lanz, and that general reached Ostiz a few miles above Sauroren at mid-day on the 29th, bringing intelligence, obtained indirectly during his march, that general Graham had retired from the Bidassoa and Villatte had crossed that river. This gave Soult a hope that his first movements had disengaged San Sebastian, and he instantly conceived a new plan of operations, dangerous indeed yet conformable to the critical state of his affairs.

[Sidenote: Soult’s Official Correspondence, MSS.]

No success was to be expected from another attack, yet he could not at the moment of being reinforced with eighteen thousand men, retire by the road he came without some dishonour; nor could he remain where he was, because his supplies of provisions and ammunition derived from distant magazines by slow and small convoys was unequal to the consumption. Two-thirds of the British troops, the greatest part of the Portuguese, and all the Spaniards were, as he supposed, assembled in his front under Wellington, or on his right flank under Hill, and it was probable that other reinforcements were on the march; wherefore he resolved to prolong his right with D’Erlon’s corps, and then cautiously drawing off the rest of his army place himself between the allies and the Bastan, in military connection with his reserve and closer to his frontier magazines. Thus posted and able to combine all his troops in one operation, he expected to relieve San Sebastian entirely and profit from the new state of affairs.

[Sidenote: Plan 2.]

In the evening of the 29th the second division of cavalry, which was in the valley of Zubiri, passed over the position to the valley of Lanz, and joined D’Erlon, who was ordered to march early on the 30th by Etulain upon Lizasso, sending out strong scouting parties to his left on all the roads leading upon Pampeluna, and also towards Letassa and Irurzun. During the night the first division of cavalry and La Martiniere’s division of infantry, both at Elcano on the extreme left of the French army, retired over the mountains by Illurdos to Eugui, in the upper part of the valley of the Zubiri, having orders to cross the separating ridge enter the valley of Lanz and join D’Erlon. The remainder of Reille’s wing was at the same time to march by the crest of the position from Zabaldica to the village of Sauroren, and gradually relieve Clauzel’s troops which were then to assemble behind Sauroren, that is to say towards Ostiz, and thus following the march of D’Erlon were to be themselves followed in like manner by Reille’s troops. To cover these last movements Clauzel detached two regiments to occupy the French heights beyond the Lanz river, and they were also to maintain his connection with D’Erlon whose line of operations was just beyond those heights. He was however to hold by Reille rather than by D’Erlon until the former had perfected his dangerous march across Wellington’s front.

In the night of the 29th Soult heard from the deserters that three divisions were to make an offensive movement towards Lizasso on the 30th, and when daylight came he was convinced the men spoke truly, because from a point beyond Sauroren he discerned certain columns descending the ridge of Cristoval and the heights above Oricain, while others were in march on a wide sweep apparently to turn Clauzel’s right flank. These columns were Morillo’s Spaniards, Campbell’s Portuguese, and the seventh division, the former rejoining Hill to whose corps they properly belonged, the others adapting themselves to a new disposition of Wellington’s line of battle which shall be presently explained.

[Sidenote: Soult’s Official Report, MSS.]

At six o’clock in the morning Foy’s division of Reille’s wing was in march along the crest of the mountain from Zabaldica towards Sauroren, where Maucune’s division had already relieved Conroux’s; the latter, belonging to Clauzel’s wing, was moving up the valley of Lanz to rejoin that general, who had, with exception of the two flanking regiments before mentioned, concentrated his remaining divisions between Olabe and Ostiz. In this state of affairs Wellington opening his batteries from the chapel height sent skirmishers against Sauroren, and the fire spreading to the allies’ right became brisk between Cole and Foy. It subsided however at Sauroren, and Soult, relying on the strength of the position, ordered Reille to maintain it until nightfall unless hardly pressed, and went off himself at a gallop to join D’Erlon, for his design was to fall upon the division attempting to turn his right and crush them with superior numbers: a daring project, well and quickly conceived, but he had to deal with a man whose rapid perception and rough stroke rendered sleight of hand dangerous. The marshal overtook D’Erlon at the moment when that general, having entered the valley of Ulzema with three divisions of infantry and two divisions of heavy cavalry, was making dispositions to assail Hill who was between Buenza and Arestegui.

_Combat of Buenza._ The allies who were about ten thousand fighting men, including Long’s brigade of light cavalry, occupied a very extensive mountain ridge. Their right was strongly posted on rugged ground, but the left prolonged towards Buenza was insecure, and D’Erlon who including his two divisions of heavy cavalry had not less than twenty thousand sabres and bayonets, was followed by La Martiniere’s division of infantry now coming from Lanz. Soult’s combination was therefore extremely powerful. The light troops were already engaged when he arrived, and the same soldiers on both sides who had so strenuously combated at Maya on the 25th were again opposed to each other.

[Sidenote: Soult’s Official despatch, MS.]

D’Armagnac’s division was directed to make a false attack upon Hill’s right; Abbé’s division, emerging by Lizasso, endeavoured to turn the allies’ left and gain the summit of the ridge in the direction of Buenza; Maranzin followed Abbé, and the divisions of cavalry entering the line supported and connected the two attacks. The action was brisk at both points, but D’Armagnac pushing his feint too far became seriously engaged, and was beaten by Da Costa and Ashworth’s Portuguese aided by a part of the twenty-eighth British regiment. Nor were the French at first more successful on the other flank, being repeatedly repulsed, until Abbé, turning that wing gained the summit of the mountain and rendered the position untenable. General Hill who had lost about four hundred men then retired to the heights of Equaros behind Arestegui and Berasin, thus drawing towards Marcalain with his right and throwing back his left. Here being joined by Campbell and Morillo he again offered battle, but Soult whose principal loss was in D’Armagnac’s division had now gained his main object; he had turned Hill’s left, secured a fresh line of retreat, a shorter communication with Villatte by the pass of Donna Maria, and withal, the great Irurzun road to Toloza distant only one league and a half was in his power. His first thought was to seize it and march through Lecumberri either upon Toloza, or Andoain and Ernani. There was nothing to oppose except the light division whose movements shall be noticed hereafter, but neither the French marshal nor general Hill knew of its presence, and the former thought himself strong enough to force his way to San Sebastian and there unite with Villatte, and his artillery which following his previous orders was now on the Lower Bidassoa.

This project was feasible. Lamartiniere’s division, of Reille’s wing, coming from Lanz, was not far off. Clauzel’s three divisions were momentarily expected, and Reille’s during the night. On the 31st therefore, Soult with at least fifty thousand men would have broken into Guipuscoa, thrusting aside the light division in his march, and menacing sir Thomas Graham’s position in reverse while Villatte’s reserve attacked it in front. The country about Lecumberri was however very strong for defence and lord Wellington would have followed, yet scarcely in time, for he did not suspect his views and was ignorant of his strength, thinking D’Erlon’s force, to be originally two divisions of infantry and now only reinforced with a third division, whereas that general had three divisions originally and was now reinforced by a fourth division of infantry and two of cavalry. This error however did not prevent him from seizing with the rapidity of a great commander, the decisive point of operation, and giving a counter-stroke which Soult trusting to the strength of Reille’s position little expected.

When Wellington saw that La Martiniere’s divisions and the cavalry had abandoned the mountains above Elcano, and that Zabaldica was evacuated, he ordered Picton, reinforced with two squadrons of cavalry and a battery of artillery, to enter the valley of Zubiri and turn the French left; the seventh division was directed to sweep over the hills beyond the Lanz river upon the French right; the march of Campbell and Morillo insured the communication with Hill; and that general was to point his columns upon Olague and Lanz threatening the French rear, but meeting as we have seen with D’Erlon was forced back to Eguaros. The fourth division was to assail Foy’s position, but respecting its great strength the attack was to be measured according to the effect produced on the flanks. Meanwhile Byng’s brigade and the sixth division, the latter having a battery of guns and some squadrons of cavalry, were combined to assault Sauroren. La Bispal’s Spaniards followed the sixth division. Fane’s horsemen were stationed at Berioplano with a detachment pushed to Irurzun, the heavy cavalry remained behind Huarte, and Carlos D’España maintained the blockade.

_Second battle of Sauroren._—These movements began at daylight. Picton’s advance was rapid. He gained the valley of Zubiri and threw his skirmishers at once on Foy’s flank, and about the same time general Inglis, one of those veterans who purchase every step of promotion with their blood, advancing with only five hundred men of the seventh division, broke at one shock the two French regiments covering Clauzel’s right, and drove them down into the valley of Lanz. He lost indeed one-third of his own men, but instantly spreading the remainder in skirmishing order along the descent, opened a biting fire upon the flank of Conroux’s division, which was then moving up the valley from Sauroren, sorely amazed and disordered by this sudden fall of two regiments from the top of the mountain into the midst of the column.

Foy’s division, marching to support Conroux and Maucune, was on the crest of the mountains between Zabaldica and Sauroren at the moment of attack, but too far off to give aid, and his own light troops were engaged with the skirmishers of the fourth division; and Inglis had been so sudden and vigorous, that before the evil could be well perceived it was past remedy. For Wellington instantly pushed the sixth division, now commanded by general Pakenham Pack having been wounded on the 28th, to the left of Sauroren, and shoved Byng’s brigade headlong down from the chapel height against that village, which was defended by Maucune’s division. Byng’s vigorous assault was simultaneously enforced from the opposite direction by Madden’s Portuguese of the sixth division, and at the same time the battery near the chapel sent its bullets crashing through the houses, and booming up the valley towards Conroux’s column, which Inglis never ceased to vex and he was closely supported by the remainder of the seventh division.

The village and bridge of Sauroren and the straits beyond were now covered with a pall of smoke, the musquetry pealed frequent and loud, and the tumult and affray echoing from mountain to mountain filled all the valley. Byng with hard fighting carried the village of Sauroren, and fourteen hundred prisoners were made, for the two French divisions thus vehemently assailed in the front and flank were entirely broken. Part retreated along the valley towards Clauzel’s other divisions which were now beyond Ostiz; part fled up the mountain side to seek a refuge with Foy, who had remained on the summit a helpless spectator of this rout; but though he rallied the fugitives in great numbers, he had soon to look to himself, for by this time his skirmishers had been driven up the mountain by those of the fourth division, and his left was infested by Picton’s detachments. Thus pressed, he abandoned his strong position, and fell back along the summit of the mountain between the valley of Zubiri and valley of Lanz, and the woods enabled him to effect his retreat without much loss; but he dared not descend into either valley, and thinking himself entirely cut off, sent advice of his situation to Soult and then retired into the Alduides by the pass of Urtiaga. Meanwhile Wellington pressing up the valley of Lanz drove Clauzel as far as Olague, and the latter now joined by La Martiniere’s division took a position in the evening covering the roads of Lanz and Lizasso. The English general whose pursuit had been damped by hearing of Hill’s action also halted near Ostiz.

The allies lost nineteen hundred men killed and wounded, or taken, in the two battles of this day, and of these nearly twelve hundred were Portuguese, the soldiers of that nation having borne the brunt of both fights. On the French side the loss was enormous. Conroux’s and Maucune’s divisions were completely disorganized; Foy with eight thousand men, including the fugitives he had rallied, was entirely separated from the main body; two thousand men at the lowest computation had been killed or wounded, many were dispersed in the woods and ravines, and three thousand prisoners were taken. This blow joined to former losses reduced Soult’s fighting men to thirty-five thousand, of which the fifteen thousand under Clauzel and Reille were dispirited by defeat, and the whole were placed in a most critical situation. Hill’s force now increased to fifteen thousand men by the junction of Morillo and Campbell was in front, and thirty thousand were on the rear in the valley of Lanz, or on the hills at each side; for the third division finding no more enemies in the valley of Zubiri, had crowned the heights in conjunction with the fourth division.

Lord Wellington had detached some of La Bispal’s Spaniards to Marcalain when he heard of Hill’s action, but he was not yet aware of the true state of affairs on that side. His operations were founded upon the notion that Soult was in retreat towards the Bastan. He designed to follow closely pushing his own left forward to support sir Thomas Graham on the Bidassoa, but always underrating D’Erlon’s troops he thought La Martiniere’s division had retreated by the Roncesvalles road; and as Foy’s column was numerous and two divisions had been broken at Sauroren, he judged the force immediately under Soult to be weak and made dispositions accordingly. The sixth division and the thirteenth light dragoons were to march by Eugui to join the third division, which was directed upon Linzoain and Roncesvalles. The fourth division was to descend into the valley of Lanz. General Hill, supported by the Spaniards at Marcalain, was to press Soult closely, always turning his right but directing his own march upon Lanz, from whence he was to send Campbell’s brigade to the Alduides. The seventh division which had halted on the ridges between Hill and Wellington, was to suffer the former to cross its front and then march for the pass of Doña Maria.

It appears from these arrangements, that Wellington expecting Soult would rejoin Clauzel and make for the Bastan by the pass of Vellate, intended to confine and press him closely in that district. But the French marshal was in a worse position than his adversary imagined, being too far advanced towards Buenza to return to Lanz; in fine he was between two fires and without a retreat save by the pass of Doña Maria upon San Estevan. Wherefore calling in Clauzel, and giving D’Erlon whose divisions, hitherto successful were in good order and undismayed, the rear-guard, he commenced his march soon after midnight towards the pass. But mischief was thickening around him.

Sir Thomas Graham having only the blockade of San Sebastian to maintain was at the head of twenty thousand men, ready to make a forward movement, and there remained besides the light division under Charles Alten of whose operations it is time to speak. That general, as we have seen, took post on the mountain of Santa Cruz the 27th. From thence on the evening of the 28th he marched to gain Lecumberri on the great road of Irurzun; but whether by orders from sir Thomas Graham or in default of orders, the difficulty of communication being extreme in those wild regions, I know not, he commenced his descent into the valley of Lerins very late. His leading brigade, getting down with some difficulty, reached Leyza beyond the great chain by the pass of Goriti or Zubieta, but darkness caught the other brigade and the troops dispersed in that frightful wilderness of woods and precipices. Many made faggot torches waving them as signals, and thus moving about, the lights served indeed to assist those who carried them but misled and bewildered others who saw them at a distance. The heights and the ravines were alike studded with these small fires, and the soldiers calling to each other for directions filled the whole region with their clamour. Thus they continued to rove and shout until morning shewed the face of the mountain covered with tired and scattered men and animals who had not gained half a league of ground beyond their starting place, and it was many hours, ere they could be collected to join the other brigade at Leyza.

General Alten, who had now been separated for three days from the army, sent mounted officers in various directions to obtain tidings, and at six o’clock in the evening renewed his march. At Areysa he halted for some time without suffering fires to be lighted, for he knew nothing of the enemy and was fearful of discovering his situation, but at night he again moved and finally established his bivouacs near Lecumberri early on the 30th. The noise of Hill’s battle at Buenza was clearly heard in the course of the day, and the light division was thus again comprized in the immediate system of operations directed by Wellington in person. Had Soult continued his march upon Guipuscoa Alten would have been in great danger, but the French general being forced to retreat, the light division was a new power thrown into his opponent’s hands, the value of which will be seen by a reference to the peculiarity of the country through which the French general was now to move.

It has been shewn that Foy cut off from the main army was driven towards the Alduides; that the French artillery and part of the cavalry were again on the Bidassoa, whence Villatte, contrary to the intelligence received by Soult, had not advanced, though he had skirmished with Longa, leaving the latter however in possession of heights above Lesaca. The troops under Soult’s immediate command were therefore completely isolated, and had no resources save what his ability and their own courage could supply. His single line of retreat by the pass of Doña Maria was secure as far as San Estevan, and from that town he could march up the Bidassoa to Elizondo and so gain France by the Col de Maya, or down the same river towards Vera by Sumbilla and Yanzi, from both of which places roads branching off to the right lead over the mountains to the passes of Echallar. There was also a third mountain-road leading direct from Estevan to Zagaramurdi and Urdax, but it was too steep and rugged for his wounded men and baggage.

The road to Elizondo was very good, but that down the Bidassoa was a long and terrible defile, and so contracted about the bridges of Yanzi and Sumbilla that a few men only could march abreast. This then Soult had to dread; that Wellington who by the pass of Vellate could reach Elizondo before him would block his passage on that side; that Graham would occupy the rocks about Yanzi, blocking the passage there and by detachments cut off his line of march upon Echallar. Then, confined to the narrow mountain-way from San Estevan to Zagaramurdi, he would be followed hard by general Hill, exposed to attacks in rear and flank during his march, and perhaps be headed at Urdax by the allied troops moving through Vellate Elizondo and the Col de Maya. In this state, his first object being to get through the pass of Doña Maria, he commenced his retreat as we have seen in the night of the 30th, and Wellington still deceived as to the real state of affairs did not take the most fitting measures to stop his march, that is to say, he continued in his first design, halting in the valley of Lanz while Hill passed his front to enter the Bastan, into which district he sent Byng’s brigade as belonging to the second division. But early on the 31st, when Soult’s real strength became known, he directed the seventh division to aid Hill, followed Byng through the pass of Vellate with the remainder of his forces, and thinking the light division might be at Zubieta in the valley of Lerins, sent Alten orders to head the French if possible at San Estevan, or at Sumbilla, in fine to cut in upon their line of march somewhere; Longa also was ordered to come down to the defiles at Yanzi, thus aiding the light division to block the way on that side, and sir Thomas Graham was advertised to hold his army in readiness to move in the same view, and it would appear that the route of the sixth and third divisions were also changed for a time.

_Combat of Doña Maria._—At ten o’clock in the morning of the 31st, general Hill overtook Soult’s rear-guard between Lizasso and the Puerto. The seventh division, coming from the hills above Olague, was already ascending the mountain on his right, and the French only gained a wood on the summit of the pass under the fire of Hill’s guns. There, however, they turned and throwing out their skirmishers made strong battle. General Stewart, leading the attack of the second division, now for the third time engaged with D’Erlon’s troops, was again wounded and his first brigade was repulsed, but general Pringle who succeeded to the command, renewed the attack with the second brigade, and the thirty-fourth regiment leading, broke the enemy at the moment that the seventh division did the same on the right. Some prisoners were taken, but a thick fog prevented further pursuit, and the loss of the French in the action is unknown, probably less than that of the allies which was something short of four hundred men.

[Sidenote: Notes by the duke of Wellington, MSS.]

The seventh division remained on the mountain, but Hill fell back to Lizasso, and then, following his orders, moved by a short but rugged way, leading between the passes of Doña Maria and Vellate over the great chain to Almandoz, to join Wellington, who had during the combat descended into the Bastan by the pass of Vellate. Meanwhile Byng reached Elizondo, and captured a large convoy of provisions and ammunition left there under guard of a battalion by D’Erlon on the 29th; he made several hundred prisoners also after a sharp skirmish and then pushed forward to the pass of Maya. Wellington now occupied the hills through which the road leads from Elizondo to San Estevan, and full of hope he was to strike a terrible blow; for Soult, not being pursued after passing Doña Maria, had halted in San Estevan, although by his scouts he knew that the convoy had been taken at Elizondo. He was in a deep narrow valley, and three British divisions with one of Spaniards were behind the mountains overlooking the town; the seventh division was on the mountain of Doña Maria; the light division and sir Thomas Graham’s Spaniards were marching to block the Vera and Echallar exits from the valley; Byng was already at Maya, and Hill was moving by Almandoz just behind Wellington’s own position. A few hours gained and the French must surrender or disperse. Wellington gave strict orders to prevent the lighting of fires the straggling of soldiers or any other indication of the presence of troops; and he placed himself amongst some rocks at a commanding point from whence he could observe every movement of the enemy. Soult seemed tranquil, and four of his “_gensd’armes_” were seen to ride up the valley in a careless manner. Some of the staff proposed to cut them off; the English general whose object was to hide his own presence, would not suffer it, but the next moment three marauding English soldiers entered the valley and were instantly carried off by the horsemen. Half an hour afterwards the French drums beat to arms and their columns began to move out of San Estevan towards Sumbilla. Thus the disobedience of three plundering knaves, unworthy of the name of soldiers, deprived one consummate commander of the most splendid success, and saved another from the most terrible disaster.

The captives walked from their prison but their chains hung upon them. The way was narrow, the multitude great, and the baggage, and wounded men borne on their comrades’ shoulders, filed with such long procession, that Clauzel’s divisions forming the rear-guard were still about San Estevan on the morning of the 1st of August, and scarcely had they marched a league of ground, when the skirmishers of the fourth division and the Spaniards thronging along the heights on the right flank opened a fire to which little reply could be made. The troops and baggage then got mixed with an extreme disorder, numbers of the former fled up the hills, and the commanding energy of Soult whose personal exertions were conspicuous could scarcely prevent a general dispersion. However prisoners and baggage fell at every step into the hands of the pursuers, the boldest were dismayed at the peril, and worse would have awaited them in front, if Wellington had been on other points well seconded by his subordinate generals.

The head of the French column instead of taking the first road leading from Sumbilla to Echallar, had passed onward towards that leading from the bridge near Yanzi; the valley narrowed to a mere cleft in the rocks as they advanced, the Bidassoa was on their left, and there was a tributary torrent to cross, the bridge of which was defended by a battalion of Spanish Caçadores detached to that point from the heights of Vera by general Barceñas. The front was now as much disordered as the rear, and had Longa or Barceñas reinforced the Caçadores, those only of the French who being near Sumbilla could take the road from that place to Echallar would have escaped; but the Spanish generals kept aloof and D’Erlon won the defile. However Reille’s divisions were still to pass, and when they came up a new enemy had appeared.

[Sidenote: August.]

It will be remembered that the light division was directed to head the French army at San Estevan, or Sumbilla. This order was received on the evening of the 31st, and the division, repassing the defiles of the Zubieta, descended the deep valley of Lerins and reached Elgoriaga about mid-day on the 1st of August, having then marched twenty-four miles and being little more than a league from Estevan and about the same distance from Sumbilla. The movement of the French along the Bidassoa was soon discovered, but the division instead of moving on Sumbilla turned to the left, clambered up the great mountain of Santa Cruz and made for the bridge of Yanzi. The weather was exceedingly sultry, the mountain steep and hard to overcome, many men fell and died convulsed and frothing at the mouth, while others whose spirit and strength had never before been quelled, leaned on their muskets and muttered in sullen tones that they yielded for the first time.

Towards evening, after marching for nineteen consecutive hours over forty miles of mountain roads, the head of the exhausted column reached the edge of a precipice near the bridge of Yanzi. Below, within pistol-shot, Reille’s divisions were seen hurrying forward along the horrid defile in which they were pent up, and a fire of musketry commenced, slightly from the British on the high rock, more vigorously from some low ground near the bridge of Yanzi, where the riflemen had ensconced themselves in the brushwood. The scene which followed is thus described by an eye-witness.

[Sidenote: Captain Cooke’s Memoirs.]

“We overlooked the enemy at stone’s throw, and from the summit of a tremendous precipice. The river separated us, but the French were wedged in a narrow road with inaccessible rocks on one side and the river on the other. Confusion impossible to describe followed, the wounded were thrown down in the rush and trampled upon, the cavalry drew their swords and endeavoured to charge up the pass of Echallar, but the infantry beat them back, and several, horses and all, were precipitated into the river; some fired vertically at us, the wounded called out for quarter, while others pointed to them, supported as they were on branches of trees, on which were suspended great coats clotted with gore, and blood-stained sheets taken from different habitations to aid the sufferers.”

On these miserable supplicants brave men could not fire, and so piteous was the spectacle that it was with averted or doubtful aim they shot at the others, although the latter rapidly plied their muskets in passing, and some in their veteran hardihood even dashed across the bridge of Yanzi to make a counter-attack. It was a soldier-like but a vain effort! the night found the British in possession of the bridge, and though the great body of the enemy escaped by the road to Echallar, the baggage was cut off and fell, together with many prisoners, into the hands of the light troops which were still hanging on the rear in pursuit from San Estevan.

The loss of the French this day was very great, that of the allies about a hundred men, of which sixty-five were British, principally of the fourth division. Nevertheless lord Wellington was justly discontented with the result. Neither Longa nor general Alten had fulfilled their mission. The former excused himself as being too feeble to oppose the mass Soult led down the valley; but the rocks were so precipitous that the French could not have reached him, and the resistance made by the Spanish caçadores was Longa’s condemnation. A lamentable fatuity prevailed in many quarters. If Barceñas had sent his whole brigade instead of a weak battalion, the small torrent could not have been forced by D’Erlon; and if Longa had been near the bridge of Yanzi the French must have surrendered, for the perpendicular rocks on their right forbade even an escape by dispersion. Finally if the light division instead of marching down the valley of Lerins as far as Elgoriaga, had crossed the Santa Cruz mountain by the road used the night of the 28th, it would have arrived much earlier at the bridge of Yanzi, and then belike Longa and Barceñas would also have come down. Alten’s instructions indeed prescribed Sumbilla and San Estevan as the first points to head the French army, but judging them too strong at Sumbilla he marched as we have seen upon Yanzi; and if he had passed the bridge there and seized the road to Echallar with one brigade, while the other plied the flank with fire from the left of the Bidassoa, he would have struck a great blow. It was for that the soldiers had made such a prodigious exertion, yet the prize was thrown away.

During the night Soult rallied his divisions about Echallar, and on the morning of the 2d occupied the “_Puerto_” of that name. His left was placed at the rocks of Zagaramurdi; his right at the rock of Ivantelly communicating with the left of Villatte’s reserve, which was in position on the ridges between Soult’s right and the head of the great Rhune mountain. Meanwhile Clauzel’s three divisions, now reduced to six thousand men, took post on a strong hill between the “_Puerto_” and town of Echallar. This position was momentarily adopted by Soult to save time, to examine the country, and to make Wellington discover his final object, but that general would not suffer the affront. He had sent the third and sixth divisions to reoccupy the passes of Roncesvalles and the Alduides; Hill had reached the Col de Maya, and Byng was at Urdax; the fourth, seventh, and light divisions remained in hand, and with these he resolved to fall upon Clauzel whose position was dangerously advanced.

_Combats of Echallar and Ivantelly._—The light division held the road running from the bridge of Yanzi to Echallar until relieved by the fourth division, and then marched by Lesaca to Santa Barbara, thus turning Clauzel’s right. The fourth division marched from Yanzi upon Echallar to attack his front, and the seventh moved from Sumbilla against his left; but Barnes’s brigade, contrary to lord Wellington’s intention, arrived unsupported before the fourth and light divisions were either seen or felt, and without awaiting the arrival of more troops assailed Clauzel’s strong position. The fire became vehement, but neither the steepness of the mountain nor the overshadowing multitude of the enemy clustering above in support of their skirmishers could arrest the assailants, and then was seen the astonishing spectacle of fifteen hundred men driving, by sheer valour and force of arms, six thousand good troops from a position, so rugged that there would have been little to boast of if the numbers had been reversed and the defence made good. It is true that the fourth division arrived towards the end of the action, that the French had fulfilled their mission as a rear-guard, that they were worn with fatigue and ill-provided with ammunition, having exhausted all their reserve stores during the retreat, but the real cause of their inferiority belongs to the highest part of war.

The British soldiers, their natural fierceness stimulated by the remarkable personal daring of their general, Barnes, were excited by the pride of success; and the French divisions were those which had failed in the attack on the 28th, which had been utterly defeated on the 30th, and which had suffered so severely the day before about Sumbilla. Such then is the preponderance of moral power. The men who had assailed the terrible rocks above Sauroren, with a force and energy that all the valour of the hardiest British veterans scarcely sufficed to repel, were now, only five days afterwards, although posted so strongly, unable to sustain the shock of one-fourth of their own numbers. And at this very time eighty British soldiers, the comrades and equals of those who achieved this wonderful exploit, having wandered to plunder surrendered to some French peasants, who lord Wellington truly observed, “_they would under other circumstances have eat up!_” What gross ignorance of human nature then do those writers display who assert, that the employing of brute force is the highest qualification of a general!

Clauzel, thus dispossessed of the mountain, fell back fighting to a strong ridge beyond the pass of Echallar, having his right covered by the Ivantelly mountain which was strongly occupied. Meanwhile the light division emerging by Lesaca from the narrow valley of the Bidassoa, ascended the broad heights of Santa Barbara without opposition, and halted there until the operations of the fourth and seventh divisions were far enough advanced to render it advisable to attack the Ivantelly. This lofty mountain lifted its head on the right, rising as it were out of the Santa Barbara heights, and separating them from the ridges through which the French troops beaten at Echallar were now retiring. Evening was coming on, a thick mist capped the crowning rocks which contained a strong French regiment, the British soldiers besides their long and terrible march the previous day had been for two days without sustenance, and were leaning, weak and fainting, on their arms, when the advancing fire of Barnes’s action about Echallar indicated the necessity of dislodging the enemy from Ivantelly. Colonel Andrew Barnard instantly led five companies of his riflemen to the attack, and four companies of the forty-third followed in support. The misty cloud had descended, and the riflemen were soon lost to the view, but the sharp clang of their weapons heard in distinct reply to the more sonorous rolling musketry of the French, told what work was going on. For some time the echoes rendered it doubtful how the action went, but the following companies of the forty-third could find no trace of an enemy save the killed and wounded. Barnard had fought his way unaided and without a check to the summit, where his dark-clothed swarthy veterans raised their victorious shout from the highest peak, just as the coming night shewed the long ridges of the mountains beyond sparkling with the last musket-flashes from Clauzel’s troops retiring in disorder from Echallar.

This day’s fighting cost the British four hundred men, and lord Wellington narrowly escaped the enemy’s hands. He had carried with him towards Echallar half a company of the forty-third as an escort, and placed a serjeant named Blood with a party to watch in front while he examined his maps. The French who were close at hand sent a detachment to cut the party off; and such was the nature of the ground that their troops, rushing on at speed, would infallibly have fallen unawares upon lord Wellington, if Blood a young intelligent man, seeing the danger, had not with surprising activity, leaping rather than running down the precipitous rocks he was posted on, given the general notice, and as it was the French arrived in time to send a volley of shot after him as he galloped away.

Soult now caused count D’Erlon to re-occupy the hills about Ainhoa, Clauzel to take post on the heights in advance of Sarre, and Reille to carry his two divisions to St. Jean de Luz in second line behind Villatte’s reserve. Foy, who had rashly uncovered St. Jean Pied de Port by descending upon Cambo, was ordered to return and reinforce his troops with all that he could collect of national guards and detachments.

Wellington had on the 1st directed general Graham to collect his forces and bring up pontoons for crossing the Bidassoa, but he finally abandoned this design, and the two armies therefore rested quiet in their respective positions, after nine days of continual movement during which they had fought ten serious actions. Of the allies, including the Spaniards, seven thousand three hundred officers and soldiers had been killed wounded or taken, and many were dispersed from fatigue or to plunder. On the French side the loss was terrible and the disorder rendered the official returns inaccurate. Nevertheless a close approximation may be made. Lord Wellington at first called it twelve thousand, but hearing that the French officers admitted more he raised his estimate to fifteen thousand. The engineer, _Belmas_, in his Journals of Sieges, compiled from official documents by order of the French government, sets down above thirteen thousand. Soult in his dispatches at the time, stated fifteen hundred as the loss at Maya, four hundred at Roncesvalles, two hundred on the 27th, and eighteen hundred on the 28th, after which he speaks no more of losses by battle. There remains therefore to be added the killed and wounded at the combats of Linzoain on the 26th, the double battles of Sauroren and Buenza on the 30th, the combats of the 31st, and those of the 1st and 2d of August; finally, four thousand unwounded prisoners. Let this suffice. It is not needful to sound the stream of blood in all its horrid depths.

OBSERVATIONS.

1º. The allies’ line of defence was weak. Was it therefore injudiciously adopted?

The French beaten at Vittoria were disorganized and retreated without artillery or baggage on excentric lines; Foy by Guipuscoa, Clauzel by Zaragoza, Reille by San Estevan, the King by Pampeluna. There was no reserve to rally upon, the people fled from the frontier, Bayonne and St. Jean Pied de Port if not defenceless were certainly in a very neglected state, and the English general might have undertaken any operation, assumed any position, offensive or defensive, which seemed good to him. Why then did he not establish the Anglo-Portuguese beyond the mountains, leaving the Spaniards to blockade the fortresses behind him? The answer to this question involves the difference between the practice and the theory of war.

[Sidenote: Wellington’s Dispatches.]

“_The soldiers, instead of preparing food and resting themselves after the battle dispersed in the night to plunder, and were so fatigued that when the rain came on the next day they were incapable of marching and had more stragglers than the beaten enemy. Eighteen days after the victory twelve thousand five hundred men, chiefly British, were absent, most of them marauding in the mountains._”

Such were the reasons assigned by the English general for his slack pursuit after the battle of Vittoria, yet he had commanded that army for six years! Was he then deficient in the first qualification of a general, the art of disciplining and inspiring troops, or was the English military system defective? It is certain that he always exacted the confidence of his soldiers as a leader. It is not so certain that he ever gained their affections. The barbarity of the English military code excited public horror, the inequality of promotion created public discontent; yet the general complained he had no adequate power to reward or punish, and he condemned alike the system and the soldiers it produced. The latter “_were detestable for every thing but fighting, and the officers as culpable as the men_.” The vehemence of these censures is inconsistent with his celebrated observation, subsequently made, namely, “that he thought he could go any where and do any thing with the army that fought on the Pyrenees,” and although it cannot be denied that his complaints were generally too well-founded, there were thousands of true and noble soldiers, and zealous worthy officers, who served their country honestly and merited no reproaches. It is enough that they have been since neglected, exactly in proportion to their want of that corrupt aristocratic influence which produced the evils complained of.

2º. When the misconduct of the troops had thus weakened the effect of victory, the question of following Joseph at once into France assumed a new aspect. Wellington’s system of warfare had never varied after the battle of Talavera. Rejecting dangerous enterprize, it rested on profound calculation both as to time and resources for the accomplishment of a particular object, namely, the gradual liberation of Spain by the Anglo-Portuguese army. Not that he held it impossible to attain that object suddenly, and his battles in India, the passage of the Douro, the advance to Talavera, prove that by nature he was inclined to daring operations; but such efforts, however glorious, could not be adopted by a commander who feared even the loss of a brigade lest the government he served should put an end to the war. Neither was it suitable to the state of his relations with the Portuguese and Spaniards; their ignorance jealousy and passionate pride, fierce in proportion to their weakness and improvidence, would have enhanced every danger.

No man could have anticipated the extraordinary errors of the French in 1813. Wellington did not expect to cross the Ebro before the end of the campaign, and his battering train was prepared for the siege of Burgos not for that of Bayonne. A sudden invasion of France her military reputation considered, was therefore quite out of the pale of his methodized system of warfare, which was founded upon political as well as military considerations; and of the most complicated nature, seeing that he had at all times to deal with the personal and factious interests and passions, as well as the great state interests of three distinct nations two of which abhorred each other. At this moment also, the uncertain state of affairs in Germany strongly influenced his views. An armistice which might end in a separate peace excluding England, would have brought Napoleon’s whole force to the Pyrenees, and Wellington held cheap both the military and political proceedings of the coalesced powers. “_I would not move a corporal’s guard in reliance upon such a system_,” was the significant phrase he employed to express his contempt.

These considerations justified his caution as to invading France, but there were local military reasons equally cogent. 1º. He could not dispense with a secure harbour, because the fortresses still in possession of the French, namely, Santona, Pancorbo, Pampeluna, and St. Sebastian, interrupted his communications with the interior of Spain; hence the siege of the latter place. 2º. He had to guard against the union of Suchet and Clauzel on his right flank; hence his efforts to cut off the last-named general; hence also the blockade of Pampeluna in preference to siege and the launching of Mina and the bands on the side of Zaragoza.

3º. After Vittoria the nature of the campaign depended upon Suchet’s operations, which were rendered more important by Murray’s misconduct. The allied force on the eastern coast was badly organized, it did not advance from Valencia as we have seen until the 16th, and then only partially and by the coast, whereas Suchet had assembled more than twenty thousand excellent troops on the Ebro as early as the 12th of July; and had he continued his march upon Zaragoza he would have saved the castle of that place with its stores. Then rallying Paris’ division, he could have menaced Wellington’s flank with twenty-five thousand men exclusive of Clauzel’s force, and if that general joined him with forty thousand.

On the 16th, the day lord William Bentinck quitted Valencia, Suchet might have marched from Zaragoza on Tudela or Sanguessa, and Soult’s preparations originally made as we have seen to attack on the 23d instead of the 25th, would have naturally been hastened. How difficult it would then have been for the allies to maintain themselves beyond the Ebro is evident, much more so to hold a forward position in France. That Wellington feared an operation of this nature is clear from his instructions to lord William Bentinck and to Mina; and because Picton’s and Cole’s divisions instead of occupying the passes were kept behind the mountains solely to watch Clauzel; when the latter had regained the frontier of France Cole was permitted to join Byng and Morillo. It follows that the operations after the battle of Vittoria were well considered and consonant to lord Wellington’s general system. Their wisdom would have been proved if Suchet had seized the advantages within his reach.

4º. A general’s capacity is sometimes more taxed to profit from a victory than to gain one. Wellington, master of all Spain, Catalonia excepted, desired to establish himself solidly in the Pyrenees, lest a separate peace in Germany should enable Napoleon to turn his whole force against the allies. In this expectation, with astonishing exertion of body and mind, he had in three days achieved a rigorous examination of the whole mass of the Western Pyrenees, and concluded that if Pampeluna and San Sebastian fell, a defensive position as strong as that of Portugal, and a much stronger one than could be found behind the Ebro, might be established. But to invest those places and maintain so difficult a covering line was a greater task than to win the battle of Vittoria. However, the early fall of San Sebastian he expected, because the errors of execution in that siege could not be foreseen, and also for gain of time he counted upon the disorganized state of the French army, upon Joseph’s want of military capacity, and upon the moral ascendancy which his own troops had acquired over the enemy by their victories. He could not anticipate the expeditious journey, the sudden arrival of Soult, whose rapid reorganization of the French army, and whose vigorous operations contrasted with Joseph’s abandonment of Spain, illustrated the old Greek saying, that a herd of deer led by a lion are more dangerous than a herd of lions led by a deer.

5º. The duke of Dalmatia was little beholden to fortune at the commencement of his movements. Her first contradiction was the bad weather, which breaking up the roads delayed the concentration of his army at St. Jean Pied de Port for two days; all officers know the effect which heavy rain and hard marches have upon the vigour and confidence of soldiers who are going to attack. If Soult had commenced on the 23d instead of the 25th the surprise would have been more complete his army more brisk; and as no conscript battalions would have arrived to delay Reille, that general would probably have been more ready in his attack, and might possibly have escaped the fog which on the 26th stopped his march along the superior crest of the mountain towards Vellate. On the other hand the allies would have been spared the unsuccessful assault on San Sebastian, and the pass of Maya might have been better furnished with troops. However Soult’s combinations were so well knit that more than one error in execution, and more than one accident of fortune, were necessary to baffle him. Had count D’Erlon followed his instructions even on the 26th general Hill would probably have been shouldered off the valley of Lanz, and Soult would have had twenty thousand additional troops in the combats of the 27th and 28th. Such failures however generally attend extensively combined movements, and it is by no means certain that the count would have been able to carry the position of the Col de Maya on the 25th, if all general Stewart’s forces had been posted there. It would therefore perhaps have been more strictly within the rules of art, if D’Erlon had been directed to leave one of his three divisions to menace the Col de Maya while he marched with the other two by St. Etienne de Baygorry up the Alduides. This movement, covered by the national guards who occupied the mountain of La Houssa, could not have been stopped by Campbell’s Portuguese brigade, and would have dislodged Hill from the Bastan while it secured the junction of D’Erlon with Soult on the crest of the superior chain.

[Sidenote: Original Note by the Duke of Wellington, MSS.]