Chapter II: Sidenote: 1814. February (2)

The bulk of the army was now necessarily halted on the right bank of the Adour until the bridges could be repaired, but Hill who was on the left bank marched to seize the magazines at Aire. Moving in two columns from St. Savin and St. Gillies on the 2d, he reached his destination about three o’clock with two divisions of infantry a brigade of cavalry and a battery of horse-artillery; he expected no serious opposition, but general Clauzel had arrived a few hours before and was in order of battle covering the town with Villatte’s and Harispe’s divisions and some guns. The French occupied a steep ridge in front of Aire, high and wooded on the right where it overlooked the river, but merging on the left into a wide table-land over which the great road led to Pau. The position was strong for battle yet it could be readily outflanked on the left by the table-land, and was an uneasy one for retreat on the right where the ridge was narrow, the ravine behind steep and rugged with a mill-stream at the bottom between it and the town. A branch of the Adour also flowing behind Aire cut it off from Barcelona, while behind the left wing was the greater Lees a river with steep banks and only one bridge.

COMBAT OF AIRE.

General Hill arriving about two o’clock attacked without hesitation. General Stewart with two British brigades fell on the French right, a Portuguese brigade assailed their centre, and the other brigades followed in columns of march. The action was however very sudden, the Portuguese were pushed forward in a slovenly manner by general Da Costa, a man of no ability, and the French under Harispe met them on the flat summit of the height with so rough a charge that they gave way in flight. The rear of the allies’ column being still in march the battle was like to be lost, but general Stewart having by this time won the heights on the French right, where Villatte, fearing to be enclosed made but a feeble resistance, immediately detached general Barnes with the fiftieth and ninety-second regiments to the aid of the Portuguese. The vehement charge of these troops turned the stream of battle, the French were broken in turn and thrown back on their reserves, yet they rallied and renewed the action with great courage, fighting obstinately until General Byng’s British brigade came up, when Harispe was driven towards the river Lees, and Villate quite through the town of Aire into the space between the two branches of the Adour behind.

General Reille who was at Barcelona when the action began, brought up Roguet’s division to support Villatte, the combat was thus continued until night at that point, meanwhile Harispe crossed the Lees and broke the bridge, but the French lost many men. Two generals, Dauture and Gasquet, were wounded, a colonel of engineers was killed, a hundred prisoners were taken, many of Harispe’s conscripts threw away their arms and fled to their homes, and the magazines fell into the conqueror’s hands. The loss of the British troops was one hundred and fifty, general Barnes was wounded and colonel Hood killed. The loss of the Portuguese was never officially stated, yet it could not have been less than that of the British, and the vigour of the action proved that the French courage was very little abated by the battle of Orthes. Soult immediately retreated up the Adour by both banks towards Maubourget and Marciac, and he was not followed for new combinations were now opened to the generals on both sides.

OBSERVATIONS.

1º. On the 14th of February the passage of the Gaves was commenced, by Hill’s attack on Harispe at Hellette. On the 2d of March the first series of operations was terminated by the combat at Aire. In these sixteen days lord Wellington traversed with his right wing eighty miles, passed five large and several small rivers, forced the enemy to abandon two fortified bridge-heads and many minor works, gained one great battle and two combats, captured six guns and about a thousand prisoners, seized the magazines at Dax, Mont Marsan, and Aire, forced Soult to abandon Bayonne and cut him off from Bordeaux. And in this time he also threw his stupendous bridge below Bayonne and closely invested that fortress after a sharp and bloody action. Success in war like charity in religion covers a multitude of sins; but success often belongs to fortune as much as skill, and the combinations of Wellington, profound and sagacious, might in this manner be confounded with the lucky operations of the allies on the other side of France, where the presumption and the vacillation of ignorance alternately predominated.

[Sidenote: Official Correspondence, MSS.]

2º. Soult attributed the loss of his positions to the superior forces of the allies. Is this well-founded? The French general’s numbers cannot be determined exactly, but after all his losses in December, after the detachments made by the emperor’s order in January, and after completing the garrison of Bayonne to fourteen thousand men, he informed the minister of war that thirty thousand infantry, three thousand cavalry and forty pieces of artillery were in line. This did not include the conscripts of the new levy, all youths indeed and hastily sent to the army by battalions as they could be armed, but brave and about eight thousand of them might have joined before the battle of Orthes. Wherefore deducting the detachments of cavalry and infantry under Berton on the side of Pau, and under Daricau on the side of Dax, it may be said that forty thousand combatants of all arms were engaged in that action. Thirty-five thousand were very excellent soldiers, for the conscripts of the old levy who joined before the battle of the Nivelle were stout men; their vigorous fighting at Garris and Aire proved it, for of them was Harispe’s division composed.

Now lord Wellington commenced his operations with the second third fourth and seventh British divisions, the independent Portuguese division under Le Cor, Morillo’s Spaniards, forty-eight pieces of artillery, and only four brigades of light cavalry, for Vandaleur’s brigade remained with Hope and all the heavy cavalry and the Portuguese were left in Spain. Following the morning states of the army, this would furnish, exclusive of Morillo’s Spaniards, something more than forty thousand fighting men and officers of all arms, of which four thousand were horsemen. But five regiments of infantry, and amongst them two of the strongest British regiments of the light division, were absent to receive their clothing; deduct these and we have about thirty-seven thousand Anglo-Portuguese combatants. It is true that Mina’s battalions and Morillo’s aided in the commencement of the operations, but the first immediately invested St. Jean Pied de Port and the latter invested Navarrens. Lord Wellington was therefore in the battle superior by a thousand horsemen and eight guns, but Soult outnumbered him in infantry by four or five thousand, conscripts it is true, yet useful. Why then was the passage of the Gaves so feebly disputed? Because the French general remained entirely on the defensive in positions too extended for his numbers.

3º. _Offensive operations must be the basis of a good defensive system._ Let Soult’s operations be tried by this rule. On the 12th he knew that the allies were in motion for some great operation and he judged rightly that it was to drive him from the Gaves. From the 14th to the 18th his left was continually assailed by very superior numbers, but during part of that time Beresford could only oppose to his right and centre, the fourth and a portion of the seventh divisions with some cavalry; and those not in a body and at once but parcelled and extended, for it was not until the 16th that the fourth seventh and light divisions were so closed towards the Bidouze as to act in one mass. On the 15th lord Wellington admitted that his troops were too extended, Villatte’s, Taupin’s, and Foy’s divisions, were never menaced until the 18th, and there was nothing to prevent D’Erlon’s divisions which only crossed the Adour on the 17th from being on the Bidouze the 15th. Soult might therefore by rapid and well-digested combinations have united four divisions of infantry and a brigade of cavalry to attack Beresford on the 15th or 16th between the Nive and the Adour. If successful the defeated troops, pushed back upon the sixth division, must have fought for life with the rivers on their flanks, Soult in front, and the garrison of Bayonne issuing from the works of Mousseroles on their rear. If unsuccessful the French retreat behind the Gave of Oleron could not have been prevented.

[Sidenote: Soult’s Official Reports, MSS.]

It is however to be pleaded that Soult was not exactly informed of the numbers and situation of his opponents. He thought Beresford had the first division also on the Lower Bidouze; he knew that Wellington had large reserves to employ, and, that general’s design of passing the Adour below Bayonne being unknown to him, he naturally supposed they would be used to support the operations on the Gaves: he therefore remained on the defensive. It might possibly also have been difficult to bring D’Erlon’s division across the Adour by the Port de Lannes before the 17th, because the regular bridge had been carried away and the communications interrupted a few days before by the floods. In fine there are many matters of detail in war known only to a general-in-chief which forbid the best combinations, and this it is that makes the art so difficult and uncertain. Great captains worship Fortune.

On the 24th the passage of the Gave d’Oleron was effected. Soult then recognised his error and concentrated his troops at Orthes to retake the offensive. It was a fine movement and effected with ability, but he suffered another favourable opportunity of giving a counter-blow to escape him. The infantry under Villatte, Harispe, and Paris, supported by a brigade of cavalry, were about Sauveterre, that is to say, four miles from Montfort and only seven from Villenave, where the principal passage was effected, where the ford was deep, the stream rapid, and the left bank although favourable for the passage not entirely commanding the right bank. How then did it happen that the operation was effected without opposition? Amongst the allies it was rumoured at the time that Soult complained of the negligence of a general who had orders to march against the passing troops. The position of Harispe’s division at Monstrueig, forming a reserve at equal distances from Sauveterre and Villenave, would seem to have been adopted with that view, but I find no confirmation of the report in Soult’s correspondence, and it is certain he thought Picton’s demonstrations at Sauveterre was a real attack.

[Sidenote: Official Correspondence, MSS.]

[Sidenote: Notes by general Reille and colonel De la Chasse, MSS.]

4º. The position adopted by the French general at Orthes was excellent for offence. It was not so for defence, when Beresford and Picton had crossed the Gave below in force. Lord Wellington could then throw his whole army on that side, and secure his communication with Hope, after which outflanking the right of the French he could seize the defile of Sault de Navailles, cut them off from their magazines at Dax, Mont Marsan and Aire, and force them to retreat by the Pau road leaving open the way to Bordeaux. To await this attack was therefore an error, but Soult’s original design was to assail the head of the first column which should come near him and Beresford’s approach to Baïghts on the 26th furnished the opportunity. It is true that the French light cavalry gave intelligence of that general’s march too late and marred the combination, but there was still time to fall on the head of the column while the third division was in the act of passing the river and entangled in the narrow way leading from the ford to the Peyrehorade road: it is said the French marshal appeared disposed to do this at first, but finally took a defensive position in which to receive battle.

However when the morning came he neglected another opportunity. For two hours the third division and the hussars remained close to him, covering the march of the sixth and light divisions through the narrow ways leading from the bridge of Berenx up to the main road; the infantry had no defined position, the cavalry had no room to extend, and there were no troops between them and Beresford who was then in march by the heights of Baïghts to the Dax road. If the French general had pushed a column across the marsh to seize the Roman camp he would have separated the wings of the allies; then pouring down the Peyrehorade road with Foy’s, D’Armagnac’s and Villatte’s divisions he would probably have overwhelmed the third division before the other two could have extricated themselves from the defiles. Picton therefore had grounds for uneasiness.

With a subtle skill did Soult take his ground of battle at Orthes, fiercely and strongly did he fight, and wonderfully did he effect his retreat across the Luy of Bearn, but twice in twenty-four hours he had neglected those happy occasions which in war take birth and flight at the same instant; and as the value of his position, essentially an offensive one, was thereby lost, a slowness to strike may be objected to his generalship. Yet there is no commander, unless a Hannibal or a Napoleon surpassing the human proportions, but will abate something of his confidence and hesitate after repeated defeats, Soult in this campaign as in many others proved himself a hardy captain full of resources.

5º. Lord Wellington with a vastness of conception and a capacity for arrangement and combination equal to his opponent, possessed in a high degree that daring promptness of action, that faculty of inspiration for suddenly deciding the fate of whole campaigns with which Napoleon was endowed beyond all mankind. It is this which especially constitutes military genius. For so vast so complicated are the combinations of war, so easily and by such slight causes are they affected, that the best generals do but grope in the dark, and they acknowledge the humiliating truth. By the number and extent of their fine dispositions then, and not by their errors, the merit of commanders is to be measured.

In this campaign lord Wellington designed to penetrate France, not with a hasty incursion but solidly, to force Soult over the Garonne, and if possible in the direction of Bordeaux, because it was the direct line, because the citizens were inimical to the emperor, and the town, lying on the left bank of the river, could not be defended; because a junction with Suchet would thus be prevented. Finally if by operating against Soult’s left he could throw the French army into the Landes, where his own superior cavalry could act, it would probably be destroyed.

To operate against Soult’s left in the direction of Pau was the most obvious method of preventing a junction with Suchet, and rendering the positions which the French general had fortified on the Gaves useless. But the investment of Bayonne required a large force, which was yet weak against an outer attack because separated in three parts by the rivers; hence if lord Wellington had made a wide movement on Pau, Soult might have placed the Adour between him and the main army and then fallen upon Hope’s troops on the right side of that river. The English general was thus reduced to act upon a more contracted line, and to cross all the Gaves. To effect this he collected his principal mass on his right by the help of the great road leading to St. Jean Pied de Port, then by rapid marches and reiterated attacks he forced the passage of the rivers above the points which Soult had fortified for defence, and so turned that general’s left with the view of finally cutting him off from Suchet and driving him into the wilderness of the Landes. During these marches he left Beresford on the lower parts of the rivers to occupy the enemy’s attention and cover the troops blockading Mousseroles. Meanwhile by the collection of boats at Urt and other demonstrations indicating a design of throwing a bridge over the Adour above Bayonne, he diverted attention from the point chosen below the fortress for that operation, and at the same time provided the means of throwing another bridge at the Port de Lannes to secure the communication with Hope by the right bank whenever Soult should be forced to abandon the Gaves. These were fine combinations.

I have shown that Beresford’s corps was so weak at first that Soult might have struck a counter-blow. Lord Wellington admitted the error. Writing on the 15th he says, “If the enemy stand upon the Bidouze I am not so strong as I ought to be,” and he ordered up the fourth and light divisions; but this excepted, his movements were conformable to the principles of war. He chose the best strategic line of operations, his main attack was made with heavy masses against the enemy’s weakest points, and in execution he was prompt and daring. His conduct was conformable also to his peculiar situation. He had two distinct operations in hand, namely to throw his bridge below Bayonne and to force the Gaves. He had the numbers required to obtain these objects but dared not use them lest he should put the Spanish troops into contact with the French people; yet he could not entirely dispense with them; wherefore bringing Freyre up to Bayonne, Morillo to Navarrens, and Mina to St. Jean Pied de Port, he seemed to put his whole army in motion, thus gaining the appearance of military strength with as little political danger as possible. Nevertheless so terrible had the Spaniards already made themselves by their cruel lawless habits that their mere return across the frontier threw the whole country into consternation.

6º. When in front of Orthes it would at first sight appear as if lord Wellington had changed his plan of driving the enemy upon the Landes, but it was not so. He did not expect a battle on the 27th. This is proved by his letter to sir John Hope in which he tells that general that he anticipated no difficulty in passing the Gave of Pau, that on the evening of the 26th the enemy were retiring, and that he designed to visit the position at Bayonne. To pass the Gave in the quickest and surest manner, to re-establish the direct communications with Hope and to unite with Beresford, were his immediate objects; if he finally worked by his left it was a sudden act and extraneous to the general design, which was certainly to operate with Hill’s corps and the light division by the right.

It was after passing the Gave at Berenx on the morning of the 27th lord Wellington first discovered Soult’s intention to fight, and that consequently he was himself in a false position. Had he shewn any hesitation, any uneasiness, had he endeavoured to take a defensive position with either Beresford’s or Picton’s troops, he would inevitably have drawn the attention of the enemy to his dangerous situation. Instead of this, judging that Soult would not on the instant change from the defensive to the offensive, he confidently pushed Picton’s skirmishers forward as if to assail the left of the French position, and put Beresford in movement against their right, and this with all the coolness imaginable. The success was complete. Soult who supposed the allies stronger than they really were, naturally imagined the wings would not be so bold unless well supported in the centre where the Roman camp could hide a multitude. He therefore held fast to his position until the movement was more developed, and in two hours the sixth and light divisions were up and the battle commenced. It was well fought on both sides but the crisis was decided by the fifty-second, and when that regiment was put in movement only a single Portuguese battalion was in reserve behind the Roman camp: upon such nice combinations of time and place does the fate of battles turn.

[Sidenote: Soult’s Official Correspondence, MSS.]

7º. Soult certainly committed an error in receiving battle at Orthes, and it has been said that lord Wellington’s wound at the most critical period of the retreat alone saved the hostile army. Nevertheless the clear manner in which the French general carried his troops away, his prompt judgement, shown in the sudden change of his line of retreat at St. Sever, the resolute manner in which he halted and showed front again at Caceres, Barcelonne, and Aire, were all proofs of no common ability. It was Wellington’s aim to drive the French on to the Landes, Soult’s to avoid this, he therefore shifted from the Bordeaux line to that of Toulouse, not in confusion but with the resolution of a man ready to dispute every foot of ground. The loss of the magazines at Mont Marsan was no fault of his; he had given orders for transporting them towards the Toulouse side fifteen days before, but the matter depending upon the civil authorities was neglected. He was blamed by some of his officers for fighting at Aire, yet it was necessary to cover the magazines there, and essential to his design of keeping up the courage of the soldiers under the adverse circumstances which he anticipated. And here the palm of generalship remained with him, for certainly the battle of Orthes was less decisive than it should have been. I speak not of the pursuit to Sault de Navailles, nor of the next day’s march upon St. Sever, but of Hill’s march on the right. That general halted near Samade the 28th, reached St. Savin on the Adour the 1st and fought the battle of Aire on the evening of the 2d of March. But from Samadet to Aire is not longer than from Samadet to St. Savin where he was on the 1st. He could therefore, if his orders had prescribed it so, have seized Aire on the 1st before Clauzel arrived, and thus spared the obstinate combat at that place. It may also be observed that his attack did not receive a right direction. It should have been towards the French left, because they were more weakly posted there, and the ridge held by their right was so difficult to retire from, that no troops would stay on it if any progress was made on the left. This was however an accident of war, general Hill had no time to examine the ground, his orders were to attack, and to fall without hesitation upon a retiring enemy after such a defeat as Orthes was undoubtedly the right thing to do; but it cannot be said that lord Wellington pushed the pursuit with vigour. Notwithstanding the storm on the evening of the 1st he could have reinforced Hill and should not have given the French army time to recover from their recent defeat. “The secret of war,” says Napoleon, “is to march twelve leagues, fight a battle and march twelve more in pursuit.”