Chapter I: Hungary Before the War

It is beyond the scope of this book to deal, however briefly, with the history of Hungary before the famous Ausgleich, or Compromise, of 1867. This Compromise determined the status of Hungary as a modern State, independent to all intents and purposes, but linked with Austria under a common monarchy. It is sufficient for our present purposes to point out that this link in no way prejudiced the freedom of Hungary to manage her own internal affairs; it is no exaggeration to say that her domestic policy was as unfettered by it as that of England or America. The treatment of the Slovaks and Rumanians by the Magyars was in no way influenced by Austrian legislation, although it was undoubtedly affected by the example of the Austrians in their dealings with the Czechs. The Magyars, owing to the measures which they took for their own supremacy, were dominant in an independent Hungary, and up to the outbreak of war in 1914 the internal policy of the Hungarian nation was governed by the will of the Magyar race.

The population of Hungary at the time of the Compromise, according to the official Hungarian census of 1869, was 13,579,000, of which 6,027,000 were of Magyar nationality, and 7,552,000 of other nationalities. From this it will be seen that the Magyars were in a minority, forming as they did 44·4 per cent. of the total. But in consequence of the agreement between the Magyars and the Hapsburg Monarchy, the former, although forming a minority upon the territory which they occupied, contrived to become the sole directors of the State. At the same period, Hungary was composed of the same territories as in 1914. These were Hungary proper, Transylvania and Croatia-Slavonia. In the first the population was preponderatingly Magyar, in the remaining two various nationalities were closely intermingled. It is and always has been impossible to draw definite lines of demarcation between the different races. The most that can be done is to indicate roughly the areas in which any given race forms the majority of the population. In order to give a general idea of the geographical distribution of the various races included in the former kingdom, it may be said that the Magyars formed the majority of the population of the central and western districts, the Serbs and Croats the south-western corner from the Drave to the Adriatic, the Rumanians the eastern and south-eastern portions, the Ruthenes the north-east, and the Slovaks the north-west and north. The Germans were distributed in compact colonies throughout Hungary proper and Transylvania, with their greatest strength in the western frontier between Hungary and Austria, and the Szekels, allied to the Magyars, formed a compact block in the extreme east of Transylvania.

It will be seen from this rough description that the Magyars occupied the hub of the wheel while the other races were situated about its rim. Further, each of these outlying nationalities were in close contact with their kindred in other countries, with whom they naturally sought union, if not definitely political at first, at least cultural. They had interests beyond the frontiers of Hungary which drew them away from, rather than towards, the Magyars of the centre. They felt that they were parts of living nationalities, each with its own national characteristics, rather than the remains of defunct races of which the inevitable destiny was absorption in a Magyar Hungary. But, given judicious treatment, there was no reason why this feeling should have evinced itself in disloyalty to the country in which they were included. Had the Magyars possessed the gift of good government there was no reason why even such a polyglot country as Hungary should not have developed into a contented State. But the Magyars have always regarded themselves as a superior and noble race created by God to rule over the subject races. A Magyar, Erno Baloghy, in his book published in Budapest in 1908 entitled _Magyar Culture and the Nationalities_, says: “Our Nationalities cannot substitute any other culture for the Magyar, for there is not and cannot be a special Serb, Rumanian or Slovak culture.” This remark is merely typical of other utterances, both written and verbal.

The result of this attitude on the part of the Magyars has been to alienate the nationalities, and to force them still further away from the centre. Where capable and tactful treatment would almost certainly have bound them by links of common policy and interest to the Magyar nucleus, coercion and irritation have driven them to look for their political future beyond the borders of the State. Through the Compromise the Magyars obtained complete control over their domestic affairs, and they utilised this control to embitter the nationalities with whom they might have lived in perfect harmony.

The first important event which followed the Compromise was the “Law of Nationalities,” which was adopted by the Hungarian Parliament on December 1, 1868. This law is a most remarkable document, and had it ever been administered in the spirit of its preamble, and the letter of its provisions, it might very possibly have solved the whole problem of racial difference in Hungary.[1]

The principal provisions of the law deal with the language to be employed in Courts of Justice, Schools, Churches and Institutions. In general, the provisions ensure that any Hungarian subject can employ his native tongue in the course of his dealings with the State or with his fellow subjects. In the case of schools, the wording of the law is peculiarly definite. “Since, from the standpoint of general culture and well-being, the success of public instruction is one of the highest aims of the State also, the State is, therefore, bound to ensure that citizens living together in considerable numbers, of whatever nationality, shall be able to obtain instruction in the neighbourhood in their mother-tongue, up to the point where the higher academic education begins.”

The manner in which this law was administered will be dealt with in a subsequent chapter. For the moment it is only necessary to state that it was never enforced. One after another prominent Magyar politicians admitted in Parliament that the law was a dead letter, or that it was impossible to fulfil its provisions owing to the fact that those whose duty it was to administer it were almost exclusively Magyars ignorant of any other language but their own. The most striking commentary on the Magyar outlook upon the law after forty years’ experience of its operation was contained in a leading article in the _Budapesti Hirlap_, a leading Hungarian newspaper, of April 3, 1908. Speaking of the provision already quoted with regard to schools, the writer points out that the educational stipulations cannot be carried out, “_because the necessary teaching staff who could teach in a foreign tongue and also the necessary customers are wanting_.” The Magyar organ, it will be noticed, uses the adjective “foreign” to describe the languages spoken by more than half the population of Hungary, and is apparently unaware of the existence of that half. It is interesting to compare this statement with the official Hungarian statistics of population for the year 1900, which show that out of a total civil population whose mother-tongue was not Magyar, of 8,132,740 only 1,365,764, or 16·8 per cent., could speak Magyar.

The next incident of importance was the Electoral Law of 1874, which is one of the most curious perversions of franchise which it is possible to imagine. Under the provisions of this law, the qualifications for the vote are extraordinarily complicated, and are such as to restrict the voters to the propertied and official classes.[2] Only 6 per cent. of the population enjoyed the vote under the law, and care was taken that of these the majority should be Magyar. Not content with this partial measure, the Magyars introduced a special franchise for Transylvania, so ingeniously contrived that the majority of voters in the province should be composed of the Szekels of Magyar sympathies, while the Rumanian element, which forms the majority of the population, was almost excluded. In fact, it was estimated that of the population of Transylvania not more than 3·2 per cent. were enfranchised.

The Electoral Law was mainly the work of Coloman Tisza, who controlled the policy of Hungary for some eighteen years. “Tisza’s aim was to convert the old polyglot Hungarian kingdom into a homogeneous Magyar State, and the methods which he employed--notably the enforced Magyarisation of the subject races, which formed part of the reformed educational system introduced by him--certainly did not err on the side of moderation.”[3] This process of Magyarisation, as it came to be called, will be dealt with more fully in a subsequent chapter. For the moment it will be sufficient to give a short sketch of the Hungarian educational system.

Until 1867 education in Hungary had been entirely in the hands of the Churches of various denominations, with very slight superintendence by the Government. To show the great diversity of religious belief in Hungary proper, excluding Croatia-Slavonia, where the population was about 70 per cent. Roman Catholic, 25 per cent. Orthodox, and 5 per cent. various, and where an entirely different system of education prevailed, the statistics given on the following page may be quoted.

It must be borne in mind that in many instances nationality and religious faith overlap. The Serbians are mostly Greek Orthodox (Greek Catholic); the Ruthenians are Uniat Greeks (Greek Oriental); the Rumanians are either Greek Orthodox or Greek Uniats; many Slovaks are Lutherans; the only other Lutherans being the Germans in Transylvania and in the Spis (Zsepes) country in Slovakia. The Calvinists are composed mostly of Magyars, so that in the country the Lutherans are designated as the “German Church” and the Calvinists as the “Hungarian Church.” The Unitarians are all Magyars. Only to the Roman Catholic Church belong several nationalities.

---------------+-----------------------+----------------------
| 1869. | 1900.
Religion. +-----------+-----------+-----------+----------
| Number. | Per Cent. | Number. | Per Cent.
---------------+-----------+-----------+-----------+----------
Roman Catholic | 6,215,251 | 45·8 | 8,136,108 | 48·7
Greek Catholic | 1,583,043 | 11·7 | 1,830,815 | 10·9
Greek Oriental | 2,067,778 | 15·2 | 2,187,242 | 13·1
Lutheran | 1,096,184 | 8·0 | 1,250,285 | 7·5
Calvinist | 2,017,391 | 14·9 | 2,409,975 | 14·4
Unitarian | 54,345 | 0·4 | 67,988 | 0·4
Jewish | 542,257 | 4·0 | 826,222 | 4·9
Other Sects | 2,880 | -- | 12,939 | --
---------------+-----------+-----------+-----------+----------

“In 1869 there were only 13,646 primary schools in existence, or one to every 995 inhabitants; and of these hardly any were fully equipped with the necessary teaching appliances. Many of the buildings were overcrowded, insanitary or even too dilapidated for use; 1,598 communes were without a school of any kind, and of the total number of children liable to attend under the new Act, barely 48 per cent. actually attended.”[4] It was obvious that in these circumstances it was the duty of the State to interest itself in the matter of education and to supplement the efforts of the denominations by the establishment of national schools or by subsidising the existing religious organisations. This duty was emphasised by the census of 1869, which revealed that 63 per cent. of the population was entirely illiterate.

The result was the Primary Education Act introduced in 1868 by the Minister of Education, Baron Eötvös. The main provisions of this Act were compulsory education between the ages of six and twelve, and the obligation imposed upon the communes of erecting schools where no denominational school already existed, and where at least thirty children were not otherwise provided for. This Act was amended by the educational policy of Count Apponyi in 1907, which was frankly Magyarising in its tendencies. The results of this policy were that for the period 1913-14 Hungary (excluding Croatia-Slavonia) contained 16,929 elementary schools, with 35,253 teachers and 1,971,141 pupils. The number of Magyar elementary schools was 13,608 with 29,963 teachers and 1,666,270 pupils. The number of pupils according to native language was 1,107,497 speaking Magyar and 256,020 speaking Slovak, a proportion of 4·3 to 1, which is approximately the proportion of Magyars to Slovaks in the population of the country. According to official Hungarian statistics 214,267 of the Slovak pupils were allocated to Hungarian elementary schools, that is to say schools where Magyar was used exclusively in imparting instruction. The number of purely Slovak elementary schools was 365, with 42,186 pupils. In other words, while the proportion of Slovak pupils was 19 per cent. of the total speaking Magyar or Slovak, only a little over 3 per cent. of these were receiving education in their mother-tongue. But this is not even yet a complete presentment of the state of national education. Under the Apponyi Act the law provided the Government with a decisive voice in the control of all the denominational schools, irrespective of whether they received a Government grant or not. The Minister of Education might, and in practice almost invariably did, arrange the hours of instruction in Magyar (which was a compulsory subject in all schools) in such a manner that little time was left for instruction in other subjects. As a result, in elementary schools which were officially designated as Slovak, German, Rumanian or Serbian, the Magyar language was cultivated to such a degree that these schools differed but little from purely Magyar schools, instruction in the Magyar language being carried on for four-fifths of the time, leaving only one-fifth for the teaching of other subjects, which might be carried on in the pupils’ mother-tongue.

As a natural consequence the educational results were very unsatisfactory, and the number of illiterates was very large. The average percentage of people who could read and write had certainly risen to 63 throughout the entire area, but the increase was mainly in the Magyar districts. In the Slovak districts the percentages were not nearly so favourable. In the district of Saris it was only 48·6, and in the Uzgorod (Ungvar) district only 43·5. In 1913 there were 32,700 Slovak children, including those who by law were supposed to attend continuation schools, who were not registered in any school at all.

These figures are extremely interesting, as demonstrating the practical working of the alleged equality of nationalities in pre-War Hungary. The results of Magyar policy were in effect to deny adequate education to those unwilling to abandon their native tongue and accept teaching in Magyar. It must not be supposed that this policy was inspired by the idea that the other languages spoken within the borders of Hungary were moribund languages, whose abandonment would be of benefit to civilisation. The exact opposite is indeed the case, and it may safely be stated that but for the artificial efforts made to keep it alive, Magyar as a modern tongue would gradually disappear. The proscribed languages were those spoken by millions, and were in no case confined to Hungarian territory. It was rather fear of a spreading of these languages, and with them the national ideals of their users, that inspired the Magyar legislators. They believed that they could overcome the centrifugal tendencies of the nationalities by a policy of forcing them to abandon the tongues with which they conversed with their brethren beyond the frontiers, and grafting on them in the place of these tongues the Magyar language, and with it the Magyar culture and ideals. Subjection rather than alliance was the formula which was to secure the union of Hungary, or, as one of the most prominent of the Magyar politicians, Coloman Tisza, put it, the so-called subject nationalities must be taught to “_be silent and pay_.” A Magyar writer, Bela Grünwald, in a work entitled _The Highlands_, is refreshingly frank on the subject. “_The secondary school is like a huge machine, at one end of which the Slovak youths are thrown in by hundreds and at the other end of which they come out Magyars._”

Enough has been said already to give the reader a rough idea of the Magyar policy with regard to the nationalities. It may be summarised by the statement that the Magyars, while on the surface passing legislation which seemed to demonstrate the perfect equality which prevailed in Hungary between the constituent nationalities, in the administration of the law took every precaution that the nationalities should be subordinated to the Magyar race. Before the War, as well as at the present time, Magyar publicists made every effort to spread throughout the world the fable of the liberty enjoyed by the nationalities which composed the realms of the Crown of St. Stephen. Both nationalities and citizens, according to them, enjoyed the most complete freedom. Hungary was the true home of democracy, a modern Utopia. How far they succeeded in imposing upon their hearers is proved by the words already quoted: “_a country whose ideals have so nearly approximated to our own for centuries past_.” The ideal of the English-speaking races has been true freedom and equality of all citizens in the eyes of the State. The legislation and the administration of Hungary have been directly opposed to this ideal. Is it possible to make any comparison between the franchise of England or America and that of a country where until recently only 6 per cent. of the population was entitled to the vote? Or between the educational systems of these nations and one which, at the beginning of the War, had so far succeeded that a third of the population of the country was utterly illiterate?

Far from being the home of democracy, Hungary was, and, as will be seen later, still is the stronghold of an oligarchy comparable only with that of Venice before the Napoleonic era. The Magyar spirit has always been reactionary and oppressive. It would almost seem that a true Magyar is unable to realise that other nationalities have rights in the political sense, or that their love of their own language, customs, history or culture is due to anything but the most deplorable ignorance. It is quite certain, from the perusal of the utterances of Magyar spokesmen or the leading articles of Magyar journals, that the rank and file of the Magyar race honestly believed that the “subject nationalities,” as they habitually speak of the Slovaks, Serbs and Rumanians, would be far better off as the helots of the Magyars than as their equals. But, unfortunately, the nationalities did not see eye to eye with their would-be masters. They exhibited an incomprehensible desire to follow their national bents, and an equally incomprehensible dislike of the idea of incorporation in the Magyar race. They were consequently accused, almost tearfully, of ingratitude, of thrusting aside the hand which endeavoured to lead them to higher planes of existence and culture.

As a matter of fact, the Magyars have always been incapable of dealing with the problem presented to them. If, instead of a policy of coercion, they had followed the advice of St. Stephen of Hungary, they might have welded the constituent parts of the nation into a homogeneous whole. “_Treat the new-comers well_,” he writes to his son Emmerich, at a time when he was insisting upon the advantages which would accrue to his country from the immigration from the West, to which he had himself opened his kingdom. “_Hold them in honour, for they bring fresh knowledge and arms into the country; they are an ornament and support of the throne, for a country where only one language and one custom prevails is weak and fragile._” Enlightened advice, more easily attributable to a statesman of the twentieth than to a monarch of the eleventh century. Almost every modern nation has at one time or another in its history been confronted with the problem of absorbing into a unanimous State the different nationalities inhabiting its territories. History proves that it is only by a policy of give and take on the part of each of these nationalities that the desired end can be reached. Any attempt by one of them to employ force in the subjugation of the rest, even though the former may be in an overwhelming majority, leads inevitably to failure. Scotland and Ireland are cases in point. Towards the former, England, once she abandoned her policy of aggression, adopted an attitude based upon natural alliance. The alliance led by easy stages to union, and union to so close an association that at the present day Scotch and English are politically indistinguishable. Towards Ireland, England maintained the policy of aggression until it was too late, with the result that union was proved to be unwelcome, and the Irish nation has chosen for itself an independent position in the Empire.

It is useless to speculate now how far the Magyars might have changed the centrifugal tendencies of the other nationalities, which originated in the first place in geographical position, into a centripetal tendency founded upon mutual interest. It is possible that the racial tendencies of the nationalities are so divergent from those of the Magyars that the attempt would have been unsuccessful. But it is obvious to any student of even the most limited history that a race which formed the minority of the population of the country could not hope to bend the majority to cheerful acceptance of its will by the employment of coercion. That the Magyars should have contemplated such an enterprise shows them to be alien in thought to the democratic nations of the modern world. It is enough for them that they claim a moral superiority; let other races fail to recognise it at their peril!

Count Czernin, a former Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, has placed on record his opinion of the Magyar outlook. “One is forced to ask oneself what the Magyars understand by ‘nation.’ If we apply the term to the inhabitants of Hungary, we see that the Magyar race forms only 40 per cent. of them, that is to say, that it is in a minority. By what right do the Magyars employ as synonymous the expressions ‘nation’ and ‘Magyar State’? The opinion of the majority in Hungary--that is to say, the real will of the nation--is never expressed; which is due not only to the nature of the Hungarian suffrage, set up with a view to favouring the Magyar minority, but far more to the intimidation, unique in Europe, to which all anti-Magyar opinions are subjected. In addition to the nationalities, humiliated, oppressed, and reduced to silence, there exists in Hungary, even among the Magyars themselves, a number of people of all classes and in every station in life who do not approve of this policy. However, any protests would involve such measures of repression on the part of the Government, the courts of justice and the authorities, that these people dare not express openly what their conscience urges, that their submission is only due to force. Hungarian elections are proverbial in Europe, and the manœuvres of which the Prime Minister Banffy availed himself when they were held, the unheard-of terrorism which he employed, are still fresh in the memories of all of us.”

This utterance may be compared with Count Apponyi’s description of Hungary as the “_island of liberty_” on the occasion of his visit to America in 1911, and with the proud declaration of the Hungarian newspaper _Budapesti Hirlap_ on June 20, 1917: “_We proclaim in the face of the whole world that on no part of the earth’s surface are the problems of nationality treated with greater patience, loyalty, and humane liberality than in Hungary._”

This astonishing declaration followed the words of Count Tisza, who, on January 24th of the same year, in the course of a speech in the Hungarian Chamber had said, amid loud cheers: “_I am confident that I am expressing the opinion of the whole House, without distinction of parties, when I say that public opinion throughout Hungary respects the principle of nationality, that the public opinion of the Magyar race desires the free development and the prosperity of the nationalities._” It must be remembered that these declarations were made under the influence of war-time conditions, when every nation was doing its best to justify itself in the eyes of its neighbours. In the less strenuous days of peace there had been certain Magyars, more honest or less hypocritical than most of their fellow-countrymen, who did not scruple to employ the German doctrine of necessity in justification of their treatment of the nationalities. For instance, a certain Dr. Rez, a professor in the University of Kolozsvar, had stated publicly in the _Budapesti Hirlap_ of May 26, 1910: “_Our object is to establish the supremacy of the Magyars: there is no sense in concealing the fact. Let us say openly that we do not desire equality of right, because political equality and political supremacy are contradictory conceptions. Supremacy is inequality, it is the domination of one race over another._”

The ethnological problems of Hungary have been extremely well set out by Gustave Beksics, an eminent Magyar publicist, in his book _Nemzeti Akcio_, which was published in 1912. “There is fought a confused and bloodless struggle, sustained by social and economic means, in which the Magyars must be victorious or perish. The Magyars would fain spread over the whole country, or, in other words, secure a decisive majority over the other nationalities, in such a way as to reduce them to relative insignificance, lest the non-Magyar races spread over the country in their turn, stimulating their national consciences and their culture in opposition to the Magyars, and so the idea of a Magyar State fall into oblivion. This must be the end of the underlying motive of our national struggle: the motive of a Magyar entity, political and social. Thus, in the near future, Hungary must either be transformed into a natural State, or she must cease to exist as a State in her present form.”[5]

The Magyars, obsessed by their national ideal of making Hungary a Magyar State at the expense of the other nationalities, had already, in the years before the War, realised that the task of suppressing the non-Magyar races was beyond their unaided strength, and they had therefore sought help from abroad. They knew that they could not count entirely upon their union with Austria, for the German element in that country was itself engaged in a desperate struggle for supremacy with the non-German races, of which the principal was the Czech, closely related by origin and language with the Slovaks. The Magyars therefore centred their hopes in Berlin, believing that German aspirations to world-sovereignty coincided with their own ends.

It will be necessary to conclude this chapter with a brief survey of Magyar foreign policy prior to the War. Gambetta styled the Magyars “_jingo barbarians_.” Bismarck said that their policy was a compound of lawyer-like sophistry and of hussar-like arrogance. It may be added that they displayed the unforgiving temperament of a Corsican. It is possible to trace throughout the latter part of the nineteenth century the national desire for revenge for the defeat of Villagos, in 1849, where the Hungarian armies, commanded by Gorgei, in revolt against Austria, were defeated by the Russians, who had been called in by the Emperor. Their anger was directed rather against the Russians, the leaders of an imaginary “Pan-Slav” movement which had for its supposed object the union of the Slavs throughout Europe in opposition to the Magyarising tendencies evinced in Hungary. It must be remembered that all Hungarian policy was directed by the Magyars, and that the other races had no voice in it. The consequence was that the Magyars consistently opposed the Slav races and all other nations suspected of being friendly or allied to them. This is, in fact, the key-note of Hungarian foreign policy. After the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1909, the Magyars intrigued at Vienna and elsewhere in favour of war against Serbia. Things reached so advanced a stage that a manifesto was already drawn up and even approved by the Emperor, ready for issue to the Austro-Hungarian Army. This manifesto called upon the troops, relying upon their prowess, for which they were famous, to punish the insolence of the Serb nation. The men at the helm of the Magyar State were already dreaming of a war against Russia, to which the Serbian war was to be but a prelude, and for this reason they inclined towards Germany, which they had hitherto hated cordially, as the motherland of the German nationals within their borders, who showed a powerful resistance to the Magyarisation of their districts. So violent had been this hatred that in 1879, after the alliance between Andrassy and Bismarck, Coloman Tisza had been compelled to deny it for fear of the disturbances which threatened to arise throughout the country. But desire for vengeance proved stronger than this old antagonism, and from this time the Magyars became devoted friends of the Germans.[6]

Long before the War, the Magyar circles in Hungary did their best to incite the Empire to war against the Serbs, the Russians and the French. The conclusion of the Entente between England and France was sufficient to destroy the traditional friendship, to which the Magyars are so fond of referring, between Hungary and the Anglo-Saxon races. Henceforth, England was regarded as a possible enemy. The Magyar newspapers habitually launched violent attacks against the countries suspected of friendship towards the Russians and Serbs, and extolled German policy and German aims. It was not to be expected that the Germans in their turn would remain insensible of the advantages to be gained from this change of heart on the part of the Magyars, although it would seem that its significance was lost upon the other nations of Europe. On September 21, 1897, the Kaiser took advantage of a visit to Budapest to make a characteristic speech on the subject of Magyar foreign policy. It was not the speech of a mere political ally, desirous of making the most of a momentary identity of interests, and ready to abandon his friends as soon as that identity ceased. It was the speech of a ruler convinced that the political ambitions of the Germans and of the Magyars were inseparably bound together and complementary to one another.

The nations of Western Europe seemed not to have realised the change of policy which had taken place in Hungary since the days of Kossuth. In France it was believed that the taste exhibited by the Magyars for French fashions, literature and art was a sign of friendship towards France. In England it was similarly believed that their passion for racing, moulded upon the English model, was a proof of political solidarity with that country. In America the persuasive words of Apponyi convinced his hearers that Hungary was shaping a democratic policy on the lines of the great Republic. Not one of these nations seemed to be aware that for half a century Hungarian policy had gravitated towards Berlin, and had chosen Germany as her political and military ally. Western Europe anticipated a Magyar revolution against the bonds that held Hungary to Austria, and this illusion was encouraged and exploited by the Magyars in order to hide their true intentions. Kossuth, the leader of the Revolution of 1848-49, was regarded as the modern champion of independence and liberty, rights so dear to the hearts of all democracies. But the Western nations seem to have overlooked the fact that while Kossuth struggled against the centralism of Austria and the policy of Metternich, he concurred in the Magyar policy of coercion of the Slovaks, the Serbs, the Croats and the Rumanians. He wished to centralise Hungary for the benefit of the Magyars, and he, the champion of right, refused to listen to the appeals for justice made by the non-Magyar nationalities, for the granting of that justice would have sounded the knell of the domination of Hungary by the Magyar race. The change in the attitude of Hungary towards Austria passed almost unnoticed in the West. As soon as Vienna abandoned her policy of centralisation of Hungary in the interests of the Germans, and resigned the Kingdom of St. Stephen to the Magyars, the latter abandoned their revolt against Austria. Had this tendency been noticed and understood, there could have been no surprise at the part played by Hungary during the War. It was no “accidental” enmity towards the Entente Powers that animated the Magyars, but a definite antagonism founded upon self-interest. They were persuaded that their interests were identical with those of the Germans of Austria, whose supremacy was equally menaced by the national movements and consciousness of their “subject races.” Both Austria and Hungary sheltered their political ambitions under the wings of the German eagle.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] It is too long for full quotation here, but it may be found in full in _Racial Problems in Hungary_. The preamble is as follows: “Since all citizens of Hungary, according to the principles of the Constitution, form from the political point of view one nation ... the indivisible unitary Hungarian nation ... of which every citizen of the Fatherland is a member, no matter to what nationality he belongs; since, moreover, this equality of right can only exist with reference to the official use of the various languages of the country, and only under special provisions, in so far as is rendered necessary by the unity of the country and the practical possibility of government and administration; the following rules will serve as standard regarding the official use of the various languages, while in all other matters the complete equality of the citizens remains untouched.”

[2] See page 56.

[3] A. N. Bain and W. A. Phillips, _Encyclopædia Britannica_.

[4] See Seton-Watson, _Racial Problems in Hungary_.

[5] Even the most fervent admirers of the Magyars do not attempt to deny the repressive policy carried out by them against the nationalities; they attempt no more than to minimise it. “Under the influence of the Jewish Press an excessive nationalism developed in Hungary, which created discord among populations which for a long time had been accustomed to get on fairly well together. There is no doubt that this Magyar Chauvinism had nothing of the brutality which disgraced the Prussian rule in Poland. Never were Serbian or Rumanian children beaten in Hungary for the offence of having said their prayers in their mother-tongue! It was rather the ebullition of a puerile vanity, which manifested itself mainly in irresponsible chatter (_bavardages de café_), in articles in the newspapers and in oratorical displays. However, if the word ‘oppression’ is too strong to express the attitude of the Magyars towards their nationalities, it must be admitted that they were not treated as equals. Nothing, or next to nothing, was done for their material, intellectual or moral development. The blunder of the Magyars was to regard them with supreme indifference. As someone graphically remarked: ‘The non-Magyar populations do not go on foot, they travel third-class’” (J. and J. Thiraud, _Quand Israel est Roi_, Paris, Plon-Nourrit et Cie).

[6] See also _Magyars et Pangermanistes_, Paris, Editions Bossard, 1918.