Chapter V: War, Revolution and Counter-Revolution

The outbreak of war came at a time when Magyar oppression of the nationalities was approaching a crisis. The Hungarian Government felt and feared the danger which was already looming on the horizon. They felt the ground trembling under their feet, despite every effort to reduce the subject races to passive obedience to their will. Of all the influences which urged the Central Empires to select 1914 as the year in which to launch their long-meditated plans, that of the Magyars was the most potent. The result of a war in which Germans and Magyars were allied would be the final submission of the Slav races of Hungary under the Magyar yoke.

So firmly was the idea of Magyar domination fixed in the minds of the ruling classes of Hungary that in a sense they regarded the War as a defensive measure. They had undertaken the struggle in order to defend the place which they had usurped and which threatened to be taken away from them. The German conception of _Mitteleuropa_ offered them a means of reasserting their supremacy. In exchange for their compliance, they would be awarded an important position in the great scheme, and would secure the assistance of the all-powerful German Empire in an enlarged policy of subjection of the subject races. Oskar Jaszi, in an article published in May 1916 in _Wirtschaftszeitung der Zentralmachte_, elaborated this idea. “_The uneasiness and the fears felt by 10 millions of Magyars in the face of an equal number of non-Magyars who necessarily feel themselves drawn in spite of themselves towards their kindred beyond the frontiers is understandable. If the 60 million Germans, politically and economically united, are indeed anxious to superintend the peaceful economic and political development of a nation of 120 millions, it is easy to understand that we should succeed in breaking the teeth of national hatreds.... A rich and well-organised Hungary would be for Central Europe the surest route towards the Balkans.... Central Europe under German hegemony, the Balkans under the protection of Hungary, such is the dawn of the new era._”

With such a rosy prospect before her, Hungary was not disposed to wait for victory before putting into effect improved measures for the disciplining of the minorities. These measures grew steadily more strict as the War continued. In 1916 the Hungarian Parliament contained 413 deputies, exclusive of the 40 deputies from Croatia-Slavonia. Of these 405 were Magyar, and only 8 of other nationalities. On a basis of representation by population, the proportion should have been 215 Magyars to 198 of other nationalities. The subject races being thus denied a voice in the affairs of their country, the way was clear for the introduction of any repressive measures which might be thought necessary. In February 1917 a Bill was brought in by the Opposition for the adoption of universal suffrage. The franchise question had been for many years a burning one in Hungarian politics, and it might have been thought that the Government would have been glad to have settled it in this way in order to conciliate the mass of the people, who had already shown signs of restlessness. But fear of the minorities stood in the way. Count Tisza opposed it vehemently. “_Universal suffrage is a national danger_,” he said. “_Racial tendencies must be resisted even if the wheel of universal history passes over the body of him who resists. Trifling as may be my strength, I shall employ it to save the nation from any thoughtless extension of the franchise._” That he had the opinion of the majority of the House with him is proved by an incident which occurred about the same time. Deputy Juriga, who was one of the eight non-Magyar members, asked permission to read a letter in Slovak, which the party he represented had written, thanking the Minister of Education for having allowed, as a war-time measure, the Slovak language to be taught in secondary schools as an optional subject. His request was drowned by cries of “Nothing but Magyar!” to which he retorted that quotations in French or English, the languages of the enemy, were allowed in the House, but that Slovak, the language of a part of Hungary, was forbidden.

The sentiments of Parliament were reflected in the actions of the local administrative authorities. In October 1917 the Lord Lieutenant of Nyitra, a county of Slovakia, in the course of a public speech, put the matter as bluntly as possible. “The Slovaks must not forget that they live in the Magyar State, and that they must not demand anything which conflicts with Magyar aspirations. Learn Magyar, all of you, this is the best advice I can give you, for Magyar is a universal language. Of what use would Slovak schools be to you? They are useless. _The main thing is for you to guard against all ideas of separation, for the moment I perceive anywhere the slightest tendency towards upsetting the existing state of affairs I shall make the Slovaks feel my power_ and shall punish them with the utmost severity. I recognise the need for a policy of agreement and counsel, but this must be in exclusive accord with the Magyar spirit. Our sole ideal must be the Unitary Magyar State. He who opposes it will be punished mercilessly. _I repeat, I shall punish all who do not act as the Magyar State wishes._”[19]

Two months previously the _Pesti Hirlap_ (August 19, 1917) had put the Magyar attitude in a nutshell: “_It is necessary to put an end to all bargaining with the nationalities. Hungary must be rendered Magyar._” As soon as he came back to office, Count Apponyi set to work to give expression to this desire. He ordered the closing of the Rumanian elementary schools and forbade the use of the Slovak language as a medium of religious instruction, which was the only subject in which it was used in the schools. But this was not enough. Dr. Roland von Hegedüs, of the University of Budapest, urged on the Government the adoption of a novel agrarian policy. “The State cannot in future leave the land in the frontier regions in the hands of proprietors whom, as the War has taught us, it is impossible to trust from the military point of view,” he declared. “In future the State cannot leave the land in the hands of the non-Magyar nationalities. The State must adopt an agrarian policy which will permit it to exercise a right of option in the frontier districts and of furthering in them the process of national assimilation.” Something of the kind had already been suggested. On June 14, 1917 the _Szegedi Naplo_, in the course of an article entitled _The Democratisation of Hungary_, had suggested a scheme of wholesale deportations. Having proved statistically that the non-Magyar nationalities occupied mainly the frontier districts, the article went on to explain that as some sort of democratic reform was necessary, but would be a source of danger to the Magyar State, it would be a good plan to remove the non-Magyar nationalities from the territories which they at present occupied, to scatter them over the centre of the kingdom, and to replace them by good and faithful Magyars. If this policy were carried out simultaneously with the reform of the Electoral Law, even the most extended suffrage would not be a menace to the Magyar State. The _Pesti Hirlap_ referred to the matter on August 4, 1917 in the course of an article entitled _Magyar Colonisation_. In the work of strengthening the Magyar nation, the principal parts must be undertaken by the Ministers of Agriculture and Education. The duty of the latter was to suppress non-Magyar education in the schools and to enforce the Magyar language. The former must, at the end of the War, initiate a national and colonising policy. He must set himself to the task of readjusting the ethnographic map of the country. Backed by public education given solely in Magyar, a policy of colonisation would serve to diminish the menace of the nationalities, which split up into Magyar islands the continuity of the great anti-Slav ocean. This policy was the only hope of upholding the national unity and territorial integrity of the State.

It was not long before the suggestions bore fruit. On October 25th the Parliament of Budapest approved a Bill presented by Mezossy, a member of the Government. He explained the purport of his Bill to a representative of the _Pesti Hirlap_, which paper published it next day. “In the first half of the War the melancholy fact was realised that in the most fertile regions of southern Hungary the land was in the hands of an unreliable population.... The same was apparent in the north.... The land in these threatened regions should be in the hands of men worthy of confidence. In order to achieve this end, the transfer of ownership of land will be regulated by the consent of the authorities. Not only the transfer of land, but the lease of it as well will depend on the authorities. The duration of a lease will not exceed ten years. In the last resort, the Minister of Agriculture will examine any particular case should there be any complaint. I can assure everybody that I shall use this right for the sole advantage of the national agrarian policy of Magyarism.”

In Austria, Mezossy’s measure was criticised as savouring of barbarism, but in Hungary, the Magyar spirit regarded it as insufficient. On November 28th, the _Pesti Hirlap_ returned to the charge. “The State should have unlimited rights of expropriation in order to be able to parcel out and colonise the land. A sane allocation of land to the Magyar nation, which alone sustains the State, must be contrived. In the south, the Serbs occupy the best land; in Transylvania, the Rumanians. Thus the decree of Mezossy is merely a beginning. We demand that this policy be continued on a large scale. So long as the Government retains the power to do so, it should endeavour to make the Magyars the masters of Hungarian soil.” In the programme produced by the reconstructed Cabinet at the end of January 1918, Wekerle showed himself not unmindful of this advice. He declared that measures would be taken in the interests of the definite safeguarding of the ideals of the nation and the State. By that it must be understood that he would do all in his power to assure to the Magyar nation the exercise of all its prerogatives. Of these the most important was the right of expropriation. In the matter of agrarian policy Magyar interests demanded first of all that the land should be in Magyar hands. This end could be achieved, without infringing the sacred rights of private ownership, by the application of the right of expropriation.

By this time it was clear that if the Central Empires won the War the non-Magyar nationalities of Hungary would be subjected to a period of oppression even more drastic than they had hitherto experienced. On the other hand, even the Magyar Jingoes realised that the loss of the War would mean the dismemberment of their much-vaunted “Unitary Magyar State.” Germany, the predominant partner, was their one hope, and during the whole of the War the Magyars did their best to support her by every means in their power, particularly in the matter of the supply of foodstuffs, even to the detriment of Austria. At the time of the campaign in the Carpathians, the Magyars realised that the future of Hungary was in the balance, and at the same time they were careful to send only Croatian and Slovak regiments into the front line. This was throughout the policy of the Magyars, to oppose to their Slav enemies the hated and despised nationalities of Slav origin, in the pious hope that they would mutually destroy one another and so leave the coveted districts at the disposal of the Magyar nation. It was proved by Deputy Jerzabek that among the nations of the Dual Monarchy the Magyars had suffered the smallest number of casualties. This may be taken as another proof of Magyar skill in inducing others to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for them, while substituting for the traditional valour of the race of Arpad a noisy bluster and a virulent abuse of the Entente nations.[20]

When President Wilson first formulated his famous Fourteen Points, the Magyar Press rejected them unanimously as the product of an utterly unpractical point of view. Count Czernin declared, on the subject of self-determination, that the Monarchy would decide for itself the details of its internal affairs, and would not brook outside interference. Up to the last moment the attitude of Hungary was one of stiff-necked obstinacy. The Magyar ruling class did not care what lessons the War might have taught; their whole policy was still concentrated upon securing for themselves the best possible terms and the largest possible area upon which to batten.

But the population of Hungary was utterly war-weary, even the military caste was for the moment incapable of being goaded into further effort. The _coup d’état_ of November, by which Hungary declared herself a Republic, was inspired by the desire to make a display of sympathy with the principles of democracy which had won the War. The Republic of Hungary might escape the punishment hanging over the heads of autocratic Germany and Austria; it might even hope that the arbiters of peace would be moved to restore to it the allegiance of the nationalities, who had already expressed their desires in no uncertain terms. But Karolyi, the first President, although even at the time he probably honestly believed that the introduction of democracy was Hungary’s only hope of salvation, was a weak man, unhappily placed between the socialistic demands of the disfranchised proletariat and the oligarchic dreams of the ruling class, who, although they had retired from the stage, remained very close behind the scenes. It is doubtful whether any man could have stemmed the Bolshevist flood which already threatened the nation; the inability of Karolyi to do so was proved almost immediately. Instead of devoting all his energies to framing a constitution for the purely Magyar districts of Hungary, which it was evident were all that would be left to her, and so endeavouring to satisfy the democratic instincts of the working classes, awakened by the War to the sense of their political importance, he wasted valuable time in launching plaintive denunciations of the wrong that had been done to the “thousand-year old Magyar State,” and in intrigue directed towards reversing what was already in effect a _fait accompli_.

Success in these directions could not be achieved by force of arms; in the eyes of the old ruling classes there remained only the forces of misrepresentation. Unscrupulous propaganda might yet save the day that political incompetence had lost. The _Pesti Hirlap_ voiced the prevailing panic. “In the three coming months we have to concentrate all our efforts on the work abroad; no matter how much it costs, whether it is one million or 100,000 millions, it is worth it. _Every article written in French, English or Italian will save for us one square kilometre of Hungarian territory. It will be the duty of a clever manager to spread into the circle of our enemies what the staff of writers will prepare. It is necessary to send into every foreign country Magyar Socialists who speak foreign languages fluently._” To uphold their nationality in foreign countries was surely a novel rôle for “Socialists.” We may suspect the Socialists of the _Pesti Hirlap_ of skin-deep convictions only.

The methods of Magyar propaganda will be dealt with in a later chapter. For the present it is sufficient to say that the most determined attempts were made to seduce the inhabitants of the new States from their allegiance. The agents employed in this campaign were the officials of the old Magyar regime, who for the most part had been left at their posts. The _Slovensky Vychod_ of February 27, 1919 said of these men: “The new regime does not please them at all; for until now they had been the supreme masters of the ‘stupid’ Slovaks. Under the Magyar regime they took bribes from everybody who merely made inquiries of the administration. Under the new order of things this sort of corruption is not allowed. A certain number of these Magyar officials have been dismissed the service because they refused to recognise the sovereignty of the Czechoslovak State in Slovakia, but they have remained within the borders of the State and have thus been enabled to continue their subversive activity.” Side by side with these attempts, the Magyars used every means of influencing foreign opinion in their favour. The Karolyi regime was made to appear as the dawn of democracy in Hungary, a sort of millennium in which all citizens enjoyed the most unfettered freedom; the argument being that the non-Magyar nationalities should be induced to return to the fold for their own sakes as much as for that of Hungary.

But Karolyi’s People’s Republic was short-lived. His failure to influence the Entente in favour of Hungary discredited him in the eyes of the ruling classes; his flirtations with Communism, undertaken in the attempt to gain popularity for his regime in the eyes of the proletariat, had afforded opportunities to the followers of Lenin of which they were not slow to take advantage. Despite the efforts of Oskar Jaszi, his Government had failed to win the nationalities, and by March 1919 he perceived that he was friendless within Hungary and without. The power slipped from his hands into those of a Soviet Republic under the presidency of Alexander Garbai, the existence of which was proclaimed on March 21st. Karolyi disappeared from the stage of Hungarian politics, in his exit accusing the Entente of planning to make Hungary a base of military operations against the Bolsheviks of Russia.

For rather more than four months Hungary was given over to the rule of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, and became the scene of famine and bloodshed. Bela Kun, the true leader of the new revolution, had declared in February that he had brought with him from Russia a sum of 300,000 crowns with which to overthrow Karolyi’s People’s Republic and replace it by Soviet rule. Hungary was admirably situated to form the focus of the World Revolution. It lay in the centre of Europe, surrounded by States suffering in greater or less degree from the exhaustion of the War and the fierce cross-currents of reconstruction. Let Bolshevism but gain a firm foothold in Hungary, so Lenin and his supporters argued, and it could not fail to spread until it covered the face of Europe.

For a time Bolshevism dominated the country and succeeded in organising a by no means despicable Red Army with which it attacked the Czechs in the north and the Rumanians in the south-east. Bela Kun believed that the surest way of converting his neighbours to his own views was by force of arms. At the same time, by means of his soldiers and especially of his “Terror-boys” under Szamueli, a ruffian with an insatiable blood-lust, he contrived to suppress all attempts at counter-revolution. Time after time the adherents of the old ruling classes endeavoured to rise against the new tyranny, but on every occasion they were prevented. The Hotel Hungaria in Budapest became the scene of political murders, while Szamueli, scouring Hungary with his executioners in a special train, made away with such individuals in the provinces who threatened to become centres of resistance to the Soviet rule. It was not until July that the military caste succeeded in setting up a White Government in Szeged.

But even then this Government was powerless and isolated, mainly through its own supineness.[21] The measures of the Soviet were successful in preventing a rising of the masses in their favour, although by this time the majority in Hungary were heartily sick of the Bolshevik experiment and anxious to return to some form of sane democracy. It might have been supposed that even the Magyar aristocracy had learnt from the events of the past months that although Bolshevism was unacceptable to the nation, the old regime would be almost equally so. The mass of the people, at all events, believed that this lesson had been learnt, and were prepared to allow their old leaders to accept the task of cleansing the country from the stain of Bolshevism and of establishing a new order on modern Western lines. If the people of the country were prepared to agree to this, there was no reason for the Entente to oppose their wishes. The Rumanians were eventually allowed to enter Budapest to restore order, and with the advance of their disciplined forces the Bolshevist regime disappeared like a shadow. On the first of August the Soviet “resigned,” and the control of the country was taken over by a military dictatorship, with Admiral Horthy as Commander-in-Chief and Mr. Friedrich as Prime Minister.

The Military Dictatorship was the direct outcome of the White Government of Szeged, and it immediately set about the work of persecuting all those suspected of sympathy with the Bolsheviks. In the words of a Liberal Magyar,[22] “_The victims of the Red Terror, according to an official statement, amount to about 300; but those of the White Terror are estimated at 6,000._ These atrocities must not be placed to the account of the Hungarian people as a whole, which is naturally kindly and humane; they are mainly the work of the Hungarian ‘gentry’ class, which is both economically and politically in decay, and which contains within it elements sufficiently corrupt and demoralised to employ such methods to prop up their traditional regime.” The doings of the Horthy Government will be examined later; we are only concerned here with the factors which led up to its establishment. It was natural that a reaction from Bolshevism should sweep the country in the first moments of relief from its sway, and it was confidently expected that as soon as the Military Dictatorship had restored order it would give place to some form of Parliamentary government elected on a truly democratic franchise. But the months passed by, and it became apparent that the old ruling classes, having regained the saddle with the assistance of the military clique, had no intention of relinquishing it. The danger to Hungary involved in this state of affairs was obvious to every onlooker. Oskar Jaszi, writing in the _New Europe_ of November 20, 1919, said: “If the ancient regime re-establishes itself in Hungary, if the magnates and prelates, with their traditional allies, the autocratic country gentry and the Jewish usurers of the cities, regain their ancient power, then all the democratic gains of our October revolution are lost, and Hungary, a prey to race hatred and Chauvinism, reverts to its old policy of oppressing the peasantry, the working classes and such few non-Magyars as remain.”

That the Horthy Government had every intention of restoring in Hungary not only the conditions which obtained before the Bolshevik experiment, but also those which obtained before the establishment of the Karolyi Government, is proved by the fact that they refused admission to the country to Karolyi himself and all his supporters. To support democratic tendencies was in their eyes treason to the State and destructive of the ultimate object which had they in view, the restoration of the Hapsburgs. Not only must democracy be suppressed with an iron hand, but any encroachment on the power of the ruling classes must be strenuously avoided. Their attitude to the agrarian question is a case in point. In Hungary, perhaps more than elsewhere, the distribution of land has for many years been in grave need of reform. For the most part agriculture has been in the hands of large owners employing very little labour, and in consequence the land hunger of the people has grown more and more acute. Under the Karolyi Government, attempts were made to readjust the tenure of land, but very little had been achieved before the fall of the Government at the hands of the power of Bolshevism. As the author already quoted,[23] remarks: “As a result of the territorial demands put forward at Budapest by Colonel Vyx in the name of the Allies, the working classes suddenly went over in large masses to the Communist camp. The Soviet Government which followed annulled the Buza land reform (instituted under the Karolyi regime), and one of the people’s commissaries afterwards publicly boasted at a meeting that the Communists had succeeded in preventing or reversing the subdivision of the large estates which had already partially begun, and that in this they had been aided by the large proprietors, who mobilised their influence for this common aim.” This policy was, in fact, one of the fundamentals of Communism. The land was the property of the State, and the large estates were, therefore, State property which was not to be privately owned by any section of the people. But, in order to manage these estates, they were put in the hands of agricultural co-operative societies, and in many cases the original owner was left as “manager” of his own estates for the co-operatives. The net result was that the labourers were as far from owning the land under Bolshevism as they had been under the former oligarchy.

“As a natural result the Proletarian State roused the mistrust of the great majority of the agricultural labourers, while the small and medium peasant proprietors were no less alienated by so dishonest a policy. Their suspicions were confirmed when the Communists came out as open opponents of small peasant ownership.... The Hungarian Soviet Dictatorship owes its really miserable failure only partially to its corruption and excesses, which have often been exaggerated. The foremost cause was that it aroused, by every possible means, the hostility of the great majority of the agricultural population, and this proved fatal to its food policy and also in other respects. The Communist experiment would in any case have failed owing to its internal weaknesses, especially in the matter of workmen’s discipline, but it need not have left such a hateful memory behind it and injured so gravely the whole cause of progress if the Soviet Government had pursued a less doctrinaire and dishonourable agrarian policy.”[24]

The counter-revolution thus found the conditions of land tenure practically untouched, and it took good care that no undesirable democratic ideas should disturb it. Divide the land to some extent it certainly did, but in such a way as to produce in Hungary a pure and undiluted mediæval feudalism. “Nothing shows so well its (the Horthy regime) feudal character as the provision that owners of the new peasant or medium holdings enjoy certain privileges, and are consequently liable to military service ‘if social order is threatened.’ The Ministerial decree, published in August 1920 in the official gazette, _Budapesti Kozlony_, says: ‘Recognised patriots who have distinguished themselves in the War will receive from the hands of the Chief of State, Governor Nicholas Horthy, of Nagybanya, a grant of small holdings for the most part, but in some cases also a lesser manorial estate. _The land received in fief is a reward for valour in the War,’ but everyone who receives land ‘must always be ready for such public services as aim at protecting social order and social peace.’_ Those receiving such grants obtain all the privileges of entail; their land cannot, therefore, be alienated, and will be inherited undivided by the eldest male survivor. In addition to this they also receive exemption from taxation, and the further privilege that their land cannot be mortgaged. Such proprietors are allowed to add to their name the hereditary predicate of _Vitez_ (which means ‘the brave,’ or, in old parlance, the equivalent of knight). Thus the effect of the Horthy land reform is to create a new armed nobility.”[25]

Lest it should seem absurd to apply the term “nobility” to landed proprietors on so small a scale, it must be explained that Hungary is accustomed to such a use of the word. Indeed, until 1848, the franchise had been confined to the “nobility” so called, who were exceedingly numerous, and indistinguishable from the remainder of the people either by manners or wealth. They were known as _bocskoros nemesseg_, “sandal nobility,” from their down-at-heel appearance. But they could be relied upon to use their votes in the Magyar interest, and were therefore invaluable to the Government.[26] It is obvious that the Horthy regime is anxious to reintroduce this state of things, and to organise a band of supporters upon whose votes and military training it can depend for its continuance in power.[27]

The tendency of the present Government of Hungary is evident from this example of its internal policy. It represents almost exclusively the privileged classes, who are bitterly opposed to the introduction of any form of democracy into the Magyar State. The Government believes that for the time the people, alarmed at the ease with which the democracy of Karolyi degenerated into the Communism of Bela Kun, will not resist the reinstatement of an oligarchy. During this period of consent to its administration, it is working hard to entrench itself throughout Hungary, so that by the time the people grow restless under its rule they will find themselves bound hand and foot and powerless.

It was not until the Entente intervened that the White Government of 1919 showed any signs of legalising its dictatorship by the summoning of a National Assembly, which it finally did in November 1919. But even then organisations like the “_M.O.V.E._” and the “_Awakened Magyars_”[28] took good care that the assembly should contain as few elements as possible likely to be dangerous to the cause they had at heart. An extremely strict censorship guarded against unfavourable reports of these elections reaching the ears of the outside world, which was, indeed, for the most part, too vitally engaged upon the problems of its own reconstruction to worry much about the details of Hungarian conditions. On the surface things appeared to be going well. Bolshevism had been defeated, a National Assembly was in process of formation. Only the new States watched anxiously, knowing the dangers which lurked behind the false appearance of a pacified Hungary. It is only now, when the internal conditions of the countries of the world are becoming more stabilised, that their inhabitants have eyes to spare for the dramas being enacted in other lands than their own. In the following chapters of this book, therefore, I shall endeavour to inquire as to how far the new States, having achieved national unity, are employing that unity for the furtherance of democratic ideals, and are thereby demonstrating the justice of their existence in the modern world; Hungary alone, the prey of an autocratic ruling class, we shall find slipping back into reaction, and thereby becoming a danger to the peace of Europe.[29]

FOOTNOTES:

[19] See _New Europe_, October 4, 1917.

[20] See page 7.

[21] An interesting picture is given of the inactivity and lack of initiative of the White Government when a bold move on its part might have saved Hungary from the ignominy of salvation at the hands of her late enemies the Rumanians, is given by MM. Jerome and Jean Thiraud, in their book, _Quand Israel est Roi_ (Paris, Plon-Nourrit et Cie). “They were French officers who went to seek at Vienna, where they have taken refuge, Count Teleki and his friends, in order to put them at the head of the Government of Szeged. But few magnates, however, elected to follow them, the majority of these gentlemen preferring to remain in Vienna at the famous Hotel Sacher, where they lived on the fat of the land and wasted their money in gambling. It was by virtue of a French safe conduct, and escorted by French officers, that Count Teleki and a few others were enabled to cross the Hungary of Bela Kun without hindrance. It was under the protection of our troops, under the friendly eyes of our Staff, that they were able to organise their Ministry and their army. If they had shown at once a greater promptitude of decision, if they had wasted less time in futile discussion and in mutual recrimination, if the odd thousands of officers who were collected at Szeged had resolutely marched upon Budapest with the arms and munitions which we had lent them, they would have secured on the way to support of many of the peasants of the Plain, and would perhaps have overthrown the Bolshevik forces, already almost dissolved. Instead of that, they schemed and made merry at Szeged, and allowed the Supreme Council time to declare that it did not recognise this reactionary Government.”

[22] Arnold Daniel, a supporter of Karolyi, in the _Slavonic Review_, June 1922.

[23] Arnold Daniel, in the _Slavonic Review_, June 1922.

[24] Arnold Daniel, in the _Slavonic Review_, June 1922.

[25] Arnold Daniel, in the _Slavonic Review_, June 1922.

[26] For a description of the sandal nobility, see _Racial Problems in Hungary_.

[27] “Fortunately this reversion to the Middle Ages can only take place on a very small scale, because the depletion of the Treasury and the interests of the big landlords do not permit of large purchases of land, except in so far as the State lays its hands upon the communal land” (Arnold Daniel, _loc. cit._).

[28] Societies for the propagation of Magyar sentiments by force. See page 187.

[29] The point of view of an active member of the Magyar aristocratic class towards the events from October 1918 to March 1919 may be perceived in Miss Cécile Tormay’s _An Outlaw’s Diary_ (London, 1923).