Chapter II: Cold Water From Disraeli (3)

Mohammed Ahmed, on hearing of the departure of the army of Hicks Pasha from Khartoum, sent spies to watch their movements, and on learning that the latter had arrived at Duem, and intended advancing on El Obeid, he sent a force of 3,000 men under the emir Abd el Halim and Abu Girgeh to follow in rear of the Egyptian army and close up the wells as they advanced, so that retreat would be impossible. Abd el Halim, on arrival at Rahad, at once rode off to El Obeid and personally informed the Mahdi of the strength and probable movements of the Egyptian force. On receipt of this news Mohammed Ahmed forthwith despatched all his fighting men towards Rahad to join Abd el Halim's force, but on their way they met Abd el Halim retiring from Alluba, and, having joined him, the whole force, amounting to some 40,000, encamped in the forest of Shekan, and there awaited the advance of the Egyptian troops.... At 10 a.m. on Monday morning, November 5, the troops marched out of the zariba and formed up in three squares, the whole formation resembling a triangle. Each square had its own transport and ammunition in the centre. Hicks Pasha with his staff led the way, followed by four guns of the artillery, then the first square, which was supported to the right and left rear by the other two squares, some 300 yards distant from the square and from each other. Ala ed Din Pasha commanded the right square and Selim Bey the left. The exposed flanks of the squares were covered by cavalry, and a detachment of horsemen brought up the rear. In this formation the troops steadily advanced, and half an hour later reached a fairly open valley, interspersed here and there with bush, while on either side were thick woods full of the enemy.... Now all was ready, and Mohammed Ahmed patiently awaited the arrival of the troops, which could already be seen advancing in the distance. He assembled his emirs for the last final instructions, and, rising from his prayer, drew his sword, shouted three times, "Allahu akbar! You need not fear, for the victory is ours." On came the squares. The first had reached the wooded depression, when up sprang the Arabs with their fierce yells. Startled and surprised, the square was broken in a moment. The flanking squares now fired wildly at the Arabs fighting hand to hand with the Egyptians, and in their efforts must have killed numbers of their own comrades. But almost at the same instant the Arabs simultaneously attacked from the woods on both sides and from front and rear. The wildest confusion followed; squares fired on each other, on friends or enemies. While the surging mass of Arabs now completely encircled the force and gradually closed in on them, a massacre of the most appalling description took place. In little over quarter of an hour all was over. Hicks Pasha with his staff, seeing that he could do nothing, cut his way through on the left and reached some cultivated ground. Here he was surrounded by some Baggara horsemen, and for a time kept them at bay, fighting most gallantly till his revolver was empty, and then committing most terrible execution with his sword. He was the last of the Europeans to fall, and one savage charge he made on his assailants is memorable to this day in the Soudan, and a body of Baggara who fled before him were called by their tribesmen "Baggar Hicks," or the cows driven by Hicks. But at last he fell, pierced by the spear of the Khalifa Mohammed Sherif. His cavalry bodyguard fought gallantly, and though repeatedly called on to surrender replied, "We shall never surrender, but will die like our officers, and kill many of you as well." And soon all were killed. Ala ed Din Pasha was killed trying to make his way from the right square to join Hicks Pasha. Genawi Bey lay dead in the square beside his horse. It is said that as he fell mortally wounded he, with his own sword, hamstrung his horse, saying, "No other shall ever ride on you after me." The whole force, with the exception of some 300 men, and most of these wounded, had now been completely annihilated.... The news of the Mahdi's victory spread far and wide, and if there had been some doubts previous to what was now termed a miracle, the complete annihilation of a whole army soon dispelled them, and from the Red Sea to the confines of Waddai the belief was universal that at last the true Mahdi had appeared.

[NOTE.--Sir R. Wingate's account is quoted from two sources--one, Mohammed Nur el Barudi, who was cook to Hicks Pasha, and was one of the wounded prisoners after the battle; and the other, Hassan Habashi, a former Government official at El Obeid, who had fallen into the Mahdi's hands on the capture of that place. Hence the story is complete on both sides.]

TRANSVAAL CONVENTION (1884).

=Source.=--_Parliamentary Papers_, "Transvaal," C 3,947 of 1884, p. 47.

_A Convention between Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the South African Republic._

Whereas the Government of the Transvaal State, through its delegates, consisting of Stephanus Johannes Paulus Kruger, President of the said State, Stephanus Jacobus Du Toit, Superintendent of Education, and Nicholas Jacobus Smit, a member of the Volksraad, have represented that the Convention signed at Pretoria on the 13th day of August, 1881, and ratified by the Volksraad of the said State on the 25th October, 1881, contains certain provisions which are inconvenient, and imposes burdens and obligations from which the said State is desirous to be relieved, and that the south-western boundaries fixed by the said Convention should be amended, with a view to promote the peace and good order of the said State and of the countries adjacent thereto; and whereas Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland has been pleased to take the said representations into consideration.

Now, therefore, Her Majesty has been pleased to direct, and it is hereby declared, that the following articles of a new Convention, signed on behalf of Her Majesty by Her Majesty's High Commissioner in South Africa, the Right Honourable Sir Hercules George Herbert Robinson, Knight Grand Cross of the most distinguished Order of St. Michael and St. George, Governor of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, and on behalf of the Transvaal State (which shall hereinafter be called the South African Republic) by the above-named delegates, Stephanus Johannes Paulus Kruger, Stephanus Jacobus Du Toit, and Nicholas Jacobus Smit, shall, when ratified by the Volksraad of the South African Republic, be substituted for the articles embodied in the Convention of 3rd August, 1881; which latter, pending such ratification, shall continue in full force and effect.

[NOTE.--The word "Preamble" is not prefixed to the opening passage of this Convention. When the suzerainty question arose in 1898 the British argument was that the 1884 Convention only altered the articles of the 1881 Convention, and left the Preamble in force; the Boer argument was that the 1884 Convention had a preamble, and therefore the earlier one must have been superseded.]

GORDON'S MISSION TO KHARTOUM (1884).

I.

=Source.=--_Parliamentary Papers_, "Egypt," No. 2 of 1884, C 3,845.

_P. 2. The Cabinet's Instructions to General Gordon._

Her Majesty's Government are desirous that you should proceed at once to Egypt, to report to them on the military situation in the Soudan, and on the measures which it may be advisable to take for the security of the Egyptian garrisons still holding positions in that country, and for the safety of the European population in Khartoum. You are also desired to consider and report upon the best mode of effecting the evacuation of the interior of the Soudan, and upon the manner in which the safety and good administration by the Egyptian Government of the ports on the sea coast can best be secured. In connection with this subject, you should pay especial consideration to the question of the steps that may usefully be taken to counteract the stimulus which it is feared may possibly be given to the Slave Trade by the present insurrectionary movement and by the withdrawal of the Egyptian authority from the interior.

II.

=Source.=--_Parliamentary Papers_, "Egypt," No. 6 of 1884, C 3,878.

_Further Instructions by the Egyptian Government._

I have now to indicate to you the views of the Egyptian Government on two of the points to which your special attention was directed by Lord Granville. These are (1) the measures which it may be advisable to take for the security of the Egyptian garrisons still holding positions in the Soudan, and for the safety of the European population in Khartoum. (2) The best mode of effecting the evacuation of the interior of the Soudan. These two points are intimately connected, and may conveniently be considered together. It is believed that the number of Europeans at Khartoum is very small, but it has been estimated by the local authorities that some 10,000 to 15,000 people will wish to move northwards from Khartoum only when the Egyptian garrison is withdrawn. These people are native Christians, Egyptian employés, their wives and children, etc. The Government of His Highness the Khedive is earnestly solicitous that no effort should be spared to insure the retreat both of these people and of the Egyptian garrison without loss of life. As regards the most opportune time and the best method for effecting the retreat, whether of the garrisons or of the civil populations, it is neither necessary nor desirable that you should receive detailed instructions.... You will bear in mind that the main end to be pursued is the evacuation of the Soudan. This policy was adopted, after very full discussion, by the Egyptian Government, on the advice of Her Majesty's Government. It meets with the full approval of His Highness the Khedive, and of the present Egyptian Ministry. I understand, also, that you entirely concur in the desirability of adopting this policy, and that you think it should on no account be changed. You consider that it may take a few months to carry it out with safety. You are further of opinion that "the restoration of the country should be made to the different petty Sultans who existed at the time of Mehemet Ali's conquest, and whose families still exist"; and that an endeavour should be made to form a confederation of those Sultans. In this view the Egyptian Government entirely concur. It will, of course, be fully understood that the Egyptian troops are not to be kept in the Soudan merely with a view to consolidating the power of the new rulers of the country. But the Egyptian Government has the fullest confidence in your judgment, your knowledge of the country, and in your comprehension of the general line of policy to be pursued. You are, therefore, given full discretionary power to retain the troops for such reasonable period as you may think necessary, in order that the abandonment of the country may be accomplished with the least possible risk to life and property.

Sir E. Baring, in forwarding the copy of the instructions to Lord Granville, wrote:

I read the draft of the letter over to General Gordon. He expressed to me his entire concurrence in the instructions. The only suggestion he made was in connection with the passage in which, speaking of the policy of abandoning the Soudan, I had said, "I understand also that you entirely concur in the desirability of adopting this policy." General Gordon wished that I should add the words, "and that you think it should on no account be changed." These words were accordingly added.

III.

=Source.=--Lord Cromer's _Modern Egypt_, vol. i., p. 428. (Macmillans.)

Looking back at what occurred after a space of many years, two points are to my mind clear. The first is that no Englishman should have been sent to Khartoum. The second is that, if anyone had to be sent, General Gordon was not the right man to send. The reasons why no Englishman should have been sent are now sufficiently obvious. If he were beleaguered at Khartoum, the British Government might be obliged to send an expedition to relieve him. The main object of British policy was to avoid being drawn into military operations in the Soudan. The employment of a British official at Khartoum involved a serious risk that it would be no longer possible to adhere to this policy, and the risk was materially increased when the individual chosen to go to the Soudan was one who had attracted to himself a greater degree of popular sympathy than almost any Englishman of modern times.

DIFFICULTIES OF GORDON'S CHARACTER (1884).

I.

=Source.=--Lord Cromer's _Modern Egypt_, vol. i., p. 432. (Macmillans.)

I must, for the elucidation of this narrative, state why I think it was a mistake to send General Gordon to Khartoum. "It is impossible," I wrote privately to Lord Granville on January 28, 1884, "not to be charmed by the simplicity and honesty of Gordon's character." "My only fear," I added, "is that he is terribly flighty and changes his opinions very rapidly...." Impulsive flightiness was, in fact, the main defect of General Gordon's character, and it was one which, in my opinion, rendered him unfit to carry out a work which pre-eminently required a cool and steady head. I used to receive some twenty or thirty telegrams from General Gordon in the course of the day when he was at Khartoum, those in the evening often giving opinions which it was impossible to reconcile with others despatched the same morning. Scarcely, indeed, had General Gordon started on his mission, when Lord Granville, who does not appear at first to have understood General Gordon's character, began to be alarmed at his impulsiveness. On February 8 Lord Granville wrote to me: "I own your letters about Gordon rather alarm. His changes about Zobeir are difficult to understand. Northbrook consoles me by saying that he says all the foolish things that pass through his head, but that his judgment is excellent." I am not prepared to go so far as to say that General Gordon's judgment was excellent. Nevertheless, there was some truth in Lord Northbrook's remark. I often found that, amidst a mass of irrelevant verbiage and amidst many contradictory opinions, a vein of sound common sense and political instinct ran through General Gordon's proposals. So much was I impressed with this, and so fearful was I that the sound portions of his proposals would be rejected in London on account of the eccentric language in which they were often couched, that, on February 12, I telegraphed to Lord Granville: "In considering Gordon's suggestions, please remember that his general views are excellent, but that undue importance must not be attached to his words. We must look to the spirit rather than the letter of what he says."

II.

=Source.=--Lord Cromer's _Modern Egypt_, vol. i., p. 488. (Macmillans.)

On February 26th, thirty-nine days had elapsed since General Gordon had left London, thirty-one days since he had left Cairo, and eight days since he had arrived at Khartoum. During that period, leaving aside points of detail, as to which his contradictions had been numerous, General Gordon had marked out for himself no less than five different lines of policy, some of which were wholly conflicting one with another, whilst others, without being absolutely irreconcilable, differed in respect to some of their most important features. On January 18 he started from London with instructions which had been dictated by himself. His wish then was that he should be merely sent to "report upon the best means of effecting the evacuation of the interior of the Soudan." He expressed his entire concurrence in the policy of evacuation. This was the first and original stage of General Gordon's opinions. Before he arrived in Egypt, on January 24, he had changed his views as to the nature of the functions he should fulfil. He no longer wished to be a mere reporter. He wished to be named Governor-General of the Soudan with full executive powers. He supplemented his original ideas by suggesting that the country should be handed over to "the different petty Sultans who existed at the time of Mehemet Ali's conquest." This was the second stage of General Gordon's opinions. Fifteen days later (February 8) he wrote from Abu Hamed a memorandum in which he advocated "evacuation but not abandonment." The Government of Egypt were to "maintain their position as a Suzerain Power, nominate the Governor-General and Moudirs, and act as a supreme Court of Appeal." This was the third stage of General Gordon's opinions. Ten days later (February 18) General Gordon reverted to the principles of his memorandum of the 8th, but with a notable difference. It was no longer the Egyptian but the British Government which were to control the Soudan administration. The British Government were also to appoint a Governor-General, who was to be furnished with a British commission, and who was to receive a British decoration. Zobeir Pasha was the man whom General Gordon wished the British Government to select. This was the fourth stage of General Gordon's opinions. Eight days later (February 26), when General Gordon had learnt that the British Government were not prepared to approve of Zobeir Pasha being sent to the Soudan, he proposed that the Mahdi should be "smashed up," and that, to assist in this object, 200 British Indian troops should be sent to Wadi Halfa. This was the fifth stage of General Gordon's opinions. In thirty-nine days, therefore, General Gordon had drifted by successive stages from a proposal that he should report on the affairs of the Soudan to advocating the policy of "smashing up" the Mahdi. It would, he said, be "comparatively easy to destroy the Mahdi."

ZOBEIR PASHA (1884).

I.

=Source.=--_Parliamentary Papers_, "Egypt," No. 12 of 1884.

_P. 71. Major-General Gordon to Sir E. Baring. Telegraphic, Khartoum, February 18, 1884._

I have stated that to withdraw without being able to place a successor in my seat would be the signal for general anarchy throughout the country, which, though all Egyptian element was withdrawn, would be a misfortune and inhuman.... I distinctly state that if Her Majesty's Government gave a Commission to my successor, I recommend neither a subsidy nor men being given. I would select and give a Commission to some man, and promise him the moral support of Her Majesty's Government and nothing more.... As for the man, Her Majesty's Government should select one above all others--namely, Zobeir. He alone has the ability to rule the Soudan, and would be universally accepted by the Soudan. He should be made K.C.M.G., and given presents.... Zobeir's exile at Cairo for ten years, amidst all the late events, and his mixing with Europeans, must have had great effect on his character....

II.

_P. 72. Extract from Sir E. Baring's Despatch commenting on the Above._

I believe Zobeir Pasha to be the only possible man. He undoubtedly possesses energy and ability, and has great local influence. As regards the Slave Trade, I discussed the matter with General Gordon when he was in Cairo, and he fully agreed with me in thinking that Zobeir Pasha's presence or absence would not affect the question in one way or the other. I am also convinced from many things that have come to my notice that General Gordon is right in thinking that Zobeir Pasha's residence in Egypt has considerably modified his character. He now understands what European power is, and it is much better to have to deal with a man of this sort than with a man like the Mahdi.... I cannot recommend that he should be promised the "moral support" of Her Majesty's Government. In the first place, he would scarcely understand the sense of the phrase, and, moreover, I do not think that he would attach importance to any support which was not material. It is for Her Majesty's Government to judge what the effect of his appointment would be upon public opinion in England, but except for that I can see no reason why Zobeir Pasha should not be proclaimed Ruler of the Soudan with the approbation of Her Majesty's Government.

III.

_P. 95. Earl Granville to Sir E. Baring. February 22, 1884._

Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that the gravest objections exist to the appointment by their authority of a successor to General Gordon. The necessity does not, indeed, appear to have yet arisen of going beyond the suggestions contained in General Gordon's Memorandum of the 22nd ultimo, by making special provision for the government of the country. In any case the public opinion of this country would not tolerate the appointment of Zobeir Pasha.

SOME OF GORDON'S TELEGRAMS (1884).

=Source.=--_Parliamentary Papers_, "Egypt," No. 12 of 1884.

_P. 156. Major-General Gordon to Sir E. Baring. Khartoum, March 3, 1884._

... I am strongly against any permanent retention of the Soudan, but I think we ought to leave it with decency, and give the respectable people a man to lead them, around whom they can rally, and we ought to support that man by money and by opening road to Berber. Pray do not consider me in any way to advocate retention of Soudan; I am quite averse to it, but you must see that you could not recall me, nor could I possibly obey, until the Cairo employés get out from all the places. I have named men to different places, thus involving them with Mahdi: how could I look the world in the face if I abandoned them and fled? As a gentleman, could you advise this course? It may have been a mistake to send me up, but that having been done I have no option but to see evacuation through, for even if I was mean enough to escape I have no power to do so.

_P. 161. The Same to the Same. Khartoum, March 9, 1884, 11.30 p.m._

If you mean to make the proposed diversion to Berber [of British troops], and to accept my proposal as to Zobeir, to install him in the Soudan and evacuate, then it is worth while to hold on to Khartoum. If, on the other hand, you determine on neither of these steps, then I can see no use in holding on to Khartoum, for it is impossible for me to help the other garrisons, and I shall only be sacrificing the whole of the troops and employés here. In this latter case your instructions to me had better be that I should evacuate Khartoum, and, with all the employés and troops, remove the seat of Government to Berber. You would understand that such a step would mean the sacrificing of all outlying places except Berber and Dongola. You must give a prompt reply to this, as even the retreat to Berber may not be in my power in a few days; and even if carried out at once, the retreat will be of extreme difficulty.

_P. 161. Same Date, 11.40 p.m._

If the immediate evacuation of Khartoum is determined upon, irrespective of outlying towns, I would propose to send all Cairo employés and white troops with Colonel Stewart to Berber, where he would await your orders. I would also ask Her Majesty's Government to accept the resignation of my commission, and I would take all steamers and stores up to the Equatorial and Bahr Gazelle provinces, and consider those provinces as under the King of the Belgians.

[_P. 160._ Sir E. Baring comments that, owing to interruption of the telegraph line, these and other messages did not reach him till March 12. He instructed Gordon to hold on at Khartoum until he could communicate further with the British Government, and on no account to proceed to the Bahr Gazelle and Equatorial provinces.]

_P. 152. Earl Granville to Sir E. Baring, March 13, 1884._

If General Gordon is of opinion that the prospect of his early departure diminishes the chance of accomplishing his task, and that by staying at Khartoum himself for any length of time which he may judge necessary he would be able to establish a settled Government at that place, he is at liberty to remain there. In the event of his being unable to carry out this suggestion, he should evacuate Khartoum and save that garrison by conducting it himself to Berber without delay.

CROSS PURPOSES (1884).

=Source.=--_Parliamentary Papers_, "Egypt," No. 13 of 1884, C 3,970.

_P. 9. Sir E. Baring to Earl Granville. Cairo, April 8, 1884._

In a telegram from Khartoum, General Gordon says: I wish I could convey to you my impressions of the truly trumpery nature of this revolt, which 500 determined men could put down. Be assured, for present, and for two months hence, we are as safe here as at Cairo. If you would get, by good pay, 3,000 Turkish infantry and 1,000 Turkish cavalry, the affair, including crushing of Mahdi, would be accomplished in four months.

_P. 12. Sir E. Baring to Earl Granville. Cairo, April 18, 1884._

Lately I have been sending telegrams to Berber to be forwarded to Gordon. Since communication between Berber and Khartoum was cut, his telegrams to me have taken from a week to ten days. My telegrams to him appear to have taken even longer, and some, I think, have not reached him at all.

_The Same, Later._

I have received another telegram from Gordon.... It is most unfortunate that of all the telegrams I have sent to him only one very short one appears to have reached him. He evidently thinks he is to be abandoned, and is very indignant.

=Source.=--_Parliamentary Papers_, "Egypt," C 3,998 of 1884.

_P. 1. Gordon to Baring. Telegraphic. Khartoum, April 16, 1884, 5.15 p.m._

As far as I can understand, the situation is this: you state your intention of not sending any relief up here or to Berber, and you refuse me Zobeir. I consider myself free to act according to circumstances. I shall hold on here as long as I can, and if I can suppress the rebellion I shall do so. If I cannot, I shall retire to the Equator, and leave you indelible disgrace of abandoning garrisons of Senaar, Kassala, Berber, and Dongola, with the certainty that you will be eventually forced to smash up the Mahdi under great difficulties if you would retain peace in Egypt.

=Source.=--_Parliamentary Papers_, "Egypt," C 3,970 of 1884.

_P. 15. Earl Granville to Mr. Egerton, April 23, 1884._

Gordon should be at once informed, in cipher, by several messengers at some interval between each, through Dongola as well as Berber, or in such other way as may on the spot be deemed most prompt and certain, that he should keep us informed, to the best of his ability, not only as to immediate but as to any prospective danger at Khartoum; that to be prepared for any such danger he advise us as to the force necessary in order to secure his removal, its amount, character, route for access to Khartoum, and time of operation; that we do not propose to supply him with Turkish or other force for the purpose of undertaking military expeditions, such being beyond the scope of the commission he holds, and at variance with the pacific policy which was the purpose of his mission to the Soudan; that if with this knowledge he continues at Khartoum, he should state to us the cause and intention with which he so continues. Add expressions both of respect and gratitude for his gallant and self-sacrificing conduct, and for the good he has achieved.

=Source.=--_Parliamentary Publications_, "Egypt," No. 21 of 1884, C 4,005.

_Mr. Egerton to Earl Granville. Cairo, May 10, 1884._

The messengers sent in succession by the Governor of Dongola with the ciphered message for Gordon have returned. He telegraphed yesterday that they report that the rebels have invested Khartoum; that, in consequence, excursions in steamers are made on the White Nile in order to attack those on the banks; that the rebels have constructed wooden shelters to protect themselves against the projectiles; when the Government forces pursue them into these shelters, the rebels take flight into the country beyond gun-shot; that this state of things makes it impossible to get into Khartoum.

=Source.=--_Parliamentary Publications_, "Egypt," No. 22 of 1884, C 4,042.

_Earl Granville to Mr. Egerton, May 17, 1884._

The following is the further message which Her Majesty's Government desires to communicate to General Gordon in addition to that contained in my telegram of the 23rd ultimo, which should be repeated to him. Having regard to the time which has elapsed, Her Majesty's Government desires to add to their communication of the 23rd April as follows: As the original plan for the evacuation of the Soudan has been dropped, and as aggressive operations cannot be undertaken with the countenance of Her Majesty's Government, General Gordon is enjoined to consider and either to report upon, or, if feasible, to adopt, at the first proper moment, measures for his own removal and that of the Egyptians at Khartoum who have suffered for him or who have served him faithfully, including their wives and children, by whatever route he may consider best, having especial regard to his own safety and that of the other British subjects. With regard to the Egyptians above referred to, General Gordon is authorized to make free use of money rewards or promises at his discretion. For example, he is at liberty to assign to Egyptian soldiers at Khartoum sums for themselves and for persons brought with them per head, contingent on their safe arrival at Korosko, or whatever point he may consider a place of safety; or he may employ or pay the tribes in the neighbourhood to escort them. In the event of General Gordon having despatched any persons or agents to other points, he is authorized to spend any money required for the purpose of recalling them or securing their safety.

GORDON'S POSITION (1884).

I.

=Source.=--_The Times_, July 29.

Last night at eleven o'clock the British and African Royal Mail steamer _Kinsembo_ arrived in Plymouth Sound, having on board Mr. H. M. Stanley, the African explorer. In the course of a conversation with a correspondent, Mr. Stanley declared that General Gordon might leave Khartoum whenever he chose, and had three routes of escape open to him. He was a soldier, but not a traveller. He would not leave Khartoum ingloriously. He could escape by means of the Congo, the Nile, and across the desert to Zanzibar. He could force his way through the country, because the people would be afraid of an armed force. He is perfectly well supplied with arms and ammunition, and is quite strong enough to meet the Mahdi. Mr. Stanley derides the suggested expedition to Khartoum, and says the men would die like flies when the summer is waning. He says that Gordon only requires to act like a soldier, as he believes he will, to settle the whole difficulty.

II.

=Source.=--Holland's _Life of the Duke of Devonshire_, vol. i., p. 472 _et seq._ (Longmans.)

On 29th July Lord Hartington circulated to the Cabinet his own final memorandum on the subject. He said: "I wish before Parliament is prorogued, and it becomes absolutely impossible to do anything for the relief of General Gordon, to bring the subject once more under the consideration of the Cabinet. On the last occasion when it was discussed, although an opinion was expressed that the balance of probability was that no expedition would be required to enable General Gordon and those dependent on him to leave Khartoum, I gathered that a considerable majority were in favour of making some preparations, and taking some steps which would make a relief expedition to Khartoum possible. I believe that I have already stated the grounds on which I think that if anything is now attempted it must be by the Valley of the Nile, and not by the Suakin-Berber line. The delay which has taken place makes it impossible that the railway should be constructed for any considerable distance on that line during the next autumn and winter, the period during which military operations would be practicable without great suffering and loss of life to the troops. The renewed concentration of the tribes under Osman Digna, near Suakin, and the fall of Berber, makes it inevitable that severe fighting would have to be done at both ends of the march, and, in consequence of the necessity of crossing the desert in small detachments, the engagement near Berber would be fought under great disadvantages. On the other hand, we have for the defence of the Nile itself been compelled to send a considerable force of British and Egyptian troops up the Nile; and the positions which are now occupied by those troops are so many stages on the advance by the Nile Valley.... The proposal which I make is that a brigade should be ordered to advance as soon as possible to Dongola by the Nile.... I have not entered into the question whether it is or is not probable that General Gordon can leave Khartoum without assistance. As we know absolutely nothing, any opinion on this subject can only be guess-work. But I do not see how it is possible to redeem the pledges which we have given, if the necessity should be proved to exist, without some such preparations and measures as those which I now suggest...." Mr. Chamberlain minuted that he was "against what is called an expedition, or the preparations for an expedition." He did not think that the information was sufficient to justify it. He thought that more information should first be obtained.... Mr. Gladstone minuted (July 31): "I confess it to be my strong conviction that to send an expedition either to Dongola or Khartoum at the present time would be to act in the teeth of evidence as to Gordon which, however imperfect, is far from being trivial, and would be a grave and dangerous error." Mr. Gladstone at the same time wrote to Lord Granville a letter, which the latter forwarded to Lord Hartington. He said: "I had intended to give much time to-day to collecting the sum of the evidence as to Gordon's position, which appears to me to be strangely underrated by some.... Undoubtedly I can be no party to the proposed despatch, as a first step, of a brigade to Dongola. I do not think the evidence as to Gordon's position requires or justifies, in itself, military preparations for the contingency of a military expedition. There are, however, preparations, perhaps, of various kinds which might be made, and which are matters simply of cost, and do not include necessary consequences in point of policy. To these I have never offered an insuperable objection, and the adoption of them might be, at the worst, a smaller evil than the evils with which we are threatened in other forms. This on what I may call my side. On the other hand, I hope I may presume that, while we are looking into the matters I have just indicated, nothing will be done to accelerate a Gordon crisis until we see, in the early days of next week, what the Conference crisis is to produce."

GORDON'S OWN MEDITATIONS (1884).

=Source.=--_General Gordon's Journal_, pp. 46, 56, 59, 93, 112. (_Kegan Paul._)

_September 17._--Had Zobeir Pasha been sent up when I asked for him, Berber would in all probability never have fallen, and one might have made a Soudan Government in opposition to the Mahdi. We choose to refuse his coming up because of his antecedents _in re_ slave trade; granted that we had reason, yet as we take no precautions as to the future of these with respect to the slave trade, the above opposition seems absurd. I will not send up A. because he will do this, but will leave the country to B., who will do exactly the same.

_September 19._--I was engaged in a certain work--_i.e._, to take down the garrisons, etc. It suited me altogether to accept this work (when once it was decided on to abandon the Soudan), which, to my idea, is preferable to letting it be under those wretched effete Egyptian Pashas. Her Majesty's Government agreed to send me. It was a mutual affair; they owe me positively nothing, and I owe them nothing. A member of Parliament, in one of our last received papers, asked "whether officers were not supposed to go where they were ordered?" I quite agree with his view, but it cannot be said I was ordered to go. The subject was too complex for any order. It was, "Will you go and try?" and my answer was, "Only too delighted." As for all that may be said of our holding out, etc., etc., it is all twaddle, for we had no option; as for all that may be said as to why I did not escape with Stewart, it is simply because the people would not have been such fools as to have let me go, so there is an end of those great-coats of self-sacrifice, etc. I must add _in re_ "the people not letting me go," that even if they had been willing for me to go, I would not have gone, and left them in their misery.

_September 19._--Anyone reading the telegram 5th May, Suakin, 29th April, Massowah, and _without_ date, Egerton saying, "Her Majesty's Government does not entertain your proposal to supply Turkish or other troops in order to undertake military operations in the Soudan, and consequently if you stay at Kartoum you should state your reasons," might imagine one was luxuriating up here, whereas, I am sure, no one wishes more to be out of this than myself; the _reasons_ are those horribly plucky Arabs. I own to having been very insubordinate to Her Majesty's Government and its officials, but it is my nature, and I cannot help it.

_September 24._--I altogether _decline_ the imputation that the projected expedition has come to _relieve me_. It has _come to save our national honour in extricating the garrisons, etc., from a position our action in Egypt has placed those garrisons_. As to myself, I could make good my retreat at any moment if I wished.

_September 29._--My idea is to induce Her Majesty's Government to undertake the extrication of all people or garrisons, now hemmed in or captive, and that if this is not their programme then to resign my commission and do what I can to attain it (the object).... I say this, because I should be sorry for Lord Wolseley to advance from Dongola without fully knowing my views. If Her Majesty's Government are going to abandon the garrisons, then do not advance. I say nothing of evacuating the country; I merely maintain that if we do so, everyone in the Soudan, captive or hemmed in, ought to have the option and power of retreat.

THE FRANCHISE AND REDISTRIBUTION (1884).

=Source.=--_The Times_, November 19.

The Representation of the People Bill was yesterday read a second time in the House of Lords without a division, and without discussion upon anything it contains.... The terms offered by the Government, and now definitely accepted by the Opposition, are, first, that the draft of the Redistribution Bill shall be submitted in private to the Conservative leaders, in order that, by suggesting the alterations they think necessary, they may convince themselves of the equity and fairness of the measure. In the second place, it is agreed that, when a Redistribution Bill satisfactory to both parties has been framed, the Opposition will give to the Government adequate assurance that the Franchise Bill shall pass the House of Lords.... Lastly, the Government pledge themselves to take up the Redistribution Bill as early as possible in the New Year, to push it through its remaining stages with all possible expedition, and, relying upon the loyal support of the Opposition being given to the joint scheme, to stake not only their credit but their existence upon the passing of the Bill into law in the Session of 1885.

FEEDING POOR SCHOOL CHILDREN (1884).

=Source.=--_The Times_, December 13.

The question of providing penny dinners for the children of the London poor has received pretty ample discussion. Everybody can form an idea now of the difficulties which will have to be surmounted by the central committee of School Board managers and teachers.... The vital principle of the scheme is that the dinners shall be supplied on a self-supporting basis. In some places the work has been undertaken with more zeal than knowledge, and there has been quick disappointment. The Vicar of St. Mark's, Walworth, who seems to doubt whether the scheme can be carried out on purely commercial lines, tells us how fastidious are the children of the poor. They turn from macaroni; they dislike the flavour of cabbage boiled up in a stew; they will have nothing to say to haricot beans, lentils, or salads; they mistrust soup; and are generally most attracted by suet dumplings and jam or currant puddings.

THE DEATH OF GORDON (1885).

=Source.=--Sir Reginald Wingate's _Mahdiism and the Egyptian Soudan_, pp. 166-172. (Macmillans.)

Soon all that had been in the commissariat was finished, and then the inhabitants and the soldiers had to eat dogs, donkeys, skins of animals, gum, and palm fibre, and famine prevailed. The soldiers stood on the fortifications like pieces of wood. The civilians were even worse off. Many died of hunger, and corpses filled the streets; no one had even energy to bury them.... We were heartbroken; the people and soldiers began to lose faith in Gordon's promises, and they were terribly weak from famine. At last Sunday morning broke, and Gordon Pasha, who used always to watch the enemy's movements from the top of the palace, noticed a considerable movement in the south, which looked as if the Arabs were collecting at Kalakala. He at once sent word to all of us who had attended the previous meeting, and to a few others, to come at once to the palace. We all came, but Gordon Pasha did not see us. We were again addressed by Giriagis Bey, who said he had been told by Gordon Pasha to inform us that he noticed much movement in the enemy's lines, and believed an attack would be made on the town; he therefore ordered us to collect every male in the town from the age of eight, even to the old men, and to line all the fortifications, and that if we had difficulty in getting this order obeyed we were to use force. Giriagis said that Gordon Pasha now appealed to us for the last time to make a determined stand, for in twenty-four hours' time he had no doubt the English would arrive; but that if we preferred to submit then, he gave the commandant liberty to open the gates, and let all join the rebels. He had nothing more to say. I then asked to be allowed to see the Pasha, and was admitted to his presence. I found him sitting on a divan, and as I came in he pulled off his tarboush (fez) and flung it from him, saying, "What more can I say? I have nothing more to say; the people will no longer believe me; I have told them over and over again that help would be here, but it has never come, and now they must see I tell them lies. If this, my last promise, fails, I can do nothing more. Go and collect all the people you can on the lines, and make a good stand. Now leave me to smoke these cigarettes." (There were two full boxes of cigarettes on the table.) I could see he was in despair, and he spoke in a tone I had never heard before. I knew then that he had been too agitated to address the meeting, and thought the sight of his despair would dishearten us. All the anxiety he had undergone had gradually turned his hair to a snowy white. I left him, and this was the last time I saw him alive.... It was a gloomy day, that last day in Khartoum; hundreds lay dead and dying in the streets from starvation, and there were none to bury them. At length the night came, and, as I afterwards learnt, Gordon Pasha sat up writing till midnight, and then lay down to sleep. He awoke some time between two and three a.m. The wild war-cries of the Arabs were heard close at hand. A large body of rebels had crept in the dark close up to the broken-down parapet and filled-up ditch, between the White Nile and the Messalamieh Gate. The soldiers never knew of the enemy's approach until about twenty minutes before they were actually attacked, when the tramp of feet was heard, and the alarm was sounded; but they were so tired out and exhausted that it was not until the sentries fired that the rest of the men suddenly started up surprised, to find swarms of Arabs pouring over the ditch and up the parapet, yelling and shouting their war-cries. Here they met with little resistance, for most of the soldiers were four or five paces apart, and were too feeble to oppose such a rush. The Arabs were soon within the lines, and thus able to attack the rest of the soldiers from behind. They were opposed at some points, but it was soon all over.... Meanwhile Gordon Pasha, on being roused by the noise, went on to the roof of the palace in his sleeping clothes. He soon made out that the rebels had entered the town, and for upwards of an hour he kept up a hot fire in the direction of the attack. I heard that he also sent word to get up steam in the steamer, but the engineer was not there; he had been too frightened to leave his house. As dawn approached Gordon Pasha could see the Arab banners in the town, and soon the gun became useless, for he could not depress it enough to fire on the enemy. By this time the Arabs had crowded round the palace in thousands, but for a time no one dared enter, for they thought mines were laid to blow them up. Meanwhile Gordon Pasha had left the roof; he went to his bedroom, which was close to the divan, and there he put on a white uniform, his sword, which he did not draw, and, carrying his revolver in his right hand, stepped out into the passage in front of the entrance to the office, and just at the head of the staircase. During this interval four men, more brave than the rest, forced their way into the palace, and once in were followed by hundreds of others. Of these latter, the majority rushed up the stairs to the roof, where, after a short resistance, the palace guard, servants, and cavasses were all killed; while the four men--Taha Shahin, a Dongolawi, whose father was formerly in my service; Ibrahim Abu Shanab, servant of George Angelleto; Hamad Wad Ahmed Jar en Nebbi, Hassani; and a fourth, also a Dongolawi, servant to Fathallah Jehami--followed by a crowd of others, knowing Gordon Pasha's room, rushed towards it. Taha Shahin was the first to encounter Gordon beside the door of the divan, apparently waiting for the Arabs, and standing with a calm and dignified manner, his left hand resting on the hilt of his sword. Shahin, dashing forward with the curse "Mala' oun el yom yomek!" (O cursed one, your time is come!), plunged his spear into his body. Gordon, it is said, made a gesture of scorn with his right hand, and turned his back, where he received another spear wound, which caused him to fall forward, and was most likely his mortal wound. The other three men, closely following Shahin, then rushed in, and, cutting at the prostrate body with their swords, must have killed him in a few seconds. His death occurred just before sunrise. He made no resistance, and did not fire a shot from his revolver. From all I knew, I am convinced that he never intended to surrender. I should say he must have intended to use his revolver only if he saw it was the intention of the Arabs to take him prisoner alive; but he saw such crowds rushing on him with swords and spears, and there being no important emirs with them, he must have known that they did not intend to spare him, and that was most likely what he wanted.... Gordon Pasha's head was immediately cut off and sent to the Mahdi at Omdurman, while his body was dragged downstairs and left exposed for a time in the garden, where many Arabs came to plunge their spears into it. I heard that the Mahdi had given orders for Gordon to be spared, but what I have stated was told me by the four men I have mentioned, and I believe the Mahdi pardoned them for their disobedience of orders.... I saw Gordon Pasha's head exposed in Omdurman. It was fixed between the branches of a tree, and all who passed by threw stones at it.

[NOTE.--This account is from the journal of Bordeini Bey, an eminent Khartoum merchant, who willingly gave up his large stores of grain to Gordon for the supply of the garrison. He was taken prisoner at the fall of the city.]

THE GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSIBILITY (1885).

=Source.=--Lord Cromer's _Modern Egypt_, vol. i., p. 589. (Macmillans.)

It has been already shown that General Gordon paid little heed to his instructions, that he was consumed with a desire to "smash the Mahdi," and that the view that he was constrained to withdraw everyone who wished to leave from the most distant parts of the Soudan was, to say the least, quixotic. The conclusion to be drawn from these facts is that it was a mistake to send General Gordon to the Soudan. But do they afford any justification for the delay in preparing and in despatching the relief expedition? I cannot think that they do so. Whatever errors of judgment General Gordon may have committed, the broad facts, as they existed in the early summer of 1884, were that he was sent to Khartoum by the British Government, who never denied their responsibility for his safety, that he was beleaguered, and that he was, therefore, unable to get away. It is just possible that he could have effected his retreat, if, having abandoned the southern posts, he had moved northward with the Khartoum garrison in April or early in May. As time went on, and nothing was heard of him, it became more and more clear that he either could not or would not--probably that he could not--move. The most indulgent critic would scarcely extend beyond June 27 the date at which the Government should have decided on the question of whether a relief expedition should or should not be despatched. On that day the news that Berber had been captured on May 26 by the Dervishes was finally confirmed. Yet it was not till six weeks later that the Government obtained from Parliament the funds necessary to prepare for an expedition.

THE VOTE OF CENSURE (1885).

=Source.=--_Hansard_, Third Series, vol. 294, col. 1311. (House of Lords debate on Egypt, February 26, 1885.)