Chapter IX: Introduction (2)

497. If it is intended only to delay the enemy, a fairly strong deployment is sufficient, but if decisive results are desired, a change to the offensive must be contemplated and the corresponding strength in rear provided. This strength is in the reserve, which should be as large as the demands of the firing line and supports permit. Even in a passive defense the reserve should be as strong as in the attack, unless the flanks are protected by other means.

498. Supports are posted as close to the firing line as practicable and reinforce the latter according to the principles explained in the attack. When natural cover is not sufficient for the purpose, communicating and cover trenches are constructed. If time does not permit their construction, it is better to begin the action with a very dense firing line and no immediate supports than to have supports greatly exposed in rear.

499. The reserve should be posted so as to be entirely free to act as a whole, according to the developments. The distance from firing line to reserve is generally greater than in the attack. By reason of such a location the reserve is best able to meet a hostile enveloping attack; it has a better position from which to make a counter attack; it is in a better position to cover a withdrawal and permit an orderly retreat.

The distance from firing line to reserve increases with the size of the reserve.

500. When the situation is no longer in doubt, the reserve should be held in rear of the flank which is most in danger or offers the best opportunity for counterattack. Usually the same flank best suits both purposes.

501. In exceptional cases, on broad fronts, it may be necessary to detach a part of the reserve to protect the opposite flank. This detachment should be the smallest consistent with its purely protective mission.

502. The commander assigns to subordinates the front to be occupied by them. These, in turn, subdivide the front among their next lower units in the firing line.

503. An extended position is so divided into sections that each has, if practicable, a field of fire naturally made distinct by the terrain.

Unfavorable and unimportant ground will ordinarily cause gaps to exist in the line.

504. The size of the unit occupying each section depends upon the latter's natural strength, front, and importance. If practicable, battalions should be kept intact and assigned as units to sections or parts of sections.

505. Where important dead space lies in front of one section, an adjoining section should be instructed to cover it with fire when necessary, or machine guns should be concealed for the like purpose.

506. Advanced posts, or any other form of unnecessary dispersion, should be avoided.

507. Unless the difficulty of moving the troops into the position be great, most of the troops of the firing line are held in rear of it until the infantry attack begins. The position itself is occupied by a small garrison only, with the necessary outguards or patrols in front.

508. Fire alone can not be depended upon to stop the attack. The troops must be determined to resort to the bayonet, if necessary.

509. If a night attack or close approach by the enemy is expected, troops in a prepared position should strengthen the outguards and firing line and construct as numerous and effective obstacles as possible. Supports and local reserves should move close to the firing line and should, with the firing line, keep bayonets fixed. If practicable, the front should be illuminated, preferably from the flanks of the section.

510. Only short range fire is of any value in resisting night attacks. The bayonet is the chief reliance. (See Night Operations.)

_COUNTERATTACK._

511. The passive defense should be assumed only when circumstances force it. Only the offensive wins.

512. An active defense seeks a favorable decision. A favorable decision can not be expected without counterattack.

513. A passive defense in a position whose flanks are not protected by natural obstacles is generally out of the question.

514. Where the defense is assumed with a view to making a counterattack, the troops for the counterattack should be held in reserve until the time arrives for such attack. The defensive line should be held by as few troops as possible in order that the force for the offensive may be as large as possible.

The force for the counterattack should be held echeloned in rear of the flank which offers it the greatest advantage for the proposed attack.

515. The counterattack should be made vigorously and at the proper time. It will usually be made:

By launching the reserve against the enemy's flank when his attack is in full progress. This is the most effective form of counterattack.

Straight to the front by the firing line and supports after repulsing the enemy's attack and demoralizing him with pursuing fire.

Or, by the troops in rear of the firing line when the enemy has reached the defensive position and is in disorder.

516. Minor counterattacks are sometimes necessary in order to drive the enemy from important positions gained by him.

_DELAYING ACTION._

517. When a position is taken merely to delay the enemy and to withdraw before becoming closely engaged, the important considerations are:

The enemy should be forced to deploy early. The field of fire should therefore be good at distances from 500 to 1,200 yards or more; a good field of fire at close range is not necessary.

The ground in rear of the position should favor the withdrawal of the firing line by screening the troops from the enemy's view and fire as soon as the position is vacated.

518. A thin firing line using much ammunition will generally answer the purpose. Supports are needed chiefly to protect the flanks.

The reserve should be posted well in rear to assist in the withdrawal of the firing line.

519. Artillery is especially valuable to a delaying force.

MEETING ENGAGEMENTS.

520. Meeting engagements are characterized by the necessity for hasty reconnaissance, or the almost total absence of reconnaissance; by the necessity for rapid deployment, frequently under fire; and usually by the absence of trenches or other artificial cover. These conditions give further advantages to the offensive.

521. The whole situation will usually indicate beforehand the proper general action to be taken on meeting the enemy.

522. Little fresh information can be expected. The boldness, initiative, and determination of the commander must be relied upon.

523. A meeting engagement affords an ideal opportunity to the commander who has intuition and quick decision and who is willing to take long chances. His opponent is likely to be overcautious.

524. The amount of information that the commander is warranted in awaiting before taking final action depends entirely upon his mission. One situation may demand a blind attack; another may demand rapid, partial deployment for attack, but careful and time-consuming reconnaissance before the attack is launched.

525. A great advantage accrues to the side which can deploy the faster. The advantage of a close-order formation, favoring rapid deployment, becomes more pronounced with the size of the force.

526. The first troops to deploy will be able to attack with longer firing lines and weaker supports than are required in the ordinary case. But if the enemy succeeds in deploying a strong, defensive line, the attack must be strengthened accordingly before it is wasted.

527. If the situation warrants the advance, the leading troops seek to deploy faster than the enemy, to reach his flanks, check his deployment, and get information. In any event, they seek to cover the deployment of their own troops in rear--especially the artillery--and to seize important ground.

528. The commander of a long column which meets the enemy should be with the advance guard to receive information promptly and to reconnoiter. If he decides to fight, the advance guard must hold the enemy while the commander formulates a plan of action, issues the necessary orders, and deploys the main body. Meantime, the column should be closing up, either in mass or to form line of columns, so that the deployment, when determined upon, may be made more promptly.

529. The action of the advance guard, prior to the receipt of orders, depends upon the situation. Whether to attack determinedly or only as a feint, or to assume the defensive, depends upon the strength of the advance guard, the terrain, the character of the hostile force encountered, and the mission and intentions of the commander of the whole.

530. If the enemy is beforehand or more aggressive, or if the advance guard is too weak, it may be necessary to put elements of the main body into action as fast as they arrive, in order to check him. This method should be avoided; it prevents the formation and execution of a definite plan and compels piecemeal action. The best results are obtained when the main body is used as a whole.

WITHDRAWAL FROM ACTION.

531. The withdrawal of a defeated force can generally be effected only at a heavy cost. When it is no longer possible to give the action a favorable turn and the necessity for withdrawal arises, every effort must be made to place distance and a rear guard between the enemy and the defeated troops.

532. Artillery gives especially valuable assistance in the withdrawal. The long-range fire of machine guns should also be employed. Cavalry assists the withdrawal by charging the pursuing troops or by taking flank positions and using fire action.

533. If an intact reserve remains it should be placed in a covering position, preferably on a flank, to check the pursuit and thus enable the defeated troops to withdraw beyond reach of hostile fire.

The covering position of the reserve should be at some distance from the main action, but close enough to bring the withdrawing troops quickly under the protection of its fire. It should have a good field of fire at effective and long ranges and should facilitate its own safe and timely withdrawal.

534. If the general line is divided, by terrain or by organization, into two or more parts, the firing line of the part in the least danger from pursuit should be withdrawn first. A continuous firing line, whose parts are dependent upon one another for fire support, should be withdrawn as a whole, retiring by echelon at the beginning of the withdrawal. Every effort must be made to restore the organizations, regain control, and form column of march as soon as the troops are beyond the reach of hostile fire.

As fast as possible without delaying the march, companies, and the larger units should be re-formed, so that the command will again be well in hand.

535. The commander of the whole, having given orders for withdrawal, should go to the rear, select a rendezvous point, and devote himself to the reorganization of his command.

The rendezvous point is selected with regard to the natural channels of movement approximately straight to the rear. It should be distant from the battle field and should facilitate the gathering and protection of the command.

SUMMARY.

536. 1. Avoid combats that offer no chance of victory or other valuable results.

2. Make every effort for the success of the general plan and avoid spectacular plays that have no bearing on the general result.

3. Have a definite plan and carry it out vigorously. Do not vacillate.

4. Do not attempt complicated maneuvers.

5. Keep the command in hand; avoid undue extension and dispersion.

6. Study the ground and direct the advance in such a way as to take advantage of all available cover and thereby diminish losses.

7. Never deploy until the purpose and the proper direction are known.

8. Deploy enough men for the immediate task in hand; hold out the rest and avoid undue haste in committing them to the action.

9. Flanks must be protected either by reserves, fortifications, or the terrain.

10. In a decisive action, gain and keep fire superiority.

11. Keep up reconnaissance.

12. Use the reserve, but not until needed or a very favorable opportunity for its use presents itself. Keep some reserve as long as practicable.

13. Do not hesitate to sacrifice the command if the result is worth the cost.

14. Spare the command all unnecessary hardship and exertion.

MISCELLANEOUS.

_MACHINE GUNS._

537. Machine guns must be considered as weapons of emergency. Their effectiveness combined with their mobility renders them of great value at critical, though infrequent, periods of an engagement.

538. When operating against infantry only, they can be used to a great extent throughout the combat as circumstances may indicate, but they are quickly rendered powerless by efficient field artillery and will promptly draw artillery fire whenever they open. Hence their use in engagements between large commands must be for short periods and at times when their great effectiveness will be most valuable.

539. Machine guns should be attached to the advance guard. In meeting engagements they will be of great value in assisting their own advance, or in checking the advance of the enemy, and will have considerable time to operate before hostile artillery fire can silence them.

Care must be taken not to leave them too long in action.

540. They are valuable to a rear guard which seeks to check a vigorous pursuit or to gain time.

541. In attack, if fire of position is practicable, they are of great value. In this case fire should not be opened by the machine guns until the attack is well advanced. At a critical period in the attack, such fire, if suddenly and unexpectedly opened, will greatly assist the advancing line. The fire must be as heavy as possible and must be continued until masked by friendly troops or until the hostile artillery finds the machine guns.

542. In the defense, machine guns should be used in the same general manner as described above for the attack. Concealment and patient waiting for critical moments and exceptional opportunities are the special characteristics of the machine gun service in decisive actions.

543. As part of the reserve, machine guns have special importance. If they are with the troops told off to protect the flanks, and if they are well placed, they will often produce decisive results against a hostile turning movement. They are especially qualified to cover a withdrawal or make a captured position secure.

544. Machine guns should not be assigned to the firing line of an attack. They should be so placed that fire directed upon them is not likely to fall upon the firing line.

545. A skirmish line can not advance by walking or running when hostile machine guns have the correct range and are ready to fire. Machine-gun fire is not specially effective against troops lying on the ground or crawling.

546. When opposed by machine guns and without artillery to destroy them, infantry itself must silence them before it can advance.

An infantry command that must depend upon itself for protection against machine guns should concentrate a large number of rifles on each gun in turn and until it has silenced it.

_AMMUNITION SUPPLY._

547. The method of supply of ammunition to the combat trains is explained in Field Service Regulations.

548. The combat train is the immediate reserve supply of the battalion, and the major is responsible for its proper use. He will take measures to insure the maintenance of the prescribed allowance at all times.

In the absence of instructions, he will cause the train to march immediately in rear of his battalion, and, upon separating from it to enter an engagement, will cause the ammunition therein to be issued. When emptied, he will direct that the wagons proceed to the proper rendezvous to be refilled. Ordinarily a rendezvous is appointed for each brigade and the necessary number of wagons sent forward to it from the ammunition column.

549. When refilled, the combat wagons will rejoin their battalions, or, if the latter be engaged, will join or establish communication with the regimental reserve.

550. Company commanders are responsible that the belts of the men in their companies are kept filled at all times, except when the ammunition is being expended in action. In the firing line the ammunition of the dead and wounded should be secured whenever practicable.

551. Ammunition in the bandoleers will ordinarily be expended first. Thirty rounds in the right pocket section of the belt will be held as a reserve, to be expended only when ordered by an officer.

552. When necessary to resupply the firing line, ammunition will be sent forward with reenforcements, generally from the regimental reserve.

Men will never be sent back from the firing line for ammunition. Men sent forward with ammunition remain with the firing line.

553. As soon as possible after an engagement the belts of the men and the combat wagons are resupplied to their normal capacities. Ammunition which can not be reloaded on combat wagons will be piled up in a convenient place and left under guard.

_MOUNTED SCOUTS._

554. The mounted scouts should be thoroughly trained in patrolling and reconnaissance. They are used for communication with neighboring troops, for patrolling off the route of march, for march outposts, outpost patrols, combat patrols, reconnaissance ahead of columns, etc. Their further use is, in general, confined to escort and messenger duty. They should be freely used for all these purposes, but for these purposes only.

555. When infantry is acting alone, or when the cavalry of a mixed command has been sent to a distance, the mounted scouts are of special importance to covering detachments and should be used to make the reconnaissance which would otherwise fall to cavalry.

556. In reconnaissance, scouts should be used in preference to other troops as much as possible. When not needed for mounted duty, they should be employed for necessary dismounted patrolling.

557. Battalion staff officers should be specially trained in patrolling and reconnaissance work in order that they may be available when a mounted officer's patrol is required.

_NIGHT OPERATIONS._

558. By employing night operations troops make use of the cover of darkness to minimize losses from hostile fire or to escape observation. Night operations may also be necessary for the purpose of gaining time. Control is difficult and confusion is frequently unavoidable.

It may be necessary to take advantage of darkness in order to assault from a point gained during the day, or to approach a point from which a daylight assault is to be made, or to effect both the approach and the assault.

559. Offensive and defensive night operations should be practiced frequently in order that troops may learn to cover ground in the dark and arrive at a destination quietly and in good order, and in order to train officers in the necessary preparation and reconnaissance.

Only simple and well-appointed formations should be employed.

Troops should be thoroughly trained in the necessary details--e.g., night patrolling, night marching, and communication at night.

560. The ground to be traversed should be studied by daylight and, if practicable, at night. It should be cleared of hostile detachments before dark, and, if practicable, should be occupied by covering troops.

Orders must be formulated with great care and clearness. Each unit must be given a definite objective and direction, and care must be exercised to avoid collision between units.

Whenever contact with the enemy is anticipated, a distinctive badge should be worn by all.

561. Preparations must be made with secrecy. When the movement is started, and not until then, the officers and men should be acquainted with the general design, the composition of the whole force, and should be given such additional information as will insure cooperation and eliminate mistakes.

During the movement every precaution must be taken to keep secret the fact that troops are abroad.

Unfriendly guides must frequently be impressed. These should be secured against escape, outcry, or deception.

Fire action should be avoided in offensive operations. In general, pieces should not be loaded. Men must be trained to rely upon the bayonet and to use it aggressively.

562. Long night marches should be made only over well-defined routes. March discipline must be rigidly enforced. The troops should be marched in as compact a formation as practicable, with the usual covering detachments. Advance and rear guard distances should be greatly reduced. They are shortest when the mission is an offensive one. The connecting files are numerous.

563. A night advance made with a view to making an attack by day usually terminates with the hasty construction of intrenchments in the dark. Such an advance should be timed so as to allow an hour or more of darkness for intrenching.

An advance that is to terminate in an assault at the break of day should be timed so that the troops will not arrive long before the assault is to be made; otherwise the advantage of partial surprise will be lost and the enemy will be allowed to reenforce the threatened point.

564. The night attack is ordinarily confined to small forces, or to minor engagements in a general battle, or to seizure of positions occupied by covering or advanced detachments. Decisive results are not often obtained.

Poorly disciplined and untrained troops are unfit for night attacks or for night operations demanding the exercise of skill and care.

Troops attacking at night can advance close to the enemy in compact formations and without suffering loss from hostile artillery or infantry fire. The defender is ignorant of the strength or direction of the attack.

A force which makes a vigorous bayonet charge in the dark will often throw a much larger force into disorder.

565. Reconnaissance should be made to ascertain the position and strength of the enemy and to study the terrain to be traversed. Officers who are to participate in the attack should conduct this reconnaissance. Reconnaissance at night is especially valuable. Features that are distinguishable at night should be carefully noted, and their distances from the enemy, from the starting point of the troops, and from other important points should be made known.

Preparations should have in view as complete a surprise as possible. An attack once begun must be carried to its conclusion, even if the surprise is not as complete as was planned or anticipated.

566. The time of night at which the attack should be made depends upon the object sought. If a decisive attack is intended, it will generally yield the best results if made just before daylight. If the object is merely to gain an intrenched position for further operations, an earlier hour is necessary in order that the position gained may be intrenched under cover of darkness.

567. The formation for attack must be simple. It should be carefully effected and the troops verified at a safe distance from the enemy. The attacking troops should be formed in compact lines and with strong supports at short distances. The reserve should be far enough in rear to avoid being drawn into the action until the commander so desires. Bayonets are fixed, pieces are not loaded.

Darkness causes fire to be wild and ineffective. The attacking troops should march steadily on the enemy without firing, but should be prepared and determined to fight vigorously with the bayonet.

In advancing to the attack the aim should be to get as close as possible to the enemy before being discovered, then to trust to the bayonet.

If the assault is successful, preparations must be made at once to repel a counterattack.

568. On the defense, preparations to resist night attacks should be made by daylight whenever such attacks are to be feared.

Obstacles placed in front of a defensive position are especially valuable to the defense at night. Many forms of obstacles which would give an attacker little concern in the daytime become serious hindrances at night.

After dark the foreground should be illuminated whenever practicable and strong patrols should be pushed to the front.

When it is learned that the enemy is approaching, the trenches are filled and the supports moved close to the firing line.

Supports fix bayonets, but do not load. Whenever practicable and necessary they should be used for counterattacks, preferably against a hostile flank.

The defender should open fire as soon as results may be expected. This fire may avert or postpone the bayonet combat, and it warns all supporting troops. It is not likely that fire alone can stop the attack. The defender must be resolved to fight with the bayonet.

Ordinarily fire will not be effective at ranges exceeding 50 yards.

A white rag around the muzzle of the rifle will assist in sighting the piece when the front sight is not visible.

See paragraphs 450, 482, 483, 509, 510.

_INFANTRY AGAINST CAVALRY._

569. A cavalry charge can accomplish little against infantry, even in inferior numbers, unless the latter are surprised, become panic-stricken, run away, or can not use their rifles.

570. A charge from the front is easily checked by a well-directed and sustained fire.

If the charge is directed against the flank of the firing line, the supports, reserves, or machine guns should stop it. If this disposition is impracticable, part of the line must meet the charge by a timely change of front. If the flank company, or companies, in the firing line execute _platoons right_, the successive firing lines can ordinarily break a charge against the flank. If the cavalry line passes through the firing line, the latter will be little damaged if the men retain their presence of mind. They should be on the watch for succeeding cavalry lines and leave those that have passed through to friendly troops in rear.

571. Men standing are in the best position to meet a charge, but other considerations may compel them to meet it lying prone.

572. In a mêlée, the infantryman with his bayonet has at least an even chance with the cavalryman, but the main dependence of infantry is rifle fire. Any formation is suitable that permits the free use of the necessary number of rifles.

Ordinarily there will be no time to change or set sights. Fire at will at battle sight should be used, whatever the range may be. It will usually be unwise to open fire at long ranges.

573. An infantry column that encounters cavalry should deploy at once. If attacked from the head or rear of the column, and if time is pressing, it may form a succession of skirmish lines. Infantry, by deploying 50 or 100 yards in rear of an obstacle, may check cavalry and hold it under fire beyond effective pistol range.

In any situation, to try to escape the issue by running is the worst and most dangerous course the infantry can adopt.

574. In attacking dismounted cavalry, infantry should close rapidly and endeavor to prevent remounting. Infantry which adopts this course will not be seriously checked by delaying cavalry.

Every effort should be made to locate and open fire on the led horses.

_INFANTRY AGAINST ARTILLERY._

575. A frontal attack against artillery has little chance of succeeding unless it can be started from cover at comparatively short range. Beyond short range, the frontal fire of infantry has little effect against the artillery personnel because of their protective shields.

Machine guns, because their cone of fire is more compact, will have greater effect, but on the other hand they will have fewer opportunities and they are limited to fire attack only.

As a rule, one's own artillery is the best weapon against hostile artillery.

576. Artillery attacked in flank by infantry can be severely damaged. Oblique or flank fire will begin to have decisive effect when delivered at effective range from a point to one side of the artillery's line of fire and distant from it by about half the range. Artillery is better protected on the side of the caisson.

577. Guns out of ammunition, but otherwise secure against infantry attack, may be immobilized by fire which will prevent their withdrawal, or by locating and driving off their limbers. Or they may be kept out of action by fire which will prevent the receipt of ammunition.

578. Artillery when limbered is helpless against infantry fire. If caught at effective range while coming into action or while limbering, artillery can be severely punished by infantry fire.

In attacking artillery that is trying to escape, the wheel horses are the best targets.

_ARTILLERY SUPPORTS._

579. The purpose of the artillery support is to guard the artillery against surprise or attack.

Artillery on the march or in action is ordinarily so placed as to be amply protected by the infantry. Infantry always protects artillery in its neighborhood.

580. The detail of a support is not necessary except when the artillery is separated from the main body or occupies a position in which its flanks are not protected.

The detail of a special support will be avoided whenever possible.

581. The formation of an artillery support depends upon circumstances. On the march it may often be necessary to provide advance, flank, and rear protection. The country must be thoroughly reconnoitered by patrols within long rifle range.

582. In action, the formation and location of the support must be such as to gain and give timely information of the enemy's approach and to offer actual resistance to the enemy beyond effective rifle range of the artillery's flanks. It should not be close enough to the artillery to suffer from fire directed at the artillery. In most cases a position somewhat to the flank and rear best fulfills these conditions.

583. The support commander is charged only with the protection of the artillery. The tactical employment of each arm rests with its commander. The two should cooperate.

_INTRENCHMENTS._

(Plate V.)

584. Ordinarily, infantry intrenches itself whenever it is compelled to halt for a considerable time in the presence of the enemy.

Infantry charged with a resisting mission should intrench whenever there is any likelihood that the cover constructed will be of use.

585. Except in permanent fortifications or in fortifications prepared long in advance, the infantry plans and constructs the field works that it will occupy.

When performing their duties in this connection officers should bear in mind that profile and construction are simple matters compared with location and correct tactical use.

586. Intrenchments enable the commander to hold a position with the least possible number of men and to prolong his line or increase his reserve.

They are constructed with a view to giving cover which will diminish losses, but they must not be so built or placed as to interfere with the free use of the rifle. Fire effect is the first consideration.

587. The trace of a fire trench or of a system of fire trenches depends upon the ground and the proposed density of the entire firing line. The trenches are laid out in company lengths, if possible.

Adjoining trenches should afford each other mutual support. The flanks and important gaps in the line should be protected by fire trenches echeloned in rear. (Fig. 6).

588. To locate the trace, lie on the ground at intervals and select the best field of fire consistent with the requirements of the situation.

A profile should be selected which will permit the fire to sweep the foreground, require the minimum of labor and time, and permit the best concealment. No fixed type can be prescribed. The type must be selected with due regard to the terrain, the enemy, time, tools, materials, soil, etc.

589. _Hasty cover._ With the intrenching tool, troops can quickly throw up a low parapet about 3 feet thick which will furnish considerable cover against rifle fire, but scarcely any against shrapnel. Such cover is frequently of value to an attack that is temporarily unable to continue. In time, and particularly at night, it may be developed into a deep fire or cover trench.

590. _Fire trenches_ should be placed and constructed so as to give a good field of fire and to give the troops protection behind a vertical wall, preferably with some head or overhead cover. They should be concealed or inconspicuous in order to avoid artillery fire or to decrease its accuracy. They should have natural or artificial communication with their supports, but in establishing the trace this is a secondary consideration.

The simplest form of fire trench is deep and narrow and has a flat, concealed parapet. (Fig. 1.) In ordinary soil, and on a basis of two reliefs and tasks of 5 feet, it can be constructed in about two hours with intrenching tools.

This trench affords fair cover for troops subjected to fire, but not actually firing. When it is probable that time will permit elaboration, the simple trench should be planned with a view to developing it ultimately into a more complete form. (Figs. 2 and 3.) Devices should be added to increase the security of the trench and the comfort of the men.

Where the excavated earth is easily removed, a fire trench without parapet may be the one best suited to the soil and other conditions affecting the choice of profile. (Fig. 4.) The enemy's infantry, as well as his artillery, will generally have great difficulty in seeing this type of trench.

In very difficult soil, if the time is short, it may be necessary to dig a wider, shallower trench with a higher parapet.

Head cover, notches, and loop holes are of value to troops when firing, but many forms weaken and disclose the location of the parapet. Filled sandbags kept in the trench when the men are not firing may be thrown on the parapet to form notches or loopholes when the troops in the trench open fire and concealment of the trench is no longer necessary or possible.

By the use of observation stations the maximum rest and security is afforded the troops. Stations are best located in the angles of traverses or at the end of the trench.

591. Where the nature of the position makes it advisable to construct traverses at regular intervals it is generally best to construct a section of trench for each squad, with traverses between squads. (Fig. 5.)

592. _Cover trenches_ are placed as closely as practicable to their respective fire trenches. Where natural cover is not available, each fire trench should have artificial cover in rear for its support--either a cover trench of its own or one in common with an adjoining fire trench.

The cover trench is simple and rectangular in profile. Concealment is indispensable. It is generally concealed by the contour of the ground or by natural features, but to guard against hostile searching fire overhead cover is frequently advisable.

Cover trenches should be made as comfortable as possible. It will often be advisable to make them extensive enough to provide cooking and resting facilities for the garrisons of the corresponding fire trenches.

593. _Communicating trenches_ are frequently necessary in order to connect fire trenches with their corresponding cover trenches where natural, covered communication is impracticable. They are generally rectangular in profile, deep, and narrow. They are traversed or zigzagged to escape enfilade.

Returns or pockets should be provided for use as latrines, storerooms, dressing stations, passing points for troops, etc.

Cover from observation while passing through the trench may insure against loss as effectively as material cover from the enemy's fire.

_Communicating ways_, naturally or artificially screened from the enemy's view, sometimes provide sufficient cover for the passage of troops.

594. _Dummy trenches_ frequently draw the enemy's attention and fire and thus protect the true fire trench.

Any type is suitable which presents to the enemy the appearance of a true trench imperfectly concealed.

595. When it is uncertain whether time will permit the completion of all the work planned, work should proceed with due regard to the order of importance of the several operations. Ordinarily the order of importance will be:

1. Clearing foreground to improve the field of fire and construction of fire trench.

2. Head or overhead cover; concealment.

3. Placing obstacles and recording ranges.

4. Cover trenches for supports and local reserves.

5. Communicating trenches.

6. Widening and deepening of trenches; interior conveniences.

See paragraph 568.

_MINOR WARFARE._

596. Minor warfare embraces both regular and irregular operations.

Regular operations consist of minor actions involving small bodies of trained and organized troops on both sides.

The tactics employed are in general those prescribed for the smaller units.

597. Irregular operations consist of actions against unorganized or partially organized forces, acting in independent or semi-independent bodies. Such bodies have little or only crude training and are under nominal and loose leadership and control. They assemble, roam about, and disperse at will. They endeavor to win by stealth or by force of superior numbers, employing ambuscades, sudden dashes or rushes, and hand-to-hand fighting.

Troops operating against such an enemy usually do so in small units, such as platoons, detachments, or companies, and the tactics employed must be adapted to meet the requirements of the situation. Frequently the enemy's own methods may be employed to advantage.

In general, such operations should not be undertaken hastily; every preparation should be made to strike suddenly and to inflict the maximum punishment.

598. In general, the service of information will be insufficient; adequate reconnaissance will rarely be practicable. March and bivouac formations must be such as to admit of rapid deployment and fire action in any direction.

599. In the open country, where surprise is not probable, troops may be marched in column of squads preceded, within sight, by a squad as an advance party.

600. In close country, where surprise is possible, the troops must be held in a close formation. The use of flank patrols becomes difficult. Occasionally, an advance party--never less than a squad--may be sent out. In general, however, such a party accomplishes little, since an enemy intent on surprise will permit it to pass unmolested and will fall upon the main body.

Under such conditions, especially when the road or trail is narrow, the column of twos or files is a convenient formation, the officers placing themselves in the column so as to divide it into nearly equal parts. If rushed from a flank, such a column will be in readiness to face and fire toward either or both flank, the ranks being back to back; if rushed from the front, the head of the column may be deployed, the rest of the column closing up to support it and to protect its flanks and rear. In any event, the men should be taught to take some form of a closed back-to-back formation.

601. The column may often be broken into two or more approximately equal detachments separated on the march by distances of 50 to 100 yards. As a rule the detachments should not consist of less than 25 men each. With this arrangement of the column, it will rarely be possible for an enemy to close simultaneously with all of the detachments, one or more being left unengaged and under control to support those engaged or to inflict severe punishment upon the enemy when he is repulsed.

602. The site for camp or bivouac should be selected with special reference to economical and effective protection against surprise. Double sentinels are posted on the avenues of approach and the troops sleep in readiness for instant action. When practicable, troops should be instructed in advance as to what they are to do in case of attack at night.

603. Night operations are frequently advisable. With the small forces employed, control is not difficult. Irregular troops rarely provide proper camp protection, and they may frequently be surprised and severely punished by a properly conducted night march and attack.

_PATROLS._

604. The following paragraphs on patrols are placed here for convenience. They relate in particular to the conduct of the patrol and its leader, and apply to patrols employed in covering detachments as well as in combat reconnaissance.

605. A patrol is a detachment sent out from a command to gain information of the country or of the enemy, or to prevent the enemy from gaining information. In special cases patrols may be given missions other than these.

606. The commander must have clearly in mind the purpose for which the patrol is to be used in order that he may determine its proper strength, select its leader, and give the latter proper instructions.

In general, a patrol should be sent out for one definite purpose only.

607. The strength of a patrol varies from two or three men to a company. It should be strong enough to accomplish its purpose, and no stronger.

If the purpose is to gain information only, a small patrol is better than a large one. The former conceals itself more readily and moves less conspicuously. For observing from some point in plain view of the command or for visiting or reconnoitering between outguards two men are sufficient.

If messages are to be sent back, the patrol must be strong enough to furnish the probable number of messengers without reducing the patrol to less than two men. If hostile patrols are likely to be met and must be driven off, the patrol must be strong.

In friendly territory, a weaker patrol may be used than would be used for the corresponding purpose in hostile territory.

608. The character of the leader selected for the patrol depends upon the importance of the work in hand.

For patrolling between the groups or along the lines of an outpost, or for the simpler patrols sent out from a covering detachment, the average soldier will be a competent leader.

609. For a patrol sent out to gain information, or for a distant patrol sent out from a covering detachment, the leader must be specially selected. He must be able to cover large areas with few men; he must be able to estimate the strength of hostile forces, to report intelligently as to their dispositions, to read indications, and to judge as to the importance of the information gained. He must possess endurance, courage, and good judgment.

His instructions should be full and clear. He must be made to understand exactly what is required of him, where to go and when to return. He should be given such information of the enemy and country as may be of value to him. He should be informed as to the general location of his own forces, particularly of those with whom he may come in contact. If possible, he should be given a map of the country he is to traverse, and in many cases his route may be specified.

Besides his arms and ammunition, the patrol leader should have a compass, a watch, a pencil, a note book, and, when practicable, field message blanks and a map of the country.

The patrol leader assembles the men detailed for the patrol. He inspects their arms and ammunition and satisfies himself that they are in suitable condition for the duty. He sees that none has any papers, maps, etc., that would be of value to the enemy if captured. He sees that their accouterments do not glisten or rattle when they move. He then repeats his instructions to the patrol and assures himself that every man understands them. He explains the signals to be used and satisfies himself that they are understood. He designates a man to take his place should he be disabled.

610. The formation and movements of the patrol must be regulated so as to render probable the escape of at least one man should the patrol encounter a superior force. The formation will depend upon the nature of the ground traversed and the cover afforded. The leader must adopt the formation and measures best suited to the accomplishment of his object.

In general, it should have the formation of a main body with advance, rear, and flank guards, though each be represented only by a single man.

611. The distances separating the members of the patrol vary according to the ground. If too close together, they see no more than one man; if too widely separated they are likely to be lost to the control of the leader.

With a patrol of four or five men the distances may vary from 25 to 50 yards; with a larger patrol they may be as great as 100 yards.

At times a column of files, separated by the distances prescribed, is a satisfactory formation.

612. The country must be carefully observed as the patrol advances. In passing over a hill, the country beyond should first be observed by one man; houses, inclosures, etc., should be approached in a similar manner or avoided entirely; woods should generally be reconnoitered in a thin skirmish line.

613. The strength and composition of hostile troops must be observed. If they can not be counted, their strength may be estimated by the length of time a column consumes in passing a given point, or by the area covered if in camp.

Patrol leaders should know, if practicable, the uniforms, guidons, etc., of the enemy, as it will assist in determining the class of troops seen when no other means for doing so are available.

Insignia from the enemy's uniforms, picked up by patrols, often convey valuable information by indicating what troops are in the vicinity.

614. Patrols avoid fighting, except in self-defense or in order to prevent the enemy's patrols from gaining valuable information, or when necessary in order to accomplish their mission. In such cases, a patrol should fight resolutely even though inferior in numbers.

615. Information gained by patrols is generally of no value unless received in time to be of use to the commander. Patrol leaders must therefore send back information of importance as soon as it is gained unless the patrol itself is to return at once.

616. If written, messages should state the place, date, hour, and minute of their dispatch. The information contained in them should be clearly and concisely expressed. They should be signed by the patrol leader.

The authorized message book should be used and the form therein adhered to.

617. If the message be an oral one, the patrol leader should require the messenger to repeat it before starting back. In general, an oral message should cover but one point. Except when there is little chance of error in transmission, messages should be written.

618. When in friendly territory and not very far from friendly troops, one messenger is sufficient unless the message is very important. In hostile territory, either two men should go together or the message should be sent in duplicate by different routes.

619. Whether the information gained is of sufficient importance to be reported at once or may await the return of the patrol is a question which must be decided in each case. In case of reasonable doubt, it is generally better to send the report promptly. If the patrol leader has received proper instructions before starting out and has the requisite ability to lead a patrol, he can generally decide such questions satisfactorily as they arise.

620. Infantry patrols are generally used for work within 2 miles of supporting troops, but cases arise where they must go to greater distances.

621. Patrols composed of mounted scouts are conducted like cavalry patrols and should be trained in accordance with the Cavalry Drill Regulations.

For distant patrolling, a mounted patrol under an officer should be used.

622. For controlling the movements of the patrol, the leader should, when necessary, make use of the arm signals prescribed in these regulations.

On account of the short distances separating them, ordinary communication between members of the patrol is best effected quietly by word of mouth.

When a member of a patrol is sent to a distant point, communication may be effected by means of simple, prearranged signals.

When practicable, the patrol leader may communicate with the main body by means of visual signaling.