Chapter XIII (2)

37. But while the war was yet raging, and the fate of the Catholic religion seemed to hang upon its success, many of the Jesuits had been strenuous advocates of the tyrannicidal doctrine; and the strong spirit of party attachment in that order renders it hardly uncandid to reckon among its general tenets whatever was taught by its most conspicuous members. The boldest and most celebrated assertion of these maxims was by Mariana, in a book, De Rege et Regis Institutione. The first edition of this remarkable book, and which is of considerable scarcity, was published at Toledo in 1599, dedicated to Philip III., and sanctioned with more than an approbation, with a warm eulogy by the censor (one of the same order, it may be observed), who by the king’s authority had perused the manuscript. It is, however, not such as in an absolute monarchy we should expect to find countenance. Mariana, after inquiring what is the best form of government, and deciding for hereditary monarchy, but only on condition that the prince shall call the best citizens to his councils, and administer all affairs according to the advice of a senate, comes to show the difference between a king and a tyrant. His invectives against the latter prepare us for the sixth chapter, which is entitled, Whether it be lawful to overthrow a tyrant? He begins by a short sketch of the oppression of France under Henry III., which had provoked his assassination. Whether the act of James Clement, “the eternal glory of France, as most reckon him,”[1077] were in itself warrantable, he admits to be a controverted question, stating the arguments on both sides, but placing last those in favour of the murder, to which he evidently leans. All philosophers and theologians, he says, agree that an usurper may be put to death by any one. But in the case of a lawful king, governing to the great injury of the commonwealth or of religion (for we ought to endure his vices so long as they do not reach an intolerable height), he thinks that the states of the realm should admonish him, and on his neglect to reform his life, may take up arms, and put to death a prince whom they have declared to be a public enemy; and any private man may do the same. He concludes, therefore, that it is only a question of fact who is a tyrant, but not one of right, whether a tyrant may be killed. Nor does this maxim give a license to attempts on the lives of good princes; since it can never be applied till wise and experienced men have conspired with the public voice in declaring the prince’s tyranny. “It is a wholesome thing,” he proceeds, “that sovereigns should be convinced that, if they oppress the state, and become intolerable by their wickedness, their assassination will not only be lawful but glorious to the perpetrator.”[1078] This language, whatever indignation it might excite against Mariana and his order, is merely what we have seen in Buchanan.

[1077] These words, æternum Gallilæ decus, are omitted in the subsequent
editions, but as far as I have compared them there is very little
other alteration; yet the first alone is in request.

[1078] Est salutaris cognitio, ut sit principibus persuasum, si
rempublicam oppresserint, si vitiis et fœditate intolerandi erunt,
ea conditione vivere, ut non jure tantum sed cum laude et gloria
perire possint, p. 77.

38. Mariana discusses afterwards the question, whether the power of the king or of the commonwealth be the greater; and after intimating the danger of giving offence, and the difficulty of removing the blemishes which have become inveterate by time (with allusion, doubtless, to the change of the Spanish constitution under Charles and Philip), declares in strong terms for limiting the royal power by laws. In Spain, he asserts, the king cannot impose taxes against the will of the people. “He may use his influence, he may offer rewards, sometimes he may threaten, he may solicit with promises and bribes (we will not say whether he may do this rightly), but if they refuse he must give way; and it is the same with new laws, which require the sanction of the people. Nor could they preserve their right of deposing and putting to death a tyrant, if they had not retained the superior power to themselves when they delegated a part to the king. It may be the case in some nations, who have no public assemblies of the states, that of necessity the royal prerogative must compel obedience--a power too great, and approaching to tyranny--but we speak (says Mariana) not of barbarians, but of the monarchy which exists, and ought to exist among us, and of that form of polity which of itself is the best.” Whether any nation has a right to surrender its liberties to a king, he declines to inquire, observing only that it would act rashly in making such a surrender, and the king almost as much so in accepting it.

39. In the second book Mariana treats of the proper education of a prince; and in the third on the due administration of his government, inveighing vehemently against excessive taxation, and against debasement of the coin, which he thinks ought to be the last remedy in a public crisis. The whole work, even in its reprehensible exaggerations, breathes a spirit of liberty and regard to the common good. Nor does Mariana, though a Jesuit, lay any stress on the papal power to depose princes, which, I believe, he has never once intimated through the whole volume. It is absolutely on political principles that he reasons, unless we except that he considers impiety as one of the vices which constitute a tyrant.[1079]

[1079] Bayle, art. Mariana, notes G, H, and I, has expatiated upon this
notable treatise, which did the Jesuits infinite mischief, though
they took pains to disclaim any participation in the doctrine.

|Popular theories in England.|

|Hooker.|

40. Neither of the conflicting parties in Great Britain had neglected the weapons of their contemporaries; the English Protestants under Mary, the Scots under her unfortunate namesake, the Jesuits and Catholic priests under Elizabeth, appealed to the natural rights of men, or to those of British citizens. Poynet, Goodman, Knox are of the first description; Allen and Persons of the second. Yet this was not done, by the latter at least, so boldly and so much on broad principles as it was on the continent; and Persons in his celebrated Conference, under the name of Doleman, tried the different and rather inconsistent path of hereditary right. The throne of Elizabeth seemed to stand in need of a strongly monarchical sentiment in the nation. Yet we find that the popular origin of government, and the necessity of popular consent to its due exercise, are laid down by Hooker in the first and eighth books of the Ecclesiastical Polity, with a boldness not very usual in her reign, and, it must be owned, with a latitude of expression that leads us forward to the most unalloyed democracy. This theory of Hooker, which he endeavoured in some places to qualify with little success or consistency, though it excited not much attention at the time, became the basis of Locke’s more celebrated Essay on Government, and, through other stages, of the political creed which actuates at present, as a possessing spirit, the great mass of the civilised world.[1080]

[1080] Bilson, afterwards bishop of Winchester, in his “Difference
between Christian Subjection and Unchristian Rebellion,” published
in 1585, argues against the Jesuits, that Christian subjects may
not bear arms against their princes for any religious quarrel, but
admits, “if a prince should go about to subject his kingdom to a
foreign realm, or change the form of the commonwealth from impery
to tyranny, or neglect the laws established by common consent of
prince and people to execute his own pleasure, in these and other
cases which might be named, if the nobles and commons join together
to defend their ancient and accustomed liberty, regiment, and laws,
they may not well be counted rebels,” p. 520.

|Political memoirs.|

|La Noue.|

41. The bold and sometimes passionate writers, who perhaps will be thought to have detained us too long, may be contrasted with another class more cool and prudent, who sought rather to make the most of what they found established in civil polity, than to amend or subvert it. The condition of France was such as to force men into thinking, where nature had given them the capacity of it. In some of the memoirs of the age, such as those of Castelnau or Tavannes, we find an habitual tendency to reflect, to observe the chain of causes, and to bring history to bear on the passing time. De Comines had set a precedent; and the fashion of studying his writings and those of Machiavel conspired with the force of circumstances to make a thoughtful generation. The political and military discourses of La Noue, being thrown into the form of dissertation, come more closely to our purpose than merely historical works. They are full of good sense, in a high moral tone, without pedantry or pretension, and throw much light on the first period of the civil wars. The earliest edition is referred by the Biographie Universelle to 1587, which I believe should be 1588; but the book seems to have been finished long before.

|Lipsius.|

|Botero.|

42. It would carry us beyond the due proportions of this chapter were I to seek out every book belonging to the class of political philosophy, and we are yet far from its termination. The Politica of Justus Lipsius deserve little regard; they are chiefly a digest of Aristotle, Tacitus, and other ancient writers. Charron has incorporated or abridged the greater part of this work in his own. In one passage Lipsius gave great and just offence to the best of the Protestant party, whom he was about to desert, by recommending the extirpation of heresy by fire and sword. A political writer of the Jesuit school was Giovanni Botero, whose long treatise, Ragione di Stato, 1589, while deserving of considerable praise for acuteness, has been extolled by Ginguéné, who had never read it, for some merits it is far from possessing.[1081] The tolerant spirit, the maxims of good faith, the enlarged philosophy, which on the credit of a Piedmontese panegyrist, he ascribes to Botero will be sought in vain. This Jesuit justifies the massacre of St. Bartholomew, and all other atrocities of that age; observing that the duke of Alba made a mistake in the public execution of Horn and Egmont, instead of getting rid of them privately.[1082] Conservation is with him, as with Machiavel, the great end of government, which is to act so as neither to deserve nor permit opposition. The immediate punishment of the leaders of sedition, with as much silence and secrecy as possible, is the best remedy where the sovereign is sufficiently powerful. In cases of danger, it is necessary to conquer by giving way, and to wait for the cooling of men’s tempers, and the disunion that will infallibly impair their force; least of all should he absent himself, like Henry III., from the scene of tumult, and thus give courage to the seditious, while he diminishes their respect for himself.

[1081] Vol. viii. p. 210.

[1082] Poteva contentarsi di sbrigarsene con dar morte quanto si può
segretamente fosse possibile. This is in another treatise by
Botero, Relazioni Universali dè Capitani Illustri.

|His remarks on population.|

43. Botero had thought and observed much; he is, in extent of reading, second only to Bodin, and his views are sometimes luminous. The most remarkable passage that has occurred to me is on the subject of population. No encouragement to matrimony, he observes, will increase the numbers of the people without providing also the means of subsistence, and without due care for breeding children up. If this be wanting, they either die prematurely, or grow up of little service to their country.[1083] Why else, he asks, did the human race reach, three thousand years ago, as great a population as exists at present? Cities begin with a few inhabitants, increase to a certain point, but do not pass it, as we see at Rome, at Naples, and in other places. Even if all the monks and nuns were to marry, there would not, he thinks, be more people in the world than there are; two things being requisite for their increase--generation and education (or what we should perhaps rather call rearing), and if the multiplication of marriages may promote the one, it certainly hinders the other.[1084] Botero must here have meant, though he does not fully express it, that the poverty attending upon improvident marriages is the great impediment to rearing their progeny.

[1083] Concio sia cosa chè se bene senza il congiungimento dell’uomo
e della donna non si può il genere umano moltiplicarsi, non dimeno
la moltitudine di congiungimenti non è sola causa della
moltiplicazione; si ricerca oltre di ciò, la cura d’Allevarli, e la
commodità di sustentarli; senza la quale o muojono innanzi tempo, o
riescono inutili, e di poco giovimento alla patria lib. viii. p.
284.

[1084] Ibid. Ricercandosi due cose per la propagazione de popoli, la
generazione et l’educazione, se bene la moltitudine de matrimonj
ajuta forte l’una, impedisce però del sicuro l’altro.

|Paruta.|

44. Paolo Paruta, in his Discorsi Politici, Venice, 1599, is perhaps less vigorous and acute than Botero; yet he may be reckoned among judicious writers on general politics. The first book of these discourses relates to Roman, the second chiefly to modern history. His turn of thinking is independent and unprejudiced by the current tide of opinion, as when he declares against the conduct of Hannibal in invading Italy. Paruta generally states both sides of a political problem very fairly, as in one of the most remarkable of his discourses, where he puts the famous question on the usefulness of fortified towns. His final conclusion is favourable to them. He was a subject of Venice, and after holding considerable offices, was one of those historians employed by the Senate, whose writings form the series entitled Istorici Veneziani.

|Bodin.|

45. John Bodin, author of several other less valuable works, acquired so distinguished a reputation by his Republic, published in French in 1577, and by himself in Latin, with many additions in 1586,[1085] and has in fact so far outstripped the political writers of his own period, that I shall endeavour to do justice to his memory by something like an analysis of this treatise, which is far more known by name than generally read. Many have borne testimony to his extraordinary reach of learning and reflection. “I know of no political writer of the same period,” says Stewart, “whose extensive, and various, and discriminating reading appear to me to have contributed more to facilitate and guide the researches of his successors, or whose references to ancient learning have been more frequently transcribed without acknowledgment.”[1086]

[1085] This treatise, in its first edition, made so great an impression,
that when Bodin came to England in the service of the Duke of
Alençon, he found it explained by lecturers both in London and
Cambridge, but not, as has sometimes been said, in the public
schools of the university. This put him upon translating it into
Latin himself, to render its fame more European. See Bayle, who has
a good article on Bodin. I am much inclined to believe that the
perusal of Bodin had a great effect in England. He is not perhaps
very often quoted, and yet he is named with honour by the chief
writers of the next age; but he furnished a store, both of
arguments and of examples, which were not lost on the thoughtful
minds of our countrymen.

Grotius, who is not very favourable to Bodin, though of necessity
he often quotes the Republic, imputes to him incorrectness as to
facts, which in some cases raises a suspicion of ill-faith. Epist.
cccliii. It would require a more close study of Bodin than I have
made, to judge of the weight of this charge.

[1086] Dissertation on the Progress of Philosophy, p. 40. Stewart,
however, thinks Bodin became so obscure that he makes an apology
for the space he has allotted to the Republic, though not exceeding
four pages. He was better known in the seventeenth century than at
present.

|Analysis of his treatise called The Republic.|

|Authority of heads of families.|

46. What is the object of political society? Bodin begins by inquiring. The greatest good, he answers, of every citizen, which is that of the whole state. And this he places in the exercise of the virtues proper to man, and in the knowledge of things natural, human, and divine. But as all have not agreed as to the chief good of a single man, nor whether the good of individuals be also that of the state, this has caused a variety of laws and customs according to the humours and passions of rulers. This first chapter is in a more metaphysical tone than we usually find in Bodin. He proceeds in the next to the rights of families (jus familiare), and to the distinction between a family and a commonwealth. A family is the right government of many persons under one head, as a commonwealth is that of many families.[1087] Patriarchal authority he raises high, both marital and paternal, on each subject pouring out a vast stream of knowledge: nothing that sacred and profane history, the accounts of travellers, or the Roman lawyers could supply, ever escapes the comprehensive researches of Bodin.[1088] He intimates his opinion in favour of the right of repudiation, one of the many proofs that he paid more regard to the Jewish than the Christian law,[1089] and vindicates the full extent of the paternal power in the Roman republic, deducing the decline of the empire from its relaxation.

[1087] Familia est plurium sub unius ac ejusdem patris familias
imperium subditorum, earumque rerum quæ ipsius propria sunt, recta
moderatio. He has an odd theory, that a family must consist of five
persons, in which he seems to have been influenced by some notions
of the jurists, that three families may constitute a republic, and
that fifteen persons are also the minimum of a community.

[1088] Cap. iii. 34. Bodin here protests against the stipulation
sometimes made before marriage, that the wife shall not be in the
power of the husband; “agreements so contrary to divine and human
laws, that they cannot be endured, nor are they to be observed even
when ratified by oath, since no oath in such circumstances can be
binding.”

[1089] It has always been surmised that Bodin, though not a Jew by
nativity, was such by conviction. This is strongly confirmed by his
Republic, wherein he quotes the Old Testament continually, and with
great deference, but seldom or never the New. Several passages
might be alleged in proof, but I have not noted them all down. In
one place, lib. i. c. 6, he says, Paulus, Christianorum sæculi sui
facile princeps, which is at least a singular mode of expression.
In another he mentions the test of true religion so as to exclude
all but the Mosaic. An unpublished work of Bodin, called the
Heptaplomeres, is said to exist in many manuscripts, both in France
and Germany; in which, after debating different religions in a
series of dialogues, he gives the advantage to Deism or Judaism,
for those who have seen it seem not to have determined which. No
one has thought it worth while to print this production. Jugler,
Hist. Literaria, p. 1740. Biogr. Univ. Niceron, xvii. 264.

|Domestic servitude.|

47. The patriarchal government includes the relation of master to servant, and leads to the question whether slavery should be admitted into a well-constituted commonwealth. Bodin, discussing this with many arguments on both sides, seems to think that the Jewish law, with its limitations as to time of servitude, ought to prevail, since the divine rules were not laid down for the boundaries of Palestine, but being so wise, so salutary, and of such authority, ought to be preferred above the constitutions of men. Slavery, therefore, is not to be permanently established; but where it already exists, it will be expedient that emancipations should be gradual.[1090]

[1090] A posthumous work of Bodin, published in 1596, Universæ Naturæ
Theatrum, has been called by some a disguised Pantheism. This did
not appear, from what I have read of it, to be the case.

|Origin of commonwealths.|

48. These last are the rights of persons in a state of nature, to be regulated, but not created by the law. “Before there was either city or citizen, or any form of a commonwealth amongst men (I make use in this place of Knolles’s very good translation), every master of a family was master in his own house, having power of life and death over his wife and children; but, after that force, violence, ambition, covetousness, and desire of revenge had armed one against another, the issues of wars and combats giving victory unto the one side, made the other to become unto them slaves; and amongst them that overcame he that was chosen chief and captain, under whose conduct and leading they had obtained the victory, kept them also in his power and command as his faithful and obedient servants, and the other as his slaves. Then that full and entire liberty by nature, given to every man to live as himself best pleased, was altogether taken from the vanquished, and in the vanquishers themselves in some measure also diminished in regard of the conqueror; for that now it concerned every man in private to yield his obedience unto his chief sovereign; and he that would not abate anything of his liberty, to live under the laws and commandments of another, lost all. So the words of lord and servant, of prince and subject, before unknown to the world, were first brought into use. Yea reason, and the very light of nature leadeth us to believe very force and violence to have given cause and beginning unto commonwealths.”[1091]

[1091] c. 6.

|Privileges of citizens.|

49. Thus, then, the patriarchal simplicity of government was overthrown by conquest, of which Nimrod seems to have been the earliest instance; and now fathers of families, once sovereign, are become citizens. A citizen is a free man under the supreme government of another.[1092] Those who enjoy more privileges than others are not citizens more than they. “It is the acknowledgment of the sovereign by his free subject, and the protection of the sovereign towards him that makes the citizen.” This is one of the fundamental principles, it may be observed by us in passing, which distinguish a monarchical from a republican spirit in constitutional jurisprudence. Wherever mere subjection, or even mere nativity, are held to give a claim to citizenship, there is an abandonment of the republican principle. This, always reposing on a real or imaginary contract, distinguishes the nation, the successors of the first community, from alien settlers, and, above all, from those who are evidently of a different race. Length of time must, of course, ingraft many of foreign origin upon the native tree; but to throw open civil privileges at random to new-comers is to convert a people into a casual aggregation of men. In a monarchy the hereditary principle maintains an unity of the commonwealth; which, though not entirely without danger, may better permit an equality of privileges among all its subjects. Thus under Caracalla, but in a period in which we should not look for good precedents, the great name, as once it had been, of Roman citizen was extended, east and west, to all the provinces of the empire.

[1092] Est civis nihil aliud quam liber homo, qui summa alterius
potestate obligatur.

|Nature of sovereign power.|

50. Bodin comes next to the relation between patron and client, and to those alliances among states which bear an analogy to it. But he is careful to distinguish patronage or protection from vassalage. Even in unequal alliances, the inferior is still sovereign; and, if this be not reserved, the alliance must become subjection.[1093] Sovereignty, of which he treats in the following chapter, he defines a supreme and perpetual power, absolute and subject to no law.[1094] A limited prince, except so far as the limitation is confined to the laws of nature, is not sovereign. A sovereign cannot bind his successor, nor can he be bound by his own laws, unless confirmed by oath; for we must not confound the laws and contracts of princes, the former depend upon his will, but the latter oblige his conscience. It is convenient to call parliaments or meetings of states-general for advice and consent, but the king is not bound by them; the contrary notion has done much harm. Even in England, where laws made in parliament cannot be repealed without its consent, the king, as he conceives, does not hesitate to dispose of them at his pleasure.[1095] And though no taxes are imposed in England without consent of parliament, this is the case also in other countries, if necessity does not prevent the meeting of the states. He concludes, that the English parliament may have a certain authority, but that the sovereignty and legislative power is solely in the king. Whoever legislates is sovereign, for this power includes all other. Whether a vassal or tributary prince is to be called sovereign, is a question that leads Bodin into a great quantity of feudal law and history; he determines it according to his own theory.[1096]

[1093] c. 7.

[1094] Majestas est summa in cives ac subditos legibusque soluta
postestas.

[1095] Hoc tamen singulare videri possit, quod, quæ leges populi
rogatione ac principis jussu feruntur, non aliter quam populi
comitiis abrogari possunt. Id enim Dellus Anglorum in Gallia
legatus mihi confirmavit; idem tamen confitetur legem probari aut
respui consuevisse contra populi voluntatem utcunque principi
placuerit. He is evidently perplexed by the case of England; and
having been in this country before the publication of his Latin
edition, he might have satisfied himself on the subject.

[1096] c. 9 and 10.

|Forms of government.|

|Despotism and monarchy.|

51. The second book of the Republic treats of the different species of civil government. These, according to Bodin, are but three, no mixed form being possible, since sovereignty or the legislative power is indivisible. A democracy he defines to be a government where the majority of the citizens possess the sovereignty. Rome he holds to have been a democratic republic, in which, however, he is not exactly right; and he is certainly mistaken in his general theory, by arguing as if the separate definition of each of the three forms must be applicable after their combination.[1097] In this chapter on despotic monarchy, he again denies that governments were founded on original contract. The power of one man, in the origin of political society, was absolute; and Aristotle was wrong in supposing a fabulous golden age, in which kings were chosen by suffrage.[1098] Despotism is distinguished from monarchy by the subjects being truly slaves, without a right over their properties; but as the despot may use them well, even this is not necessarily a tyranny.[1099] Monarchy, on the other hand, is the rule of one man according to the law of nature, who maintains the liberties and properties of others as much as his own.[1100] As this definition does not imply any other restraint than the will of the prince imposes on himself, Bodin labours under the same difficulty as Montesquieu. Every English reader of the Esprit des Loix has been struck by the want of a precise distinction between despotism and monarchy. Tyranny differs, Bodin says, from despotism, merely by the personal character of the prince; but severity towards a seditious populace is not tyranny; and here he censures the lax government of Henry II. Tyrannicide he justifies in respect of an usurper who has no title except force, but not as to lawful princes, or such as have become so by prescription.[1101]

[1097] lib. ii. c. 1.

[1098] In the beginning of states, quo societas hominum coalescere
cœpit, ac reipublicæ forma quædam constitui, unius imperio ac
dominatu omnia tenebantur. Fallit enim Aristoteles, qui aureum
illud genus hominum fabulis poeticis quam reipsa illustrius, reges
heroas suffragio creasse prodidit; cum omnibus persuasum sit ac
perspicuum monarchiam omnium primam in Assyria fuisse constitutam
Nimrodo principe, &c.

[1099] c. 2.

[1100] c. 3.

[1101] c. 4.

|Aristocracy.|

52. An aristocracy he conceives always to exist where a smaller body of the citizens governs the greater.[1102] This definition, which has been adopted by some late writers, appears to lead to consequences hardly compatible with the common use of language. The electors of the House of Commons in England are not a majority of the people. Are they, therefore, an aristocratical body? The same is still more strongly the case in France, and in most representative governments of Europe. We might better say, that the distinguishing characteristic of an aristocracy is the enjoyment of privileges, which are not communicable to other citizens simply by anything they can themselves do to obtain them. Thus no government would be properly aristocratical where a pecuniary qualification is alone sufficient to confer political power; nor did the ancients ever use the word in such a sense. Yet the question might be asked, under what category we would place the _timocracy_, or government of the rich.

|Senates and councils of state.|

53. Sovereignty resides in the supreme legislative authority; but this requires the aid of other inferior and delegated ministers, to the consideration of which the third book of Bodin is directed. A senate he defines, “a lawful assembly of counsellors of state, to give advice to them who have the sovereignty in every commonwealth; we say, to give advice, that we may not ascribe any power of command to such a senate.” A council is necessary in a monarchy; for much knowledge is generally mischievous in a king. It is rarely united with a good disposition, and with a moral discipline of mind. None of the emperors were so illiterate as Trajan, none more learned than Nero. The counsellors should not be too numerous, and he advises that they should retain their offices for life. It would be dangerous as well as ridiculous, to choose young men for such a post, even if they could have wisdom and experience, since neither older persons, nor those of their own age, would place confidence in them. He then expatiates, in his usual manner, upon all the councils that have existed in ancient or modern states.[1103]

[1102] Ego statum semper aristocraticum esse, judico, si minor pars
civium cæteris imperat. c. 1.

[1103] c. 1.

|Duties of magistrates.|

54. A magistrate is an officer of the sovereign, possessing public authority.[1104] Bodin censures the usual definitions of magistracy, distinguishing from magistrates both those officers who possess no right of command, and such commissioners as have only a temporary delegation. In treating of the duty of magistrates towards the sovereign, he praises the rule of the law of France, that the judge is not to regard private letters of the king against the justice of a civil suit.[1105] But after stating the doubt, whether this applies to matters affecting the public, he concludes that the judge must obey any direction he receives, unless contrary to the law of nature, in which case he is bound not to forfeit his integrity. It is however better, as far as we can, to obey all the commands of the sovereign, than to set a bad example of resistance to the people. This has probably a regard to the frequent opposition of the Parliament of Paris, to what it deemed the unjust or illegal ordinances of the court. Several questions, discussed in these chapters on magistracy, are rather subtle and verbal; and, in general, the argumentative part of Bodin is almost drowned in his erudition.

[1104] c. 3.

[1105] c. 4.

|Corporations.|

55. A state cannot subsist without colleges and corporations, for mutual affection and friendship is the necessary bond of human life. It is true that mischiefs have sprung from these institutions, and they are to be regulated by good laws; but as a family is a community natural, so a college is a community civil, and a commonwealth is but a community governed by a sovereign power; and thus the word community is common unto all three.[1106] In this chapter we have a full discussion of the subject; and, adverting to the Spanish Cortes and English Commons as a sort of colleges in the state, he praises them as useful institutions, observing, with somewhat more boldness than is ordinary to him, that in several provinces in France there had been assemblies of the states, which had been abolished by those who feared to see their own crimes and peculations brought to light.

[1106] c. 7.

|Slaves, part of the state.|

56. In the last chapter of the third book, on the degrees and orders of citizens, Bodin seems to think that slaves, being subjects, ought to be reckoned parts of the state.[1107] This is, as has been intimated, in conformity with his monarchical notions. He then enters upon the different modes of acquiring nobility, and inveighs against making wealth a passport to it; discussing also the derogation to nobility by plebeian occupation. The division into three orders is useful in every form of government.

[1107] Si mihi tabellæ ac jura suffragiorum in hac disputatione
tribuantur, servos æque ac liberos homines civitate donari cupiam.
By this he may only mean that he would desire to emancipate them.

|Rise and fall of states.|

57. Perhaps the best chapter in the Republic of Bodin is the first in the fourth book, on the rise, progress, stationary condition, revolutions, decline, and fall of states. A commonwealth is said to be changed when its form of polity is altered; for its identity is not to be determined by the long standing of the city walls; but when popular government becomes monarchy, or aristocracy is turned to democracy, the commonwealth is at an end. He thus uses the word _respublica_ in the sense of polity or constitution, which is not, I think, correct, though sanctioned by some degree of usage, and leaves his proposition a tautological truism. The extinction of states may be natural or violent, but in one way or the other it must happen, since there is a determinate period to all things, and a natural season in which it seems desirable that they should come to an end. The best revolution is that which takes place by a voluntary cession of power.

|Causes of revolutions.|

58. As the forms of government are three, it follows that the possible revolutions from one to another are six. For anarchy is the extinction of a government, not a revolution in it. He proceeds to develop the causes of revolutions with great extent of historical learning and with judgment, if not with so much acuteness or so much vigour of style as Machiavel. Great misfortunes in war, he observes, have a tendency to change popular rule to aristocracy, and success has an opposite effect; the same seems applicable to all public adversity and prosperity. Democracy, however, more commonly ends in monarchy, as monarchy does in democracy, especially when it has become tyrannical; and such changes are usually accompanied by civil war or tumult. Nor can aristocracy, he thinks, be changed into democracy without violence, though the converse revolution sometimes happens quietly, as when the labouring classes and traders give up public affairs to look after their own; in this manner Venice, Lucca, Ragusa, and other cities have become aristocracies. The great danger for an aristocracy is, that some ambitious person, either of their own body or of the people, may arm the latter against them: and this is most likely to occur, when honours and magistracy are conferred on unworthy men, which affords the best topic to demagogues, especially where the plebeians are wholly excluded: which, though always grievous to them, is yet tolerable so long as power is intrusted to deserving persons; but when bad men are promoted, it becomes easy to excite the minds of the people against the nobility, above all, if there are already factions among the latter, a condition dangerous to all states, but mostly to an aristocracy. Revolutions are more frequent in small states, because a small number of citizens is easily split into parties; hence we shall find in one age more revolutions among the cities of Greece or Italy than have taken place during many in the kingdoms of France or Spain. He thinks the ostracism of dangerous citizens itself dangerous, and recommends rather to put them to death, or to render them friends. Monarchy, he observes, has this peculiar to it, that if the king be a prisoner, the constitution is not lost; whereas, if the seat of government in a republic be taken, it is at an end, the subordinate cities never making resistance. It is evident that this can only be applicable to the case, hitherto the more common one, of a republic, in which the capital city entirely predominates. “There is no kingdom which shall not, in continuance of time, be changed, and at length also be overthrown. But it is best for them who least feel their changes by little and little made, whether from evil to good, or from good to evil.”

|Astrological fancies of Bodin.|

59. If this is the best, the next is the worst chapter in Bodin. It professes to inquire, whether the revolutions of states can be foreseen. Here he considers, whether the stars have such an influence on human affairs, that political changes can be foretold by their means, and declares entirely against it, with such expressions as would seem to indicate his disbelief in astrology. If it were true, he says, that the conditions of commonwealths depended on the heavenly bodies, there could be yet no certain prediction of them; since the astrologers lay down their observations with such inconsistency, that one will place the same star in direct course at the moment that another makes it retrograde. It is obvious that any one who could employ this argument, must have perceived that it destroys the whole science of astrology. But, after giving instances of the blunders and contradictions of these pretended philosophers, he so far gives way as to admit that, if all the events from the beginning of the world could be duly compared with the planetary motions, some inferences might be deduced from them; and thus giving up his better reason to the prejudices of his age, he acknowledges astrology as a theoretical truth. The hypothesis of Copernicus he mentions as too absurd to deserve refutation; since, being contrary to the tenets of all theologians and philosophers and to common sense, it subverts the foundations of every science. We now plunge deeper into nonsense; Bodin proceeding to a long arithmetical disquisition, founded on a passage in Plato, ascribing the fall of states to want of proportion.[1108]

[1108] c. 2.

|Danger of sudden changes.|

60. The next chapter, on the danger of sudden revolutions in the entire government, asserts that even the most determined astrologers agree in denying that a wise man is subjugated by the starry influences, though they may govern those who are led by passion like wild beasts. Therefore a wise ruler may foresee revolutions and provide remedies. It is doubtful whether an established law ought to be changed, though not good in itself, lest it should bring others into contempt, especially such as affect the form of polity. These, if possible, should be held immutable; yet it is to be remembered, that laws are only made for the sake of the community, and public safety is the supreme law of laws. There is therefore no law so sacred that it may not be changed through necessity. But, as a general rule, whatever change is to be made should be effected gradually.[1109]

[1109] c. 3.

|Judicial power of the sovereign.|

61. It is a disputed question whether magistrates should be temporary or perpetual. Bodin thinks it essential that the council of state should be permanent, but high civil commands ought to be temporary.[1110] It is in general important that magistrates shall accord in their opinions; yet there are circumstances in which their emulation or jealousy may be beneficial to a state.[1111] Whether the sovereign ought to exercise judicial functions may seem, he says, no difficult question to those who are agreed that kings were established for the sake of doing justice. This, however, is not his theory of the origin of government; and after giving all the reasons that can be urged in favour of a monarch-judge, including as usual all historical precedents, he decides that it is inexpedient for the ruler to pronounce the law himself. His reasons are sufficiently bold, and grounded on an intimate knowledge of the vices of courts, which he does not hesitate to pour out.[1112]

[1110] c. 4.

[1111] c. 5.

[1112] c. 6.

|Toleration of religions.|

62. In treating of the part to be taken by the prince, or by a good citizen, in civil factions, after a long detail from history of conspiracies and seditions, he comes to disputes about religion, and contends against the permission of reasonings on matters of faith. What can be more impious, he says, than to suffer the eternal laws of God, which ought to be implanted in men’s minds with the utmost certainty, to be called in question by probable reasonings? For there is nothing so demonstrable, which men will not undermine by argument. But the principles of religion do not depend on demonstrations and arguments, but on faith alone; and whoever attempts to prove them by a train of reasoning, tends to subvert the foundations of the whole fabric. Bodin in this sophistry was undoubtedly insincere. He goes on, however, having purposely sacrificed this cock to Æsculapius, to contend that, if several religions exist in a state, the prince should avoid violence and persecution; the natural tendency of man being to give his assent voluntarily, but never by force.[1113]

[1113] c. 7.

|Influence of climate on government.|

63. The first chapter of the fifth book, on the adaptation of government to the varieties of race and climate, has excited more attention than most others, from its being supposed to have given rise to a theory of Montesquieu. In fact, however, the general principle is more ancient; but no one had developed it so fully as Bodin. Of this he seems to be aware. No one, he says, has hitherto treated on this important subject, which should always be kept in mind, lest we establish institutions not suitable to the people, forgetting that the laws of nature will not bend to the fancy of man. He then investigates the peculiar characteristics of the northern, middle, and southern nations, as to physical and moral qualities. Some positions he has laid down erroneously; but, on the whole, he shows a penetrating judgment and comprehensive generalisation of views. He concludes that bodily strength prevails towards the poles, mental power towards the tropics; and that the nations lying between partake in a mixed ratio of both. This is not very just; but he argues from the great armies that have come from the north, while arts and sciences have been derived from the south. There is certainly a considerable resemblance to Montesquieu in this chapter; and like him, with better excuse, Bodin accumulates inaccurate stories. Force prevails most with the northerns, reason with the inhabitants of a temperate or middle climate, superstition with the southerns; thus astrology, magic, and all mysterious sciences have come from the Chaldeans and Egyptians. Mechanical arts and inventions, on the other hand, flourish best in northern countries, and the southerns hardly know how to imitate them, their genius being wholly speculative, nor have they so much industry, quickness in perceiving what is to be done, or worldly prudence. The stars appear to exert some influence over national peculiarities; but even in the same latitudes great variety of character is found, which arises from a mountainous or level soil, and from other physical circumstances. We learn by experience, that the inhabitants of hilly countries and the northern nations generally love freedom, but having less intellect than strength, submit readily to the wisest among them. Even winds are not without some effect on national character. But the barrenness or fertility of the soil is more important; the latter producing indolence and effeminacy, while one effect of a barren soil is to drive the people into cities, and to the exercise of handicrafts for the sake of commerce, as we see at Athens and Nuremburg, the former of which may be contrasted with Bœotia.

64. Bodin concludes, after a profusion of evidence drawn from the whole world, that it is necessary not only to consider the general character of the climate as affecting an entire region, but even the peculiarities of single districts, and to inquire what effects may be wrought on the dispositions of the inhabitants by the air, the water, the mountains and valleys, or prevalent winds, as well as those which depend on their religion, their customs, their education, their form of government; for whoever should conclude alike as to all who live in the same climate would be frequently deceived; since, in the same parallel of latitude, we may find remarkable differences even of countenance and complexion. This chapter abounds with proofs of the comprehension as well as patient research which distinguishes Bodin from every political writer who had preceded him.

|Means of obviating inequality.|

65. In the second chapter, which inquires how we may avoid the revolutions which an excessive inequality of possessions tends to produce, he inveighs against a partition of property, as inconsistent with civil society, and against an abolition of debts, because there can be no justice where contracts are not held inviolable; and observes, that it is absurd to expect a division of all possessions to bring about tranquillity. He objects also to any endeavour to limit the number of the citizens, except by colonisation. In deference to the authority of the Mosaic law, he is friendly to a limited right of primogeniture, but disapproves the power of testamentary dispositions, as tending to inequality, and the admission of women to equal shares in the inheritance, lest the same consequence should come through marriage. Usury he would absolutely abolish, to save the poorer classes from ruin.

|Confiscations--rewards.|

66. Whether the property of condemned persons shall be confiscated is a problem, as to which, having given the arguments on both sides, he inclines to a middle course, that the criminal’s own acquisitions should be forfeited, but what has descended from his ancestors should pass to his posterity. He speaks with great freedom against unjust prosecutions, and points out the dangers of the law of forfeiture.[1114] In the next, being the fourth chapter of this book, he treats of rewards and punishments. All states depend on the due distribution of these; but, while many books are full of the latter, few have discussed the former, to which he here confines himself. Triumphs, statues, public thanks, offices of trust and command, are the most honourable; exemptions from service or tribute, privileges, and the like, the most beneficial. In a popular government, the former are more readily conceded than the latter; in a monarchy, the reverse. The Roman triumph gave a splendour to the republic itself. In modern times the sale of nobility, and of public offices, renders them no longer so honourable as they should be. He is here again very free-spoken as to the conduct of the French, and of other governments.[1115]

[1114] c. 3.

[1115] c. 4.

|Fortresses.|

67. The advantage of warlike habits to a nation, and the utility of fortresses, are then investigated. Some have objected to the latter, as injurious to the courage of the people, and of little service against an invader; and also, as furnishing opportunities to tyrants and usurpers, or occasionally to rebels. Bodin, however, inclines in their favour, especially as to those on the frontier, which may be granted as feudal benefices, but not in inheritance. The question of cultivating a military spirit in the people depends on the form of polity: in popular states it is necessary; in an aristocracy, unsafe. In monarchies, the position of the state with respect to its neighbours is to be considered. The capital city ought to be strong in a republic, because its occupation is apt to carry with it an entire change in the commonwealth. But a citadel is dangerous in such a state. It is better not to suffer castles, or strongholds of private men, as is the policy of England; unless when the custom is so established, that they cannot be dismantled without danger to the state.[1116]

[1116] c. 5.

|Necessity of good faith.|

68. Treaties of peace and alliance come next under review. He points out with his usual prolixity the difference between equal and unequal compacts of this kind. Bodin contends strongly for the rigorous maintenance of good faith, and reprobates the civilians and canonists who induced the council of Constance to break their promise towards John Huss. No one yet, he exclaims, has been so consummately impudent, as to assert the right of violating a fair promise; but one alleges the deceit of the enemy; another, his own mistake; a third, the change of circumstances, which has rendered it impossible to keep his word; a fourth, the ruin of the state which it would entail. But no excuse, according to Bodin, can be sufficient, save the unlawfulness of the promise, or the impossibility of fulfilling it. The most difficult terms to keep are between princes and their subjects, which generally require the guarantee of other states. Faith, however, ought to be kept in such cases; and he censures, though under an erroneous impression of the fact, as a breach of engagement, the execution of the Duke of York in the reign of Henry VI.; adding, that he prefers to select foreign instances, rather than those at home, which he would wish to be buried in everlasting oblivion. In this he probably alludes to the day of St. Bartholomew.[1117]

[117] c. 6. Externa libentius quam domestica recordor, quæ utinam
sempiterna oblivione sepulta jacerent.

|Census of property.|

|Public revenues.|

69. The first chapter of the sixth book relates to a periodical census of property, which he recommends as too much neglected. The Roman censorship of manners he extols, and thinks it peculiarly required, when all domestic coercion is come to an end. But he would give no coercive jurisdiction to his censors, and plainly intimates his dislike to a similar authority in the church.[1118] A more important disquisition follows on public revenues. These may be derived from seven sources: namely, national domains; confiscation of enemies’ property; gifts of friendly powers; tributes from dependent allies; foreign trade carried on by the state; tolls and customs on exports and imports; or, lastly, taxes directly levied on the people. The first of these is the most secure and honourable; and here we have abundance of ancient and modern learning, while of course the French principle of inalienability is brought forward. The second source of revenue is justified by the rights of war and practice of nations; the third has sometimes occurred; and the fourth is very frequent. It is dishonourable for a prince to be a merchant, and thus gain a revenue in the fifth mode, yet the kings of Portugal do not disdain this; and the mischievous usage of selling offices in some other countries seems to fall under this head. The different taxes on merchandise, or, in our language, of customs and excise, come in the sixth place. Here Bodin advises to lower the import duties on articles with which the people cannot well dispense, but to lay them heavily on manufactured goods, that they may learn to practise these arts themselves.

[1118] lib. vi. c. 1.

|Taxation.|

70. The last species of revenue, obtained from direct taxation, is never to be chosen but from necessity; and as taxes are apt to be kept up when the necessity is passed, it is better that the king should borrow money of subjects than impose taxes upon them. He then enters on the history of taxation in different countries, remarking it as peculiar to France, that the burthen is thrown on the people to the ease of the nobles and clergy, which is the case nowhere except with the French, among whom, as Cæsar truly wrote, nothing is more despised than the common people. Taxes on luxuries, which serve only to corrupt men, are the best of all; those also are good which are imposed on proceedings at law, so as to restrain unnecessary litigation. Borrowing at interest, or by way of annuity, as they do at Venice, is ruinous. It seems, therefore, that Bodin recommends loans without interest, which must be compulsory. In the remainder of this chapter he treats of the best mode of expending the public revenue, and advises that royal grants should be closely examined, and, if excessive, be rescinded, at least after the death of the reigning king.[1119]

[1119] c. 2.

|Adulteration of coin.|