Chapter XXXIV: Part I: pp. 39–41, 3rd ed

Footnote 514:

As to the divisibility of sovereign power, see Bryce’s Studies in
History and Jurisprudence, II., p. 70: “Legal sovereignty is
divisible, _i.e._, different branches of it may be concurrently vested
in different persons or bodies, co-ordinate altogether, or co-ordinate
partially only, though acting in different spheres.” For a statement
of the contrary opinion see Brown, Austinian Theory of Law, p. 174.

Footnote 515:

Leviathan, ch. 20. Eng. Works, III. 194.

Footnote 516:

I. 263.

Footnote 517:

The distinction between _de jure_ or legal and _de facto_ or practical
sovereignty—sovereign power in law and sovereign power in fact—is
admirably expressed and analysed in Bryce’s Studies in History and
Jurisprudence II., pp. 49–73.

Footnote 518:

Fragment on Government, ch. 4. sects. 35, 36.

Footnote 519:

We have already seen that the state may and does owe legal duties to
its subjects, but that these duties are necessarily imperfect and
unenforceable. Supra, § 79.

Footnote 520:

For authorities, see § 57.

Footnote 521:

As to the possibility of legal limitations of sovereign power, see
Jellinek, Das Recht des modernen Staates, I. pp. 432–441; Pollock,
Jurisprudence, pp. 270–273; Sidgwick, Elements of Politics, pp. 23–29;
623–638; Bryce, Studies in History and Jurisprudence, II. 71. “Legal
sovereignty,” says Dr. Bryce, “may be limited, i.e. the law of any
given state may not have allotted to any one person or body, or to all
the persons or bodies taken together, who enjoys or enjoy supreme
legislative or executive power, the right to legislate or to issue
special orders on every subject whatever.” Brown, Austinian Theory of
Law, pp. 158–164. “The Austinian position,” says Professor Brown,
“that a supreme legislature is incapable of legal limitation, is a
position which does not rest, as Austin supposes, upon logical
necessities, but upon the humbler ground of expediency.”

Footnote 522:

No small part of this branch of the law of status, however, may be
conveniently dealt with in connexion with various departments of the
law of property and obligations. It may be best, for example, to
discuss the contractual capacity of different classes of persons in
the law of contracts, instead of in the law of the personal status of
these persons.

Footnote 523:

Blackstone, however, is sufficiently scrupulous in respect of logical
arrangement to include them in this department of the law.

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TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES

1. P. 468, changed “In all cases, therefore, sovereign power is
necessarily present somewhere, but it is not in a cases to be
found in its entirety within the borders of the state itself” to
“In all cases, therefore, sovereign power is necessarily present
somewhere, but it is not in all cases to be found in its entirety
within the borders of the state itself”.
2. P. 471, changed “In this view, law and legal obligation are
co-extensive, and the legal limitation of supreme power appears to
involve the subjection of the possessor of it to legal obligations
in respect to the exercise of .” to “In this view, law and legal
obligation are co-extensive, and the legal limitation of supreme
power appears to involve the subjection of the possessor of it to
legal obligations in respect to the exercise of it.”
3. Silently corrected obvious typographical errors and variations in
spelling.
4. Retained archaic, non-standard, and uncertain spellings as printed.
5. Enclosed italics font in _underscores_.
6. Enclosed bold font in =equals=.