Chapter VIII: The Transcendental Deduction of the Categories (2)

"But it is just this transcendental unity of apperception[55] which forms, from all possible phenomena which can be together in one experience, a connexion of them according to laws. For this unity of consciousness would be impossible, if the mind in the knowledge of the manifold could not become conscious of the identity of the function whereby it unites the manifold synthetically in one knowledge. Consequently, the original and necessary consciousness of the identity of oneself is at the same time a consciousness of an equally necessary unity of the synthesis of all phenomena according to conceptions, i. e. according to rules which not only make them necessarily reproducible, but thereby determine an object for their perception, i. e. determine the conception of something in which they are necessarily connected. For the mind could not possibly think the identity of itself in the manifold of its representations, and this indeed _a priori_, if it had not before its eyes the identity of its action which subjects all synthesis of apprehension (which is empirical) to a transcendental unity, and first makes possible its connexion according to rules."

[55] Kant seems here and elsewhere to use the phrase
'transcendental unity of apperception' as synonymous with
'transcendental apperception', the reason, presumably, being
that transcendental apperception is a unity.

The argument seems indisputably to be as follows: 'The mind is necessarily able to be aware of its own identity throughout its manifold representations. To be aware of this, it must be aware of the identity of the activity by which it combines the manifold of representations into a systematic whole. Therefore it must be capable of combining, and of being conscious of its activity in combining, all phenomena which can be its representations into such a whole. But this process, from the point of view of the representations combined, is the process by which they become related to an object and so enter into knowledge. Therefore, since we are capable of being conscious of our identity with respect to all phenomena which can be our representations, the process of combination and consciousness of combination which constitutes knowledge must be possible with respect to them.' Thus the thought of this and the preceding paragraph seems to involve a circle. First the possibility of self-consciousness is deduced from the possibility of knowledge, and then the possibility of knowledge is deduced from the possibility of self-consciousness.

An issue therefore arises, the importance of which can be seen by reference to the final aim of the 'deduction', viz. the vindication of the categories. The categories are 'fundamental conceptions which enable us to think objects in general[56] for phenomena'[57]; in other words, they are the principles of the synthesis by which the manifold of sense becomes related to an object. Hence, if this be granted, the proof that the categories are applicable to objects consists in showing that the manifold can be subjected to this synthesis. The question therefore arises whether Kant's real starting-point for establishing the possibility of this synthesis and therefore the applicability of the categories, is to be found in the possibility of knowledge, or in the possibility of self-consciousness, or in both. In other words, does Kant start from the position that all representations must be capable of being related to an object, or from the position that we must be capable of being conscious of our identity with respect to all of them, or from both?

[56] _Objecte ueberhaupt_, i. e. objects of any kind in
distinction not from objects of a particular kind but from no
objects at all.

[57] A. 111, Mah. 204

Prima facie the second position is the more plausible basis for the desired conclusion. On the one hand, it does not seem obvious that the manifold _must_ be capable of being related to an object; for even if it be urged that otherwise we should have only 'a random play of representations, less than a dream'[58], it may be replied, that this might be or might come to be the case. On the other hand, the fact that our representations are ours necessarily seems to presuppose that we are identical subjects of these representations, and recognition of this fact is the consciousness of our identity.

[58] A. 112, Mah. 204.

If we turn to the text for an answer to this question, we find that Kant seems not only to use both starting-points, but even to regard them as equivalents. Thus in introducing the categories[59] Kant begins by appealing to the necessity for knowledge that representations should relate to an object.

[59] A. 110-12, Mah. 203-4.

"Unity of synthesis according to empirical conceptions would be purely contingent, and were these not based on a transcendental ground of unity, it would be possible for a confused crowd of phenomena to fill our soul, without the possibility of experience ever arising therefrom. But then also all relation of knowledge to objects would fall away, because knowledge would lack connexion according to universal and necessary laws; it would be thoughtless perception but never knowledge, and therefore for us as good as nothing."

"The _a priori_ conditions of any possible experience whatever are at the same time conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience. Now I assert that the above mentioned _categories_ are nothing but _the conditions of thinking in any possible experience_, just as _space and time_ are the _conditions of perception_ requisite for the same. The former therefore are also fundamental conceptions by which we think objects in general for phenomena, and are therefore objectively valid _a priori_--which is exactly what we wished to know."

The next sentence, however, bases the necessity of the categories on the possibility of self-consciousness, without giving any indication that a change of standpoint is involved.

"But the possibility, nay, even the necessity, of these categories rests on the relation which the whole sensibility, and with it also all possible phenomena, have to original apperception, a relation which forces everything to conform to the conditions of the thoroughgoing unity of self-consciousness, i. e. to stand under universal functions of synthesis, i. e. of synthesis according to conceptions, as that wherein alone apperception can prove _a priori_ its thorough-going and necessary identity."

Finally, the conclusion of the paragraph seems definitely to treat both starting-points as really the same.[60] "Thus the conception of a cause is nothing but a synthesis (of the consequent in the time series with other phenomena) _according to conceptions_; and without such a unity, which has its _a priori_ rule and subjects phenomena to itself, thorough-going and universal and therefore necessary unity of consciousness in the manifold of sense-perceptions would not be met with. But then also these perceptions would belong to no experience, consequently they would have no object, and would be nothing but a blind play of representations, less than a dream."

[60] Cf. A. 113, Mah. 205-6 and A. 108-10, Mah. 202-3.

The fact is that since for Kant the synthesis of representations in accordance with the categories, accompanied by the consciousness of it, is at once the necessary and sufficient condition of the relatedness of representations to an object and of the consciousness of our identity with respect to them, it seems to him to be one and the same thing whether, in vindicating the synthesis, we appeal to the possibility of knowledge or to the possibility of self-consciousness, and it even seems possible to argue, _via_ the synthesis, from knowledge to self-consciousness and vice versa.

Nevertheless, it remains true that the vindication of the categories is different, according as it is based upon the possibility of relating representations to an object or upon the possibility of becoming self-conscious with respect to them. It also remains true that Kant vindicates the categories in both ways. For while, in expounding the three so-called syntheses involved in knowledge, he is vindicating the categories from the point of view of knowledge, when he comes to speak of transcendental apperception, of which the central characteristic is the consciousness of self involved, there is a shifting of the centre of gravity. Instead of treating representations as something which can become related to an object, he now treats them as something of which, as belonging to a self, the self must be capable of being conscious as its own, and argues that a synthesis in accordance with the categories is required for this self-consciousness. It must be admitted then--and the admission is only to be made with reluctance--that when Kant reaches transcendental apperception, he really adopts a new starting-point,[61] and that the passage which introduces transcendental apperception by showing it to be implied in knowledge[62] only serves to conceal from Kant the fact that, from the point of view of the deduction of the categories, he is really assuming without proof the possibility of self-consciousness with respect to all our representations, as a new basis for argument.

[61] The existence of this new starting-point is more
explicit, A. 116-7 (and note), Mah. 208 (and note), and A.
122, Mah. 212.

[62] A. 107, Mah. 200.

The approach to the categories from the side of self-consciousness is, however, more prominent in the second edition, and consequently we naturally turn to it for more light on this side of Kant's position. There Kant vindicates the necessity of the synthesis from the side of self-consciousness as follows:[63]

[63] The main clauses have been numbered for convenience of
reference.

"[1.] It must be possible that the 'I think' should accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought; in other words, the representation would be either impossible or at least for me nothing. [2.] That representation which can be given before all thought is called _perception_. All the manifold of perception has therefore a necessary relation to the 'I think' in the same subject in which this manifold is found. [3.] But this representation[64] [i. e. the 'I think'] is an act of _spontaneity_, i. e. it cannot be regarded as belonging to sensibility. I call it _pure apperception_, to distinguish it from _empirical apperception_, or _original apperception_ also, because it is that self-consciousness which, while it gives birth to the representation 'I think', which must be capable of accompanying all others and is one and the same in all consciousness, cannot itself be accompanied by any other.[65] [4.] I also call the unity of it the _transcendental_ unity of self-consciousness, in order to indicate the possibility of _a priori_ knowledge arising from it. For the manifold representations which are given in a perception would not all of them be _my_ representations, if they did not all belong to one self-consciousness, that is, as my representations (even though I am not conscious of them as such), they must necessarily conform to the condition under which alone they _can_ stand together in a universal self-consciousness, because otherwise they would not all belong to me. From this original connexion much can be concluded."

[64] This is an indisputable case of the use of
representation in the sense of something represented or
presented.

[65] I. e. consciousness of our identity is final; we cannot,
for instance, go further back to a consciousness of the
consciousness of our identity.

[5.] "That is to say, this thorough-going identity of the apperception of a manifold given in perception contains a synthesis of representations,[66] and is possible only through the consciousness of this synthesis.[67] [6.] For the empirical consciousness which accompanies different representations is in itself fragmentary, and without relation to the identity of the subject. [7.] This relation, therefore, takes place not by my merely accompanying every representation with consciousness, but by my _adding_ one representation to another, and being conscious of the synthesis of them. [8.] Consequently, only because I can connect a manifold of given representations _in one consciousness_, is it possible for me to represent to myself the _identity of consciousness in these representations_; i. e. the _analytical_ unity of apperception is possible only under the presupposition of a _synthetical_ unity. [9.] The thought, 'These representations given in perception belong all of them to me' is accordingly just the same as, 'I unite them in one self-consciousness, or at least can so unite them;' [10.] and although this thought is not itself as yet the consciousness of the _synthesis_ of representations, it nevertheless presupposes the possibility of this synthesis; that is to say, it is only because I can comprehend the manifold of representations in one consciousness, that I call them all _my_ representations; for otherwise I should have as many-coloured and varied a self as I have representations of which I am conscious. [11.] Synthetical unity of the manifold of perceptions, as given _a priori_, is therefore the ground of the identity of apperception itself, which precedes _a priori_ all _my_ determinate thinking. [12.] But connexion does not lie in the objects, nor can it be borrowed from them through perception and thereby first taken up into the understanding, but it is always an operation of the understanding which itself is nothing more than the faculty of connecting _a priori_, and of bringing the manifold of given representations under the unity of apperception, which principle is the highest in all human knowledge."

[66] I understand this to mean 'This through and through
identical consciousness of myself as the identical subject of
a manifold given in perception involves a synthesis of
representations'.

[67] The drift of the passage as a whole (cf. especially
Sec. 16) seems to show that here 'the synthesis of
representations' means 'their connectedness' and not
'the act of connecting them'.

[13.] "Now this principle of the necessary unity of apperception is indeed an identical, and therefore an analytical, proposition, but nevertheless it declares a synthesis of the manifold given in a perception to be necessary, without which the thorough-going identity of self-consciousness cannot be thought. [14.] For through the Ego, as a simple representation, is given no manifold content; in perception, which is different from it, a manifold can only be given, and through _connexion_ in one consciousness it can be thought. An understanding, through whose self-consciousness all the manifold would _eo ipso_ be given, would _perceive_; our understanding can only _think_ and must seek its perception in the senses. [15.] I am, therefore, conscious of the identical self, in relation to the manifold of representations given to me in a perception, because I call all those representations _mine_, which constitute _one_. [16.] But this is the same as to say that I am conscious _a priori_ of a necessary synthesis of them, which is called the original synthetic unity of apperception, under which all representations given to me stand, but also under which they must be brought through a synthesis."[68]

[68] B. 131-5, M. 81-4.

Though this passage involves many difficulties, the main drift of it is clear. Kant is anxious to establish the fact that the manifold of sense must be capable of being combined on principles, which afterwards turn out to be the categories, by showing this to be involved in the fact that we must be capable of being conscious of ourselves as the identical subject of all our representations. To do this, he seeks to prove in the first paragraph that self-consciousness in this sense must be possible, and in the second that this self-consciousness presupposes the synthesis of the manifold.

Examination of the argument, however, shows that the view that self-consciousness must be possible is, so far as Kant is concerned,[69] an assumption for which Kant succeeds in giving no reason at all, and that even if it be true, it cannot form a basis from which to deduce the possibility of the synthesis.

[69] Cf. p. 204, note 3.

Before, however, we attempt to prove this, it is necessary to draw attention to three features of the argument. In the _first_ place, it implies a somewhat different account of self-consciousness to that implied in the passages of the first edition which we have already considered. Self-consciousness, instead of being the consciousness of the identity of our activity in combining the manifold, is now primarily the consciousness of ourselves as identical subjects of all our representations, i. e. it is what Kant calls the analytical unity of apperception; and consequently it is somewhat differently related to the activity of synthesis involved in knowledge. Instead of being regarded as the consciousness of this activity, it is regarded as presupposing the consciousness of the product of this activity, i. e. of the connectedness[70] of the manifold produced by the activity, this consciousness being what Kant calls the synthetical unity of apperception.[71] In the _second_ place, it is plain that Kant's view is not that self-consciousness involves the consciousness of our representations as a connected whole, but that it involves the consciousness of them as capable of being connected by a synthesis. Yet, if it is only because I can connect (and therefore apprehend as connected) a manifold of representations in one consciousness, that I can represent to myself the identity of consciousness in these representations, self-consciousness really requires the consciousness of our representations as _already_ connected; the mere consciousness of our representations as _capable_ of being connected would not be enough. The explanation of the inconsistency seems to lie in the fact that the synthetic unity of which Kant is thinking is the unity of nature. For, as Kant of course was aware, in our ordinary consciousness we do not apprehend the interconnexion of the parts of nature in detail, but only believe that there is such an interconnexion; consequently he naturally weakened the conclusion which he ought to have drawn, viz. that self-consciousness presupposes consciousness of the synthesis, in order to make it conform to the facts of our ordinary consciousness. Yet, if his _argument_ is to be defended, its conclusion must be taken in the form that self-consciousness presupposes consciousness of the actual synthesis or connexion and not merely of the possibility of it. In the _third_ place, Kant twice in this passage[72] definitely makes the act of synthesis, which his argument maintains to be the condition of _consciousness of the identity_ of ourselves, the condition of the _identity_ of ourselves. The fact is that, on Kant's view, the act of synthesis of the representations is really a condition of their belonging to one self, the self being presupposed to be a self capable of self-consciousness.[73]

[70] More accurately, 'of the possibility of the
connectedness'.

[71] The same view seems implied A. 117-8, Mah. 208. Kant
apparently thinks of this consciousness as also a
self-consciousness (cf. Sec. 9), though it seems that he
should have considered it rather as a condition of
self-consciousness, cf. p. 204, note 2.

[72] Sections 6 and 10.

[73] Cf. pp. 202-3.

We may now turn to the first of the two main points to be considered, viz. the reason given by Kant for holding that self-consciousness must be possible. In the first paragraph (Secs. 1-4) Kant appears twice to state a reason, viz. in Secs. 1 and 4. What is meant by the first sentence, "It must be possible that the 'I think' should accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought; in other words, the representation would either be impossible or at least for me nothing"? It is difficult to hold that 'my representations' here means objects of which I am aware, and that the thesis to be established is that I must be capable of being conscious of my own identity throughout all awareness or thought of objects. For the next sentence refers to perceptions as representations which can be given previously to all thought, and therefore, presumably, as something of which I am not necessarily aware. Again, the ground adduced for the thesis would be in part a mere restatement of it, and in part nonsense. It would be 'otherwise something would be apprehended with respect to which I could not be aware that I was apprehending it; in other words, I could not apprehend it [since otherwise I could be aware that I was apprehending it]', the last words being incapable of any interpretation. It is much more probable that though Kant is leading up to self-consciousness, the phrase 'I think' here refers not to 'consciousness that I am thinking', but to 'thinking'. He seems to mean 'It must be possible to apprehend all my 'affections' (i. e. sensations or appearances in me), for otherwise I should have an affection of which I could not be aware; in other words, there could be no such affection, or at least it would be of no possible importance to me.'[74] And on this interpretation self-consciousness is not introduced till Sec. 3, and then only surreptitiously. On neither interpretation, however, does Kant give the vestige of a _reason_ for the possibility of self-consciousness. Again, it seems clear that in Sec. 4 'my representations', and 'representations which belong to me' mean objects of which I am aware (i. e. something presented); for he says of my representations, not that I may not be conscious of them--which he should have said if 'my representations' meant my mental affections of which I could become conscious--but that I may not be conscious of them as my representations. Consequently in Sec. 4 he is merely asserting that I must be able to be conscious of my identity throughout my awareness of objects. So far, then, we find merely the _assertion_ that self-consciousness must be possible.[75]

[74] A third alternative is to understand Kant to be thinking
of all thought as self-conscious, i. e. as thinking
accompanied by the consciousness of thinking. But since in
that case Kant would be arguing from thinking as _thinking_,
i. e. as apprehending objects, the possibility of
self-consciousness would only be glaringly assumed.

[75] The same is true of A. 116 and A. 117 note, Mah. 208,
where Kant also appears to be offering what he considers to
be an argument.

In the next paragraph[76]--which is clearly meant to be the important one--Kant, though he can hardly be said to be aware of it, seems to _assume_ that it is the very nature of a knowing self, not only to be identical throughout its thoughts or apprehendings, but to be capable of being conscious of its own identity. Sec. 6 runs: "The empirical consciousness which accompanies different representations is in itself fragmentary, and without relation to the identity of the subject." Kant is saying that if there existed merely a consciousness of A which was not at the same time a consciousness of B and a consciousness of B which was not at the same time a consciousness of A, these consciousnesses would not be the consciousnesses belonging to one self. But this is only true, if the one self to which the consciousness of A and the consciousness of B are to belong must be capable of being aware of its own identity. Otherwise it might be one self which apprehended A and then, forgetting A, apprehended B. No doubt in that case the self could not be aware of its own identity in apprehending A and in apprehending B, but none the less it would _be_ identical in so doing. We reach the same conclusion if we consider the concluding sentence of Sec. 10. "It is only because I can comprehend the manifold of representations in one consciousness, that I call them all my representations; for otherwise I should have as many-coloured and varied a self as I have representations of which I am conscious." Doubtless if I am to _be aware of_ myself as the same in apprehending A and B, then, in coming to apprehend B, I must continue to apprehend A, and therefore must apprehend A and B as related; and such a consciousness on Kant's view involves a synthesis. But if I am merely to _be_ the same subject which apprehends A and B, or rather if the apprehension of A and that of B are merely to _be_ apprehensions on the part of one and the same subject, no such consciousness of A and B as related and, therefore, no synthesis is involved.

[76] Secs. 5-11.

Again, the third paragraph assumes the possibility of self-consciousness as the starting-point for argument. The thought[77] seems to be this: 'For a self to be aware of its own identity, there must be a manifold in relation to which it can apprehend itself as one and the same throughout. An understanding which was perceptive, i. e. which originated objects by its own act of thinking, would necessarily by its own thinking originate a manifold in relation to which it could be aware of its own identity in thinking, and therefore its self-consciousness would need no synthesis. But our understanding, which is not perceptive, requires a manifold to be given to it, in relation to which it can be aware of its own identity by means of a synthesis of the manifold.' If this be the thought, it is clearly presupposed that _any_ understanding must be capable of being conscious of its own identity.[78]

[77] Cf. B. 138 fin.-139 init., M. 85 fin.

[78] B. 139 init., M. 85 fin. also assumes that it is
impossible for a mind to be a unity without being able to be
conscious of its unity.

Further, it is easy to see how Kant came to take for granted the possibility of self-consciousness, in the sense of the consciousness of ourselves as the identical subject of all our representations. He approaches self-consciousness with the presupposition derived from his analysis of knowledge that our apprehension of a manifold does not consist in separate apprehensions of its elements, but is one apprehension or consciousness of the elements as related.[79] He thinks of this as a general presupposition of all apprehension of a manifold, and, of course, to discover this presupposition is to be self-conscious. To recognize the oneness of our apprehension is to be conscious of our own identity.[80]

[79] It is in consequence of this that the statement that 'a
manifold of representations belongs to me' means, with the
probable exception of Sec. 1, not, 'I am aware of A, I am
aware of B, I am aware of C,' but, 'I am aware, in one act of
awareness, of A B C as related' (= ABC are 'connected in' or
'belong to' one consciousness). Cf. Secs. 4, 8 ('in one
consciousness'), 9, 10 ('in one consciousness'), and A. 116,
Mah. 208 ('These representations only represent anything in
me by belonging with all the rest to one consciousness
[accepting Erdmann's emendation _mit allen anderen_], in
which at any rate they can be connected').

[80] The above criticism of Kant's thought has not implied
that it may not be true that a knowing mind is, as such,
capable of being aware of its own unity; the argument has
only been that Kant's proof is unsuccessful.

Again, to pass to the second main point to be considered,[81] Kant has no justification for arguing from the possibility of self-consciousness to that of the synthesis. This can be seen from the mere form of his argument. Kant, as has been said, seems first to establish the possibility of self-consciousness, and thence to conclude that a synthesis must be possible. But if, as it is his point to urge, consciousness of our identity only takes place through consciousness of the synthesis, this method of argument must be invalid. It would clearly be necessary to know that the synthesis is possible, _before_ and _in order that_ we could know that self-consciousness is possible. An objector has only to urge that the manifold might be such that it could not be combined into a systematic whole, in order to secure the admission that in that case self-consciousness would not be possible.

[81] Cf. p. 198.

Nevertheless, the passage under consideration may be said to lay bare an important presupposition of self-consciousness. It is true that self-consciousness would be impossible, if we merely apprehended the parts of the world in isolation. To be conscious that I who am perceiving C perceived B and A, I must be conscious at once of A, B, and C, in one act of consciousness or apprehension. To be conscious separately of A and B and C is not to be conscious of A and B and C. And, to be conscious of A and B and C in one act of consciousness, I must apprehend A, B, and C as related, i. e. as forming parts of a whole or system. Hence it is only because our consciousness of A, B, and C is never the consciousness of a mere A, a mere B, and a mere C, but is always the consciousness of A B C as elements in one world that we can be conscious of our identity in apprehending A, B, and C. If _per impossibile_ our apprehension be supposed to cease to be an apprehension of a plurality of objects in relation, self-consciousness must be supposed to cease also. At the same time, it is impossible to argue from the consciousness of our identity in apprehending to the consciousness of what is apprehended as a unity, and thence to the existence of that unity. For, apart from the consideration that in fact all thinking presupposes the relatedness or--what is the same thing--the necessary relatedness of objects to one another, and that therefore any assertion to the contrary is meaningless, the consciousness of objects as a unity is a condition of the consciousness of our identity, and therefore any doubt that can be raised in regard to the former can be raised equally with regard to the latter.

We may now pass to the concluding portion of the deduction. For the purpose of considering it, we may sum up the results of the preceding discussion by saying that Kant establishes the synthesis of the manifold on certain principles by what are really two independent lines of thought. The manifold may be regarded either as something which, in order to enter into knowledge, must be given relation to an object, or as something with respect to which self-consciousness must be possible. Regarded in either way, the manifold, according to Kant, involves a process of synthesis on certain principles, which makes it a systematic unity. Now Kant introduces the categories by maintaining that they are the principles of synthesis in question. "I assert that the above mentioned _categories_ are nothing but the _conditions of thinking in a possible experience_.... They are fundamental conceptions by which we think objects in general for phenomena."[82] A synthesis according to the categories is 'that wherein alone apperception can prove _a priori_ its thorough-going and necessary identity'.[83] In the first edition this identification is simply asserted, but in the second Kant offers a proof.[84]

[82] A. 111, Mah. 204. Cf. A. 119, Mah. 210.

[83] A. 112, Mah. 204.

[84] Cf. p. 161.

Before, however, we consider the proof, it is necessary to refer to a difficulty which seems to have escaped Kant altogether. The preceding account of the synthesis involved in knowledge and in self-consciousness implies, as his illustrations conclusively show, that the synthesis requires a particular principle which constitutes the individual manifold a whole of a particular kind.[85] But, if this be the case, it is clear that the categories, which are merely conceptions of an object in general, and are consequently quite general, cannot possibly be sufficient for the purpose. And since the manifold in itself includes no synthesis and therefore no principle of synthesis, Kant fails to give any account of the source of the particular principles of synthesis required for particular acts of knowledge.[86] This difficulty--which admits of no solution--is concealed from Kant in two ways. In the first place, when he describes what really must be stated as the process by which parts or qualities of an object become related to an object of a particular kind, he thinks that he is describing a process by which representations become related to an object in general.[87] Secondly, he thinks of the understanding as the source of general principles of synthesis, individual syntheses and the particular principles involved being attributed to the imagination; and so, when he comes to consider the part played in knowledge by the understanding, he is apt to ignore the need of particular principles.[88] Hence, Kant's proof that the categories are the principles of synthesis can at best be taken only as a proof that the categories, though not sufficient for the synthesis, are involved in it.

[85] Cf. p. 177, note 2, and p. 185.

[86] Cf. pp. 215-17.

[87] Cf. pp. 181-2.

[88] Cf. p. 217.

The proof runs thus:

"I could never satisfy myself with the definition which logicians give of a judgement in general. It is, according to them, the representation of a relation between two conceptions...."

"But if I examine more closely the relation of given representations[89] in every judgement, and distinguish it, as belonging to the understanding, from their relation according to the laws of the reproductive imagination (which has only subjective validity), I find that a judgement is nothing but the mode of bringing given representations under the _objective_ unity of apperception. This is what is intended by the term of relation 'is' in judgements, which is meant to distinguish the objective unity of given representations from the subjective. For this term indicates the relation of these representations to the original apperception, and also their _necessary unity_, even though the judgement itself is empirical, and therefore contingent, e. g. 'Bodies are heavy.' By this I do not mean that these representations _necessarily_ belong _to each other_ in empirical perception, but that they belong to each other _by means of the necessary unity_ of apperception in the synthesis of perceptions, that is, according to principles of the objective determination of all our representations, in so far as knowledge can arise from them, these principles being all derived from the principle of the transcendental unity of apperception. In this way alone can there arise from this relation _a judgement_, that is, a relation which is _objectively valid_, and is adequately distinguished from the relation of the very same representations which would be only subjectively valid, e. g. according to laws of association. According to these laws, I could only say, 'If I carry a body, I feel an impression of weight', but not 'It, the body, _is_ heavy'; for this is tantamount to saying, 'These two representations are connected in the object, that is, without distinction as to the condition of the subject, and are not merely connected together in the perception, however often it may be repeated.'"[90]

[89] _Erkenntnisse_ here is clearly used as a synonym for
representations. Cf. A. 104, Mah. 199.

[90] B. 140-2, M. 86-8; cf. _Prol._, Secs. 18-20.

This ground for the identification of the categories with the principles of synthesis involved in knowledge may be ignored, as on the face of it unsuccessful. For the argument is that since the activity by which the synthesis is affected is that of judgement, the conceptions shown by the _Metaphysical Deduction_ to be involved in judgement must constitute the principles of synthesis. But it is essential to this argument that the present account of judgement and that which forms the basis of the _Metaphysical Deduction_ should be the same; and this is plainly not the case.[91] Judgement is now represented as an act by which we relate the manifold of sense in certain necessary ways as parts of the physical world,[92] whereas in the _Metaphysical_ _Deduction_ it was treated as an act by which we relate conceptions; and Kant now actually says that this latter account is faulty. Hence even if the metaphysical deduction had successfully derived the categories from the account of judgement which it presupposed, the present argument would not justify the identification of the categories so deduced with the principles of synthesis. The fact is that Kant's vindication of the categories is in substance independent of the _Metaphysical Deduction_. Kant's real thought, as opposed to his formal presentation of it, is simply that when we come to consider what are the principles of synthesis involved in the reference of the manifold to an object, we find that they are the categories.[93] The success, then, of this step in Kant's vindication of the categories is independent of that of the metaphysical deduction, and depends solely upon the question whether the principles of synthesis involved in knowledge are in fact the categories.

[91] Cf. Caird, i. 348-9 note.

[92] We may notice in passing that this passage renders
explicit the extreme difficulty of Kant's view that 'the
objective unity of apperception' is the unity of the parts of
nature or of the physical world. How can the 'very same
representations' stand at once in the subjective relation of
association and in the objective relation which consists in
their being related as parts of nature? There is plainly
involved a transition from representation, in the sense of
the apprehension of something, to representation, in the
sense of something apprehended. It is objects apprehended
which are objectively related; it is our apprehensions of
objects which are associated, cf. pp. 233 and 281-2. Current
psychology seems to share Kant's mistake in its doctrine of
association of ideas, by treating the elements associated,
which are really apprehensions of objects, as if they were
objects apprehended.

[93] Cf. A. 112, Mah. 204; B. 162, M. 99.

The substance of Kant's vindication of the categories may therefore be epitomized thus: 'We may take either of two starting-points. On the one hand, we may start from the fact that our experience is no mere dream, but an intelligent experience in which we are aware of a world of individual objects. This fact is conceded even by those who, like Hume, deny that we are aware of any necessity of relation between these objects. We may then go on to ask how it comes about that, beginning as we do with a manifold of sense given in succession, we come to apprehend this world of individual objects. If we do so, we find that there is presupposed a synthesis on our part of the manifold upon principles constituted by the categories.

To deny, therefore, that the manifold is so connected is implicitly to deny that we have an apprehension of objects at all. But the existence of this apprehension is plainly a fact which even Hume did not dispute. On the other hand, we may start with the equally obvious fact that we must be capable of apprehending our own identity throughout our apprehension of the manifold of sense, and look for the presupposition of this fact. If we do this, we again find that there is involved a combination of the manifold according to the categories.'

In conclusion, attention may be drawn to two points. In the first place, Kant completes his account by at once emphasizing and explaining the paradoxical character of his conclusion. "Accordingly, the order and conformity to law in the phenomena which we call _nature_ we ourselves introduce, and we could never find it there, if we, or the nature of our mind, had not originally placed it there."[94] "However exaggerated or absurd then it may sound to say that the understanding itself is the source of the laws of nature and consequently of the formal unity of nature, such an assertion is nevertheless correct and in accordance with the object, i. e. with experience."[95] The explanation of the paradox is found in the fact that objects of nature are phenomena. "But if we reflect that this nature is in itself nothing else than a totality[96] of phenomena and consequently no thing in itself but merely a number of representations of the mind, we shall not be surprised that only in the radical faculty of all our knowledge, viz. transcendental apperception, do we see it in that unity through which alone it can be called object of all possible experience, i. e. nature."[97] "It is no more surprising that the laws of the phenomena in nature must agree with the understanding and with its _a priori_ form, that is, its faculty of connecting the manifold in general, than that the phenomena themselves must agree with the _a priori_ form of our sensuous perception. For laws exist in the phenomena as little as phenomena exist in themselves; on the contrary, laws exist only relatively to the subject in which the phenomena inhere, so far as it has understanding, just as phenomena exist only relatively to the subject, so far as it has senses. To things in themselves their conformity to law would necessarily also belong independently of an understanding which knows them. But phenomena are only representations of things which exist unknown in respect of what they may be in themselves. But, as mere representations, they stand under no law of connexion except that which the connecting faculty prescribes."[98]

[94] A. 125, Mah. 214.

[95] A. 127, Mah. 216.

[96] _Inbegriff._

[97] A. 114, Mah. 206.

[98] B. 164, M. 100.

In the second place, this last paragraph contains the real reason from the point of view of the deduction[99] of the categories for what may be called the negative side of his doctrine, viz. that the categories only apply to objects of experience and not to things in themselves. According to Kant, we can only say that certain principles of connexion apply to a reality into which we introduce the connexion. Things in themselves, if connected, are connected in themselves and apart from us. Hence there can be no guarantee that any principles of connexion which we might assert them to possess are those which they do possess.

[99] The main passage (B. 146-9, M. 90-2), in which he argues
that the categories do not apply to things in themselves,
ignores the account of a conception as a principle of
synthesis, upon which the deduction turns, and returns to the
earlier account of a conception as something opposed to a
perception, i. e. as that by which an object is thought as
opposed to a perception by which an object is given.
Consequently, it argues merely that the categories, as
conceptions, are empty or without an object, unless an object
is given in perception, and that, since things in themselves
are not objects of perception, the categories are no more
applicable to things in themselves than are any other
conceptions.