Chapter XIII: Second Mission to China. Pekin (1)

THE LANDING--CHINESE OVERTURES--TAKING OF THE FORTS--THE PEN TIENTSIN-- NEGOTIATIONS BROKEN OFF--NEW PLENIPOTENTIARIES--AGREEMENT MADE--AGREEMENT BROKEN--TREACHEROUS SEIZURE OF MR. PARKES AND OTHERS--ADVANCE ON PEKIN- -RETURN OF SOME OF THE CAPTIVES--FATE OF THE REST--BURNING OF THE SUMMER PALACE--CONVENTION SIGNED--FUNERAL OF THE MURDERED CAPTIVES--IMPERIAL PALACE--PRINCE KUNG--ARRIVAL OF MR. BRUCE--RESULTS OF THE MISSION.

[Sidenote: The landing.]

On the 1st of August the landing of the allied troops was effected in perfect order, without the slightest opposition on the part of the inhabitants, at the point already mentioned, viz. near the little town of Pey-tang which is situated at the mouth of a river of the same name, about eight miles north of the mouth of the Peiho. What Lord Elgin saw of the operations is described in the following letter:--

_August 2nd._--There have been a few days' interval since I wrote, and
I now date from Pey-tang, and from the General's ship the 'Granada,' a
Peninsular and Oriental steamer; for I owe it to him that I am here. I
need hardly tell you the events that have occurred--public events I
mean--since the 28th, as they will all be recorded by 'Our Own.' We
moved on the 29th to a different anchorage, some five miles nearer
Pey-tang. ... All the evidence was to the effect that the Pey-tang
Forts were undefended, at least that there were no barricades in the
river, and therefore that the best way of taking them would be to pass
them in the gunboats as we did the Peiho Forts in 1858, and as we also
passed Nankin that year ... but it was resolved that we should land a
quantity of men in the mud about a mile and a half below them. This
was to have taken place on the 30th, and those of my gentlemen who
intended to leave me, as better fun was to be found elsewhere, kept up
a tremendous bustle and noise from about 4 A.M. However, at about 6,
they were informed that the orders for landing were countermanded, on
the plea that there was too much sea to admit of the horses being
transferred from the vessels to the gunboats. Next day, the 31st, it
was raining, and the sea seemed rougher in the morning. However, at
about 9, the gunboats began to move. The General had agreed that I
should have his ship, and that I should move either over the bar or as
near to it as I could manage. ... I anchored the 'Granada' outside the
bar, and as I did not choose to lose the sight of the landing, I got
into my row-boat ... going at last on board the 'Coromandel,' the
Admiral's ship. The landing went on merrily enough. It was a lovely,
rather calm evening. We were within a long-range shot of the Forts;
and if shot or shell had dropped among the boats and men who were
huddled up on the edge of the mud-bank, it would have been
inconvenient. Our enemy, however, had no notion of doing anything so
ungenerous; so the landing went on uninterruptedly, the French
carrying almost all they wanted on their backs, our men employing
coolies, &c., for that purpose. We saw nothing of the enemy except the
movements of a few Tartar horsemen out of and into the town, galloping
along the narrow causeway on which our troops were to march. At
midnight eight gunboats--six English and two French--steamed past the
Forts. It was a moment of some excitement, because we did not know
whether or not they would be fired at. However, nothing of the kind
took place; and, about an hour after they had started, three rockets
that soared and burst over the village intimated that they had reached
the place appointed to them. Having witnessed this part of the
proceedings I lay down on the deck with my great-coat over me; but not
for long, for at half-past two, Captain Dew (my old friend)[1] arrived
with the announcement that, having been on an errand to the lines of
the troops, he had met a party of French soldiers who were obliging
some Chinese to carry a wooden gun which they had captured in the
fort, declaring that they had entered it, found it deserted, and
possessed of no defences but two wooden guns. It turned out that they
had not entered first, but that an English party, headed by Mr.
Parkes, had preceded them. This rather promised to diminish the
interest of the attack on the forts which had been fixed for half-past
four in the morning. But there was another fort on the opposite side
of the river, perhaps there might be some resistance there. Alas! vain
hope. Three shots were fired at it from the gunboats which had passed
through during the night, and some twenty labourers walked out of it
to seek a more secure field for their industry in some neighbouring
village. Afterwards our troops went in and found it empty as the
other; so ended the capture of Pey-tang.

We came over the bar in the evening, and I went to see Hope Grant at
the captured fort, where he has fixed his abode. While there we
discovered a strongish body of Tartar cavalry, at a distance of about
four miles along the causeway which leads from this to Tientsin and
Taku. I urged the General to send out a party to see what these gentry
were doing, lest they should be breaking up the causeway, or doing any
other mischief; and I heard from him this morning that he had arranged
with General Montauban to do so, and that a party of 2,000 men started
on that errand early. The Tartars seem to be in greater force than was
supposed. The officer in command (rightly or wrongly, I know not
which) resolved to consider the expedition merely a reconnaissance,
and to retire after staying on the ground a short time. Of course the
Tartars will consider this a victory, and will he elated by it; but
perhaps this is a good thing, as it may induce them to face us on the
open. The ground on which they were found is firm and fit for cavalry,
and is about four miles from the Peiho Forts. This is a very nasty
place. The country around is all under water, and it is impossible to
get through it except by moving along the one or two causeways that
intersect it. The military are, therefore, glad to find sound footing
at no great distance.

[Sidenote: Chinese overtures.]

Up to this time no communication of any kind had passed between the Special Ambassadors and any Chinese officials. An _ultimatum_ had been presented by Mr. Bruce in March, demanding an apology for the attack on our ships of war, the immediate ratification of the Treaty, and prompt payment of the indemnity of 4,000,000 taels, as therein stipulated. As these demands had been formally refused by the Chinese Government, there was no room for diplomacy. Even the bare announcement of his arrival Lord Elgin feared they might interpret as an invitation to treat, and use as an excuse for dilatory and evasive negotiations. The justice of this view was proved by what took place on the 5th of August. Having occasion to station one of his ships near the shore for the purpose of getting water, the Admiral sent a flag of truce to warn some Tartar troops posted near the spot, that 'his ship had not gone there with the view of making an attack, but that it would fire on the Tartars if they approached too near it.' The Governor- General at once took advantage of the opening this gave him. Affecting to believe that the flag of truce came from Lord Elgin, he addressed to him a despatch full of professions of amity, and saying that he 'had received instructions to discuss and dispose of all questions with the British Minister,' but containing no mention of the _ultimatum_. To this and numerous similar missives, which came for a time in rapid succession, Lord Elgin had but one reply--that he could discuss nothing until the demands already made had been satisfied.

_August 9th._--My diplomacy began yesterday, for I received in the
morning a communication from the Governor-General of the province, not
frankly conceding our demands, but making tolerably plausible
proposals for the sake of occasioning delay. I have refused to stay
the march of the military on such overtures; but the great slowness of
our operations is likely to lead me into diplomatic difficulties. The
Chinese authorities, if they become frightened, are clever enough to
advance propositions which it may be impossible to accede to without
compromising the main objects of this costly expedition, and by
refusing which I shall, nevertheless, expose myself to great
animadversion. There was a reconnaissance again this morning, and I
hope from the report of Crealock (who accompanied it, and who is doing
very well) that the enemy will prove quite as little formidable as I
have always expected. The serious advance was positively to have taken
place to-morrow, but I almost fear there will be another delay. I am
anxious to conclude peace as soon as possible after the capture of the
Peiho Forts, because, from what I have seen of the conduct of the
French here, I am sure that they will commit all manner of atrocities,
and make foreigners detested in every town and village they enter. Of
course their presence makes it very difficult to maintain discipline
among our own people.

[Sidenote: Taking of the forts.]

The 'serious advance' took place on the 12th, and was completely successful. On that day the Allies took possession of the little town of Sinho: two days later they occupied Tangkow. The forts, however, which guarded the entrance of the Peiho--the Taku Forts, from which the British forces had been so disastrously repulsed the year before--remained untaken. Opinions were divided as to the plan of operations. The French were for attacking first the great fortifications on the right or southern bank of the river; but Sir Robert Napier urged that the real key to the enemy's position was the most northerly of the forts, on the left or northern bank. Happily his counsels prevailed. On the 21st this fort was taken by assault, with but little loss of life; and the soundness of the judgment which selected the point of attack was proved by the immediate surrender of all the remaining defensible positions on both sides of the river.

During the greater part of this time Lord Elgin was on board the 'Granada,' moored off Pey-tang, suffering all the anxieties of an active spirit condemned to inactivity in the midst of action: responsible generally for the fate of the expedition, yet without power to control any detail of its operations; fretting especially at the delays which are, perhaps, necessarily incident to a divided and subdivided command. Writing after the surrender of the Taku Forts he said:--

I have torn up the earlier part of this letter, because it is needless
to place on record the anxieties I felt at that time. To revert to the
portion of my history which was included in the part of my letter that
I have destroyed, I must tell you that it was on the 12th that the
troops first moved out of Pey-tang. I saw them defile past, and in the
afternoon rode out to the camp, but was turned back by a large body of
Tartar cavalry, who menaced my flank, and as some of my people had
just discovered, in the apartment of the Tartar General at Sinho, a
letter stating that they were determined to capture the 'big barbarian
himself' this time, I thought it better to retrace my steps. The
second action took place on the 14th, and on the 15th I rode out to
see the General, and had a conference with him. On the 17th I went to
the gulf to see Gros. I have had dozens of letters from the Chinese
authorities, and I have answered some of them, not in a way to give
them much pleasure. All these details were given at full length in my
annihilated letter, but already they seem out of date.

_Tangkow.--August 23rd._--Grant has been marvellously favoured by the
weather, for the rain, which arrests all movements here, stopped the
day before he moved out of Pey-tang, and began again about an hour
after he had taken the Taku Fort, which led to the surrender of the
whole. I must also say that the result entirely justified the
selection which he made of his point of attack, and, as this was
against the written opinion of the French General, it is a feather in
Grant's cap. The Chinese are just the same as they were when I knew
them formerly. They fired the cannons with quite as little accuracy,
but there was one point of difference in their proceedings. On
previous occasions we have always found their forts open on one side;
so that, when they were turned, the troops left them and escaped. In
this instance they were enclosed with ditches, palisades, stakes, &c.,
so that the poor fellows had nothing for it but to remain in them till
they were pushed out by bayonets. Almost all our casualties occurred
during the escalade. I went through the hospitals yesterday, and found
very few who had been struck by round shot. A very small portion of
the force was engaged, so that my opinion of its unnecessary magnitude
is not shaken. I need not describe the action for you, as you will no
doubt see elsewhere a detailed account of it. My own personal history
will not be indifferent to you. I left the 'Granada' at about 5.30
P.M. on the 20th (Monday). Found some dinner and a tent at the camp at
Sinho. Started next morning at about 5.30 A.M.; rode into Tangkow,
where I now am, and mounted to the top of the Head-quarters' House,
whence I had a very good view of the operations. I was dislodged after
a while, because a battery opened fire at about fifteen hundred yards
from us, and some of the balls fell so near, that we began to think
they were perhaps firing at me. On being dislodged from my Belvidere,
I took some breakfast to console myself; and soon after, seeing the
British flag on the fort which we had been attacking, I rode over to
it. We met a good many of our own wounded, and all round the fort were
numbers of the poor Chinamen, staked and massacred in all sorts of
ways. I found the two Generals there, and soon after the Admiral came
up from his ship under a flag of truce. Two letters came to me from
the Chinese; but, true to my policy of letting the fighting men have
all the prestige of taking the Forts, I would not have anything to say
to them. The messengers were told that they must give up the forts to
the Commanders-in-Chief before I would listen to them; and that, in
the meantime, the army would proceed with its operations. They moved
on accordingly, and I returned to my post of observation at Tangkow. I
had hardly reached it when the rain began, and in about an hour the
roads had become absolutely impassable for artillery, and nearly so
for everything else. The troops met with no resistance at the second
fort, and the indefatigable Parkes having gone over to the unfortunate
Governor-General, extorted from him a surrender of the whole, which he
brought to the Commanders-in-Chief on the morning of the 22nd, having,
I believe, dictated its terms. Of course, Grant's triumph is complete,
and deservedly so. ... The system of our army involves such an
enormous transportation of provisions, &c., that we make, however, but
slow progress. I have, therefore, urged the Admiral, who has got
through the barriers at the mouth of the Peiho (and who is not
unwilling to go ahead), to proceed up the river with his gunboats: if
he meets with any obstructions which are serious, he can stop his
progress, and await the arrival of troops. If he meets none, he will
soon reach Tientsin.

_August 24th._--This morning, at about four, Grant awoke me with a
letter from the Admiral, saying that he had experienced in going up
the river exactly what we did in 1858--the poor people coming down in
crowds to offer submission and provisions, and no opposition of any
kind. He wrote from ten miles below Tientsin, which place he was going
to occupy with his small gunboat force. The General has agreed to
despatch a body of infantry in gunboats, and to make his cavalry march
by land; and I am only awaiting the return of the Admiral to move on.
So all is going on well. Grant has also agreed to send a regiment to
Shanghae in case there should be trouble there. ... It really looks
now as if my absence would not be protracted much beyond the time we
used to speak of before I started. ... At the same time, I do not like
to be too confident.

[Sidenote: The Peiho.]

_August 25th.--Noon._--High and dry at about fifteen miles below
Tientsin. This must remind you of some of my letters from the Yangtze,
two years ago. We started this morning at 6.30 in the 'Granada:' the
General and I, with both our staffs. We had gone on famously to this
point, scraping through the mud occasionally with success. In rounding
a corner, however, at which a French gunboat had already stuck before
us, we have run upon a bank. It is very strange to me to be going up
the Peiho river again. The fertility of the plain through which it
runs strikes me more than it did formerly. The harvest is at hand, and
the crops clothe it luxuriantly. The poor people in the villages do
not appear to fear us much. We treated them well before, and they
expect similar treatment again. The Admiral did his work of occupying
Tientsin well.... He has great qualities.

[Sidenote: Tientsin.]

_Tientsin.--Sunday, August 26th._--We reached this place about
midnight. It was about the most nervous operation at which I ever
assisted, going round the sharp turns with this long ship by
moonlight. I had a moment of painful _saisissement_ when I felt almost
certain that we should run into my dear colleague Gros, who had
grounded in a little gunboat at one of the worst bends of the river.
We only saved him by dropping an anchor from the stern, and going
backwards full speed. The Yangtze was bad enough, but we never used to
go on at night, and there was no danger of collisions. This ship looks
also as if she would go head over heels much more easily than the
'Furious.' I am waiting for Parkes and the General before I decide as
to landing, &c. Is it not strange to be here? Immediately ahead of us
is the yamun where Gros and I spent the eventful weeks in 1858, which
preceded the signature of the treaties of Tientsin! _Two P.M._--We are
to have the yamun in which Reed and Putiatine were lodged in 1858; a
much better quarter than our old one; and the General, Gros, and I are
all to lodge in it together.

[Sidenote: Chinese yamun.]

_Tientsin.--August 27th._--I had a very bad headache after I had sent
off the mail yesterday. ... Our ship had, moreover, got aground, and
was lying over so much on one side that it seemed possible that she
might topple over altogether. Under these circumstances, and having
the prospect of a very noisy night on board, I determined to land and
sleep in my yamun. The portion of it dedicated to me consists of a
regular Chinese garden, with rockwork and bridges, and ponds full of
lotus leaves, and flowerpots of all dimensions with shrubs and flowers
in them, surrounded on two sides by wooden buildings, containing rooms
with carved woodwork and other Chinese neatnesses. It is the only
house of a Chinese gentleman I have ever inhabited, for when I was
here before I dwelt in a temple. The mosquitoes were a little
troublesome at first, but I got my net up, and slept tolerably, better
than I should have done here; for the iron ships get so heated by the
sun during the day that they are never cool, however fresh the night
air may be.

[Sidenote: Negotiations.]

_August 29th._--I intended to have told you that I was sending a stiff
letter to my old friend Kweiliang; but, in fact, it has taken some
time and consultation with Gros to settle its terms, and it is only
now being translated. Yesterday afternoon the long-expected mail
arrived. ... Shall I really eat my Christmas dinner with you? Really
many things are more improbable than that. I hoped at one time that
this letter might be despatched from Pekin; but as we have to meet
Commissioners here, and to make a kind of supplementary treaty before
proceeding thither, it is doubtful whether we shall accomplish this. I
am not sure that I like my present domicile as well as I did my
domicile here in 1858, because, although it is a great deal more
_orné_, it is proportionably hotter, being surrounded by walls which
we cannot see over. It is a great place, with an infinite number of
courts and rooms of all sizes. I should think several families must
live in it, unless the establishment of a Chinese gentleman is very
large indeed. If Kweiliang and Co. come into our terms, my present
intention is to send at once to Frederick officially, and request him
to come on to Pekin. ... He has been having some very troublesome work
at Shanghae with the Rebels; indeed, there is at present work enough
for both of us in China.

_September 1st._--Kweiliang arrived last night, and sent me a hint
that he intended to call on me to-day. I sent one in return, to say
that I would not see him until he had answered my letter. I fear a
little more bullying will be necessary before we bring this stupid
Government up to the mark. Both yesterday and to-day I took a ride in
the morning with Grant. I rode a horse of his, a very nice one. The
sun becomes powerful very early, but it is a charming climate now. The
abundance of all things wonderful: beef and mutton at about threepence
a pound; peaches, grapes, and all sorts of vegetables in plenty; ice
in profusion. I daresay, however, that in six weeks' time it may be
very cold.

At one moment, on the 2nd of September, it really seemed as if the object of the mission was achieved; for the Imperial Commissioners--one of whom was the same Kweiliang who had conducted the negotiations in 1858--in a formal despatch gave a positive assurance that the Treaty of Tientsin should be faithfully observed, and that all the demands hitherto made should be conceded in full. A draft of convention was accordingly prepared on this basis; but, when it came to the point, Kweiliang and his colleagues declared that they had no authority to sign it without referring to Pekin; and it became obvious that he either did not possess, or did not at that moment wish it to be supposed that he possessed, powers equal to those which he held in 1858, although his previous language had been calculated to convey the opposite impression.

[Sidenote: Broken off.]

Here was clearly a deliberate design to create delay, with the view of dragging on negotiations into the winter. It was indispensable, Lord Elgin thought, to check this policy by an act of vigour; and accordingly, with the concurrence of Baron Gros, he intimated to the Imperial Commissioners that, in consequence of the want of good faith exhibited by them in assuming the title of Plenipotentiaries when they could not exercise the authority which it implied, and of the delays which the alleged necessity of constant reference to Pekin would occasion, he had determined to proceed at once to Tung-chow, in the immediate neighbourhood of the capital, and to enter into no further negotiations with them until he should have reached that place.

_September 8th._--I am at war again! My idiotical Chinamen have taken
to playing tricks, which give me an excellent excuse for carrying the
army on to Pekin. It would be a long affair to tell you all the ins
and outs, but I am sure from what has come to pass during the last few
days, that we must get nearer Pekin before the Government there comes
to its senses. The blockheads have gone on negotiating with me just
long enough to enable Grant to bring all his army up to this point.
Here we are, then, with our base established in the heart of the
country, in a capital climate, with abundance around us, our army in
excellent health, and these stupid people give me a snub, which
obliges me to break with them. No one knows whether our progress is to
be a fight or an ovation, for in this country nothing can be foreseen.
I think it better that the olive-branch should advance with the sword.
I am afraid that this change in the programme--a hostile instead of a
peaceful march on Pekin--will keep me longer here, because I cannot
send for Frederick till peace is made; and I cannot, I suppose, leave
Pekin till he arrives there.

_Sunday, September 9th._--Kweiliang and Co. wanted very much to call
on me yesterday, but I would not receive them. The junior
Commissioner, who was at Canton with Parkes, and knows him well, told
him that, in fact, the people here had been urging them to make an
effort to prevent war, saying: 'If we were sure that the foreigners
would have the best of it, we should not care; but if they are worsted
they will fall back on us, and wreak their vengeance upon us.' This
does not seem a very formidable state of mind as far as we are
concerned. We have behaved well to the people, except at Peytang and
Sinho, and the consequence is that we can move through the country
with comparative ease. If the people tried to cut off our baggage, and
refused us supplies, we should find it very difficult to get on. ...
_Noon_.--I have just returned from a service on board the 'Granada,'
where the clergyman administered the sacrament to a small
congregation. At four we march to the wars; but as I go to bear the
olive, it is not so bad a Sunday's work. You may very likely hear
through Siberia of the result of our march before you receive this
letter announcing that it is to take place. I shall not, therefore,
speculate upon it.

_Yang-tsun, about twenty miles above Tientsin.--September 10th.--Two
P.M._--This morning we started at about five, and reached this
encampment soon after seven. A very nice ride, cool, and through a
succession of crops of millet; a stiff, reedy stem, some twelve or
fourteen feet high, with a tuft on the top, is the physiognomy of the
millet stalk. It would puzzle the Tartar cavalry to charge us through
this crop. As it is, we have seen no enemy; and Mr. Parkes has induced
the inhabitants to sell us a good many sheep and oxen. Our tents were
not pitched till near noon; so I sat during most of the forenoon under
the shade of a hedge. There has been thunder since, and a considerable
fall of rain. I hope it will not make the roads impassable; but if it
fills the river a little it will do us good, for we may then use it
for the transport of our supplies, and it is now too low. We do not
know much what is ahead of us, but we hear of Tartar troops farther
on; and at Tung-chow it is said that a large army is collected under
Sang-ko-lin-sin himself (their great general). I am now enjoying the
life of a camp; writing to you seated on my portmanteau, with my desk
on my only chair. It is perhaps better than my hothouse at Tientsin.

[Sidenote: New Plenipotentiaries.]

_September 11th.-Six A.M._--Parkes and Wade have just been in my tent
with a letter from two new Plenipotentiaries--really some of the
highest personages in the empire--stating that they are under orders
to come to Tientsin to settle everything, and deprecating a forward
movement.[2] I shall of course stick by my programme, and decline to
have anything to say to them till I reach Tung-chow. Of course this
proceeding on their part augurs well for peace. It poured all last
evening, and the General determined not to march this morning; but as
it is fine now, I think we may start at noon, and make out our
allotted march. It is cooler this morning, and I think it not
improbable that the thunder of yesterday may close the hot season.
However, the sun is coming out in his strength, so one cannot say what
the day may bring forth. _Ten_ A.M.--All our cart-drivers, with their
animals, disappeared during last night, leaving the carts behind them.
Probably they got a hint from the Chinese authorities. I am sorry for
it, for if we begin to resort to measures of violence to supply
ourselves, we may entirely alter the footing on which we have hitherto
stood with the people. We are putting all our surplus goods into
junks, in order to reduce our baggage.

[Sidenote: Chinese gentleman-farmer.]

_Nan-tsai-tsun.--September 12th._--Where will this letter be sent
from? It is begun at a small town on the close of our march of to-day,
which ought to have been our march of yesterday. It was a very mild
one--about eight miles--through a nice country, more wooded than
former marches, and with bright sunshine, and a fresh, almost frosty
air. The sunshine we had not at first, for we started before the sun
had appeared on the horizon. Instead of trusting to our tents, we have
this day taken up our abode in the house of a Chinese gentleman-
farmer, the owner of about 1,000 acres. It is nearly as large as the
house I occupied at Tientsin; at least it has nearly as many courts.
The gentleman has a good library, in which I have established myself;
and he seems, poor man, very anxious to accommodate us, though his
appearance is not that of a man entirely at his ease. As I was
starting this morning I got a second letter from the new
Plenipotentiaries, rather more defiant in its tone, and saying that
there are troops at our next station, with whom we shall come into
collision, if we advance with an army. Parkes is gone on with an
escort, and we shall soon know from him what the state of the case
really is.

[Sidenote: Ho-see-woo.] [Sidenote: Monastery.]

_Ho-see-woo.--September 14th._--We had a charming march to this place
yesterday morning. The country much more beautiful than before, and
hills in the distance. All around us the most luxuriant crops, and
hamlets embosomed in clumps of willows. The temperature was delicious;
almost too cold at starting, but, later, a fresh breeze in our faces
gave the requisite coolness and no more. Our march was about twelve
miles, and on reaching its close I was conducted to a temple where I
now am. It is a monastery, with very nice apartments, and quantities
of stabling, grain, agricultural implements, &c., all indicative of a
very prosperous community. I have seen no _bonzerie_ on anything like
so comfortable a scale. I had a second letter from my Commissioners in
the evening of the last day on which I wrote a page of this journal,
more humble in its tone then the preceding one, and as my General was
getting uneasy about his supplies, &c., I thought it necessary to make
a kind of proposition for an arrangement. ... Our soldiers do so
little for themselves, and their necessities are so great, that we
move but slowly. Our present party consists of about 1,500 fighting
men; but we count about 4,000 mouths, and all must have abundantly of
the best. The French (I admit that they take more out of the country,
and sometimes perhaps by rougher methods) carry on their backs several
days' provisions. They work in all sorts of ways for the army. The
contrast is, I must say, very striking. ... I therefore thought it
better to send Wade and Parkes to the new Imperial Commissioners, to
see whether they intended to resist or not, and to make a proposal to
test this. They set out last night, and I have just heard from them,
that, as they did not find the Commissioners at the place they
expected (Matow), they are gone on to Tung-chow, the place where I
intend to sign the Convention. Parkes is one of the most remarkable
men I ever met; for energy, courage, and ability combined, I do not
know where I could find his match; and this, joined to a facility of
speaking Chinese, which he shares only with Lay, makes him at present
_the_ man of the situation.

[Sidenote: Terms agreed to.]

After eight hours' discussion the Chinese Commissioners conceded every point; agreeing among other things that the army should advance to a place called Five-li Point, within six miles of Tung-chow, and there remain while the Ambassador proceeded with an escort of 1,000 men to Pekin. In the high character and standing of the two Commissioners, one the Minister of War, the other a Prince of the Blood Imperial, and in their repeated assurances that 'what they signed was as though the Emperor signed it,' and that 'no comparison could be drawn between the authority vested in them and that held' by previous Commissioners, there appeared to be everything necessary to justify the belief that their word might be trusted. Unhappily the confidence which the Allies were thus led to repose in them was destined to be deceived; not however, so far as appears, owing to bad faith on their part, but owing to the fact that their pacific influence at court was overborne on this occasion by that of the war party, headed by the Commander-in-Chief, Sang-ko-lin-sin.[3]

On the return of the two secretaries from the conference, Lord Elgin at once acquainted Baron Gros and Sir Hope Grant with its results; and it was agreed that the Commanders-in-Chief should move forward on Monday the 17th from Ho-se-woo to the place already mentioned, Five-li Point, which they expected to reach in two days' march; and that, at the same time, or rather before the departure of the army, Mr. Parkes and some members of the Ambassador's suite should proceed to Tung-chow to prepare for his reception, and to procure means of transport, accompanied by an officer of the Quarter-master General's Department, and another of the Commissariat, and escorted by a small body of troops.[4]

_Sunday, September 16th_.--We have had service in my temple. The
General and Staff attended. ... Wade and Parkes did good work at Tung-
chow. It is arranged now that the General and bulk of the force
proceed to-morrow on their way to the point at which (if the Chinese
Plenipotentiaries come in to all our terms) we are to stay the
progress of the main body, going on from that point with an escort of
1,000 men. This place is about five miles from Tung-chow, and twenty
from Pekin; and so I hope to effect my pacific entry into Pekin. ...
This place has been, I am sorry to say, much maltreated, for the
people ran away, and when that takes place, it is impossible to
prevent plundering. The present plan is, that I remain here till the
army has taken up its new position, and all is arranged for my
reception at Pekin and Tung-chow, when I shall move on. Gros is here.
He has just been with me, and is in a great state because our
soldiers, in their zeal to drive away all Chinese robbers, have driven
away all his coolies.

_September 17th_.--I rode out very early this morning to see my
General before he started, and to give him a hint about the _looting_,
which has been bad here. He disapproves of it as much as I do. ...
Parkes went off again this morning to Tung-chow, with another missive
from me to my Prince (the new Plenipotentiary), rather stiff and
plain-spoken; and Loch is gone with him to get carts, &c., as I have
no means of conveying my goods and chattels. I shall probably hear to-
morrow whether there is any hitch; but even if all be right, I hardly
expect to get on before Thursday, for want of transport.

[Sidenote: Agreement broken.]

_September 18th.--Noon._--There is firing in front of us; and I have a
letter from Parkes from Tung-chow, stating that the Prince and his
colleagues made great difficulties about an _audience_ with the
Emperor. If I was sure that Parkes and Co. were well out of Tung-chow,
and that we should push on well, I should not regret the firing.
_Five P.M._--M. de Bastard, Gros' secretary, has just returned from
Tung-chow. He reports that the Tartars this morning were in possession
of the ground on which, according to the understanding entered into
with the Prince and Co., we were to have encamped. He had to ride
through their army, to his no small alarm; but he met Parkes (who
knows not what fear is) riding back to Tung-chow to tell the Prince,
&c., of the position of the Tartar army, and that they should be held
responsible for the consequences. Loch was with the General. I wonder
he is not come to inform me of what has happened.

[Sidenote: Treacherous seizure of Mr. Parkes and others.]

At the time when these words were written, nearly the whole of the party which had ridden forth the morning before, 'in high spirits at the prospect of an early and successful termination of the war,' had been treacherously seized by the soldiers of Sang-ko-lin-sin, and Mr. Parkes and Mr. Loch were being violently hurried off, with their hands tied behind their backs, in a rude springless cart, over a badly-paved road, to the prisons of Pekin. The details of their capture and imprisonment, together with such particulars as could afterwards be ascertained of their companions' fate, may be read in the very interesting narrative of one of the victims.[5] We can here touch only upon those points in which their story is mixed up with public events.

[Sidenote: Cause of the change.]

As to the origin and cause of the renewal of hostilities, it is impossible to speak with certainty; nor is it probable that we shall ever arrive at a better opinion on the subject, than that which was formed by Lord Elgin on the spot. In his report to the Government he wrote:--

To hazard conjectures as to the motives by which Chinese functionaries
are actuated is not a very safe undertaking; and it is very possible
that further information may modify the views which I now entertain on
this point. I am, however, disposed at present to doubt there having
been a deliberate intention of treachery on the part of Prince Tsai
and his colleague; but I apprehend that the General-in-Chief, Sang-ko-
lin-sin, thought that they had compromised his military position by
allowing our army to establish itself so near his lines at Chang-kia-
wan. He sought to counteract the evil effect of this by making a great
swagger of parade and preparation to resist when the Allied armies
approached the camping-ground allotted to them. Several of our people,
Colonel Walker, with his escort, my private Secretary, Mr. Loch, Baron
Gros' Secretary of Embassy, Comte de Bastard, and others, passed
through the Tartar army during the course of the morning on their way
from Tung-chow without encountering any rudeness or ill-treatment
whatsoever. At about a quarter to ten, however, a French Commissariat
officer was assaulted by some Tartar soldiers under circumstances
which are not very clearly ascertained; and this incident gave rise to
an engagement, which soon became general. On the whole, I come to the
conclusion that, in the proceedings of the Chinese Plenipotentiaries
and Commander-in-Chief in this instance, there was that mixture of
stupidity, want of straightforwardness, suspicion, and bluster, which
characterises so generally the conduct of affairs in this country; but
I cannot believe that, after the experience which Sang-ko-lin-sin had
already had of our superiority in the field, either he or his civil
colleagues could have intended to bring on a conflict in which, as the
event has proved, he was so sure to be worsted.

[Sidenote: Firm measures.]

Late on the night of the 18th, Lord Elgin received at the same time the report of a successful engagement, and the intelligence of the capture of his friends. From this moment he felt that, until the prisoners were given up, there could be no further negotiation. A notification was at once issued, that 'all English and French subjects were required to return to the head-quarters of their respective armies; and that if any impediment was put in the way of their return, the city of Pekin would forthwith be attacked and taken.' Even when offers came that they should be restored on condition of his withdrawing his troops, he refused to listen to such terms; convinced that any sign of yielding on his part would be as dangerous to their safety as it would be fatal to all hope of success in the objects of his mission.[6]

_September 23rd_.--I have had a very busy time since I last wrote in
this journal. I have, moreover, been separated from it, and from all
my effects. On the 21st we had another battle with the Tartars. I
accompanied the army, and saw it all. Considering that the Tartars are
so wretchedly armed and led, they did pretty well. We are now about
six miles from Pekin, but I believe the Generals will not move for a
week. We learn that Parkes and his companions, viz. Loch, De Norman,
Bowlby, Captain Brabazon, Lieutenant Anderson, nineteen Sikhs, and one
of the Dragoon Guards, are in Pekin, but we have had no communication
with them yet.

[Sidenote: Pali-chiao]

_Pali-chiao.--September 27th_.--I closed my last letter somewhat in
haste, for I had been separated for three days from it and my desk,
and when we met again, I was busy with my despatches, &c. The arrest
of Parkes and the others is a very disagreeable incident, and we do
not yet know what it may lead to. I sent word yesterday to the
Emperor's brother, who is now named to treat with me, that unless they
are returned to the camp within three days' time, and a pledge is
given that the Convention I drew up at Tientsin is signed, Pekin will
be assaulted. We are anxious, until we receive an answer to this
_ultimatum_. It was a reply to a letter from the Prince to me, in
which he coolly stated that the prisoners should be returned when our
army and fleet had retired from the country. ... Meantime we have an
army in excellent health, abundantly supplied, and which, in five
actions with the enemy, has lost some twenty killed! ... I think I
told you at the close of my last letter, that at midnight on the 18th
I received a note in pencil from the General, telling me what had led
to the conflict of that day. At 3.30 A.M. I sent an answer by
Crealock, and at five set off with an escort of thirty Irregulars, to
ride about twenty miles to the General's camp.

We then agreed that the Commanders-in-Chief should send a notification
to the chief mandarin of Tung-chow, to the effect that, unless our
countrymen were forthwith restored, Pekin would be assaulted. No
notice was taken of this. So on the 21st we advanced, and attacked a
large body of Tartars, encamped between Tung-chow and Pekin. I
accompanied the infantry and artillery during the day's proceedings.
We encamped after the battle, where we now are, among some trees. We
sleep in tents, but we have a house where we mess. I am living with
the General, as my establishment has not yet been brought up from Ho-
see-woo. I rode over yesterday to see the Russian Minister, who, with
his sixteen Cossacks, is occupying the village, or rather town, of
Chin-kia-wan, which was taken after the affair of the 18th. It is a
sad scene of desolation. General Ignatieff was very obliging and
friendly, as I have indeed found him to be throughout. He and I
entirely agree as to how the Chinese should be fought. ... I may be
very near the close of this China business, or I may be at the
commencement of a new series of difficulties. All is very uncertain at
present. ... The climate is pleasant here, were it not for the
quantity of dust, which is overwhelming. We have abundance of grapes,
and some other good fruit.

_September 29th._--At midnight of the 27th I was roused by Wade, who
brought me a letter from Prince Kung (the Emperor's brother), a good
deal milder than the last, but still implying that Parkes, &c., were
not to be returned until the treaty, &c., was signed. The comparative
mildness of the tone of this communication was clearly attributable to
the firmness of my last letter, and I therefore induced those with
whom I act to agree to nay adhering to it in my reply. I accordingly
wrote to say that the army would advance unless the prisoners should
return in the course of to-day; but that I do not intend to add to the
Convention which I have already furnished to the Chinese
Plenipotentiaries, and that I will sign that at once, and close the
war, if they choose. I hardly expect to see our friends to-day. The
Generals will not advance to-morrow, but they say they will on Monday.
Meanwhile it is raining; a sort of English rain, not tropical; and if
we have not too much of it, it will do good.

_October 1st._--Yesterday morning came another letter, proposing that
the army should retire to Chin-kia-wan, and that then the treaty
should be signed and the prisoners restored. This was clearly
inadmissible, as the Chinese would infer from it that whenever they
had a difficulty with us they had only to kidnap some of our people to
bring us to terms. So we have again handed the matter over to the
Generals, from whose hands indeed it would not now have been taken if
they had not urged me to make this last overture to Prince Kung. I do
not know when they will advance.

_October 3rd_.--We have moved about two miles, and are now lodged in a
mosque--a nice building, a good deal ornamented--which is for the
nonce turned to profane uses. The army was to have advanced to attack
Sang-ko-lin-sin's force to-morrow, but now I am told the French are
not ready. ... These delays give the Chinese fresh heart, and they are
beginning to send people to fire on our convoys, &c., coming up from
Tientsin. ... There was a letter sent to me yesterday by Prince Kung,
signed by Loch and Parkes. Loch managed in his signature to convey to
us in Hindostanee that the letter was written under compulsion. As it
was in Chinese the information was hardly necessary. It said that
_they two_ were well treated, complimented Prince Kung, and asked for
some clothes. We have heard nothing about the others who are missing.

[Sidenote: Advance on Pekin.]

_October 5th._--We left our mosque this morning at about seven. The
whole army was drawn up in contiguous columns of regiments, and had a
good appearance. The cavalry on the right, then the artillery, and
then the infantry. The French were on our left. In this way we
advanced about four miles, when we reached a place from which we saw
one of the gates of Pekin at about a mile and a half distance. We met
with no enemy, but we heard of him about three miles farther on.
However, the French declined to go any farther; so here we remain for
the night, and we have got into a joss-house, which is lucky, for we
have no tents with us--only a very light kit and three days'
provisions for each person. We hear that the Emperor has left for
Tartary, which is very probable. We might have stopped him if we had
marched on immediately after the 21st ultimo; but that was, in the
judgment of the Generals, impossible.

[Sidenote: Suburbs.]

_October 6th.--Five P.M._--We are lodged in a _Lamaserie_ in the
north-west suburb of Pekin. Our move began at seven. We streamed along
narrow roads in a long line. I got a scolding from the General for
outflanking the skirmishers, which I did to get out of the dust. At
about nine we reached a brick-kiln, from whence we had a view of
Pekin, and of a mound, behind which, as we were assured, Sang-ko-lin-
sin and his army were encamped. We halted for some time and then
advanced; we on the right, the French on the left, towards these
supposed camps. The French were to attack in front, we were to take
the enemy in flank. I was with the second division of our force. When
we arrived abreast of the entrenchment we could see nothing of an
enemy. After a while I rode to the top of the mound at the corner of
the entrenchment, and found the French General and Staff. The Tartars
had all decamped the night before. I then rejoined our army and
advanced with it to this point. With the exception of a few shots
exchanged with a picket of the enemy, we know of no fighting which has
taken place to-day; but, strange to say, our cavalry which went off
far to the right in the morning has not been heard of yet, and we
cannot discover what has become of the French. It is a nice country,
covered with clumps of trees and suburban villas. The temperature of
the air is cool, but the sun was very hot all day.

[Sidenote: The Summer Palace.]

_Sunday, October 7th._--We hear this morning that the French and our
cavalry have captured the Summer Palace of the Emperor. All the big-
wigs have fled, nothing remains but a portion of the household. We are
told that the _prisoners_ are all in Pekin. ... _Five P.M._--I have
just returned from the Summer Palace. It is really a fine thing, like
an English park--numberless buildings with handsome rooms, and filled
with Chinese _curios_, and handsome clocks, bronzes, &c. But, alas!
such a scene of desolation. The French General came up full of
protestations. He had prevented _looting_ in order that all the
plunder might be divided between the armies, &c. &c. There was not a
room that I saw in which half the things had not been taken away or
broken to pieces. I tried to get a regiment of ours sent to guard the
place, and then sell the things by auction; but it is difficult to get
things done by system in such a case, so some officers are left who
are to fill two or three carts with treasures which are to be sold....
Plundering and devastating a place like this is bad enough, but what
is much worse is the waste and breakage. Out of 1,000,000 _l_. worth
of property, I daresay 50,000 _l_. will not be realised. French
soldiers were destroying in every way the most beautiful silks,
breaking the jade ornaments and porcelain, &c. War is a hateful
business. The more one sees of it, the more one detests it.

[Sidenote: Return of some of the captives.]

Pressed thus closely up to the walls of the capital, the Chinese Regent--for the Emperor had retired to Tartary, 'being obliged by law to hunt in the autumn'--yielded at last to save the storming of the city. In the afternoon of the 8th of October the English and French prisoners detained in Pekin, numbering eight in all, were sent into the camp.[7]

_October 9th._--Yesterday at 4 P.M., Parkes, Loch, and one of Fane's
Irregulars arrived. With them were four French soldiers and M.
d'Escayrac (the head of a scientific commission). The hands and wrists
of the latter were in a sad condition, they had been so hurt by the
cords tied round them. Bowlby, De Norman, and the rest, do not seem to
be in Pekin as we had hoped. Parkes and Loch were very badly treated
for the first ten days; since then, conciliation has been the order of
the day, and, I have no doubt, because I stood firm. If I had wavered,
they would have been lost; because the Chinese, finding they had a
lever with which they could move us, would have used their advantage
unsparingly. Parkes and Loch have behaved very well under
circumstances of great danger. The narrative of their adventures is
very interesting, but I cannot attempt to give it in this letter. They
seem to be in good health notwithstanding the hardships they have gone
through.

In a public despatch of the same date, announcing the restoration of the captives, he wrote:-