Chapter XII: Part II: XXV (3)

By those whose knowledge of the country is limited to newspaper news a much more serious state of affairs is supposed to exist, a "pretender" collecting his forces for a final coup, etc. Something of truth there may be in this, but the situation is grossly exaggerated. The local rising of a few tribes in eastern Morocco never affected the rest of the Empire, save by that feeling of unrest which, in the absence of complete information, jumps at all tales. Even the so-called "rout" of an "imperial army" three years ago was only a stampede without fighting, brought about by a clever ruse, and there has never been a serious conflict throughout the affair, though the "Rogi" is well supplied with arms from Algeria, and his "forces" are led by a Frenchman, M. Delbrel. Meanwhile comparative order reigns in the disaffected district, though in the north, usually the most peaceful portion of the Empire, all is disturbed.

There a leader has arisen, Raïsûli by name, who obtained redress for the wrongs of tribes south of Tangier, and his own appointment as their kaïd, by the astute device of carrying off as hostages an American and an Englishman, so that the pressure certain to be brought to bear by their Governments would compel the Sultan to grant his demands. All turned out as he had hoped, and the condign punishment which he deserves is yet far off, though a local struggle continues between him and a small imperial force, complicated by feuds between his sometime supporters, who, however, fight half-heartedly, for fear of killing relatives pressed into service on the other side. Those who once looked to Raïsûli as a champion have found his little finger thicker than the Sultan's loins, and the country round Tangier is ruined by taxation, so that every one is discontented, and the district is unsafe, a species of civil war raging.

The full name of this redoubtable leader is Mulai Ahmad bin Mohammed bin Abd Allah er-Raïsûli, and he is a shareef of Beni Arôs, connected therefore with the Wazzán shareefs; but his prestige as such is low, both on account of his past career, and because of his acceptance of a civil post. His mother belonged to Anjera, near Tangier, where he was born about thirty-six years ago at the village of Zeenát, being well educated, as education goes in Morocco, with the Beni M'sawah. But falling into bad company, he first took to cattle-lifting, afterwards turning highwayman, as which he was eventually caught by the Abd es-Sadok family--various members of which were kaïds from Ceuta to Azîla--and consigned to prison in Mogador. After three or four years his release was obtained by Háj Torres, the Foreign Commissioner in Tangier, but when he found that the Abd es-Sadoks had sequestrated his property, he vowed not to cut his hair till he had secured their disgrace. Hence, with locks that many a woman might envy, he has plotted and harassed till his present position has been achieved. But as this is only a means to an end, who can tell what that may be?

Raïsûli is allowed on all hands to be a peculiarly able and well-bred man, full of resource and determination. Though his foes have succeeded in kidnapping even his mother, it will certainly be a miracle if he is taken alive. Should all fail him, he is prepared to blow his brains out, or make use of a small phial of poison always to hand. It is interesting to remember that just such a character, Abd Allah Ghaïlán, held a similar position in this district when Tangier was occupied by the English, who knew him as "Guyland," and paid him tribute. The more recent imitation of Raïsûli's tactics by a native free-booter of the Ceuta frontier, in arresting two English officers as hostages wherewith to secure the release of his brother and others from prison, has proved equally successful, but as matters stand at present, it is more than doubtful whether the Moorish Government is in a position to bring either of these offenders to book, and the outlook in the north is decidedly stormy. It is, indeed, quite in accordance with the traditions of Moorish history, throughout which these periods of local disorganization have been of constant recurrence without danger to the State.

A MOORISH KAÏD AND ATTENDANTS.]

In the south things are quiet, though a spirit of unrest pervades the people, especially since it has been seen that the Sultan no longer either collects the regular taxes or maintains the regular army. There the immediate result of the failure to collect the taxes for a year or two was that the people had more to spend on cattle and other stock, which rapidly rose in price, no one needing to sell unless he wished. Within the last two years, however, the kaïds have recommenced their oppressive treatment, under the pretext of a levy to put down the rising in the eastern provinces. Men and money were several times furnished, but though now more difficult to raise, the demands continue. The wonder is that the people remain so quiet, but they are of a more peaceable nature than the Berbers of the north.

Three of the Sultan's brothers have been for some time camped in as many centres, engaged in collecting funds, but tribe after tribe has refused to pay, declaring that they have been exempted by their lord, and until he returns they will submit to no kaïd and pay no dues. It is only in certain districts that some of the funds demanded have been forthcoming, and the kaïds have full authority, but these are officials of long standing and great repute, whose jurisdiction has been much extended in consequence. Changes among the less important kaïds have been continual of late. One man would buy the office and struggle to establish himself, only to find a new man installed over his head before he was settled, which has frequently led to local disorders, fighting and plundering. In this way the Government has quite lost prestige, and a strong hand is awaited.

The Moors would have preferred another Ismáïl the Bloodthirsty, who could compel his will, and awe all other rascals in his dominions, to the mild and well-intentioned youth now at the helm. Some would even welcome any change that would put an end to present insecurity, but only the French _protégés_ desire to see that change effected by France, and only those under the German flag already would hail that with joy. The Jews alone would welcome any, as they have good cause to do.

Such was already the condition of things when the long-threatening clouds burst, and the Anglo-French Agreement was published in April, 1904. Rumours of negotiations for the sale of British interests in Morocco to France had for some time filled the air, but in face of official denials, and the great esteem in which England was held by the Moors, few gave credence to them. Mulai Abd el Azîz had relied especially on Great Britain, and had confidently looked to it for protection against the French; the announcement of the bargain between them broke him down.

It may have been inevitable; and since an agreement among all the Powers concerned was so remote a possibility, an understanding between the three most interested may have been the wisest course, in view of pending internal troubles which would certainly afford excuses for interference. It was undoubtedly good policy on their part to decide who should inherit the vineyard, and on what terms, that conflict between them might be avoided. But on the unconsulted victim it came a cruel blow, unexpected and indefensible. It is important not to forget this.

But the one absorbing thought of all for nearly a year past has been the drought and consequent famine. Between November, 1904, and October, 1905, there was practically no rainfall over a large portion of the country, and agriculture being interfered with, grain rose to five times its normal price. Although relief has now come, it will be months before the cattle are in proper condition again, and not till after next year's harvest in May and June, should it prove a good one, will contentment be restored. Under such conditions, though more ready than ever to grumble, the people have had no heart to fight, which has, to some degree, assisted in keeping them quiet. The famine has, however, tried them sore, and only increased their exasperation.

Added to this, the general feeling of dissatisfaction regarding the Sultan's foreign predilections, and the slumbering fanaticism of the "learned" class, there is now a chronic lack of funds. The money which should have been raised by taxation has been borrowed abroad and ruthlessly scattered. Fortunes have been made by foreigners and natives alike, but the Sultan is all but bankrupt. Yet never was his entourage so rich, though many who to-day hold houses and lands were a few years ago penniless.

As for the future, for many years the only answer possible to tediously frequent inquiries as to what was going to happen in Morocco has been that the future of the Shareefian Empire depended entirely on what might happen in Europe, not to any degree on its own internal condition. The only way in which this could affect the issue was by affording an excuse for outside interference, as in the present case.

Corrupt as the native administration may be, it is but the expression of a corrupt population, and no native government, even in Europe, is ever far in advance of those over whom it rules. In spite, too, of the pressure of injustice on the individual here and there, the victim of to-day becomes the oppressor of to-morrow, and such opportunities are not to be surrendered without a protest. The vast majority is, therefore, always in favour of present conditions, and would rather the chances of internecine strife than an exotic peace. No foreign ruler, however benign, would be welcome, and no "penetration," however "pacific," but will be endured and resented as a hostile wound. Even the announcement of the Anglo-French Agreement was sufficient to gravely accentuate the disorders of the country, and threaten immediate complications with Europe, by provoking attacks on Europeans who had hitherto been safe from interference save under exceptional circumstances. A good deal of the present unrest is attributable to this cause alone.

It is, therefore, a matter of deep regret that the one possible remedy--joint action of the Powers in policing the Moors, as it were, by demanding essential reforms in return for a united guarantee of territorial integrity--was rendered impossible by the rivalries between those Powers, especially on the part of France. Great Britain's step aside has made possible the only alternative, the surrender of the coveted task to one of their number, in return for such _quid pro quo_ as each could obtain. Had the second-class Powers been bargained with first, not only would they have secured substantial terms, which now it is no use their asking, but the leading Powers could have held out for terms yet undreamed of.

France did well to begin with Great Britain, but it was an egregious diplomatic error to overlook Germany, which was thereby promoted to the hitherto unhoped-for position of "next friend" and trusted adviser of Morocco. Up to that point Germany had played a waiting game so patiently that France fell into the trap, and gave her all she wanted. It is inconceivable how the astute politicians of the Quai d'Orsay committed such a blunder, save on the assumption that they were so carried away by the ease with which they had settled with Great Britain, that they forgot all other precautions--unless it was that they feared to jeopardize the conclusion of the main bargain by delay in discussing any subsidiary point.

When the Agreement was made known, the writer pointed out in the _Westminster Review_, that, "Portugal, Italy and Austria have but to acquiesce and rest assured of the 'most favoured nation' treatment, as will all the other Powers save one. That one, of course, is Germany, _whose sole interest in Morocco is the possibility of placing a drag on France_. She will have to be dealt with. Having disposed of England, which had real interests at stake, in the command of the straits and the maintenance of Gibraltar, France should be able to accomplish this as well. Five and twenty years ago Germany had not even a commercial interest in Morocco. Great Britain did three-fourths of the trade, or more, France about a tenth, Spain and others dividing the crumbs between them. But an active commercial policy--by the encouragement and support of young firms in a way that made Britishers envious, and abusive of their own Foreign Office--has secured for Germany a growing share of the trade, till now she stands next to Great Britain, whose share is reduced to one-half."[24]

[24: It is curious, indeed, how little the German Empire or its
component States figure in the history of diplomatic relations
with Morocco. One has to go back to the time of Rudolf II., in
1604, to find an active policy in force with regard to Moroccan
affairs, when that remarkable adventurer or international
diplomatist, Sir Anthony Sherley, was accredited to Abd el Azîz
III., the last of the Moorish rulers to bear the same name as
the present one. This intrepid soldier, a man after the Kaiser's
own heart, had been accredited to Germany by the great Shah of
Persia, Abbás, whose confidence he had won to a marvellous
degree, and he appears to have made as great an impression on
Rudolf, who sent him as his envoy to Morocco. Arrived there,
he astonished the natives by coolly riding into the court of
audience--a privilege still reserved to the Sultan alone. But
the Ameer, as he was called in those days, was too politic or
too polite to raise the question, only taking care that the
next time the "dog of a Christian" should find a chain stretched
across the gateway. This Sir Anthony could not brook, so rode
back threatening to break off negotiations, and it affords a
striking lesson as to the right way of dealing with orientals,
that even in those days the Moors should have yielded and
imprisoned the porter, permitting Sir Anthony's entrance on
horseback thereafter. The treaty he came to negotiate was
concluded, and relations with the Germans were established on
a right footing, but they have been little in evidence till
recent years.]

After all, the interests of Germany in Morocco were but a trifling consideration, meaning much less to her than ours do to us, and it was evident that whatever position she might assume, however she might bluster, she, too, had her price. This not being perceived by the ill-informed Press of this country, the prey of political journalists in Paris, Cologne and Madrid--more recently even of Washington, whence the delusive reports are now re-echoed with alarming reverberations--there was heated talk of war, and everything that newspapers could do to bring it about was done. Even a private visit of the Kaiser to Tangier, the only important feature of which was the stir made about it, was utilized to fan the flame. However theatrical some of the political actions of Wilhelm II. may have been, here was a case in which, directly he perceived the capital being made of his visit, he curtailed it to express his disapprobation. It was in Tangier Bay that he received the newspaper cuttings on the subject, and although the visit was to have extended in any case but to a few hours, he at once decided not to land. It was only when it was urged upon him what disappointment this would cause to its thirty thousand inhabitants and visitors for the occasion, that he consented to pay one short visit to his Legation, abandoning the more important part of the programme, which included a climb to the citadel and an interchange of visits with a kinsman of the Sultan. Nothing more could have been done to emphasize the private nature of the visit, in reality of no greater moment than that of King Edward to Algeria almost at the same time.

Neither such a personal visit, nor any other action should have been required to remind Great Britain and France that they and Spain alone were affected by their agreements, and that not even official notification to Morocco or the other Powers could restrict their perfect liberty of action. When, therefore, the distracted Sultan turned to Germany as the most influential Power still faithful to its undertakings, the response of Germany was perfectly correct, as was his own action. But Germany, although prepared to meet him with a smile, and not averse to receiving crumbs in the form of concessions, had no more intention of embroiling herself on his behalf than Great Britain. Extraordinary rumours, however, pervaded the country, and the idea of German intervention was hailed with delight; now general disappointment is felt, and Germany is classed with England among the traitors.

Mulai Abd el Azîz had but one resource, to propose another conference of the Powers, assured that France and Germany would never come to an understanding, and that this would at least ward off the fatal day indefinitely. Yet now that France and Germany have agreed, it is probable that this step is regretted, and that, since the two have acted in concert, the Moorish Court has been at its wits' ends; it would now regard as a God-send anything which might prevent the conference from being held, lest it should strengthen the accord among its enemies, and weaken its own position.

The diplomatic negotiations between Fez, Berlin, and Paris have been of a character normal under the circumstances; and as the bickerings and insinuations which accompanied them were foreign to Morocco, the Sultan's invitation only serving as an opportunity for arriving at an understanding, they need not be dwelt on here. It is the French Press which has stirred up the commotion, and has misled the British Public into the belief that there has been some "Morocco Tangle." The facts are simply these: since 1880, the date of the Madrid Convention regarding the vexed question of foreign rights of protecting natives and holding property in Morocco, all nations concerned have been placed on an equal footing in their dealings with that country. The "most favoured nation" clause has secured for all the advantages gained by any in its special treaties. Nothing has since occurred to destroy this situation. In asking his "friends" to meet again in conference now, the Sultan acted wisely and within his rights. The fact that any two or three of them may have agreed to give one of their number a "free hand," should it suit her purposes to upset the _status quo_, does not theoretically affect the position, though it has suggested the advisability of further discussion. It is only in virtue of their combined might that the Powers in question are enabled to assume the position they do.

Spain, the only power with interests in Morocco other than commercial, had been settled with by a subsequent agreement in October, 1904, for she had been consulted in time. Special clauses dealing with her claims to consideration had even been inserted in the Anglo-French Agreement--

Art. VII. "This arrangement does not apply to the points now
occupied by Spain on the Moorish shore of the Mediterranean.

Art. VIII. "The two Governments, animated by their sincerely
friendly sentiments for Spain, take into particular consideration
the interests she possesses, owing to her geographical position
and to her territorial possessions on the Moorish shore of the
Mediterranean, in regard to which the French Government will make
some arrangement with the Spanish Government ... (which) will be
communicated to the Government of His Britannic Majesty."

These Articles apply to Ceuta, which Spain withheld from the Portuguese after the brief union of the crowns in the sixteenth century; to Veléz, an absolutely worthless rock, captured in 1564 by Garcia de Toledo with fifteen thousand men, the abandonment of which has more than once been seriously urged in Spain; to Alhucemas, a small island occupied in 1673; to Melilla, a huge rock peninsula captured, on his own account, by Medina Sidonia in 1497; and to the Zaffarine (or Saffron) Islands, only one of which is used, in the seizure of which the French were cleverly forestalled in 1848. All are convict stations; unless heavily fortified in a manner that at present they are not, they would not be of sufficient value to tempt even a foe of Spain. Ceuta and Melilla alone are worthy of consideration, and the former is the only one it might ever pay to fortify.

So far have matters gone. The conference asked for by Morocco--the flesh thrown to the wolves--is to form the next Act. To this conference the unfortunate Sultan would like to appeal for protection against the now "free hand" of France, but in consenting to discuss matters at all, she and her ally have, of course, stipulated that what has been done without reference to treaty shall not be treated of, if they are to take part, and as an act of courtesy to us, the United States has followed suit. Other matters of importance which Mulai Abd el Azîz desired to discuss have also been ruled out beforehand, so that only minor questions are to be dealt with, hardly worth the trouble of meeting.

Foremost among these is the replenishing of the Moorish exchequer by further loans, which might more easily have been arranged without a conference. Indeed, there are so many money-lenders anxious to finance Morocco on satisfactory terms, that the competition among them has almost degenerated into a scramble. But all want some direct guarantee through their Governments, which introduces the political element, as in return for such guarantee each Power desires to increase its interests or privileges. Thus, while each financier holds out his gold-bags temptingly before the Sultan, elbowing aside his rival, each demands as surety the endorsement of his Government, the price of which the Sultan is hardly prepared to pay. He probably hopes that by appealing to them all in conference, he will obtain a joint guarantee on less onerous terms, without affording any one of them a foothold in his country, should he be unable to discharge his obligations. He is wise, and but for the difficulties caused by the defection of England and France from the political circle, this request for money might alone have sufficed to introduce a reformed _régime_ under the joint auspices of all. As it is, attempts to raise funds elsewhere, even to discharge the current interest, having failed, his French creditors, who do possess the support of their Government, have obligingly added interest to capital, and with official sanction continue to roll the snowball destined one day to overwhelm the State. In the eyes of the Moors this is nothing less than a bill-of-sale on the Empire.

A second point named by the Sultan for submission to the conference is the urgency of submitting all inhabitants of the country without distinction to the reformed taxation; a reasonable demand if the taxes were reasonable and justly assessed, but who can say at present that they are either? The exchequer is undoubtedly defrauded of large sums by the exemptions enjoyed by foreigners and their _protégés_, on account of the way in which these privileges are abused, while, to begin with, the system itself is unfair to the native. Here again is an excellent lever for securing reforms by co-operation. Let the Sultan understand that the sole condition on which such a privilege can be abandoned is the reform of his whole fiscal and judicial systems, and that this effected to the satisfaction of the Powers, these privileges will be abandoned. Nothing could do more to promote the internal peace and welfare of Morocco than this point rightly handled.

A third demand, the abolition of foreign postal services in his country, may appear to many curious and insignificant, but the circumstances are peculiar. Twenty years ago, when I first knew Morocco, there were no means of transmitting correspondence up country save by intermittent couriers despatched by merchants, whom one had to hunt up at the _cafés_ in which they reposed. On arrival the bundle of letters was carried round to likely recipients for them to select their own in the most hap-hazard way. Things were hardly more formal at the ports at which eagerly awaited letters and papers arrived by sea. These were carried free from Gibraltar, and delivered on application at the various consular offices.

At one time the Moorish Government maintained unsatisfactory courier services between two or three of the towns, but issued no stamps, the receipt for the courier's payment being of the nature of a postmark, stamped at the office, which, though little known to collectors, is the only genuine and really valuable Moorish postage stamp obtainable. All other so-called Morocco stamps were issued by private individuals, who later on ran couriers between some two Moorish towns, their income being chiefly derived from the sale of stamps to collectors. Some were either entirely bogus services, or only a few couriers were run to save appearances. Stamps of all kinds were sold at face value, postmarked or not to order, and as the issues were from time to time changed, the profits were steady and good. The case was in some ways analogous to that of the Yangtse and other treaty ports of China, where I found every consul's wife engaged in designing local issues, sometimes of not inconsiderable merit. In Morocco quite a circle of stamp-dealers sprang up, mostly sharp Jewish lads--though not a few foreign officials contracted the fever, and some time ago a stamp journal began to be issued in Tangier to promote the sale of issues which otherwise would not have been heard of.

Now all is changed; Great Britain, France, Spain and Germany maintain head postal offices in Tangier, the British being subject to that of Gibraltar, whose stamps are used. All have courier services down the coast, as well as despatching by steamer, and some maintain inland mails conveyed by runners. The distance from Tangier to Fez, some hundred and fifty miles, is covered by one man on foot in about three days and a half, and the forty miles' run from Tangier to Tetuan is done in a night for a dollar, now less than three shillings.

But a more enlightened Sultan sees the advantage it would be to him, if not to all parties, to control the distribution of the growing correspondence of both Europeans and natives, the latter of whom prefer to register their letters, having very little faith in their despatch without a receipt. And as Mulai Abd el Azîz is willing to join the Postal Union, provided that the service is placed in efficient European hands there is no reason why it should not be united in one office, and facilities thereby increased.

France, however, in joining the conference, has quite another end in view than helping others to bolster up the present administration, and that is to obtain a formal recognition by all concerned, including Morocco, of the new position created by her agreement with Great Britain. That is to say, without permitting her action to be questioned in any way, she hopes to secure some show of right to what at present she possesses only by the might of herself and her friends. She has already agreed with Germany to recognize her special claim for permission to "police" the Morocco-Algerian frontier, and those who recall the appropriation of Tunisia will remember that it originated in "policing" the Khomaïr--known to the French as "Kroumirs"--on the Tunisian frontier of Algeria.

It is, indeed, a curious spectacle, a group of butchers around the unfortunate victim, talking philanthropy, practising guile: two of the strongest have at last agreed between themselves which is to have the carcase, but preparations for the "pacific" death-thrust are delayed by frantic appeals for further consultation, and by the refusal of one of their number who had been ignored to recognize the bargain. Consultation is only agreed to on conditions which must defeat its object, and terms are arranged with the intervener. Everything, therefore, is clear for the operation; the tender-hearted are soothed by promises that though the "penetration" cannot but be painful, it shall at least not be hostile; while in order that the contumacious may hereafter hold their peace, the consultation is to result in a formal but carefully worded death-warrant.

Meanwhile it is worth while recalling the essential features of the Madrid Convention of 1880, mainly due to French claims for special privileges in protecting natives, or in giving them the rights of French citizens. This was summoned by Spain at the suggestion of Great Britain, with the concurrence of Morocco. Holland, Sweden and Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Portugal, France, Germany, the United States, Italy, Brazil, and Austria-Hungary accepted the invitation in the order named, but Brazil was ultimately unrepresented. Russia was also invited as an after-thought, but did not consider it worth while accepting. The scope of the conference was limited to the subject of foreign protection, though the question of property was by mutual consent included.

The representatives of the conferring Powers accredited to the Spanish Court were nominated as members--the English Plenipotentiary acting for Denmark--as it was felt that those accredited to Morocco already held too decided views of the matter. The Moorish Foreign Minister attended on behalf of Morocco, and Señor Canovas, President of the Council, represented Spain. Seventeen meetings were held, under the presidency of Señor Canovas, between May 19 and July 3, the last being purely formal. The Convention then signed contained little that was new, but it re-stated clearly and harmonized with satisfactory results rights previously granted to one and another. In several particulars, however, its provisions are faulty, and experience of their working has long led to demands for revision, but conflicting interests, and fears of opening up larger issues, have caused this to be postponed.

Now that the time has arrived for a re-definition of the whole position and rights of foreigners and their Governments in Morocco, it is earnestly to be hoped that the opportunity may not be lost. The great fault of the Madrid Convention is that while it recognizes the right of foreigners to acquire land in Morocco, it stipulates for the previous consent of the native authorities, which is only to be obtained, if at all, by liberal "presents." But the most pressing need is the establishment of an international tribunal for the trial of cases involving more than one nationality, to replace the present anarchy, resulting from the conflict in one case of any of the thirteen independent jurisdictions at present in force in Morocco. Such a measure would be an outcome of more value than all possible agreements to respect the independence and integrity of Morocco till it suited the purpose of one party or another to encroach thereon.

In lands knowing but one jurisdiction it is hard to conceive the abuses and defeats of justice which result from the confusion reigning in Morocco, or those which existed in Egypt previous to the establishment of international tribunals there. For instance, plaintiff, of nationality A., sues defendants, of nationalities B., C., and D., for the return of goods which they have forcibly carried off, on the ground that they were pledged to them by a party of nationality E., who disputes their claim, and declares the goods sold to original plaintiff. Here are five jurisdictions involved, each with a different set of laws, so that during the three separate actions necessitated, although the three defendants have all acted alike and together, the judgment in the case of each may be different, _e.g._ case under law B. dismissed, that under law C. won by plaintiff, while law D. might recognize the defendants' claim, but condemn his action. Needless to follow such intricacies further, though this is by no means an extreme case, for disputes are constantly occurring--to say nothing of criminal actions--involving the several consular courts, for the most part presided over by men unequipped by legal training, in which it is a practical impossibility for justice to be done to all, and time and money are needlessly wasted.

XXXI

FRANCE IN MOROCCO

"Who stands long enough at the door is sure to enter at last."

_Moorish Proverb._

In a previous work on this country, "The Land of the Moors," published in 1901, the present writer concluded with this passage: "France alone is to be feared in the Land of the Moors, which, as things trend to-day, must in time form part of her colony. There is no use disguising the fact, and, as England certainly would not be prepared to go to war with her neighbour to prevent her repeating in Morocco what she has done in Tunis, it were better not to grumble at her action. All England cares about is the mouth of the Mediterranean, and if this were secured to her, or even guaranteed neutral--were that possible--she could have no cause to object to the French extension. Our Moorish friends will not listen to our advice; they keep their country closed, as far as they can, refusing administrative reforms which would prevent excuses for annexation. Why should we trouble them? It were better far to come to an agreement with France, and acknowledge what will prove itself one day--that France is the normal heir to Morocco whenever the present Empire breaks up."

Unpopular as this opinion was among the British and other foreign subjects in the country, and especially among the Moors, so that it had at first no other advocate, it has since been adopted in Downing Street, and what is of more moment, acted upon. Nay more, Great Britain has, in return for the mere recognition of a _fait accompli_ in Egypt, agreed to stand aside in Morocco, and to grant France a free hand in any attempt to create there a similar state of things. Though the principle was good, the bargain was bad, for the positions of the two contracting Powers, in Egypt and Morocco respectively, were by no means analogous. France could never have driven us out of Egypt save with her sword at our throat; England had but to unite with other Powers in blocking the way of France in Morocco to stultify all her plans. Had England stood out for terms, whether as regarding her commercial interests in Morocco, which have been disgracefully sacrificed, or in the form of concessions elsewhere, a very much more equal-handed bargain might have been secured.

The main provisions of the agreement between the two countries, concluded April 8, 1904, are--

Art. II. "The British Government recognizes that it appertains
to France, more especially as being the Power in contiguity with
Morocco, to control the peace of the country, and to lend its
assistance in all administrative, economical, financial, and
military reforms. The British Government declares that it will not
interfere with the action of France in this regard, provided that
this action will leave intact the rights which, in virtue of
treaties, conventions, and usages, Great Britain enjoys in
Morocco, including the right of coasting between the Morocco
ports, of which English vessels have had the benefit since 1901."

Art. VII. "In order to secure the free passage of the Straits of
Gibraltar, both Governments agree not to allow fortifications or
any strategic works to be erected on that part of the Moorish
coast between Melilla and the heights which dominate the right
bank of the Sebu exclusively."

France has secured all that she wanted, or rather that her aggressive colonial party wanted, for opinions on that point are by no means identical, even in France, and the Agreement at once called forth the condemnation of the more moderate party. What appears to be permissive means much more. Now that Great Britain has drawn back--the Power to which the late Sir John Drummond Hay taught the Moors to look with an implicit confidence to champion them against all foes, as it did in the case of the wars with France and Spain, vetoing the retention of a foot of Moorish soil--Morocco lies at the feet of France. France, indeed, has become responsible for carrying out a task its eager spirits have been boiling over for a chance of undertaking. Morocco has been made the ward of the hand that gripped it, which but recently filched two outlying provinces, Figig and Tûát.

Englishmen who know and care little about Morocco are quite incapable of understanding the hold that France already had upon this land. Separated from it only by an unprotected boundary, much better defined on paper than in fact, over which there is always a "rectification" dispute in pickle, her province of Algeria affords a prospective base already furnished with lines of rail from her ports of Oran and Algiers. From Oojda, an insignificant town across the border from Lalla Maghnîa (Marnia), there runs a valley route which lays Fez in her power, with Táza by the way to fortify and keep the mountaineers in check. At any time the frontier forays in which the tribes on both sides indulge may be fomented or exaggerated, as in the case of Tunis, to afford a like excuse for a similar occupation, which beyond a doubt would be a good thing for Morocco. Fez captured, and the seaports kept in awe or bombarded by the navy, Mequinez would fall, and an army landed in Mazagan would seize Marrákesh.

All this could be accomplished with a minimum of loss, for only the lowlands would have to be crossed, and the mountaineers have no army. But their "pacification" would be the lingering task in which lives, time, and money would be lost beyond all recompense. Against a European army that of the Sultan need not be feared; only a few battalions drilled by European officers might give trouble, but they would see former instructors among the foe, and without them they would soon become demoralized. It would be the tribal skirmishers, of whom half would fall before the others yielded to the Nazarenes, who would give the trouble.

The military mission which France has for many years imposed on the Sultan at his expense, though under her control, which follows him in his expeditions and spies out the land, has afforded a training-ground for a series of future invading leaders. Her Algerian Mohammedan agents are able to pass and repass where foreigners never go, and besides collecting topographical and other information, they have lost no opportunity of making known the privileges and advantages of French rule. In case it may be found advisable to set up a dummy sultan under a protectorate, the French have an able and powerful man to hand in the young Idreesi Shareef of Wazzán, whom the English refused to protect, and who, with his brother, received a French education.

But while we, as a nation, have been unable to comprehend the French determination to possess Morocco, they have been unable to comprehend our calm indifference, and by the way in which they betray their suspicions of us, they betray their own methods. Protestant missionaries in Algeria and Tunisia, of whatever nationality, are supposed to be the emissaries of the British Government, and in consequence are harassed and maligned, while tourists outside the regular beat are watched. When visiting Oojda some years ago, I myself was twice arrested in Algeria, at Tlemçen and Lalla Maghnîa, because mingling with natives, and it was with difficulty that I could persuade the _juges d'instruction_ of my peaceful motives.

Determined and successful efforts to become acquainted with the remotest provinces of Morocco, the distribution of its population, and whatever could be of use to an invading or "pacifying" force have long been made by France, but the most valuable portion of this knowledge remains pigeon-holed, or circulates only in strictly official _mémoires_. Many of the officials engaged here, however, have amused themselves and the public by publishing pretty books of the average class, telling little new, while one even took the trouble to write his in English, in order to put us off the scent!

If ever means could justify an end, France deserves to enjoy the fruit of her labours. No longer need she foment strife on the Algerian frontier, or wink at arms being smuggled across it; no longer need the mis-named "pretender" be supplied with French gold, or intrigues be carried on at Court. Abd el Azîz must take the advice and "assistance" of France, whether he will or no, and curse the British to whom he formerly looked. This need not necessarily involve such drastic changes as would rouse the people to rebellion, and precipitate a costly conquest. There are many reforms urgently required in the interests of the people themselves, and these can now be gradually enforced. Such reforms had been set on foot already by the young Sultan, mainly under British advice; but to his chagrin, his advisers did not render the financial and moral support he needed to carry them out. France is now free to do this, and to strengthen his position, so that all wise reforms may be possible. These will naturally commence with civil and judicial functions, but must soon embrace the more pressing public works, such as roads, bridges, and port improvements. Railways are likely to be the first roads in most parts, and Mulai Abd el Azîz will welcome their introduction. The western ideas which he has imbibed during the last few years are scoffed at only by those who know little of him. What France will have to be prepared for is Court intrigue, and she will have to give the Moors plainly to understand that "Whatsoever king shall reign, she'll still be 'boss of the show,' sir."

As one of the first steps needed, but one requiring the co-operation of all other Powers on treaty terms with the Moors, the establishment of tribunals to which all should be amenable, has already been touched upon. These must necessarily be presided over by specially qualified Europeans in receipt of sufficient salary to remove them from temptation. A clear distinction should then be made between a civil code administered by such tribunals and the jurisdiction of the Muslim law in matters of religion and all dependent upon it. But of even more pressing importance is the reform of the currency, and the admission of Morocco to the Latin Union. This could well be insisted on when the financial question is discussed at the Algeciras Conference, as well as the equally important establishment in competent hands of a State Bank. This and the reform of the whole fiscal system must precede every other measure, as they form the ground-work of the whole.

Whatever public works may be eventually undertaken, the first should be, as far as possible, such as the Moors themselves can execute under European direction, and as they can appreciate. Irrigation would command enthusiasm where railways would only provoke opposition, and the French could find no surer way of winning the hearts of the people than by coping at once with the agricultural water supply, in order to provide against such years of famine as the present, and worse that are well remembered. That would be a form of "pacific penetration," to which none could object.

Education, too, when attempted, should be gradually introduced as a means of personal advancement, the requirements of the public service being raised year by year, as the younger generation has had opportunities of better qualifying themselves. Above all, every post should be in theory at least thrown open to the native, and in practice as soon as the right man turned up. Better retain or instal more of the able Moors of to-day as figureheads with European advisers, than attempt a new set to start with. But a clean sweep should be made of the foreigners at present in the Moorish service, all of whom should be adequately pensioned off, that with the new order might come new men, adequately paid and independent of "commissions." It is essential that the people learn to feel that they are not being exploited, but that their true welfare is sought. Every reform should be carried out along native lines, and in conformity with native thought.

TUNISIA UNDER THE FRENCH--AN EXECUTION.]

The costly lesson of Algeria, where native rights and interests were overthrown, and a complete detested foreign rule set up, has taught the French the folly of such a system, however glorious it may appear on paper. They have been wiser in Tunisia, where a nominally native government is directed by Frenchmen, whom it pays, and sooner or later Morocco is almost certain to become a second Tunisia. This will not only prove the best working system, but it will enable opposition to be dealt with by Moorish forces, instead of by an invading army, which would unite the Berber tribes under the Moorish flag. This was what prolonged the conquest of Algeria for so many years, and the Berbers of Morocco are more independent and better armed than were those of Algeria seventy years ago. What France will gain by the change beyond openings for Frenchmen and the glory of an extended colonial empire, it is hard to imagine, but empty glory seems to satisfy most countries greedy of conquest. So far the only outward evidences of the new position are the over-running of the ports, especially of Tangier, by Frenchmen of an undesirable class, and by an attempt to establish a French colony at the closed port of Mehedîya by doubtful means, to say nothing of the increased smuggling of arms.

How the welfare of the Moors will be affected by the change is a much more important question, though one often held quite unworthy of consideration, the accepted axiom being that, whether they like it or not, what is good for us is good for them. Needless to say that most of the reforms required will be objected to, and that serious obstacles will be opposed to some; the mere fact that the foreigner, contemptuously called a "Nazarene," is their author, is sufficient to prejudice them in native eyes, and the more prominent the part played by him, the more difficult to follow his advice. But if the Sultan and his new advisers will consent to a wise course of quiet co-operation, much may be effected without causing trouble. It is astonishing how readily the Moors submit to the most radical changes when unostentatiously but forcibly carried out. Never was there a greater call for the _suaviter in modo, fortiter in re_. Power which makes itself felt by unwavering action has always had their respect, and if the Sultan is prepared not to act till with gold in his coffers, disciplined troops at his command, and loyal officials to do his behest, he can do so with unquestioned finality, all will go well.

Then will the prosperity of the people revive--indeed, achieve a condition hitherto unknown save in two or three reigns of the distant past, perhaps not then. The poor will not fear to sow their barren fields, or the rich to display their wealth; hidden treasure will come to light, and the groan of the oppressed will cease. Individual cases of gross injustice will doubtless arise; but they will be as nothing compared with what occurs in Morocco to-day, even with that wrought by Europeans who avail themselves of existing evils. So that if France is wise, and restrains her hot-heads, she may perform a magnificent work for the Moors, as the British have done in Egypt; at least, it is to be hoped she may do as well in Morocco as in Tunisia.

But it would be idle to ignore the deep dissatisfaction with which the Anglo-French Agreement has been received by others than the Moors.[25] Most British residents in Morocco, probably every tourist who has been conducted along the coast, or sniffed at the capital cities; those firms of ours who share the bulk of the Moorish trade, and others who yearned to open up possible mines, and undertake the public works so urgently needed; ay, and the concession-prospectors and company-mongers who see the prey eluding their grasp; even the would-be heroes across the straits who have dreamed in vain of great deeds to be done on those hills before them; all unite in deploring what appears to them a gross blunder. After all, this is but natural. So few of us can see beyond our own domains, so many hunger after anything--in their particular line--that belongs to a weaker neighbour, that it is well we have disinterested statesmen who take a wider view. Else had we long since attempted to possess ourselves of the whole earth, like the conquering hordes of Asia, and in consequence we should have been dispossessed ourselves.

[25: See Appendix.]

Even to have been driven to undertake in Morocco a task such as we were in Egypt, would have been a calamity, for our hands are too full already of similar tasks. It is all very well in these times of peace, but in the case of war, when we might be attacked by more than one antagonist, we should have all our work cut out to hold what we have. The policy of "grab," and dabbing the world with red, may be satisfactory up to a certain point, but it will be well for us as a nation when we realize that we have had enough. In Morocco, what is easy for France with her contiguous province, with her plans for trans-Sáharan traffic, and her thirst to copy our colonial expansion--though without men to spare--would have been for us costly and unremunerative. We are well quit of the temptation.

Moreover, we have freed ourselves of a possible, almost certain, cause of friction with France, of itself a most important gain. Just as France would never have acquiesced in our establishing a protectorate in Morocco without something more than words, so the rag-fed British public, always capable of being goaded to madness by the newspapers, would have bitterly objected to French action, if overt, while powerless to prevent the insidious grasp from closing on Morocco by degrees. The first war engaging at once British attention and forces was like to see France installed in Morocco without our leave. The early reverses of the Transvaal War induced her to appropriate Tûát and Figig, and had the fortune of war been against us, Morocco would have been French already. These facts must not be overlooked in discussing what was our wisest course. We were unprepared to do what France was straining to do: we occupied the manger to no one's good--practically the position later assumed by Germany. Surely we were wiser to come to terms while we could, not as in the case of Tunisia, when too late.

But among the objecting critics one class has a right to be heard, those who have invested life and fortune in the Morocco trade; the men who have toiled for years against the discouraging odds involved, who have wondered whether Moorish corruption or British apathy were their worst foe, in whom such feeling is not only natural but excusable. Only those who have experienced it know what it means to be defrauded by complacent Orientals, and to be refused the redress they see officials of other nations obtaining for rivals. Yet now they find all capped by the instructions given to our consuls not to act without conferring with the local representatives of France, which leads to the taunt that Great Britain has not only sold her interests in Morocco to the French, but also her subjects!

The British policy has all along been to maintain the _status quo_ in spite of individual interests, deprecating interference which might seem high-handed, or create a precedent from which retraction would be difficult. In the collection of debts, in enforcing the performance of contracts, or in securing justice of any kind where the policy is to promise all and evade all till pressure is brought to bear, British subjects in Morocco have therefore always found themselves at a disadvantage in competition with others whose Governments openly supported them. The hope that buoyed them up was that one day the tide might turn, and that Great Britain might feel it incumbent on her to "protect" Morocco against all comers. Now hope has fled. What avails it that grace of a generation's span is allowed them, that they may not individually suffer from the change? It is the dream of years that lies shattered.

Here are the provisions for their protection:

Art. IV. "The two Governments, equally attached to the principle
of commercial liberty, both in Egypt and Morocco, declare that
they will not lend themselves to any inequality either in the
establishment of customs rights or other taxes, or in the
establishment of tariffs for transport on the railways.... This
mutual agreement is valid for a period of thirty years" (subject
to extensions of five years).

Art. V. secures the maintenance in their posts of British
officials in the Moorish service, but while it is specially
stipulated that French missionaries and schools in Egypt shall not
be molested, British missionaries in Morocco are committed to the
tender mercies of the French.