Chapter XXIII: Part 23

When on the second day Jackson had effected a junction with Lee, Hill was selected to relieve his tired troops by passing rapidly to his left and turning the extreme right of the enemy. A. P. Hill, Longstreet, Whiting, and Jackson had successively moved upon the double lines of infantry and artillery posted on the range of hills behind Powhite Creek from the McGehee to the Gaines house. The approach of the attacking columns of A. P. Hill and Whiting was in part over a plain about four hundred yards wide and was embarrassed by abattis and ditches in front of the first line. The struggle along the front of these divisions and that of Longstreet had become doubtful, and almost desperate, when the troops of Jackson and Hill created a diversion by engaging the extreme right of the enemy. The first of the lines of entrenchments had been taken, and Longstreet, Hood, Law, and other brave leaders were moving on the last stronghold in the enemy's center, when the victorious shouts of Garland's and G. B. Anderson's Brigades of Hill's Division were followed by the rapid retreat of the enemy and the surrender, first of the ridge at the McGehee house, and then of their whole line. Thus did it fall to the lot of Hill once more to strike the decisive blow at a critical moment. But claiming for him this distinction among a host of heroic commanders, it is proper that I should rely on the evidence of the lamented Garland, who sealed his devotion to the cause with his heart's blood at South Mountain, and the corroborating accounts of Hill's superiors, from Jackson to President Davis, and not on my own assertion.

"The effect of our appearance at this opportune moment upon the enemy's flank, cheering and charging," said Garland in his report, "decided the fate of the day. The enemy broke and retreated and made a second stand, which induced my immediate command to halt under cover of the roadside and return the fire, when charging forward again we broke and scattered them in every direction." This discomfiture uncovered the left of the fortified line and left no obstacle between Hill and the McGehee house. (_Official Records_, Series 1, Vol. XI, Part 2, p. 626.)

General Jackson's language is not less unmistakable: "Again pressing forward, the Federals fell back, but only to select a position for more obstinate defense, when at dark--under the pressure of our batteries and the dashing charge of General Hill's infantry, in which the troops of General C. S. Winder joined--the enemy yielded the field and fled in confusion." Of the part taken by Hill, General Lee said in his report (_Official Records_, Series 1, Vol. XI, Part 2, p. 493): "D. H. Hill charged across the open ground in his front, one of his regiments having first bravely carried a battery whose fire enfiladed his advance. Gallantly supported by the troops on his right, who pressed forward with unfaltering resolution, he reached the crest of the ridge (above the McGehee house), and after a sanguinary struggle broke the enemy's line, captured several of his batteries and drove him in confusion towards the Chickahominy until darkness rendered further pursuit impossible." Mr. Davis, in _The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government_, Vol. II, p. 138, adopts the exact language of General Lee. General McClellan refers to the report of Fitz John Porter, who was in command, for a detailed account of the affair at Gaines' Mill. Porter admits that the withdrawal of his line was caused by the retreat on his right, but insists that the demoralization was due entirely to the stampede of the Federal cavalry, who were mistaken, as they fell back on the infantry line, for rebels. More candid, or better informed than General Porter, the French princes, who served on his staff on that day, admit that the charge of Hill and the discomfiture of the enemy's right necessitated the abandonment of their line of entrenchments. If to double the right flank of an army suddenly back, so as to expose to an enfilade the flank of his last and strongest line of entrenchments, is to make his position untenable, then Hill's charge was indeed decisive of the struggle at Gaines' Mill.

Crossing the Chickahominy on the night of the 29th, in the advance of Jackson's Corps, D. H. Hill passed Savage Station, where he took one thousand prisoners, exclusive of three thousand in and connected with the Federal Hospital. The progress of Jackson was arrested by obstructions and the stubborn resistance at White Oak Swamp, and he failed to effect a junction with Longstreet till after the fight at Frasier's Farm.

D. H. Hill was again the first to reach and occupy the position which he was ordered to assume preparatory to a general advance on Malvern Hill. The other parts of the line were not formed till a much later hour in the day. General Lee says in his report, of the battle (_Official Records_, Series 1, Vol. XI, Part 2, p, 496): "Orders were issued for a general advance at a given signal, but the causes referred to prevented a proper concert of action among the troops. D. H. Hill pressed forward across the open field and engaged the enemy gallantly, breaking and driving back his first line; but a simultaneous advance of the other troops not taking place, he found himself unable to maintain the ground he had gained against the overwhelming numbers and numerous batteries of the enemy. Hill was therefore compelled to abandon a part of the ground he had gained after suffering severe loss and inflicting heavy damage upon the enemy."

Prompt, vigilant, and obedient, he was always at his post at the appointed hour, and with the true conception of soldierly duty, moved upon order or signal of his superiors without waiting to count the cost. At Malvern Hill, as at Seven Pines, he charged the enemy under orders from the commanding general. The persistent pluck of his brave men, developed to the highest degree of his own unequaled coolness and courage, enabled him again to take and hold much of the enemy's outer line till after the last gun was fired.

When Pope had twice been punished by Jackson and driven back upon the supposed stronghold at Manassas, the transfer of troops from the Federal army on the Peninsula made it necessary for General Lee to move with the bulk of his army to the support of his dashing lieutenant, who had already twice defeated an enemy much stronger numerically than himself. D. H. Hill, recalled from the command of his department south of the James, which included his own State, and placed at the head of his old division, was ordered to watch and check the movements of McDowell's command, which was still occupying Fredericksburg, and consequently took no part in the second battle of Manassas.

Crossing over the Potomac with Longstreet to Fredericktown, Maryland, when our forces moved from that point south General Hill was ordered to occupy and hold a pass in the South Mountains, which, if gained by McClellan, would have enabled him to relieve Harper's Ferry and possibly to prevent the junction of our scattered army and destroy the divisions in detail, or drive them precipitately south of the Potomac with great loss of artillery and transportation.

General Lee's object in crossing the Potomac east of the Blue Ridge was to induce the enemy, by threatening Washington and Baltimore, to evacuate Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry, and to establish his own line of communication through the valley, and then by advancing towards Pennsylvania to draw the enemy away from his own base of supplies. General Lee had not contemplated making a stand at South Mountain, probably not at Sharpsburg, or at any point north of the Potomac; but the continued occupation of Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry made it necessary to move directly upon the former place and to invest the latter, where both garrisons ultimately united. In consequence of the delay in reducing the garrison it became essential to the safety of Lee's army that McClellan's entire force should be held in check for a whole day at the pass in the South Mountains by Hill's depleted division, now numbering only four thousand, as a glance at the map with a knowledge of the disposition of Lee's different divisions will show.

Longstreet, with his whole force, estimated at four thousand, was at Hagerstown, while Jackson had disposed his own command, including McLaws' and A. P. Hill's Divisions, either with a view to an attack on Harper's Ferry or to cutting off the retreat of the force occupying it. Three days later McClellan, according to his own report, advanced to the attack at Sharpsburg with eighty-seven thousand men. Of this vast army probably thirty-three thousand were in the force actually engaged in the assault upon the little Spartan band of D. H. Hill for five hours, without cessation, before Longstreet's advance brigade arrived at 3:30 o'clock, which was followed by others coming up from that time till dark.

The late Justice Ruffin, Colonel of the Thirteenth North Carolina, standing by the side of the gallant Garland when he was instantly killed, discovered a moment later that the other regiments of the brigade had retired, leaving his command surrounded by the enemy. Facing to the rear in an instant, he ordered his regiment to charge, and though embarrassed by a painful wound, performed the desperate feat of cutting his way through the serried ranks of the enemy. A few moments later that gallant officer was astonished to hear his intrepid commander express his delight at the discovery that McClellan's whole army was approaching his front. The explanation afterwards given was one that could have been safely disclosed only to a kindred spirit, such as Ruffin had shown himself to be. Hill then said that he had at first feared the movement upon his front was a feint, and that the main body of the enemy had passed through another gap and might be thrown between Jackson and Lee. The situation was still further embarrassed by the fact that General Stuart had at daylight withdrawn his command, except the single regiment of Rosser, which afterwards did its duty so nobly, under the impression that but a small force was in General Hill's front.

It was "with the stern joy" of an intrepid warrior waiting for the coming contest, that from an elevated pinnacle of the mountain he saw the four advance corps of the grand Army of the Potomac, one of which was forming at the foot of the mountain. The hour and the man had met when Lee entrusted to Hill the duty of holding the approach against that army with his little band of four thousand. From Seven Pines to Malvern Hill they had never turned their backs upon the foe. They believed that their leader would require them to endure no sacrifice or face no danger that was not demanded by the inevitable exigencies of the situation. With God's help, Hill determined to save the army, as his chief ordered him to do at any sacrifice, and, if the emergency had demanded his own life, he would have met death, not as the decree of fate, but as the Providence of God, who had brought him face to face with a desperate duty. Captain Seaton Gales, the gallant Adjutant-General of George B. Anderson on that memorable day, summarized the important results of this battle as follows:

"It may be safely said that in its consequences, in the accomplishments of predetermined objects, and in the skillful disposition of small numbers to oppose overwhelming odds, it is without a parallel in the war. The division, unaided until a late hour in the afternoon, held in check the greater portion of McClellan's vast army endeavoring with battering-ram impetus to force its way through the narrow gap, and thereby afforded time for the concentration of our various corps, dispersed in strategic directions, in season for the bloody issue at Sharpsburg."

Imbued with an earnest devotion to the cause, which rose on occasion to the height of enthusiasm, Hill did not hesitate to denounce in unmeasured terms those who evaded duty in our armies, when the conditions were such as to plainly demand the active service of every able-bodied son of the South. One of his random shots at the "bomb-proofs" of the Confederacy wounded a gentleman who, having done nothing in the war worthy to be written, determined to write something, in the vain hope that it would be read by future generations. Prompted by petty revenge, he recklessly asserted that General D. H. Hill had thrown a copy of a general order upon the ground in his camp at Frederick City, which being afterwards picked up and handed to McClellan, gave him an idea of the movements and location of the different portions of Lee's army.

It will appear from an inspection of its contents that on the day when McClellan attacked Hill at South Mountain, he had reason to believe, and must have thought, that Longstreet was occupying the mountains, supported by Hill. But we are not left to conjecture on that subject. McClellan wrote General Franklin from Frederick City on the 14th, just after he had read the "lost order," that Longstreet was to move to Boonsborough, and there halt with D. H. Hill, and he therefore directed Franklin to make his dispositions with an eye both to the relief of the garrison at Harper's Ferry and the capture of Longstreet and Hill. The plan outlined in the letter is predicated upon the supposition that Longstreet and Hill were together, and constituted the main body of an army, which he estimated in another report to General Halleck at one hundred and twenty thousand. If it were not manifest from this letter that McClellan was misled by the order, and his opinion corroborated by the skillful disposition of Hill's troops, his report proves beyond all question that he thought the force in his front was thirty thousand strong, composed of Hill's Division, fifteen thousand, with Longstreet's and a portion of Jackson's command (_Official Records_, Series 1, Vol. XIX, Part 1, p. 55). The skill of Hill, then, and the order combined to mislead McClellan by causing him to over-estimate our strength, and the cautious and dilatory movement which gave Longstreet time to come up in the afternoon, enabled Hill to escape with his little band, leaving the whole Army of the Potomac deployed before him.

The order issued by Lee and sent out from army headquarters was as follows:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,

September 9, 1862.

_Special Orders No. 191._

I. The citizens of Fredericktown being unwilling, while overrun
by members of this army, to open their stores, in order to give
them confidence, and to secure to officers and men purchasing
supplies for benefit of this command, all officers and men of
this army are strictly prohibited from visiting Fredericktown
except on business, in which case they will bear evidence of
this in writing from division commanders. The Provost Marshal
in Fredericktown will see that his guard rigidly enforces this
order.

II. Major Taylor will proceed to Leesburg, Va., and arrange
for transportation of the sick and those unable to walk to
Winchester, securing the transportation of the country for this
purpose. The route between this and Culpeper Court House east of
the mountains being unsafe, will no longer be traveled. Those
on the way to this army already across the river will move up
promptly, all others will proceed to Winchester collectively and
under command of officers, at which point, being the general
depot of the army, its movements will be known and instructions
given by commanding officers regulating further movements.

III. The army will resume its march to-morrow, taking the
Hagerstown road. General Jackson's command will form the
advance, and, after passing Middletown, with such portion as he
may select, take the route to Sharpsburg, cross the Potomac at
the most convenient point, and by Friday morning take possession
of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, capture such of the enemy as
may be at Martinsburg, and intercept such as may attempt to
escape from Harper's Ferry.

IV. General Longstreet's command will pursue the main road as
far as Boonsborough, where it will halt, with reserve, supply
and baggage trains of the army.

V. General McLaws, with his own division and that of General
R. H. Anderson, will follow General Longstreet. On reaching
Middletown will take the route to Harper's Ferry, and by Friday
morning possess himself of the Maryland Heights and endeavor to
capture the enemy at Harper's Ferry and vicinity.

VI. General Walker, with his division, after accomplishing
the object in which he is now engaged, will cross the Potomac
at Cheek's Ford, ascend its right bank to Lovettsville, take
possession of the Loudoun Heights, if practicable, by Friday
morning, Key's Ford on his left, and the road between the end of
the mountain and the Potomac on his right. He will, as far as
practicable, co-operate with Generals McLaws and Jackson and
intercept retreat of the enemy.

VII. General D. H. Hill's Division will form the rear guard of
the army, pursuing the road taken by the main body. The reserve
artillery, ordnance, and supply trains, etc., will precede
General Hill.

VIII. General Stuart will detach a squadron of cavalry to
accompany the commands of Generals Longstreet, Jackson, and
McLaws, and, with the main body of the cavalry, will cover the
route of the army, bringing up all the stragglers that may have
been left behind.

IX. The commands of Generals Jackson, McLaws, and Walker,
after accomplishing the objects for which they have been
detached, will join the main body of the army at Boonsborough or
Hagerstown.

X. Each regiment on the march will habitually carry its axes
in the regimental ordnance wagons, for use of the men at their
encampments, to procure wood, etc.

By command of General R. E. Lee.

R. H. CHILTON,
_Assistant Adjutant-General._

[The copy of the "lost order" given by McClellan, as far as it goes, is the same as the one above set forth, but it does not contain sections 1 and 2.]

If Pollard's malignant charges, made to detract from the honor and glory of an achievement so brilliantly executed and so fruitful of benefit to the cause, were not shown by the most direct proof from the most honorable men to be false and unfounded, the marked discrepancy between the order published in the _Official Records_, as No. 191, copied from General Lee's book of general orders, and that which McClellan declared in his report to be a _copy_ of the order sent by him to Washington, suggests to a legal mind a solution of the dispute which corroborates in the strongest possible manner the sworn testimony of Major James W. Ratchford, Adjutant-General of Hill's Division, that the custody of such papers was a part of his exclusive duty at that time, and that no such order was delivered to him, with the solemn statement of General Hill that he never saw or read a copy of the order in question, except one purporting to have been sent through General Jackson, to whose corps he was attached when it was issued, and which he still preserved among his private papers in 1886. It will be observed that the first of the two paragraphs, omitted in what purports to be the copy of the order that fell into the possession of the enemy, forbade the troops stationed around Frederick City from entering that town without permission, and the second directed that the sick and disabled of the army should be removed to Winchester. Halleck's correspondence with McClellan on the same day, September 13, 1862 (_Official Records_, Series 1, Vol. XIX, Part 1, p. 41), evinces the greatest apprehension that the movement of the army was aimed at Washington City, and the demonstrations higher up the Potomac were intended to distract attention from the real design. Was it not more important that the chief officer of all the armies should know that Lee's sick and disabled soldiers were to be moved to Winchester, as the general depot of the army, and that all recruits, returning or coming for the first time to the army were to rendezvous at Winchester, than to learn from the last paragraph of the copy sent him that Lee's troops were to habitually carry in their regimental wagons axes to cut wood, etc.? The second paragraph seemed plainly to indicate that Lee's purpose was what he afterwards declared in his report to have been his plan--to establish his base of operations by way of the valley of Virginia and invade or threaten Pennsylvania, not Washington, after taking Harper's Ferry. (_Official Records_, Series 1, Vol. XIX. Part 1, p. 145.) This was McClellan's own idea of Lee's design, and if he could have convinced Halleck of the correctness of his views there would have been no reason for further hesitation about weakening the garrison of the capital city to swell the effective force in the field. McClellan did not get the whole order and omit a portion of it in his correspondence at the time because it tended to sustain his view against Halleck. He did not send his chief the full copy of his order and omit in his report, written after his removal from command, a section which proved that he (not Halleck) had divined Lee's purpose from the beginning. The two paragraphs would not have been omitted in a copy intended for Hill, because it was Hill's troops that at the time were stationed nearest to Frederick City, and were prohibited from entering it. It is evident that General Lee must have sent the whole order to Hill, and it is equally manifest that McClellan had every reason for inserting a full copy in his report if he received it.

The explanation which readily suggests itself, therefore, is that the original draft of the order contained only the portion beginning with the third section and was signed in that shape by Colonel Chilton, but was afterwards modified so as to prefix the two first paragraphs before it was issued. The "lost order" was found by an Indiana soldier, wrapped around three cigars. The first paper drawn would have become useless after the material additions made to it, and might well have been wrapped around cigars by some one at General Lee's headquarters, with the purpose of using it to light them, and then lost before cigars or paper were disposed of, as intended. It will be more readily believed that a clerk or assistant in the office at army headquarters might have been guilty of carelessness than that Ratchford swore to and that Hill told a falsehood. If their positive statements are believed, only the one order, addressed as though sent through General Jackson's headquarters, was received by General Hill. When Lee and Hill were encamped in sight of each other near Fredericktown, and General Lee was then and afterwards (as at South Mountain) habitually sending orders direct to General Hill, it does not seem probable that Lee, whose forte was the power of readily mobilizing his army, would have tolerated such circumlocution as making one courier ride across the Potomac to Jackson with an order which was to be sent back by another messenger to a camp in sight of its starting point on the next day. It would have been a fair compromise between extreme official courtesy and that common sense which always characterized the conduct of our great leaders, if Lee had recognized Jackson's authority by addressing the order as though transmitted through him, and at the same time ordering its delivery directly to Hill, thus conforming his conduct to the conditions which demanded that Hill should know at the earliest possible moment of his proposed plan of operation, and of the prohibition against entering the neighboring town applying only to his own and Longstreet's Division.

The direct testimony bearing upon the dispute in reference to the lost order was the sworn statement of Major James W. Ratchford, Adjutant-General, that only the single copy of the order reached him, which was preserved by General Hill till his death, and the solemn statement of Hill that he himself received no other copy. Leaving out of view the difference between the original paper recorded in Lee's book and the supposed copy delivered to McClellan, there is nothing to contradict the testimony of one of the bravest and truest officers in the army of Virginia and the word of D. H. Hill. The attention of these two officers had been called to the loss of the paper within a few months after it passed into McClellan's hands, when all that had occurred in Maryland was still fresh in their memories, and they then made the same statement that the one reiterates to-day and the other published in 1886. Lee himself charged no particular person with the loss of the dispatch. While he possibly magnified (says Longstreet in his article in the _Century Magazine_) its effect upon the Maryland campaign, he was inclined to attribute its loss to the fault of a courier. (_Battles and Leaders of the Civil War_, Vol. II, p. 674.) In his report of the operations in Maryland he said: "The small command of General Hill repelled repeated assaults of the Federal army and held it in check for five hours." The only contradicting testimony comes from Major Taylor of General Lee's staff, and being negative in its character, is not entitled to the weight that should be attached to the positive evidence of gentlemen of equal reputation for veracity. The substance of his statement is, that it was his habit during that campaign to send such orders directly to the headquarters of Hill's Division as well as through Jackson to Hill. But he neither recalls the fact of sending the particular paper in question, nor does he name any officer or courier who attests its actual delivery. Admitting the high character of Taylor, as well as that of Ratchford, the verdict of history, under the most familiar rules of evidence, must unquestionably acquit Hill of negligence, and accord to him the high honor of saving the army of Lee by his strategy, coolness, and courage.

At Sharpsburg, the last engagement in which D. H. Hill participated with that army, no figure was more conspicuous and no line firmer than his. As usual, he was the first to open and the last to quit the fight. General Lee said in his report: "The attack on our left was speedily followed by one in heavy force on the center. This was met by part of Walker's Division and the brigades of G. B. Anderson and Rodes of D. H. Hill's command, assisted by a few pieces of artillery. The enemy were repulsed and retired behind the crest of a hill, from which they kept up a desultory fire. At this time, by a mistake of orders, General Rodes' Brigade was withdrawn from its position during the temporary absence of that officer at another part of the field. The enemy immediately passed through the gap thus created and G. B. Anderson's Brigade was broken and retired, General Anderson himself being mortally wounded.... The heavy masses of the enemy again moved forward, being opposed by only four pieces of artillery, supported by a few hundred men belonging to different brigades, rallied by General D. H. Hill and other officers, and parts of Walker's and R. H. Anderson's commands, Colonel Cooke of the Twenty-seventh North Carolina Regiment, of Walker's Brigade, standing boldly in line without a cartridge." "At this critical moment, when the enemy was advancing on Cooke," says General Longstreet, "a shot came across the Federal front, plowing the ground in a parallel line, then another and another, each nearer and nearer their line. This enfilade fire was from a battery on D. H. Hill's line, and it soon beat back the attacking column." (_Battles and Leaders of the Civil War_, Vol. II, p. 670.)

On the right General Lee was stationed in person, and with Toombs' Brigade (says General Longstreet) held the enemy in check till A. P. Hill's Division rushed to the rescue, with Pender on the right and Branch on the left of his line, and aided by well-directed shots from a battery planted by D. H. Hill on his front, drove them back in confusion. Generals Lee, Longstreet, and D. H. Hill concluded during a short suspension of musketry fire to reconnoiter the position of the enemy from the crest of a ridge in front of the Confederate line, which was formed behind a fence. Lee and Longstreet giving General Hill a sufficiently wide berth, went out on foot, while Hill rode. In a few moments, says Longstreet, Hill was making vain and rather ludicrous efforts to dismount from the third horse killed under him in that engagement, the legs of the animal having been cut off at the knees by a cannon ball. When Major Ratchford, who himself was never known to quail in the face of the foe, but whose affection for his friend was unbounded, said to him on this occasion: "General, why do you expose yourself so recklessly? Do you never feel the sensation of fear?" General Hill replied that he would never require his men to go where he did not know the ground or would not go himself, and that he had no fear of death if he met it in the line of duty. His friend then inquired if he would not rather live than die. "Oh, yes," said General Hill, "when I think of my wife and babies I would; but God will take care of them if he allows anything to happen to me."

When, in November, 1862, Hill's Division was ordered to take the lead in the march to Fredericksburg to meet Hooker, a large number of his men had been barefooted since the return of the army from Maryland, yet he accomplished the unusual feat of marching two hundred miles in twenty days without leaving on the way a single straggler. One of the remarkable features of the battle of December 13th, 1862, near Fredericksburg, which followed this sudden transfer of the seat of war, was the fact that D. H. Hill's Division, Jubal A. Early's and most of John B. Hood's were in the reserve line. It was evidence of an easy victory that the services of three such fighting men were not needed in front.

In February, 1863, Hill bade a final adieu to his old division, when he was ordered to assume command in the State of North Carolina. Before the campaign opened in the following spring Hill had made a demonstration against New Bern, followed by an advance upon Washington in this State, which would have resulted in the capture of the latter place but for Lee's order to send a portion of his command to Virginia.

Later in the spring of 1863, Hill was ordered to remove his headquarters to Petersburg, and was placed in command of the department extending from the James to the Cape Fear. When Lee invaded Pennsylvania the citizens of Richmond and the heads of the various departments became greatly alarmed for the safety of the place. The officers in charge of the defenses of the city and of the Peninsula had failed to inspire confidence in their vigilance, efficiency or capacity. When the troops of Dix began to move up the Peninsula from Yorktown and West Point, General Hill was ordered by the President to transfer all available troops from south of the James and assume command of the forces gathered for the defense of the capital city. With the brigades of Cooke and M. W. Ransom, and a few other regiments, General Hill met the army of Dix near Bottom's Bridge, drove them back without serious difficulty in the direction of West Point, and in two or three days restored perfect confidence on the part of the panic-stricken people of the city.

About the 10th of July, 1863, President Davis called at General Hill's quarters three miles east of Richmond, and, after many kind and complimentary comments upon his conduct as an officer during the preceding year, informed him that he was appointed a lieutenant-general, and would be ordered to report forthwith to General Joseph E. Johnston, near Vicksburg, Mississippi. Orders having been issued accordingly, on the 13th of July General Hill, with his staff, set out immediately for his new field. When he reached his home in Charlotte he was notified that his destination had been changed, and he would report for duty to General Braxton Bragg at Chattanooga.

Lieutenant-General D. H. Hill found the army of Bragg encamped along the Tennessee River in and around the small town which has since assumed the proportions of a city. Colonel Archer Anderson, chief of Hill's staff, in his able address upon the battle of Chickamauga, says: "The corps of Hardee had lately gained as a commander a stern and dauntless soldier from the Army of Northern Virginia in D. H. Hill, whose vigor, coolness and unconquerable pertinacity in fight had already stamped him as a leader of heroic temper. Of the religious school of Stonewall Jackson, his earnest convictions never chilled his ardor for battle, and in another age he would have been worthy to charge with Cromwell at Dunbar, with the cry, 'Let God arise and let his enemies be scattered.'"

Hill received from Bragg the warm welcome of a comrade who had seen his metal tried on the hard-fought fields of Mexico. Not less cordial was the greeting of his old classmate, A. P. Stewart, and of the plucky Pat. Cleburne, who seemed from the first to feel that he had found a soldier-affinity in the congenial spirit of Hill. When at last the scattered hosts had concentrated and confronted each other on the Chickamauga, it was not till after the night of the first day that Bragg made public his purpose to give the entire management of the right wing to Polk and the control of the left to Longstreet. If the enemy's left, under the stalwart Thomas, could be driven from the Lafayette road the communication with Chattanooga would be cut off and the retreat and ruin of the enemy inevitable. To accomplish this end Bragg seemed more intent on hurried than concentrated effort. That grand man, officer and statesman, John C. Breckinridge, at his own request was allowed to take the extreme right, flanked by Forrest and supported in this forward movement by Cleburne on the left. Stewart having been transferred to Buckner, these two divisions constituted Hill's Corps. In rear of the line from which Breckinridge and Cleburne moved to the attack at nine in the morning, on the last decisive day, was the corps of the old veteran known as "Fighting Bill" Walker, and as eager for the fray as a school-boy for frolic. His command was composed of his own and Liddell's Divisions, embracing six brigades, led by such dashing soldiers as Ector, Gist, and Walthall. But the first lesson learned by a staff officer, who went from the East to the West, was that even an old war-horse like Walker dared not to fire a gun or move an inch, acting upon his own best judgment, without an order brought with due formality through all of the regular channels. The Virginia Brigadier struck his blows where opportunity offered and reported to his superior that he was striking. The Western Brigadier lost his opportunity to strike waiting for permission to do so. Still behind Walker stood Frank Cheatham, with his splendid division, like their leader, chafing under restraint.

Such were the dispositions in Hill's rear when the impetuous charge of Breckinridge's two right brigades broke the left of Thomas and crossed the fateful road. With two thousand infantry and a battery of artillery, Breckinridge swung his line around at a right angle to that of the enemy and started to sweep down upon their flank; but the left of Breckinridge had encountered an earthwork, as had Cleburne's whole line, and their western foe standing firm, one or two brigades gave way. Another advancing line to fill the gap, and the day would be won before noon, and the enemy driven across the Tennessee or captured before night. In vain might Hill plead or Walker swear, when no orders came and no chief could be found to give them. Chafed and disappointed, the grand Kentuckian found himself for want of support at last exposed to destruction or capture, and slowly and stubbornly both he and Cleburne fell back and reformed, but much nearer to the enemy than the line from which they advanced. Scarcely had the decimated forces of Hill reformed when, all too late, Walker went forward with another single line, to be hurled back by the fresh troops that the enemy was rapidly massing on his left to meet the design now developed by our ill-managed movement. Cheatham, meanwhile, was not allowed to budge an inch or fire a gun. Thus was the plan frustrated and the attacking force driven back and cut to pieces in detail for want of a present, active, moving head to strike with the two arms of the right wing at one time. The fierce onslaught of Hill failed, as did the no less impetuous charge of Walker, because as a chain is no stronger than its most defective link, so a single advancing line is no stouter than its weakest point.

The splendid conduct of our troops on our right and the dread inspired by Breckinridge's bold charge of the morning bore fruit, however, in a way entirely unexpected, when it led the enemy to mass so much of his force behind Thomas. This was the occupation of the enemy while Hill and Forrest were riding up and down in front of our line and drawing the fire of the enemy upon the young troop who followed at their heels, and when there was a temporary lull in front of Longstreet on the left and left center.

At last the thunder of artillery and the roar of musketry again burst upon us from along the whole front of the Virginia lieutenant, while Hill in vain sent messenger after messenger to beg that these lines be formed and a general advance ordered on the right as well as on the left. Just before night General Polk permitted Hill to take charge of the forward movement of the three lines, Walker in front, his own corps composing the second and Cheatham the third. The advance of our attacking column on the left, before that time steady, now became impetuous, and with a momentary wavering of a brigade on the right, we rushed over the breastworks of Thomas and caught 5,000 prisoners in the angle, where Longstreet and Hill met, as they had on many hard-fought fields before, to discuss the events of that day and prepare, as they had hoped, for a still more eventful one that was to follow. But a short time had elapsed when they were joined by Forrest, impatient for orders to pursue the flying foe. When some hours had been passed in the vain effort to learn where the headquarters of the commanding general were located, Longstreet and Hill agreed to divide the responsibility of ordering the immediate pursuit by Forrest, with an assurance that they would ask the privilege of pushing forward to his support at early dawn.

Unable by the most diligent inquiry to open communication with Bragg till the next afternoon, they failed to secure for Forrest the infantry support that would have swept the single division of Thomas out of the gap on Missionary Ridge, or flanked and captured it, without another obstruction in the road to Chattanooga and on to Nashville. Such might have been the fruits of our victory, which being lost by delay, the last hope of the tottering Confederacy to regain the prestige and restore the confidence lost at Gettysburg and Vicksburg was gone forever.

Scattered along the face of Missionary Ridge, waiting for the enemy to make Chattanooga impregnable, and then uniting the forces of Grant and Sherman with the reorganized army of Thomas to overwhelm them, were the disheartened Confederates, daily growing weaker from the desertion of men whose homes were exposed to devastation by the Federals.

It was at this juncture that Buckner drew up and Polk, Longstreet, Hill, Buckner, Cleburne, Cheatham, Brown, and other generals signed and sent to the president a petition stating that the commanding general had lost the confidence of the army, and asking that he be transferred to another command and replaced by a more acceptable leader. Hill was the last of the lieutenant-generals consulted, but, unfortunately for his future, his headquarters were located at a central point on the line and the paper was left there to be signed. Cheatham and Cleburne met at that point and put their names to the paper at the same time. After the battle at Murfreesboro, Bragg had addressed letters to the chiefs of divisions in his army, asking whether he retained the confidence of the troops, and intimating a willingness to resign if he had lost it. Breckinridge, Cleburne, and one or two others promptly answered that they thought he could no longer be useful in the position he occupied. The correspondence led to an open breach between Bragg and Breckinridge, and a newspaper controversy, in which each charged upon the other the responsibility of our failure at Murfreesboro. General Breckinridge, in a conversation with me, stated that his reason for declining to sign the paper was that his opinion of the commanding general was known, and, as their relations were already unfriendly, his motives might be misconstrued.

No better illustration of the prevailing opinion among the higher officers, as well as the rank and file of the army, in reference to the efficiency of the commanding general can be given than the substance of a conversation between Cheatham and Cleburne, as they joined in a social glass after signing the petition: "Here are my congratulations upon your recovery from your bad cold," said Cleburne. "I have had no bad cold," said Cheatham. "Let me tell you an old fable," replied Cleburne. "The report had been circulated among the beasts of the forest that the lion had a bad breath; whereupon, as king, the lion summoned all to appear, and admitted them to his presence one by one. As each would answer, upon smelling his breath, that it was bad, the lion would devour him. When at length the fox was brought in, he replied to the question that he had a bad cold, and escaped. You had a bad cold when you wrote Bragg after the battle of Murfreesboro that you didn't know whether he still retained the confidence of the army. You have at last recovered."

Hill cherished no unkind feeling toward Bragg, and at the time reluctantly reached the conclusion that it was his duty to join his comrades in urging his removal, hoping that it might still be within the range of possibility to find a leader like Jackson, who could overcome superior numbers by vigilance, celerity, and strategy.

Mr. Davis was induced to believe that Hill was the originator and most active promoter of the plan to get rid of Bragg as a chief, and both the President and General Bragg determined to visit the whole sin of the insubordination of the inferior officers of that army on him. His name was not sent to the Senate for confirmation as lieutenant-general, and the repeated efforts of Johnston, backed by many of his subordinates, to have Hill returned to the command of a corps, were refused up to the last campaign of Johnston in North Carolina. In response to repeated demands made upon Bragg and the Adjutant for a court of inquiry to report upon any charge or criticism that the latter might make, Hill at last received the answer that there were no charges to be investigated.

But it is due to the memory of General Hill that the world should know how thoroughly he retained the confidence, respect and admiration of the officers and men of the army, which Bragg left after the next fight, never to rejoin till he found Hill on the soil of his own State leading its reduced regiments in their last forlorn charge against their old foe.

The following letters, for which he did not ask, but which he treasured as testimonials of his relations to his troops to the day of his death, are submitted for the first time for the vindication of his memory against the suspicion of negligence, inefficiency, incompetency or infidelity to his trust as commander of a corps:

HEADQUARTERS CLEBURNE'S DIVISION,

MISSION RIDGE, October 9, 1863.

_General_:--In your departure from the army of Tennessee, allow
me to offer you my grateful acknowledgments for the uniform
kindness that has characterized all your official intercourse
with my division. Allow me also to express to you the sincere
regard and high confidence with which in so short a time you
succeeded in inspiring both myself and, I believe, every officer
and man in my command.

It gives me pleasure to add that now, though your connection
with this army has ended, you still retain undiminished the
love, respect and confidence of Cleburne's Division.

Respectfully, your friend,

P. R. CLEBURNE,

_Major-General_.

_Dear General_:--I have just learned officially that you have
been relieved from command in this army and ordered to report to
Richmond.

I cannot see you go away without sending you, in an unofficial
and friendly note, the expression of my sincere regret at our
separation. It has the merit of at least being disinterested.
I saw you for the first time on my way to this army from
Mississippi, when my division became a part of your corps, and
I have had more than one occasion to express my admiration
for your fidelity to duty, your soldierly qualities, and your
extraordinary courage on the field.

It may gratify you to know the opinion of one of your
subordinates, and to be assured that, in his opinion, they are
shared by his division. I am, General,

Very truly, your friend,

JOHN C. BRECKINRIDGE,

_Major-General_.

HEADQUARTERS CORPS ARMY OF TENNESSEE,

October 15, 1863.

_My Dear General_:--Your note of to-day is received. I am
surprised and grieved to learn that you have been relieved from
duty with this army. We have stood side by side on so many
severely contested battle-fields that I have learned to lean
upon you with great confidence.

I hope and trust that you may find some other position where
your services may be as useful as they can be here. * * *

Very truly and sincerely yours,

J. LONGSTREET.
HEADQUARTERS CLAYTON'S BRIGADE,

NEAR CHATTANOOGA, 3 November, 1863.

_Lieutenant-General D. H. Hill_:--Returning to my command a few
days ago, I regretted to learn that you had left the command of
our corps, and that I had not the opportunity of telling you
farewell.

I have been in the military service since the 6th of February,
1861, and I have never been under a commander to whom I and
my command formed so strong an attachment in so short a space
of time. In the camp we were not afraid to approach you, and
on the field _you_ were not afraid to approach us and even go
beyond us. This feeling was universal among privates as well as
officers and to a greater degree than I have ever known towards
any one except, perhaps, General Stuart. Those who have been in
the military service and been _frozen to death_ by a different
class of officers, alone know how fully to appreciate this.

Your friend and obedient servant,

H. D. CLAYTON.

HEADQUARTERS POLK'S BRIGADE,

October 16, 1863.

_General_:--In behalf of myself and brigade, allow me to express
to you our high appreciation of your uniform kindness in all
of your official intercourse with us, and to say to you that
although you have not been long with us, you have gained our
love, confidence, and respect; and that it was with great regret
that we heard of your being taken away from us; and in being so
taken away our confidence in you as a soldier, gentleman, and
patriot has not been in the least diminished. We part with you,
General, with the greatest regret, and hope some new field may
be given you for the display of that generalship that led us to
victory at Chickamauga.

Respectfully, your friend,

L. E. POLK,

_Brigadier-General_.

HEADQUARTERS LOWERY'S BRIGADE,

MISSION RIDGE, October 16, 1863.

_Dear General_:--Paragraph 2, Special Order No. 33, from Army
Headquarters, relieving you from duty in this department has
just been received by me. I take this opportunity to express to
you my deep regret at this change. So far as I have heard an
expression from the officers and men of this corps, your service
with us has been _most satisfactory_. In the camp and on the
march your orders were received and obeyed with the most cordial
approval and with the greatest pleasure. The warm devotion that
has been created in so short a time will not die while memory
lives. In behalf of my brigade, permit me to express our regret
on account of your separation from us, and the kindest wishes
for your prosperity and happiness. For myself the memories of
our short acquaintance will be warmly cherished in a devoted
heart of friendship, and the guidance and protection of the
Unseen Hand invoked on you wherever your lot may be cast.

May the glory of victorious fields form a wreath around your
name in all time to come, and the memory of your deeds of
gallantry and patriotism be cherished in the hearts of a
grateful and free people.

Respectfully, General, your obedient servant,

M. P. LOWERY,

_Brigadier-General_.

Long after the war General J. E. Johnston addressed the following letter to General Hill, from which it will appear that the influence of Bragg, who was at the elbow of the President as his military adviser, was still omnipotent after he was transferred from the west to Richmond:

WASHINGTON, D. C., September 22, 1887.

GENERAL D. H. HILL:

_Dear General_:--Your conduct at Yorktown and at Seven Pines
gave me an opinion (of you) which made me wish for your
assistance in every subsequent command that I had during the
war. When commanding the army of Tennessee, I applied for your
assignment to a vacancy * * * * * * * *

Yours very truly,

J. E. JOHNSTON.

It is but just to President Davis, as well as to General Hill, to state that there was good reason to believe that the former, in his last days, became convinced that General Hill was not the author of the petition, or the principal promoter of the plan for Bragg's removal, and that it dawned upon the great chieftain that the retention of Bragg was the one mistake of his own marvelous administration of the government of the Confederacy. When Johnston and others criticised the President, General Hill, then editing a magazine that was read by every Confederate, indignantly refused to utter one reproachful word, even in his own vindication, because, as he said, the time-servers who had turned their backs on the Lost Cause were making him the scapegoat to bear the supposed sin of a nation.

Misjudged, deprived of command and made to stand inactive in the midst of the stirring scenes of the last days of the Confederacy, Hill was not a man to sulk in his tent. Volunteering successively on the staff of his old friends, Beauregard and Hoke, who appreciated his advice and assistance, he showed himself ever ready to serve the cause in any capacity.

The repeated and urgent requests of both Johnston and Beauregard that Hill should be restored to command, resulted at last in his assignment to duty at Charleston, from which place he fell back with our forces to Augusta.

When the remnant of the grand army of Tennessee reached Augusta in charge of General Stevenson, Johnston ordered Hill to assume command and move in front of the vast and victorious hosts of Sherman. The greeting given him by the little bands of the old legions of Cleburne and Breckinridge now left was a fitting tribute to an old commander whom they loved and admired. Hoping against hope, Hill was the leader above all others to infuse new spirit into the forlorn band devoted to this desperate duty. At every stream and on every eminence in his native State he disputed the ground with Sherman's vanguard till he developed a force that made it madness to contend further. Hill's reputation as a soldier depends in nowise upon successful running. This final retreat was the first and last in which he took a leading part. When once more his foot was planted upon the soil of North Carolina it was eminently fitting that he who heard the first victorious shouts of her first regiment in the first fight in Virginia would lead her brave sons in the last charge of the grand army of the great West within her own borders. Again, as in the last onset of Cox at Appomattox, North Carolina soldiers stood the highest test of the hero by facing danger in a gallant charge when they knew that all hope of success was gone forever.