Chapter V: Critique of the Divisions of the Concepts and

THEORY OF DISTINCTION AND DEFINITION

The pseudoconcepts, not a subdivision of the concept--Obscurity, clearness and distinction, not subdivisions of the concept--Inexistence of subdivisions of the concept as logical form--Distinctions of the concepts not logical, but real--Multiplicity of the concepts; and logical difficulty arising therefrom. Necessity of overcoming it--Impossibility of eliminating it--Unity as distinction--Inadequacy of the numerical concept of the multiple--Relation of distincts as ideal history--Distinction between ideal history and real history--Ideal distinction and abstract distinction--Other usual distinctions of the concept, and their significance--Identical, unequal, primitive and derived concepts, etc.--Universal, particular and singular. Comprehension and extension--Logical definition--Unity-distinction as a circle--Distinction in the pseudoconcepts--Subordination and co-ordination of empirical concepts--Definition in empirical concepts, and forms of the concept--The series in abstract concepts.

VI

OPPOSITION AND LOGICAL PRINCIPLES

Opposite or contradictory concepts--Their diversity from distincts --Confirmation of this afforded by empirical Logic--Difficulty arising from the double type of concepts, opposite and distinct--Nature of opposites; and their identity, when they are distinguished, with distincts--Impossibility of distinguishing one opposite from another, as concept from concept--The dialectic--Opposites are not concepts, but the unique concept itself--Affirmation and negation--The principle of identity and contradiction; true meaning, and false interpretation of it--Another false interpretation: contrast with the principle of opposition. False application of this principle also--Errors of the dialectic applied to the relation of distincts--Its reduction to the absurd--The improper form of logical principles or laws--The principle of sufficient reason.

SECOND SECTION

INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT

I

THE CONCEPT AND THE VERBAL FORM. THE DEFINITIVE JUDGMENT

Relation of the logical with the æsthetic form--The concept as expression--Æsthetic and æsthetic-logical expressions or expressions of the concept: propositions and judgments--Overcoming of the dualism of thought and language--The logical judgment as definition--Indistinction of subject and predicate in the definition--Unity of essence and existence--Pretended vacuity of the definition--Critique of the definition as fixed verbal formula.

II

THE CONCEPT AND THE VERBAL FORM. THE SYLLOGISM

Identity of definition and syllogism--Connection of concepts and thinking of concepts--Identity of judgment and syllogism--The middle term and the nature of the concept--Pretended non-definitive logical judgments--The syllogism as fixed verbal formula--Use and abuse of it--Erroneous separation of truth and reason of truth in pure concepts--Separation of truth and reason of truth in the pseudoconcepts.

III

CRITIQUE OF FORMAL LOGIC

Intrinsic impossibility of formal Logic--Its nature--Its partial justification--Its error--Its traditional constitution--The three logical forms--Theories of the concept and of the judgment--Theory of the syllogism--Spontaneous reductions to the absurd of formal Logic--Mathematical Logic or Logistic--Its non-mathematical character--Example of its mode of treatment--Identity of nature of Logistic and formal Logic--Practical aspect of Logistic.

IV

INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT AND PERCEPTION

Reaction of the concept upon the representation--Logicization of the representations--The individual judgment; and its difference from the judgment of definition--Distinction of subject and predicate in the individual judgment--Reasons for the variety of definitions of the judgment and of some of its divisions--Individual judgment and intellectual intuition--Identity of individual judgment with perception or perceptive judgment, and with commemorative or historical judgment--Erroneous distinction of individual judgments as of fact and of value--The individual judgment as ultimate and perfect form of knowledge--Error of treating it as the first fact of knowledge--Motive of this error--Individual syllogisms.

V

THE INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT AND THE PREDICATE OF EXISTENCE

The copula: its verbal and logical significance--Questions relating to propositions without a subject. Verbalism--Confusion between different forms of judgments in the question of existentiality--Determination and subdivision of the question concerning the existentiality of individual judgments--Necessity of the existential character in these judgments---The absolutely and the relatively inexistent--The character of existence as predicate--Critique of existentiality as position and faith--Absurd consequences of those doctrines--The predicate of existence as not sufficient to constitute a judgment--The predicate of judgment as the totality of the concept.