Chapter I

IDENTITY OF THE JUDGMENT OF DEFINITION (PURE CONCEPT) AND OF THE INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT

Result of preceding enquiry: the judgment of definition and the individual judgment--Distinction between the two: truth of reason and truth of fact, necessary and contingent, etc.; formal and material--Absurdities arising from these distinctions: the individual judgment as ultra-logical; or, duality of logical forms--Difficulty of abandoning the distinction--The hypothesis of reciprocal implication, and so of the identity of the two forms--Objection; the lack of representative and historical element in the definitive--The historical element in the definitions taken in their concreteness--The definition as answer to a question and solution of a problem--Individual and historical conditionally of every question and problem--Definition as also historical judgment--Unity of truth of reason and truth of fact--Considerations in confirmation of this--Critique of the false distinction between formal and material truths--Platonic men and Aristotelian men--Theory of application of the concepts, true for abstract concepts and false for true concepts.

II

THE _A PRIORI_ LOGICAL SYNTHESIS

The identity of the judgment of definition and of the individual judgment, as synthesis _a priori_--Objections to the synthesis _a priori,_ deriving from abstractionists and empiricists--False interpretation of the synthesis _a priori_--Synthesis _a priori in_ general and logical synthesis _a priori_--Non-logical synthesis _a priori--_The synthesis _a priori,_ as synthesis, not of opposites, but of distincts--The category in the judgment. Difference between category and innate idea--The synthesis _a priori,_ the destruction of transcendency, and the objectivity of knowing--Power of the synthesis _a priori_ remained unknown to its discoverer.

III

LOGIC AND THE DOCTRINE OF THE CATEGORIES

The demand for a complete table of the categories--This demand extraneous to Logic--Logical categories and real categories--Uniqueness of the logical category: the concept. The other categories, no longer logical, but real. Systems of categories--The Hegelian system of the categories, and other posterior systems--The logical order of the predicates or categories--Illusion as to the logical reality of this order--The necessity of an order of the predicates not founded upon Logic in particular, but upon the whole of Philosophy--False distinction of Philosophy into two spheres--Metaphysic and Philosophy, rational Philosophy and real Philosophy, etc., derived from the confusion between Logic and Doctrine of the categories--Philosophy and pure Logic, etc.; overcoming of the dualism.

SECOND PART

PHILOSOPHY, HISTORY AND THE NATURAL AND MATHEMATICAL SCIENCES

I

THE FORMS OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE DIVISIONS OF KNOWLEDGE

Summary of the results relating to the forms of knowledge--Non-existence of technical forms, and of composed forms--Identity of forms of knowledge and of knowing. Objections to them--Empirical distinctions and their limits--Enumeration and determination of the forms of knowing reality, corresponding to the forms of knowledge--Critique of the idea of a special Logic as doctrine of the forms of knowing the external world and of a special Logic as doctrine of the methods--Nature of our treatment of the forms of knowledge.

II

PHILOSOPHY

Philosophy as pure concept; and the various definitions of philosophy--Those which negate philosophy--Those which define it as science of supreme principle, of final causes, etc.; contemplation of death, etc.; as elaboration of the concepts, as criticism, as science of norms; as doctrine of the categories--Exclusion of material definitions from philosophy--Idealism of every philosophy--Systematic character of philosophy--Philosophic significance and literary significance of the system--Advantages and disadvantages of the literary form of the system--Genesis of the systematic prejudice, and rebellion against it--Sacred and philosophic numbers; meaning of their demand--Impossibility of dividing philosophy into general and particular--Disadvantages of the conception of a general philosophy, distinct from particular philosophies.