Chapter XI: Part 11

I will not go into the foundations of the universities. I am not for raising any quibble on that subject. I apprehend that they have grown up, as all other institutions have done, very much from a series of accidents, and the force of chances. One college has been founded by one individual, and one by another; but, however they have grown up, they have, in fact, become, and are now considered, as the national seminaries of education. I would reserve to them, in every respect, their corporate rights. I would respect them as places where the religion of the country is taught, and professed; but undoubtedly I would if possible, for the sake of general peace and union, and for the sake of bringing together those who are now divided, try, with the sanction and approbation of the universities themselves (and we know perfectly well that most of their distinguished members are of opinion that this can be done); I would, I say, try whether we could not open the gates of these universities to that great body of this country, who unfortunately dissent from the doctrines of the church of England. I would not do so, however, rashly, nor with any violence to honest prejudices, or to those well-intentioned feelings which some persons are found to cherish.

The noble duke has said that tests are no securities against the admission of atheists or schismatics, and that a man may take them who dissented from them, if he chose to stifle all his feelings of right and wrong. But, my lords, I beg leave to say that tests are no security against any man. It is impossible ever to have looked at the history of religion in any state, or at any period, and not to feel that the test laws have been the weakest ground upon which any faith could stand. Were tests any security for the heathen religion against the vital spirit of the heaven-descended energy of Christianity? Yet we are aware that every act of the life of a heathen was in itself a test. He could not sit to his meat, he could not retire to rest, he could not go through the most simple transactions of life, without some act of acknowledgment offered towards some heathen deity. Unless these observances were attended to by the Christians, they were subject to the most cruel punishments, and yet such means failed to preserve the dominant faith. In fact, it is well known that one of the most violent persecutions of the Christians, instituted by the Roman emperors, was followed, as it were, almost immediately by the establishment of Christianity as the dominant religion of the empire. Were tests any security to the Roman Catholic religion, against the growing light and energy of the Protestant faith? Tests of various kinds were adopted at the very moment the new doctrines showed themselves, but it was soon found that they were vain and fragile against the light and strength of the new doctrines. Were tests any security to these very universities themselves? I have not looked very deeply into this subject; I have no doubt that if I were to look closer into it, I should find more instances of the sort; but I find that about fourteen years after the establishment of King's College, in the university of Cambridge, a decree was sent down there by King Henry VI., admonishing the scholars, that is to say, in the language of the present day, the fellows of that college, against the damnable and pernicious errors (so it styled them), of John Wickliffe and Richard Peacock, and denouncing the pains of expulsion from college, and perjury, against those of them who should show any favour to those doctrines. Yet, in two years after this, this very king's college became what, at that time was called the most heretical, but which now, in our time, would be called the most Protestant college in the university; and we know that these doctrines thus fiercely denounced, and strongly guarded against by tests, about fifty or sixty years afterwards became, by law, the established religion of this country. It is upon her native strength--upon her own truth--it is upon her spiritual character, and upon the purity of her doctrines, that the Church of England rests. Let her not, then, look for support in such aids as these. It is by these means, and not by tests and proscriptions, that protestantism has been maintained; let her be assured of this.

_August 1, 1834._

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_Cause of the dismissal of the Melbourne Administration in November, 1834._

I am not responsible for the dissolution of the late government. The late government was dissolved from the absolute impossibility of its going on any longer. When a noble earl (Spencer), whom I do not now see in his place, was removed from the House of Commons, by the necessity of taking his seat in this house, it was impossible for the late government to go on. I will just desire your lordships to recollect that it was stated by the noble earl (Grey), who so worthily filled the situation of prime minister for nearly four years, when his noble colleague (Lord Althorp), in the House of Commons, thought proper to resign, "that he had lost his right hand, and that it had thus become absolutely impossible for him to continue to carry on the government, or to serve the Crown with honour or advantage." Not only did the noble earl make this declaration of his inability to go on upon the retirement of his noble colleague from his majesty's councils, but the noble viscount opposite, himself, when he afterwards came to form his government, stated that the noble earl (Spencer), having consented to retain his office and position in the House of Commons, he was prepared to undertake to preside over his majesty's councils, and carry on the business of the country. But this was not all; for I happen to know that, when the noble viscount found that he was likely to be deprived of the services and assistance of that noble lord in the other house, he felt that his administration would be placed in circumstances of the greatest difficulty and embarrassment. Besides that, it was perfectly well known to his majesty, that the influence of that noble lord in the other house of parliament was the foundation on which the government to which he was attached, reposed; and, that that support being removed, it must fall. When, therefore, his majesty found that it was fairly put to him whether he would consent to arrangements for the late government proceeding as it best could, or whether he would consent to steps being taken for the formation of another administration, it was surely natural for his majesty to consider his own situation, and the situation in which the late government was lately placed by the death of the late Earl Spencer.

_February 24, 1835_.

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_Why the Duke of Wellington held so many offices_, ad interim, _in November_, 1834.

I gave his majesty the best advice which, under the circumstances of the case, it appeared to me practicable to give. I advised his majesty to send for that right hon. gentleman (Sir R. Peel), a member of the House of Commons, who seemed to me to be the most fit and capable person to place at the head of the new administration, as first lord of the treasury. That right honourable gentleman was then in another part of the world, and some time must necessarily elapse before it would be possible that he could return to this country. It appeared to his majesty and to myself, however, to be essentially necessary that, in the meantime, the government should be taken possession of and administered. This step I considered to be absolutely necessary, and I also felt it to be absolutely necessary that, whoever might exercise the authority of government in the interval, should take no step that might embarrass or compromise the right honourable baronet on his return. It was only on that ground that I accepted, for the time, of the offices of first lord of the treasury, and secretary of state for the home department.

The noble viscount has made a little mistake in alleging that I was appointed to three departments at once. He makes it a matter of charge against me that I exercised the authority of the three secretaries of state; but the noble viscount knows very well that the secretary of state for the home department is competent, under certain circumstances, to do so. It was for the public service, and the public convenience, and no other reason whatever, that I, my lords, consented to hold, for a time, the situations of first lord of the treasury, and secretary of state for the home department. But I want to know whether this was, as the noble viscount insinuates, an unprecedented act? When Mr. Canning was secretary of state for the foreign department, he was appointed first lord of the treasury. The latter office Mr. Canning received on the 12th of April, and he did not resign the seals of the foreign department until the 30th of that month. During the whole of that period Mr. Canning discharged the duties both of secretary of state for foreign affairs, and first lord of the treasury. My lords, I am quite aware that there were at that period, two other secretaries of state, but the fact is as I have stated it, that Mr. Canning exercised at the same time; the functions both of first lord of the treasury, and secretary of state for the foreign department. The transaction in my case was, therefore, not unprecedented; and I must also say, that when the noble viscount thought proper to blame me, as he did, he was bound to show that my conduct, in that respect, had been attended with some evil or inconvenient result. Now, it does not appear that it has been attended with any such result. The fact is, that during the whole of the time that I held the two offices. I cautiously avoided taking any step which might be productive of subsequent embarrassment or inconvenience, and when my right honourable friend took possession of his office, I can undertake to say that he did not find himself compromised by any such act.

_February_ 24,1835.

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_Lord Londonderry's appointment to the Embassy at St. Petersburgh._

My lords, having learned that it would not be disagreeable to my noble friend to be employed in the public service, I did concur in the recommendation, or rather, my lords, I did recommend to my right honourable friend, Sir Robert Peel, that my noble friend should be appointed ambassador to the court of St. Petersburgh. I made this recommendation, founded as it was on my own personal knowledge of my noble friend for many years past,--on the many great and important military services he has performed, and on the fitness he has proved himself to possess for such an appointment in those various diplomatic employments he has filled during a long period of time; more particularly at the court of Vienna, where for a period of nine years, he performed most important services to the entire satisfaction of the ministers who employed him, up to the last moment of his employment. He returned from the discharge of that office, my lords, with the strongest testimony of the approbation of the then secretary of state for foreign affairs. I was aware, my lords, of the peculiar talents of my noble friend in certain respects, for this particular office, and of his consequent fitness for this very description of diplomatic employment, especially on account of his being a military officer of high rank in the service of this country, and of distinguished reputation in the Russian army. I knew the peculiar advantages that must attach to an individual conducting such an embassy on that account. Under these circumstances, I was justified, my lords, in recommending my noble friend, and I was glad to find that my right honourable friend concurred in that recommendation, and that his majesty was pleased to approve of it. I may also add, that the nomination of my noble friend having been communicated in the usual manner to the court of St. Petersburgh, it was received with approbation at that court. For all these reasons, my lords, it was with the greatest regret I learned that this nomination,--for it had gone no further than nomination,--was not approved of in another place; for it is in consequence of that expression of disapproval that my noble friend, with that delicacy of feeling which belongs to his character, has declined the office.

_March_ 16,1834.

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_Prerogative of the Crown in appointing Ambassadors._

There can be no doubt whatever that there is no branch of the prerogative of the crown greater, or more important, than that of sending ambassadors to foreign courts; nor is there any branch of that prerogative the unrestricted use of which ought to be kept more inviolate. But, my lords, the ministers of the crown are responsible for these nominations. They are also responsible for the instructions under which my noble friend, or any other noble lord so nominated, is bound to act. They are, moreover, responsible for the proper performance of these duties on the part of those whom they select--to the other house of parliament, and to the country at large. It is impossible, therefore, for me to believe that the House of Commons would in this case proceed so far as to interfere with that peculiar prerogative, and to say that an individual who has been already nominated by the crown should not fill the situation; inasmuch as, by so doing, the House of Commons would not only be taking upon itself the nomination of the officer, and the direction of the particular duties to be discharged by him--but would also be relieving the minister from the constitutional responsibility of the appointment. I do not think that sentiments of such a description, on a subject of this delicacy and importance, are very general; and I cannot bring myself to believe that a vote affirming such a violation of the royal prerogative would have passed the House of Commons.

_March 15,1835._

I

_The Roman Catholics interested in maintaining the Established Church._

The great bulk of the Roman Catholics are as much interested as the Protestants of the established church in maintaining the safety of the established church.

_June 10, 1835._

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_Defence of the Thirty-nine Articles._

I conceive that there is no cause to complain of the subscription to the thirty-nine articles, as practised in Oxford. The explanation given by the most reverend prelate is entirely borne out by the statues of the university, and by the practice that prevails there; and this explanation agrees entirely with that given by a right reverend prelate, who was formerly head of one of the colleges at Oxford. It might, perhaps, be desirable that some other test should be adopted to prove that the individuals to be matriculated are members of the church of England; the most important point is, that Cambridge and Oxford should be filled only by members of the Church of England--upon that I consider the whole question to rest. The noble earl said, in the course of the discussion, that I advised your lordships not to consent to the bill introduced last session; because, if you did, you would have to carry to the foot of the throne a measure which would tend to subvert the union between church and state. My meaning in so doing was neither more nor less than this--that it was absolutely necessary that the universities, founded as they are, should educate their members in the religion of the church of England. Your lordships could not go to the king, and ask his consent to a bill which had for its object to establish in the university a system of education different from that of the church of England, without attacking the very foundation of the principle of the connexion between church and state. But the noble lord says, the church herself does not exact subscription to the thirty-nine articles from each individual. It is very true that the church of England does not require subscription from her members, nor would the university of Oxford require it, but as a proof that the person subscribing was a member of that church, or of the family of a member thereof.

The noble earl stated that individuals might obtain admittance to the universities both of Oxford and Cambridge, notwithstanding that they were dissenters; but there is a great deal of difference between casually admitting dissenters, and permitting them to enter into the universities as a matter of right. I see no objection to the admission of the few now admitted, who must submit to the regulations and discipline of the university, and of its several colleges; but I do object to the admission of dissenters into the universities by right; and my reason for making this exception is, that I am exceedingly desirous that the religion taught there should be the religion of the church of England; and I confess I should be very apprehensive that, if dissenters of all denominations were admitted by right, and they were not under the necessity of submitting to the rules and regulations of the several colleges, not only would the religion of the church of England not to be taught there, but no kind of religion whatever. I state this on the authority of a report which I have recently received of the proceedings of an institution in this country for the instruction of children of dissenting clergymen; from which it appears absolutely impossible, for any length of time, to adhere to any creed, or any tenet or doctrine in these seminaries, in which every doctrine is matter of dispute and controversy. I was rather surprised to hear the noble viscount opposite--a minister of the crown--express his preference for polemical disputations in the universities. I should have thought that he would have felt it to be his inclination, as well as duty, by all means to protect the universities from such disputes, and from a system fruitful in such controversies; and probably to end in a cessation of any system of religion or religious instruction whatever, on account of the different opinions of the members.

_July_ 14,1835.

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_University Tests rendered necessary by Toleration._

The tests in our universities are the children of the Reformation, which the system of toleration wisely established in this country has rendered still more necessary, if we intend to preserve the standard of the religion of the church of England. If we open the door wide and say "We will have no established religion at all--every man shall follow the religion he chooses"--if, in a word, we have recourse to the voluntary system,--then we must make up our minds to take the consequences which must follow from the enactments of the bill and the polemical and other controversial agitations to which it must lead. But, supposing the object of the noble lord, to put an end to these tests, to be desirable, I can conceive no mode of effecting this object so objectionable as the interference by parliament with the privileges of the universities, secured to them by charter and repeatedly acknowledged and confirmed by parliament.

_July_ 14 1835

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_Irish Clergy--their Depression by the Melbourne Government_.

I do say that the Protestant people and clergy of Ireland have great reason to complain of the want of protection to their rights and properties manifested on the part of the government of this country; and this is the cause of those disputes and those circumstances which the noble lord opposite (Lord Melbourne) has complained of in the few words he has addressed to the house on the subject. Far be it from me to wish for the renewal of any dissensions in Ireland; and, God knows, I would go any length, and do any thing in my power to put them down in the extent to which they now exist; but we are mistaken if we suppose that they can be put down by oppressing one party, or allowing one party to oppress another, or by extinguishing--an extinction which for the last three or four years you have attempted and are now about to complete--that description of property in Ireland allotted to the payment of the clergy. This is the circumstance which occasions the present dissensions in Ireland, and which has induced the present discussion in this house. The noble lord opposite cannot lament the cause of such discussions more than I do; but if he be determined to do his duty, let him give the protection of his majesty's government to the Protestant clergy and people of Ireland, as he does not hesitate to do in the case of other classes in that country; and the evils which he so much deplores will soon cease to exist.

_July_ 16, 1835.

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_A Power of Revising Railway Acts ought to be Reserved by the Legislature_.

I certainly have a very strong feeling on the subject of all these railways to be traversed by the aid of steam. I sincerely wish that all these projects could prove successful; but, in proportion as they may be successful, in the same proportion is it desirable that there should not be a perpetual monopoly established in the country. Under these circumstances, I have a strong feeling that it is desirable to insert in all these bills some clause, to enable the government or the parliament to revise the enactments contained in them at some future specific period. I conceive that, by carrying these measures into execution, a very great injustice is often done to many landed proprietors in the country; and they are forced either to submit to great inconvenience, or to contend against that inconvenience by incurring a very large expense, both in this and the other house of parliament. If some measure of the description to which I allude be not adopted, and if these railroads are to become monopolies in the hands of present or of future proprietors, we shall hereafter be only able to get the better of such monopolies by forming fresh lines of road, to the farther detriment of the interests of the landed proprietors, and at a great increase of expense and inconvenience. These circumstances have most forcibly struck my mind. I have had the subject under consideration for some days; I have conversed with others respecting it; and it appears to me that some plan ought to be devised in order to bring these railroads under the supervision of parliament at some future period. I therefore am anxious that the further proceedings in all these bills[18] should be suspended for a short time, in order that I may propose some clause, or introduce some measure, to meet the object to which I have referred. I think it is a subject the consideration of which ought not to fall on any individual. It is, I conceive, a matter which the government should take into its especial consideration. I am, however, perfectly ready to share with the government the responsibility of proposing such a measure to the house.

[Footnote 18: Some railway bills before the Home of Lords.]

_June_ 3,1836.

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_Moderation of the Opposition in the House of Lords towards the Melbourne Government_.

From my own experience, I must take the liberty of observing, that I consider the conduct pursued by noble lords on this side of the house, throughout the present session, to have been marked with the utmost moderation. For myself, I think I am correct in stating, that since the address to the throne in answer to the king's speech, with the exception only of one occasion, when I requested the noble viscount to postpone the Corporations (Ireland) Bill till after the Easter holidays, I never entered the house till after Easter. Since that period, I have certainly taken part in the proceedings that have been going forward in the house, and I have felt it my duty to oppose some of the measures of government; but I think I shall be borne out when I say that I have accompanied the vote which I have given with observations expressed in terms of great moderation. I have acted on all occasions to the best of my opinion, and in a way which I thought most calculated to be beneficial to the country. The noble viscount has been pleased to taunt us for not having addressed the king with a view to obtain his and his colleagues' removal from the situations which they hold. If the noble viscount would look at the manner in which they were appointed to office, if he would look at the whole history for the last twelve months I think he would find sufficient reason for our not having adopted that course of proceeding. The noble viscount knows very well upon what ground he stands, and knowing that, it would have been just as well in him if he had avoided his taunts against us for not having asked the king to remove him from office. I would take the liberty to recommend the noble viscount to consider himself not as the minister of a democratic body in another place, but as the minister of a sovereign in a limited monarchy, in a country, great in point of extent, great in its possessions, and in the various interests which it comprises; and that considering these circumstances, he should, in future, concert such measures as he has reason to think may pass with the approval and suit the general interests of all,--meet the good will of all,--and not of one particular party in one particular place only. If the noble viscount will but follow that course for some little time, he will find no difficulty in conducting the business of government in this house, but will find every facility afforded him in forwarding measures of the above description. I would beg the noble lord to recollect one fact, in regard to the church of England, whether in England or Ireland. Let him recollect that the avowed policy followed by this country during the last three hundred years, has been to retain inviolable the church establishment. We are called here to consult particularly for the good of the church; and if the noble viscount brings forward any measures relating to that subject, let him recollect that all measures of such a kind must be discussed by us with that particular object in view. This is not only the old feeling of this house of three hundred years' standing, but it is that on which we acted no longer than eight or nine years ago, when we had occasion to review the safeguards and general landmarks whereby the church establishment of this country was defended.

_August_ 18, 1836.

_The Quadruple Treaty. Effects of our Intervention in Spain_.

It is well known to your lordships that I was one of those who objected to the treaty called the "Quadruple Treaty." It is perfectly true that I was afterwards instrumental in carrying it into effect; because it was my duty, in the situation in which I was placed at that time, to carry into effect those treaties which his majesty had entered into, whether I had originally approved of them or not. I cannot, therefore, now, disapprove of the due execution of the quadruple treaty by others; nor will I refuse my assent to the proposition that the measures which his majesty has adopted in execution of the treaty are satisfactory as far as we have any knowledge of them. If any measures should have been adopted, not already provided for in the treaty, it will be our duty to consider them calmly and dispassionately. Much discussion has taken place in other countries with respect to the course pursued by other members of this alliance, in the execution of this treaty. I must say, that so far as I am enabled to form a judgment of the treaty, (and I know nothing more than what appears on the face of the treaty itself) it seems to me that it has been fairly executed by all the parties who subscribed it. When I had the honour of serving his majesty in 1834, I was called upon to state whether the treaty in question would be carried into execution. I then stated what I understood was the meaning and scope of the treaty;--viz. that there should be no armed intervention in the internal affairs of Spain, which should tend to affect the independence of that country. That was my sense of the treaty at the time--it is my sense of the treaty at the present moment--it was so understood by the other parties to the treaty. It was the understanding of all parties that there should he no military intervention in the internal affairs of Spain. This was the understanding of the treaty, and in the month of November, 1834, this explanation was communicated and was satisfactory to the Spanish government.

I consider that the attempt by his majesty's government, aided even by the strongest power in Europe, to force upon Spain any form of government, must fail. Those who should make the attempt must take upon themselves not only the expenses of their own army in a most expensive contest, but those of the civil and military government of Spain; and they must hold their position in Spain, and defray their expenses till the new government should be settled and submitted to, and tranquillity established in the country. I should like to see how the Commons House of Parliament, or the Chamber of Deputies, would treat a proposition that should call upon them to agree to a vote of money for any such operation, for the purpose of forcibly imposing a liberal government on Spain, or on any other country. I contend my lords, that this scheme is absolutely impracticable. His majesty's ministers may rely on it, that they have undertaken that which they never can perform; and that the sooner they place themselves on the footing on which they ought strictly to stand with reference to the quadruple alliance, the sooner will the pacification of Spain, which we must all of us anxiously wish for, be accomplished. I feel, for one, the strongest objection to anything like interference with the internal affairs of the Peninsula. I object to it, not only on account of the vast expense it must inevitably entail upon this country, but still more so on account of the injury which it inflicts on the parties existing in that state. Of my own certain knowledge I can state, that the individuals composing these parties in Spain, have actually been ruined, their properties confiscated, their fortunes sacrificed, by the course which his majesty's government have pursued. Acting under the assurances of his majesty's government, individuals have adopted a certain line of conduct. They followed his majesty's government, as a party in the state. His majesty's government, thus acting, is obliged to move forward with the democratic movement The unfortunate persons I have alluded to have, in consequence, been abandoned, their fortunes sacrificed, and their prospects blighted for ever. Events like these, my lords, which affect the character as well as the influence of the country, inclined me to be more adverse to such interference than I should be on the mere score of expense. I do not mean to oppose the address, but in taking this course, I beg to be clearly understood as not holding myself bound to approve of the employment of any force beyond that stipulated for by the quadruple treaty, which treaty parliament has recognised.

_January_ 30,1837.

_The Poor Law Act has surpassed his expectation_.

My lords, I supported the bill while it was in this house; and having given that support to the bill from being a witness to the evils, and being apprehensive of the consequences likely to have attended the former system, I conceive it to be my duty to come forward on this occasion, and to state that this bill has surpassed any expectation which I had formed of the benefits likely to result from it. The bill, my lords, may require amendment in certain parts, and it appears that his majesty's government have taken measures to ascertain what points in the bill so require amendment. I, for one, am ready to pay the greatest attention to the points which may be brought under the consideration of this house. But I must say that I approve of the measure as far as it has gone hitherto, and I have witnessed its operation. I do not talk of what I have seen generally, I talk of the details of the management of the bill, from having witnessed that management in different workhouses, in different parts of the country in which I have resided; and I must say that it has been practically beneficial, and particularly in cases such as these. First of all, it has put the workman and his employer upon a true and friendly footing of confidence. Then it has connected the man of property, the man of the highest rank in his country, with the lowest class, with the labouring class, by admitting such to the board of Guardians. I can mention some noble lords, who are ornaments to this house, and who constantly attend at the weekly meetings of the guardians, being elected guardians by the parishes in the neighbourhood in which they reside. No measure could be attended with better results, and being convinced that it will effect still greater benefits, sincerely thinking so, I should be ashamed if I did not step forward, and at once avow my sentiments respecting it. I avow at once that I supported the bill at the time his majesty's ministers proposed it--that I do not repent of what I did on that occasion in so supporting it--but, on the contrary, that I rejoice in the part I then took; and I now congratulate his majesty's ministers on its success.

_April_ 7, 1837.

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_The Universities--their Education System the admiration of the World._

The working of all these colleges and of the system on which they are regulated, is for the benefit of the public; and in each and every college the object is to carry into execution the will of the founder, just as it would probably have been had he lived to this period. In every case the great object of the governing authorities is, to benefit the public by the education of the youth who resort to these institutions. The noble viscount (Melbourne) could not help admitting that these institutions have worked well, and that latterly a great improvement has taken place in the system of education pursued under their auspices. The noble viscount has also spoken of the great improvement in the system of education pursued in the new university of Durham, and in other new universities elsewhere. But, nevertheless, the noble viscount could not help admitting that the old universities of Oxford and Cambridge possess the merit of having established in England an excellent system of education, which is, in point of fact, the envy and admiration of the world.

_April_ 11, 1837.

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_The Quadruple Treaty condemned_.

My lords, I must confess that I did not approve of the original Quadruple Treaty. I considered it inconsistent with the ancient principle and the policy and practice adopted in this country with regard to Portugal, to avoid to interfere in the disputes between the two princes of the House of Braganza, which had been the policy of this country for many years. It sanctioned the introduction of Spanish troops into Portugal, which measure was inconsistent with our defensive relations with Portugal, and which had been objected to and prevented in that very contest between the rival princes of the House of Braganza. Yet it gave no fresh assistance to bring the contests in Portugal to a conclusion, excepting the promise to give the aid of this country by the employment of a naval force in co-operation with the Spanish and Portuguese troops, which aid was not necessary. Another objection which I entertained to the Quadruple Treaty was, that it mixed up France and this country in the offers and promises made to Don Carlos and Don Miguel, in the fifth and sixth articles of the treaty. These powers became, in fact, guarantees for the performance of these engagements, as well as for the performance of the engagements made under the same articles of the treaty to the subjects of Portugal and Spain. It is impossible to describe the inconvenience of such articles; they require the interference of government in hundreds of little questions. I have felt the inconvenience of those articles since their adoption; I stated my objections to them at the time, and I have seen no reason, since, to alter the opinions I then formed.

_April_ 21, 1837.

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_Effects of the Additional Articles to the Quadruple Treaty._

By the first of the additional articles to the treaty, the King of the French obliged himself to take such measures in those parts of his dominions which adjoined to Spain, as might be calculated to prevent succours of men, arms, and warlike stores being sent from France into Spain; and the King of Great Britain engaged, under the second of the said additional articles, to furnish such arms and warlike stores as her majesty the Queen of Spain might require; and further to assist her majesty with a naval force if necessary. The Duke of Braganza was to give his best assistance to serve her majesty, that he might be called upon to render. So that those additional articles were essentially different from the terms and provisions of the original treaty, by which the removal of the two princes from Portugal was effected. I do not mean to say, that, in the preamble to that treaty, allusion is not made to the affairs both of Spain and Portugal, but there still is a remarkable difference between the words used in the treaty and the additional articles; and moat particularly in relation to the part to be taken by this country.

_April_ 21, 1837.

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_The Legion and the Stock Exchange.--Impotency of our interference_.

I contend, as I have before contended in this house, that his majesty's present ministers (Lord Melbourne's government) ought not to have departed from the position which the previous administration had established while they were in power. I will not pretend to say what would have been the result of their following out that course, but this I do say, that the course pursued by his lordship's government has not benefited the military or the financial affairs of Spain, or promoted the peace of that country or the general tranquillity of Europe, or attained any of the political advantages which the noble viscount boasts have been attained by his departure from that position which the previous government had occupied and left to their successors. But, my lords, it did unfortunately happen that certain parties in this country had been connected with the Spanish finances; and it was important to those parties that the red coats should make their appearance in Spain, and that the name of "Great Britain," and of the British legion, should be mixed up in the operations of the war. Money was raised in this country to defray the expense of the equipment of the "Legion," as it was called, of 10,000 or 12,000 men, and also of their pay, their food, and maintenance, for a certain number of months; and the noble lords, in order that this scheme might be carried into execution, gave their consent to the order in council for the suspension of the Foreign Enlistment Act. The corps gathered in this country, and went to Spain, in the spring of the year 1835, nearly two years ago. Their first operation upon their arrival at St. Sebastian, was a march over the very same ground to the very spot which was the scene of the late disaster. My lords, up to that moment, the Eliot convention, as it is most honourably and justly called, had been carried into execution. It was on that day departed from on both sides, and from that day to this, I firmly believe, from all I have seen and read,--and I have read much on the subject within the last few days--there has been no certainty in the execution of that convention. Not only has there been no certainty in the execution of that convention, but, notwithstanding the millions of money that Spain has expended,--notwithstanding the blood which has been shed and the number of lives that have been lost,--I will venture to say, that the military affairs of the Queen of Spain are in a worse condition now than they were in the month of May, 1835.

The whole of the policy of the British government, therefore; all the operations of the British legion, backed by the British squadron; have effected nothing more nor less towards putting an end to the war, and giving peace to Spain and to Europe, than the removal of the blockade of St. Sebastian from one point to another, so as not to come within the liability of being affected by the 68-pounders of the British steamers, under the command of Lord John Hay.

_April_ 21,1837.

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_Uselessness of the operations of the Legion, and Lord John Hay's Squadron, at St. Sebastian_.

If the noble lord supposes that the safety of St. Sebastian had been more or less endangered by the blockade, I can assure him that he is much mistaken; for, from what I know of that fortified town, which is one of the first or second order in Europe, I can take upon myself to say that the Carlists might have been left in their original position without any danger whatever to the town, because they could not make an attack upon such a fortress. In the whole course of the war they have not, to my knowledge, taken by an attack any fortified post; or even any open town of any magnitude, prepared for its defence. They could not have distressed St. Sebastian for provisions, because its communication with the sea could not be prevented. I say, it could not be prevented, even if the whole British fleet were blockading it, instead of being there to relieve it. The amount of inconvenience felt in the town from the Carlist force being in the neighbourhood, was neither more nor less than the unpleasantness of ladies and gentlemen, residing there, being prevented taking their evening walks in the neighbourhood. This is the whole amount of the inconvenience from which the town was relieved. This was the whole amount of the service rendered.

_April_ 21,1837.

_Strictures on General Evans_.

My lords, I will go a little further. I will say, that I firmly believe that the connexion between the legion and the fleet has been injurious to the military operations of the queen of Spain's generals. That is my decided opinion, founded upon my knowledge of the nature of the country, and of the position of both parties. My lords, there is one point to which I refer; that is, the want of communication between the Queen of Spain's generals, which can be relied upon. If corps of the size of those now employed are not actually joined, there must be a certain communication between them; for, without communication there can be no co-operation; and any attempt at co-operation would, in my opinion, in all probability, lead to disasters such as have recently taken place at Hernani. How are these troops situated? General Evans's troops are at St. Sebastian; General Saarsfield is at the other side of the Borunda, at Pampeluna; and Espartero, with his army, is at Bilboa. It is impossible that there can be any communication between these three, except by the French frontier, and by sea from Socoa, or by the Ebro. An arrangement is made for an attack, and a day named. What was the consequence? General Evans made an attack, but General Saarsfield, at Pampeluna, does not attack; there is a frost or snow, or rain, or some physical impediment which prevents a movement on the part of Saarsfield. General Evans cannot be informed in time, and the enemy has opportunity and leisure to throw his whole force upon General Evans; who, even if the troops had behaved well, would have been compelled to retire. The position, therefore, of the legion at St. Sebastian, in order to co-operate with the British squadron, that there might be something like British co-operation, was not an operation of war, it was one of stock-jobbing. My lords, it is a matter of much surprise to me, that General Evans, who, having acquired the confidence of his majesty's government, and that of the Queen of Spain, I presume must be an able man--it is, certainly, a surprising circumstance, that having had experience of the difficulties of carrying on communication in that country, and having met with a check in the month of January, 1836, for want of communication, he should not have felt the danger of his position, and should have omitted to put himself in communication to a certainty with corps in whose co-operation he was to act, instead of keeping himself at a distance, in order that he might carry on operations in concert with his majesty's fleet.

_April_ 21,1837.

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_Undisciplined state of the Legion_.

The noble lord has stated that he will not recall the marines. I would beg to remind your lordships, and the noble viscount in particular, of this fact--that the marines are properly the garrisons of his majesty's ships, and that upon no pretence ought they to be moved from a fair and safe communication with the ships to which they belong. The noble lord states, that he is responsible, and that he will take upon himself the responsibility. I have commanded his majesty's armies, and have incurred as many risks, and faced more difficulties than, I hope, the noble lord will ever have to encounter. I have been engaged in hostilities of this description, where co-operation was carried on upon the coast; and though I certainly would do as much for the service, and I believe I may say, have done as much for the service, as the noble lord, yet I would not venture, and have never ventured, to put any corps whatever in co-operation with the Spaniards, or in any situation whatever in which the detached troops could not communicate with the corps from which they were detached; and, above all, upon the sea-coast, where the troops detached could not hold communication with the ships. The first order to each of these detachments was, to keep the communication with their ships. The loss of 400 or 500 marines may not materially involve the honour of this country, but the lives of the men ought not to be endangered, as they must be, if care be not taken that they should have a communication with a point of safety, without some very extraordinary cause. We hear of the operations of the marines with the Austrians. But the Spanish troops, and particularly the British legion, are not the Austrians. I cannot consider this corps of General Evans to be in a state of discipline and subordination, such as a body of troops ought to be in, with which his majesty's marine forces ought to be connected. They have suffered very considerably; their losses have been great, and have affected their subordination, their good order and discipline, particularly in the presence of an enemy. A disaster or panic may occur among the best troops; but among such, order can be re-established. It does not appear that these are in the state in which they ought to be, to render it safe to co-operate with them. No efforts of their officers can, in such cases, have any effect upon them.

_April_ 21,1837.

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_Intervention, if at all, should be on a National Scale_.

The noble viscount says that we are carrying on these operations with the object of maintaining the peace of Europe; and these objects are, more especially, put forth in a pamphlet which is attributed to a colleague of the noble viscount, who has applauded his opinions, if he has not gone further, and adopted them as his own. Is the noble lord desirous, in accordance with the policy so set forth, to press upon the nation the adoption of the system of a general combination of the powers of the west, upon principles offensive as well as defensive, against the powers of the north and east of Europe? If so momentous an affair and such a course are seriously contemplated, they should not be commenced by stealth, but in a manner worthy of the character of a great nation like Great Britain. It is not by allowing Spain to raise a legion here in the first instance, and afterwards by sending a few hundred marines, that any really important object can be accomplished. But if the noble lords are in earnest, a message should be sent to parliament, and the support of the country should be called for, to this new scheme of policy; and a commanding force should be sent, in order to carry it into execution. But I recommend the noble viscount well to consider the length of time which must elapse before these operations can be brought to a conclusion; the expense which must, in the first instance, be incurred; and the lengthened period which must elapse before the troops can be withdrawn, and the other expenses can be discontinued, which must be incurred if this scheme be undertaken. The noble lord must establish a government in Spain; he must have the assistance of a Spanish army; and he must pay, equip, and provide for, not only his majesty's troops, but every Spanish officer and soldier employed in the settlement of the government of the country. It may be said, that there are financial resources in Spain; but I am much mistaken, regarding the state of the Spanish military establishments and Spanish finances, if there are not non-effective establishments, such as pensions, retired allowances, expenses of garrisons, and others, which will consume the whole of the pecuniary resources of Spain, however well managed, even without including the interest of the existing debt. I think that, if this country should have this matter fairly brought under its view, it would not be thought advisable to enter upon the scheme proposed in this pamphlet. But we are told that France ought to act this part; and that we ought to give France our moral support. France act! At whose expense? France would have the same difficulties--nay, greater difficulties--than this country. Is it intended that we are to subsidise France? No such thing; we are to assist with our ships and marines on the coast, but it is France that is to carry on the operations in the interior, and pay this expense. Is it believed that Louis Philippe has lost his senses? If we cannot expect that France will pay all this expense, what is to become of the integrity of the Spanish dominions, and the independence of the Spanish government, after the operations shall he concluded?

_April_ 21,1837.

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_Necessity of Conciliating the Protestants of Ireland_.