Chapter IV: Part 4

It is impossible, however, for me to interfere in any manner with a billet, given by the magistrates of Coimbra, for an officer and his family to be quartered in your house. I must at the same time inform you, that I am not a little surprised that a person of your rank and station, and quality in the country, should object to give accommodation in your house, and should make a complaint of this officer, that he had asked you for additional accommodation, when it appears by the letter which you enclosed, and which I now return, that when you objected to give him this additional accommodation for which he asked, he acquiesced in your objection, and did not any longer require this accommodation.

The unfortunate situation in which Portugal is placed, and the desire of the insatiable enemy of mankind to force this once happy and loyal people to submit to his iron yoke, to plunder them of their properties to destroy their religion and to deprive them of their monarch, has rendered it necessary to collect in this country a large army, in order, if possible, to defeat and frustrate the designs of the enemy. It is the duty of those whose age, whose sex, or whose profession, do not permit them to take an active part in the defence of their country, to assist those employed in its defence with provisions, lodgings for officers and troops, means of transport, &c., and at all events not to oppose themselves to the granting of this description of assistance. These duties are more particularly incumbent upon the rich and high in station, who would be the first victims of, and greatest sufferers from, the enemy's success, unless, indeed, they should be of the number of those traitors who are aiding to introduce the common enemy into the country, to destroy its happiness and independence.

Under these circumstances I am not a little astonished to receive these frivolous and manifestly unfounded complaints from you, and that you should be the person to set the example of objecting to give quarters to an officer, because he is married and has children.

It is not very agreeable to anybody to have strangers quartered in his house; nor is it very agreeable to us strangers, who have good houses in our own country, to be obliged to seek for quarters here. We are not here for our pleasure; the situation of your country renders it necessary: and you, a man of family and fortune, who have much to lose, should not be the first to complain of the inconvenience of our presence in the country.

I do everything in my power to alleviate the inconvenience which all must suffer. We pay extravagant prices with unparalleled punctuality for everything we receive; and I make it a rule to inquire into and redress every injury that is really done by the troops under my command, as I shall that to which I have above referred, of which you complain, in the conduct of----towards your servant.

_Dispatch, August 23, 1810._

* * * * *

_Croaking Spirit in the British Army in Portugal_.

It appears that you have had a good smart contest with the government respecting our plan of operations. They will end in forcing me to quit them, and then they will see how they will get on. They will then find that I alone keep things in their present state. Indeed the temper of some of the officers of the British army gives me more concern than the folly of the Portuguese government. I have always been accustomed to have the confidence and support of the officers of the armies which I have commanded; but for the first time, whether owing to the opposition in England, or whether the magnitude of the concern is too much for their minds and their nerves, or whether I am mistaken and they are right, I cannot tell; but there is a system of croaking in the army which is highly injurious to the public service, and which I must devise some means to put an end to, or it will put an end to us. Officers have a right to form their own opinions upon events and transactions, but officers of high rank or situation ought to keep their opinions to themselves; if they do not approve of the system of operations of their commander, they ought to withdraw from the army. And this is a point to which I must bring some, if I should not find that their own good sense prevents them from going on as they have done lately. Believe me that if any body else, knowing what I do, had commanded the army, they would now have been in Lisbon, if not, in their ships.

_Dispatch, September 11, 1810._

_Note_--This passage from a letter to the British minister at Lisbon is one of many, which explain the difficulties Lord Wellington had to encounter from the Portuguese Government, from the opposition and the press in England, and from the want of proper military spirit in his own officers.

_Conduct of the Portuguese._

If we are to go on as we have hitherto; if Great Britain is to give large subsidies, and to expend large sums in the support of a cause in which these most interested sit by and take no part; and those at the head of the government, with laws and power to force the people to exertion in the critical circumstances in which the country is placed, are aware of the evil, but neglect their duty and omit to put the laws into execution, I must believe their professions to be false; that they look to a little dirty popularity instead of to save their country; that they are unfaithful servants to their master, and persons in whom his allies can place no confidence.

_Oct. 28, 1810._

* * * * *

_The National Disease of Spain._

The national disease of Spain, that is, boasting of the strength and power of the Spanish nation, till they are seriously convinced that they are in no danger, then sitting down quietly and indulging their national indolence.

_Dec. 2, 1810._

* * * * *

_Apathy of the Portuguese._

There exists in the people of Portugal, an unconquerable love of their ease, which is superior even to their fear and detestation of the enemy. Neither will they, or their magistrates, or the government, see that the temporary indulgence of this passion for tranquillity must occasion the greatest misfortunes to the state and hardships to the individuals themselves; and no person in the country likes to have his tranquillity and habits disturbed for any purpose, however important, or to be the instrument of disturbing those of others. Thus every arrangement is defeated, and every order disobeyed with impunity. The magistrate will not force the inhabitants to adopt a measure, however beneficial to the state and himself, which will disturb his old habits; and the government will not force the magistrate to do that which will be disagreeable to him and to the people: thus we shall go on till the end of time.

_January 3, 1811._

* * * * *

_Takes no Notice of Newspapers._

I hope that the opinions of the people in Great Britain are not influenced by paragraphs in newspapers, and that those paragraphs do not convey the public opinion or sentiment upon any subject: therefore I (who have more reason than any other public man of the present day to complain of libels of this description) never take the smallest notice of them; and have never authorized any contradiction to be given, or any statement to be made in answer to the innumerable falsehoods, and the heaps of false reasoning, which have been published respecting me and the operations which I have directed.

_January 7, 1811._

_Indolence of the Natives of the Peninsula._

There is something very extraordinary in the nature of the people of the Peninsula. I really believe them, those of Portugal particularly, to be the most loyal and best disposed, and the most cordial haters of the French, that ever existed; but there is an indolence and a want even of the power of exertion in their disposition and habits, either for their own security, that of their country, or of their allies, which baffle all our calculations and efforts.

_January 16, 1811._

* * * * *

_Different Constitution of the French and English Armies._

It may also be asked why should we spend our money, and why these troops should not go on as the French troops do, without pay, provisions, magazines, or any thing? The French army is certainly a wonderful machine; but if we are to form such a one, we must form such a government as exists in France, which can with impunity lose one-half of the troops employed in the field every year, only by the privations and hardships imposed upon them. Next, we most compose our army of soldiers drawn from all classes of the population of the country; from the good and middling, as well as in rank as education, as from the bad; and not as all other nations do, and we in particular, from the bad only. Thirdly, we must establish such a system of discipline as the French have; a system founded on the strength of the tyranny of the government, which operates upon an army composed of soldiers, the majority of whom are sober, well disposed, amenable to order, and in some degree educated.

When we shall have done all this, and shall have made these armies of the strength of those employed by the French, we may require of them to live as the French do, viz., by authorised and regular plunder of the country and its inhabitants, if any should remain; and we may expose them to the labour, hardships and privations which the French soldier suffers every day; and we must expect the same proportion of loss every campaign, viz., one-half of those who take field.

_January 26, 1811._

* * * * *

_Character of the Marques de la Romana._

In him the Spanish army have lost their brightest ornament, his country their most upright patriot, and the world the most strenuous and zealous defender of the cause in which we are engaged; and I shall always acknowledge with gratitude the assistance which I received from him, as well by his operations as by his counsel, since he had been joined with this army.

_January 26, 1811._

* * * * *

_None but the worst men enter the Army as Privates._

In respect to recruiting the army, my own opinion is, that the government have never taken an enlarged view of the subject. It is expected that people will become soldiers in the line, and leave their families to starve, when, if they become soldiers in the militia, their families are provided for. This is an inconsistency that must strike the mind of even the least reflecting of mankind. What is the consequence? That none but the worst description of men enter the regular service.

* * * * *

But admitting the truth of the expense, I say that the country has not a choice between army and no army, between peace or war. They must have a large and efficient army, one capable of meeting the enemy abroad, or they must expect to meet him at home; and then farewell to all considerations of measures of greater or lesser expense, and to the ease, the luxury, and happiness of England. God forbid that I should see the day on which hostile armies should contend within the United Kingdom; but I am very certain that I shall not only see that day, but shall be a party in the contest, unless we alter our system, and the public feel in time the real nature of the contest in which we are at present engaged, and determine to meet its expense. I have gone a little beyond the question of recruiting; but depend upon it that you will get men when you provide for the families of soldiers in the line and not in the militia, and not before.

_January 28, 1811._

_Buonaparte's "disgusting Tyranny."_

I am glad to hear such good accounts of affairs in the North. God send that they may prove true, and that we may overthrow this disgusting tyranny: however, of this I am certain, that whether true or not at present, something of the kind must occur before long, and, if we can only hold out, we shall yet see the world relieved.

_March 23, 1811._

* * * * *

_A French army in England would be the consequence of our withdrawal from the Peninsula._

I shall be sorry if government should think themselves under the necessity of withdrawing from this country, on account of the expense of the contest. From what I have seen of the objects of the French government, and the sacrifices they make to accomplish them, I have no doubt that if the British army were for any reason to withdraw from the Peninsula, and the French government were relieved from the pressure of military operations on the Continent, they would incur all risks to land an army in his majesty's dominions. Then indeed would commence an expensive contest; then his majesty's subjects discover what are the miseries of war, of which, by the blessing of God, they have hitherto had no knowledge; and the cultivation, the beauty, and prosperity of the country, and the virtue and happiness of its inhabitants, would be destroyed: whatever might be the result of the military operations; God forbid that I should be a witness, much less an actor, in the scene.[6]

[Footnote 6: At this time the clamours of the opposition regarding the expense of the war induced a fear that the government might determine to discontinue it.]

_March 23, 1811._

* * * * *

_The Peninsular Governments must not mind unpopularity._

I recommend to them (the Spaniards and Portuguese) to advert seriously to the nature of the task which they have to perform. Popularity, however desirable it may be to individuals, will not form, or feed, or pay an army; will not enable it to march and fight; will not keep it in a state of efficiency for long and arduous services. The resources which a wise government must find for these objects must be drawn from the people, not by measures which will render those unpopular who undertake to govern a country in critical circumstances, but by measures which must for a moment have a contrary effect. The enthusiasm of the people in favour of any individual never saved any country. They must be obliged by the restraint of law and regulation, to do those things and to pay those contributions, which are to enable the government to carry on this necessary contest.

_April 9, 1811._

* * * * *

_Coolness in action, not headlong bravery, is required in the Army._

The desire to be forward in engaging the enemy is not uncommon in the British array; but that quality which I wish to see the officers possess, who are at the head of the troops, is a cool, discriminating judgment in action, which will enable them to decide with promptitude how far they can and ought to go, with propriety; and to convey their orders, and act with such vigour and decision, that the soldiers will look up to them with confidence in the moment of action, and obey them with alacrity.

_May 15, 1811._

* * * * *

_The battle of Albuera one of the most glorious in the War._

You will have heard of the Marshal's (Beresford) action on the 16th. The fighting was desperate, and the loss of the British has been very severe; but, adverting to the nature of the contest, and the manner in which they held their ground against all the efforts the whole French army could make against them, notwithstanding all the losses which they had sustained, I think this action one of the most glorious, and honourable to the character of the troops, of any that has been fought during the war.

_May 20, 1811._

* * * * *

_Portuguese Troops, better than Spanish._

What a pity it is that the Spaniards will not set to work seriously to discipline their troops! We do what we please now with the Portuguese troops; we manoeuvre them under fire equally with our own, and have some dependence on them; but these Spaniards can do nothing but stand still, and we consider ourselves fortunate if they do not run away.

_May 25, 1811._

* * * * *

_Disorganized state of the Peninsular Governments._

Those unfortunate governments in the Peninsula have been reduced to such a state of decrepitude, that I believe there was no authority existing within Spain or Portugal before the French invaded these countries. The French invasion did not improve this state of things; and, since what is called in Spain the revolution, and in Portugal the restoration, no crime that I know of has been punished in either, excepting that of being a French partisan. Those malversations in office--those neglects of duty; the disobedience of orders; the inattention to regulation, which tend to defeat all plans for military operation, and ruin a state that is involved in war, more certainly than the plots of all the French partisans, are passed unnoticed; and, notwithstanding the numerous complaints which Marshal Beresford and I have made, I do not know that one individual has yet been punished, or even dismissed from his office. The cause of this evil is the mistaken principle on which the government have proceeded. They have imagined that the best foundation for their power was a low, vulgar popularity; the evidence is the shouts of the mob of Lisbon, and the regular attendance at their levees, and the bows and scrapes of people in office, who ought to have other modes of spending their time; and to obtain this babble the government of Portugal, as well as the successive governments in Spain, have neglected to perform those essential duties of all governments, viz., to force those they are placed over to do their duty, by which, before this time, these countries would have been out of danger.

The other evil is connected very materially with the first. The government will not regulate their finances, because it will interfere with some man's job. They will not lay on new taxes, because in all countries those who lay on taxes are not favourites with the mob. They have a general income-tax, called 10 per cent., and, in some cases, 20 per cent., which they have regulated in such a manner as that no individual, I believe, has paid a hundredth part of what he ought to have paid. Then, for want of money, they can pay nobody, and, of course, have not the influence which they ought to have over the subordinate departments.

In addition to embarrassments of all descriptions surrounding us on all sides, I have to contend with an ancient enmity between these two nations, which is more like that of cat and dog than anything else, of which no sense of common danger, or common interest, or anything, can get the better, even in individuals.

_June 12, 1811._

To write an anonymous letter is the meanest action of which any man can be guilty.

_Dispatch, July 3, 1811._

* * * * *

_British Officers, as well at Soldiers, require to be kept in order._

I must also observe that British officers require to be kept in order, as well as the soldiers under their command, particularly in a foreign service. The experience which I have had of their conduct in the Portuguese service has shown me that there must be authority, and that a strong one, to keep them within due bounds, otherwise they would only disgust the soldiers over whom they should be placed, the officers whom they should be destined to assist, and the country in whose service they should be employed.

_October 1, 1811._

* * * * *

_Money in aid of Labour better than Charity._

That which would be desirable is, if possible, to aid laborious exertions to procure a subsistence by small advances of money; and I propose to keep this principle in view in the distribution of the money entrusted to me, by which not only it will subsist those to whom it will be given for a longer period, but it may be hoped that the people will resume their habits of industry, and that they will soon again be able to provide for their own subsistence.

_Oct. 11, 1811._

_A General Re-action against Buonaparte predicted._

I have, however, long considered it probable, that even _we_ should witness a general resistance throughout Europe to the fraudulent and disgusting tyranny of Buonaparte, created by the example of what has occurred in Spain and Portugal; and that _we_ should be actors and advisers in these scenes; and I have reflected frequently upon the measures which should be pursued to give a chance of success.

Those who embark in projects of this description should be made to understand, or to act as if they understood, that having once drawn the sword they must not return it, till they shall have completely accomplished their object. They must be prepared, and must be forced, to make all sacrifices to the cause. Submission to military discipline and order is a matter of course; but when a nation determines to resist the authority, and to shake off the government of Buonaparte, they must be prepared and forced to sacrifice the luxuries and comforts of life, and to risk all in a contest, which it should be clearly understood before it is undertaken, has for its object to save all or nothing.

The first measure for a country to adopt is to form an army, and to raise a revenue from the people to defray the expense of the army: above all, to form a government of such strength, as that army and people can be forced by it to perform their duty. This is the rock upon which Spain has split; and all our measures in any other country which should afford hopes of resistance to Buonaparte should be directed to avoid it. The enthusiasm of the people is very fine, and looks well in print; but I have never known it to produce any thing but confusion. In France, what was called enthusiasm was power and tyranny, acting through the medium of popular societies, which have ended by overturning Europe, and in establishing the most powerful and dreadful tyranny that ever existed. In Spain, the enthusiasm of the people spent itself in _vivas_ and vain boasting. The notion of its existence prevented even the attempt to discipline the armies; and its existence has been alleged, ever since, as the excuse for the rank ignorance of the officers and the indiscipline and constant misbehaviour of the troops.

I therefore earnestly recommend you, wherever you go, to trust nothing to the enthusiasm of the people. Give them a strong and a just, and, if possible, a good government; but, above all, a strong one, which shall enforce upon them to do their duty by themselves and their country; and let measures of finance to support an army go hand in hand with measures to raise it.

I am quite certain that the finances of Great Britain are more than a match for Buonaparte, and that we shall have the means of aiding any country that may be disposed to resist his tyranny. But those means are necessarily limited in every country by the difficulty of procuring specie. This necessary article can be obtained in sufficient quantities only by the contributions of the people; and although Great Britain can and ought to assist with money, as well as in other modes, every effort of this description, the principal financial as well as military effort, ought to be by the people of the resisting country.

_Dec. 10, 1811._

* * * * *

_The French System of Predatory War._

In the early days of the revolutionary war, the French, at the recommendation, I believe, of Brissot, adopted a measure which they called a _levee en masse_; and put every man, animal, and article, in their own country, in requisition for the service of the armies. This system of plunder was carried into execution by the popular societies throughout the country. It is not astonishing that a nation, among whom such a system was established, should have been anxious to carry on the war beyond their own frontiers. This system both created the desire and afforded the means of success; and with the war, they carried, wherever they went, the system of requisition; not, however, before they had, by these and other revolutionary measures, entirely destroyed all the sources of national prosperity at home.

Wherever the French armies have since gone, their subsistence, at least, the most expensive article in all armies, and means of transport, have been received from the country for nothing. Sometimes, besides subsistence, they have received clothing and shoes; in other instances, besides these articles, they have received pay; and from Austria and Prussia, and other parts of Germany and Italy, they have drawn, besides all these articles of supply for their troops, heavy contributions in money for the supply of the treasury at Paris. To this enumeration ought to be added the plunder acquired by the generals, officers, and troops; and it will be seen that the new French system of war is the greatest evil that ever fell on the civilised world.

The capital and industry of France having been destroyed by the revolution, it is obvious that the government cannot raise a revenue from the people of France adequate to support the large force which must be maintained in order to uphold the authority of the new government, particularly in the newly-conquered or ceded states; and to defend the widely-extended frontier of France from all those whose interest and inclination must lead them to attack it. The French government, therefore, under whatever form administered, must seek for support for their armies in foreign countries. War must be a financial resource; and that appears to me to be the greatest misfortune which the French revolution has entailed upon the present generation.

_Jan. 31, 1812._

* * * * *

I consider the Portuguese troops, next to the British, the best in the Peninsula.

_May 3, 1812._

* * * * *

It is very difficult to manage the defence of the kingdom of Portugal, the whole country being frontier.

_June 11, 1812._

_How to establish National Credit._

When a nation is desirous of establishing public credit, or, in other words, of inducing individuals to confide their property to its government, they must begin by acquiring a revenue equal to their fixed expenditure; and they must manifest an inclination to be honest, by performing their engagements in respect to their debts.

_June 25. 1812._

* * * * *

_The Spaniards cry "Viva!" but don't act._

I do not expect much from the exertions of the Spaniards, notwithstanding all that we have done for them. They cry _viva!_ and are very fond of us, and hate the French; but they are, in general, the most incapable of useful exertion of all the nations that I have ever known; the most vain, and at the same time the most ignorant, particularly of military affairs, and above all of military affairs in their own country.

_August 18, 1812._

* * * * *

_Imbecility of the Spanish Leaders._

It is extraordinary that the revolution in Spain should not have produced one man with any knowledge of the real situation of the country. It really appears as if they were all drunk, and thinking, and talking of any other subject but Spain.

_November 1, 1812._

_Evils of uncontrolled popular Legislatures._

The theory of all legislation is founded in justice; and, if we could be certain that legislative assemblies could on all occasions act according to the principles of justice, there would be no occasion for those checks and guards which we have seen established under the best systems. Unfortunately, however, we have seen that legislative assemblies are swayed by the fears and passions of individuals; when unchecked, they are tyrannical and unjust; nay, more, it unfortunately happens too frequently, that the most tyrannical and unjust measures are the most popular. Those measures are particularly popular which deprive rich and powerful individuals of their properties under the pretence of the public advantage; and I tremble for a country in which, as in Spain, there is no barrier for the preservation of private property, excepting the justice of a legislative assembly possessing supreme powers.

_January 29, 1813._

* * * * *

_Ingratitude of the Portuguese to the British Army._

I must say, that the British army, which I have the honour to command, have met with nothing but ingratitude from the government and authorities in Portugal for their services; and that everything that could be done has been done by the civil authorities, lately, to oppress the officers and soldiers on every occasion in which it has by any accident been in their power. I hope, however, that we have seen the last of Portugal.

_July 20, 1813._

* * * * *

Jealousy of the interference of foreigners in their internal concerns, is the characteristic of all Spaniards.

_July 12, 1813._

* * * * *

Sound sense is better than abilities.

_August 8, 1813._

* * * * *

_Basis of military operations against the United States from the side of Canada._

Any offensive operation founded upon Canada must be preceded by a naval superiority on the lakes. But even if we had that superiority, I should doubt our being able to do more than secure the points on those lakes at which the Americans could have access. In such countries as America, very extensive, thinly peopled, and producing but little food in proportion to their extent, military operations by large bodies are impracticable, unless the party carrying them on has the uninterrupted use of a navigable river, or very extensive means of land transport, which such a country can rarely supply.

I conceive, therefore, that were your army larger even than the proposed augmentation would make it, you could not quit the lakes; and, indeed, would be tied to them the more necessarily in proportion as your army would be large.[7]

[Footnote 7: The letter from the Duke the above is taken was written in reply to an application by the home government for his opinion. We frequently find the Duke applied to for his opinion on political matters at home, while serving in the Peninsula.]

_February 22, 1814._

* * * * *

_The Morale of an Army important to Discipline._

No reliance can be placed on the conduct of troops in action with the enemy, who have been accustomed to plunder, and those officers alone can expect to derive honour in the day of battle from the conduct of the troops under their command, who shall have forced them, by their attention and exertions, to behave as good soldiers ought in their cantonments, their quarters, and their camps.

_March 5, 1814._

* * * * *

English officers are very strictly instructed, and those who mean to serve their country well must obey their instructions, however fearless they may be of responsibility. Indeed, I attribute this fearlessness very much to the determination never to disobey, as long as the circumstances exist under which an order is given.

_April 16, 1814._

* * * * *

_French Feelings about the Slave Trade._

You (Mr. Wilberforce) judge most correctly regarding the state of the public mind here upon this question. Not only is there no information, but, because England takes an interest in the question, it is impossible to convey any through the only channel which would be at all effectual, viz., the daily press. Nobody reads anything but the newspapers; but it is impossible to get anything inserted in any French newspaper in Paris in favour of the abolition, or even to show that the trade was abolished in England, from motives of humanity. The extracts made from English newspapers upon this, or any other subject, are selected with a view, either to turn our principles and conduct into ridicule, or to exasperate against us still more the people of this country; and therefore the evil cannot be remedied by good publications in the daily press in England, with a view to their being copied into the newspapers here.

* * * * *

I must say that the daily press in England do us a good deal of harm in this as well as in other questions. We are sure of the king and his government, if he could rely upon the opinion of his people. But as long as our press teems with writings drawn with a view of irritating persons here, we shall never be able to exercise the influence which we ought to have upon this question, and which we really possess.

_Letter to Mr. Wilberforce, October 8, 1814._

* * * * *

The real power in Spain is in the clergy.

_October 20, 1814._

* * * * *

Les choses neuves, surtout quand elles sont compliquees, ne vont pas bien.

_Letter to Doumouriex, November 3, 1814._

FRANCE.

_Effects of Buonaparte's Government of France._

Ce qu'il y a de pis c'est le mecontentement general, et la pauvrete universelle. Cette malheureuse revolution et ces suites ont ruine le pays, de fond en comble. Tout le monde est pauvre, et, ce qui est pis, leurs institutions empechent qu'aucune famille devienne riche et puissante. Tous doivent donc necessairement viser a remplir des emplois publics, non, comme autrefois, pour l'honneur de les remplir, mais pour avoir de quoi vivre. Tout le monde donc cherche de l'emploi public.

Buonaparte laissa une armee de million d'hommes en France, outres les officiers prisonniers en Angleterre et en Russie. Le roi ne peut pas en maintenir le quart. Tous ceux non employees sont mecontens. Buonaparte gouvernait directement la moitie de l'Europe, et indirectement presque l'autre moitie. Pour des causes a present bien develloppees et connues, il employait une quantite infinie de personnes dans ses administrations; et tous ceux employes, ou dans les administrations exterieures, civiles, ou dans les administrations militaires des armees, sont renvoyes, et beaucoup des ceux employes dans les administrations interieures; a cette classe nombreuse ajouter la quantite d'emigres, et de personnes rentres, tous mourant de faim, et tous convoitant de l'emploi public afin de pouvoir vivre, et vous trouverez que plus des trois quarts de la classe de la societe, non employee a la main d'oeuvre ou a labourer la terre, sont en etat d'indigence, et, par consequence, mecontens. Si vous considerez bien ce tableau, qui est la stricte verite, vous y verrez la cause et la nature du danger du jour. L'armee les officiers, sourtout, sont mecontens. Ils le sont pour plusieurs raisons inutiles a detailler ici, mais ce mecontentement pourra ce vaincre en adoptant des mesures sages pour ameliorer l'esprit.

_Letter to Doumouriex, November 26, 1814._

* * * * *

_Re-establishment of the Bourbons necessary to the Peace of Europe._

I have frequently told your highness, and every day's experience shews me that I am right, that the only chance of peace for Europe consists in the establishment in France of the legitimate Bourbons. The establishment of any other government, whether in the person of----, or in a regency in the name of young Napoleon, or in any other individual, or in a republic, must lead to the maintenance of large military establishments, to the ruin of all the governments of Europe, till it shall suit the convenience of the French government to commence a contest which can be directed only against you, or others for whom we are interested. In this contest we shall feel the additional difficulty, that those who are now on our side will then be against us, and you will again find yourself surrounded by enemies. I am convinced that the penetration of your highness will have shewn you the danger of all these schemes to the interests of the emperor, and that you will defeat them all by adhering to that line of conduct (in which you will find us likewise) which will finally lead to the establishment in France of the legitimate government, from which alone can Europe expect any genuine peace.

_May 20, 1815._

* * * * *

_Effects of Waterloo._

I may be wrong, but my opinion is, that we have given Napoleon his death-blow: from all I hear, his army is totally destroyed, the men are deserting in parties, even the generals are withdrawing from him. The infantry throw away their arms, and the cavalry and artillery sell their horses to the people of the country, and desert to their homes. Allowing for much exaggeration in this account, and knowing that Buonaparte can still collect, in addition to what he has brought back with him, the 5th corps d'armee, under Rapp, which is near Strasbourg, and the 3rd corps, which was at Wavre during the battle, and has not suffered so much as the others, and probably some troops from La Vendee, I am still of opinion that he can make no head against us--qu'il n'a qu'a se pendre.

_June 23, 1815._

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Some of the regiments (the new ones I mean) are reduced to nothing; but I must keep them as regiments, to the great inconvenience of the service, at great expense; or I must send them home, and part with the few British soldiers I have.

I never was so disgusted with any concern as I am with this; and I only hope that I am going the right way to bring it to an early determination some way or other.

_June 25, 1815._

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_Waterloo described to a Soldier._

Notre Bataille du 18 a ete une de geans; et notre succes a ete complet, comme vous voyez. Que Dieu me favorise assez pour que je n'en aie plus, parceque je suis desole de la perte de mes anciens amis et comrades.

Mon voisin et collaborateur (Bluecher) est en bonne sante quoique un peu souffrant d'une chute qu'il a faite d'un cheval blesse sous lui dans la bataille du 16.

_Letter to Doumouriex, June 26, 1815._

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_If Buonaparte is to be put to Death, he will not be his Executioneer._

General----has been here this day to negociate for Napoleon's passing to America, to which proposition I have answered, that I have no authority. The Prussians think the Jacobins wish to give him over to me, believing that I will save his life.---- wishes to kill him; but I have told him I shall remonstrate, and shall insist upon his being disposed of by common accord. I have likewise said that, as a private friend, I advised him to have nothing to do with so foul a transaction; and that he and I had acted too distinguished parts in these transactions to become executioners, and that I was determined that, if the sovereigns wished to put him to death, they should appoint an executioner, which should not be me.

_June 26, 1815._

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_The "Pounding Match."_

You will have heard of our battle of the 18th. Never did I see such a pounding match. Both were what the boxers call "gluttons." Napoleon did not manoeuvre at all. He just moved forward in the old style, in columns, and was driven off in the old style. The only difference was that he mixed cavalry with his infantry, and supported both with an enormous quantity of artillery.

I had the infantry for some time in squares, and we had the French cavalry walking about as if they had been our own. I never saw the British infantry behave so well.

_Letter to Marshal Beresford, July 9, 1815._

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_Blucher's Vandalism averted._

To Marshal Prince Blucher.--Several reports have been brought to me during the evening and night, and some from the government, in consequence of the work carrying on by your highness on one of the bridges over the Seine, which it is supposed to be your intention to destroy.

As this measure will certainly create a good deal of disturbance in the town, and as the sovereigns when they were here before, left all these bridges, &c., standing, I take the liberty of suggesting to you to delay the destruction of the bridge, at least till they should arrive; or, at all events, till I can have the pleasure of seeing you to-morrow morning.

_July 8, 1815._

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The destruction of the bridge of Jena is highly disagreeable to the king and to the people, and may occasion disturbance in the city. It is not merely a military measure, but is one likely to attach to the character of our operations, and is of political importance. It is adopted solely because the bridge is considered as a monument of the battle of Jena, notwithstanding that the government are willing to change the name of the bridge. Considering the bridge as a monument, I beg leave to suggest that its immediate destruction is inconsistent with the promise made to the commissioners on behalf of the part of the army, during the negociation of the convention, viz., that the monuments, museums, &c., should be reserved for the decision of the allied sovereigns.

All that I ask is, that the execution of the orders given for the destruction of the bridge may be suspended till the sovereigns shall arrive here, when, if it should be agreed by common accord that the bridge ought to be destroyed, I shall have no objection.

_July 9, 1815._[8]

[Footnote 8: The Duke rarely writes or speaks twice, when once will do. On this occasion he was anxious; and--successful.]

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_Summary Justice._

To the Sous-Prefet de Pontoise.--J'ai ordonne qu'on vous fasse prisonnier, parceque, ayant envoye une requisition a Pontoise pour des vivres, vous avez repondu que vous ne les donneriez pas, sans qu'on envoie une force militaire assez forte pour les prendre.

Vous vous etes mis dans les cas des militaires, et je vous fais prisonnier de guerre, et je vous envoie en Angleterre.

Si je vous traitais comme l'usurpateur et ses adherens ont traite les habitans des pays ou ils ont fait la guerre, je vous ferais fusiller; mais, comme vous vous etes constitue guerrier, je vous fais prisonnier de guerre.

_July 13, 1815._

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_Characteristic Letter to Marshal Beresford_.

The battle of Waterloo was certainly the hardest fought that has been for many years, I believe, and has placed in the power of the allies the most important results. We are throwing them away, however, by the infamous conduct of some of us; and I am sorry to add that our own government also are taking up a little too much the tone of their rascally newspapers. They are shifting their objects; and, having got their cake, they want both to eat it and keep it.

As for your Portuguese concerns, I recommend you to resign, and come away immediately. It is impossible for the British government to maintain British officers for the Portuguese army, at an expense even so trifling as it is, if the Portuguese government are to refuse to give the service of the army in the cause of Europe in any manner. Pitch them to the devil, then, in the mode which will be most dignified to yourself, and that which will have the best effect in opening the prince's eyes to the conduct of his servants in Portugal; and let the matter work its own way. Depend upon it, the British government must and will recall the British officers.

_August 7, 1815._

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SPEECHES IN PARLIAMENT.

_Praise of Lord Hastings and the Indian Army._

He professed his entire concurrence in the tribute of approbation bestowed on the Marquis of Hastings, for his conduct of the late war in India. There could not remain a doubt in the minds of those acquainted with the facts, but that the wisdom of the plan on which it was commenced, and the vigour of its execution, merited the highest praise. The noble Duke said, he was pleased that an opportunity, like the present, had occurred to do justice to the services and gallantry of our troops in India, which were often neglected or disallowed. No troops in the world performed their duty better, or observed a more steady discipline. They had evinced their good qualities in all their late transactions, whether acting in great masses or small detachments. In all situations they had nobly performed their duty.

_House of Lords, March 9, 1819._

_Impossibility of granting Catholic Emancipation._

The whole question turned upon the degree of security which could be given to the Protestant religion as by law established in Ireland. To consider this, it was necessary to consider how the reformation had been established in Ireland. It was not necessary for him to recall to their lordships remembrance that the unreformed religion had been established in Ireland at the point of the sword, and by means of confiscations. All this was repeated at the revolution, and was fresh in the recollection of the people of Ireland. Keeping in view that the Irish Roman Catholic church, under all oppressions, continued in the same state--the pope having the same influence over the clergy, the clergy the same power over the people; in this state of things, he would ask, whether it was possible that Roman Catholics could be safely admitted to hold seats in parliament? The influence of the priesthood over the people was fostered by the remembrance of the events to which he had alluded; and the idea of unmerited and mutual suffering; and no doubt could be entertained, from their present feelings, that if the Roman Catholics were admitted to the enjoyment of political power, their first exertion would be to restore their religion to its original supremacy; and to recover the possessions and property of which they had been stripped by the reformation. It was, however, said, that securities were offered on the part of the Roman Catholics.

The pope, it seemed, had in the appointment of bishops, relinquished all to the crown, except the mere conferring of a spiritual blessing. But how had that concession been received by the people of Ireland? It had excited the utmost discontent, and was regarded as an abandonment of the essential principles of their religion, and an attack on their national independence. Did that arise from the people of Ireland having a less clear idea of national independence than other people? No; but they felt if the executive power possessed any control over the appointment of the Roman Catholic bishops, some security would be thereby obtained for the Protestant church. Considering, then, that the whole question turned on the degree of security which could be given, and looking at the various securities which had at several times been proposed, he had never yet seen anything that came up to his notion of that which ought to be required. As to what had been said of the domestic nomination of bishops, he did not see how the laws of the country could operate upon it, so as to make it an adequate security. Then as to the oath of allegiance which the bishop was to take, of what avail could it be, that the law required this oath from a bishop, appointed God knows how, or by whom? When all these circumstances were considered, the state of the Irish Catholic church, the way in which the reformation had been effected, the rivalry and enmity between the Catholics and the established church, and the inadequacy of all securities which had been proposed, there was in his opinion, enough to decide the question; for, the first and greatest duty of the legislature was, to secure the establishments as settled at the revolution.

_House of Lords, May 17, 1819._

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County meetings if properly regulated, are a fair constitutional mode of taking the sense of the county; but this cannot be the case if they are attended by a mob for the express purpose of supporting one side.

_House of Lords, January 26, 1821._

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_The Porte our ancient Ally._

The Ottoman Porte is the ancient ally of this country. It forms an essential part of the balance of power in Europe. The preservation of the Ottoman Porte has been an object of importance not merely to England but also to the whole of Europe; and the changes of possession which have taken place in the east of Europe within the recollection of all who hear me, render its existence as an independent and powerful state, necessary to the well being of this country.

In the late war, had it not been for the influence of the councils of England over the Porte, I may safely say that the disaster which finally led to the establishment of Europe as it now is, would not have occurred to the extent it did in 1812. Under these circumstances I think we may term the Ottoman Porte the "ancient ally" and friend of this country, even though the treaties upon which our alliance is founded are not of a hundred years standing.

_House of Lords, Jan. 29, 1828._

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_Battle of Navarino an untoward Event. Sir E. Codrington acquitted of all blame._

There is one other subject to which I shall address myself, I mean the sense in which the word "untoward" has been used. It was intended by "untoward" to convey, that the event referred to was unexpected--was unfortunate. The sense in which the word was used was this: in the treaty which is not yet before the house, and which cannot, therefore, regularly come under discussion, though all of us have read it, it is mentioned as one stipulation, that the execution of it, if possible, shall not lead to hostilities; and therefore, when the execution of it did lead to hostilities, it was a consequence which the government did not anticipate, and which it has, therefore, a right to call untoward.

It was hoped by the former government, that the treaty could be executed without risk of commencing hostilities; and that is rendered quite indisputable, not merely by the treaty, but by the force which the contracting parties sent into the Mediterranean to superintend its operation.

The late administration entertained hopes that those treaties could be carried into execution without hostilities, as your lordships must have perceived from what you have seen of those treaties themselves, as well as from the nature of the force sent to see them carried into execution; and when it was ultimately found that hostilities were likely to ensue, every one must look upon it as an untoward event which could give rise to such a state of things.

When the news of the affair which took place at Navarino reached Constantinople, it was apprehended that a war would ensue, and therefore every one was justified in looking upon it as an untoward event.

It is gratifying, however, to find from his majesty's speech, that those appearances of hostility have ceased to exist, and that hopes are entertained that no impediment will present itself to an amicable adjustment of the question; this, however, does not deprive the transaction of the character of "untowardness" which it originally possessed.

But in making this statement, do I make the slightest charge, do I cast the most distant imputation upon the gallant officer who commanded at Navarino? Certainly not. That gallant officer, in doing as he has done, discharged what he felt to be his duty to his country. His majesty's government have taken that gallant officer's conduct into consideration, and have acquitted him of all blame; and, therefore, it would ill become me to cast the slightest imputation on the distinguished action he performed. It should be recollected, that the gallant admiral was placed in a situation of great delicacy as well as difficulty. He was placed in the command of a combined squadron, in conjunction with two foreign admirals; and his conduct was such, that they placed the most implicit confidence in him, and allowed him to lead them to victory. My lords, I should feel myself unworthy of the situation which I hold in his majesty's councils, if I thought myself capable of uttering a single syllable against that gallant admiral, admiring, as I do, the intrepid bravery with which he conducted himself in a moment of much danger and difficulty.

_House of Lords, January 29, 1828._

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_Reason for being Prime Minister._