Chapter D: Retreat of Barren-Hill (10)

A French frigate arriving from America,--the son of M. de Rochambeau on board! Good God, what a commotion all that will excite, and how much trouble inquisitive people will take to discover the secrets of the ministers. But I, my dear cousin, will confide to you our secret. The French army has arrived at Rhode Island, and has not quitted that spot. M. de Ternay's seven vessels have been blockaded the whole time, and the English have nineteen vessels here under that lucky commander, Rodney. We Americans, without money, without pay, and without provisions, by holding out fair promises, have succeeded in forming an army, which has been offering to fight a battle with the English for the last three months, but which cannot without vessels reach the island of New York. Gates, who was no favourite of mine, has become still less so since he has allowed himself to be beaten in the south. But all this is quite as monontonous as a European war, and catastrophes are necessary to excite and sustain the interest of men.

You must know, then, my cousin, that a certain General Arnold, of some reputation in the world, was our commander at West Point, a fort on the North River, whose importance the Duke d'Ayen will explain to you. General Washington and I, returning from Hartford, where we had held a conference with the French generals, discovered a conspiracy of the highest importance. We owe that discovery to an almost incredible combination of accidents. West Point was sold by Arnold, and we were consequently lost. The traitor has fled to join the enemy.

I received letters from you by the fleet, and by the Alliance, and I am impatiently expecting more recent ones. The nation will not be pleased with the state of tranquillity in which we remain. But as we have no ships, we can only wait for the enemy's blows, and General Clinton does not appear in any haste to attack us. As to ourselves, we republicans preach lectures to our sovereign master, the people, to induce him to recommence his exertions. In the mean while we practise so much frugality, and are in such a state of poverty and nudity, that I trust an account will be kept in the next world, whilst we remain in purgatory, of all we have suffered here.

Poircy~[1] is here, and although he does not find a St. Germain in this part of the world, he accustoms himself extremely well, I assure you, to a soldier's life. I thank you from the bottom of my heart for all the news you gave me. Although they afforded me the greatest pleasure, I scarcely dare reply to them, from the fear that my answers may appear to come from another world. I saw in the paper that the King of Spain was dead: has God, then, punished him for having conferred the title of grandee upon M. de Montbarrey?

I need not tell you that I am in good health, for that is, you know, my usual custom. My situation here is as agreeable as possible. I am in high favour, I believe, with the French army: the American army shew me every possible kindness and attention. I have the command of a flying corps, composed of the elite of the troops. My friend General Washington continues to be everything to me that I before described to you.

Adieu, my dear cousin. When shall I again see you? I pray that God may grant us an honourable peace, and that I may embrace my friends, and I willingly, for my own part, will give up my share of the glory in the hope eventually to win.

Present my affectionate regards to M. de Tesse, M. de Mun, M. Tenai, and the baron;~[2] I was on the point of saying, embrace his daughter for me.

Footnotes:

1. Secretary. The Marshal de Noailles had a house at Saint Germain.

2. The Baron de Tott.

TO MADAME DE LAFAYETTE.

Near Fort Lee, opposite Fort Washington, on the North River, Oct. 7th, 1780.

You must have already learnt, my dearest love, all that can interest you relating to myself, from my arrival at Boston until my voyage to Rhode Island, which place public affairs, and the desire of seeing my friends, induced me to visit soon after my landing. I have been since to Hartford in Connecticut, to be present at an interview between the French generals and General Washington: of all my young friends, Damas ~[1] was the only one who accompanied us. The viscount~[2] and I often write to each other, but we do not meet, and the poor man remains shut up in Rhode Island; the French squadron detains the army there, and is itself detained by nineteen ships of the line and sundry other ships of war, upon which M. Rodney proudly exhibits the British colours. So long as our naval inferiority lasts, you need feel no anxiety about the health of your friends in America.

I must speak to you, however, about my health; it continues excellent, and has not been interrupted for a single moment; a soldier's mode of living is extremely frugal, and the general officers of the rebel army fare very differently from the French army at Newport. You have probably heard that, on my arrival in America, I found the army of General Washington very weak in numbers, and still more so in resources. Our prospects were not brilliant, and the loss of Charleston was for us a most heavy blow, but the desire of co-operating with their allies gave new vigour to the states. General Washington's army increased more than half in number, and more than ten thousand militia were added to it, who would have come forward if we had acted offensively. Associations of merchants and patriotic banks were formed to supply the army with subsistence. The ladies made, and are still making, subscriptions, to afford succour to the soldiers. When that idea was first proposed, I made myself your ambassador to the ladies of Philadelphia, and you are inscribed on the list for a hundred guineas. General Gates had in the south an army quite sufficient for defence; but he has been completely beaten in Carolina. The fruit of all these labours has been, to prove to the French that the Americans desire nothing better than to second their views upon England, to prove to the English that the flame of liberty was not wholly extinguished in America, and to keep us, during the whole campaign, in daily expectation of a battle, which General Clinton, although equal to us in number, has never thought proper to accept. If we had only had ships, we should have been enabled to do a great deal more.

As I know that all that interests me deeply is also interesting to you, I will tell you that we are much occupied by an important system, which would secure to us a considerable army during the whole war, and would bring into action all the resources which America is capable of making. God grant that the nation may understand its true interests, and our affairs will go on without difficulty!

M. de Rochambeau and M. de Ternay, as well as all the other French officers, conduct themselves extremely well here. A little ebullition of frankness gave rise to a slight altercation between those generals and myself. As I perceived I could not convince them, and that it was important for the public good that we should remain friends; I declared, with due humility, that I had been mistaken, that I had committed an error, and, in short, in proper terms, I asked their pardon, which produced such an excellent effect that we are now on a more amicable footing than ever.

I command a flying corps, which always forms an advance guard, and is quite independent of the great army; this is far too grand for our pacific situation.

On the Hackensack River, Oct. 8th, 1780.

You will learn, my dearest love, an important event, which has exposed America to the greatest danger. A frightful conspiracy has been planned by the celebrated Arnold: he sold to the English the fort of West Point, which was under his command, and, consequently, the whole navigation of the river: the plot was within an ace of succeeding, and quite as many chances combined together to discover it as in that affair of the _Alliance_, which I have so often described to you.~[3] After our journey to Hartford, General Washington passed by West Point, which was not on his road; but he was desirous of shewing me the works that had been constructed since my departure for France. Detained by various accidents upon the road, we arrived at the traitor's house just as he received the letters which announced that he had been discovered. He had not time to intercept those proofs of infamy, and consequently he could only make his escape towards New York half an hour before our arrival.

The adjutant-general of the English army has been arrested under a feigned name and dress. He was an important person, the friend and confidant of General Clinton. He behaved with so much frankness, courage, and delicacy, that I could not help lamenting his unhappy fate.

I received, with great delight, the letters of my dear sisters; I shall write to them to-morrow; but I shall send this scrawl, as I fear the frigate may depart. I finish my letter in this place, having begun it rather more close to the enemy: we had approached them to protect a small enterprise, in which a detachment of my advance-guard has been engaged, and which only ended by capturing two officers, and fifteen men and horses. We are now marching towards a place you will find marked upon the map Sotawa, whither the grand army is also to repair. I shall write to Madame d'Ayen and to my sisters.

Sotawa Bridge, October 10th, 1780.

I am closing my letter, but before sealing it, I must again speak to you for a moment of my affection. General Washington was much pleased by the kind messages which I delivered from you; he desires me to present to you his tender regards; he is affectionately attached to George, and is much gratified by the name we have given him. We often speak of you and of the little family. Adieu, adieu.

Footnotes:

1. The Count Charles de Damas, died a peer of France under the restoration.

2. The Viscount de Noailles.

3. The conspiracy discovered on board the frigate which brought home M. de Lafayette, in September, 1779.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Light Camp, October 30th, 1780.

MY DEAR GENERAL,--In our conversations upon military operations you have often told me that, since the beginning of the campaign, your eyes were turned towards a project upon which I generally agree in opinion with you, and beg leave to offer some observations.

Far from lessening my desire of finishing the campaign by some brilliant stroke, the project of Staten Island, though it miscarried, has strengthened my opinions, as I have clearly seen, by the details of this operation, that we should, in all human probability, have succeeded, and that our men were fully equal to any enterprise of that kind.~[1]

My reasons for wishing to undertake something are these:--1st. Any enterprise will please the people of this country, and shew them that when we have men we do not lie still; and even a defeat (provided it was not fatal) would have its good consequences. 2ndly. The French court have often complained to me of the inactivity of the American army, who, before the alliance, had distinguished themselves by their spirit of enterprise. They have often told me, your friends leave us now to fight their battles, and do no more risk themselves: it is, moreover, of the greatest political importance to let them know, that, on our side, we were ready to co-operate. Be sure, my dear general, that many people's interest will be to let it be believed that we _were not ready_, and if anything may engage the ministry to give us the asked for support, it will be our proving to the nation that, on our side, _we had been ready_. So far was the Chevalier de la Luzerne convinced of this (and on this point the minister's interest is the same as ours) that he was made happy by my mentioning to him the Staten Island affair. I well know the court of Versailles, and were I to go to it, I should think it very impolitic to go there unless we had done something. 3rdly. It is more than probable that mediators will interfere this winter by a negotiation. Then England will say, how can we give up people whom we consider as half conquered; their best city has been taken by an army not much superior to the people that were to defend it; their southern army was routed almost as soon as looked at by the British troops New York is so much ours, that they dare not approach it, and General Washington's army does not exceed five thousand men. What shall France answer? Principally now that from the letters I have received I find the Charleston affair has brought our arms into contempt. But what difference, if France might say, the American army has taken, sword in hand, your best works; they have offered to you the battle upon your own island, and, perhaps they may add (for news increases in travelling), they are now in possession of New York.

Upon these considerations, my dear general, what I want is this, to find an expedition which may wear a brilliant aspect, and afford probable advantages, also an immense, though very remote one, which, if unsuccessful, may not turn fatal to us, for the loss of two or three hundred men, half of them being enlisted for two months, I do not consider as a ruinous adventure.

The basis of the plan will be, that Fort Washington, being in our possession, may, with the Fort Lee batteries, protect our crossing North River, and be a security for our retreat, principally if some works are added on the point of embarkation. The taking of Fort Washington we may demonstrate to be very probable, and upon that point you are of my opinion.

The enemy have, on the upper part of the Island from fifteen hundred to two thousand men, who would immediately occupy all the other upper posts. Their army on Long Island would repair to New York, and there would also retire the troops posted at Harlem.

As soon as Fort Washington should be ours, the army would cross over to the island, and those of West Point arrive in the same time (which calculation may be easily done) so that we should effectually possess all the upper posts, or cut them off from their main army. Some militia would come to our assistance, and as these posts are not well furnished with provisions we should take them, at least, by famine.

The enemy's army consists of nine thousand men: they must certainly leave one thousand men in their several posts; fifteen hundred of them, at least, will be either killed at Fort Washington or blocked up at Laurel Hill, and they will then have between six and seven thousand men to attack ten. The two thousand militia (in supposing that they durst take them out) I do not mention, because we may have four thousand militia for them: under such circumstances it is, probable that Sir Henry Clinton will venture a battle. If he does, and by chance beat us, we retire under Fort Washington; but, if we beat him, his works will be at such a distance, that he will be ruined in the retreat. If, on the contrary, he knows that the French army is coming, and if we spread the report of a second division, or of Count de Guichen being upon the coasts, he will keep in his works, and we will, some way or other, carry the upper posts. When we are upon the spot we may reconnoitre New York, and see if something is to be done. If Clinton was making a forage into the Jerseys, I should be clear for pushing to the city.

If we undertake, the circumstances of the weather make it necessary that we undertake immediately. I would move the army, as soon as possible, to our position near the new bridge. This movement may invite Clinton in the Jerseys, and bring us nearer to the point of execution.

Though my private glory and yours, my dear general, both of which are very dear to my heart, are greatly interested, not so much for the opinions of America, as for those of Europe, in our doing something this campaign, I hope you know me too well to think I should insist upon steps of this nature unless I knew that they were politically necessary, and had a sufficient military probability.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The six hundred men of Luzerne's legion might be got in twelve days. If our movements had no other effect but to make a diversion in favour of the south, it would, on that footing, meet with the approbation of the world, and perhaps impeach the operations of General Leslie.

Footnote:

1. M. de Lafayette had taken, since the 7th of August, command of the corps of light infantry, consisting of six companies of men, selected in different lines of the army. Those battalions were divided into two brigades; one under the command of General Hand, the other of General Poor. The inactivity of the army was very opposite to the character and policy of M. de Lafayette; he endeavoured incessantly to find means of putting an end to it, at least as far as regarded himself. The 14th of August he had written to General Washington to ask his permission to attempt a nocturnal surprise on the two camps of Hessians established at New York Island. At the beginning of October, he attempted an expedition on Italian Island, which could not be accomplished, owing to a mistake made by the administration of the materality of the army. This letter, and the letters of the 13th of November, allude to this circumstance. We have been obliged to retrench ten letters, which relate solely to the unimportant incidents of a war of observation.

FROM GENERAL WASHINGTON TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

(ORIGINAL.)

Head-quarters, 30th October, 1780.

It is impossible, my dear marquis, to desire more ardently than I do, to terminate the campaign by some happy stroke; but we must consult our means rather than our wishes, and not endeavour to better our affairs by attempting things which, for want of success, may make them worse. We are to lament that there has been a misapprehension of our circumstances in Europe; but to endeavour to recover our reputation, we should take care that we do not injure it more. Ever since it became evident that the allied arms could not co-operate this campaign, I have had an eye to the point you mention, determined, if a favourable opening should offer, to embrace it; but, so far as my information goes, the enterprise would not be warranted; it would, in my opinion, be imprudent to throw an army of ten thousand men upon an island against nine thousand, exclusive of seamen and militia. This, from the accounts we have, appears to be the enemy's force. All we can do at present, therefore, is to endeavour to gain a more certain knowledge of their situation, and act accordingly. This I have been some time employed in doing, but hitherto with little success. I shall thank you for any aids you can afford. Arnold's flight seems to have frightened all my intelligencers out of their senses. I am sincerely and affectionately yours.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Light Camp, November 13th, 1780.

MY DEAR GENERAL,--In revolving in my mind the chances of discovery by moonlight, and, on the other hand, the inconveniences of staying longer than you wish under our tents, I have thought if there was any position which might enable us to take advantage of the first hours of the night. How far the sending of the Pennsylvanians towards Aquakanac, and going ourselves to the Hukinsac~[1] position, may awaken the enemy, I cannot pretend to say. The most difficult affair in this would be the article of the boats. Colonel Smith will go tomorrow morning to West Point, unless any intelligence received at head-quarters had made it useful that the enterprise be attempted soon, in which case he would go and reconnoitre the place. Suppose he was to bring from West Point Colonel Gouvion, who has often examined the place with the eye of an engineer. These ideas, my dear general, have rather started into any mind, than become fixed, and I thought I would communicate them.

Most affectionately and respectfully yours,

LAFAYETTE.

The Marquis de Laval Montmorency, one of the most illustrious families in France, is on his way to the camp. The Chevalier de Chastellux, a relation and friend of mine, major-general in the French army, is also coming. I every day expect my brother-in-law, and his friend, Count de Charlus, only son to the Marquis de Castries, who enjoys a great consideration in France, and has won the battle of Closter Camp. The Duke of Lauzun has also written to me that he would come soon.~[2] These five gentlemen may, by their existence at home, be considered as the first people in the French army. This little history I give you before their arrival, in consequence of what you have desired from me at the beginning.

I write some letters to the commanding officers at Fishkill, West Point, and King's Ferry, so that the gentlemen may be directed to come by the best road to my quarters, from which I will present them to you. I think the letters ought to be sent as soon as possible.

P.S. As General Heath commands in all these parts, I think, upon recollection, that I had better write to him alone. You might also send him a line on the subject.

Footnotes:

1. The general-in-chief projected an attack on the posts of the northern part of New York. While General Heath was to attract, by a feint, the attention of the enemy, Washington was to march in advance, and M. de Lafayette to attack Fort Washington. This expedition, for which great preparations had been made, terminated in a few reconnoitring parties. The campaign closed without an engagement.

2. The Marquis de Laval, is the Duke de Laval, who died under the restoration. The Chevalier de Chastellux is well known by his works. The Count de Charlus is at present the Duke de Castries, member of the chamber of peers. M. de Lauzun has been general in the service of the French republic.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON

(ORIGINAL.)

Paramus, November the 28th, 1780.

My dear General,--We arrived last night at this place, and were much favoured by the weather in our recognising of the Island, where, I confess, my feelings were different from what I had experienced when looking at these forts with a hopeful eye. I saw the fatal sentry alluded to, Colonel Gouvion, on an upper battery of Jeffery's Hook. I also saw a small vessel playing off this Hook, but quite a trifling thing, without guns, and but two men on board. Nothing else on the river but the usual guards of spiting devil.

As you have been pleased to consult me on the choice of an adjutant-general, I will repeat here, my dear general, that though I have a claim upon General Hand, in every other point of view, his zeal, obedience, and love of discipline, have given me a very good opinion of him.

Colonel Smith has been by me wholly employed in that line, and I can assure you that he will perfectly answer your purpose.

Unless, however, you were to cast your eye on a man who, I think, would suit better than any other in the world. Hamilton is, I confess, the officer whom I should like to see in that station. With equal advantages, his services deserve from you the preference to any other. His knowledge of your opinions and intentions on military arrangements, his love of discipline, the superiority he would have over all the others, principally when both armies shall operate together, and his uncommon abilities, are calculated to render him perfectly agreeable to you. His utility would be increased by this preferment; and on other points he could render important services. An adjutant-general ought always to be with the commander-in-chief. Hamilton should, therefore, remain in your family, and his great industry in business would render him perfectly serviceable in all circumstances. On every public or private account, my dear general, I would advise you to take him.

I shall, on my arrival at Philadelphia, write you how those matters are going, upon which I build my private schemes. But I heartily wish that some account or other from Europe may enable you to act this winter on maritime operations. I hate the idea of being from you for so long a time; but I think I ought not to stay idle. At all events, I must return when your army takes the field.

I flatter myself with the hope of meeting Mrs. Washington on the road. Adieu, my dear general, most affectionately and respectfully yours.

TO HIS EXCELLENCY GENERAL WASHINGTON.~[1]

(ORIGINAL.)

Philadelphia, December 5th, 1780.

MY DEAR GENERAL,--By my letter of yesterday I have mentioned to you that a Spanish expedition was intended against St. Augustine. They mean to set out at the end of December, which will certainly delay them till the middle of January. It consists of twelve ships of the line, some frigates, bomb ketches, and a large number of troops. I have advised the minister to communicate officially to you this intelligence, and also to Count de Rochambeau, that proper means, if convenient, may be taken to improve it.

For my part, my dear general, I have conducted myself agreeably to what you said to me in our last conversations, that if, in the course of the winter, a naval superiority was obtained, our business should be to push for the southward, and that you would take for that purpose four thousand French and two thousand Americans. Nothing against New York can be undertaken before the end of May. Anything, therefore, that could employ us during February, March, and April, is worthy of our attention.

The confederacy was going to sail for some clothing which we have in the West Indies. No time was left to wait for an answer from you. I knew perfectly your sense of this affair. I therefore, with the advice of Chevalier de la Luzerne, wrote him a letter dated from Camp, wherein I explained to him that something might be done in conjunction for the public good. My opinion is strengthened by your sentiments on this matter, without, however, bringing myself, and still less yourself, to make any formal application to the Spanish generals.

Inclosed you will find a copy of this letter, the first part of which mentions that if, after having landed their troops in Florida, they would send their ships of the line for us, we might, at three weeks notice before the departure of the squadron, have in readiness six thousand men for a powerful diversion in Carolina. Their own interest is the only thing I seem to consider in this business, and I endeavour to invite Spanish caution in this measure; but, unless a more particular application is made, I do not believe that this part of my letter will have any effect.

The second part will, I hope, be productive of some good for America. I urge the necessity immediately to open a correspondence with General Greene that he may, by his manoeuvres, facilitate the operation of Spain. I tell them, that unless they land a corps of troops on the boundaries of Georgia, with a view at least to threaten Augusta and Savannah, their expedition will run a great risk. I advise the measure of cruizing off Charleston Harbour, the whole under the idea of their own interest.

I have also written to the naval French commander in the West Indies, advising him to succour Chevalier de Ternay, which I know he will not do. But I take this opportunity of condemning their foolish neglect, in not appearing on our coasts when they return to Europe; and I do also advise that, in their cruizes from St. Domingo, they may sometimes appear off Savannah and Charlestown Harbour. Inclosed you will find a copy of this letter.

Though I always speak of the beginning of February, it is, however, certain, that any time in February would be convenient to go to the southward. March and April are more than sufficient for the taking of Charlestown; and in all cases, I know, from our last conversations, that you wish for a naval superiority this winter, in order to succour the southern states.

I had this morning, my dear general, a long conversation with the Chevalier de la Luzerne, relating to a southern operation. He is, as well as myself, clearly of opinion, that unless a formal application and a plan of campaign be proposed to them, they will not send their ships to us. In this last case their coming ought still to be questioned. But if you thought it better to try, you might propose to the French generals to send a frigate there, and see, with them, what might be done in conjunction. Suppose they were to take four thousand men, leaving some, and the militia, at Rhode Island. We could on our part muster two thousand Americans. However, the Spaniards are so positive and strict in following literally their instructions that I do not believe anything will engage them to come. But my letter, which I look upon as a mere cipher on the first proposition, will, I hope, engage, them to impart their projects to General Greene, and of course this diversion will become useful to us.

Suppose Count de Rochambeau and Chevalier de Ternay were to send to Havanna a copy of your letter, I think they ought to intrust it to Viscount de Noailles, who will soon return to Rhode Island, and whose name is highly respected by the court of Spain for many particular reasons, too long to be mentioned here.

I have seen Mr. Ross, and find that very little clothing is to be for the present expected. They have some arms on board the _Alliance_, and, I think, a hundred bales of cloth on board a vessel under Jones's convoy. The remainder will come with the _Serapis_. Unless the storm has forced Jones to put in some French harbour, he may be expected every minute.

The assembly of Pennsylvania have before them the affair of the recruits; but proper arrangements are not properly supported. They are fond of voluntary enlistments. I have an appointment for to-morrow with General Mifflin, where I will debate this matter with him.

To-morrow, my dear general, I will go to Brandywine with Chevalier de Chastellux, and also to Red Bank, Fort Mifflin, &c. On my return I hope to find news from France, and I will write you my determination about my going to the southward.

Inclosed you will find a newspaper, wherein congress have printed a letter from General Gates, relating to a new success of Sumpter.

Congress have lately received letters from Mr. Jay and Mr. Adams, but nothing very particular. They have more fully written by other opportunities that are expected. Portugal has entered into the convention of neutrality, and with such conditions as to shew their partiality to our side of the question.

Adieu, my dear general, most respectfully and affectionately.

Footnote:

1. The winter, according to custom, causing the dispersion of the army, M. de Lafayette repaired to Philadelphia to be nearer arrivals and intelligence from Europe. It was there he first conceived the project of going to serve in the south under General Greene, who was to make a winter campaign. As regards the project of making a division in Florida, with the co-operation of the Spaniards, he seconded it with ardour, and to General Washington, M. de la Luzerne, and the Spanish commanders, he wrote long letters on the subject, which have but little interest, owing to the project not having been attended with any important result: those letters have been omitted.

FROM GENERAL WASHINGTON TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

(ORIGINAL.)

New Windsor, 14th December, 1780.

My dear Marquis,--Soon after despatching my last letter to you, your favour dated at Paramus was put into my hands by Colonel Gouvion. The Chevalier de la Luzerne's despatches came in time for the post, which is the only means left me for the conveyance of letters; there not being so much money in the hands of the quartermaster-general (I believe I might go further, and say in those of the whole army,) as would bear the expense of an express to Rhode Island. I could not get one the other day to ride so far as Compton.

I am now writing to the Count de Rochambeau and the Chevalier de Ternay, on the subject of your several letters. When their answer arrives, I will communicate the contents to you. You must be convinced, from what passed at the interview at Hartford, that my command of the French troops at Rhode Island stands upon a very limited scale, and that it would be impolitic and fruitless in me to propose any measures of co-operation to a third power, without their concurrence; consequently an application from you, antecedently to an official proposition from the minister of France, the gentlemen at the head of the French armament at Rhode Island, congress, or myself, could only be considered as coming from a private gentleman; it is, therefore, my advice to you to postpone your correspondence with the Spanish generals, and let your influence come in hereafter, as auxiliary to something more formal and official. I do not hesitate to give it clearly as my opinion to you, (but this opinion and this business should be concealed behind a curtain,) that the favourable moment of the Spanish operations in the Floridas ought to be improved to the utmost extent of our means, provided the Spaniards, by a junction of their maritime force with that of his most Christian Majesty, under the command of the Chevalier de Ternay, will give us a secure convoy, and engage not to leave us until the operations shall be at an end, or it can be done by consent of parties.

I am very thankful to the minister for permitting, and to you for communicating to General Greene, intelligence of the Spanish movement towards the Floridas. It may have a happy influence on his measures, and it may be equally advantageous to the Spaniards. Your expressions of personal attachment and affection to me are flattering and pleasing, and fill me with gratitude. It is unnecessary, I trust, on my part, to give you assurances of mutual regard, because I hope you are convinced in your own choice to go to the southern army or to stay with this, circumstances and inclination alone must govern you. It would add to my pleasure if I could encourage your hope of Colonel Nevill's exchange. I refused to interest myself in the exchange of my own aide. General Lincoln's were exchanged with himself, and upon that occasion, for I know of no other, congress passed a resolution, prohibiting exchanges out of the order of captivity.

Under one general head, I shall express my concern for your disappointment of letters, our disappointment of clothes, and disappointment in the mode of raising men; but I shall congratulate you on the late change of the administration of France,~[1] as it seems to be consonant to your wishes, and to encourage hope. I am much pleased at the friendly disposition of Portugal. Much good, I hope, will result from the combination of the maritime powers. I am in very confined quarters; little better than those at Valley Forge, but such as they are I shall welcome into them your friends on their return to Rhode Island. I am, &c.

Footnote:

1. Footnote 1: The Marquis de Castries had succeeded, as minister of the navy, to M. de Sartine. This change gave rise to the hope that France would send the promised succours, and that expectation induced M. de Lafayette to renounce his journey to the south.

TO M. DE VERGENNES.~[1]

New Windsor, on the North River, Jan. 30th, 1781.

The letters which I had the honour of writing to you, sir, and which were dated the 20th May, 19th July, 4th and 16th December, have, I hope, reached you safely. Since the arrival of the squadron, your despatch of the 3rd of June is the only one I have received. The Chevalier de la Luzerne has only received one letter of the same month, and none have yet reached the officers of the army and squadron.

The first copy of this letter will be delivered to you by Lieutenant-Colonel Laurens, aide-de-camp to General Washington, who is charged by congress with a private mission. Permit me to recommend to you this officer as a man who, by his integrity, frankness, and patriotism, must be extremely acceptable to government.

According to the instructions of congress, he will place before you the actual state of our affairs, which demand, I think more than ever, the most serious attention. As to the opinions which I may allow myself to express, sir, they entirely correspond with those I have hitherto expressed, and the very slight alterations observable in them have been occasioned by a change of time, prejudices, and circumstances.

With a naval inferiority, it is impossible to make war in America. It is that which prevents us from attacking any point that might be carried with two or three thousand men. It is that which reduces us to defensive operations, as dangerous as they are humiliating. The English are conscious of this truth, and all their movements prove how much they desire to retain the empire of the sea. The harbours, the country, and all the resources it offers, appear to invite us to send thither a naval force. If we had possessed but a maritime superiority this spring, much might have been achieved with the army that M. de Rochambeau brought with him, and it would not have been necessary to have awaited the division he announced to us. If M. de Guichen had stopped at Rhode Island, on his way to France, Arbuthnot would have been ruined, and not all Rodney's efforts could have prevented our gaining victories. Since the hour of the arrival of the French, their inferiority has never for one moment ceased, and the English and the Tories have dared to say that France wished to kindle, without extinguishing the flame. This calumny becomes more dangerous at a period when the English detachments are wasting the south; when, under the protection of some frigates, corps of fifteen hundred men are repairing to Virginia, without our being able to get to them. On the whole continent, with the exception of the Islands of Newport, it is physically impossible that we should carry on an offensive war without ships, and even on those Islands the difficulty of transportation, the scarcity of provisions, and many other inconveniences, render all attempts too precarious to enable us to form any settled plan of campaign.

The result, sir, of all this is, that the advantage of the United States being the object of the war, and the progress of the enemy on that continent being the true means of prolonging it, and of rendering it, perhaps, even injurious to us, it becomes, in a political and military point of view, necessary to give us, both by vessels sent from France, and by a great movement in the fleet in the Islands, a decided naval superiority for the next campaign; and also, sir, to give us money enough to place the American forces in a state of activity; fifteen thousand of the regular army, and ten thousand, or, if we choose it, a still greater number of militia in this part of the country; a southern army, of which I cannot tell precisely the extent, but which will be formed by the five southern states, with all means of supporting in this country such a considerable force. Such, sir, are the resources that you may employ against the common enemy; immense sums of money could not transport resources of equal value from Europe to America, but these, without a succour of money, although established on the very theatre of war, will become useless; and that succour, which was always very important, is now absolutely necessary.

The last campaign took place without a shilling having been spent; all that credit, persuasion, and force could achieve, has been done,--but that can hold out no longer: that miracle, of which I believe no similar example can be found, cannot be renewed, and our exertions having been made to obtain an army for the war, we must depend on you to enable us to make use of it.

From my peculiar situation, sir, and from what it has enabled me to know and see, I think it is my duty to call your attention to the American soldiers and on the part they must take in the operations of the next campaign. The continental troops have as much courage and real discipline as those that are opposed to them. They are more inured to privation, more patient than Europeans, who, on these two points, cannot be compared to them. They have several officers of great merit, without mentioning those who have served during the last wars, and from their own talents have acquired knowledge intuitively; they have been formed by the daily experience of several campaigns, in which, the armies being small, and the country a rugged one, all the battalions of the line were obliged to serve as advance-guards and light troops. The recruits whom we are expecting, and who only bear, in truth, the name of recruits, have frequently fought battles in the same regiments which they are now re-entering, and have seen more gun-shots than three-fourths of the European soldiers. As to the militia, they are only armed peasants, who have occasionally fought, and who are not deficient in ardour and discipline, but whose services would be most useful in the labours of a siege. This, sir, is the faithful picture that I think myself obliged to send you, and which it is not my interest to paint in glowing colours, because it would be more glorious to succeed with slighter means. The Chevalier de la Luzerne, who, having himself seen our soldiers, will give you a detailed and disinterested account of them, will doubtless tell you, as I do, that you may depend upon our regular troops. The result of this digression, sir, is, to insist still more earnestly on the necessity of sending money to put the American troops in movement, and to repeat that well-known truth, that a pecuniary succour and a naval superiority must be the two principal objects of the next campaign.

It would take us too long to examine the faults that have been committed, and the efforts that the states may still endeavour to make: we must return to the former point, that, under present circumstances, money is requisite to derive any advantage from the American resources; that the means which have been substituted for funds are almost completely worn out; that those to which we are at present reduced, do not fulfil the proposed end, and are opposed to the ideas which induced the nation to commence the revolution; that, consequently, we require money to restore to the army that degree of activity without which it cannot operate in an efficacious manner. Clothes, arms, ammunition, are comprised in the same article, and Colonel Laurens carries with him a copy of the former list, from which some deductions have been made. I will content myself with saying, that nothing of any importance has been sent us, that it is necessary to clothe the American army, that it requires arms, and, to be enabled to besiege places, a great augmentation of powder. As these expenses relate to the pecuniary succours, and are those which will strike most forcibly individuals, both of the army and nation, I think it important that the government should prepare them with promptness, and send them in a secure manner.

If it should appear strange, sir, to call that completion of the army a great effort, I would beg to observe, that hunger, cold, nudity, and labour, the certainty of receiving no pay, clothes, or necessary food, being the prospects held out to the American soldier, they must be but little inviting to citizens who are, generally speaking, accustomed to live at home with some degree of comfort; and the English having had sufficient time to think of all the naval points, the attacks of next year will be anything rather than surprises, and our forces must increase in proportion to their precautions. I could have wished that there had been some French troops, and my confidence in the decrease of prejudice has been even greater than that of congress, General Washington, or your minister at that time. The advance-guard of the Count de Rochambeau, although inactive itself from want of ships, by its presence alone has rendered an essential service to America: if it had not arrived, the campaign would have been a ruinous one. When I consider the present state of feeling, my opinion, as I have had the honour of telling you before, would be to send hither, for the expedition of New York, a division of about ten thousand Frenchmen.

In our conference at Hartford, sir, the calculations were of course made, not according to the fortifications actually existing, but according to those they might intend erecting. The answers General Washington thought proper to make to the questions put by the Count de Rochambeau, have been long since carried to you by the _Amazon_. A proposal to ask for a corps of fifteen thousand Frenchmen could only be acceptable to the commander-in-chief. But if that surplus were to lessen the sum of money by means with which fifteen thousand regular troops, ten thousand militia, and a southern army should be put into motion; if it were to lessen the number of ships that would enable us to act in all places, and with a decided superiority;--I must again repeat, that pecuniary succours and a naval superiority are the two most essential points; that the same quantity of money would, put into action here, double that number of American soldiers; and that, without ships, a few thousand men more would be but of little use to us.

The admirable discipline of the French corps, in addition to the honour it confers on M. de Rochambeau and the soldiers under his command, fulfils a still more important aim, by impressing on the minds of the Americans the highest idea of our nation.

The wisdom of the government, in placing that corps under the orders of General Washington, allows me only to repeat how essential it is that his authority should be complete, and without any sort of restriction. The talents, prudence, delicacy, and knowledge of country, which are all united in him in the greatest degree of perfection, are qualities of which one only would suffice to ensure the rigid observance of the instructions which I bear; and the longer I remain here, the more frilly am I convinced that each of them is equally necessary to the harmony and success of the whole affair.

We have had, lately, sir, an important mutiny, of which Colonel Laurens will give you the details.~[2] A corps of Pennsylvanian troops, almost wholly composed of strangers, and stationed at Morristown (Jersey), unanimously rose against their officers, and, under the direction of one of their sergeants, marched on to Princetown. The civil authorities repaired thither, to afford them the justice they demanded. To be in want of food and clothes, to serve for more than a year without pay, some of them, indeed, having been forced to serve a whole year beyond their engagement, are evils to which no army would submit. It is singular enough that those mutineers should have hung up the envoys of General Clinton. The greatest part of the soldiers are disbanded, but they are to re-enter the service, and to join the recruits in different regiments of the state. I am not less positive as to the number of men we shall have in our continental army. Some troops belonging to the Jerseys, seduced by example, and being those next to the Pennsylvanians, which were composed of the greatest number of foreigners, wished to take the same method of obtaining justice; but General Washington, having taken the management of this affair in his own hands, sent forward a detachment; the mutineers submitted, and their chiefs were punished. It is impossible to pass too high encomiums upon the New England troops, almost all national ones, whose cause was at bottom the same, and who, in spite of their nudity, crossed heavy snows to march against the mutineers. This proves, sir, that human patience may have some limits, but that soldier citizens will endure far more than strangers. These events furnish another argument for the necessity of obtaining money.

I flatter myself, sir, that the government, conscious that the ensuing campaign may be a decisive one, will occupy itself seriously of rendering it favourable to us. The taking of New York would destroy the power of the English on this continent, and a short continuation of naval superiority would secure to us the easy conquest of all the other parts of the United States. As to the taking of New York, which it would be rash to consider easy, but absurd to respect the town as if it were a fortified one, it is, I believe, well authenticated, and General Washington has no doubt upon the subject, that with the means proposed in my letter, we should obtain possession of it in the course of the summer.

It is, I believe, important to turn, as far as possible, the enemy's attention towards Canada.

When General Washington gave Colonel Laurens his opinion respecting military affairs and the operations of the campaign, he also put down in writing some ideas on our present situation, and communicated to me that letter, which contains the substance of several of his conversations with me. I take the liberty of requesting the king's minister, to ask to see that letter. Our situation is not painted in flattering colours; but the general speaks from the sad experience of our embarrassments, and I agree with him, sir, that it is indispensable for us to obtain some pecuniary succours, and a decided naval superiority.

You must certainly have learnt, sir, that the defeat of Ferguson, and some other successes of ours, having disarranged the plans of Lord Cornwallis, General Leslie re-embarked to form the junction by water, and that he has since arrived at Charlestown. Arnold, became an English general, and honoured by the confidence of that nation, is at this moment at the head of a British detachment. Having landed in Virginia, he took possession of Richmond for some hours, and destroyed some public and private property: he must now have retired into a safe harbour, or has, perhaps, joined some other expedition. At the very moment when the English fancied that we were in the most awkward situation from the mutiny of some troops, General Washington sent a detachment on the left side of the Hudson, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Hull, supported by General Parsons, which surprised, at Westchester, a corps of three hundred men under Colonel Delancey, wounded several, killed thirty, took sixty prisoners, burnt all the barracks and provisions, and retired, after having destroyed a bridge of communication with the Island of New York.

The general is soon to pass some days with the French troops at Rhode Island, and I shall accompany him on that journey.

I have the honour to be, sir, with equal affection and respect, &c. &c:

New Windsor, February 4th, 1781.