Chapter D: Retreat of Barren-Hill (14)

As to the powder, my dear General, I hope the Navy will give us some, not however a great deal. You cannot conceive how difficult it is for the present to speak with them on offensive plans. They expect Clinton at every minute, and say his success will decide our operations, I had however this morning a conversation with the Land General, and was to see in the evening the Admiral, who, I am told, cannot come, so that I must delay it to be done to-morrow.

Connecticut will, I think, furnish you with a much greater quantity than you expected. How far it will fulfil your purpose I hope to hear from you; but I cannot flatter you to get so much from the fleet as two hundred, even as hundred tons.

I have fully considered, my dear General, the idea of those French Generals, and made myself acquainted with every thing that has past since my departure from France. A great mismanagement in the affair of transports, has prevented the whole coming here at once; but as the French and Spaniards have a superiority, there is no doubt but that if they join together as was intended, the second division will be here in less than three of four weeks. The fleet on this Continent will, I hope, be commanded by Mr. Duchoffaut, and will be very superior to that of the enemy. If by an unlucky chance the junction was prevented, the second division would yet certainly come in the autumn, and be in a situation to act during the winter; but I have all reasons to believe that they will be here in three weeks, and you may depend upon it that they will at all events be here for the winter. From what I have been intrusted with I have a pretty certain ground to hope that my letter will produce upon Count de Guichen, the desired effect, and after an expedition which I can't trust to paper, will be concluded, you may, I think, depend upon his coming this way with a good part of his fleet.

In a word, the French Ministry are determined to keep here during the war a land and naval force which will act on the Continent till a peace is concluded, and to support it with all their power. They look upon Rhode Island as a point to be kept for receiving their fleets and their reinforcements of troops, and want the defence of it to be such an object as will insure the basis of our operations.

Before settling any thing the French Generals want to hear from their second division. _Don't fear by any means_ their acting rashly, and be assured that you may very far depend on their _caution_; but our wants of arms and ammunition have made me also very cautious. If the States furnish us with a sufficiency of the first article, and almost a sufficiency of the second, which we will make up with the fleet, then I am most strongly of opinion that waiting for the second division is all together wrong and unwarrantable.

I have, however, brought Count de Rochambeau to this, viz.:--That if the second division comes we must attack. That in all cases, if we are masters of the water, we may attack; and that we may do it if the Admiral thinks that we can secure the passage by batteries, and if each part is equal to the whole of the enemy.

We must now see what the Admiral has to say. What he wrote about the harbour of New York don't please me. If Duchoffaut comes, I answer for anything you wish. To-morrow I will speak with the two Gentlemen, so at least I hope, and will let you know their answers.

If the second division comes in time we shall certainly act and succeed. Then we will have our arms, powder, clothing, &c.

I never thought, my dear General, that Clinton would come this way; nor do I think it now, but every body says he is coming. Governor Clinton has it as a certainty, and upon his letter received this morning they have altered the arrangement; I had settled to dismiss the extraordinary militia. I hate troubling all these people, and taking them away from their harvest. Gen. Heath is of my opinion, but the intelligences are so particular, so authentic, that he dares not to neglect to gather as many men as possible. Before you receive this you will certainly know the truth of those reports.

If you think, my dear General, that Clinton is coming, and if he disembarks upon Rhode Island, I am clearly of opinion that three or four thousand Continental troops and the militia landing on his rear, while the Count would sally from Newport, would ruin the British army, and that the taking of New York would be but a trifle after such a stroke.

In case you adopt the measure, I think that the communication with the main is very important. I went yesterday to the North end of the Island, and had the works repaired in such a way (at least they will be soon so) as to keep up a communication by Howland's Ferry for eight or ten days after the enemy will possess the Island. I have also desired Colonel Greene, in case they appear, to run up the boats to Slave Ferry. Signals have been established from Watch Point to Connanicut; all those arrangements I have made with the approbation and by the orders of General Heath.

You will by this express receive a letter from Genl. Heath, who applies for, and most ardently wishes a leave of repairing to his command in the grand army. For my part, my dear General, I will, I think, wait your answer to this, and want to know if by the situation of your arms and ammunition, there is a possibility of your acting before the second division comes. If from the answers of the States you think _such a proportion_ of powder from the fleet will be sufficient; then I will be more positive. If, however, after my conversations, I was to see that the second division must be waited for at all events, then I need not be waiting for your answer to this. I will, therefore, my dear General,

1st, Or arrange with them a beginning of operations before the second division comes, and then wait for your answer about arms and ammunition, or the prospects I may have by myself to fix it entirely.

2d, Or fix our plans for the moment the second division comes, and then I will, as soon as possible, repair to head-quarters.

They seem rather doubtful of the possibility of landing safely, and having a sufficiency of boats to carry them under the protection of our Westchester batteries, and I beg you will give me such a note about it as I might show to them.

With the highest respect and most tender friendship, I have the honor to be, dear General,

Yours, &c.

All the officers and soldiers of the army have a great desire to join the grand army, and hate the idea of staying at Rhode Island.

Footnote:

1. See Spark's Writ. of Wash. vol. 7, p. 117.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL)

Newport, July the 31st, 1780,

My Dear General,--In consequence of a note from me the Admiral came to last evening, and defensive ideas gave way to offensive plans. Our conversation was long, and it is not yet ended, but I hasten to write you a summary report of what past between the Count, the Chevalier, and myself.

I first began, in my own name, to give them a pretty exact account of the situation we were in three months ago, of the supernatural efforts which the country had made for the purpose of an immediate co-operation. I told them that by the 1st of January our army would be dismissed; that the Militia was only to serve for three months. I added, that for the defensive they were useless to us, nay, they were hurtful, and that I thought it necessary to take New-York before the winter. All that, my dear General, was said in my own name, and therefore in a less delicate way than when I am your interpreter.

I then told them that I was going to speak of you, and after many compliments, assurances of confidence, &c., I went on with your plan, beginning with the importance of possessing the harbour, and going on about the three ways which you have directed me to point out as to be hereafter regulated by circumstances.

As to the possessing of the harbour the Chevalier told that he did not believe his ships might go in; but that if superior at sea, he would answer by cruising off to protect the landing, the transportation, and prevent an evacuation; indeed to blockade the harbour.

The French General, with the advice of the Naval commander did not hesitate to prefer the going in transports to the point you know of. Both were of opinion that nothing could be undertaken unless we had a naval superiority, and as I know it is your opinion also, (tho' it is not mine,) I durst not insist on that article.

There was another reason which made me wait for the reinforcement. I knew we had neither arms nor powder. I know we would be at least a long time to get them; but as they did not think of making me the objection I put my assent to the others on the account of my private confidence in their superior abilities; told them that you also thought we should have a naval superiority, and added, in my own name, that however we must, any how, act before the winter, and get rid of a shameful defensive.

The summary of the arrangement will, I presume, be this: That as soon as we hear of a naval reinforcement we go where you know, and establish what you intend to fix; that, if possible, we get where I want you to be; that immediately the French will embark and go where you wish them to be, or thereabout; that a number equal to the enemy's whole force be stationed in that part; that they don't want there more than ten pieces of our heavy cannon; that after every thing will be disembarked, three weeks, in their opinion, will do the business on their side; that proper means will be taken by sea to keep up the communication and prevent an evacuation; that we must not give up that plan if we may begin in August or September; that fascines and other apparatus must be ready on the opposite shore; that they will take for us all the boats belonging to the Continent which will be at Providence; that as soon as our clothing, &c., arrive, it will without entering any harbour be sent to W.C. or thereabout.

Their superiority at sea, will, I think, take place in the course of this month; they have two ways to depend upon it:--1st, Unless of an absolute impossibility the second division, consisting of four other regiments and the remaining part of Lauzun's, with the Alliance and all other stores, and with a strong convoy of ships of the line, will be here very soon. When they will be heard of on the coast, Chevalier de Tergay will, at all events, go out and meet them. 2dly, the Gentleman I wrote to on my arrival has full liberty to send here reinforcements, the Admiral has already applied to him, but I am going to make him write other letters _in my way_, and will send them to-morrow or the day after to Chevalier de la Luzerne, whom I beg you will immediately desire to secure three fast sailing vessels for the West Indies.

I am going this evening to fix plans with Pilots, and also to speak of the entrance of the harbour. Dobs and Shaw are here, and I will have a full conversation with them and the Admiral, both for the entrance of the harbour and the navigation of the Sound. To-morrow I call, with as much secrecy as possible, a number of Pilots for the harbour of Halifax and River St. Laurence.

Inclosed, you will find a letter from Count de Rochambeau. He requests you will have the goodness of letting the Minister know what the French army is about, as he had no time of writing to him; it is, I believe, very important. 1st, To send every where to meet the reinforcement, and give them proper directions. 2dly, To have some vessels ready for the West Indies.

The French set more value upon Rhode Island than it is worth. I however got them to promise that in case of an operation they will not leave here a Garrison, and that their Magazines would be sent to Providence.

You know, my dear General, I did not expect Clinton, and tho' I could not stand alone in my opinion, I ever lamented the calling out of the Militia. I am happy to inform you that they have been dismissed. Nothing can equal the spirit with which they turned out, and I did not neglect letting the French know that they have done more for their allies than they would have done for the security of their own continental troops on a similar occasion.

As to the three month men, the French General wants them to establish the communication with the main; but I will soon request him to let them go to the grand army, and will, in the same time, get from this State as many arms and powder as possible. I have written to Massachusetts for the same purpose.

After I will have sent the Pilots, and made calculations with the Commander of the Artillery and the first Engineer whom the Count will consult, I shall draw a plan which I will get their answer to, and repair with it to head-quarters. In the meantime I will receive answers from Boston and from Governor Greene.

The Admiral cannot send to us more than thirty thousand of powder. But you see that their demands as to heavy pieces are small; they indeed say they do not want any on the Island, and that their twenty-ones will be sufficient. All that, my dear General, I will be more positive upon after the Commanders of Artillery and Engineers will have made with us their calculations.

I hope, my dear General, that by the 5th or 6th of August, I will have nothing more to do in this place. The French army hate the idea of staying here, and want to join you; they swear at those that speak of waiting for the second division; they are enraged to be blockaded in this harbour. As to the dispositions of the inhabitants and our troops, and the dispositions of the inhabitants and the Militia for them, they are such as I may wish. You would have been glad the other day to see two hundred and fifty of our drafts that came on Connecticut without provisions or tents, and who were mixed in such a way with the French troops, that every French soldier and officer took an American with him and divided their bed and their supper in the most friendly manner.

The patience and sobriety of our Militia is so much admired by the French Officers, that two days ago a French Colonel called all his officers together to desire them to take the good examples which were given to the French soldiers by the American troops. So far are they gone in their admirations that they find a great deal to say in favor of General Varnum, and his escort of Militia Dragoons, who fill up all the streets of Newport. On the other hand, the French discipline is such, that chiken and pigs walk between the tents without being disturbed, and that there is in the camp a cornfield, from which not one leaf has been touched. The Tories don't know what to say to it.

Adieu, my dear General. To-morrow, I hope having the pleasure of writing you another letter, and am with the most tender friendship, dear General,

Your most obedient humble servant, &c.

I beg, my dear General, you will present my compliments to the family. ~[1]

Footnote:

1. See Spark's Writ. of Wash. vol. 7, p. 117. The answer to this letter appears in Spark's Writ. of Wash. v. 7, p. 135.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Newport, August the 1st, 1750.

My Dear General,--Your letter to Count de Rochambeau~[1] mentioning the enemy's embarkation, and your future movements against New-York, a positive letter from Governor Trumbull, and a positive one from General Parsons, have once more altered the dispositions, and such of the Militia as had been dismissed have been again sent for.

In consequence of these expectations my offensive arrangements have been entirely cut short, they are wholly taken in their preparations. My letter of yesterday has been detained with the hope that some intelligence might be added to it; but I will send it this morning, and if it is possible to obtain from the Admiral some hour's conversation with Captains Dobs and Shaw I shall to-morrow morning dispatch another express.

The dispositions of defence are, I believe, these; the French to occupy the English lines; General Heath to command a corps of militia on the Tivertown side; I to have his van-guard on the Island, and to watch the enemy's motions almost all around the Island, which is not a small affair.

If the enemy land I will try to oppose it, and the French will come in columns to attack them with fixed bayonets. If this attack do not succeed they will retire behind the lines, and take with them fifteen hundred Militia, when with the few ones that may stay, I will retire to Butt's Hill, and secure the communication with General Heath.

As you did not write to me, my dear General, I could not know what you want me to do. If you think seriously of entering on the Island of New-York, I am extremely sorry to stay here. If on the contrary you send troops this way, (which, if the enemy land, would be fatal to them,) I will not be to lament my being away from the army. I shall feel very unhappy to be with some Militia while the Light Infantry is acting under you, and had I been sent for, I would have joined you very fast; but if you can take New-York I will heartily forget that I could have been there, and feel nothing but joy; if, however, there was time enough, I'd beg you will send for me. If you send troops this way I believe they may strike a great blow.

The wind is against them, so that they won't be here before the day after to-morrow. Adieu, my dear General, with the highest respect I have the honor to be,

Your's, &c.~[2]

Footnotes:

1. See Spark's Writ. of Wash. vol. 7, p. 126.

2. For the answer to the above, approving the measures of Lafayette, See Spark's Writ. of Wash. v.7, p.147.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Elizabeth Town, October the 27th, 1780.

My Dear General.--From what you have heard from Dr. Hagen about the boats when on your way to head-quarters, I don't believe that you may have kept any hope for our success. The boats have been, it seems, reduced to five, and from the time when they were yet at the Little Falls you may see that they could not be here at the appointed hour.

I will not permit myself to reflect on this moment upon the many blunders committed on that affair by the Quarter-General's department. I was too certain of some brilliant success, and military glory is too much idolized by me; not to be rather severe on the occasion. I will content myself to say that from the report and common agreement of all the spies and guides collected together by Major Lee, from the negligence of the enemy, the circumstances of the tide and a thick foggy weather, not one of those whom I led into the matter had the least doubt upon your success.

The only advantage I have got from it has been to convince myself that our troops are particularly fit for such an expedition, on account of their patience and silence; and that if the other business could be supported upon a large scale, I would answer to carry it. I have written upon both roads to the commanding officer of the brigade of the line that our expedition was relinquished, and that I would advise him not to give to his men the trouble of going farther. I have also requested him to speak of this movement as if it had taken place on account of some intelligence that the enemy meant to come out into the Jersey's to attack us.

I have taken my position between Elizabethtown and Connecticut Farms. General Clinton has not the time of making any disposition against us. To-morrow at nine or ten I will march to our position of Crane's Town, and the day after to-morrow to Cotawa, unless I receive contrary orders.

Newark Mountain was rather too far to march it this night, and too near for to-morrow, because our men being in want of blankets will like better to join their tents again.

If your Excellency approves of this arrangement, I beg, you will order our baggage to wait for us on our position of Crane's Town; if you dislike the disposition your orders may reach us on the road.

I beg, my dear General, you will please to communicate our ill success and disgraceful disappointment to the Minister, who said he would not leave Morris Town until he hears from me.

Had I any thing to reproach to myself on the occasion, I would be inconsolable. I undertook the business because I thought myself equal to it; I wish the people in the Quarter Master's Department had done the same for their plans.

I am, my dear General, your's, &c.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Light Camp, October 27th, 1780.

My Dear General,--I am sorry to hear from Major Gibbs that my letter of last night did not reach you before your departure from head quarters. It had been written at one o'clock, as soon as I took my position for the night, and intrusted to Colonel Ogden, who promised to send it by an officer acquainted with the roads.

Depending upon your communication of the sad intelligence to Chevalier de la Luzerne, I did not send to Morristown where he was to wait for the news of the success.

Among the many blunders which have been committed, I shall extract from that complete assortment some instances (not for this glorious occasion that is forever lost) but on any future one.

You may remember that after a long time Colonel Pickering assured to you that the boats were in complete readiness whilst they had no oars,--he afterwards positively told that he had only three boats with him at Camp when two hours before I had seen five of them with my own eyes. The sending of those five boats two hours after that which you had appointed, you have been early apprized of, but you don't perhaps know that instead of being at Dod's the night before last the boats from Suffrans arrived there last evening about sunset, to this report the man who received them eight miles this side of Suffrans adds that they wanted their double trees and spread chains, so that he was obliged to lose about two hours in taking those things from Continental wagons and the inhabitants; when our affairs will be thus managed your best projects cannot fail of being defeated.

Had Mr. Pickering followed the example of General Knox, every thing would have been here in proper time and proper order, as was the artillery from the Park.--I confess, my dear General, that I cannot reconcile my feelings to the idea that by this neglect I have lost a most happy opportunity, blessed with all the little circumstances which may insure success. Our expedition has taken the most foolish turn in the eyes of any one who is unacquainted with this circumstance of the boats.

When I was in hopes of seeing in time at least five of them, I gave up the watering place to think only of Richmond; but when I saw that we could not be there before the break of the day, I did not hesitate to relinquish an expedition which on that footing would have occasioned a great profusion of blood for little or no purpose, but you will easily guess what I have felt on the occasion. I never have been so deeply wounded by any disappointment.

By Mercereau and Colonel Ogden, I hear that the enemy are collecting boats and intend a forage into the Jerseys. I would be very happy to know if you have got the like intelligence. Suppose they were to come out in force and at a distance from us, would not this be an opportunity to execute your grand plan?

I beg you will let me know this evening if I am to march to-morrow to our old ground to Cotawa; if the enemy were likely to come out, or if you thought of a certain plan, I would advise to keep Major Lee for some days, as in both cases he will be a capital man,--he is a most charming officer.

Arnold has issued a second proclamation wherein he invites the officers and soldiers of our army to join him, promising to them equal ranks to those they hold in the American service.

I am told expresses were sent to me to acquaint me of the delay of the boats; but excepting Doctor Pagen I have not seen one of them,--the boats have been sent to the two bridges by Major Gibbs, I had brought them up with me, and in passing by them both conductors and wagoners have received the curses of every officer and soldier in the division. The men marched last night very fast with such silence, good order and desire of fighting as would have highly pleased you. The activity and resources of Major Lee have been on that occasion displayed in such a way as entitles him to my eternal esteem and gratitude. I felt not only for me but for all the officers and men who had promised themselves so much glory on the occasion.

With the most tender affection and high respect I have the honor to be, my clear general, yours, &e,

Colonel Ogden has remained behind to get inteligences; so that being uncertain if my first letter has reached you, I would be happy to know in the course of the night if I am to march to-morrow morning to the old ground.~[1]

Footnote:

1. The two preceding letters relate to a descent upon Staten Island, which was projected, and was to be executed by Lafayette, who was now in command of a Light Corps, consisting of battallions, stationed in advance of the main army, and was anxious to effect some important enterprise before the campaign should be brought to a close; but this expedition, as well as an attack proposed in his letter of the 30th October, ante upon the upper part of New York Island, was rendered impracticable by the want of boats and other necessary preparations. See Sparks' Writ. of Wash. v. 7, p. 280, and App. No. 9.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Philadelphia, December 4, 1780.

MY DEAR GENERAL,--I will for this time write a very short letter to you and cannot be more particular either on public or private business, until some few days stay in this city have enabled me to get further information.

I have been greatly disappointed in my not meeting Mrs. Washington. I have been very angry with my bad fate which led me into another road at the only moment when I could miss her--this has been the more the case, as I knew you was uneasy about her, and I wanted both to send you an express and to advise her to the best way of meeting you as soon as possible.

The southern news are expected this evening. Leslie has re-embarked and will probably go to Charleston; the southern members are pleased to like my going towards their country. However I cannot for the present be determined, as I don't yet know if the campaign will be active, and if succours are to be expected from France.

By a vessel from there who left Lorient before the middle of October, we hear that nothing material had happened except the taking of the merchant fleet. Both naval armies were in port. There was an expedition of, I think, ten ships of the line and five thousand men ready to sail--this vessel came in company with Jones, who is daily expected; but a very little part of our clothing will be on board, some will come on board the Serapis, Jones, who mounts the _Ariel_ had dispatches from the French Court, for as he however might have been detained by a storm off the French coast which separated the little convoy. In the vessel arrived was a Mr. Ross, who, I hope will give me some account of the clothing, and Baron d'Arent, who got rid of his rupture, has a star with a cross and a ribbon, and is upon very good terms with the King of Prussia.

Congress have debated a motion about your being desired to go to the southward, but have determined that you would better know than they do if it was more useful to go or to stay. I am more than ever of this last opinion.

On my arrival I found one of the salt meat vessels sold and the other to be sold to day. I have spoken on the subject to almost every member of Congress, who promised that they would take the best measures in their power to get these provisions.

Chevalier de la Luzerne has communicated to me in _the most confidential way_ a Spanish plan against St. Augustine, upon which I am building a letter for the Generals of this nation, and using the best arguments in my power to engage them either to send twelve ships of the line to take us and conduct us to Charleston, as to render their operations as useful as possible to General Greene. To-morrow I will write you about it. If I have time before the departure of the confederacy who is going to the West Indies, I will send you the original, if not a copy of my letter. This is entirely _confidential_, as I have not the Chevelier's permission to mention it. Adieu, my dear General, your's, most respectfully.

A letter dated Cadiz, September 23d, mentions that Count d'Estaing commands the combined fleet, and is gone to sea. In this case his going with sixteen ships could not be true. I will endeavour to ascertain this matter.~[1]

Mr. Carmichael writes that Spain has sent a hundred and thirty thousand dollas. It is not a great deal, the dispositions of that court are very satisfactory. Portugal does every thing we want, letters are just arrived from St. Domingo but not desciphered.

Footnote:

1. The Light Infantry corps which Lafayette had commanded was broken up when the army went into winter quarters, and he now entertained the desire of transferring his services to the southern army under General Greene, and had applied to Washington for his advice. See Sparks' Writ. of Wash. Vol. 7, p. 316.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

December the 5th, in the Evening, 1780.

MY DEAR GENERAL,--However acquainted I may be with your intentions, I thought, upon the whole, that I should better wait for your approbation before I present any opinion of yours to the Spanish and French Generals in the West Indies. I will, I know, lose the opportunity of the confederacy, but many vessels are going that way, and if my letters meet with your approbation I shall send them by triplicates. I Impatiently wait for your answer.

I will write to General Greene to let him know of this intended expedition, which, tho' uncertain as all human events are, may be, however, in a great measure depended upon.

I confess that I don't hope to prevail upon the Spaniards to come here; but if you will, you, Count de Rochambeau, and Chevalier de Ternay, may try. In that case I wish you would write to both of them. My letter will, at all events, give some remote chance of their doing what I wish, and insure their communicating with General Greene. For political reasons I also wish to draw them into this correspondence.

Chevalier de la Luzerne wishes his packet to Count de Rochambeau to be forward as soon as possible. Adieu, my dear General, yours most respectfully and affectionately.~[1]

Footnote:

1. For the answer to this letter, See Sparks' Writ. of Wash. v. 7, p. 322.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Philadelphia, December the 16th, 1780.

MY DEAR GENERAL,--Your favor of the 8th instant never came to hand before last night. My former letters will have explained to you my sentiments relating to a journey southward. I must heartily thank you, my dear General, for the kind and friendly letters you have been pleased to send me. I am so happy in your friendship that every mark of your affection, for me gives me a degree of pleasure which far surpasses all expressions.

As I have written to you before, my dear General, there is an intelligence of some ships and troops having been put in readiness at Brest; there is a possibility of a Spanish officer waiting on you for the sake of a co-operation. We are also to expect news from my friend the new Minister of the French Navy, and before they arrive you would not like my departure.

Two other reasons have weight with me; the first that if the enemy make this detachment, without which nothing material will happen in the Southward, and if the intelligence is true about the fast recruiting of six month men, there is (not a probability) but a possibility of some thing to be done in this quarter. The second is, that for reasons I will explain to you when we meet, a visit from you to the French army is to be much wished, and in this case you will be glad that I may accompany you.

Under these circumstances, to which is added a natural reluctance to part from you and this army, and some idea that upon the whole my staying will be more agreeable to you, I think, my dear General, that unless new intelligence comes I will soon return.

Colonel Laurens persists in refusing to go, and hopes Hamilton may be sent, whom he thinks better calculated for the purpose; but I don't believe now that this plan may be effected, and in that case I should advise Laurens to accept of the commission, provided he is merely a _messenger_ and not an _envoy_, that would supersede the old Doctor.

The Assembly of Pennsylvania have passed a bill for their officers which seems satisfactory to them. Before I go I will still intrigue for the affair of filling up the battalions. Mifflin behaves perfectly well.

Adieu, my dear General, most affectionately and respectfully, Yours, &c.~[1]

Footnote:

1. For the letter referred to in the commencement of this, See Sparks' Writ. of Wash. v. 7, p. 316, and see also the letter of Washington to Lafayette, ibid, p.322 & 339.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Philadelphia, March the 2nd, 1781.

MY DEAR GENERAL,--Your letters of the 25th and 26th~[1] both came yesterday to hand, which shows that the expresses have not made great dispatch. I would have done myself the honour of writing to your Excellency had I not every minute waited for intelligence from the Southward.

Your Excellency remembers that our shortest calculation on the arrival of the troops at the head of Elk was for the 6th of March; I am happy to inform you that they will be there this day or to-morrow early, and notwithstanding the depth of the mud, and the extreme badness of the roads, this march, which I can call rapid, (as for example, they came in two days from Morris Town to Princeton,) has been performed with such order and alacrity, that agreeable to the report two men only have been left behind; and yet these two men have embarked at Trenton with some remains of baggage. At every place where the detachment have halted, they have found covering and wood ready for them, and there has not been the least complaint made to me from any inhabitant. Every third day they have drawn their provisions; the clothing has also been distributed, and having embarked yesterday at Trenton they passed the city about two o'clock with a wind which was extremely favorable. Congress have given to their troops the advance of one month's pay which will be distributed at the head of Elk in new emission.

The Artillery, consisting of one 24, six 18, two brass 12, one 8 inch howitzer, two 8 inch mortars, in all, 12 heavy pieces; four 6 pounders, and two small howitzers, with a sufficient quantity of ammunition, will be at the head of the Elk this day and to-morrow, so that by the 4th I hope we shall be ready to sail. A quantity of medicines and instruments, and fifteen hundred pairs of shoes will be at the head of Elk before we embark. Vessels will be in readiness to receive us with thirty days provision on board. I am also assured that we will have a sufficient quantity of boats to land the detachment, and two heavy ones will be added for the Artillery, the public, and some of the private armed vessels in the Bay have been ordered to the head of Elk; two dispatch boats are there, and four more have been asked for. As a farther security to our subsistence, I have got the Minister's permission to dispose of the French flour and salt meat along the Bay in case of necessity.

On my arrival at this place I heard that M. de Tilly, the French Commander, had conferred with the Virginians, but upon seeing that nothing could be done immediately, he was undetermined whether to stay or to return to Rhode Island. Fearing that our letters might miscarry, and wishing to hurry the preparations of the Militia, I complied with the earnest solicitations of the Minister of France to send on Colonel Gouvion, and directed him to go either by land or water (as the state of the Bay would permit) on board the French squadron, and afterwards to Baron de Steuben's Camp, where he may apprise these Gentlemen of our force, our intentions, and the time of our arrival. This minuted account I give to your Excellency to show you that nothing on our part has been wanting for the success of the expedition. Our preparations have in every article fulfilled, and in the most important one, time, have exceeded what had been expected.

Your letter was sent by express to General St. Clair, who immediately came to town; but nothing having been done for the settling of the accounts, none of the promises having been complied with, and the men being much scattered, it has, (after much consideration,) been thought impossible to embark any number with us, and General St. Clair promises to make every exertion for the sending of two or three hundred in a few days whom however I am not to depend upon.

I am myself going to the head of Elk and shall arrive there this evening. It has not been possible for me to leave sooner the City, as the three days I have remained here have been fully employed in making and forwarding preparations.

Before I go I will wait on the Board of War Navy and propose the sending of the frigates; but the Trumbull having not her compliment of men, and those of the Ariel having mutinied at sea, I am afraid we will find difficulties. The preparations made at New York; the return of the Amarila; the remasting of the Bedfort; the impossibility Mr. Destouches is under to give us any further assistance; the uncertainty of what Mr. de Tilly may have determined before he had received your letter. Such are, my dear General, the many reasons which from a pretty certain expedition have lately made a precarious one. Under these circumstances, indeed, there must always be more or less danger in going down the Bay, and venturing the low country about Portsmouth. Being unacquainted with the answer you have received from Count de Rochambeau and Mr. Destouches, I am not able to judge how far I may depend upon the same ship being ordered again to Chesapeake (in case before the reception of your letter) she had thought proper to sail. Her coming was not in consequence of your proposition; her going was relative to the difficulties of an expedition very different from ours, and I wish I might know if (tho' Mr. Destouches cannot give further assistance,) this assistance at least may be depended upon, so as to hope for the return of the ship should M. de Tilly have left the bay. The bottom of the Bedfort is said to be damaged; the Amarila was said to have been dismasted. Suppose those circumstances were true, they would be in our favour. If a detachment was to go from New York to Portsmouth, Westpoint would be less in danger. If Cornwallis continues advancing on, perhaps our being in the neighbourhood of Arnold may be of service; I will, however, confine myself literally to my instructions, and if Colonel Gouvion writes me with certainty that M. de Tilly is gone; if I am not led to suppose he will return, I will march back the detachment; for the present I am going on because upon the increasing of the enemy's force at Gardner's Bay, you recommended dispatch to me; I hope, however, that I will hear from your Excellency. Now that the chain is established, Colonel Dickering says, that in six days I may receive your answer at the head of Elk. The hope of seeing the French ship again, or some other reason, may detain me; but your answer will determine my movements, and I can receive it by the 8th, which is about the time when it was thought we would arrive at the head of Elk.

My expectations are not great, and I think we have but few chances for us. I shall make all possible dispatch, and listen particularly to the voice of prudence; however, some hazard might be ran, if we undertake under these circumstances.

General Duportail having not left this place, I am led to hope that if we don't go I may return in time for the journey to Rhode Island. I most earnestly beg, my dear General, that you will favor me with an immediate answer.

With the highest respect and most tender affection, I have the honor to be, your's, &c.

P.S.--One of our transports from Trenton had got aground, but the troops of her will still be in time for her at the head of Elk. Some new difficulties have been made for the collecting of shoes, but I will try to get over them. From the extraordinary motions of Lord Cornwallis, whom we have not heard of these many days, and from the movements in New-York, I am led to hope that I will hear from you respecting my future conduct, and that I may be at head-quarters before you think it prudent to leave New Windsor.~[2]

Footnotes:

1. For these, See Sparks' Writ. Wash. p. 430 & 439 The date of the letter is there given as the 27th.

2. See the letters of Washington is Sparks' Writ. of Wash. Vol. 7, p. 444 & 447.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Head of Elk, March the 7th, 1781.

My dear general,--Contrary winds, heavy rains, disappointments of vessels, and every inconvenience to which we had no remedy, have been, from the day of my arrival, combined against our embarkation. I hope, however, we will be on board to-morrow morning, and as nothing certain has been heard from the French ships, no time will be lost on our part for the celerity of the expedition.

The troops will embark five miles below this place, and three miles higher up than the Point where General Howe landed. There will be more room for the arrangements of our vessels, and the shallowness of the water insures us against the enterprise of any vessel of force. In this situation we may wait for intelligence from our friends. The State of Maryland have made to me every offer in their power. I will improve this opportunity of making up some deficiencies in the Quarter-Master and Engineer's Department, of insuring to us a good stock of provisions, and upon the intelligence received that Baron de Steubens was gone with a large detachment to the Southward, I had hinted the possibility of getting some Militia from the lower countries, and repairing some cannon at Baltimore; but having read the inclosed from the Baron, I will write again to Governor Lee, (as my letter has been gone but two days,) and save the State from any expence of that kind. To the obtaining of vessels has been joined the difficulty of getting them up the river, as they were taking every opportunity to slip them off. All the vessels, three excepted, are only bay craft, and our Admiral's ship mounts twelve guns. I have prepared some kind of orders for that fleet, but hope to be relieved from my Naval command by the arrival of a French frigate, and have, at all events, sent for Commodore Nicholson of Baltimore. Mr. McHenry has been very active in accelerating the measures of his State.

By a letter from Colonel Gouvion, dated Yucomico River, I find that after many adventures, he had landed there on the 4th, and was proceeding by land to his destination. The wind is fair enough to come up the Bay, and hope soon to hear from our friends.

The enclosed letter from the Baron having first come into my hand, and being on public service, as it was waited upon _to be forwarded with dispatch_, I took the liberty to open it, but was very sorry to have done it after a letter of the same date had came also to hand; both say the same thing (at least in every material point,) and I am happy to find that the Baron's preparations are going on rapidly.

Whatever may be the Baron's opinion upon the facility of taking, sword in hand, the fortifications of Portsmouth, I will not hazard any thing before I have considered the matter with my own eyes. Arnold had so much time to prepare, and plays so deep a game; nature has made the position so respectable, and some of the troops under his orders have been in so many actions that I don't flatter myself to succeed so easily as it may be thought. The prospect of preserving Naval superiority must, I think, decide if we are to save bloodshed by regular approaches, or to risk our men into the dangers of an assault; but I would like to destroy the works in some measure before we attempt to storm them. A conversation with the Baron, with Colonel Gouvion, and some other officers, joined to what I can see myself, will better fix my mind on the matter than it can be at present. When I left Philadelphia General Wayne was not far from hoping he could soon collect a thousand men; but I am not so sanguine in my expectations; I am, however, trying to prepare matters for this number of men, but I think that a sufficiency of vessels, (unless ours are sent back,) will not be obtained in a few days. Let General Wayne arrive in time or not, when he comes under my directions I wish to know if in case we succeed, he must be sent to Genl. Greene. Supposing he is to go there, would your Excellency think of selecting some riflemen for the grand army? It seems to me that I heard you once mentioning this matter. The State of Virginia, I am told, finds difficulties in the keeping of prisoners. Suppose something of the kind was stated to me, am I to alter any thing in what you said to me on the subject?

I am in a great hurry to go, my dear General; but let us succeed or fall in the object we have in view, I shan't be less hurried to return with the detachment to head-quarters, where I hope to be again as soon as you may possibly expect. I beg you will present my respects to Mrs. Washington, and Mrs. Hamilton, and compliments to the family. I have received Mr. Washington's answer, he is waiting for me at the Baron's quarters.

With the highest respect and most tender affection I have the honor to be, your's, &c.~[1]

Footnote:

1. See Washington's letter in Sparks' Writ. in Wash, vol. 8, p. 449.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Off Turkey Point, March the 9th.

My dear general,--Commodore Nicholson has joined us sooner than I expected; he answers to conduct the detachment to Annapolis without the least danger, there he will wait for intelligence from me, but says that if the French fleet are below be might go with safety (if not for the vessels at least for the troops) to the point of our destination. Nicholson will be very useful to the French fleet as he knows well the bay.

I will be at Hampton to-morrow night or the day after, and three days after my arrival, if the French (whose arrival has not been heard of) consent to send a Frigate, the detachment may come in two days from Annapolis.

Most respectfully, my dear General, your's &c.

P.S.--I have written to the State of Maryland to tell them we don't want any of their Militia. I have left to the Navy Board to judge of the propriety to send out the Ariel adding that it was no more essential.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

York, March 15th, 1781.

My Dear General,--The number of small frigates and privateers that are in the bay, made it impossible for me to carry the detachment farther down than Annapolis, and I have requested the Governor of Maryland as well as the principal officers of the detachment, to give out that we are going to join General Greene; but the object of the expedition is so perfectly well known every where, that our sole dependence to keep Arnold must be upon the apprehension he has of a French fleet being cruizing off the capes.

For my part, I came in a barge from Annapolis, and very luckily escaped the dangers that were in the way. Colonel Harrison will have given to your Excellency a minute detail of the reasons which have prompted me to this measure. I have taken his advice on the matter, and have no doubt but that your Excellency (considering the probability that no frigate would have been sent) will approve of the step I have taken to forward as much as possible both the advantage of the expedition and the honor of the American arms.

On my arrival, (yesterday afternoon) I have found that Baron de Stuben had been very active in making preparations, and agreeable to what he tells me, we shall have five thousand militia ready to operate. This, with the Continental detachment, is equal to the business, and we might very well do without any land force from Newport.

By papers found in the baggage of a British officer, (taken in a boat) it seems that General Gregory had a correspondence with the enemy. The Baron has suspended him, but he is still with the troops.

Arnold is so well acquainted with the coming of the detachment, and his object is so well known, that, as I said before, our only chance to keep him must be the idea of a French fleet being off the capes; he is fortifying at Portsmouth, and trying to get provisions. There has been some trifling skirmishes with the militia.

To my great disappointment the French fleet have not yet appeared. If the project has not been given up they must be expected every minute; they had double the time which they wanted, and such winds as ought have brought them in four days.

I wanted to hold up the idea of my going to the Southward; but the Baron says that if the detachment is not announced, the militia will desert. He wanted me to take the command immediately, but I thought it more polite not to do it until the detachment arrives or operations are begun.