Chapter XVII: General Summary and Concluding Remarks (3)

Champollion on Egyptian hieroglyphics, 311

Charlevoix on language of savages, 349

Cheyenne language. _See_ Languages

Child, psychogenesis of, 4, 5;
emotions and instincts of, 7, 8;
intelligence of, as regards classification, 26, 27, 41, 66, 67;
instinctive and imitative articulation by, 121, 122;
understanding of words by infantile, 123;
spontaneous invention of words by, 138-143;
indicative stage of language in, 158, 218-222, 324;
denotation and connotation of, 179, 191, 218-231, 283-285;
recognizing portraits, &c., 188, 189;
rise of self-consciousness in, 200-212;
use of personal pronoun by, 201, 232, 408, 409;
hypothesis of languages having been originated by, 259-263;
undifferentiated language of, 296, 297, 317;
stages of language in, 157-193, 328;
differences between infantile and primitive man, as regards
development of speech, 329-334;
order of development of articulate sounds in, 372, 373

Cicero on the origin of speech, 240

Chimpanzee. _See_ Apes

Chinese language. _See_ Language

Classification, in relation to abstraction, 31, 32;
powers of, exhibited by a young child, 26, 66, 67;
by lower animals generally, 27-30 (_see_ also under Precepts);
of ideas, 34-39, 193;
conceptual, 78-80, 174;
of the animal kingdom by the early Jews and by Aristotle, 78, 79;
of language, 85-89;
of mental faculties artificial, 234;
of languages, 245-251

Clicks of Hottentots, 291

Clothes only worn by man, 19

Communication. _See_ Language

Complex ideas. _See_ Ideas

Compound ideas. _See_ Ideas

Comte, Auguste, on the logic of feelings and of signs, 42, 46, 47

Conception. _See_ Concepts

Concepts, defined, 34;
logic of, 47, and chap. iv.;
as named recepts, 74, 75;
as higher and lower, 76, 185;
in relation to particular and generic ideas, 76-78;
in relation to judgment and self-consciousness, 168-191;
Max Müller’s alleged, 221;
in relation to non-conceptual faculties, 234-237;
attainment of, by the individual, 230-232;
original, 269-281;
philological proof of derivation of, from recepts, 343-349

Concrete ideas. _See_ Ideas

Connotation, 88, 89, 136, 137, 157, 159-162, 169, 170, 179-184, 218,
219, 283, 284, 294 _et seq._, 368, 383, 384

Conscience. _See_ Morality

Coptic language. _See_ Language

Copula, the, 172, 173, 230, 309, 314, 387

Counting, by rooks, 56, 57, 214, 215;
by an ape, 58, 215;
by sensuous computation and by separate notation, 57, 215;
by savages, 215

Crawford on Malay language, 351

Cronise on the climate of California, 261

Crows, intelligence of, 56, 57

Cuvier on speech as the most distinctive characteristic of man, 371

D

Dammaras, counting by, 215

Darwin, Charles, on intelligence of savage man in relation to his
cerebral development, 16, 17;
on intelligence of animals, 51, 52, 54;
on pointing of sporting dogs, 97;
on expression of emotions, 103;
on psychogenesis of child, 123, 158;
on self-consciousness, 199;
on descent of man, 369, 370, 374-376, 380

Dayak language. _See_ Language

Deaf-mutes, sign-making by, 105-120;
ideation of, 149, 150, 339-341;
invention of articulate signs by, 122, 263, 367

De Fravière on sign-making by bees, 90

Demonstrative elements. _See_ Pronouns

Denomination, 88, 89, 161, 162, 168-170, 294, _et seq._

Denotation, 88, 89, 157, 158, 159, 162, 168, 179-184, 218, 219, 294
_et seq._, 368-369, 383, 384, 386

De Quatrefages, on distinctions between animal and human intelligence,
17-19;
on intelligence of a dog, 198;
on poverty of savage languages in abstract terms, 351

Dog, seeking water in hollows, 51;
making allowance for driftway, 52;
generic ideas shown by, 54, 352;
chasing imaginary pigs, 56;
idea of causation shown by, 59, 60;
pointing and backing of, 97, 98;
other gesture signs made by, 99, 100, 221;
understanding of written signs by, 101, 102;
understanding of words by, 124, 125;
alleged articulation by, 128;
Indian sign for barking, 146;
recognizing pictorial representations, 188;
practising concealment and hypocrisy, 198;
ejective ideation of, 198;
receptual self-consciousness of, 199;
counting by, 215;
begging before a bitch, 221;
deaf-mute’s articulate name of, 367

Donaldson on demonstrative elements, 244

_Dublin Review_ on psychology of judgment, 166, 167

Dumas, Alex., on sign-making, 111

Du Ponceau on language of savages, 349, 351

E

Ecitons. _See_ Ants

Egyptian language. _See_ Language

Elephant, intelligence of, 98

Ellis on early English pronunciation, 373

Emerson on fundamental metaphor, 344

Emotions of man and brutes compared, 7

Empty words, 246

_Encyclopædia Britannica_ (1857), on the origin of speech, 240

English language. _See_ Language

Etruscan language. _See_ Language

F

Farrar, Archdeacon, on demonstrative elements, 244;
on invention of languages by children, 263;
on roots of language, 268, 358;
on origin of the verb, 275;
on paucity of words in vocabulary of English labourers, 280;
on onomatopœia, 284-288, 290;
on objective phraseology of young children and early man, 301;
on the substantive verb, 309;
on fundamental metaphor, 344;
on language of savages in respect of abstraction, 350;
on absence of subjective personal pronouns in early forms of speech,
421

Feejee language. _See_ Language

Fire only made by man, 19

Fitzgerald, P. F., on self-consciousness, 212

Flight, capability of, in insects, reptiles, birds, and mammals, 156,
157

Forbes, James, on intelligence of monkeys, 100

Fox, intelligence of, 55, 56

Frogs, understanding by, of tones of human voice, 124

G

Galton, Francis, on ideas as generic images, 23;
on relation of thought to speech, 83;
on intelligence of Dammaras, 215

Garnett, on nature and analysis of the verb, 275, 307, 309-312;
on sentence-words, 300;
on primitive forms of predication, 318;
on fundamental metaphor, 344, 358;
on absence of subjective cases of pronouns in early forms of speech,
421

Geiger, on ideas, 45;
on dependence of thought upon language, 83;
on understanding of words by brutes, 127;
on roots of language, 268, 273, 336;
on distinction between ideas as general and generic, 279;
on increasing conceptuality of terms with increase of culture, 280;
on the impossibility of language having ever consisted exclusively
of general terms, 282;
on Heyse’s theory of the origin of speech, 289;
on onomatopœia, 292;
on the vanishing point of language, 314, 354;
on fundamental metaphor as illustrated by names of tools, 345, 346,
and words of moral significance, 346, 347;
on the sense of sight in relation to the origin of speech, 366, 367;
on _Homo alalus_, 380

General ideas. _See_ Ideas

Generalization. _See_ Ideas

Generic ideas. _See_ Recepts

Genitive case, philology of, 305, 385

Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, Isid., on a monkey recognizing pictorial
representations, 188

Geology, imperfect record of, 19

Gesture. _See_ Language

Gibbon. _See_ Apes

Goethe on obliteration of original meanings of words, 284

Goodbehere, S., on sign-making by a pony, 97

Gorilla. _See_ Apes

Greek. _See_ Language

Green, Professor, on self-consciousness, 212

Grimace. _See_ Language

Grimm, on the origin of speech, 240;
on names for thunder, 286;
on fundamental metaphor, 344

H

Haeckel, Professor, on _Homo alalus_, 370, 380;
on sounds made by apes, 374

Hague on sign-making by ants, 93, 94

Hale, Dr. H., on spontaneous invention of words by children, 138-144;
on the origin of languages, 259-263

Hamilton, Sir William, on ideas as abstract and general, 24, 25, 79,
80

Harper, F., on Greek tenses, 301

Haughton, Sir Graves, on roots of languages, 275

Hebrew. _See_ Language

Hegel, on absence in brutes of the idea of causality, 58;
on self-consciousness, 212

Heinieke on words spontaneously invented by deaf-mutes, 367

Hen, different tones used by, as signs to chickens, &c., 96

Herder, on the origin of speech, 240;
on the original concretism of language, 359

Herzen on self-consciousness, 212

Heyse, on onomatopœia, 285, 287;
on the origin of speech, 289;
on fundamental metaphor, 344;
on poverty of savage languages in abstract terms, 351

Hobbes on the copula, 172, 173

Hogg on a dog understanding words, 125

Holden on the vocabularies of children, 372, 373

_Homo._ _See_ Man

Horace on the origin of speech, 240

Horse, sign-making by, 97

Hoste, Sir W., on intelligence of monkeys, 101

Hottentots, language of, 291, 373, 374

Houzeau, on dogs seeking water in hollows, 51;
on tones used by the common hen as signs, 96;
on talking birds, 129, 130;
on danger signals of birds, 369

Hovelacque, on demonstrative elements, 244;
on auxiliary words, 247;
on formulæ of language-structure, 248;
on affinities of languages, 250, 255;
on limitations of consonantal sounds in various languages, 373

Huber on sign-making by insects, 88-90

Human. _See_ Man

Humboldt on the origin of speech, 240

Hun, Dr. E. R., on spontaneous invention of words by young children,
140-143

Hungarian language. _See_ Language

Huxley, Professor, on importance of the evolution theory in relation
to anthropology, 2, 3;
on animal automatism, 11;
on the brain-weight of man as compared with that of anthropoid apes,
16;
on ideas, 23, 43;
on importance of language to development of human thought, 134;
on smallness of anatomical difference which determines or prevents
power of articulation, 153, 370, 371;
on psychology of judgment, 164;
on erect attitude assumed by gibbon and gorilla, 381, 382

I

Icelandic language. _See_ Language

Ideas, definition and classification of, 20-39;
as recepts, chap. iii.;
as concepts, chap. iv.;
as general and generic, 38, 39, 68, 69, 276-281, 336, 337;
as abstract, 20-39, 70-80;
of causation in brutes, 58-60,
and in man, 210;
of uneducated deaf-mutes, 149-151;
psychological classification of artificial, 234-237;
of savages, 337, 338, 349-353

Idiots, psychology of, 104, 105;
meaningless and imitative articulation by, 121;
ideation of, 152

Incorporating. _See_ Languages

Indians, sign-making by, 105-113;
languages of, 249, 255, 259, 260

Indicative phase of language. _See_ Language

Indicative signs, or stage of language. _See_ Language

Indo-European languages. _See_ Languages

Infant. _See_ Child

Inflectional. _See_ Languages

Instinct, defined, 7;
of man and brutes compared, 7, 8

Intellect of man and brutes compared, 9

Introspection. _See_ Self-consciousness

Isolating. _See_ Languages

J

Jackdaw, sign-making by, 97

James on language of savages, 349

Javanese language. _See_ Language

Johnson, Capt., on intelligence of monkeys, 100, 101

Jones, Sir W., on the origin of speech, 240

Judgment, unconscious or intuitive, 48, 49, 189;
J. S. Mill upon, 48;
psychology of, 163-237;
G. H. Lewes upon, 164;
Professor Huxley upon, 164;
St. G. Mivart upon, 165, 166;
Professor Max Müller upon, 165;
in relation to recepts, concepts, and thought, 163-193;
Professor Sayce upon, 170;
pre-conceptual, 227-230, 278, 384, 386;
blank form of, 166, 167, 319, 320

K

Khetshua language. _See_ Language

Kleinpaul on gesture language, 120

L

Landois on sign-making by bees, 90

Langley, S. P., on intelligence of a spider, 62, 63

Language, in relation to brain-weight, 16;
abstraction dependent on, 25, 30-39;
not always necessary to thought, 81-83;
etymology and different signification of the word, 85;
categories of, 85-89;
as sign-making exhibited by brutes, 88-102;
of tone and gesture, 104-120;
articulate, spontaneously imitated by children, 138-143;
of tone and gesture in relation to words, 145-162;
stages of, as indicative, denotative, connotative, denominative, and
predicative, 157-193;
in relation to self-consciousness, 212;
growth of, in child, 218-237;
theories concerning origin of, in race, 238-242, 361-384;
evolution of, 240-245, 264, 265;
roots of, 241-245, 248, 249;
differentiation of, into parts of speech, 294-320, 339-342;
demonstrative elements of, 243-245;
of savages deficient in abstract terms, 349-353;
nursery, 365, 366;
Chinese, 246, 253, 256, 257, 265, 266, 298, 300, 317, 338, 373;
Magyar, 253;
Turkish, 253;
Basque, 258, 260, 311;
Etruscan, 258;
Hungarian, 259;
Malay, 259, 301, 305, 311, 351;
Latin, 267;
Egyptian, 297, 298, 310, 311;
English, 247, 259, 266, 338, 348, 373;
Khetshua, 263;
Hebrew, 266, 309;
Greek, 301, 310, 320;
Taic, 305;
Sanskrit, 266-277, 301, 309, 354;
Zend, 309;
Lithuanic, 309;
Icelandic, 309;
Coptic, 310;
Javanese, 311;
Malagassy, 311;
Philippine, 311;
Syriac, 311;
Dayak, 317;
Feejee, 318;
Cheyenne, 348;
Australian, 351;
Eskimo, 351;
Zulu, 351;
Tasmanian, 352;
Kurd, 352;
Japanese, 373;
Hottentot, 373, 374

Languages, number of, 245;
classification of, 245-251;
isolating, radical, or monosyllabic, 245, 246, 267, 268;
agglutinative or agglomerative, 247;
inflective or transpositive, 247, 248;
polysynthetic or incapsulating, 249;
incorporating, 245-250;
analytic, 250;
affinities of, 250-259;
native American, 249, 255, 259-263, 265, 311, 342, 348, 349, 351;
African, 260, 263, 291, 337, 338, 351, 373, 374;
Aryan and Indo-European, 266-278, 298, 304, 309, 314, 423;
Semitic, 266, 311;
Romance, 308;
Polynesian, 318

Latham, Dr., on the growth of language, 241;
on language of savages in respect of abstraction, 351, 352

Latin, roots of, 267.
_See_ also Language

Laura Bridgman, her syntax, 116;
her instinctive articulate sounds, 122

Lazarus, on ideas, 44, 45;
on origin of speech, 361

Lee, Mrs., on talking birds, 130

Lefroy, Sir John, on intelligence of a dog, 99

Leibnitz on teaching a dog to articulate, 128

Leroy on intelligence of wolf, 53;
of stag, 54, 55;
of fox, 55, 56;
of rooks, 56, 57

Lewes, G. H., on the logic of feelings and of signs, 47;
on judgment, 164;
on pre-perception, 185

Links between ape and man missing, 19

Lithuanic language. _See_ Language

Locke on ideas, 20-23, 28-30, 65, 342

Logic, of recepts, chap. iii.;
of concepts, 47, and chap. iv.

Long on gesture-language, 120

Lubbock, Sir John, on communication by ants, 94, 95;
on teaching a dog written signs, 101, 102

Lucretius on the origin of speech, 240

Ludwig on demonstrative elements, 244

M

Magyar language. _See_ Language

Malagassy language. _See_ Language

Malay language. _See_ Language

Malle, Dureau de la, on intelligence of brutes, 12

Mallery, Lieut.-Col., on sign-making by Indians and deaf-mutes, &c.,
105-112, 117-120;
on teaching a dog to articulate, 128;
on sign for a barking dog, 146;
on genetic relation between gestures and words, 342, 348, 349

Man, antecedent remarks on psychology of, 4-6;
points of resemblance between his psychology and that of brutes,
6-10;
points of difference, 10-39;
intelligence of savage, 13, 16, 17, 215, 337, 338, 349-353,
and of palæolithic and neolithic, 14, 213, 214;
corporeal structure of, 19;
animism of savage and primitive, 275;
speechless, 277;
differences between infantile, and infantile child as regards
development of speech, 329-334;
use of personal pronoun by early, 300, 301, 387-389;
hypotheses as to mode of origin of, from brute, 361-389;
superior use by, of the sense of sight, 366, 367;
possibly speechless condition of early, 370-379

Mansel, Dean, on ideas as general and abstract, 42

Maudsley, Dr., on self-consciousness, 212

Maury on poverty of savage languages in abstract terms, 351

M’Cook, Rev. Dr., on sign-making by ants, 95

Metaphor, importance of, in evolution of speech, 343-349

Meunier, on the understanding of words by brutes, 125;
on talking birds, 130

Midas, a, recognizing pictorial representations, 188

Mill, James, on the copula, 173

Mill, John Stuart, on ideas as abstract and concrete, 25;
on the logic of feelings and of signs, 41, 42;
on judgment, 48;
on connotation and denomination, 169;
on conception, 172;
on the copula, 173;
on predication, 236

Milligan on poverty of savage languages in abstract terms, 352

Mind, undergoes evolution, 4-6;
of man and brute compared, 7-39;
classification of faculties of artificial, 234

Missing links, 19

Mivart, St. George, on psychology of brutes, 10, 177;
on animal automatism, 11;
on superiority of savage mind to simian, 16;
on absence in brutes of the idea of causality, 58;
on relation of thought to speech, 83;
on categories of language, 85, 86;
on rationality of brutes, 87;
on psychology of judgment, 165-167;
on thought and reflection, 177, 178

Mixed ideas. _See_ Ideas

Moffat, R., on invention of languages by children, 263

Monboddo on the origin of speech, 240

Monkeys, general intelligence of, 60, 61, 100, 101;
discovering mechanical principles, 60, 61, 213, 214;
more intelligent and imitative than parrots, 153;
recognizing pictorial representations, 188;
understanding words, 369;
using stones to open oysters, 382

Monosyllabic. _See_ Languages

Morality, alleged to distinguish man from brute, 17-19, 346;
terms relating to, derived from ideas morally indifferent, 346, 347

Morshead, E. J., on comparative psychology, 37

Moschkan, Dr. A., on talking birds, 130

Müller, F., on sign-making by bees, 90

Müller, J., on absence in brutes of the idea of causality, 58

Müller, Professor Friedrich, on ideas, 45;
on language, as not identical with thought, 83;
on classification of languages, 245;
on sentence-words, 296;
on undifferentiated language of child, 297;
on origin of pronouns, 302;
on the genitive case, 305;
on the origin of speech, 362

Müller, Professor F. Max, on ideas, 42, 43;
on language as necessary to thought, 81, 83;
on psychology of judgment, 165;
on the copula, 173;
on origin of the personal pronoun, 210;
on evolution of language, 241;
on demonstrative elements, 244, 423;
on roots of Sanskrit, 267-289;
on undifferentiated language of young children, 296, 317;
on sentence-words, 298-300, 317;
on gesture origin of pronouns, 302,
and of language in general, 354;
on origin of adjectives, 306;
on the origin of verbs, 307;
on Chinese sentence-words, 317;
on Aristotle’s logic as based on Greek grammar, 320, 321;
on philology proving that human thought has proceeded from the
abstract to the concrete, 334-336;
on names necessarily implying concepts, 336, 337;
on fundamental metaphor, 344, 345;
on imperfection of early names, 356;
on the evolution of parts of speech, 423;
on the general theory of evolution, 432, 433

N

Names, in relation to abstract and generic ideas, 31, 32, 57, 58,
70-78, 174, 273-281, 336-339;
not always necessary for thoughts, 81-83;
or thoughts for them, 226, 336-339

Natterer, J., on the languages of Brazil, 263

Negro, intelligence of, 13;
Mr. Mivart’s use of the term to illustrate the psychology of
predication, 166, 235

Neuter insects, instincts of, 297-299

Nodier, on onomatopœia, 288;
on metaphor, 344

Noiré, on ideas, 43;
on the origin of speech, 288, 289, 379-381;
on the origin of pronouns, 302;
on fundamental metaphor, 344, 345

Nominalism, 145

Noun-substantives, appropriately used by parrots, 129, 152;
early use of, by children, 218;
of earlier linguistic growth than verbs or pronouns, 275;
not differentiated in early forms of speech, 295 _et seq._;
oblique cases of, as attribute-words, 306, 385

O

Onomatopœia, in nursery-language, 136, 244;
in relation to the origin of speech, 282-293, 339

Orang-outang. _See_ Apes

Oregon, climate and native languages of, 262

P

Palæontology. _See_ Geology

Parrots, talking of, 128-138;
use of indicative signs by, 158;
denotative and connotative powers of, 179-191, 222-226;
statements made by, 189, 190

Particular ideas. _See_ Ideas

Parts of speech, differentiation of language into, 294-320, 339-342,
423

Peckham, Mr. and Mrs., on memory in a spider, 207

Perception, analogies between reason and, 32;
constituted by fusions of sensations, 37;
in relation to other mental faculties, 48;
illusions of, 49

Perez on psychogenesis of the child, 26, 41, 158, 210

Philippine language. _See_ Language

Philology. _See_ Language

Pickering on poverty of savage languages in abstract terms, 352

Pictures recognized as portraits, &c., by infants, dogs, and monkeys,
188, 189

Pig taught to point game, 97

Poescher on the Aryan race, 273

Pointing, game by a pig, 97;
of setter-dogs, 97, 98;
as the first stage of language, 157, 158

Polynesian languages. _See_ Languages

Polysynthetic. _See_ Languages

Pony, sign-making by, 97

Pott, on the origin of speech, 240;
on language-roots, 267;
on names for thunder, 286;
on fundamental metaphor, 344

Powers on the climate of California, 261

Pre-concepts, 185-193, 218, 219, 227-230, 278, 384, 386

Predicate, the, 305, 306, 423

Predication, 88, 89, 157, 162-164, 169, 171, 175, 227, 235-237, 294
_et seq._, 384, 386, 387, 422

Prepositions not differentiated in early forms of speech, 295
_et seq._

Preyer, on psychogenesis of the child, 26, 219, 221, 222;
on sensuous computation of number, 57, 58

Primates. _See_ Apes _and_ Monkeys

Pritchard on Celtic languages, 275

Progress in successive generations, 12-15

Pronoun, first personal, 201, 232, 301, 387-389, 408, 409

Pronouns and pronominal elements, 210, 275;
not differentiated in early forms of speech, 295 _et seq._;
origin of, in gestures, 301-304, 387, 421, 422

Proposition. _See_ Predication

Psychogenesis. _See_ Child

Psychology. _See_ Mind

Q

Quadrumana. _See_ Apes _and_ Monkeys

R

Radical. _See_ Languages

Ray on different tones used by the common hen, 96

Reason in relation to perception, 32;
to sensation, 37;
and to other mental faculties in general, 48

Recepts, defined, 36-39;
logic of, 40-69;
recognized by previous writers, 40-45;
in relation to the intellectual faculties, 48-50, 234;
examples of, in the animal kingdom, 51-63;
as primitive as percepts, 64-69;
of water-fowl, 74;
in relation to judgment and self-consciousness, 176-193;
as higher and lower, 184-193;
counting by, 214, 215;
naming by, 218, 219;
of the framers of Sanskrit, 277-279;
philologically prior to concepts, 343-349

Reflection in relation to reflex action, 48.
_See also_ Thought

Reflex action, 48

Religion alleged to distinguish man from brute, 17, 19, 346

Renan on roots of Hebrew, 266

Rengger on different tones uttered by the cebus, 96

Reptiles, understanding by, of tones of human voice, 124

Ribot, Professor, on self-consciousness, 212

Richter on obliteration of the original meanings of words, 284

Romance languages. _See_ Languages

Romanes, on teaching an ape to count, 58;
on intelligence of cebus, 60, 61;
on sign-making by caterpillars, 95, 96;
on pointing of setter-dogs, 97, 98;
on sign-making by other dogs, 100, 221;
on infant intelligence, 122, 159, 160, 188, 189, 218-220, 232, 283,
324;
on dogs and apes understanding words, 124-126;
on talking birds, 129, 130;
on ideation of deaf-mutes, 149, 150

Rooks, intelligence of, 56, 57

Roots of language. _See_ Language

S

Sandwith on poverty of savage languages in abstract terms, 352

Sanskrit. _See_ Language

Sayce, Professor, on differences of degree and kind, 3;
on terms as abbreviated judgments, 170;
on the number of languages, 245;
on the affinities between languages, 250-259;
on monosyllabic origin of language, 268;
on civilization of the Aryan race, 272;
on antiquity of the Aryan race, 273;
on rarity of general terms in savage languages, 280;
on onomatopœia, 286;
on the clicks in the language of Hottentots, etc., 291, 373, 374;
on sentence-words, 299, 300, 303;
on the origin of pronouns, 302;
on the genitive case, the predicate, and the attribute, 305, 306,
313, 423;
on the evolution of nouns, adjectives, and verbs, 308;
on Aristotle’s logic as based on Greek grammar, 321;
on deficiency of savage languages in abstract terms, 352;
on Noiré’s theory of the origin of speech, 380

Schelling on parts of speech, 295, 296

Schlegel on the origin of speech, 240

Schleicher, on evolution of language, 241;
on formulæ of language-structure, 248

Scott, Dr., on psychology of idiots and deaf-mutes, 104, 105, 115,
116, 121

Scott, Sir Walter, on a dog understanding words, 125

Self-consciousness, condition to introspective reflection or thought,
175;
absent in brutes, 175, 176;
genesis of, 194-212;
philosophy and psychology of, 194, 195;
character of, in man and in brutes, 195-212;
as inward and outward, or receptual and conceptual, 199, 200;
growth of, in child, 200-212, 228, 229-234

Semitic. _See_ Languages

Sensation in relation to perception and reason, 37;
and to other mental faculties in general, 48

Sentence and sentence-words, 296 _et seq._

Sicard, Abbé, on syntax of gesture-language, 116

Sight, superior use of sense of, by man, 366, 367

Signs and sign-making. _See_ Language

Simple ideas. _See_ Ideas

Skeat, Professor, on Aryan roots of English, 266

Skinner, Major, on intelligence of elephants, 98

Smith, Rev. S., on ideation of deaf-mutes, 150

Snakes, understanding by, of tones of human voice, 124

Solomon, quoted, 195

Somnambulism in animals, 149

Speech. _See_ Language

Spider, intelligence of, 62, 63, 153, 207

Steinthal, on ideas, 45;
first issue of his _Zeitschrift_, 240;
on roots of language, 277;
on onomatopœia, 286;
on primitive forms of predication, 318

Stephen, Leslie, on intelligence of the dog, 54

Stephen, Sir James, on dependence of thought upon language, 85

Street, A. E., on vocabulary of a young child, 143, 144

Substantive. _See_ Noun _and_ Verb

Sullivan, Sir J., on talking birds, 130

Sully, J., on ideas, 40, 41;
on illusions of perception, 49;
on rise of self-consciousness in the growing child, 201-203, 207,
210, 212

Sweet, on animistic thought of primitive man, 275;
on the evolution of grammatical forms, 306, 315, 316

Syntax, of gesture-language, 107-120;
of different spoken languages, 246, 247;
of gesture-language in relation to that of early speech, 339-342,
385

Syriac language. _See_ Language

T

Taine, on psychogenesis of the child, 26, 66, 67, 180, 181;
on abstract ideas, 31, 32;
on self-consciousness, 212

Thought, distinguished from reason, 12;
absent in brutes, 29, 30;
dependent on language, 30, 31;
simplest element of, 165, 174, 215, 216;
animistic, of primitive and savage man, 275;
not necessary to naming, 226, 336-339

Toads, understanding by, of tones of human voice, 124

Tone. _See_ Language

Tools, said to be only used by man, 19;
names of, derived from activities requiring only natural organs,
345-347;
used by monkeys, 382

Threlkeld on language of savages, 349

Transposition. _See_ Languages

Tschudi, Baron von, on the Khetshua language, 262, 263

Turkish language. _See_ Language

Tylor, on sign-making by Indians and deaf-mutes, 105-108, 113-117;
on articulate sounds instinctively made by deaf-mutes, 122;
on ideation of deaf-mutes, 150

V

Varro on roots of Latin, 267

Verbs, appropriately used by parrots, 130, 152;
substantive, 167, 308-312;
early use of, by children, 219;
early origin of, 274;
not differentiated in early forms of speech, 295 _et seq._;
development of, 275, 307, 308, 385, 386

Voice. _See_ Language

Volition of man and brutes compared, 8

W

Waitz, Professor, on self-consciousness, 212;
on the sentence as the unit of language, 296

Wallace, A. R., on intelligence of savage man in relation to his
cerebral development, 15, 16

Ward on the descent of man, 365

Wasps, sign-making by, 88-90

Watson on understanding of words by brutes, 125

Wedgwood, on roots of language, 268;
on onomatopœia, 288

Westropp, H. M., on intelligence of a bear, 51

Whitney, Professor, on dependence of thought upon words, 83;
on superiority of voice to gesture in sign-making, 147, 148;
on our ignorance of polysynthetic languages, 255, 256;
on monosyllabic origin of language, 267;
on civilization of the Aryan race, 272;
on the growth of language, 290;
on priority of words to sentences, 333, 334;
on fundamental metaphor, 343;
on the possibly speechless condition of primitive man, 369

Wildman on bees understanding tones of human voice, 124

Wilkes, Dr. S., on talking birds, 131, 132, 136

Will. _See_ Volition

Wolf, intelligence of, 53

Wright, Chauncey, on language in relation to brain-weight, 16;
on self-consciousness, 199, 206, 207, 212

Wundt, Professor, on latent period in seeing and hearing, 146;
on self-consciousness, 197, 200, 201, 208, 211, 212;
on evolution of language, 265;
on the distinction between ideas as general and generic, 279, 280;
on onomatopœia, 287, 291;
on objective phraseology of primitive speech, 301;
on sentence-words, 304

Y

Youatt on a pig being taught to point game, 97

Z

Zend language. _See_ Language

Zoological affinity between man and brute, 19

FOOTNOTES:

[1] _Man’s Place in Nature_, p. 59.

[2] It is perhaps desirable to explain from the first that by the words “difference of kind,” as used in the above paragraph and elsewhere throughout this treatise, I mean difference of _origin_. This is the only real distinction that can be drawn between the terms “difference of kind” and “difference of degree;” and I should scarcely have deemed it worth while to give the definition, had it not been for the confused manner in which the terms are used by some writers—_e.g._ Professor Sayce, who says, while speaking of the development of languages from a common source, “differences of degree become in time differences of kind” (_Introduction to the Science of Language_, ii. 309).

[3] See _Mental Evolution in Animals_, chapter on the Emotions.

[4] _Mental Evolution in Animals_, p. 159. “The term is a generic one, comprising all the faculties of mind which are concerned in conscious and adaptive action, antecedent to individual experience, without necessary knowledge of the relation between means employed and ends attained, but similarly performed under similar and frequently recurring circumstances by all individuals of the same species.”

[5] Of course my opponents will not allow that this word can be properly applied to the psychology of any brute. But I am not now using it in a question-begging sense: I am using it only to avoid the otherwise necessary expedient of coining a new term. Whatever view we may take as to the relations between human and animal psychology, we must in some way distinguish between the different ingredients of each, and so between the instinct, the emotion, and the intelligence of an animal. See _Mental Evolution in Animals_, p. 335, et seq.

[6] If any one should be disposed to do so, I can only reply to him in the words of Professor Huxley, who puts the case tersely and well:—“What is the value of the evidence which leads one to believe that one’s fellow-man feels? The only evidence in this argument from analogy is the similarity of his structure and of his actions to one’s own, and if that is good enough to prove that one’s fellow-man feels, surely it is good enough to prove that an ape feels,” etc. (_Critiques and Addresses_, p. 282). To this statement of the case Mr. Mivart offers, indeed, a criticism, but it is one of a singularly feeble character. He says, “Surely it is not by similarity of structure or actions, but by _language_ that men are placed in communication with one another.” To this it seems sufficient to ask, in the first place, whether language is not action; and, in the next, whether, as expressive of _suffering_, articulate speech is regarded by us as more “eloquent” than inarticulate cries and gestures?

[7] Of course where the term Reason is intended to signify Introspective Thought, the above remarks do not apply, further than to indicate the misuse of the term.

[8] I here neglect to consider the view of Bishop Butler, and others who have followed him, that animals may have an immortal principle as well as man; for, if this view is maintained, it serves to identify, not to separate, human and brute psychology. The dictum of Aristotle and Buffon, that animals differ from man in having no power of mental apprehension, may also be disregarded; for it appears to be sufficiently disposed of by the following remark of Dureau de la Malle, which I here quote as presenting some historical interest in relation to the theory of natural selection. He says: “Si les animaux n’étaient pas suscéptibles d’apprendre les moyens de se conserver, les espèces se seraient anéanties.”

[9] John Fiske, _Excursions of an Evolutionist_, pp. 42, 43 (1884).

[10] _Natural Selection_, p. 343. It will subsequently appear, as a general consequence of our investigation of savage psychology, that of these two opposite opinions the one advocated by Mr. Mivart is best supported by facts. But I may here adduce one or two considerations of a more special nature bearing upon this point. First, as to cerebral _structure_, the case is thus summed up by Professor Huxley:—“The difference in weight of brain between the highest and the lowest man is far greater, both relatively and absolutely, than that between the lowest man and the highest ape. The latter, as has been seen, is represented by, say 12 ounces of cerebral substance absolutely, or by 32:20 relatively; but, as the largest recorded human brain weighed between 65 and 66 ounces, the former difference is represented by more than 33 ounces absolutely, or by 65:32 relatively. Regarded systematically, the cerebral differences of man and apes are not of more than generic value—his family distinction resting chiefly on his dentition, his pelves, and his lower limbs” (_Man’s Place in Nature_, p. 103). Next, concerning cerebral _function_, Mr. Chauncey Wright well remarks:—“A psychological analysis of the faculty of language shows that even the smallest proficiency in it might require more brain power than the greatest proficiency in any other direction” (_North American Review_, Oct. 1870, p. 295). After quoting this, Mr. Darwin observes of savage man, “He has invented and is able to use various weapons, tools, traps, &c., with which he defends himself, kills or catches prey, and otherwise obtains food. He has made rafts or canoes for fishing, or crossing over to neighbouring fertile islands. He has discovered the art of making fire.... These several inventions, by which man in the rudest state has become so preeminent, are the direct results of the development of his powers of observation, memory, curiosity, imagination, and reason. I cannot, therefore, understand how it is that Mr. Wallace maintains that ‘natural selection could only have endowed the savage with a brain a little superior to that of an ape’” (_Descent of Man_, pp. 48, 49).

[11] _The Human Species_, English trans., p. 22.

[12] Sundry other and still more special distinctions of a psychological kind have been alleged by various writers as obtaining between man and the lower animals—such as making fire, employing barter, wearing clothes, using tools, and so forth. But as all these distinctions are merely particular instances, or detailed illustrations, of the more intelligent order of ideation which belongs to mankind, it is needless to occupy space with their discussion. Here, also, I may remark that in this work I am not concerned with the popular objection to Darwinism on account of “missing-links,” or the absence of fossil remains structurally intermediate between those of man and the anthropoid apes. This is a subject that belongs to palæontology, and, therefore, its treatment would be out of place in these pages. Nevertheless, I may here briefly remark that the supposed difficulty is not one of any magnitude. Although to the popular mind it seems almost self-evident that if there ever existed a long series of generations connecting the bodily structure of man with that of the higher apes, at least some few of their bones ought now to be forthcoming; the geologist too well knows how little reliance can be placed on such merely negative testimony where the record of geology is in question. Countless other instances may now be quoted of connecting links having been but recently found between animal groups which are zoologically much more widely separated than are apes and men. Indeed, so destitute of force is this popular objection held to be by geologists, that it is not regarded by them as amounting to any objection at all. On the other hand, the close anatomical resemblance that subsists between man and the higher apes—every bone, muscle, nerve, vessel, etc., in the enormously complex structure of the one coinciding, each to each, with the no less enormously complex structure of the other—speaks so voluminously in favour of an uninterrupted continuity of descent, that, as before remarked, no one who is at all entitled to speak upon the subject has ventured to dispute this continuity so far as the corporeal structure is concerned. All the few naturalists who still withhold their assent from the theory of evolution in its reference to man, expressly base their opinion on those grounds of psychology which it is the object of the present treatise to investigate.

[13] In my previous work I devoted a chapter to “Imagination,” in which I treated of the psychology of ideation so far as animals are concerned. It is now needful to consider ideation with reference to man; and, in order to do this, it is further needful to revert in some measure to the ideation of animals. I will, however, try as far as possible to avoid repeating myself, and therefore in the three following chapters I will assume that the reader is already acquainted with my previous work. Indeed, the argument running through the three following chapters cannot be fully appreciated unless their perusal is preceded by that of chapters ix. and x. of _Mental Evolution in Animals_.

[14] _Human Understanding_, bk. ii., chap. ii., 10, 11. To this passage Berkeley objected that it is impossible to form an abstract idea of quality as apart from any concrete idea of object; _e.g._ an idea of motion distinct from that of any body moving. (See _Principles of Human Knowledge_, Introd. vii.-xix.). This is a point which I cannot fully treat without going into the philosophy of the great discussion on Nominalism, Realism, and Conceptualism—a matter which would take me beyond the strictly psychological limits within which I desire to confine my work. It will, therefore, be enough to point out that Berkeley’s criticism here merely amounts to showing that Locke did not pursue sufficiently far his philosophy of Nominalism. What Locke did was to see, and to state, that a general or abstract idea embodies a perception of likeness between individuals of a kind while disregarding the differences; what he failed to do was to take the further step of showing that such an idea is not an idea in the sense of being a mental image; it is merely an intellectual symbol of an actually impossible existence, namely, of quality apart from object. Intellectual symbolism of this kind is performed mainly through the agency of verbal or other conventional signs (as we shall see later on), and it is owing to a clearer understanding of this process that Realism was gradually vanquished by Nominalism. The only difference, then, between Locke and Berkeley here is, that the nominalism of the former was not so complete or thorough as that of the latter. I may remark that if in the following discussion I appear to fail in distinctly setting forth the doctrine of nominalism, I do so only in order that my investigation may avoid needless collision with conceptualism. For myself I am a nominalist, and agree with Mill that to say we think in concepts is only another way of saying that we think in class names.

[15] This simile has been previously used by Mr. Galton himself, and also by Mr. Huxley in his work on Hume.

[16] Hence, the only valid distinction that can be drawn between abstraction and generalization is that which has been drawn by Hamilton, as follows: “Abstraction consists in concentration of attention upon a particular object, or particular quality of an object, and diversion of it from everything else. The notion of the _figure_ of the desk before me is an abstract idea—an idea that makes part of the total notion of that body, and on which I have concentrated my attention, in order to consider it exclusively. This idea is abstract, but it is at the same time individual: it represents the figure of this particular desk, and not the figure of any other body.” Generalization, on the other hand, consists in an ideal compounding of abstractions, “when, comparing a number of objects, we seize on their resemblances; when we concentrate our attention on these points of similarity.... The general notion is thus one which makes us know a quality, property, power, notion, relation, in short, any point of view under which we recognize a plurality of objects as a unity.” Thus, there may be abstraction without generalization; but inasmuch as abstraction has then to do only with particulars, this phase of it is disregarded by most writers on psychology, who therefore employ abstraction and generalization as convertible terms. Mill says, “By _abstract_ I shall always, in Logic proper, mean the opposite of _concrete_; by an abstract name the name of an attribute; by a concrete name, the name of an object” (_Logic_, i. § 4). Such limitation, however, is arbitrary—it being the same kind of mental act to “concentrate attention upon a particular _object_,” as it is to do so upon any “particular _quality_ of an object.” Of course in this usage Mill is following the schoolmen, and he expressly objects to the change first introduced (apparently) by Locke, and since generally adopted. But it is of little consequence in which of the two senses now explained a writer chooses to employ the word “abstract,” provided he is consistent in his own usage.

[17] The age here mentioned closely corresponds with that which is given by M. Perez, who says:—“At seven months he compares better than at three; and he appears at this age to have visual perceptions associated with ideas of _kind_: for instance, he connects the different flavours of a piece of bread, of a cake, of fruit, with their different forms and colours” (_First Three Years of Childhood_, English trans., p. 31).

[18] _Die Seele des Kindes_, s. 87.

[19] Taine, _Intelligence_, p. 18.

[20] _Human Understanding_, bk. ii., ch. ii., §§ 5-7.

[21] If required, proof of this fact is to be found in abundance in the chapter on “Imagination,” _Mental Evolution in Animals_, pp. 142-158. It is there shown that imagination in animals is not dependent only on associations aroused by sensuous impressions from without, but reaches the level of carrying on a train of mental imagery _per se_.

[22] _Loc. cit._, pp. 397-399. Allusion may also be here conveniently made to an interesting and suggestive work by another French writer, M. Binet (_La Psychologie du Raisonnement_, 1886). His object is to show that all processes of reasoning are fundamentally identical with those of perception. In order to do this he gives a detailed exposition of the general fact that processes of both kinds depend on “fusions” of states of consciousness. In the case of perception the elements thus fused are sensations, while in the case of reasoning they are perceptions—in both cases the principle of association being alike concerned.

[23] _Mental Evolution in Animals_, p. 118.

[24] In this connection I may quote the following very lucid statements from a paper by the Secretary of the Victoria Institute, which is directed against the general doctrine that I am endeavouring to advance, _i.e._ that there is no distinction of kind between brute and human psychology.

“Abstraction and generalization only become intellectual when they are utilized by the intellect. A bull is irritated by a red colour, and not by the object of which redness is a property; but it would be absurd to say that the bull voluntarily abstracts the phenomenon of redness from these objects. The process is essentially one of abstraction, and yet at the same time it is essentially automatic.” And with reference to the ideation of brutes in general, he continues:—“Certain qualities of an object engage his attention to the exclusion of other qualities, which are disregarded; and thus he abstracts automatically. The image of an object having been imprinted on his memory, the feelings which it excited are also imprinted on his memory, and on the reproduction of the image these feelings and the actions resulting therefrom are reproduced, likewise automatically: thus he acts from experience, automatically still. The image may be the image of the same object, or the image of another object of the same species, but the effect is the same, and thus he generalizes, automatically also.” Lastly, speaking of inference, he says:—“This method is common to man and brute, and, like the faculties of abstraction, &c., it only becomes intellectual when we choose to make it so.” (E. J. Morshead, in an essay on _Comparative Psychology_, _Journ. Vic. Inst._, vol. v., pp. 303, 304, 1870.) In the work of M. Binet already alluded to, the distinction in question is also recognized. For he says that the “fusion” of sensations which takes place in an act of perception is performed automatically (_i.e._ is receptual); while the “fusion” of perceptions which are concerned in an act of reason is performed intentionally (_i.e._ is conceptual).

[25] The more elaborate analysis of German psychologists has yielded five orders instead of three; namely, _Wahrnehmung_, _Anschauung_, _Vorstellungen_, _Erfahrungsbegriff_, and _Verstandesbegriff_. But for the purposes of this treatise it is needless to go into these finer distinctions.

[26] _Outlines of Psychology_, p. 342. The italics are mine. It will be observed that Mr. Sully here uses the term “generic” in exactly the sense which I propose.

[27] _First Three Years of Childhood_, English trans., pp. 180-182.

[28] _Examination of Hamilton’s Philosophy_, p. 403.

[29] To this, Max Müller objects on account of its veiled conceptualism—seeing that it represents the “notion” as chronologically prior to the “name” (_Science of Thought_, p. 268). With this criticism, however, I am not concerned. Whether “the many pictures” which the mind thus forms, and blends together into what Locke terms a “compound idea,” deserve, when so blended, to be called “a general notion” or a “concept”—this is a question of terminology of which I steer clear, by assigning to such compound ideas the term recepts, and reserving the term notions, or concepts, for compound ideas _after they have been named_.

[30] _Logos_, p. 175, quoted by Max Müller, who adds:—“The followers of Hume might possibly look upon the faded images of our memory as abstract ideas. Our memory, or, what is often equally important, our oblivescence, seems to them able to do what abstraction, as Berkeley shows, never can do; and under its silent sway many an idea, or cluster of ideas, might seem to melt away till nothing is left but a mere shadow. These shadows, however, though they may become very vague, remain percepts; they are not concepts” (_Science of Thought_, p. 453). Now, I say it is equally evident that these shadows are _not_ percepts: they are the result of the _fusion_ of percepts, no one of which corresponds to their generic sum. Seeing, then, that they are neither percepts nor concepts, and yet such highly important elements in ideation, I coin for them the distinctive name of recepts.

[31] _Life of Hume_, p. 96.

[32] Steinthal and Lazarus, however, in dealing with the problem touching the origin of speech, present in an adumbrated fashion this doctrine of receptual ideation with special reference to animals. For instance, Lazarus says, “Es gibt in der gewöhnlichen Erfahrung kein so einfaches Ding von einfacher Beschaffenheit, dass wir es durch _eine_ Sinnesempfindung wahrnehmen könnten; erst aus der Sammlung seiner Eigenschaften, d. h. erst aus der _Verbindung_ der mehreren Empfindungen ergibt sich _die Wahrnehmung eines Dinges_: erst indem wir die weisse Farbe sehen, die Härte fühlen und den süssen Geschmack empfinden, erkennen wir ein Stück Zucker” (_Das Leben der Seele_ (1857), 8, ii. 66). This and other passages in the same work follow the teaching of Steinthal; _e.g._ “Die Anschauung von einem Dinge ist der Complex der sämmtlichen Empfindungserkenntnisse, die wir von einem Dinge haben ... die Anschauung ist eine Synthesis, aber eine unmittelbare, die durch die Einheit der Seele gegeben ist.” And, following both these writers, Friedrich Müller says, “Diese Sammlung und Einigung der verschiedenen Empfindungen gemäss der in den Dingen verbundenen Eigenschaften heisst Anschauung” (_Grundriss der Sprachwissenschaft_, i. 26). On the other hand, their brother philologist, Geiger, strongly objects to this use of the term _Anschauung_, under which, he says, “wird theils etwas von der Sinneswahrnehmung gar nicht Unterschiedenes verstanden, theils auch ein dunkles Etwas, welches, ohne dass die Bedingungen und Ursachen zu erkennen sind, die Einheit der Wahrnehmungen zu kleineren und grössern Complexen bewirken soll.... So dass ich eine solche ‘Synthesis’ nicht auch bei dem Thiere ganz ebenso wie bei dem Menschen voraussetze: ich glaube im Gegentheile, dass es sich mit der Sprache erst entwickelt” (_Ursprung der Sprache_, 177, 178). Now, I have quoted these various passages because they serve to render, in a brief and instructive form, the different views which may be taken on a comparatively simple matter owing to the want of well-defined terms. No doubt the use of the term _Anschauung_ by the above writers is unfortunate; but by it they appear to me clearly to indicate a nascent idea of what I mean by a recept. They all three fail to bring out this idea in its fulness, inasmuch as they restrict the powers of non-conceptual “synthesis” to a grouping of simple perceptions furnished by different sense-organs, instead of extending it to a synthesis of syntheses of perceptions, whether furnished by the same or also by different senses. But these three philologists are all on the right psychological track, and their critic Geiger is quite wrong in saying that there can be no synthesis of (non-conceptual) ideas without the aid of speech. As a matter of fact the _dunkles Etwas_ which he complains of his predecessors as importing into the ideation of animals, is an _Etwas_ which, when brought out into clearer light, is fraught with the highest importance. For, as we shall subsequently see, it is nothing less than the needful psychological condition to the subsequent development both of speech and thought. The term _Apperception_ as used by some German psychologists is also inclusive of what I mean by receptual ideation. But as it is also inclusive of conceptual, nothing would here be gained by its adoption. Indeed F. Müller expressly restricts its meaning to conceptual ideation, for he says, “Alle psychischen Processe bis einschliesslich zur Perception lassen sich ohne Sprache ausführen und vollkommen begreifen, die Apperception dagegen lässt sich nur an der Hand der Sprache denken” (_loc. cit._ i., 29).

[33] As stated in a previous foot-note, this truth is well exhibited by M. Binet, _loc. cit._

[34] The word Logic is derived from λόγος, which in turn is derived from λέδω, to arrange, to lay in order, to pick up, to bind together.

[35] The terms Logic of Feelings and Logic of Signs were first introduced and extensively employed by Comte. Afterwards they were adopted, and still more extensively employed by Lewes, who, however, seems to have thought that he so employed them in some different sense. To me it appears that in this Lewes was mistaken. Save that Comte is here, as elsewhere, intoxicated with theology, I think that the ideas he intended to set forth under these terms are the same as those which are advocated by Lewes—although his incoherency justifies the remark of his follower:—“Being unable to understand this, I do not criticize it” (_Probs. of Life and Mind_, iii., p. 239). The terms in question are also sanctioned by Mill, as shown by the above quotation (p. 42).

[36] _Mental Evolution in Animals_, p. 62.

[37] Special attention, however, may be drawn to the fact that the term “unconscious judgment” is not metaphorical, but serves to convey in a technical sense what appears to be the precise psychology of the process. For the distinguishing element of a judgment, in its technical sense, is that it involves an element of _belief_. Now, as Mill remarks, “when a stone lies before me, I am conscious of certain sensations which I receive from it; but if I say that these sensations come to me from an external object which I perceive, the meaning of these words is, that receiving the sensations, I intuitively believe that an external cause of those sensations exists” (_Logic_, i., p. 58). In cases, such as that mentioned in the text, where the “unconscious judgment” is wrong—_i.e._ the perception illusory—it may, of course, be over-ridden by judgment of a higher order, and thus we do not end by believing that the bowl is a sphere. Nevertheless, so far as it is dependent on the testimony of our senses, the mind judges erroneously in perceiving the bowl as a sphere. In his work on _Illusions_, Mr. Sully has shown that illusions of perception arise through the mental “application of a rule, valid for the majority of cases, to an exceptional case.” In other words, an erroneous judgment is made by the non-conceptual faculties of perception—this judgment being formed upon the analogies supplied by past experience. Of course, such an act of merely perceptual inference is not a judgment, strictly so called; but it is clearly _allied_ to judgment, and convenience is consulted by following established custom in designating it “unconscious,” “intuitive,” or “perceptual judgment.”

[38] _Descent of Man_, p. 76.

[39] See _Animal Intelligence_, pp. 465, 466.

[40] Of course the words “general idea” and “concept” here are open to that psychological objection for the avoidance of which I have coined the terms generic idea and recept.

[41] In my previous works I have already quoted facts of animal intelligence narrated by this author, but not any of those which I am now about to use.

[42] _Intelligence of Animals_, English trans., p. 20.

[43] _Ibid._, p. 107. This identical illustration appears to have occurred independently both to Mr. Darwin and Mr. Leslie Stephen. All these writers use the terms “abstract” and “general” as above; but, of course, as shown in my last chapter, this is merely a matter of terminology—in my opinion, however, objectionable, because appearing to assume, without analysis, that the ideation of brutes and of men is identical in kind.

[44] _Ibid._, pp. 43, 44.

[45] _Ibid._, p. 39.

[46] _Ibid._, p. 30. In the present connection, also, I may refer to the chapter on Imagination in my previous work, where sundry illustrations are given of this faculty as it occurs in animals; for wherever imagination leads to appropriate action, there is evidence of a Logic of Recepts, which in the higher levels of imagination, characteristic of man, passes into a Logic of Concepts.

Since publishing the chapter just alluded to, I have received an additional and curious illustration of the imaginative faculty in animals, which I think deserves to be published for its own sake. Of course we may see in a general way that dogs and cats resemble children in their play of “pretending” that inanimate objects are alive, and this betokens a comparatively high level of the imaginative faculty. The case which I am about to quote, however, appears to show that this kind of imaginative play may extend in animals, as in children, to the still higher level of not only pretending that inanimate objects are alive, but of “peopling space with fancy’s airy forms.” I shall quote the facts in the words of my correspondent, who is Miss Bramston, the authoress.