Chapter XVII: General Summary and Concluding Remarks (5)

[164] I may add that the hypothesis admits of corroboration from sources not mentioned by its author. For Archdeacon Farrar wrote in 1865:—“The neglected children in some of the Canadian and Indian villages, who are left alone for days, can and do invent for themselves a sort of _lingua franca_, partially or wholly unintelligible to all except themselves;” and he quotes Mr. R. Moffat as “testifying to a similar phenomenon in the villages of South Africa (_Mission Travels_).” He also alludes to the fact that “deaf-mutes have an instinctive power to develop for themselves a language of signs,” which, as we have seen in an earlier chapter, embraces the use of arbitrary articulations, even though in this case the speakers cannot themselves hear the sounds which they make.

While this work is passing through the press an additional paper has been published by Dr. Hale, entitled, _The Development of Language_. It supplies further evidence in support of this hypothesis.

[165] Wundt, _Vorlesungen, &c._, ii., 380, 381.

[166] Sayce, _Introduction to Science of Language_, ii, 13.

[167] The difference of opinion in question seems to arise from individual prepossessions with regard to the ulterior question whether or not the aboriginal roots of all languages must have been polysyllabic. For my own part, and for the reasons already given, I can see no presumption in favour of the view that primitive languages must all have presented the “polysinthetic genius.”

[168] _Histoire des Langues Semitique_, p. 138.

[169] _Etymological Dictionary_, p. 746.

[170] See Max Müller, _Science of Thought_, p. 332.

[171] _Ibid._, p. 404.

[172] _Ethnologische Forschungen_, ii., s. 73, _et seq._ He here quotes Varro to the effect that the roots of Latin amount to about a thousand.

[173] _Language and the Study of Language_, p. 256.

[174] Sayce, _Introduction to the Science of Language_, ii., p. 4.

[175] Geiger, _Ursprung der Sprache_, s. 16.

[176] Sayce, _loc. cit._, ii. p. 6.

[177] Wedgwood, _Etymol. Dict._, p. iii.

[178] Farrar, _Origin of Language_, p. 53.

[179] _Science of Thought_, p. 439.

[180] _Science of Thought_, p. 549.

[181] _Science of Thought_, pp. 551, 552.

[182] _Ibid._, pp. 551, 552.

[183] “The Aryan languages are the languages of a civilized race; the parent speech to which we may inductively trace them was spoken by men who stood on a relatively high level of culture” (Sayce, _Introduction, &c._, i. 56). “The primitive tribe which spoke the mother-tongue of the Indo-European family was not nomadic alone, but had settled habitations, even towns and fortified places, and addicted itself in part to the rearing of cattle, in part to the cultivation of the earth. It possessed our chief domesticated animals—the horse, the ox, the goat, and the swine, besides the dog: the bear and the wolf were foes that ravaged its flocks; the mouse and the fly were already domestic pests.... Barley, and perhaps also wheat, was raised for food, and converted into meal. Mead was prepared from honey, as a cheering and inebriating drink. The use of certain metals was known; whether iron was one of them admits of question. The art of weaving was practised; wool and hemp, and possibly flax, being the materials employed.... The weapons of offence and defence were those which are usual among primitive peoples, the sword, spear, bow, and shield. Boats were manufactured and moved by oars.... The art of numeration was learned, at least up to a hundred; there is no general Indo-European word for ‘thousand.’ Some of the stars were noticed and named; the moon was the chief measurer of time. The religion was polytheistic, a worship of the personified powers of nature” (Whitney, _Language and the Study of Language_, pp. 207, 208). For a more detailed account of this interesting people, see Poescher, _Die Arier_.

[184] “Unsere Wurzeln sind die Urwurzeln nicht; wir haben vielleicht, von keiner einzigen die erste, ursprüngliche Laut-form mehr vor uns, ebensowenig wohl die Urbedeutung” (Geiger, _Ursprung der Sprache_, s. 65). And this opinion, so far as I know, is adopted as an axiom by all other philologists.

[185] “It is impossible to bring down the epoch at which the Aryan tribes still lived in the same locality, and spoke practically the same language, to a date much later than the third millennium before the Christian era” (Sayce, _Introduction_, _&c._, ii., p. 320).

[186] This fact alone would be sufficient to dispose of what I cannot but consider, from any and every point of view, the transparent absurdity of the doctrine that “the formation of thought is the first and natural purpose of language, while its communication is accidental only” (_Science of Thought_, p. 40). Such a “purpose” would imply “thought” as already formed; and, therefore, the doctrine must suppose a purpose to precede the conditions of its own possibility.

[187] I use the term “verbs” merely for the sake of brevity and clearness. Of course there cannot have been verbs, strictly so-called, before there were parts of speech of any kind. The more accurate statement is given in the next sentence, and is the one which I desire to be understood hereafter in the short-hand expression “verbs.”

[188] “It must be borne in mind that primitive man did not distinguish between phenomena and volitions, but included everything under the head of actions, not only the involuntary actions of human beings, such as breathing, but also the movements of inanimate things, the rising and setting of the sun, the wind, the flowing of water, and even such purely inanimate phenomena as fire, electricity, &c.; in short, all the changing attributes of things were conceived as voluntary actions” (Sweet, _Words, Logic and Grammar_, p. 486).

[189] As a matter of fact, and as we shall subsequently see, there is an immense body of purely philological evidence to show that verbs are really a much later product of linguistic growth than either nouns or pronouns. This is proved by their comparative paucity in many existing languages of low development (their place being taken by pronominal appositions, &c.); and also by tracing the origin of many of them to other parts of speech. (See especially Garnett’s _Essays, Pritchard on the Celtic Languages_, _Quart. Rev._, Sept. 1876; _The Derivation of Words from Pronominal and Prepositional Roots_, _Proc. Philol. Soc._ vol. ii.; and _On the Nature and Analysis of the Verb_, ibid., vol. iii.) Later on it will be shown that in the really primitive stages of language-growth there is no assignable distinction between any of the parts of speech. Archdeacon Farrar well remarks, “The invention of a verb requires a greater effort of abstraction than that of a noun.... We cannot accept it as even _possible_ that from roots meaning _to shine_, _to be bright_, names were formed for _sun_, _moon_, _stars_, &c.... In some places, indeed, Professor Müller appears to hold the correct view, that at first ‘roots’ stood for any and every part of speech, just as the monosyllabic expressions of children do” (_Chapters on Language_, pp. 196, 197; see, also, some good remarks on the subject by Sir Graves Haughton, _Bengali Grammar_, p. 108).

[190] “Standst du dabei, als sich der Brust des noch stummen Urmenschen der erste Sprachlaut entrang? und verstandst du ihn? Oder hat man dir die Urwurzeln jener ersten Menschen vor hundert tausend Jahren überliefert? Sind das, was du als Wurzeln hinstellst, und was wirklich Wurzeln sein mögen, auch Wurzeln der Urzeit, unveränderte Reflexlaute? Sind jene deine Wurzeln älter als sechstausend, als zehntausend Jahre? und wie viel mögen sie sich in den früheren Jahrzehntausenden verändert haben? wie mag sich ihre Bedeutung verändert haben?” (Steinthal, _Zeits. b. Volkerpysch. u. Sprachwiss._, 1867, s. 76).

[191] _Supra_, p. 68, _et seq._

[192] _Ursprung der Sprache_, s. 74. To the same effect, and from the side of psychology, I may quote Wundt:—“Oft hat man desshalb in der Sprache einen Ubergang vom Abstrakten zum Konkreten zu finden geglaubt, weil dieselbe thatsächlich zunächst umfassendere, dann individuellere Vorstellungen bezeichnet und erst zuletzt wieder die Namen individueller Objekte zu Gemeinnamen stempelt. Aber was am Anfang dieser Reihe liegt ist etwas ganz anderes als was den Schluss derselben bildet: Gemeinnamen sind wirkliche Zeichen für Allgemeinvorstellungen und Begriffe. Jene ersten Vorstellungen, welche das Bewusstsein bildet und die Sprache ausdrückt, sind nicht _Allgemein_vorstellungen sondern _umfassende_ Vorstellungen. Beides ist wesentlich aus einander zu halten” (_Vorlesungen, &c._, ii. 382). The passage then proceeds to discuss the psychology of the subject.

[193] _Introduction, &c._, ii. 5, 6.

[194] And even as regards this minority (such as “to be,” “to think,” “to do,” &c.), we must remember an important consideration on which Geiger bestows a number of excellent pages. Briefly put, this consideration is that the offspring of words are everywhere proved to have progressively changed their meanings by successive steps and in divergent lines: applying this general law to the case of roots, it follows that the oldest meaning which philology is able to trace as expressed by a root, need not be anywhere near the meaning which attached to its remoter parents: the latter may have been much less conceptual.

[195] Professor Max Müller says in one place, “The Science of Language, by inquiring into the origin of general terms, has established two facts of the highest importance, namely, first, that all terms were originally general; and, secondly, that they could not be anything but general” (_Science of Thought_, p. 456). Elsewhere, however, he says, “Although during the time when the growth of language becomes historical and most accessible, therefore, to our observation, the tendency certainly is from the general to the special, I cannot resist the conviction that before that time there was a pre-historic period during which language followed an opposite direction. During that period roots, beginning with special meanings, became more and more generalized, and it was only after reaching that stage that they branched off again into special channels” (_ibid._, pp. 383, 384). Again, in his earlier work on the _Science of Language_ (vol. i., pp. 425-432), he argues in favour of terms having been aboriginally general. It will thus be seen that with reference to this question he is not consistent. Touching the first of his doctrines above quoted, Geiger pertinently observes that against such a conclusion there lies the obvious absurdity, that if a language were to consist exclusively of general terms, it would be _ipso facto_ unintelligible to its own speakers; “for what hope could there be of any mutual understanding with a language comprising only such words as “to bind,” “to sound,” &c.? (_Ursprung der Sprache_, s. 16). Clearly, Professor Max Müller’s difficulties regarding this subject are quite imaginary, and would disappear if he were to entertain the natural alternative that there is no reason to suppose aboriginal words were exclusively restricted to being either special or general—_i.e._ generic.

[196] Bunsen, _Philosophy of Universal History_, ii. 131.

[197] Professor Max Müller in all his works; but it is observable that his opposition to what he calls the “bow-wow and pooh-pooh theory” was more strenuous in his earlier publications than it is in his later.

[198] It is needless to say that innumerable instances might be quoted of this metaphorical change in the meanings of words, even in existing languages,—so much so, indeed, that, as Richter says, all languages are but dictionaries of forgotten metaphors. For example, there is a single Hebrew word of three letters which may bear any one of the following significations:—to mix, to exchange, to stand in place of, to pledge, to interfere, to be familiar, to disappear, to set, to do a thing in the evening, to be sweet, a fly or beetle, an Arabian, a stranger, the weft of cloth, the evening, a willow, and a raven. (See Farrar, _Chapters on Language_, p. 229. He adds, “Assuming that all these significations are ultimately deducible from one and the same root, we see at once the extent to which metaphor must have been at work.” For further examples of the same principle, see _ibid._, pp. 234, 251, 252.)

[199] _Science of Thought_, pp. 317, 318.

[200] Or, as Heyse puts it, many onomatopœias are not “old fruitful roots of language, but modern inventions which remain isolated in language, and are incapable of originating any families of words, because their meaning is too limited and special to admit of a manifold application” (_System_, s. 92, quoted by Farrar, _Chapters on Language_, p. 152, who also shows that words of onomatopoetic origin are not invariably sterile. When such origin is not so remote as to have become wholly obscured by a widely connotative extension, it does remain possible to trace its progeny through areas of smaller extension).

[201] “Nichtsdestoweniger bleibt es eine wichtige psychologische Thatsache, dass die Laute einen onomatopoetischen Werth haben, dass wir diesen Werth heute noch fühlen. Nur ist dieses Gefühl nicht sicher genug, um als wissenschaftlicher Beweis zu gelten, wie es denn auch bei den verschiedenen Racen verschieden ist. Die Sprachen der mongolischen Race haben zur Bezeichnung von Naturereignissen viele Onomatopöien, welche wir nicht mitfühlen. Und das ist weder zu verwundern, noch ist es ein Beweis gegen die geistige Einheit des Menschengeschlechtes. Das Gefühl wird ja vielfach durch Associationen der Vorstellungen bestimmt. Andere Associationen aber walten im Kaukasier, andere im Mongolen” (_Zeits. b. Volkerpsych. u. Sprachwissen._, 1867, s. 76).

[202] _Introduction, &c._, i., p. 108. He points out that “_bilbit_, _glut-glut_, and _puls_, are all attempts to represent the same sound.”

[203] _Chapters on Language_, p. 154.

[204] _Ueber Namen des Donners_, 1855.

[205] Steinthal’s _Zeitschrift_, &c.

[206] Professor Max Müller has argued that in the Indo-European languages the apparently onomatopoetic words signifying “thunder” are derived from the root _tan_, to “stretch,” and therefore were not of imitative origin. But Farrar has satisfactorily met this objection, even as regards this one particular case, by showing that even if not originally onomatopoetic, these words afterwards “became so from a feeling of the need that they should be” (_Origin of Language_, p. 82). See also, _Chapters on Language_, pp. 178-182; Heyse, _System_, s. 93; and Wundt, _Vorlesungen, &c._, ii. 396.

[207] See also Nodier, _Dictionnaire des Onomatopées_; and Wedgwood, _Dictionary of English Etymology_.

[208] Probably the explanation of this apparent inconsistency is to be found in the fact that Noiré’s special version of the onomatopoetic theory comes within easy distance of a hypothesis which Max Müller had himself previously sanctioned. This hypothesis, originally propounded by Heyse in his _System der Sprachwissenschaft_, is that, just as every inorganic substance in nature gives out a particular sound when struck—metal one sound, wood another, stone another, &c.—so different animals have inherent tendencies (or “instincts”) to emit distinctive sounds. In the case of primitive man this inherent tendency was in the direction of articulate speech. For my own part, I do not see that this theory explains anything; and therefore agree with Geiger, who says of it:—“Die Annahme eines jetzt erloschenen Vermögens der Sprachschöpfung und die damit zusammenhängende von einem vollkommenen Urzustande des Menschen ist eine Zuflucht zum Unbegreiflichen, und nicht weit von dem Eingeständnisse entfernt, dass es uns der Natur der Dinge nach für immer unmöglich sei, den wahren Sinn der Urwurzeln zu erkennen und den Vorgang des Sprachursprunges zu erklären. Wir würden mit einer solchen Annahme auf einen mystischen Standpunkt zurückgeführt sein, da doch schon Herder das ‘Gespenst vom Wort Fähigkeit’ bekämpft und gesagt hat: ‘Jch gebe den Menschen nicht gleich plötzlich neue Kräfte, keine sprachschaffende Fähigkeit, wie eine willkürliche qualitas occulta’” (_Ursprung der Sprache_, s. 24). Sayce, also, well remarks of this hypothesis, “It really rests upon an _a priori_ conception of the origin of speech, which is neither borne out by linguistic facts nor easily intelligible.... Such a theory of language is plainly mystical” (_Introduction to Science of Language_, vol. i., pp. 66, 67).

[209] _Encyclo. Brit._, art. “Philology,” vol. xviii., p. 769.

[210] See, for instance, Farrar, _Chapters on Language_, p. 184.

[211] See above, pp. 138-144.

[212] See above, pp. 121, 122.

[213] See _Vorlesungen, &c._, ii. 394, 395.

[214] See above, pp. 132-136.

[215] _Introduction to the Science of Language_, ii. 302.

[216] See above, pp. 138-143.

[217] _Der Ursprung der Sprache_, s. 31. His own answer to the question is as follows:—“Sind die Wörter Produkte der Natur order der Willkür? Beides und beides nicht. Kein Wort hat naturnothwendig seine bestimmte Bedeutung; insofern sind sie alle willkürlich: aber keines ist zu seiner Bedeutung durch menschliche Willensthätigkeit gekommen” (_ibid._, s. 113).

[218] Schelling, _Einl. in die Philos. d. Mythologie_, s. 51.

[219] _Anthropologie der Naturvölker_, i., 272. See also, F. Müller, _Grundriss der Sprachwissenshaft_, I. i. 49.

[220] _Science of Language_, ii. 91, 92.

[221] _Grund. d. Sprachwiss._, i., 43.

[222] _Ægypten_, i. 324.

[223] Sayce, _Introduction, &c._, i. 119, 120.

[224] _Science of Thought_, 423-440.

[225] Sayce, _Introduction, &c._, i. 111.

[226] _Ibid._, i. 113, 114.

[227] Sayce, _Introduction, &c._, i. 121.

[228] _Science of Thought_, p. 242.

[229] Garnett, _Philolo. Essays_, p. 87.

[230] _Ibid._, 77, 78.

[231] Farrar, _Origin of Language_, p. 99. The passage continues, “We might have conjectured this from the fact already noticed, that children learn to speak of themselves in the third person—_i.e._ regard themselves as objects—long before they acquire the power of representing their material selves as the instrument of an abstract entity.” He also alludes to “some admirable remarks to this effect in Mr. F. Whalley Harper’s excellent book on the _Power of Greek Tenses_;” and recurs to the subject in his more recently published _Chapters on Language_, p. 62. I could quote other authorities who have commented upon this philological peculiarity of early pronouns; but will only add the following in order to show how the peculiarity in question may continue to survive even in languages still spoken. “The Malay _ulun_, ‘I,’ is still ‘a man’ in Lampong, and the Kawi _ugwang_, ‘I,’ cannot be separated from _nwang_, ‘a man’” (Sayce, _Introduction_, ii. 26). Lastly, Wundt has pointed out that this impersonal form of speech is distinctive, not only of early pronominal elements, but also of early forms of predication. For instance, “Die ersten Urtheile, die in das Bewusstsein hereinbrechen, _subjektlose_ Urtheile sind, und dass die Prädikate derselben stets eine sinnliche Vorstellung ausdrücken. ‘Es leuchtet es glänzt, es tönt,’—solcher Art sind die Urtheile, die der Mensch zuerst denkt und zuerst ausspricht. Jenes Prädikat, dass sogleich bei der Wahrnehmung eines Gegenstandes sich aufdrängt, wird zur Bezeichnung des Gegenstandes selber. ‘Das Leuchtende, Glänzende, Tönende,’—solcher Art find die Wörter, die ursprünglich in der Sprache gebildet werden” (_loc. cit._, ii. 377).

[232] _Science of Thought_, p. 221.

[233] _Ibid._, p. 554.

[234] _Ibid._, 241.

[235] Sayce, _Introduction, &c._, ii. 25; see also to the same effect, Bleek, _Ursprung der Sprache_, 70-72; F. Müller, _Grundriss der Sprachwissenshaft_, I., i., s. 40; and Noiré, _Logos_, p. 186. The chief ground of this scepticism is that it is difficult to conceive how a word could ever have gained a footing if it did not from the first present some independent predicative meaning. But it seems to me that the force of this objection is removed if we remember the sounds which are arbitrarily invented by young children and uneducated deaf-mutes, not to mention the inarticulate clicks of the Bushmen. Moreover, there is nothing inimical to the pronominal theory in the supposition that pronominal elements, even of the most aboriginal kind, were survivals of still more primitive sentence-words—a supposition which would of course remove the difficulty in question. But, as explained in the text, this difficulty, even if it could not be thus met, would really not be one of any importance to my exposition.

[236] _Introduction, &c._, i. 117.

[237] _Introduction, &c._, ii. 301. Or, as Wundt puts it, “Die demonstrative Wurzel ist daher eine demonstrirende Pantomime in einen Laut übersetzt” (_Vorlesungen, &c._, ii. 392).

[238] Sayce, _Introduction, &c._, i. 415. See also F. Müller, _loc. cit._, I. i. 2, p. 2, for another statement of the same facts referred to by Sayce.

[239] Sayce, _Introduction, &c._, i. 416.

[240] Sweet, _Words, Logic, and Grammar_, in _Trans. Philo. Soc._, 1867, p. 493.

[241] _Science of Thought_, p. 442.

[242] See especially Garnett, _On the Nature and Analysis of the Verb_.

[243] _Science of Thought_, p. 223.

[244] _Ibid._, p. 442.

[245] Sayce, _Introduction, &c._

[246] I refer the reader to what is said on both these aspects of the verb in question by my opponents (see pp. 165-167.)

[247] Farrar, _Origin of Language_, pp. 105, 106.

[248] Garnett, _On the Nature and Analysis of the Verb_, _Proc. Philo. Soc._, vol. iii.

[249] Sayce, _Introduction, &c._, i. 415.

[250] Geiger, _Development of the Human Race_, English trans., p. 22.

[251] Sweet, _Words, Logic, and Grammar_, in _Trans. Philol. Soc._, 1876, pp. 486, 487.

[252] Sweet, _loc. cit._, pp. 489, 490.

[253] Bleek, _Ursprung der Sprache_, s. 69, 70.

[254] _Science of Thought_, p. 241.

[255] Steinthal, _Charakteristik, &c._, 165, 173.

[256] Garnett, _Philological Essays_, p. 310.

[257] _Ibid._, p. 311.

[258] _Ibid._, p. 312.

[259] _Ibid._, p. 314.

[260] See Chapter on Speech, p. 166.

[261] I may remark that it was Aristotle who first fell into the error of identifying the copula with the verb _to be_, by which it happens to be expressed in Greek. For many centuries afterwards this error was a fruitful source of endless confusions; but it is curious to find a wholly new fallacy springing from it in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Touching the subject and predicate, Aristotle, of course, never contemplated any more primitive relation between them than that which obtained in the only forms of speech with which he was acquainted. As regards his “categories” the following remarks by Professor Max Müller are worth quoting:—

“These categories, which proved of so much utility to the early grammarians, have a still higher interest to the students of the science of language and thought. Whereas Aristotle accepted them simply as the given forms of predication in Greek, after that language had become possessed of the whole wealth of its words, we shall have to look upon them as representing the various processes by which those Greek words, and all our own words and thoughts, too, first assumed a settled form. While Aristotle took all his words and sentences as given, and simply analyzed them in order to discover how many kinds of predication they contained, we ask how we ever came into possession of such words as _horse_, _white_, _many_, _greater_, _here_, _now_, _I stand_, _I fear_, _I cut_, _I am cut_. Anybody who is in possession of such words can easily predicate, but we shall now have to show that every word by itself was from the first a predication, and that it formed a complete sentence by itself. To us, therefore, the real question is, how these primitive sentences, which afterwards dwindled away into mere words, came into existence. The true categories, in fact, are not those which are taught by grammar, but those which produced grammar, and it is these categories which we now proceed to examine” (_Science of Thought_, p. 439).

[262] Sayce, _Introduction, &c._, ii. 229. He adds, “Had Aristotle been a Mexican, his system of logic would have assumed a wholly different form.”

[263] _Introduction, &c._, i, 15.

[264] In these considerations I find myself able largely to reconcile what has always been regarded as a contradiction between the views of Professor Whitney and those of other philologists on the subject of sentence-words. Partly following Schleicher—who maintains the doctrine still more unequivocally—he regards the word as having been historically prior to the sentence. This, of course, is in contradiction to the doctrine of the sentence having been historically prior to the word, which, as we have seen, is the doctrine now held by philologists in general. But, now, what the latter doctrine really amounts to is, that words were sentences before they were names—predicative before they were nominative; and, as I understand it, Whitney’s objection to this doctrine is really raised on grounds of psychology. If so, the above considerations show that he is perfectly right. Intellectually, primitive man was fully capable of acquiring the use of words as names; and, therefore, psychologically considered, it was only an accident of social environment which prevented him from so doing.

[265] _Science of Thought_, pp. 432, 433.

[266] Pp. 281, 282, note.

[267] _Ursprung der Sprache_, s. 65. For the original German, see the passage as previously quoted on page 273, note.

[268] As pointed out in a previous chapter, curious ambiguity attaches to this term. For, as used in biology, it means the _hitherto undifferentiated_, while in psychology and elsewhere a “generalization” means the _synthetically integrated_. But, as psychologists never speak of ideas as “generalized,” I here use the word in its biological sense. See also above, pp. 277-280.

[269] _Ursprung der Sprache_, s. 69, 70.

[270] Bleek entertains no doubt on this point.

[271] Compare also close of Chapter VII. (pp. 138-144), where the children mentioned by Dr. Hale are shown to have adopted the syntax of gesture-language in their spontaneously devised spoken language.

[272] Chapter VI., pp. 114-120.

[273] _Sign-Language, &c._, p. 284. On page 352, this writer further supplies a most interesting comparison between gesture and spoken language as both are used by the North American Indians—showing that the syntax in the two cases is identical.

[274] Whitney, _Encyclo. Brit._, _loc. cit._, p. 770. It is interesting to note that the psychological importance of this principle was clearly enunciated by Locke:—“It may lead us a little towards the original of all our notions and knowledge, if we remark how great a dependence our words have on common sensible ideas; and how those which are made use of to stand for actions and notions quite removed from sense, have their rise from thence, and from obvious sensible ideas are transferred to more abstruse significations, and made to stand for ideas that come out under the cognizance of our senses” (_Human Understanding_, iii. i. 5).

[275] Whitney, _Encyclo. Brit._, p. 770. See also Nodier, _Notions de Linguistique_, p. 39; Garnett, _Essays_, p. 89; Grimm, _Gesch. d. d. Sprache_, s. 56 _et seq._; Pott, _Metaphern vom Leben, &c._, _Zeitschr. fur Vergl. Sprachf. Jahrg._, ii., heft 2; Heyse, _System, &c._, s. 97; and Farrar, _Origin of Language_, 130; _Chapters on Language_, pp. 67, 133, 204-246. He refers to the above, and quotes the following passages from Emerson and Carlyle:—“As the limestone of the Continent consists of infinite masses of shells of animalcules, so language is made up of images and tropes, which now, in their secondary use, have long ceased to remind us of their poetic origin” (_Essays on the Poets_). “Language is the flesh-garment of Thought. I said that Imagination wore this flesh-garment; and does she not? Metaphors are her stuff. Examine Language. What, if you except a few primitive elements of natural sound, what is it all but metaphors recognized as such, or no longer recognized; still fluid and florid, or now solid-grown and colourless? If those same primitive elements are the osseous fixtures in the flesh-garment of Language—then are metaphors its muscles, its tissues, and living integuments. An unmetaphorical style you shall in vain seek for: is not your very _attention_ a _stretching-to_?” (_Sartor Resartus_, ch. x.).

[276] _Science of Thought_, p. 329.

[277] _Science of Language_, p. 123.

[278] _Logos_, p. 258, _et seq._

[279] Geiger, _Address delivered before the International Congress for Archæology and History at Bonn_, 1868.

[280] Geiger, _A Lecture to the Commercial Club of Frankfort-on-the-Main_ (1869).

[281] Perhaps the most interesting department of fundamental metaphor is that wherein the metaphor is found by philological research to have reference, not to any natural object, quality, &c., but to a pre-existing action or gesture as already made by man himself for the purpose of conveying information, expressing his emotions, &c. For fundamental metaphor of this kind obviously brings us within seeing distance of the time when the audible signs of articulations were born of the visible signs of gesture and grimace. In illustration of this branch of our subject I will only quote one passage; but the reader will at once perceive how easy it would be to furnish many other instances from the etymology of words now in habitual use.

“The further a language has been developed from its primordial roots, which have been twisted into forms no longer suggesting any reason for their original selection, and the more the primitive significance of its words has disappeared, the fewer points of contact can it retain with signs. The higher languages are more precise because the consciousness of the derivation of most of their words is lost, so that they have become counters, good for any sense agreed upon and for no other.

“It is, however, possible to ascertain the included gesture even in many English words. The class represented by the word _supercilious_ will occur to all readers, but one or two examples may be given not so obvious and more immediately connected with the gestures of our Indians. _Imbecile_, generally applied to the weakness of old age, is derived from the Latin _in_, in the sense of on, and _bacillum_, a staff, which at once recalls the Cheyenne sign for _old man_ [previously mentioned]. So _time_ appears more nearly connected with [Greek: teinô], to stretch, when information is given of the sign for _long time_, in the Speech of Kin Chē-ĕss, in this paper, namely, placing the thumbs and forefingers in such a position as if a small thread was held between the thumb and forefinger of each hand, the hands first touching each other, and then moving slowly from each other, as if _stretching_ a piece of gum-elastic” (Mallery, _Sign-Language, &c._, p. 350). This writer also says, with reference to the uncivilized languages which he has specially studied, “In the languages of North America, which have not become arbitrary, to the degree exhibited by those of civilized man, the connection between the idea and the word is only less obvious than that still unbroken connection between the idea and the sign, and they remain strongly affected by the concepts of outline, form, place, position, and feature on which gesture is founded, while they are similar in their fertile combination of radicals. Indian language consists of a series of words that are but slightly differentiated parts of speech following each other in the order suggested in the mind of the speaker without absolute laws of arrangement, as its sentences are not completely integrated. The sentence necessitates parts of speech, and parts of speech are possible only when a language has reached that stage where sentences are logically constructed. The words of an Indian tongue, being synthetic or undifferentiated parts of speech, are in this respect strictly analogous to the gesture elements which enter into a sign-language. The study of the latter is therefore valuable for comparison with the words of the former. The one language throws much light upon the other, and neither can be studied to the best advantage without a knowledge of the other.”

[282] There are certain writers, such as Du Ponceau, Charlevoix, James, Appleyard, Threlkeld, Caldwell, &c., who have sought to represent that the languages of even the lowest savages are “highly systematic and truly philosophical,” &c. But this opinion rests on a radically false estimate of the criteria of system and philosophy in a language. For the criteria chosen are exuberance of synonyms, intricacies or complications of forms, &c., which are really works of a low development. The fallacy is now acknowledged to be such by all philologists. Even Farrar, who at first himself fell into this error (_Origin of Language_, p. 28), in his subsequent work writes:—“Further examination has entirely removed this belief. For this apparent wealth of synonyms and grammatical forms is chiefly due _to the hopeless poverty of the power of abstraction_. It would not only be no advantage, but even an impossible encumbrance to a language required for literary purposes. The transnormal character of these tongues only proves that they are the work of minds incapable of all subtle analysis, and following in one single direction an erroneous and partial line of development.... If language proves anything, it proves that these savages must have lived continuously in a savage condition” (Farrar, _Chapters on Language_, pp. 53, 54, who also refers to numerous authorities).

[283] The term “conception” here is, of course, equivalent to my term “pre-conception.” When my daughter uttered her first denotative word “star,” she was, indeed, bestowing a name; but it was the name of a recept, not of a concept.

[284] Farrar, _Chapters on Language_, pp. 198, 199.

[285] _Mithridates_, iii. 325, 397. See also Pott, _Etym. Forsch._, ii. 167; and Heyse, _System_, 132.

[286] Latham, _Races of Man_, p. 376.

[287] Quatrefages, _Rev. des Deux Mondes_, Dec. 15, 1860; Maury, _La Terre et l’Homme_, p. 433.

[288] _Mem. sur le Syst. Gram., &c._, p. 120.

[289] _Malay Grammar_, i., p. 68, _et seq._

[290] _Journl. Ameri. Orient, Soc._, i. No. 4, p. 402.

[291] Casalis, _Grammar_, p. 7.

[292] Pickering, _Indian Languages_, p. 26.

[293] _Vocabulary of the Dialects of some of the Aboriginal Tribes of Tasmania_, p. 34.

[294] _Introduction, &c._, vol. ii., p. 6.

[295] _Ibid._, vol. i., p. 379.

[296] _A Lecture delivered at Frankfort_, 1869.

[297] _Science of Thought_, p. 245.

[298] _Essays_, p. 89.

[299] _Chapters on Language_, p. 133.

[300] Herder, _Abhandl._, s. 122.

[301] _Das Leben der Seele_, ii. 47.

[302] _Grundriss der Sprachwissenschaft_, i. 35, 36.

[303] See, for example, F. Müller, _loc. cit._, i. 36, 37.

[304] Some of the supporters of the interjectional theory in this extreme, not to say extravagant form, appear to go on the assumption that primitive and hitherto speechless man already differed from the lower animals in presenting conceptual thought. This assumption would, of course, explain why man alone began to invest his instinctive cries, &c., with the character of names. But, from a psychological point of view, any such assumption is obviously a putting of the cart before the horse. I make this remark in order to add that the objection would not apply if the ideation were supposed to be _pre-conceptual_—_i.e._ beyond the level reached by any brute, though not yet distinctively human. Later on, I myself espouse a theory to this effect.

[305] _E.g._ by Mr. Ward, in his _Dynamical Sociology_.

[306] Differences of opinion are entertained by philologists concerning the value of “nursery-language,” or “baby-talk,” as a guide to the probable stages of language-growth in primitive man. Without going into the arguments upon this question on either side, it appears to me that the analogy as above limited cannot be objected to even by the most extreme sceptics upon the philological value of infantile utterance. And it is only to this extent that I anywhere use the analogy.

[307] For cases, see Heinieke, _Beobachtungen über Stumme_, s. 137, &c.

[308] _Ibid._, s. 73.

[309] _Mental Evolution in Animals_, p. 238.

[310] The carnivorous habits of this animal (which is named as a new species) are most interesting. It is surmised that in its wild state it must live upon birds; but in the Zoological Gardens it is found to show a marked preference for cooked meat over raw. It dines off boiled mutton-chops, the bones of which it picks with its fingers and teeth, being afterwards careful to clean its hands. It mixes a little straw with the mutton as vegetables, and finishes its dinner with a dessert of fruits. But a more important point is that this animal answers its keeper in vocal tones—or rather grunts—when he speaks to it, and these tones are understood by the keeper as indicative of different mental states. I have spent a great deal of time in observing this animal, but the publicity and other circumstances render it difficult to do much in the way of experiment or tuition. With regard to teaching her to count, see above, p. 58; and with regard to her understanding of words, p. 126.

[311] “If there once existed creatures above the apes and below man, who were extirpated by primitive man as his especial rivals in the struggle for existence, or became extinct in any other way, there is no difficulty in supposing them to have possessed forms of speech, more rudimentary and imperfect than ours” (Professor Whitney, Art. _Philology_, _Ency. Brit._, vol. xviii., p. 769).

[312] Houzeau gives a very curious account of his observations on this subject in his _Facultés Mentales des Animaux_, tom. ii., p. 348.

[313] _Descent of Man_, p. 87.

[314] _Descent of Man_, p. 87.

[315] This term is used by Haeckel as synonymous with _Pithecanthropoi_, or the ape-like men, who are supposed to have immediately preceded _Homo sapiens_ (_History of Evolution_, English trans., vol. ii., p. 293). In the next instalment of work I will consider what has to be said in favour of this view from the side of my anthropology. Meanwhile, it is sufficient to bear in mind that, as previously stated, great as is the psychological difference introduced by the faculty of speech, for the attainment of this faculty anatomical changes so minute as to be imperceptible were all that seem to have been required. “The argument, that because there is an immense difference between a man’s intelligence and an ape’s, therefore there must be an equally immense difference between their brains, appears to me to be about as well based as the reasoning by which one should endeavour to prove that, because there is a ‘great gulf’ between a watch that keeps accurate time and another that will not go at all, there is therefore a great structural hiatus between the two watches. A hair in the balance-wheel, a little rust on a pinion, a bend in a tooth of the escapement, a something so slight that only the practised eye of the watchmaker can discover it, may be the source of all the difference. And believing, as I do, with Cuvier, that the possession of articulate speech is the grand distinctive character of man (whether it be absolutely peculiar to him or not), I find it very easy to comprehend, that some equally inconspicuous structural difference may have been the primary cause of the immeasurable and practically infinite divergence of the human from the simian stirps” (Huxley, _Man’s Place in Nature_, p. 103).

[316] Here I will ask the reader to bear in mind the considerations above adduced from Geiger, as to the encouragement which must have been given to a semiotic use of vocal sounds by habitual attention being given to the movements of the mouth in significant grimace—such attention being naturally bestowed in larger measure by an intelligent ape-like creature which was accustomed to depend chiefly on its sense of sight, than it would be by any of the existing quadrumana.

[317] For sign-making among the social insects, see above, pp. 88-95.

[318] Here, be it observed, the element of truth which belongs to the first of the three hypotheses that we are considering comes in. Compare foot-note on page 364: _Homo alalus_, though not yet a conceptual thinker, is nevertheless in possession of a higher receptual life than has ever been attained by a brute, and is correspondingly more capable of utilizing as signs interjectional or other sounds which emanate from the “purely physiological grounds” of his own organization.

[319] See Preyer, _loc. cit._, for a detailed account of the order in which the consonants are developed in the growing child. Also Professor Holden, on the _Vocabularies of Children_, in _Proc. Amer. Philolo. Ass._, 1877. There can be no doubt that vowel sounds must have been of early origin in the race; but in what order the consonants may have followed is much more doubtful. For different races now exhibit great differences with regard to the use—and even to the capability of using—consonantal sounds; the Chinese, for instance, changing _r_ into _l_, while the Japanese change _l_ into _r_. And, of course, the whole science of comparative philology may be said to be based upon a study of the laws of “phonetic change.” But it is obviously a matter of no importance in what particular order the different articulate sounds were first evolved. According to Prince Lucien Bonaparte, who has investigated the matter with much care, the total number of these sounds that can be possibly made by the human organs of vocalization is 385. See, also, Ellis, on _Early English Pronunciation_; and, for the limitation of consonants in various languages of existing races, Hovelaque, _Science of Language_, English trans., pp. 49, 61, 81.

[320] “When we remember the inarticulate clicks which still form part of the Bushman’s language, it would seem as if no line of division could be drawn between man and beast, even when language is made the test” (Sayce, _Introduction, &c._, ii., p. 302).

[321] _Ursprung der Sprache_, s. 52.

[322] _Introduction, &c._, ii., 302: by “thought” of course he means what I mean by recepts.

[323] Here also compare the first of the three hypotheses, the important elements of truth in which are, as I have already more than once observed, to be considered as adopted by Mr. Darwin’s hypothesis, and therefore also by the present one.

[324] The song of the gibbon has already been alluded to in a quotation from Darwin. I may here add that the chimpanzee “Sally” not unfrequently executes an extraordinary performance of an analogous kind. The song, however, is by no means so “musical.” It is sung without any regard to notation, in a series of rapidly succeeding howls and screams—very loud, and accompanied by a drumming of the legs upon the ground. She will only thus “break forth into singing” after more or less sustained excitement by her keeper; but more often than not she refuses to be provoked by any amount of endeavour on his part.

[325] Compare quotations from the German philologists in support of the first hypothesis, pp. 361, 362.

[326] See pp. 288-290.

[327] _Welt als Entwickelung der Geists_, s. 255. This book, however, was not published until 1874—_i.e._ some years after the _Descent of Man_.

[328] This is likewise the view that was ably supported by Geiger on philological grounds, _Ursprung der Sprache_, 1869; and by Haeckel on grounds of general reasoning, _History of Creation_, English trans., 1876.

[329] “How many of the roots of language were formed in this way it is impossible to say; but when we consider that there is no modern word which we can derive from such cries as the sailor makes when he hauls a rope, or the groom when he cleans a horse, it does not seem likely that they can have been very numerous” (Sayce, _Introduction, &c._, i., p. 110).

[330] With regard to the erect attitude, we must remember that, although the chimpanzee and orang never adopt it, the only other kinds of anthropoid apes—namely, gorilla and gibbon—frequently do so when progressing on level surfaces. In the case of the gorilla, indeed, although the fore-limbs quit the ground and the locomotion thus becomes bipedal, the body is never fully straightened up; but in the case of the gibbon the erect attitude may be said to be complete when the animal is walking. (Huxley, _Man’s Place in Nature_, pp. 36-49). With regard to the selection and use of stones as tools, Commander Alfred Carpenter, R.N., thus describes the _modus operandi_ of monkeys inhabiting islands off S. Burmah:—“The rocks at low-water are covered with oysters. The monkeys select stones of the best shape for their purpose from shingle of the beach, and carry them to the low-water mark, where the oysters live, which may be as far as eighty yards from the beach. This monkey has chosen the easiest way to open the rock-oyster, namely, to dislocate the valves by a blow on the base of the upper one, and to break the shell over the attaching muscle” (_Nature_, vol. xxxvi., p. 53. In connection with this subject see also _Animal Intelligence_, p. 481).

[331] See above, p. 220.

[332] See pp. 220-222.

[333] See pp. 179-181.

[334] See above, pp. 300, 301.

[335] Whitney.

[336] Sayce.

[337] Farrar.

[338] Garnett.

[339] Sayce.

[340] Max Müller.

[341] See especially _Science of Thought_, chaps, ii. and iv. The following quotations may suffice to justify this statement. “If once a genus has been rightly recognized as such, it seems to me self-contradictory to admit that it could ever give rise to another genus.... Once a sheep always a sheep, once an ape always an ape, once a man always a man.... What seems to me simply irrational is to look for a fossil ape as the father of a fossil man.... Why should it be the settled or ready-made Pithecanthropus who became the father of the first man, though everywhere else in nature what has once become settled remains settled, or, if it varies, it varies within definite limits only? (pp. 212-215).... If the germ of a man never develops into an ape, nor the germ of an ape into a man, why should the full-grown ape have developed into a man? (p. 117).... Let us now see what Darwin himself has to say in support of his opinion that man does not date from the same period which marks the beginning of organic life on earth—that he has not an ancestor of his own, like the other great families of living beings, but that he had to wait till the mammals had reached a high degree of development, and that he then stepped into the world as the young or as the child of an ape” (p. 160), &c., &c. So far as can be gathered from these, and other statements to the same effect, it does not appear that Professor Max Müller can ever have quite understood the theory of evolution, even in its application to plants and animals. For these are not criticisms upon that theory: they are failures to appreciate in what it is that the theory itself consists.

[342] _Ursprung der Sprache_, s. 84.

[343] _Ursprung der Sprache_, s. 119.

[344] It would be no answer to say that by “names” he means only signs of ideas which present a conceptual value—or, in other words, that he would refuse to recognize as a name what I have called a denotative sign. For the question here is not one of terminology, but of psychology. I care not by what terms we designate these different sorts of signs; the question is whether or not they differ from one another in kind. If the term “name” is expressly reserved for signs of conceptual origin, it would be no argument, upon the basis of this definition, to say that there cannot be names without concepts; for, in terms of the definition, this would merely be to enunciate a truism: it would be merely to say that without concepts there can be no concepts, nor, _à fortiori_, the signs of them. In short, the issue is by no means one as to a definition of terms; it is the plain question whether or not a non-conceptual sign is the precursor of a conceptual one. And this is the question which I cannot find that Max Müller has adequately faced.

[345] _Ursprung der Sprache_, s. 91. The exact words are, “Die Sprache hat die Vernunft erschaffen: vor ihr war der Mensch vernunftlos.” It is needless to observe that the word which I have rendered by its English equivalent “Reason” is here used in the sense of conceptual thought.

[346] Wundt, _Vorlesungen, &c._, ii. 282.

End of Project Gutenberg's Mental Evolution in Man, by George John Romanes