Chapter XXIX: Conclusion (2)

The people will be compelled to build the roads for private corporations, and, after they are built, pay toll or fare for the privilege of using them. The people pay for the roads, yet they do not own them, and have no interest in them, or right to use them except upon payment of such sums as the private corporations owning them may choose to demand. We insist that no such power is vested in the legislatures or in congress. If the power does exist--if the people can be compelled to build railroads for private corporations--in the language of a distinguished judge of the state of New York, "It is legal robbery, less respectable than highway robbery, in this: that the perpetrator of the latter assumes the danger and infamy of the act, while this act has the shield of legislative responsibility." The effect of this decision is to make railroad companies a component part of the government, to draw more clearly the line between the people and the combination of monopolies that now control the country. When the court of last resort in the nation comes boldly to the front, and by an edict (for it cannot be treated as a judicial decision) declares that unless there is an "absence of all possible public interest, so clear and palpable as to be perceptible by every mind at first blush," the power to levy and collect taxes in aid of railroads owned and controlled by private corporations exists, the people have reason to fear that the interests of railroads and not the constitution of the country is the paramount law. But says the court, "That railways, though constructed by private corporations and owned by them, are public highways, has been the doctrine of nearly all the courts ever since such conveniences for passage and transportation have had an existence. Very early the question arose whether a state's right of eminent domain could be exercised by a private corporation created for the purpose of constructing a railway. Clearly it could not, unless taking land for such a purpose was taking land for public use. The right of eminent domain nowhere justifies the taking of property for private use. Yet, it is a doctrine universally accepted that a state legislature may authorize a private corporation to take land for the construction of such road, making compensation to the owner. What else does the doctrine mean if not that building a railway, though it be built by a private corporation, is an act done for a public use. And the reason why the use has always been held a public one is that such a road is a public highway, whether made by the government itself or by the agency of corporate bodies, or even by individuals, when they obtain their power to construct it from legislative grant." If the court had been employed as the attorneys of the parties seeking to collect the tax, no more ingenious or partisan argument could have been made for the claimants than is presented in this opinion. As a finishing argument in favor of the taxing power, the court says: "Whether the use of a railway is a public or a private one depends in no measure upon the question who constructed it or who owns it." The court decides that railroads are used for public purposes; that the right of eminent domain attaches to them; that, being used for public purposes, and having the right of eminent domain, they are public highways; and, being public highways, taxes may be levied upon the people to aid private parties in constructing them. We have quoted enough of this decision to give the reader an idea of the train of reasoning resorted to by the court to support the theory that railroads owned and controlled absolutely by private parties are public highways, and that the people may be taxed to build and maintain them. If the supreme court of the United States possessed the power under the constitution to pass upon the constitutionality of the law of the state of Wisconsin, we would be compelled to accept this decision as the law of the case; to acknowledge that as a question of law private railroads were public highways; yet, as a matter of fact, we would still have to insist that they remained private roads, over which the public could ride or ship freight upon making compensation to the owners, just as they could ride or ship freight upon a steamboat or common road wagon upon paying the required amount to the owner or master. While legislatures grant to railroad companies the right to appropriate the lands of others in procuring the right of way, upon making compensation therefor, no part of the price for this right of way is paid by the government or the public. It is paid by the companies building the roads. We are not prepared to admit that the grant of this privilege to railroad companies makes them a part of the government, or that it clothes them with any of the attributes of sovereignty. Taxes can only be levied for public purposes, for the support of the government, and for the benefit of the public. The compulsory payment of taxes to private corporations cannot be supported upon any other basis than of our government being a despotism and not a constitutional republic. We have before referred to the action and decisions of the supreme court on questions arising between the people and corporations, and only refer to it here for the purpose of showing the necessity of reform. The action of the courts shows that, whatever may have been their intention, they have departed from old constructions of the constitution; that judicial legislation has superseded constitutional restrictions and limitations, and that the personal views of the judges constituting a majority of the court have become the supreme law of the land.

Another noticeable fact is that the recently appointed judges are the most prominent in this new departure. We make the assertion that the supreme court of the United States does not possess the power under the constitution to overrule or disregard the decision of a state court upon questions arising under state laws and constitutions. No paragraph, line, or syllable, of the constitution of the United States confers this power upon the supreme court, save when the state law or constitution contravenes some provision of the constitution of the United States, or some statute passed in aid of constitutional provisions. If the reader will examine the decisions from which we have been quoting, he will find that the rights of the states and of the people, expressly guaranteed by the constitution, have been, by a bold and unwarranted assumption by the United States supreme court, obliterated. The decision of the supreme court of a state, whose decision was final and binding upon the supreme court of the United States, has been overruled and declared null and void, not by virtue of any constitutional right vested in the United States court, but by an assumption of power making the will of that court the supreme law, and placing corporations beyond the control of the states granting them their charters. The fact that the reason upon which the decision is based appears in the nature of an apology for the decision, while constitutional rights are lost sight of, proves the truth of our assertion, that judges of courts are subject to influences that control other men, and that the interest of monopolies and not the constitutional rights of the people has a controlling influence in the highest court in the nation. It also demonstrates the fact that no thorough reform can be effected until the constitution of our common country shall control the decisions of the courts.

In proof of the facts that the decisions of the supreme court of the United States are not always controlled by the constitution, let us again refer to the legal tender decisions. Here again, the opinion of a bare majority of the court (five of the judges concurring and four dissenting) establishes the law for forty millions of people, and does violence to both the letter and spirit of the constitution. Under the constitution the power to coin money and regulate its value is vested in congress. The states are prohibited from coining money, and from making anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts. The letter of the constitution does not deny to congress the power to issue paper money and make it a legal tender; but when we take into consideration that the power is denied to the states, the conclusion is irresistible that the power was intended to be denied to the general, as well as to the state governments. While as a war measure the power might be exercised, it certainly could not be in time of peace. Being one of the extraordinary powers vested in congress in time of war, rising above the constitutional restriction, if we may use the expression, governed by the law of necessity, the power should not be enlarged by judicial interpretation, nor should the plain letter of the acts of congress passed as war measures be made to extend beyond its express provisions. When the highest court in the nation decided that the legal tender act was ultro-active in its operations, that court decided, in effect, that under the constitution congress possessed the power to annul contracts made between private citizens, that one might legally take from another a part of his property without compensation. While that court has uniformly decided that bonds obtained from counties, cities, and towns fraudulently, and without consideration, must be paid, it decides that a retroactive statute may be passed which takes a man's property without consideration; and that congress, without any such power being conferred by the constitution, can substitute a new standard of values. Not only that congress can do this, but that the legal tender act extended beyond its plain reading, and made paper money, a thing that is of no intrinsic value, a legal tender for debts generally; that this paper was the standard of values, and that coin, gold and silver, were but articles of commerce, the value of which was fixed by this new paper standard. If one not learned in the law had been called upon to interpret the constitution he would have arrived at a different conclusion. If ten years ago one learned in the law had been called upon to interpret the meaning of the constitutional provision above referred to, he would, without hesitation, have decided that such an act was unconstitutional. If the eminent jurists who graced the supreme bench at any time since the organization of our government had been required to decide as to the validity of the statute, or to construe its terms, or declare its meaning, a realizing sense of the obligation resting upon them, and of the danger of violating the provisions of the constitution, would have deterred them from making such a decision. When, in the winter of 1869, the question was before the court, upon careful examination Chief Justice Chase, who was the author of the statute under which the question arose, and four other judges, decided that it only applied to contracts made after its passage, and then only as a war measure. The supreme court of the United States declared that the legal tender act had no retro-active operation, and that, under the constitution, it could not be extended beyond its terms. That to extend it further would be a violation of the fundamental law. Here the matter should have ended. The decision was and should have remained final. But it did not meet the approval of corporation rings and Wall street gamblers. They demanded a different decision, and their demand was gratified. To obtain a reversal without a reconstruction of the court was not expected. It was suddenly discovered that there was a necessity for an additional judge. The reason given was that an even number of judges might divide and no decision could be rendered. Hence the necessity for one more. It was known to them that one judge was about to resign, and that one had concurred in the decision which they desired reversed. Two judges were to be appointed. If both were in favor of reversal, then five of the nine would favor a reversal. (We have referred to this matter before, and do it now for a purpose that will soon appear.) Two railroad attorneys, Strong and Bradley, were recommended and appointed before the close of the term of the court at which the legal tender decision had been rendered. Notice was at once given that the legal tender case would again be presented to the court for a decision. It was announced, both before and after the appointment of Messrs. Strong and Bradley, that they were committed to a reversal of the legal tender decision. Soon after these _fresh caught railroad attorneys_ had taken their seats upon the supreme bench, we find them redeeming the pledges the friends of a reversal claimed had been made, and writing long arguments in favor of a reversal of the opinion of Chief Justice Chase and the four other eminent judges, in which argument they seem to disregard constitutional restrictions, and to apologize for the opinions they pronounced, declaring that treasury notes are a legal tender for all debts, save those that are excepted in favor of the government. Thus by the appointment of two judges, understood to be pledged to the railroad interests, the supreme law of the United States makes paper "promises to pay" a legal tender when contracts call for money; fixes this kind of paper as the standard of values, and makes gold and silver coin articles of commerce, and at the same time the constitution makes coin a legal tender and the standard of values, and prohibits the states from making anything but coin a legal tender. To serve a particular _interest_ and benefit railroad corporations, the personal views of these two judges, approved by three others, became the supreme law of the land, in disregard of the plain letter of the constitution, as well as the decisions of the same court upon the same statutes made but a few months before.

We have been thus particular in referring to this decision and the means used to procure it, for the purpose of showing that the idea of exacting pledges of men who are candidates for judicial position is not new, and that those who apparently look with alarm at what they are pleased to term an innovation upon long established precedents, as well as an attempt to destroy the independence of the courts of the country, have themselves been successfully practicing the same thing, and securing the election and appointment of judges whose views accorded with their own.

FOURTH.--_Judicial and Partisan Legislation Reviewed, and a Remedy Suggested._--The consequence of special legislation in favor of railroad corporations, the granting of subsidies of land and bonds, is not what is claimed by the advocates of such legislation. It has placed the whole producing interests of the country at the mercy of soulless corporations. It has given railroad corporations title to, and absolute control of, enough of the public land to make an empire of vast extent. Lands that of right belong to the people, are owned by these corporations, and instead of the nominal price fixed by the government upon them, our pioneers, who settle and develop the country, must pay whatever sum is demanded by these corporations, or content themselves with such lands as they can find in less desirable localities.

It has given to railroad corporations the absolute control of the coal lands of the country, so that in the future, as well as at the present time, at all points where there is a scarcity of timber, the people are compelled to pay such prices as are, and in the future will be, demanded of them or perish with cold.

It has established an unequal and unjust system of taxation, by means of which corporations are relieved from the payment of their just proportion of the public taxes. It sanctions and supports bare frauds upon the public, in permitting corporations to add to their capital stock at pleasure, making the apparent cost of these roads much greater than they really are, and permitting them to extort from the people for transportation of freights sufficient amounts to pay the interest and dividends on this "watered stock." It has taken from the people the rights guaranteed to them by the constitution, and transferred their rights to railroad companies. These are a part of the evil consequences of partial and special legislation in favor of corporations; and they could be speedily remedied, but for the decisions of the courts.

These decisions we have noticed, and have shown that whatever may have been the intention of the courts rendering them, their tendency has been to strengthen and uphold the mighty power asserted by corporations. Where conflicts have arisen between counties and municipalities on the one side, and these corporations on the other, the courts have treated these railroad companies as private corporations, and have decided in their favor. When the majority of a legislature, believing that corporations were subject to legislative control, have attempted to restrict their powers, and correct their abuses, the courts have said their charters were in the nature of contracts, which the legislature could not alter or amend, and the people have been compelled to submit. When the question of the right to levy taxes for the purpose of building railroads is to be decided, another phase of the question is presented. All the courts agree that taxes cannot be levied for a private purpose. The difficulty is met and overcome in this way:

_First._--It is announced that railroad corporations have the right of eminent domain, that this right is an attribute of sovereignty; and for this reason they must be considered public corporations. We have referred to this already, but refer to it again for the purpose of showing that the argument is not sound. The right of eminent domain is possessed by the supreme power of the nation. It belongs to all governments. Of right it is not inherent in, nor can it be acquired by, any private person or corporation. If the right is ever exercised by any corporation, company, or individual, it must be by the permission of the governing power; in this country by legislative grant. If it belonged to corporations they could exercise it without the consent of the legislature. They could themselves decide how, when, and where they would exercise it. They could prescribe the mode of condemning the property of others to their own use, and no power in government could question their acts. It will not be contended that without special legislative enactment, railroad companies could appropriate the property of others for the purpose of building their roads upon it. All will agree that before they can do this, the legislature must confer the right upon them. Does the act of granting to corporations the right to build their roads through the property of others confer upon them any of the attributes of sovereignty? If so, the legislature possesses the power of granting its attributes to corporations or to any private person. It would be immaterial whether a single person, a company, or a corporation, desired to build a railroad. To make such person, company, or corporation a part of the government, the legislature need but delegate to the party desiring to build a railroad the right of eminent domain; and from that moment the individual or corporation becomes a part of the government. A moment's reflection will convince the reader that the position is untenable. If one of the attributes of sovereignty can be _farmed out_ to railroad corporations, another can be to some other interest, and in process of time the government itself would become a mere skeleton, having delegated all its powers to private parties, remaining only a government in name. From time immemorial, the legislature has granted to various parties the same kind of privileges that are granted to railroad companies; yet it never was, and is not now claimed, that because of such grants, the parties obtaining them became public corporations, or that they were clothed with any of the attributes of sovereignty. Ferry companies, plank-road companies, and turnpike road companies, have been chartered with power to take the property of others, and place their ferries, buildings, and roads upon the property so taken, upon payment of the appraised value. In many of the states laws have been enacted under which private parties have been granted the same privilege. Persons building mills are permitted to construct dams across streams and appropriate such portions of the overflowed lands of adjoining owners to their own use, upon payment of its value as found by appraisers. A and B, and their associates, desire to build a mill; in the construction of their dam they cause the backwater to flood the land of C. Under the provisions of the statute a jury is called, who assess the value of the land of C so overflowed and appropriated by A and B. The mill is built for the accommodation of the public. All who desire to do so can take their grain to this mill and have it ground upon payment of the required toll. The owners have, under the statute, the same right of eminent domain that is conferred upon railroad companies; and their mill is used expressly for grinding for all who patronize it and pay the required toll. The owners of the railroad, and the owners of the mill alike, serve the public. Both do it for a pecuniary consideration. Both have the same right of appropriating the property of others. Yet the railroad, under the decisions of the courts, is a public corporation, while the mill is a private one. The railroad corporation is clothed with one of the attributes of sovereignty, while the owners of the mill retain their character as a private corporation. No good reason appears for this distinction. While we admit that the supreme court of the United States has decided that because of the fact of legislatures having granted to railroad companies the right to appropriate the lands of other persons to be used as road-beds, they become public corporations, and that until reversed we must accept it as the law, we contend that as long as the railroads are owned and controlled by private parties, and their earnings are appropriated and used exclusively for private purposes, the facts are in direct conflict with the law as declared by the supreme court, and that either the facts or the law must be changed before they harmonize.

_Second._--It has also been decided by the courts that railroads are public highways (an absurdity on its face, that under the law railroads are public highways, while they are owned and controlled by private companies, who become public corporations because of one of the attributes of sovereignty having been conferred upon them), and that, because they are public highways, taxes can be levied upon the people for building and repairing them. The fact being admitted that private parties own and control railroads; that the government receives no part of their earnings, and that neither the government nor private persons can ride upon them without paying for the privilege, or procuring a pass, and that no freights can be shipped over them without payment of the amounts demanded, seems to conflict with the decisions of the courts. Under the decisions of the supreme court, the property of the citizen is taken from him without compensation, and bestowed upon a private corporation, and the plain provision of the constitution has received a new interpretation, which compels the property owners to bestow a part of it on corporations without any consideration whatever. The situation is about as follows: When a conflict arises between the people and railroad corporations, or when the legislature attempts to reform abuses practiced by them, the courts hold that railroad charters are in the nature of contracts, and that the legislature can neither alter, amend, or repeal them. The companies are then treated as private corporations. In proof of this look at the following decision, of recent date:--

"SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

"_The Wilmington & Weldon Railroad Company, Plaintiff in error, vs. John A. Reid, Sheriff, etc.--In error to the Supreme Court of the State of North Carolina._

"Mr. Justice Davis delivered the opinion of the court:--

"This is a writ of error to the supreme court of the state of North Carolina, and brings up the question whether the recent legislation of the state, concerning the collection of taxes, is, as it affects the plaintiff in error, in violation of that provision of the constitution of the United States which declares that no state shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts. As early as 1833, the general assembly of North Carolina incorporated the Wilmington & Weldon railroad company, for the purpose of constructing a railroad in the state, and inserted a provision in the charter 'that the property of said company, and the shares therein, shall be exempted from any public charge or tax whatsoever.' It has been so often decided by this court that a charter of incorporation granted by a state creates a contract between the state and the corporators, which the state cannot violate, that it would be a work of supererogation to repeat the reasons on which the argument is founded. It is true that when a corporation claims an exemption from taxation, it must show that the power to tax has been clearly relinquished by the state, and if there be a reasonable doubt about this having been done, that doubt must be solved in favor of the state. (The Binghampton Bridge Case, 3 Wallace.) If, however, the contract is plain and unambiguous, and the meaning of the parties to it can be clearly ascertained, it is the duty of the court to give effect to it, the same as if it were a contract between private persons, without regard to its supposed injurious effects upon the public interests.

"It may be conceded that it were better for the interests of the state that the tax-paying power, which is one of the highest and most important attributes of sovereignty, should on no occasion be surrendered. In the nature of things, the necessities of the government cannot always be foreseen, and in the changes of time the ability to raise revenue from every species of property may be of vital importance to the state, but the courts of the country are not the proper tribunals to apply the corrective to improvident legislation of this character. If there be no constitutional restraint on the action of the legislature on this subject, there is no remedy, except through the influence of a wise public sentiment, reaching and controlling the conduct of the law-making power.

"There is no difficulty whatever in this case. The general assembly of North Carolina told the Wilmington & Weldon railroad company, in language which no one can misunderstand, that if they would complete the work of internal improvement for which they were incorporated, their property and the shares of their stockholders should be forever exempt from taxation. This is not denied, but it is contended that the subsequent legislation does not impair the obligation of the contract, and this presents the only question in the case. The taxes imposed are upon the franchise and rolling stock of the company, and upon lots of land appurtenant to and forming part of the property of the company, and necessary to be used in the successful operation of its business. It certainly requires no argument to show that a railroad corporation cannot perform the functions for which it was created without owning rolling stock, and a limited quantity of real estate, and that these are embraced in the general term property. Property is a word of large import, and, in its application to this company, included all the real and personal estate required by it for the successful prosecution of its business. If it had appeared that the company had acquired either real or personal estate beyond its legitimate wants, it is very clear that such acquisitions would not be within the protection of the contract. But no such case has arisen, and we are only called upon to decide upon the case made by the record, which shows plainly enough that the company has not undertaken to abuse the favor of the legislature.

"It is insisted, however, that the tax on the franchise is something entirely distinct from the property of the corporation, and that the legislature, therefore, was not inhibited from taxing it. This position is equally unsound with the others taken in this case. Nothing is better settled than that the franchise of a private corporation--which, in its application to a railroad, is the privilege of running it and taking fare and freight--is property, and of the most valuable kind, as it cannot be taken for public use even, without compensation. (Redfield on Railways, p. 129, sec. 70.) It is true it is not the same sort of property as the rolling stock, road-bed, and depot grounds, but it is equally with them covered by the general term, 'the property of the company,' and, therefore, equally within the protection of the charter.

"It is needless to argue the question further. It is clear that the legislation in controversy did impair the obligation of the contract which the general assembly of North Carolina made with the plaintiff in error, and it follows that the judgment of the supreme court must be reversed. It is so ordered, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings, in conformity with this opinion.

"D. W. MIDDLETON,
"C. S. C. U. S."

When the question of the right to levy taxes upon the people, for the purpose of building railroads, is before the courts, they decide that such right exists: First, because the right of eminent domain has been conferred upon the company; and, second, because the railroads are public highways; so, that, in every phase the question assumes, the decisions of the courts are in favor of these corporations, and adverse to the people.

Notwithstanding the fact that the decisions of the courts fix the status of the railroad corporations as public in their nature, the real fact remains that railroads are owned and controlled by private parties, and it is a mere fiction of law to call them public; and while we accept the decisions as law, the facts are unchanged. The effect of the legislation to which we have referred is apparent to all. It has strengthened corporations, enlarged their powers, and constantly encroaches upon the rights of the people. So great has this evil become that almost the entire population of the country, not under the control of or interested in railroad corporations, are demanding a change of legislation, and relief from the oppressions heaped upon them by these monopolies.

But the injuries inflicted upon the people by the decisions of the courts are far greater than those resulting from legislation. By the decisions of the supreme court of the United States, the distinction between public and private rights has been obliterated; the constitution of the country has become of no more binding force than statute laws. State statutes and the decisions of state courts have been overridden and annulled where the interests of corporations were to be subserved; the settled decisions of the same court have been overruled, and a new doctrine, in conflict with the settled interpretation of the fundamental law of the land, has been announced, which makes the people the vassals of railroad corporations. The rights of the people and the states have been disregarded, and the edicts of the supreme court have been substituted for constitutional law. By the decree of that court, railroad corporations are clothed with the attributes of sovereignty, and the people are compelled to pay taxes to aid in the construction of their roads. That court has engaged in judicial legislation, and fastened upon the people a despotic government, with railroad corporations as their rulers. If it be true that railroad corporations are public and not private, they are not subject to the control of state courts or state legislatures. They are not by their charters, or the powers derived from legislative grants, made public corporations, and if they are public, they are made so by the decisions of the supreme court, or by some assumed power not visible to the public eye. It is contended by some, that if it is fully established that they are public corporations, the state legislatures and the state courts can regulate and control them. Is this so? Will not that fact take from the states all jurisdiction over them? The decision making railroad corporations public, also makes their roads public highways extending throughout the country. It is claimed that the general government, having power to regulate commerce between the states, can take control of all the railroads in the United States. No power is conferred upon state legislatures, in many of the states, to grant charters to railroad companies, conferring upon them any sovereign powers. And by the constitutions of some of the states they are deprived of the power of aiding in any works of internal improvement. As a consequence, there could not be uniform legislation among the states in relation to railroads. Being public highways, and the corporations being also public, the power of regulating and controlling them, and preventing discrimination among the states, would belong to the general government, and these powerful corporations, chartered by the state in which they are located, could defy state authority. With a congress composed of their friends, and a supreme court already committed to their interests, the people would be powerless. But on the other hand, if (as we insist is the fact) railroad companies are private corporations, then they are within the jurisdiction, and subject to the control of, the authorities of the states in which they are located. This we insist is the true status of railroad corporations, and the courts, by their decisions, cannot change this character. The decisions of the courts of the different states and of the nation have not been of a character to command the respect of the people, and unless we accept the last edict of the supreme court of the nation, as the supreme law of the land, and admit that it supersedes the constitutions and statutes of the states, as well as the decisions of the state courts, it is difficult to determine the character of railroad corporations and their relation to the people. Accepting that decision as final, the constitution of the United States is of but small value, and state governments are of but little benefit to the people. Upon the various questions that have arisen in connection with the construction of railroads, and the rights of the people, and railroad corporations respectively, there has been such confusion in the decisions of the courts, as well as contradiction, reversals, and overrulings, that there now exists a necessity for the regular issue of a judicial bulletin, like the market reports, that the people may know what is the latest interpretation of the constitution. By the supreme court of the state of Iowa, it was decided to be constitutional for counties and cities to subscribe stock to railroad companies, and that there was a statute authorizing such subscriptions. By the same court it was decided, overruling the above named decision, that the constitution did not confer the power to subscribe stock to railroad companies, and that there was no law of the state authorizing such subscription. The whole matter arose under the constitution and laws of the state. The supreme court of the United States overruled this last decision of the state courts, and decided that such subscription was constitutional and was authorized by the laws of the state. The courts of the states of Pennsylvania, Illinois, Indiana, Wisconsin, Missouri, and others, made like decisions, and the supreme court of the United States overruled them. The legislatures of some of the states--Iowa, Wisconsin, and Michigan included, passed statutes authorizing local aid in shape of a tax to be voted to railroad companies. The supreme courts of these states decided that the statutes were unconstitutional, and within fifteen months thereafter the supreme court of Iowa decided that the Iowa act was constitutional. Like decisions were made in some of the other states. In Wisconsin the state courts decided the act was unconstitutional, and the supreme court of the United States overruled that decision and decided that the act was constitutional. Some of the state courts hold that railroad corporations are private, whilst others decide that they are public. The supreme court of the United States, by its decisions, clothes them with one of the attributes of sovereignty, and declares that under the law they are public corporations, and that their roads are public highways. The same court, upon the legal tender issues, decided that treasury notes were not legal tender for debts contracted before the enactment of the statute providing for their issue. In a few months after that decision was made, and after the friends of railroad corporations had so reconstructed the court as to have a majority of the court in favor of a re-hearing of the question, the same _high court_ decided that treasury notes were not only legal tender for all debts (save those excepted by the statutes), but that they were the standard of values. In all of the above decisions made by the supreme court of the nation, either reversing the decisions of the state courts, or reversing and overruling its own decisions, such reversals and overrulings were in favor of the corporations and against the people. When courts, whose duty it is to declare the law and interpret the constitution, differ so widely and change so often, it is not strange that the people should begin to look with suspicion upon, and doubt the binding force of, these decisions; and when it is received as a truth, that in the appointment of judges care was taken to select men who were pledged to decide important issues then pending, in accordance with the interests and expressed wishes of railroad companies, it will not appear strange that the people, before voting for a judge, should demand of him a pledge in favor of measures advocated by them, or that he at least should pledge himself to abstain from judicial legislation and from twisting the meaning of the constitution to suit the views of the monopolists who are already clothed with too much power. If it is important that men elected to congress and state legislatures should be in sympathy with the people in their struggle to regain their rights, now usurped by the different monopolies of the country; and if it is necessary that the executive departments of the state and national government should be filled with men who are friends of the people and in favor of restricting corporations within proper and legitimate bounds,--it is of vastly more importance that the seats of justice, the courts of the country, should be filled and controlled by men who, instead of deciding cases according to their own personal views of what the constitution ought to be, will accept it in letter and spirit as it is, and decide accordingly. An inordinate desire to interpret the fundamental law, to give it a new meaning, or, as it is commonly expressed, for amending the constitution by judicial legislation, seems to have seized the courts, and has been followed to such length as to make it almost impossible for even the courts themselves to decide when an act is constitutional and when it is not. A new decision is made as often as a new judge is appointed, not unfrequently overruling the long settled decisions of the courts. These decisions, no matter how absurd or unjust, must be accepted by the whole country as the supreme law of the land. Of late years, by accident or design, most of the decisions on questions of a general nature have been adverse to the interests of the people, and in favor of monopolies. Newly appointed judges, scarcely warm in their seats, have not hesitated to overrule the decisions of "Marshall," of "Story," and "Chase;" to disregard the views of "Webster," of "Adams," of "Jefferson," of "Washington," and "Hamilton," on constitutional questions. Their own personal views have been substituted for constitutional law, until the protection that instrument is supposed to afford the private citizen is entirely destroyed, and the absolute control of the government is transferred to the few monopolists, who, under the sanction of the courts, oppress the whole people. Whatever reform may be effected in the legislative and executive departments of the government, no real reform can obtain without a reformation of the courts.

FIFTH.--_The Effect of the Legal Tender Decision, and its Antidote._--The power of congress to issue treasury notes and government paper as a war measure, is not denied. The authority or the right, under the constitution, to make government promises to pay (treasury notes) legal tender, is not admitted. We have already treated of the legal tender decisions; of the reconstruction of the court, and the means used to secure the appointment of judges to insure a majority in favor of the validity of the legal tender act, and its general application to all debts save those excepted in the act, no matter at what time they were contracted. We recur to this subject again for the purpose of showing its effect upon the financial interests of the country. Whatever may have been the views of congress in passing the act, or of the court in declaring it constitutional, it has proved disastrous to the interests of the people, and of great benefit to the corporate oligarchy that now rules the country. Whatever may have been the views of the majority of the court, or the motives that prompted and controlled that majority in rendering the legal tender decisions, these decisions have proved disastrous to the interests of the people, and added greatly to the already great power of corporations and Wall street speculators. In our commerce with foreign nations we are obliged to use _money_ or its equivalent. While the acts of congress and the decisions of courts may make treasury notes legal tender for all domestic debts, and all foreign debts payable in this country, neither the acts of congress nor the decisions of courts can have any power or controlling influence over other nations. Debts due from us payable in foreign countries must be paid in coin or its equivalent. Our governmental promises to pay will not pass current as money in foreign countries, even though accompanied and supported by the decision of the supreme court, deciding that they are to be received by us as legal tender in all of our transactions. No one will claim that treasury notes are money, or that they are of intrinsic value. It is because the government is pledged to redeem this class of paper with coin that it has a market value. All other nations recognize coin--gold and silver--as the measure of values. It is the standard for all other articles of barter or sale. It is _money_. All other issues are but the representatives of money. Debts due from us, payable in foreign countries, must be paid in money; legal tender will not answer. But if debts due us from persons residing in other countries are to be paid here, the debtors can take their money, buy our legal tender at a discount of fifteen or twenty dollars to the hundred, and discharge their debts, saving for themselves the difference between coin and paper. The confidence we have in the promises of the government to redeem in coin is all that makes treasury notes pass current, or gives them a market value.

The hope of an early resumption of specie payment is blasted by the legal tender decision. Its effect is to drain the United States of coin in our commerce with foreign nations, thus making it impossible to resume. Our coin grows less from day to day, and the secretary of the treasury is obliged to sell gold in New York at short intervals and in large amounts, in order to prevent the Wall street brokers making a margin of twenty-five per cent or more between coin and government paper. While stock jobbers and gold brokers make large profits in the appreciated price of gold; and railroad companies, in paying their bonds, make a net gain to the amount of the difference in value between gold and legal tender currency, the farmers and producers suffer loss to the amount of this difference in disposing of their products. When wheat is sold for one dollar per bushel, the seller gets but eighty-four cents, or just the value of treasury notes, and not one dollar in money, as he imagines, because the dollar he gets has no intrinsic value, but sells at its market worth, coin being the standard of values.

Another result of the legal tender decision is to make the value of farm products dependent upon the operations of Wall street sharpers. Legal tenders are the standard of values, says the court; coin and all marketable articles have their values measured by treasury notes. The price of treasury notes fluctuates. This fluctuation is not caused by any real change in the relative value of coin and treasury notes, but results from the dealings and operations in Wall street. If the "bulls" corner gold, its value rises, or, more properly speaking, treasury notes depreciate in value. When the "bears" control the market, the price of treasury notes advances. This legal measure of values is constantly changing, and with its rise and fall the prices of western products also rise or fall. Railroads, railroad stocks and bonds, and the currency of the country, as well as the coin, are all under the control of Wall street operators, and as long as treasury notes are treated as legal tender, these same operators will control the markets of the whole country.

The legal tender acts and decisions, in effect, provide an irredeemable paper currency for the people, and coin for the government. Duties on imports must be paid in coin. Wall street brokers have the coin of the country cornered; the importer must buy it of them; he pays it to the government; government sells it to the broker, and he again sells it to the importer. It cannot get into general use, because the brokers preserve so great a margin between gold and paper as to drive all coin from circulation. They monopolize the gold market, and, under the legal tender decision, control the money market of the whole country. This state of things must continue until the legal tender act is repealed or the decisions of the supreme court are reversed.

The imagination cannot devise a more perfect system for the subjection of the best interests of the people to the control of railroad and monied corporations and companies, and Wall street brokers and gamblers. It needed but the legal tender decision to make it perfect; to subject the whole country to the rule of rings and combinations of unscrupulous and dishonest men; to reduce the people to a state of vassalage more degrading than that of the Russian serfs. In name we are a free people, protected by the constitution of our country; in fact, we are the servants of these giant monopolies. We retain of the proceeds of our labor such portion as they graciously permit us to keep. With the congress of the United States, and the legislatures of most of the states, committed to their interests, and the supreme court of the nation issuing its edicts in their favor, they can defy the people and continue their oppressions.