Chapter XXX: Conclusion (3)

SIXTH.--_Popular Measure of Relief Discussed.--The Nature of the Reform Needed._--We recognize no higher human power than the will of the people. When the servants of the people, elected and appointed to represent their interests in legislative bodies, or to decide upon questions affecting public interests, prove recreant to the trusts and interests confided to them, the people--the sovereign power--can remove them in the method provided by the fundamental law, or, if this cannot be effected, then the people have the right, the God-given right, to resort to nature's first law for self-preservation. If by legislation the rights of the people are taken from them, then that power, retained by the whole people to be exercised when their rights are refused them--that power which is inherent in the supreme rulers of our country--can be exercised. Under our system of government it should not be asserted save in the last extremety. When all other means fail; when redress can be obtained in no other way, then the people, as supreme rulers, should arise in their majesty, and, by the exercise of their reserved rights, _take_ what their servants have denied them. As a people, we have not yet reached the point which would justify extreme measures. While the different monopolies of which we have been treating, by their shrewd management, by the use of their money, and by concert of action, have obtained almost unlimited control of all the departments of the government, numerically they comprise but a small part of the population of the country. Their success is to be attributed to two causes: their systematic organization, and their unlimited control of the finances of the country. We might add, as a further cause of their success, the inattention of a large majority of the people to the political affairs of the country, and their willingness to follow a few political leaders, to whom they seem to have entrusted the entire control of the politics of the country. As a rule, we submit to wrongs in the administration of the affairs of states, as well as the national government, until we individually suffer from their mal-administration, then, what has been termed the "sober second thought of the people" manifests itself, and reforms are effected. The situation of the affairs of the nation, and the great power that the monopolists have obtained in the land, have aroused that "sober second thought," and never in the history of our government has there been more urgent need of action on the part of the people. Never were issues presented that demanded more earnestly the united efforts of all who love and prize constitutional liberty. The evils of which we have been treating can be remedied by demanding of all who fill official positions a recognition of the superior binding force of the constitution. It is not to be expected that those men filling official places in the legislative and judicial departments of the government, who, from interest and custom, have become addicted to the habit of giving new meanings and interpretations to the constitution, will reform the abuses that have been rapidly accumulating, or that they will manifest any zeal or alacrity in stripping the railroad corporations and other monopolies of the great powers conferred upon them, or that any real reformation can be effected without a thorough change of public servants. No matter what political party has control of the government, or to what party the men selected to fill the different offices belong, or with what political organizations they affiliate, unless they acknowledge the superior binding force of the fundamental law they should be requested to vacate their official positions, and their places should be filled by men who are willing to acknowledge the binding force of the constitution, and will pledge themselves to abstain from judicial legislation. Men elected to congress and state legislatures are the servants of the people, elected to protect their interests; hence, their will should control the action of members of congress and state legislatures. Being elected to serve the people and not to promote selfish interests or support class legislation, the people, before supporting any candidate for a legislative office, should demand of him a pledge to labor for and support only such measures as will tend to a restoration of the rights that have been taken from and denied to them, and by special charters and grants conferred upon corporations and other monopolies. Railroad corporations being created by legislative grants, their business being that of common carriers for hire, the legislature possesses full power to enact such laws as will limit and restrict their charges for transportation to a reasonable tariff, prohibit and punish extortions and unjust discriminations, and provide for the swift infliction of penalties whenever the laws are violated. Before the people elect any man to a legislative office, he should pledge himself to support and obey the requirements of the constitution, and to abstain from that bane of a republican government, special class legislation. By supporting only such men as would, in good faith, pledge themselves, as above suggested, and who, as legislators, would abide by their pledges, unjust discriminations would cease, and some of the rights of the people would be restored. But reforms must extend beyond the points named. Railroad companies being chartered and railroads constructed for the prosecution of the business of common carriers, having received aid in lands and bonds from the general government, and from states, counties, cities, and towns, bonds and taxes, as well as special privileges not granted to any other corporations, in contemplation of law, these companies are bound to act honestly. It was never the intent of the legislatures (if they acted in good faith) to create these powerful corporations, to grant them extraordinary aid and privileges, and then allow them, by false and fictitious reports as to the cost of their roads, to charge unjust prices for carrying freights and passengers. By the watering process to which we have referred, the pretended cost of the roads, as shown from their reports, is often two or three times the actual cost, and the rates that are charged for transportation are such as to pay dividends not only on the cost of the road, but on the fictitious or added stock. Indeed, in many cases the stock reported as paid up is not paid in a legitimate manner; but when the company is organized, by selling bonds it builds its road from the proceeds, and from the earning of the road pays not only the interest on its bonds but accumulates a surplus. This surplus is divided among the stockholders, not as dividends on their paid-up stock, but is capitalized and stock issued to subscribers. The road is made to pay the interest, and eventually the principal, of the capital borrowed to build it, and also to earn money enough to show a paid-up capital to the amount of the actual cost of the road. This species of financiering on the part of the company is robbing the people, and abusing the privileges conferred by the charter. No thorough reform of the abuses practiced by railroad companies can be effected until the legislatures, by statutes, compel each and every company to purge its stock of every spurious dollar, so that the stock of each company shall not appear to be in excess of the cost of its road. If the legislature does not possess the power to do this, then it has the power to create a corporation that, by arbitrarily increasing its stock to any amount it may choose, can extort from the people sufficient to pay the interest upon such amount, and defy the power of its creator. The position is not sound. Any and all abuses practiced by railroad corporations can be corrected by legislative enactment, unless we admit that the creature is greater than the creator.

But it is claimed that if the legislatures should by statute compel railroad companies to reduce their stock to the cost of constructing their roads, or to their actual value, and then limit their tariff of charges to reasonable rates, great injustice would be done the innocent holders of their bonds; that such reduction would render it impossible for them to pay either the interest or principal of these bonds; that such statutes would impair the obligations of contracts; that many of the bonds are held by widows and orphans, who would be ruined. This may or may not be true. If true, who is responsible for it? Certainly not the states or the people. Originally the bonds were purchased of the railroad companies. If these companies by false representations have obtained credit on their roads to two or three times their actual value, the companies are the responsible parties, and not the public. While innocent persons may suffer, their suffering results from their own imprudence, or it is a misfortune occasioned by the fraud of the railroad company. There is no justice in allowing these companies to extort from the people money sufficient to relieve themselves from the consequences of their frauds. A owns a farm worth $2,000; he represents it to be worth $6,000, and by reason of this false representation obtains from B a loan of $4,000, secured by a mortgage on this farm. He fails to pay the money borrowed, and B forecloses his mortgage, and sells the farm. It pays but one-half his judgment or decree. Would B have any claim upon the public for the balance of his debt? He made his own contract, and expected a profit on his investment, but was disappointed. Under the law A had full authority to mortgage his land, and B had the option of loaning his money to A and taking a mortgage. He acted in good faith, and believed his security was ample, but was mistaken. Is there any difference in principle between the case of A and B and the purchasers of railroad bonds? Both parties will suffer loss because of the fraud of the party with whom they dealt. Neither have any claim upon the public in law or in equity, and both must look to the parties with whom they contracted. The charters to railroad companies empowered them to transact business, but did not empower them to commit frauds, by mortgaging their roads for three times their actual value. To require railroad companies to act honestly and charge reasonable rates for carrying freights, does not impair the obligations of any contract. Nor does it, to compel them to reduce their stock to what it actually should be, measured by the value of their roads. The legislature should be composed of men who are not embarrassed by personal interest, and who have not received bribes. We do not claim that because of the fact that men are stockholders or directors in railroad companies they are disqualified for seats in the legislatures of states, or of congress. But do insist that when men are elected for the express purpose of advocating the increase of the already too great powers and privileges conferred upon corporations, they prostitute their offices to base and illegitimate purposes. When the sole aim of men elected to represent the people is demonstrated to be to defeat every measure designed to relieve them from the effect of unjust laws, and to correct abuses practiced by the combined influence of corporations, they dishonor the place they fill. The rights of the people can be neither restored nor preserved, until legislatures are purged of this class of men. Men who receive any remuneration from any man, class of men, or corporations, paid or bestowed for the purpose of securing friendly legislation, are unfit to represent the people. It makes no difference whether the consideration is paid in money, or in _passes over the railroads_; it is given as a _bribe_. Passes are called complimentary; they are accepted as complimentary, yet it is a fact that these complimentary passes are placed where they "will do the most good." They are given to congressmen, legislators, judges of courts, and executive officers. If it were necessary to offer proof that these passes were intended as bribes, we need only look at the manner of their distribution to the members of the last Iowa legislature. They were distributed among those friendly to legislation in favor of railroads, and withheld from those opposed to such legislation. If passes are purely complimentary, this was wrong; but if they are given as _bribes_ it was the proper distribution of them. The legislator who accepts a pass, and the party giving it, should be punished under the provisions of the statutes against "bribery and corruption in office." And the provisions of the same statutes ought to be enforced against all persons holding official positions in the states, and in the general government. If officers cannot afford to pay for travel over railroads on their present salaries, increase them so as to make them independent of railroad companies, who estimate official integrity as being equal in value to a pass over their respective roads. History demonstrates that in some cases these passes have been received as full consideration for official influence. Legislatures possess the power to regulate and control railroad companies, and should exercise that power in every case of abuse of their privileges by the railroad companies. Some deny the power of legislatures to compel railroad companies to reduce their stock to the actual cost of their roads. This power is lodged in some department of government. We are not prepared to admit that these corporations are supreme; that they can openly, and in defiance of law, and the rights of the governing power, practice frauds, which, if practiced by an individual, would consign him to prison. If the legislature does not possess it, the courts certainly do, as we will hereafter demonstrate. We have shown that by the manner of building roads with borrowed capital obtained by sale of bonds, and by extortionate charges for transportation, making their roads earn sufficient to pay dividends on stock which had not been paid, as well as on the watered stock, the railroad companies in the United States whose roads cost $2,456,230,000, yet in fact representing the enormous sum of $6,236,638,749, in what purports to be-paid-up capital stock, and bonds, were robbing the people.

The question we are now discussing is, How to remedy these evils. Our attempt thus far has been to demonstrate the fact that the remedy is exclusively within the state authorities, and not in those of the United States, and that railroad companies are private, and not public. Adhering to these views, we contend that railroad companies are subject to taxation at the same rate on the assessed value of their property as an individual; and the legislature cannot adopt a different rule for taxing railroad property without disregarding the letter and spirit of the constitution. The chartering, regulating, and controlling of railroad companies, and all corporations created for pecuniary profit, must remain with the states. To concede the exercise of this power to the national administration is to overturn republican government and take from the people the rights and powers reserved to them and the states; create a great central power without constitutional limit or restitution, but governed by the personal views of those in office. We have treated of this subject in the preceding pages, and refer to it here in considering the remedies for the evils endured by the people. We know that congress has granted charters to corporations organized for pecuniary profit, and that United States courts have taken jurisdiction of cases arising under state statutes, and disregarded the action of state legislatures and state courts on questions affecting the interests of railroad corporations, and have also decided that congress possesses the power to charter railroad companies. But we do not recognize the decisions as right, nor do we believe they will remain long unreversed. The opinion generally prevails that railroad corporations have abused, and are abusing, their charters; that they are oppressing the people; that there must be a reform of the abuses practiced by them. But differences of opinion exist as to the means to be applied. If we recognize the people as the source of power, and that they retain all the power they have not delegated to the government, the more nearly the interests of the people and the companies approach each other, the more closely they can be blended and united, and the more readily can abuses be corrected. To divide their rights and interests; to provide different governments, and rules of decisions for them; to make the people amenable to state authority, while the United States authority takes control of corporations, will create rival interests, and render railroad companies independent of the people. If the congress of the United States, claiming to have the constitutional right, should provide by statute for transferring the exclusive control of railroad corporations to the United States, an entire change of the relation between the states and the general government would be the result. The states would not have the power to redress any abuses of the charter privileges granted to these companies, either by legislative enactment or by judicial decisions. Railroad companies created by state legislatures, and hitherto subject to the jurisdiction of the state courts, would be released from all obligations to state government, and from the control of state legislatures and courts. The congress of the United States and the federal courts would have exclusive control and jurisdiction over them, and constant confusion and conflicts of jurisdiction would naturally follow. Such a course would confer upon railroad companies still greater power, and place in their hands more efficient means for oppressing the people. Another evil resulting from such a course would be, that the whole corporate interest of the country could combine and concentrate their whole influence for the purpose of accomplishing any desired object. Now both congress and state legislatures must be bought over to their support; but if the United States government should take the whole control of corporations and railroad companies, the whole railroad force of the country, from the men who own, manage, and control this great interest, to the most menial employes, could be directed to a single purpose--that of securing congressional favor.

Now, state legislatures must be approached, and _persuaded_, as well as congress; then a single legislative body, and that one the farthest removed from the people, would be the only body to claim the attention of this great corporate interest. When grants were once made to railroad companies, and privileges conferred upon them, it would be simply impossible to effect any change, no matter how oppressive they might be upon the people. The idea that railroads are public highways, and that railroad companies are public corporations, already obtains among congressmen and in the supreme court of the United States. This is well understood among railroad men, as well as the fact that there is an increasing demand on the part of the people for the reform of the many abuses that are now practiced by them. Hence their anxiety to have the United States government assume control of railroad corporations. They desire it for another reason: Most of the special favors and grants they have received have been the result of bargain and sale. The same means will be used in the future unless a thorough reform is effected, and it will cost the corporate interests of the country less to deal with one body representing all the states than it would to deal with the legislatures of all the states. Another reason for this desire on the part of railroad companies is, that the supreme court, as now formed, is in full sympathy with them upon the points at issue between corporations and the people.

Careful consideration and examination of this question will satisfy the people that their only hope for the restoration and preservation of their rights in the conflict now existing between themselves and the railroad companies is in states retaining exclusive jurisdiction and control of all the railroad corporations and railroads within their respective borders. Another remedy suggested is, for the general government to purchase and own all the railroads in the country, and control them in the future. If this plan were feasible, it is of doubtful wisdom. The purchase could not be made without the consent of the owners of the roads. This consent could only be obtained upon payment of the prices demanded, because railroad stock is not such property as can be condemned for public use. It is not to be expected that the companies owning the stocks and roads would sell for less than cost; and this cost would be the amount of money represented by the roads. This we have shown is over $6,000,000,000. To pay less than this amount (being nearly three times their actual cost) would be aiding the companies to defraud their creditors, for the reason that the roads are the only security the bondholders have. The purchase of the roads would increase the national debt to the amount paid for them, and impose additional burdens in the shape of taxes upon the people. It would add to the list of government officers and employes at least two hundred thousand men, whose influence could be relied upon when the interests of the people and those persons in office conflicted.

It may be said that the government would not operate the roads, but would lease them. Would this afford relief? It would require two parties to make the contract. The contractor would agree to pay a certain stipulated amount for the use of the road. He would then fix his own rate of charges for transportation, and being only a lessee, would be virtually irresponsible. Government could not fix the price to be paid for the use of the road, and also the tariff of charges. But the lessee would demand the right to fix his own tariff in order that he might have sufficient to make repairs, pay for the use of the road, and make his profit. This system would be subject to the abuses of which the shippers now complain. Irresponsible persons would often have control of these roads, or a part of them, and a wide field would be open for fraud and irregular practices. The wants of the people demand some other and cheaper mode of transportation; either a cheaper system of building and operating railroads, so that the tariffs can be reduced, or some new method. The present roads may be superseded and another kind adopted. In that case, the present railroad system would become of little value, and would prove a loss to the government. Last of all, the general government cannot go into the railroad business without contravening the provisions of the constitution. In addition to the above reasons why the government should not become the owner of the railroads, is this one, which outweighs all others: It would place them entirely beyond the control of the people. If the control of corporations is left to the states, they are in the hands of the people; each county, town, and neighborhood, can bring its influence to bear upon the questions at issue. In the election of congressmen and other United States officers, local issues are lost sight of. National questions engage the public mind, while in the election of members of the state legislatures and other state officers, local questions enter largely in the canvass. Numerically, the monopolists are but a small fraction of the people; their great strength lies in the control they have obtained over the business and finances of the country. The people, united against the monopolists, can elect whom they choose to any state office, and can secure a majority in their favor. The remedy is in their own hands, and by united action they cannot fail of success. If a reform is ever effected, if the people ever regain their lost rights, they must commence at the _ballot box_. The producers throughout the west and south are largely in the majority; they can elect their own men. If they fail to do so, if they do not themselves apply the remedy, they ought not to complain of others because they do not apply it for them. There need be no difficulty or delay in effecting reforms dependent upon legislative action, provided the people are true to their own interests. They elect their agents to act for them. If they do not elect men who are with them in principle, sympathy, and feeling, they ought not to complain.

But, says the reader, admitting that legislative reform can be accomplished, how can the decisions of the courts be changed? This question presents more difficulty. It has been the custom from time immemorial for courts to be governed and controlled by precedents. This is adopted in order that the law may be settled and certain. When questions arise under statutes, the meaning of which is ambiguous, resort is had to former decisions under like statutes, for a rule of construction, and thus the law is _settled_. We accept the decision as the law of the land, and to criticise it is seemed discourteous to the court making it. To call in question the motives of the courts, or to doubt their wisdom, is deemed rank "treason." The rule governing them may be of ancient date; the reason for its adoption may have long since ceased; the rule itself may be obsolete. Yet, to find a precedent for a decision that outrages justice and is at war with the best interests of the people, but in favor of the corporate interests of the country, this old rule is dragged from its long repose and made the basis of new decisions. Most of these old precedents originated in monarchical countries, where all doubtful questions were construed in favor of the crown, and where the rights of the people always yielded to kingly prerogative. While precedents should have their true weight in determining between private parties, when none of the great questions arise affecting the national welfare, and while interpretations of the constitution, acquiesced in for many years, should remain as the settled law of the land, and be observed by the courts, the practice of solving constitutional problems by resort to old monarchical precedents, and the adoption of the reasoning of the high courts of the king's _exchequer_, should not be tolerated in a republic. Our form of government is new. Our courts should be the courts of the people, and not a _star chamber_ for the protection and perpetuation of the monarchical dogma, that "it is absolutely essential to independent national existence that government should have a firm hold of the two great sovereign instrumentalities of the _sword_ and the _purse_," as was declared by the supreme court of the United States, in December, 1871. Such declarations are at war with our ideas of republican government. It has no support save in despotic governments and decisions emanating from them; yet it is the doctrine that must obtain, if the recent decisions of the supreme court are to remain as the settled law of the nation. To accept this doctrine as a final exposition of the relative rights of the people and the government, is to acknowledge that the agents and servants of the people, elected and appointed to office, become their masters, clothed with imperial powers.

It is not only in the adoption of old precedents that the rights of the people have been denied in courts, but by wresting the meaning of the earlier decisions made by the distinguished men who graced the bench of the supreme court in its earlier and purer days. The "Dartmouth College" case was the first in which the rights of states or the people to interfere with charter privileges was determined. We have given the history of this case in preceding pages. It in no sense justifies or supports the recent decisions of the court, as to the rights and privileges of corporations organized for pecuniary profit. Yet, taking the decision in that case as a precedent, the supreme court has gradually encroached upon the rights of the people, until, under its latest decisions, railroad corporations are public corporations, their roads are public highways, and the property of all the tax-payers can be taxed, and the taxes thus collected can be used by these private corporations to pay for building and repairing their roads. This is the latest new departure, and with the "Legal Tender" decision, makes the interest of the whole people, as well as the value of their property, depend upon the action of corporations.

No good reason can be shown why the decisions of courts should not be subjected to criticism, the same as the acts of legislative bodies. The courts are a co-ordinate branch of the government, but with a power greater than that of the legislative and executive branches combined. The decisions of courts render nugatory the acts of the other departments of the government. To admit that the decisions of the judiciary cannot be questioned, is to concede to it all the prerogatives possessed by absolute tyrants. Not only have the people the right to question the decisions of the courts, and if need be to examine the motives which prompted them, but also to know the views of the men who aspire to judicial positions, upon all questions of a general and public nature. No candidate for judicial position should be expected to form an opinion upon, or decide a question affecting the rights of parties until it had been finally submitted. But, upon the great questions that frequently arise affecting the public welfare, his views should be publicly known. Let the people understand the views of the men seeking for a seat on the bench, before his election, and judicial legislation and partisan decisions will soon disappear. The judges of the supreme court of the United States hold their offices for life, by appointment; that court is further removed from the people than state courts. Reforms are not easily effected. Judges recently appointed received their appointment because of their understood views upon certain public questions. The course of decisions of this court demonstrates that the rights of the people are considered of less importance than the demands of corporations, in cases of conflict. While the present system of selecting these judges continues, with their life terms, it will be hard for the people to regain their rights. There are times when, because of oppressions, the people have the right to demand changes in the fundamental law. At the present time they are demanding redress; they are asking to be relieved from the unjust burdens imposed upon them by companies and corporations, who are petted and supported by the supreme court. But one certain means is left them, and that is an amendment to the constitution, restricting their term to a certain number of years, and providing for their election by the people. We could then free ourselves from the burdens imposed upon us by this anti-republican department of our national government, and take from corporations some of their oppressive powers and privileges, now assured to them by the decisions of the supreme court. If any relief is afforded the people from the oppressions under which they now suffer, they must obtain it through their own efforts. No other channel is now open. All of the departments of the government, state and national, are more or less controlled by the monopolies against which the farmers are now preparing to fight. The silent ballot is the weapon to use; when used by a united people victory is assured. It is more potent than all the appliances of an army; more thorough in its execution than the bullet. It is the dread of the unfaithful legislator, dishonest office-holder, and the unjust judge. It strikes terror into the hearts of the unscrupulous men, who are willing to sacrifice honor, country, and future happiness for the purpose of amassing wealth, by extortions practiced upon the sweating, toiling millions who till the ground. While partial relief may be obtained through other channels, real, genuine, and lasting redress can only be obtained by organized action at the polls.

How can the abuses of the transportation system be corrected? This question is now having a practical test in Illinois, and is being discussed throughout the country. It is being demonstrated that a _pro rata_ tariff will not afford relief; and that some other means must be adopted. What that may be, time will develop. No uniform _pro rata_ tariff would be just to either the companies or the people. The shipping of way freights is always attended with more proportionate expense and delay than at prominent and terminal points. The extensive shipper, who loads a large number of cars for a single train, should be allowed more favorable rates than the one who ships at some way station but one car of freight at long intervals. The real cause of complaint is the uniformly exorbitant rates charged for carrying freights, in connection with the present warehouse and elevator system. The legislatures and the courts are clothed with full power to prevent oppressive or unjust charges for carrying freight. They care not how much per cent the companies shall make upon their investments; but when their charges amount to an abuse of their charter privileges the legislatures and the courts can correct them. The rule established by railroad companies, to force from shippers such rates as will pay interest or dividends upon an amount of imaginary stock, is unjust. The process by which they increase their stock to two or three times the amount invested is fraudulent. The legislatures and the courts possess the power to compel railroad companies to make a return of the actual amounts of money invested in their respective roads, in order to determine whether their charges are excessive and oppressive. Railroad companies being dependent upon state legislatures for such grants as will enable them to construct their roads, and being common carriers, the legislature can, by statute, restrict the capital stock to the amount invested. If this course had been adopted years ago many of the abuses now endured by the people would have been prevented. Not only has the law-making power the right to restrict the stock to the actual cost of the road, but it has also the power to fix the maximum rates for transportation. Competition will always have a controlling influence upon the price of any commodity, as well as fixing the price of any species of services or labor. The legislature has the power to enact statutes to prohibit the consolidation of the business of railroad companies, or a combination on their part to charge excessive tariffs; and the courts possess the power to enforce the observance of such statutes by the infliction of suitable penalties. In this connection the abuses practiced by the dispatch companies may be considered. The railroad companies receive their charters with the understanding and implied agreement on their part that, as common carriers, they will deal honestly with the public, and that they will furnish the necessary locomotives, cars, etc., for the purpose of supplying the ordinary wants of the people. This they are bound to furnish, and also to do the ordinary carrying of freights, for a reasonable compensation.

We have already given a history of the dispatch lines, and told who compose the companies, and how they do the business the railroad companies agreed to transact when they obtained their charters. These dispatch lines are a fraud upon the public, for which the companies should be held responsible. Every dollar paid to them, in excess of the regular rates of the railroad companies' regular tariff, can be recovered from the companies. The fiction of hiring their roads and locomotives to another company, and giving such company a monopoly of the trade over their road, in order that higher rates may be charged, is an abuse that the legislature can correct and the courts can punish. Of the same nature are the "warehouse" and "elevator" combinations. Of these we know what is open and visible; but of the internal workings and divisions of the "pools," or, more properly speaking, the "spoils," we know but little. We know that it is a means of oppression, and that it compels farmers to sell to _inside_ men, or sacrifice the moiety of the crop the railroad companies allow them to retain. In law, railroad companies are bound to ship for all who pay the regular rates without bestowing a bounty upon elevator and warehouse men; and they are also bound to deliver the freight at such warehouses as the shippers direct. For a refusal to do so, they are liable to the shipper for damages to the amount of the loss suffered, and sums extorted. Shippers can compel the companies to receive their freights on board their cars at regular stations, and to deliver their freights at the place designated, irrespective of any and all combinations to prevent it. To conclude this whole matter, the people have the power to reform all the abuses they suffer at the hands of these monopolies by the election of men to legislative offices whose hands will not touch bribes, and by filling the seats of justice with judges who are not so wedded to ancient precedents as to do injustice rather than make a new departure; by men whose chief object shall be to do equal and exact justice to all, and not resort to judicial legislation and new interpretations of the constitution in order to uphold and strengthen the power and advance the interests of corporations already too powerful in the land.

In order to restore to the people the rights now denied them, and to abridge the combined power of the monopolies who now rule the country, the control of the finances must be taken from them. The financial policy of the government, adopted during the late civil war as a war measure, is still adhered to. The internal commerce of the whole country is controlled by a few men--the same who own and operate the railroads and rule the _business_ in "Wall street." The peculiar financial policy of the government tends to concentrate the money of the country--to gather it together, rather than to scatter it abroad. New York City being the great commercial center, and the internal commerce of the country, being under the control of a few men who make this metropolis their principal place of business, with their vast lines of railroads extending over the whole country, bringing to them a never-ceasing stream of money, they are able to regulate the market value of almost all articles of commerce, and to limit the supply of the circulating medium as occasion serves. We have already shown the bad results of the system upon the interests of the people, and do not intend to repeat it here. Ordinarily, the laws of trade, of demand and supply, will regulate and equalize the distribution of the circulating medium over the country. Such will always be the case if no special causes exist to prevent it. But with the railroad interest of the country controlled by the same combination of men who "corner" all the coin in the country; with the established policy of the government making depreciated paper the only circulating medium, and the "legal tender" decision making this depreciated currency the standard of values; with the constant fluctuation of prices resulting from the above named causes--it is not strange that these corporations and Wall street brokers control the finances of the country. Until this control is taken from them, the wrongs of the people cannot be redressed.

Money is said to be "power," and when a certain interest or locality has the absolute control of this "power," all others must suffer. One means of stripping railroad magnates and Wall street gamblers of this power would be the resumption of "specie payment." As we have shown, under the present financial and tariff policy of the country, this is out of the question. With our legal tender decisions, our depreciated currency, and our tariff system, the balance of trade is largely against us; our coin is being shipped to other countries, not leaving us sufficient for the purposes of resumption, or for circulation. Add to this the fact that the Wall street brokers own or control most of what is in the country, and the truth is patent that resumption cannot be effected until the whole financial policy of the government is remodeled. Will an increase of the banking facilities of the country under the present system accomplish this object? We answer, No. An increase of banks, and of the currency, would only afford temporary relief. Suppose $100,000,000 should be added to the present amount of currency, and that it should all be distributed in the west and south. Wall street operators would only have to increase their operations to gather the whole of it under their control. They now, in their various ramifications, own and control capital more than sufficient to pay the whole of the national debt and leave them a large surplus. While the distribution of additional currency through the country might afford them temporary relief, under the combined management of railroad corporations and Wall street brokers, and without any change in their present system, they could and would soon absorb this surplus of currency, and resume the absolute control of the finances of the country. The people would again be in their power, with an additional burden imposed upon them, "to-wit"--the payment of the interest on an additional $100,000,000 of government bonds. Would a change in the banking system of the country take from these monopolists the control of the finances of the country? This would depend upon the character of the change. If the secretary of the treasury, or his department, should retain the entire management of the system, no real relief could be expected. While the general government has the exclusive right to regulate the coinage and value of coin (money), it is the assumption of power not delegated to vest in one man, or department, the exclusive management of the finances of the entire country, not only of the government, but of all private persons. We do not comprehend the wisdom of fixing and limiting the amount of currency the country may have for a circulating medium, and empowering one man to decide, how, when, and where it shall be distributed. Conceding to the general government the power to charter banks and issue treasury notes, the power is not exclusive. There is no limit to the volume of gold and silver, and if government should attempt to limit the amount of coin, it could not do it. The laws of trade, the demand and supply, would fix the amount. Under our present banking system, coin is driven from circulation, and a definitely fixed amount of treasury notes and government paper is all that the country is permitted to have for the transaction of its whole business--and this amount must be placed just where the comptroller of the currency shall determine.

The legal tender decisions have made the resumption of specie payment impossible. The present banking system prevents an increase of currency or treasury notes, and gives concentrated capital absolute and unlimited control of the business of the country. Any other banking system, if left under the same control, would be subject to the same objections. No one department of the government, nor the whole government combined, can determine the amount of currency necessary for transacting the business of the country. Fixing the amount in the present banking act has afforded the means to Wall street operators for "cornering" such amounts of currency as would derange the market and depress prices. No valid objection can be offered to what is known as the "free banking system." Such a system, if generally adopted, would strip railroad corporations, Wall street jobbers, and all other rings and combinations of men, of the power to control the finances of the country. Another advantage would result to the people: It would free them from the annual payment of from $18,000,000 to $20,000,000 interest on government bonds purchased by bankers and deposited with the treasury department. Such a system of banking would reduce the margin between coin and currency and promote the resumption of specie payment, and, instead of having only depreciated paper as a circulating medium, we would have a currency convertible into coin. The giant corporations and other monopolies that now rule would be shorn of much of their strength, and the people would be freed from their relentless grasp.

SEVENTH.--_Free Trade and Direct Taxation._--Our conclusion would not be complete were we to omit a reference to the subject of tariff. Indeed, it so interlaces the question of transportation and the construction of railroads as to become an integral part of our discussion. Disclaiming any partisan views of the question, we shall try to demonstrate that all tariffs are unjust and oppressive. In a former chapter we have shown the operations of our tariff, and some of its results. We now proceed to demonstrate that the true rule in all our dealings and commercial transactions is, _to sell where we can obtain the best prices, and to purchase where we can obtain the desired article for the least money_. Demand and supply should regulate the prices in our dealings, and protective tariffs should be repealed. A "protection" that taxes three-fourths or four fifths of the whole people, in order that the remaining fraction may amass riches, is an oppression that ought not to be tolerated. No class is more oppressed by protective tariffs than the farmers and producers of the country. They do not ask, nor do they receive any protection.

With high or protective tariffs, farmers and producers pay much more than their just proportion to the support of the government. The consumer simply pays tariff duties on what he consumes, while the producer not only pays on what he consumes, but his product must pay a large part of the duty upon what is consumed by others. The products of the country are its wealth. No matter who is obliged to pay the duty in the first instance, ultimately the producer must pay it. To illustrate this proposition, let us take any given article produced, manufactured, or constructed in the United States. There is a duty on some of the material used in the manufacture of the reaper. The manufacturer pays this duty, and adds it to the cost of the machine purchased by the farmer. In the erection of factories, machine shops, furnaces, and foundries, dutiable articles are used, all of which, in the end, must be paid for from the products of the country. In the construction of railroads, locomotives, cars, etc., iron and other articles are used upon which there are high tariff rates. These duties are paid by the companies in the first instance, the amounts paid are included in the cost of the roads, and must be returned in shape of increased rates for transportation over the roads. In the end these duties are paid by the producer. Every bushel of wheat, corn, or other grain, shipped over a railroad, pays part. Protective tariffs are so interwoven with the construction of railroads and the internal commerce of the country that they cannot be separated from the questions we have been discussing. All tariff duties are direct charges upon the productions of this country, and not on any other. Import duties are not paid by the people of the country from whence the goods are imported, but by our own people. It matters not who pays the tax in the first instance, in the end it must be paid from the product of the country. The main product of our country, especially of the west and south, being from the soil, it follows that the farmer must pay by far the greatest portion of tariff duties. The burdens imposed on him are more than his just share. In the first place he pays directly the duty charged upon what he consumes, and then pays, indirectly, much the larger part of the duties paid in the first instance by others. He is charged with the cost of shipping his grain to market, whether that market is in the United States or Europe, and his product must pay the cost of shipping the return cargo from Europe to America, with the addition of such protective duty as congress may fix by statute. His product must bear the whole burden. "In other words, the question of transportation is part and parcel of the tariff question, and cannot be dealt with apart from it. Transportation is made dear by the dearness of supplies; that is to say, the railroads are taxed enormously, and, through the railroads, the farmers, for the benefit of special industries. There can be no cheap transportation without cheap iron, cheap cars, cheap stations; and, what is more, there can be no market for American produce abroad so long as the sale of all foreign commodities, except gold, is made as difficult as high duties and vexatious custom house regulations can make it. Agricultural produce at the west is now a glut; it must become more and more of a glut, if either more railroads are opened or the cost of transportation on the present roads is diminished, as long as new markets are not provided, or, in other words, as long as access to the crowded regions of the Old World is artificially impeded. Of course, there may come a time when there will be population enough in the west to eat up all its corn and pork; but, at the present rate of agricultural and railroad development, this will not be witnessed by either the present generation or the next, and the cry of the 'Granges' ought to be for a clearing of the outlets to the Old World in all ways. To secure this, it is not enough to cheapen transportation; we have to offer a market to the foreigner for his commodities in order to get him to take ours."