Chapter LXX: Appendix

Of the precepts of Natural Law, some are more simple and of wider extension; others are derivative, complex, and extend to fewer cases. It is a question of more and less, and no hard and fast line of demarcation can be drawn between them. The former however are called _primary_, the latter _secondary_ precepts. Again, the nature of man is the same in all men and at all periods of history for its essential elements, but admits of wide, accidental variation and declension for the worse. Thirdly, it is clear that Natural Law is a law good and suitable for human nature to observe. Starting from these three axioms, we apply the reasoning of St. Thomas, 1a 2æ, q. 96, art. 2, not to human law alone, of which he is speaking, but to sundry secondary precepts of Natural Law. These are his words:

"A law is laid down as a rule or measure of human acts. Now a measure ought to be homogeneous with the thing measured. Hence laws also must be imposed upon men according to their condition. As Isidore says: 'A law ought to be possible both according to nature and according to the custom of the country.' Now the power or faculty of action proceeds from interior habit or disposition. The same thing is not possible to him who has no habit of virtue, that is possible to a virtuous man; as the same thing is not possible to a boy and to a grown man, and therefore the same rule is not laid down for children as for adults. Many things are allowed to children, that in adults are visited with legal punishment or with blame, and in like manner many things must be allowed to men not perfect in virtue, which would be intolerable in virtuous men."

This reasoning leads us up to a conclusion, which St. Thomas states thus (la 2æ, q. 94. art. 5):

"A conceivable way in which the Natural Law might be changed is the way of subtraction, that something should cease to be of the Natural Law that was of it before. Understanding change in this sense, the Natural Law is absolutely immutable in its first principles; but as to secondary precepts, which are certain detailed conclusions closely related to the first principles, the Natural Law is not so changed as that its dictate is not right in most cases steadily to abide by; it may however be changed in some particular case, and in rare instances, through some special causes impeding the observance of these secondary precepts."

The reason for this conclusion, more pregnant, it may be, than St. Thomas himself discerned, is given briefly as follows (2a 2æ, q. 57, art. 2, ad 1):

"Human nature is changeable; and therefore what is natural to man may sometimes fail to hold good."

The precepts of Natural Law that fail to be applicable when human nature sinks below par, are only secondary precepts, and few even of them. Christianity brings human nature up to par, and _fulfils_ the Natural Law (St. Matt. v. 17), enjoining the observance of it in its integrity. This is the meaning of St. John Chrysostom's saying: "Of old not such an ample measure of virtue was proposed to us; ... but since the coming of Christ the way has been made much narrower." (_De Virginitate_, c. 44: cf. his 17th Homily on St. Matt. v. 37; indeed the doctrine is familiar in his pages.) Thus the prohibition of polygamy, being a secondary precept of the natural law, failed in its application in that age of lapsed humanity, when a woman was better one of many wives, protected by one husband, than exposed to promiscuous violence and lust. (Isaias iv. i.)

NOTE ON ROUSSEAU.

The ruler is the servant of the _good_ of the people, not of the _will_ of the people, except inasmuch as--

a. the _will_ of the people is an indication of their _good_, of which they are probable judges;

b. it is usually impossible to do _good_ to the people against their steady _will_.

* * * * *

INDEX

Aggregation theory of civil power,

Altruism,

Altum dominium,

Anger,
differs from hatred,

Appetite in the modern sense,
in the scholastic sense,
appetite and desire,

Archetype Ideas,

Aristotle, imperfect as a moral philosopher,
on happiness,
on the passions,
on the mean of virtue,
on death,
his Magnanimous Man,
distinguishes chastisement from vengeance,
virtue from art,
on property,
defines a State, a citizen, a polity,
on the State's need to punish,

Atheism, effects of social and political,

Autocentric and heterocentric,

Bain, Alexander, on content,
on punishability,

Beatific vision,

Capital Punishment,
not inconsistent with God's dominion over life, nor
with the personality (autocentric) of man,
power of (right of the sword), the distinguishing mark of sovereignty,
sole instance of rightful direct killing,

Charity,
to enemies,
obligation of, how differing from justice,

Church and State, elementary philosophy of,

Circumstances of act,
distinguished from means,

Civil authority, of God,
binds the conscience,
latent or free,
various distributions of,
not tied to any one polity,
when rightfully resisted,

Comfort, no specific against crime,

Communism,

Conscience, natural law of,
defined,
erroneous conscience,
requires educating,
Conscience and the State,

Contemplation, essence of happiness,

Contracts,

Delight, or pleasure, quality of,
said to perfect activity,
not happiness,

Democracy, may be tyrannical,
not the sole valid polity,
sheer democracy difficult to work,
original and special sanctity attaching to democracy,

Deontology,

Desire, physical and psychical,

Direct and indirect (or incidental) defined,

Divorce,

Duelling, essential wrong of,

Dumb animals, our relations with,

Duty, matter not of mere goodness, but of law;
duties of justice, correlative of a right;
duties negative and positive,

Education, the State's part in,

End in view; end does not justify means;
itself limitless, sets a limit to the means,

English monarchy,

Ethics, strict view of,

Evil, none essential and positive in human nature,

Fear, as an excuse,

Food and fiddling, when better than philosophy,

Fortitude,

Francis of Assisi, St.,

General Consequences, principle of,

God, transcends created being,
object of human happiness,
God and possibilities,
cannot but enforce morality,
how entering into Moral Philosophy,
does not dispense from the natural law,
punishes sin,
twofold worship of,
God beyond the sphere of utilities,
duty of knowing Him,
why He cannot lie,
no God, no sin,

Greek taste,

Grotius and Milton, on lying,

Habit, defined,
acquired by acts,
a living thing, needs exercise,
habit and custom,
man a creature of habits,
habits remain in the departed soul,

Happiness, defined,
open to man,
final in contemplation of God,
other than contentment,
desired without limit,
not pleasure,

Hatred and anger,

Hedonism,

Hobbes, his _Leviathan_,

Honour and reputation,

Horace, his phrase, _aurea mediocritas_,

Human act,
outward and inward, one,

Humility,

Hypnotism,

Ignorance, as an excuse,

Integrity, state of,

Intellectual error, sometimes voluntary,
in that case not mere intellectual error,

Jurisdiction, differs from dominion,

Justice, always relative to another,
legal (or general),distributive, commutative (corrective),
justice and charity differ,

Kant, his Categorical Imperative,

Killing, direct and indirect,
indirect in self-defence,
and in war,
direct only in capital punishment,

Knowledge of God, obligatory,

Labour, qualitative as well as quantitative,
capital not simply an embodiment of labour,

Land, a raw material, nationalisation of,

Law, defined,
the Eternal Law,
irresistible and yet resisted,
extends to all agents, rational and irrational,
co-eternal with, yet not necessary as God,
laws of physical nature,
law of conscience,
fundamental laws of a state,
civil law, necessary complement of natural law,
civil law, how binding in conscience,
the King, _legibus solutus_, how far,
law and liberty,

Lay mind,

Liberty, the meshes of the net of law,
liberty of opinion and the press,

Locke, on the state of nature,

Lying, definition of,
intention to deceive, no part of the definition,
intrinsically and always wrong,
why God cannot lie,
not against commutative justice,
mental reservation not in every case a lie,

Magnanimous man,

Magnificence,

Marriage, duty of the race, not of the individual,
two goods of marriage,
unity,
indissolubility,

Material and formal,

Marx, Karl,

Means to end, truly willed,
four sorts of,
how far and how not sanctified by the end,
distinguished from circumstances,
limited by the end,

Meekness and clemency,

Mental reservation, not in every case a lie,

Mill, John, confounds self-defence with vengeance,
his Utilitarianism,
on Liberty,

Modesty,

Morality, meaning of,
determinants of,

Moral Philosophy, definition and division,
a progressive science,
subtlety of,

Moral Sense, no peculiar faculty distinct from Intellect,

Money, ancient and modern use of,

Nature, does nothing in vain,
living according to nature,
laws of nature, inviolable as tendencies,
state of nature,

Natural, in contrast with supernatural,
natural and physical confounded by ancients,
does not mean "coming natural",

Natural law of conscience,
mutable subjectively,
immutable, situation remaining unchanged,
primary and secondary precepts, some of the latter fail to
hold even objectively, where human nature has sunk below par,
(notwithstanding),
not open to dispensation,

Nominalism, subversion of philosophy,

Obedience, not wholly of the nature of a contract,

Ought, or Obligation, analysis of the idea,

Passion, as an excuse,
definition of,
species of,
not to be extirpated,
never morally evil by itself,
passion and principle, two different sources of sin,

People, the, all government for,
sovereignty of,
not philosophers,

Person, autocentric, as distinguished from a thing (hetero-centric),
to have a right, you must be a person,

Plato, on desires,
on the mean of virtue,
his similitude of the charioteer,
his phrase, "set up on holy pedestal",
fails to discover justice in his _Republic_,
his ignoring of spiritual sins,
ignores retributive punishment,
object of his _Republic_,

Pleasure, or delight, quality of,
perfects activity,
how far wrong to act or live for pleasure,
not happiness,

Polity, defined,
variety of polities,
no one polity best, universal and exclusive,
elementary and original polity,
the polity the standard of the politically allowable,

Polygamy; patriarchal practice,

Powers that be, ordained of God,

Private war, right renounced by civilised man,

Probable opinion, what, how a lawful ground of action,

Property, _res familiaris_,

Prudence,

Punishment, naturally consequent upon sin,
also a divine infliction,
final, eternal,
medicinal, deterrent, retributive,
human punishment perhaps never purely retributive,
capital punishment,
punishment a stimulus to conscience,
war not punishment,

Pyramid of capacities,

Reiffenstuel, on duelling,

Religion, how connected with morality,
duties of religion,
natural religious power,
the State and religion,

Restitution, when due,
not retribution,

Resurrection,

Revolution, is it ever right?

Right, a, defined,
connatural, acquired, alienable, inalienable,
one man's right imports another man's duty, but not conversely,
not all rights consequences of duties,
not wholly the creation of the State,

Ritual, needs regulation,

Rousseau, his Social Contract,
his inalienable sovereignty of the people,

Secrets,

Self-defence, differs from punishment and from vengeance,
a wrong maxim of the jurists,
duelling not self-defence,

Simulation and dissimulation,

Sin, material and formal,
differs from vice,
some by mere passion, other on principle,
spiritual sins,
philosophical sin,
sin alone properly unnatural,
entails punishment,
grave and light,
forgiveness of, an uncertainty in philosophy,
sin against God, crime against the State,
atheism the abolition of sin,

Socialism, Collectivism and Syndicalism,
an endeavour to supersede private virtue,

Soldier's death,

Spiritualism,

State, individual not all blended in,
definition of,
a natural requisite, more than a necessity of nature,
involves authority, to be obeyed,
a perfect community,
commanded and commissioned by God,
a secular concern with a secular end,
the State and virtue,
State and Church,
State and education,
doctrines dangerous to the State,
State and Conscience,
remotely a judge of sin, but does not punish it as such,

Stoics, would extirpate passion,
their _naturae convenienter vivere_,
a paradox of theirs,

Suarez, explains the natural rise of civil authority,
neglects the historical,

Suicide,

Supernatural,

Superstitious practices,

Synderesis,

Temperance,

Testamentary right,

Usury, defined,
principle upon which it is wrong,
commercial loans not usurious, gradual opening for such,

Utilitarianism, an ill-concerted blend of Hedonism and Altruism,

Value, use value, market value,

Vice and Virtue, habits, not acts,
not in children,
vice not sin,

Virtue, a habit,
not reducible to knowledge,
intellectual and moral,
how moral and intellectual virtues differ,
need of moral virtue,
moral virtue (not theological) observes the mean,
cardinal virtues,
are the virtues separable?,
potential parts of a virtue,
sense of virtue necessary to national greatness,
virtue not "another man's good,",
how differing from art,
how far the care of the State,

Virtuous man, acts on motives of virtue,

War, the self-defence of nations,
not a punitive operation,
direct and proper object, not to kill but to put out of action,

Wild boy of Hanover,

Worship, interior and exterior, reasons for the latter,
not as useful to God, but because He is worthy of it,

End of Project Gutenberg's Moral Philosophy, by Joseph Rickaby, S. J.