Chapter XVI: Part VI: Mussolini the “fascista Prime Minister” (2)

_The Work of the Italian Government._ Matters standing thus, the Italian Government cannot at present change its attitude, because no step it took now would alter the general situation or exercise a preponderating influence in the decisions of the Governments most involved. The opinion of the Italian Government is that the situation on the Ruhr has not yet reached the stage at which a solution must necessarily be found, and only when that moment arrives will it be able, perhaps, to have an influence on the situation itself.

As for the Moratorium which President Poincaré has decided to propose to the Germans, in view of the fast approaching date of payment, 31st January, it is worthy of note that it will include some of the points made in the Italian Memorandum of London, namely the two years’ Moratorium and the German internal loan.

As far as America is concerned, having once withdrawn her troops from the Rhine, she has not altered her policy of neutral inactivity.

One understands that the events in the Ruhr district have caused a general uneasiness over the whole of Europe, especially in the countries which form the Little Entente. Rumours which spoke of mobilisation and the concentration of troops upon some of the frontiers have proved unfounded and exaggerated. As regards Russia, beyond reports of certain political activities on the part of the Third International, carried on with a view to taking advantage socially of the events on the Ruhr, there is no definite news of serious preparations for military intervention on a large scale. At Lausanne, the reaction of the situation on the Ruhr is being felt, and is arousing an increased intransigence on the part of Turkey.

To sum up: The policy of Italy must be inspired first of all by the defence of her own interests, though, at the same time, due note must be taken of considerations and needs of a general order. It is a question whether, by a more exact valuation of the conditions put forward in the Italian Memorandum of London, the grave complications which exist to-day would not have been avoided. At any rate the Italian Government will take careful and speedy measures to avoid any further difficulties and re-establish as soon as possible a release of tension throughout Europe, which might make it possible to face the problem of reparations and debts under other conditions.

(The Cabinet at the end express entire approval of the line of foreign policy adopted by the Prime Minister.)

THE RUHR, THE CONFERENCE OF LAUSANNE AND THE PORT OF MEMEL

Speech delivered at Rome, 1st February 1923, before the Cabinet.

_The Prime Minister._ With reference to foreign affairs, the situation, as far as Italy is concerned, cannot be said to have altered much in the interval which has elapsed between the last Cabinet meeting and to-day.

The German resistance on economic grounds has provoked aggravation of the measures—both military and political—which are being taken by France and Belgium, but from which Italy, following her previous line of conduct, has kept apart.

The complications which were—or could have been—feared, so far have not occurred. Fresh factors have not entered into the close duel which is being fought on the Ruhr. Russia has not altered her attitude as a State, although the dominating party continues to give clamorous verbal demonstrations of solidarity with the German proletariat.

The serious disquietude which had been manifested by the Powers of the Little Entente is diminishing. There had been rumours—more or less without foundation and spread, perhaps, with the object of producing complications—of plans for repeating in Hungary what France had done on the Ruhr, which were attributed to one State or another. These have given Italy the opportunity of confirming and clearly establishing her attitude of opposition to any movement which could extend the conflict to other zones or give the opportunity of attacking the validity of the treaties of peace already concluded.

The Italian Government has been and is following attentively the coal situation on the Ruhr, above all as regards its reaction on other events. I can say that all internal measures, reduction of the train services, including those from abroad, and contracts for fresh supplies, have been quickly and diligently carried through, because, whatever may happen, no paralysis of our industrial activity or of our communications must result. In connection with the supplies of raw materials, I have the pleasure to announce to the Cabinet that the Italian Government has succeeded in concluding a favourable agreement with the Polish Government for oil.

As I said last time, the events on the Ruhr have had the most serious consequences in the developments at the Conference of Lausanne, which has now arrived at its last stage. The Italian Delegation has carried out successful work there with the object of obtaining peace in the East.

The Italian Government has not been among the last to recognise the legitimate rights of Turkey, and thinks to-day that it would not be in her interests to entrench herself in a position of absolute intransigence. It may be that Turkey has not realised the extensive programme that was laid down by the Grand National Assembly of Angora, but it cannot be denied that a great part of that programme has been put into execution, since the Turks from Angora have returned not only to Smyrna but to Constantinople and Adrianople, and have got their way, it can be said, in questions of the highest importance, such as that of the domination of the Straits and that of Capitulations.

Taken as a whole, although the general situation continues to be very critical, there seems to be a small ray of light upon the horizon. The action of the Italian Government is directed decidedly towards a policy of general peace.

As regards the question of Memel, the Italian Government has pursued a temperate policy, inspired by principles of equity and justice. It is not possible to do less than recognise the rights of Lithuania over that port, but the Lithuanian Government cannot be allowed to substitute itself for the Allied Powers in deciding its fate.

We, then, have remained in an attitude of solidarity with the Allies in the measures taken for facing the situation there. But we have, on the other hand, tried effectively to reduce those measures to the necessary minimum, avoiding those of such a nature as to provoke further complications.

RATIFICATION OF THE WASHINGTON TREATY OF NAVAL DISARMAMENT

Chamber of Deputies. Sitting of 6th February 1923.

_The Prime Minister._ Honourable Members,—I do not think that it is worth while losing time in a general discussion upon the qualities of men, good and bad, and upon the question as to whether the war of 1914 will be the last or the one before the last. That would be perfectly idle and would only lead to academic discussions. Let us, instead, turn our attention more practically to the Project of Law which I have presented.

The Convention of Washington was closed a year ago. Now the delay in the ratification of the treaty on the part of Italy has already had ambiguous and, I should almost say, unfavourable consequences in the international world. It will be a good thing, then, to proceed at once to complete this act.

The Conference at Washington shared the fate of all the conferences. It opened with great hopes, flashing before our eyes the possibility of eternal peace. Then the concrete results frustrated these hopes. I confess that I do not believe in perpetual and universal peace. In the life of the peoples, notwithstanding ideals—noble and worthy of respect—there exist the permanent factors of race, and the greatness and decadence of nations, which lead to differences often only settled by a recourse to arms. Now it is not a case of weighing these conventions with a view to peace; they represent a breath, a pause, and it is useless to enquire if they have been laid down for idealistic or for business reasons. In any case I declare that Italy did well to adhere to this Convention. If she had not done so, we should have appeared in the eyes of the world as Imperialists and jingoists, which is far from what we have in our hearts and minds. The fact that the Government asks the Chamber for this ratification gives an idea of the general trend of the Fascista foreign policy. (Applause.)

(The ratification of the Treaty is approved of without discussion, only the Communists being against it.)

MESSAGE FROM THE HON. MUSSOLINI TO THE ITALIANS IN AMERICA UPON THE
OCCASION OF THE SIGNING OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE LAYING OF CABLES
BETWEEN ITALY AND THE AMERICAN CONTINENT

The National Government, which has worked indefatigably for three months to set the country going upon the path to better fortunes, has in these days signed the Convention for the laying of cables which are to put our country into communication with you, who represent it in the numerous, rich and patriotic colonies beyond the Atlantic.

The enthusiasm for this work, so necessary to our life as a great nation, seemed at one time to have died down, but to-day with the rise of youth upon the scenes of Italian politics, that which it seemed would be relegated to some remote future has been transformed into a concrete and almost immediate reality. It is not you, who suffer almost more than any the pangs of homesickness for our adored country, who need to be shown the usefulness and necessity of this undertaking, which will be carried through in the shortest space of time possible. It will render frequent, daily and, above all, free the communications between the forty million Italians who live in our beautiful peninsula and the six millions who live beyond the ocean. All the Italians who can give financial and moral support must co-operate so that the undertaking may succeed. The Italian Government does not appeal in vain to its emigrant citizens, because it knows that distance makes the love of their country stronger and more intense.

The cables, which in two or three years will bind together Italy and the Americas across the boundless ocean, are like a gigantic arm which the country stretches out to her distant sons to draw them to her and to make them share more intimately her griefs and her joys, her work, her greatness and her glory.

MUSSOLINI.

ROME, _6th February 1923_.

FOR THE CARRYING OUT OF THE TREATY OF RAPALLO

Prefatory remarks to the Deputies, 8th February 1923, accompanying
the Project of Law presented by the Hon. Mussolini, Minister for
Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister.

_The Prime Minister._ Honourable Members,—Last November I began my statement to Parliament of the programme of the National Government as regards foreign policy with the following words:

“The fundamental principle upon which our foreign policy is based is that treaties of peace, once signed and ratified, must be carried out whether they are good or bad. A self-respecting nation cannot follow another course. Treaties are not eternal or irreparable; they are chapters and not epilogues in history; to put them into practice means to try them. If in the course of execution they are proved to be absurd, this in itself may constitute the new element which may open the possibility of a further examination of the respective positions.”

The preceding Government had undertaken to present to Parliament the Agreements concluded at Santa Margherita, and signed at Rome on the 23rd October last. This undertaking I now fulfil.

These Agreements, contrary to what has been stated by someone, do not contain any new political pledges on the part of Italy, but regulate the relations between the Commune of Zara and the surrounding territory of Dalmatia, make clear some recognised rights on the part of citizens who are Italian by option, and endeavour, by means of friendly agreements, to find a possibility of giving and assuring a peaceful and industrious life to the troubled city of Fiume.

Owing to the way in which it is drawn up—whether on account of its diffuseness in those clauses which touch upon territorial questions, and its brevity in others, or whether on account of the seeming precedence given to the task of the commissions which ought, according to the letter of the treaty itself, to proceed exclusively to the settlement of territorial questions, while for the commissions to which were entrusted the settlement of other questions, limits were established, _a priori_, of a certain amplitude (Art. VI.)—the Treaty of Rapallo has given Yugoslavia the opportunity of maintaining that it was necessary first to effect the evacuation of the territories over which the sovereignty of the Serbo-Croat-Slovak Kingdom had been recognised, and then of proceeding to the stipulations of the agreements for the regulation of the new relations between the two countries.

They tried to justify this with arguments of a political nature. That is to say, they saw, in the first place, that the opposition met with in various Italian political spheres to the transactions concluded at Rapallo had stirred up the discontent and opposition of the Yugoslavs to the treaty; secondly, that the suspended execution of the Territorial Clauses, evidently attributed to some Italian parties, had given the impression to the Yugoslavs that Italy did not want to proceed to the carrying out of the treaty; thirdly, that, in consequence, the parliamentary opposition to a policy of friendliness towards Italy had become very marked, and rendered extremely difficult the adoption of direct provisions for the favourable regulation of these relations; and lastly, that if, instead, the prearranged course had been followed—that of proceeding, say, first to the evacuation of the territories—a radical change of position would have been realised, which would have allowed of the conclusion of more favourable agreements.

In Italy, on the other hand, the discontent was increased by an idea, entertained by many, that the new State, which had also arisen as the result of Italy’s victorious war, ought to give to the citizens, and in Italian interests, privileges no less great than those granted by the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, not taking into account that a national State, newly formed, may have particular exigencies and susceptibilities. The contrast of such opposite tendencies ended by creating in the relations between the two countries an atmosphere of uneasiness, which has at times reached an acute stage. And in Italy, the intransigence of some circles found justification, above all, in the weakness of the Governments, inasmuch as they had ground for fearing that all our rights would be trodden underfoot the moment we no longer had tangible securities in our hands. By the Agreements which are now handed to us, the Government of Belgrade has recognised the necessity of determining the régime which will have to regulate the reciprocal relations of the new boundaries before passing to the definite execution of the Territorial Clauses.

As for the substance of the Agreements, it is my conviction that their greater or less efficacy will depend upon the spirit in which they are carried out, because never, perhaps, has it been so true, as in this case, that the most perfect pacts become empty formulas if a doubtful or hostile spirit is brought to their execution.

I observe, in conclusion, that the uncertainty which has been manifested in the foreign policy of Italy as regards the Treaty of Rapallo has created a situation unfavourable to her, often preventing her from taking a decided attitude, which would have been in her interest, in most essential questions of a general nature, and making her appear in a light contradictory to her position as a Great Power.

My intense, though brief, experience of Government has shown me that it is not possible to carry out a strong foreign policy without having decisive and clearly defined attitudes as regards the other States.

Italy must get away from this weak situation, must regain her full liberty and efficiency of action also in this sphere. We shall, therefore, carry out the treaty resolutely and loyally, exacting its scrupulous observance. We shall watch over this as is our right and duty. And we wait for time to pass definite judgment upon the soundness and the fate of to-day’s Conventions.

With this understanding, I ask you, Honourable Members, to approve of the following Project of Law:

“Full and entire execution is given to the Agreements and Conventions signed at Rome on 23rd October 1921, between the Kingdom of Italy and the Kingdom of the Serbs, the Croats and the Slovenes for the execution of the Treaty of Rapallo of 12th November 1920.”

THE AGREEMENTS OF SANTA MARGHERITA, ITALY AND YUGOSLAVIA

Chamber of Deputies. Sitting of 10th February 1923.

_The Prime Minister._ Honourable Members,—With the approval of the Agreements of Santa Margherita, there came to an end what might be called “the Foreign Policy week” of the Italian Government; a week that might also be called pacific, since it began with the ratification of the Convention of Washington, which represents a pause in the great naval armament, and ends with the approval of the Agreements of Santa Margherita, which are the consequence of the Treaty of Rapallo already ratified and partly carried out.

In closing this week of the life of Parliament, I realise that the Chamber has done good work, and that it has during this session undoubtedly raised, in some ways, its prestige in the country. (Comments.) The questions with which the Chamber has dealt are large; they are not concerned with treaties and bills of minor importance, as some have said.

I refuse to embark, as was attempted on the Left, upon the usual discussions of a general character which do not conclude anything. While I am on this bench, the Chamber will not be changed into an electoral meeting.

_No Discussion._ There is nothing to discuss as regards home policy; that which happens, happens because it is my direct and clear desire and in accordance with my precise orders, and for which I naturally assume full personal responsibility. (Comments.)

It is useless, therefore, to go to the police officials, because the orders are mine. It does not affect me to know of the existence of a plot, in the sense usually attributed to that word; this will be settled by competent authorities. But there are those who thought that they would fight with impunity against the State and Fascismo. By now they must be disillusioned; and they will be more so in the future. The difference between the Liberal and Fascista States consists precisely in this: that the Fascista State does not defend itself only, but attacks, and those who intend to slander it abroad and to undermine its authority at home must be warned that their manœuvres bring with them unforeseen consequences. The enemies of the Fascisti must not be surprised if I treat them severely as enemies.

As regards the speech of Filippo Turati, my old fighting scent did not deceive me when a few days ago I refused the advances which came to me from that quarter through Gregorio Nofri, who, having been in Russia, felt the overpowering necessity of becoming anti-Bolshevist. Strayed sheep do not enter my fold. I am still faithful to my old tactics. I do not seek anybody. I do not refuse anybody. I put faith above all in my own forces. This is why, lately—after the meeting of the Great Fascista Council—I desired that there should be a closer union with those parties with which, fighting on national ground, friendly relations can be established for common work. But all this, let it be said at once, has not been done for parliamentary purposes, but for the sake of cohesion, unity and the pacification of the country.

I agree wholly with that which the Hon. Cavazzoni said yesterday with regard to the eight-hour day. I declared, before a meeting of eight hundred printers, that the eight-hour day represents an inviolable conquest on the part of the working classes. To-day there are those who dream of setting on foot a long discussion because opposing ideas are attributed to this and that member of the Cabinet. I give definite notice that the Government, in one of its forthcoming meetings, will decide once and for all the question of the eight-hour day. This having been said, and I hope that everybody will understand also the sense of all I have not said, I pass on to the subject of foreign policy.

_A Circumspect Policy of Activity._ In the meantime, I cannot accept the statement of the Hon. Lucci, who makes out that I am original. In the first place, he must give me time. In the second, there is no originality in foreign affairs, and I refuse to be original, if this originality would result in the slightest damage to my country. (Applause.) And I cannot accept, either, his too idealistic point of view. I see the world as it really is, that is to say, a world of unbounded egoism. If the world was Arcadia, it would be pleasant to amuse oneself with nymphs and shepherds; but I do not see anything of all this, and even when the more or less respectable standards of great principles are displayed, I see behind them interests which seek for a footing in the world. If all foreign policy were brought into the region of pure idealism, it would certainly not be Italy who would refuse to join in. But it is not so; hence all that the Hon. Lucci says belongs to the music of the most distant spheres. (Laughter.)

When I first took up my position on this bench, there was a moment of trepidation in certain sections of international politics. It was thought that the advent to power of Fascismo would mean, at the very least, war with Yugoslavia. After a few months, international opinion is fully reassured. The foreign policy of Fascismo cannot be, especially in these historic times, other than extremely circumspect, though at the same time very active.

The nation, having issued from the splendid and blood-stained travail of the war, is now fully intent on the work of building up its political, economic, financial and moral life. To compel it to make an effort which was not absolutely necessary, would be to follow an anti-national and suicidal policy. At London, as at Lausanne, Italian foreign policy has pursued this direction; at Lausanne, above all, the work of the Italian Delegation has been highly appreciated. If peace was not concluded there, it was not the fault, in any way, of Italy.

On the other hand, it is not good to speak too pessimistically of the development of affairs in the Eastern Mediterranean. It must not be thought that a certain harmless showing of teeth, sometimes the result of reciprocal restlessness, means the beginning of a war. I think that if Greece is prudent and the Entente remains firmly united—as in the case of their ships in the port of Smyrna—that Turkey too, since she has realised a large part of the programme laid down at Angora, will become reasonable. There is no reason, therefore, to fear military complications in Europe. Still Italy will keep a careful look-out that the disturbances resulting upon the events in the Ruhr district shall not have serious consequences among the countries of the Danube basin.

The situation on the Ruhr is stationary. I declare once again that Italy could not have followed a different line of policy. The time for fine gestures is past, as they are useless. The attitude which was advocated by certain elements on the Left would have been equally useless. We could not have prevented the French from marching on the Ruhr, and we might have encouraged the German resistance. Also the other plan of our mediation could not have been carried out, because no mediation of any kind is possible if it is not asked for and welcomed. (Applause.) Besides, England has limited herself to non-technical participation in the operations on the Ruhr, but has not pushed her difference of opinion with France to the point of withdrawing her troops from the Rhine. It is opportune to add that France has not asked us, up to now, for formal and concrete assistance. Should this happen, it is evident that Italy should reserve to herself the right of exposing all the complex system of the relations between the two countries. (Loud applause.)

_The Last Phase of the Adriatic Drama._ As to the Agreements of Santa Margherita, of which the Chamber is asked to approve, they represent the last phase of our sad and lamentable Adriatic drama. I could here reply in detail, I could show the Hon. Chiesa, for example, how only yesterday, 9th February, I received a telegram from Belgrade to this effect: “The Ministry of Yugoslavia communicates that orders have been sent to the authorities of Spalato that the premises of the school shall be evacuated and put at the disposal of the school itself, and that the house which adjoins the Church of Santo Spirito shall be emptied and handed over.” I could correct other inaccuracies, but it is not my business, it is not worth while to descend to the discussion of detail. I am always of the opinion that this Convention must be carried out in order to test it. At the same time, I do not feel like defending, at too great a length, a treaty of which I did not approve when it was concluded, and which I still hold to be, as regards a great many of its clauses, absurd and harmful to Italian interests. But matters, to-day, stand thus: either the treaty must be definitely enforced or denounced. Since, in present conditions, it cannot be denounced, for that would mean the reopening of all difficulties, there remains nothing but its loyal and scrupulous application on our part, as loyal and scrupulous as the application on the part of Belgrade will have to be. (Applause.)

To wait indefinitely for events which may occur is the worst of systems at this moment. It is necessary to put an end to a situation which has become unbearable and which gave us all the disadvantages without assuring us of what might be the advantages of clearly defined relations. Moreover it is difficult to understand why the Treaty of Rapallo, of all the treaties which have been made from the beginning of history, should be the only one irreparable and perpetual. No treaty has ever withstood new conditions of affairs developed by the progress of time. The essential thing, to my mind, is to place ourselves in such a position that an eventual revision will enable us to vindicate our eternal rights with dignity and power. (Applause.)

_The Government in favour of Fiume and Zara._ By the application of the Agreements of Santa Margherita the Fascista Government gives a solemn proof of its probity, its spirit of decision and of absolute loyalty. Belgrade must do the same. Yugoslavia must take into account the intrinsic value of this act, and follow, where the Italians who remain in Dalmatia are concerned, a policy of freedom and judicious action; as a policy which would tend to suppress the Italian element in Dalmatia would not be tolerated by the Fascista Government. (Applause.) By the ratification of these Agreements the Government offers Yugoslavia the opportunity of furthering the economic relations between the two countries.

The Government, which has already done all it can, within the limits of its possibilities, for Fiume and Zara, will continue to work with the utmost energy and diligence for these two cities. The evacuation of Susak having been carried out—and of Susak only, because the Delta and Porto Baros will still be occupied by our troops until Fiume has become juridically a perfect State—Italy will continue to interest herself in the fate of Fiume, so that she may be restored in a short time to her ancient splendour.

As for Zara, her destiny is serious and difficult, and I, for one, understand the tragedy of that city and the suffering of all the Italians scattered in Dalmatia up as far as Cattaro. But Zara, the sentinel of Dalmatia, is ready to bear, with the spirit of absolute national discipline, the completion of the last act of the Adriatic drama.

The Government will meet its needs immediately, because Zara must live, because Zara beyond the Adriatic represents one of the most vital portions of the Italian people. And the people of Zara and Dalmatia may be sure that the Government will watch over their fate with the most loving care. These are not merely words spoken to help them through this difficult time; deeds will follow them.

As for public, national opinion, it is unanimous in feeling that these Agreements had to be applied in order that Italy might be free in the ever closer international competition, free to carry out a policy of defence of her interests and free to influence with increasing activity the course of events. I think that the best part of the Italian people agree in this line of home and foreign policy. (Applause.)

QUESTIONS OF FOREIGN POLICY BEFORE THE SENATE. THE RUHR; FIUME; ZARA AND
DALMATIA

Sitting of the Senate, 16th February 1923.

_The Prime Minister._ Honourable Senators,—After having written the prefaces and the introductions to the Bills, and after the speech made in the other branch of Parliament, I do not think that there remains much to say.

The very rapidity of the discussion itself bears witness to the fact that all these treaties and agreements are already, in a certain sense, superseded. By this I do not wish to deny their importance, but it is a question of treaties and conventions of some time back, and life to-day moves at a very great rate. I do not disguise the fact that in continuing the eternal theory of conferences, people have reason to show a certain scepticism about the likelihood of results. (Laughter.)

_Why Italy intervenes._ Senator Crespi tried to carry the discussion on to general ground—the burning ground of debts and reparations. He demands new pacts; but there are none. Perhaps there cannot be any. With reference to a recent appeal for Italy’s intervention in this matter, if responsible members of Governments, and especially those engaged or interested in the conflict, turned to Italy, the only nation in the world which, at this moment, is following a policy of peace—(Applause.)—I should not hesitate one moment in answering the appeal.

There is a new factor, Senator Crespi, which it would be a good thing to take into consideration, though it is one which tends to stifle rather than arouse enthusiasm. It is that England and the United States have come to an agreement. England has undertaken to pay her debts to America. It is no good, therefore, for us to entertain too many illusions about the likelihood of a cancellation of our debts. It would be perfectly just, I think, from the strictly moral point of view; but the criteria and principles of absolute morality do not as yet guide the relations of the peoples. (Approval.)

It was said in a foreign Parliament that Italy had attempted to mediate between France and Germany. No such attempt was ever made. My duty was to make investigations in the European capitals, and I have done so. But having gathered that there was no possibility of proceeding in that direction, I drew back, as to continue would have been a great mistake. I think, however, that the crisis has reached its culminating point. It is a question now of knowing whether the Entente still exists and still will exist. (Comments.)

I do not think that I shall be revealing secrets if I say here what meets the eye of anyone who reads the daily news in the papers. Not a single event has occurred, not a single question arisen, without the problem of the unity of action of the Entente having been brought forward. Of necessity in this political situation there can be no improvised action and still less originality. All foreign policies, not excluding that of Russia, which is simply terrifying in form and method, are of a cautious and circumspect nature at this moment. There is no reason why Italy should follow a different course. When it is a question of the interests of our nation and of forty million inhabitants who have the right to live, it is necessary to be careful about improvisations, and it is necessary to take into account that, besides our wishes, there are also the wishes of others.

If we had coalfields; if we had in some way solved the problem of raw materials; if we could dispose of large reserves of gold in order to keep up the value of our money, we could follow a given policy, even one of generosity towards Germany. But we cannot afford the luxury of prodigality and generosity when we have to toil to carry on life, when we have to summon all our energies to avoid falling into the abyss.

And so you will agree with me, Honourable Members, that Italy could not keep aloof from that which is taking place on the Ruhr, could not deprive herself of participation in an economical and technical capacity. It is always better, in my opinion, to be present, because sometimes complicated problems find unexpected solutions. It was not possible to run the risk capriciously of not being present, in the event—not at all improbable—of an economic agreement, as regards iron and coal, between Germany and France. (Applause.)

_Zara and Dalmatia._ Coming to the Agreements of Santa Margherita, I understand perfectly the grief and anguish expressed in the words of Senators Tamassia and Tivaroni. Undoubtedly sentiment is a great spiritual force, both in the lives of individuals and of peoples, but it cannot be the one dominating influence of foreign policy.

It is necessary to have the courage to say that Italy cannot remain for ever penned up in one sea, even if it is the Adriatic. Beyond the Adriatic there is the Mediterranean and other seas which can interest us. The Treaty of Rapallo was, in my opinion, a lamentable transaction, which was the result of a difficult internal situation and of a foreign policy which was not marked by its excessive autonomy. And here allow me to repeat that a strong and dignified foreign policy cannot be carried out if the nation does not present a daily example of iron discipline. (Approval.) I do not think that these Agreements of Santa Margherita sign the death warrant of Zara and Dalmatia. With the last concessions we have saved the use of the Italian language for our brothers there. Now I think it was Gioberti who said that where the language is spoken there is the nation. For this reason, if these brothers of ours can speak, write and learn in their mother tongue, I think that already one of the foundations of their Italian nationality is saved.

For a decade the Italians of Zara and Dalmatia have resisted the furious attempts at denationalisation made by the Hapsburg Monarchy. In those days Italy could not give active assistance to those brothers; now you see that she has another realisation of herself. Those brothers of ours, who might have felt themselves forgotten if the Agreements of Santa Margherita were applied by another nation, cannot feel the same when the definite and necessary application of the Treaty of Rapallo is carried out by the Government over which I have the honour of presiding and of which the members are those who won the victory. (Applause.) We firmly believe that the strict and scrupulous application of the Agreements of Santa Margherita on our part, as well as on the part of Yugoslavia, will save the Italian character of Zara and Dalmatia. There is no need for me to repeat that treaties are transactions, and are like the steps of an equilibrist. No treaty is eternal and perpetual; all that is happening to-day under our eyes gives us clear warning.

_The Question of Fiume._ We shall then carry out these Agreements immediately and loyally. It must not be thought that the Third Zone is a kind of vast continent, and that in it we have immense forces. It is a question of the territory round Zara and a group of islands; all told, we have only 120 policemen, 18 custom-house guards, and 20 soldiers. At Susak we have a battalion of infantry. It will be a case of turning them back to the line of Eneo, because until it is known what is to become of Fiume, Porto Baros and the Delta, they will remain under the control of Italian troops. (Applause.) What is this Arbitration Commission? It represents an attempt to bring about the existence of that more or less vital creature, first conceived at Rapallo, known as the Independent State of Fiume. (Laughter.) One thing is certain, at any rate, and that is that there are three Italians on the Commission. And another thing is certain, and that is that it is not absolutely necessary for Fiume to become a new province of the realm. That there should actually be a prefect at Fiume is to me a secondary matter; the important thing is that Fiume shall keep her spirit sound and intact, that she shall remain Italian, and that such means shall be found that shall make her a city which lives in itself and for itself and not only through the largess of the Italian State. (Loud applause.)

The Government, which sometimes makes deeds precede words, has already taken steps for the provision of Zara, economically, politically and spiritually. The same has been done for Dalmatia. It is necessary to admit frankly that since the coming of the Fascista Government the Yugoslavs have been less intransigent with regard to us. There is no doubt that the definite carrying out of the Treaty of Rapallo is the cause of great grief to the citizens of Fiume and Zara, of Dalmatia and many in the old kingdom.

(Cries of “It is true.”)

_Mussolini._ At other times there might perhaps have been difficulties. But the Government over which I have the honour of presiding does not hesitate; it faces difficulties, I was almost going to say seeks them. I intend to regulate as soon as possible all that more or less successful heritage of foreign policy left me by my predecessors. It is no good being alarmed by what happens. I have what I dare to call a Roman conception of history and life. Things must never be thought to be irreparable. Rome did not believe in the irreparable, even after the battle of Cannæ, when she lost the flower of her generation. On the contrary, you will remember that the Senate went out to meet Terentius Varro, who, having wished to undertake the battle against the advice of Paulus Æmilius, was certainly one of those responsible for the defeat. Rome fell, and rose up again; she marched slowly, but she marched; she had a goal to reach, and she intended to reach it. Italy, our Italy, the Italy which we carry in our hearts, and which is our pride, must be like this; the Italy which accepts her destiny when it is imposed, by hard necessity, but only while she prepares her spirit and her forces to overcome it some day. (Loud and prolonged applause, many Senators advance to congratulate the Prime Minister. Silence being once more established, Mussolini continues.)

I propose that the Senate, having concluded the discussion suspended yesterday evening, should be adjourned. I do not know for how long. The Government must be left free to work and to prepare work for the Chamber and the Senate.

Meanwhile, I feel the necessity of thanking the President, who has directed the proceedings with that tact and high wisdom for which he is known. I am glad that the Senate, in approving of these political and commercial treaties—which are two aspects of the same policy—has thus brought to a conclusion a part of our foreign policy. I beg the President to accept the expression of my profound admiration.

_Tittoni, President of the Senate_, replies, reciprocating the words of the Prime Minister and praising his spirit and his patriotic faith. He pays tribute to the way in which the Hon. Mussolini has assumed, with a firm hand, the direction of public interests.

A REVIEW OF EUROPEAN POLITICS IN THEIR RELATION WITH ITALY

Speech delivered before the Cabinet, 2nd March 1923.

_The Prime Minister._ Honourable Colleagues,—The situation on the Ruhr has remained stationary during these last weeks. While the two disputants seem to settle themselves more rigidly in their respective positions of passive resistance on the part of Germany and active pressure on the part of Belgium and France, England has not changed her attitude of benign disapproval and Italy has neither increased nor reduced the number of technical experts representing her on the Ruhr. So far there has not arisen the new factor which would lead, in one sense or the other, to the solution of the crisis. This new factor could consist either in a direct proposal made by one disputant to the other, or in a request for mediation, or in the modification, on a political basis, of the aims which France says she has in view—aims of an economic nature, which so far have not gone beyond the limit of the payment of reparations—or else in an increase of the opposition of England which would lead to the withdrawal of her troops from the Rhine.

It seems, however, clear—notwithstanding the solicitations of an element of the advanced democracy—that England maintains her attitude of circumspect waiting, without impatience or precipitation. The war, which at the present moment has for its theatre the basin of the Ruhr, is one of attrition, and it may yet last for some time, in spite of the general expectation all over Europe of a rapid conclusion. As I have already said both in the Senate and the Chamber, Italy will not refuse her assistance in any attempt that may be made to render normal the situation in Central Europe as soon as possible, and of this she has given tangible proof in the help afforded, before any other country, to Austria. The solidarity which Italy was bound to show towards France upon the common ground of reparations, has given rise to projects of greater importance, which might have been interpreted in certain circles as having been directed against other Powers or to the exclusion of some one of them. An official declaration on the part of the Government has established the truth of the matter. The campaign in certain papers has not been approved of and still less authorised. That it is very opportune that friendly and cordial relations should exist between Italy and France is the sincere conviction of my Government. It is very much to be desired that the economic relations between these two neighbouring countries shall be intensified and strengthened, and the Government has worked in this direction in concluding the recent commercial agreement. But this has nothing to do with a real treaty of alliance, as has been suggested in certain sections of public opinion. The Fascista Government intends on the whole to follow a line of foreign policy as far as possible autonomous, and it could never adhere to alliances which did not protect the interests of Italy in the highest degree and which did not constitute a solid guarantee of peace and prosperity for Italy in particular and Europe in general.

Fascista Italy cannot and will not adhere to a system of alliances which does not take into account these fundamental premises. For her to pledge herself in any way definitely while the Entente is still in a state of crisis, and there are still many obscure points in the general situation in the world, would be unpardonable.

_Turkey and Peace._ No reliable news has hitherto reached us as to the intentions of the Government at Angora concerning the acceptance or non-acceptance of the projected treaty presented by the Allies to the Turkish Delegation at Lausanne. Information is contradictory, because, whereas on the one hand it is said that, in spite of the moderating influence of Mustapha Kemal and Ismet Pasha, the Assembly of Angora has shown itself adverse to some of the conditions already accepted by the Turkish Delegation at Lausanne and intends to re-discuss the projects of the treaty, article by article; on the other hand, especially from British quarters, it is continually said that the Turks seem favourably disposed towards the rapid conclusion of peace.

Whatever may be the decision of the Government at Angora, it must be remembered that, once the deliberations of the Assembly are at an end, the Turks will, by means of the Secretary-General of the Conference, who remains for the present at Lausanne, give a definite reply to the Allies concerning eventual requests and proposals.

Between the Governments at Rome, London and Paris there is in consequence an active diplomatic correspondence in progress with the object of establishing the common line of action to be adopted by the Allies in certain important questions, such as that of Capitulations and those concerning the Economic Clauses, as well as the course to be adopted in the eventual resumption of the work of the Conference, if the Turkish proposals are such as to furnish a serious basis for discussion. The British Government is showing itself to be very rigid in this respect and seems not to wish to allow discussion upon other than these three points:

(_a_) The formula of the Turko-Grecian reparations.

(_b_) The formula of the judicial guarantees for foreigners.

(_c_) Economic Clauses.

As regards the first, it is a question of putting in the hands of an Arbitration Commission the reciprocal claims of the two countries, since the Turks do not even admit that the Greeks have any claims to present. For the second, it is a question of finding a formula which will provide more efficient guarantees for foreigners where the searching of private houses and arrests are concerned; and as regards the third, of resuming the discussion and negotiations upon all economic questions and of handing them over to another commission to be dealt with apart from the treaty of peace.

The Italian Government is fully convinced of the necessity of bringing about the conclusion of this peace in order that grave dangers, derived from the actual situation in the East, may be avoided, and in order that normal conditions, favourable to the free exercise of trade and industry, may be re-established. Although we are resolute in demanding from Turkey the acceptance of the really moderate conditions proposed by the Allies, we do not think, however, that every and any request, not connected with the three points mentioned above, made by Turkey, should be excluded _a priori_, but rather that the possibility of examination without preconception should always be considered where some well-defined and limited proposal is concerned.

As to procedure, the British Government would be inclined towards the renewal of the discussion at Constantinople, while the Italian Government, realising the dangers which would menace the success of the negotiations in the surroundings of the Turkish capital, would prefer that it should take place at Lausanne with a limited gathering of technical delegates.

In any case it will not be possible to make a definite decision about this before knowing the answer of the Turkish Government, which is to be decided by the vote of the Grand Assembly.

_Memel and the Polish Frontier._ The question of Memel has been solved in theory, and it is not probable that in practice overpowering obstacles will be met with, since in the solution the rights of both the Lithuanians and the Poles have been taken into account.

This incident has afforded an opportunity of examining generally the still uncertain position of Poland with regard to her boundaries. It seemed to the Italian Government that such uncertainty was pregnant with dangers, and that it was of the utmost importance to arrive, as soon as possible, at the recognition of the frontier, the delimitation of which is reserved for the Allied Powers by the Treaty of Versailles. Consequently, at the Conference of Ambassadors at Paris, the Government proposed that such a delimitation should be proceeded with at once, a proposal which, not having appeared at first to meet with the approval of the other representatives, has recently been presented again by the French Government, and to which we, for the sake of consistency, have adhered.

As far as the boundaries between Lithuania and Poland are concerned, we should have preferred the League of Nations to have been called upon to pass an opinion, so that the largest number of States possible should be interested in guaranteeing the decision. Our Allies, however, having drawn attention to the fact that the procedure of the League of Nations is of a length and tediousness which, at the present moment, it is better to avoid, we have also adhered on this point to the French proposal to hand the question over to the Conference of Ambassadors.

We truly hope that Poland and Lithuania will accept the decisions which the Conference of Ambassadors thinks it just to make. And this is one of those typical cases in which Poland and Lithuania must take into account the inevitable necessity of sentiment yielding to reason.

_The Problems of the Adriatic. Fiume; Abbazia; Zara._ The Italian Delegation and part of that of Yugoslavia have already arrived at Abbazia. At present work has not begun, but will begin as soon as possible. At our request the Government at Belgrade has replaced Admiral Priza by Signor Rybar as her representative. The accusations against Admiral Priza, as a participator in the legal proceedings which led to the condemnation and death of Nazario Sauro, are well known. The Government at Belgrade showed itself to be appreciative of the eminently moral reasons for our objection and consented to the substitution—even at the cost of facing the criticism of the Italophobe opposition—with a good-will which seems an excellent omen for the future.

Our Delegation, too, to the Commission for the Evacuation of the Third Zone is already at Zara, and since the Yugoslav Delegation has also arrived, work can begin at once.

An incident which occurred the night before last, when abuse of Zara and Italy was shouted from a passing Yugoslav steamer within sight of that port, has already evoked spontaneous and immediate apologies from the Yugoslav consul to our prefect. But I have urged Belgrade to prevent such deplorable, although unimportant, incidents from occurring again.

I must say that, hitherto, the Yugoslav Government has shown itself to be animated on the whole by excellent feeling, and loyally co-operates in seeking to smooth the way in this period of important and delicate negotiations which has just begun.

As for the attitude of the national elements at Zara and Fiume, they remain inspired by a high sense of discipline and recognition of the necessity of subordinating private interests to the general welfare of the nation.

_The Conference of the Südbahn._ The work of the Conference of the Südbahn for the purpose of technical and administrative reorganisation has made sufficient progress. Both the States interested and the company have presented their proposals for amendments, in which they try, without interfering with the basis of the projects under discussion, to lessen the financial burden.

The project of the agreement concerning through traffic, which contains regulations guaranteeing the regularity of the organisation of the railways, facilities for the customs and sanitary services, and the setting in order of the international stations, as well as regulations regarding the railway rates of the through trains, has already been discussed. The States have shown themselves to be of one opinion with regard to the intentions of the project, which tend to unite in a special convention all the different regulations which have issued from the treaties of peace and the projects of the Convention concluded at Barcelona and Portorose.

The project, moreover, is directed particularly towards reviving the powers of the Convention of Berne in respect of international traffic. The scheme of agreement for the technical and administrative reorganisation of the Südbahn admits the possibility of direct control on the part of the State as well as on the part of the company. It aims also at the maintenance of that unity of commercial direction which, without offending the sovereignty of the States with regard to tariffs, will allow of international traffic and the direct despatching of goods, and will take into account the special exigencies of trade which require particular measures and which, not being prejudicial to the States, will be advantageous as regards the economic relations between them.

The work of the Conference will probably last another week on account of the complicated and difficult character of the various financial, technical and administrative problems to be solved.

THE ITALO-YUGOSLAV CONFERENCE FOR THE COMMERCIAL TREATY

Opening address delivered in Rome at the Palazzo Chigi, on 6th March
1923, before the members of the Conference.

Gentlemen,—I am particularly glad to open this meeting and welcome cordially the delegates of the Kingdom of the Serbs, the Croats and the Slovenes. I attach great importance to this meeting and to its results, which I am confident will be excellent.

You know that at Abbazia the Adriatic question is being settled, so that at the present time the field may be cleared of those special problems which up to to-day have not permitted an understanding with Yugoslavia.