Chapter IV (1)

_The Dominant Voice:_
Ruin the arrogant hate of love!
Ruin the haters, God above!
Bless Thou their harvest to quell their sin--
Honor the sinned-against, God within!

_All Voices:_
_Warring nations, bleed, bleed,
But to let the leaders lead!
Springs to come from Falls to go,
Love's lords, Life's lords, show, show!_

How England Prevented an Understanding With Germany

By Dr. Th. Schiemann.

The writings of Professor Schiemann of the University of
Berlin, who is also the leading editorial writer of the
Kreuz Zeitung, are regarded as inspired by the Kaiser's
Government, and in some degree by the Kaiser himself. Dr.
Schiemann is often spoken of as an intimate personal friend
of the Kaiser. The subjoined article was, in the original,
sent by Dr. Schiemann to Professor John Bates Clark of the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, with the special
request that it be translated and forwarded for publication
in THE NEW YORK TIMES CURRENT HISTORY.

After the great crisis of the first world war, which terminated in the Congress of Vienna, the relations of England to the German States were fairly good. People lived in the protecting shade of the great alliance; England was busy digesting the enormous prey which it had seized at the expense of all the other powers that had taken part in the war; Continental Europe was endeavoring, as best it could, to heal the wounds and sores which had remained behind as mementos of oppressive but, despite all, glorious years. France recuperated most rapidly; by the Treaties of Paris there had been recovered from it only part of the abundant harvest which it had gathered in consequence of the victories and the coercive policy of Napoleon; the national soil was still fertile and the national consciousness was still imbued with the "gloire" which the Corsican General, with the help of his own and of foreign troops, had won for the French name. The great disturbances of world peace that marked the years 1830, 1854, and 1870 were attributable to an incessant pursuit of new "gloire," to which all other aims were subordinate. Parallel with this French striving for new "gloire" was England's endeavor to keep the Continent in a feverish condition; this was the policy of Lord Palmerston, and with it was combined a hysterical fear of attack on the part of possible enemies that were thought to exist in Russia, and especially in France. At the same time an arrogant challenge was constantly held forth to all the nations of the earth, and an almost uninterrupted war was carried on against the small States adjoining England's colonies in Asia and Africa. Between the years 1856 and 1900 England waged no less than thirty-four such wars, and by so doing acquired 4,000,000 square miles of land and 57,000,000 subjects. In Europe after the year 1815 England, for the most part, kept peace; the Crimean war, which was a coalition war, constitutes an exception, and it was not England's fault that Prussia, too, was not drawn into that war, which concerned a specifically English interest. At that time English threats were quite as numerous as they were in the year 1863, when The Daily News declared King William I. an outlaw, and The Daily Mail proclaimed for him the fate of Charles I. The cause of this, however, was that in London it was looked upon as an interference with English interests that Bismarck, by his attitude during the Polish insurrection, had prevented the effectuation of a coalition directed against Russia. During the war of 1864 over Schleswig-Holstein the threats were renewed, and even then we began to hear the watchwords with which public opinion in England for a decade has been mobilized against us: A Germany organized on a military basis, and with a fleet at its command besides, indicates that the goal of that State's policy, even more than in the case of France, is world rule. At that time, too, however, France and Russia were regarded by English war makers as the country's real enemies, and this conviction, rather than ideal considerations of any kind whatsoever, accounts for the fact that in the years 1870 and 1871 English policy followed a neutral course. England wished to see France weakened, had not foreseen Germany's great success, and had reserved for future opportunities the settlement of accounts with Russia, its very annoying rival in Asia.

In other respects, however, Bismarck was by no means satisfied with the way in which England pursued its policy of "neutrality." He had expected, at least, that the English would condemn the war, begun, as it was, in such a criminal manner, and not that they would carry on with France a flourishing trade in weapons. "It is a surprising fact, pregnant with warning," he wrote in May, 1874, "that Mr. Gladstone succeeded so easily in holding the country to an attitude directly opposed to the traditional hostility of the English masses toward France." He had all the more reason to expect a different attitude in view of the fact that, as was well known in England, it had been out of regard for England that Bismarck in December, 1870, had refused an offer of peace from Thiers, which rested on the condition that Belgium should be united to France under the rule of King Leopold. After the battle of Sedan Lord Odo Russell and Disraeli aroused the fears of the English people over the possibility of a German invasion; but Bismarck, nevertheless, was thinking of an English-German alliance, which, on account of the blood relationship of the two dynasties, was by no means impracticable, and which to Queen Victoria would have seemed a natural combination. Subsequently, in the years 1873 and 1874, Bismarck negotiated with Lord Odo Russell in Berlin regarding a German-English alliance, and through Münster he also took up the matter with Disraeli, who denied very emphatically that he had French sympathies. Nothing, he said, was more incorrect. The two peoples, he alleged further, who alone could proceed hand in hand, and who must become more and more cognizant of that fact, were Germany and England. The power of France, he added, was on the wane, a fact regarding which the demoralization of the empire, the decrease of population, and the course of recent events left no room for doubt. Notwithstanding Disraeli's views, however, the alliance with England, as is well known, was never formed. The most serious obstacle was created by the fact that party government in England rendered binding obligations extraordinarily difficult. Then came all sorts of pinpricks, as, for instance, Derby's advocacy in the year 1875 of Gortchakoff's famous rescue campaign. But despite all Bismarck held fast to the idea of bringing about closer relations with England, and the formation of the alliance with Austria-Hungary confirmed him in that purpose. "We shall have to adjust our attitude more and more," he wrote to Schweinitz in March, 1880, "with the object of increasing the security of our relations with Austria and England." It was this political desire that prompted him to reject a Russian proposal to unite the four Eastern powers in a common protest against England's isolated procedure in connection with the occupation of Egypt. He wished to prevent England from being humiliated by a prearranged coalition. A letter from Bismarck to Salisbury (July 8, 1885) has been preserved, which is very characteristic of this friendly attitude of German policy. "As to politics," he writes, "I have not the slightest doubt that the traditional friendly relations between the two dynasties, as well as between the two nations, will give sufficient security for settling every existing or arising question in a conciliatory way."

With respect to the question of the Egyptian loan that was being discussed at that time, as well as with respect to the burning Afghan question, Bismarck adhered tenaciously to this policy, and later on, too, he was determined to spin the threads further. In the latter part of the Autumn of 1887 an exchange of letters again took place between Lord Salisbury and Prince Bismarck, wherein the latter gave expression to the idea that Austria and England were the natural allies of Germany. If they were opposed to an alliance it would be necessary for Germany to alter its policy entirely and to think about establishing more intimate relations with Russia. This, properly considered, was an invitation to enter into negotiations regarding an alliance treaty. But Salisbury, who hoped for a conflict of the Continental powers which would insure England's position of power for another generation, answered evasively, and Bismarck justly regarded his reply as a rejection. But such a conflict did not arise. The menacing danger brought about by Alexander III. was overcome by the publication of the German-Austrian treaty of alliance. Even then, however, Bismarck did not give up the idea of bringing about closer relations with England. In December, 1888, he wrote: "The promotion of common feeling with England is primo loco to be encouraged." If Bismarck had left behind a political testament this sentence would in all probability be contained in it. Such was also the attitude which our Emperor has consistently maintained from his accession to the throne until the outbreak of the present war. He was a favorite of the old Queen, and the treaty signed on July 1, 1890, whereby we obtained possession of Heligoland by relinquishing our claims to Witu and Zanzibar, was an outward sign of an honest endeavor on the part of both nations to bring about closer mutual relations. The mutual limitation of spheres of interest in East and West Africa in the year 1893, and the friendly adjustment of the conflict which Article III. of the British Agreement with the Congo Free State of the year 1894 had threatened to bring about, might be considered additional symptoms of this general disposition or tendency.

The year 1896, however, brought disturbances; the telegram which Emperor William on Jan. 5 sent to President Kruger, after the predatory invasion of Dr. Jameson had been fortunately repelled, was received very unfavorably in England, and led to demonstrations on the part of the British fleet, which, although they had a very provocative character, remained finally without lasting effect. The impression was created, however, that public opinion in England was very easily excited; it saw itself disturbed in the execution of a thoroughly considered political plan, and, as it were, caught in flagranti. But the fact that there were still deeper reasons for a gradually increasing mistrust of Germany is brought to light by Wilson's book, published in 1896, which, under the title "Made in Germany," developed a program of battle against Germany's rapidly growing economic power. Since then all steps taken by Germany in the pursuit of its internal as well as its external policy have been viewed with extraordinary disapprobation on the part of England. The adoption of our Naval bill by the Reichstag on March 28, 1898, the foundation of the Naval League two days later, the new East-Asiatic policy of Germany, which in the leasing of Kiao-Chau was exemplified in a manner not at all to the liking of the English politicians, the Emperor's trip to the Orient, which led to friendly relations between Turkey and Germany--all this was looked upon with the more displeasure in view of the fact that Emperor William in the Summer of 1895 had emphatically rejected a plan, proposed to him by Lord Salisbury, to divide up Turkey. In August, 1898, nevertheless, when the Fashoda crisis had strained the relations of England and France to the utmost, and when, at the same time, English-Russian relations were becoming critical in the Far East, an understanding between Germany and England, which might perhaps have the character of an alliance, seemed to be quite possible. Secretary of State von Bülow and the English Ambassador, Sir Frank Lascelles, took up the matter very earnestly, but it was impossible to secure from England the assurance that the entire English Government and Parliament would sanction an alliance. Russia warded off the menacing danger of a war with England by means of the well-known proposal which on May 18, 1899, led to the holding of the Disarmament Conference in The Hague, and Delcassé on Jan. 20, 1899, began, with reference to the Fashoda affair, the policy of retreat, which excluded France from the Nile territory. Then came England's war against the Boers. It is well known how the German Government during this war scrupulously maintained its neutrality (not according to the English method) despite the fact that all the sympathies of the German people were with the Boers in their struggle for freedom. It is not so well known, on the other hand, that the Imperial Government rejected a Russian proposal to form an alliance against England. That, too, was a service for which England has not thanked us. Of the tragedy in South Africa it has retained in mind only one incident, the so-called "Kruger Message," which it regarded as an interference with its right to do violence to a weaker power, figuratively speaking, as a slap in the face.

In the course of the war the old Queen died, and Edward VII. entered upon his fateful reign. Emperor William had gone over to London to attend the funeral of his grandmother, and Prince Henry had accompanied him, so that the dynastic relationship was made most conspicuous. After that the political relations of the two States seemed about to shape themselves most propitiously. Of the fact that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, concluded on Jan. 30, 1902, was directed against Russia, there was never for a moment any doubt; indeed it was Japan, not England, which took the initiative in bringing it about. On the other hand, the co-operation of English and German war vessels in adjusting the difficulties which both powers had with Venezuela was in complete harmony with the political wishes and convictions of Emperor William, who, like Bismarck at an earlier date, was of the opinion that the interests of the two nations could readily be reconciled. But in England that co-operation resulted in an excited anti-German campaign on the part of the press. The Times, The National Review, The Daily News, The Daily Telegraph, The Daily Express, and other newspapers vehemently attacked the Government for acting conjointly with us, and there can be no doubt that in so doing they gave expression, not to the ideas of the Balfour Ministry, but to the sentiments which, as was well known in those journalistic circles, were held by King Edward. Balfour, in an address which he delivered in Liverpool on Feb. 13, 1903, had opposed with great emphasis the arousing of English public opinion against Germany. "We wish," he said, "to bear in mind an old ideal, namely, that all the nations which stand in the front ranks of civilization should learn to work together in the interest of the whole, and that nothing any longer stands in the way of the realization of this high ideal save those national bitternesses, jealousies, and hostilities.... As far as Venezuela is concerned, that is passing over ... but with respect to the future it fills me with anxiety when I think how easy it is to stir up the fire of international jealousy, and how hard it is to quench it." It was all the harder in view of the fact that the King, from the very beginning of his reign, adhered tenaciously to the political idea of using the old French revanche notion as the cardinal point of English policy.

In April, 1903, the King began a series of political trips to Portugal, Spain, France, and Austria, while Berlin, very strangely, was not visited by him. Each one of these visits resulted in political agreements, into which Vienna alone declined to enter, and which, after a return visit on the part of Loubet, at that time President of the French Republic, and after a surprising visit in Paris on the part of certain members of the English Parliament, led to the significant English-French agreement of April 8, 1904, a treaty which culminated in the balancing of Morocco against Egypt and made it possible for the English Government, as soon as it chose, to regulate the Morocco question in such a way that it would necessarily bring about a conflict between France and isolated Germany. The ally of King Edward was the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Delcassé, who, on the basis of the agreements made with England, had likewise concluded treaties with Spain and Italy, which, as he confidently assumed, insured the pénétration pacifique, i.e., the conquest, unhindered by Europe, of Morocco. How this plan presently fell through and how Delcassé was overthrown shall not be related here; on the other hand, attention should be called to the intimidating efforts to which England resorted for the purpose of exerting pressure upon Germany. The first effort of this nature took the form of an address delivered on Feb. 3, 1905, by Arthur Lee, a Civil Lord of the English Admiralty, who threatened the German fleet with destruction; the second effort came after Emperor William had landed in Tangier on March 31 and after Delcassé had been overthrown, and took the form of an appearance of an English fleet before Swinemünde, on which occasion it was officially asserted that the resolution had been adopted back in May, that is, at a time when the intrigues of Delcassé were culminating and when a war between Germany and France seemed likely to break out at any time. For even after Delcassé's overthrow England did not give up the game as lost; it declined to take part in a conference regarding Morocco and considered in all seriousness the question of an invasion. England's naval superiority was so great that the success of such an invasion could not seem doubtful, and in London it was thought that they could even do without the support of France. These plans were finally given up; for some time it was not known very well in London what decisions had been reached in the meeting between the Czar and Emperor William at Bjorkö, and there was a feeling of uncertainty. Accordingly, England also sent delegates to the conference at Algeciras, wherein we were obliged to deal solely, except for the Austrian delegates, with friends of the English-French combination.

The result, therefore, could only be a vague understanding, wherein was concealed the germ of subsequent conflicts. The first consequence, nevertheless, was a relaxation of German-English relations. In December, 1905, a Liberal Ministry had taken the helm, and the idea was conceived of diverting Germany by other means from the pursuit of a "world policy." Sir Edward Grey championed the contention that more intimate relations between England and Germany were, to be sure, desirable, but could only be effected if we swallowed France's Morocco policy unflinchingly, like bitter medicine. For this event Mr. Haldane, the new Minister of War, proposed an understanding between us similar to that which England had reached with France. This constituted the preliminary step toward an endeavor to effect more intimate relations, an endeavor which at first had a non-official character. German Burgomasters visited the City of London and were cordially received by King Edward himself. This was followed, in August, 1906, by a meeting between the King and his imperial nephew, in Homburg vor der Höhe, which, as was to be expected, passed off in a satisfactory manner. It should, nevertheless, be recalled to mind that the King expressed himself very ironically on the subject of The Hague Conference, which, he asserted, was a humbug. And Sir Charles Hardinge, who entered into negotiations with Secretary of State von Tschirschky, also voiced the opinion that the conference should offer no opportunity for serious interference with England's naval policy. On this point English and German views concurred, though from different motives. In the following September the English Minister of War, Mr. Haldane, was our guest. He came for the purpose of studying German military organization, and every conceivable courtesy was extended to him. In the addresses which he delivered after his return to England he referred many times to his sojourn in Berlin. He also made the assertion that the relations of England to France were closer and more intimate than ever before, that to Russia they were friendly, and that to Germany they were better than they recently had been. We now know--a fact which the Liberté also divulged at that time--that an English-French military convention had then been signed with reference to future possibilities. This fact was immediately denied, but it was merely a question of word quibbling. No convention, to be sure, was actually signed by the Government, but the "inner circle" of the Cabinet undoubtedly agreed that "conversations" between the military authorities of the two nations should take place, and these military conversations were held regularly, just as if a secret alliance existed, until the outbreak of the present war. Parallel with these political preparations were efforts that stood in sharp contrast to the irritating activities carried on without interruption by the above-mentioned anti-German press, which we embrace under the name "Pearson and Harmsworth Press." In England, as well as in Germany, societies were organized with the object of mitigating and, if possible, entirely abolishing the differences and antagonisms which existed between the two nations; these were the so-called "Friendship Committees." In England the Duke of Argyll and Lord Avebury were at the head of such a committee, and a visit made to London by representatives of our press initiated a well-meant movement which found enthusiastic representatives on both sides. English and German clergymen traveled back and forth between England and Germany, representatives of the English press paid a return visit to Germany, English and German workingmen's representatives endeavored to cement feelings of friendship by making personal observations and acquaintances, and in a similar way representatives of the Parliamentary groups of both countries thought and acted, while the leaders of science were working together at congresses held in Berlin and London. In this way were formed a number of valuable personal relations which led to political friendships and resulted in a conscious co-operation toward an honest English-German understanding.

These efforts continued until shortly before the month of August, 1914. One may safely say, moreover, that nobody has interceded more zealously and more constantly for English-German friendship and co-operation and for the removal of the difficulties that are ever cropping up anew than our Emperor. The enthusiasm with which Emperor William was always received in England on occasion of his numerous visits, especially in November and December, 1907, again in 1910, when he went to London to attend the funeral of Edward VII., and again in 1911, when he visited King George, would be absolutely inconceivable hypocrisy, which we regard as out of the question, had it not been the spontaneous expression of popular sentiment. Official English policy, however, followed other channels. As early as the year 1907 Sir Edward Grey had succeeded in securing from Russia an agreement which united England and Russia in co-operation at the expense of Persia, but which, indirectly, also affected German interests, the injury to which was later happily warded off by the Treaty of Potsdam. It soon became evident, moreover, that England, in concluding the agreement relating to Persia, was in reality less concerned about protecting its Asiatic interests than it was about including Russia in that coalition by means of which it expected to put a stop to the "world policy" of Germany and to check the further development of the German fleet. This became very distinctly evident on June 9, 1908, when a meeting took place at Reval between Edward VII. and Nicholas II. At that time it was agreed and decided between Hardinge and Iswolski, not officially, but in an oral exchange of views, that Russia would be ready to proceed hand in hand with England in European affairs (i.e., in the policy directed against Germany) as soon as it had sufficiently recovered from the after-effects of the war with Japan and the revolution. It was thought that this regeneration of Russia's military power would take six or eight years. The scope of this agreement is very obvious. Whereas Germany, during the persistent danger of a war with France over Morocco, had hitherto considered it highly probable that England would maintain a neutral attitude, it was obliged, as soon as England drew nearer to the Dual Alliance, to figure at all events upon a malevolent neutrality and very likely indeed upon open hostility. Sir Edward Grey, to be sure, who had not yet escaped from the anxiety with which English friends of peace were following the King's trip to Russia, in order to cover up his game, on July 7 had declared in the lower house, in reply to a question directed to the Government, that the visit of the King by no means had any diplomatic significance which might lead to an alliance or to an agreement or to any kind of a convention; no negotiations were being entered into, he asserted, for the purpose of concluding a treaty or a convention with Russia, nor would any such treaty or convention be concluded during the King's visit. But he went on to say that the visit would have some political effect, and it was very true that political effect was desired. "We wish that the visit shall exert a beneficent influence upon the mutual relations of both empires." Public opinion in England allowed itself to be satisfied with this equivocal, oracular statement. In other countries, however, a keener insight was displayed. THE NEW YORK TIMES judged the situation correctly when it said: "It is always a mistake to force a warm friend, who is at the same time a business friend, a blood relative, out of intimate and useful friendship into bitter antagonism, and this mistake, according to the judgment of all non-partisan observers of contemporary history, has been committed by King Edward." When Edward VII. acceded to the throne, it went on to say, England was a warm friend of Germany and of the German Emperor, who had given numerous proofs of his friendship, and was not only willing but anxious to become England's ally; now, however, the guns of the two nations were, so to speak, pointed at each other.

King of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions Beyond the Seas, Emperor of India

(_Photo from W. & D. Downey_)]

Czar of All the Russias, and the Grand Duke Alexis Nicholaievitch, the Heir Apparent

(_Photo from Underwood & Underwood_)]

Such, indeed, was the actual case; a determined malevolence on the part of the King, the English statesmen, and that newspaper trust organized by Pearson and Harmsworth, began to mobilize Europe against Germany, and to incense, by means of cable and telegraph, the judgment of the world against our Emperor and against the German policy. No means seemed too infamous if it served this purpose. Over a private letter which Emperor William had sent to Admiral Lord Tweedmouth for the purpose of checking false rumors that were maliciously being spread abroad regarding our naval policy, The Times made a terrible fuss in order to disseminate the notion that Emperor William was interfering with the internal policy of Great Britain with a view to injuring English military power. The excitement of public opinion in England was then utilized by the press for the purpose of creating a sentiment in favor of a concentration of the British fleet in the North Sea. That, however, was certainly done at the instigation of the Government, which was fond of attributing resolutions it had already adopted to the pressure of public opinion throughout the country. The naval manoeuvres which in July, 1908, were carried out in the North Sea, close to our coastline, were participated in by a combination of the canal fleet and the so-called home fleet, and they bore a very provocative and demonstrative character. At this time, moreover, appeared that widely read book by Percival A. Hislam, entitled "The Admiralty of the Atlantic," the expositions of which culminated in the statement that a war between England and Germany was unavoidable, and that the sooner it broke out the shorter it would be and the less money and blood it would cost. All this, however, is rendered easily intelligible by the fact that the Balkan crisis, in consequence of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, had at that time assumed a very dangerous aspect, and was threatening to bring on a war between Austria and Russia and perhaps a world war, wherein England expected to gain its own particular ends. It was therefore a severe disappointment to English statesmen that Nicholas II., despite the vociferous protests of the Serbs, and despite the decidedly warlike attitude of the Russian people on March 25, 1909, recognized the annexation. The disappointment was all the more severe for the reason that shortly before that time, despite the still menacing conflict over Casablanca, the Morocco difficulties between Germany and France were also settled. On Feb. 9, 1909, the day on which King Edward made his first visit in Berlin, a German-French agreement regarding Morocco was signed, and in the latter part of May the Casablanca conflict was also adjusted by arbitration to the tolerable satisfaction of both contestants.

It is not too much to say that King Edward, in so far as he was able, did his best to bring about another outcome, and in England this was generally recognized. "There must be a definitive stopping of the King's interference in foreign politics," declared Mr. Sidebotham, M.P., in the Reform Club at Manchester during this crisis. His words were loudly approved by his hearers, but his voice, as well as the voice of other men in favor of establishing good relations with Germany, was drowned without effect under the influence of the panic which from the end of the year 1908 until well on into the Summer of 1909 kept all England in a state of excitement. Watchwords denoting the necessity of taking immediate action against the German fleet, as they were published in The Standard, The Morning Post, and in the great monthly periodicals, The Nineteenth Century, the Fortnightly Review, and The National Review, were echoed in the negotiations of Parliament, and they dominated the Maritime Law Conference held in London. The naval manoeuvres of July, 1909, brought together all three English fleets, and the plan was conceived of summoning the fleets of the larger colonies. A meeting of newspaper publishers, called in London, was designed to carry on propaganda for these ideas, and the Imperial Defense Conference, also held in London, proposed that England should be supported by its large colonies, though, to be sure, with certain reservations. In order to weaken the impression which Russia's recognition of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina had created, the Czar visited the English fleet at Spithead, and for the same reason, probably, the Russian Army manoeuvres in the Fall were considered a rehearsal of the measures that would be adopted to check the advance of an enemy toward St. Petersburg. Finally, on Oct. 23, agreements were made in Racconigi between Iswolski, who was accompanying the Czar on a new trip abroad, and Tittoni, which agreements were to make it possible for Russia, as a Russian newspaper put it, "to liberate itself from the necessity of friendly relations with Germany."

During this excitement in the political atmosphere the Imperial Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg, endeavored to bring about a turn for the better by effecting an understanding with England, in whose attitude he correctly recognized the real cause of the political insecurity. At this point attention must be called to the fundamental difficulty with which all negotiations at that time, and subsequently, were confronted, and necessarily confronted. In Germany it was seen very clearly from the start that the probability of a combined French-Russian attack, for which influential political groups in St. Petersburg, as well as in Paris, were working, was very slight, so long as England's entrance into this anti-German combination could be left out of consideration. What we hoped to insure, therefore, was England's neutrality in the event of war, inasmuch as a German-English alliance, which might have definitely insured world peace, could not be effected. In order to win England over to the idea of neutrality, the Imperial Chancellor declared his willingness to decrease the rate at which our war vessels were being constructed. Both nations, moreover, were to give assurances that neither intended to attack the other, nor actually would make an attack. A second clause in the German proposal formulated the neutrality obligation. These negotiations continued until the Autumn of the year 1909, and were accompanied by the threatening chorus of the English anti-German press: "German dreadnoughts must not be built." [Black and White--"The Writing on the Wall."] The positive refusal on the part of Germany to abandon the naval program adopted by the Reichstag, and the fixed idea designedly fostered by the British Government that we were cherishing the intention of attacking France, gave England a pretext for rejecting the German efforts to effect an understanding between the two countries. But it is impossible to believe in the honesty of these arguments, which were recently defended, in dialectic perversion of the truth, by Sir Edward Cook in an article entitled "How Britain Strove for Peace." England's aggressive tendency is clearly shown by its above-mentioned agreements with France and Russia, which are today publici juris. Regarding that point there was no self-deception in those English circles which did not belong to the conspiracy; Edward Dicey, one of the most eminent of English publicists, expressed it in point-blank form in February, 1910, when he wrote in The Empire Review: "If England and Germany are friends, the peace of Europe is assured; but if the two nations fall apart, it will be a very unfortunate day for humanity." At that time, when Delcassé tendencies were again asserting themselves in France and a new political storm was brewing in the Balkan countries, King Edward died, on May 6. The hope could now be cherished, the leader of the anti-German policy of England being gone, that the moment had come when it would be possible to effect an understanding.

Dicey again began to argue for peace, the English-German Friendship Committee, the Albert Committee, the Archbishop of Canterbury, The Manchester Guardian, and The Economist advocated this idea, and Prime Minister Asquith found it profitable under these circumstances to strike the note of peace in a report which he submitted to the lower house regarding the frustrated German-English negotiations. But he included in this report false and disquieting statements regarding the German fleet. Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg replied to these statements in the Reichstag, and this led to the resumption of negotiations regarding a permanent political agreement on the basis of the existing German naval program, provided we would decrease our rate of building war vessels, as we had already offered to do. It soon became evident, however, with what little sincerity these negotiations were entered into on the part of England. With the direct encouragement of England, which renewed its promises regarding its attitude in the event of war, France, in the latter part of April, and in outright violation of the treaty, began its advance again Fez; and at the same time, as if it was desired that no doubt should arise regarding the solidarity of England and France, The Fleet Annual published an illustration representing the German high sea fleet under full steam, and under it were printed the words "The Enemy." As a sign of our disapproval of the French violation of the treaty we sent the Panther to Agadir, and in place of German-English negotiations German-French negotiations were commenced. Meanwhile England, cherishing the hope that a German-French war would now break out with certainty, armed itself against us in August and September with might and main. This fact was placed beyond all doubt by the well-known disclosures of Captain Faber, (before his electors in Andover.) The Times said later on that the year 1911 had brought three German-English crises, the first in the third week of July, the second in the week ending on Aug. 19, (that was the time of the enormous and very disillusioning labor strikes,) and the third in September. It is amazing that Sir Edward Cook dared to assert under these circumstances that Great Britain had facilitated the conclusion of the French-German Morocco agreement, which was ratified on March 12, 1912. In the "Open Letter on Foreign Policy," which on Nov. 24, 1911, was submitted to the members of the English Parliament, and was signed with the initials E.D.M. and F.W.H., (which is to be resolved into Edmund D. Morel and Francis W. Hirst,) it is expressly stated by these esteemed and honorable politicians:

"Our attitude was determined exclusively by the ostensible interests of France, which were directly opposed to the interests of British commerce and of British enterprise.... From this it follows that alliances, nay, even political agreements, with Continental powers, which may coerce us to take steps that are, at a given moment, harmful to our national interests, should be avoided."

Sir Edward Grey took pains to conceal these facts from the lower house and passed lightly over the disclosures of Faber--when the Imperial Chancellor vigorously opposed him--with skillful legerdemain. In the upper house Grey's policy also met with severe criticism, and from his declarations, as well as from those of Lloyd George made at the same time, only one conclusion could be drawn--that official England was determined to remain steadfast in the form of its political co-operation with France and Russia. Precisely to this was to be attributed the insecurity of the European situation. It has not become publicly known but has been reliably ascertained that the English Naval Attaché in Rome at that time pointed out that England, in the event of a war, which he expected to come, would have to occupy either Belgium or Copenhagen. That, he added, was very brutal, to be sure, but at the same time was rendered necessary by historic developments and by circumstances.

In view of all this we cannot deceive ourselves into believing that the mission which brought Lord Haldane to Berlin in February, 1912, had any other purpose than that of satisfying the voices in England which were calling with ever-increasing vigor for an understanding with Germany. The proposals which he submitted to us, after a discussion with Sir Edward Grey, were formulated by the English Cabinet as follows: "Inasmuch as both powers naturally wish to maintain relations of peace and friendship with each other, England declares that it will neither make an unprovoked attack upon Germany, nor support any other power in making such an attack. To attack Germany is neither the direct nor the indirect object of any treaty, understanding, or combination to which England is now a party, nor will England make itself a party to anything that has such an object." This carefully excogitated statement embraced in its Machiavellian wording neither those "oral conversations" at Reval nor the "innocent discussions" engaged in by the English and French General Staffs--discussions which were always revived on occasion of every political crisis. It was only natural, therefore, that we, since these relations between the General Staffs of the powers belonging to the Entente were no secret to us, demanded greater security and a declaration of neutrality on the part of England before consenting to enter into any general understanding.

This was all the more necessary in view of the fact that Poincaré, the French President, while the negotiations, commenced by Haldane, between Berlin and London were being carried on, had undertaken, in August, 1912, that trip to St. Petersburg, from which he brought back to France the system of three years' compulsory military service; and at the same time Hartwig, the Russian Ambassador in Belgrade, organized that Balkan Conference, the purpose of which was, first, to break the backbone of Turkey, and, secondly, to serve as a tool for the overthrow of Austria. The introduction and adoption of the German military program made it evident to all the world that we had recognized correctly, and betimes, the dangers which threatened the peace of the world, and in particular the peace of Germany. Furthermore, in a conversation with Prince Lichnowski, Lord Haldane said in so many words that England, in the event of a general war, would have to place itself on the side of France "in order to prevent Germany from becoming too powerful." We must not neglect to mention that during this critical year, as well as in the year 1913, negotiations were again entered into regarding the carrying out of the treaty concluded between England and Germany in the days of Caprivi with respect to an economic penetration of the Portuguese colonies in East and West Africa. The refusal of Sir Edward Grey to give these negotiations the secure form of a treaty, which could be laid before the English Parliament and the German Reichstag, here again shows that he was desirous of effecting only the appearance of an understanding. Both he and France were resolved to postpone their action against Germany until Russia, which was preparing itself with prodigious exertion, had finished its preparations, which in August, 1913, were critically inspected by General Joffre, and among which is to be included the construction of railways to run through Poland to the Austrian and Prussian frontiers. This consideration also accounts for England's attitude during the Balkan confusion of 1912 and 1913. At the London Conference we were able to co-operate with Sir Edward Grey in settling the great difficulties brought about by the war of the Balkan nations against Turkey, and subsequently their war inter se and the overthrow of Bulgaria. Under the impression created by this political co-operation the peace party in England also seemed to gain ground. On Feb. 18, 1913, Charles Trevelyan, M.P., paid me a visit and assured me with great positiveness that England would under no circumstances wage war. A Ministry which undertook to make preparations for war, he said, would at once be deposed. An inclination to bring about an understanding with Germany, he added, prevailed in all industrial circles. My impression that such was actually the case was confirmed during a sojourn in London in the months of March and April, 1914. On occasion of a political supper à deux with Lord Haldane the latter gave expression to the view that the present grouping of the powers offered the best guarantee of peace, that Sir Edward Grey was holding Russia in check and we were holding Austria-Hungary in check, in saying which he emphasized the fact that England had implicit confidence in the German Imperial Chancellor. I replied, saying that in consequence of the existing combination Paris and St. Petersburg would certainly count upon England's help in the event of a war, and would thus bring on the war. We then discussed the situation between England and Germany, and remarked how the present plan, adopted by both Governments, of fortifying both sides of the North Sea was detrimental to the real interests of both. The following letter, which I received from Lord Haldane in Berlin on April 17, is an echo of this conversation:

"It was a great pleasure to see you and have had the full and unreserved talk we had together. My ambition is, like yours, to bring Germany into relations of ever closer intimacy and friendship. Our two countries have a common work to do for the world as well as for themselves, and each of them can bring to bear on this work special endowments and qualities. May the co-operation, which I believe to be now beginning, become closer and closer. Of this I am sure, the more wide and unselfish the nations and the groups questions make her supreme purposes of their policies, the more will friction disappear and the sooner will the relations that are normal and healthy reappear. Something of this good work has now come into existence between our two peoples. We must see to it that the chance of growth is given."[5]

[Footnote 5: This passage from a letter of Lord Haldane is quoted in the original English by Professor Schiemann and is here copied verbatim.--TRANSLATOR.]

It is difficult to believe in the sincerity of the sentiments here expressed, when we consider that Lord Haldane belonged to the inner circle of the Cabinet and therefore must have known the secret chess-moves of Grey's policy. Furthermore, he did not resign, as did three other members of the Cabinet--Lord Morley, Burns, and Charles Trevelyan--when, on Aug. 4, Sir Edward's false game was shown up and when treaties grew out of those "conversations" and alliances out of those ententes, which had until then existed under counterfeit names. Even as late as June 13 Sir Edward Grey denied that he had entered into any binding obligations. Six weeks after that, however, England confronted Germany with the fait accompli of a life-and-death struggle. Grey had consciously uttered a falsehood before Parliament, and, as was ascertained from a Russian source, had not only accepted a Russian proposal to conclude a naval agreement, but had expressly given his approval that the deliberations regarding the effectuation of this agreement should be participated in by the Naval Staffs of both countries. In so doing he expressly counted upon a war between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente, and upon the complete alliance of England. England, at the proper time, was to send merchantmen to Russian ports on the Baltic Sea for the purpose of landing Russian troops in Pomerania, and to send as many ships to the Mediterranean Sea as seemed necessary to insure the ascendency of France. With the help of French money it was intended to overthrow the Ministry of Rodoslawow in Bulgaria and, with the assistance of the Russophile, Malinow, to win over that country to the combination, which was to attack Austria in the rear. All this, which took place before the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, was the political plan of battle adopted by the conspiring powers, which subsequently found an excuse for their behavior in the alleged coercion of Serbia. The hypocrisy with which the intrigue was carried out is without precedent. The palm rests, probably, on the friendly visit of the English squadron, under Admiral Beatty, in Kiel. Two days after the assassination of the Archduke the squadron started on its way home, through the Emperor William Canal, for the purpose of joining the concentration of the entire English fleet, which lay, ready for war, off Spithead. That England afterward made common cause with Russia and France for the murderers of the Archduke, and with moral indignation rose against the satisfaction demanded of Serbia by Austria, is all part of the system of the frivolous use of any pretext which might bring England closer to its longed-for goal--the deposition of Germany from her position in the world. Such was England's rôle in the preparation of this wantonly prearranged war.

Germany Free!

By BEATRICE BARRY.

Deeds that have startled the civilized world
Blot her escutcheon, brand her with shame;
But though the German flag there be unfurled,
Do Germans know what is done in their name?
If not, the final accounting may see--
Germany free!

Germany, free from the canker of self--
Free from the lusting for prestige and power;
Purged of her passion for place and for pelf--
Shall she not rise to great heights in that hour?
God speed its coming, for fain would we see--
Germany free!

Free from the militant few who have ruled
Seventy millions with sabre of steel;
Free from the doctrine in which they are schooled--
"Might shall prevail!" All the rancor we feel
Strikes at that dogma, from which we would see--
Germany free!

Much in her national life we admire,
Much we recoil from, or needs must dispute;
Germany needs her baptism of fire,
But you will find us the first to salute--
(God speed the "Day" the awakening shall be)
Germany FREE!

Chronology of the War

Showing Progress of Campaigns on All Fronts and Collateral Events from April 30, 1915, Up to and Including June 15, 1915.

CAMPAIGN IN EASTERN EUROPE

May 1--Germans advance in their invasion of the Russian Baltic provinces, a Russian force retreating toward Mitau; fighting is being renewed along the East Prussian frontier and in Central Poland; Russians gain ground in their campaign for the Uzsok Pass; Germans defeat Russians near Szawle, in Kovno; Austrians repulse Russian attacks against the heights of the Orawa and Opor Valleys.

May 2--A great battle is developing in the plain of Rawa, Central Poland; Russians are taking the offensive; Austrians have opened an offensive in the region of Ciezkowice.

May 3--German and Austrian armies, under General von Mackensen, win a victory in West Galicia, breaking the Russian centre for miles, and gaining ground across practically the whole western tip of Galicia, from near the Hungarian border to the junction of the River Dunajec with the Vistula; the Teutonic allies take 30,000 prisoners, 22 cannon, and 64 machine guns; the Austrians gain ground in the Beskid region, and repulse Russians north of Osmaloda; the German advance in the Russian Baltic provinces continues unchecked along a 100-mile front, extending from the Baltic Sea, near Libau, southeast to the northern tributaries of the River Niemen.

May 4--Russians claim that the Austro-German drive in West Galicia is being checked; Germans hold positions on the right bank of the Dunajec; a fierce battle is raging in the direction of Stry; Germans make further progress in the Russian Baltic provinces.

May 5--Russians are retreating at points along the Galician line from the Vistula to the Carpathians, and are in retreat from positions they occupied on the Hungarian slopes of the Carpathians; the third line of Russian fortifications has been pierced; Austro-German Army captures the town of Gorlice.

May 6--Austro-German armies continue to advance in West Galicia; the northern wing has captured Tarnow; southern wing has crossed the Wisloka River and Russians are retreating east of the Lupkow Pass; Austro-Germans take the last Russian positions on the heights east of the Dunajec and Biala Rivers; Jaslo and Dukla have been taken from the Russians; Russians admit partial retreat in West Galicia.

May 7--Austro-German army is pursuing retreating Russians in West Galicia; Austrians take more prisoners, stores, and guns; in the eastern sector of the Carpathian front Russian attacks are repulsed by Austrians; Russian attacks in Southeast Galicia are repulsed; in Poland there is severe fighting.

May 8--Germans capture Libau, taking 1,600 prisoners, 18 cannon, and much war material; severe fighting continues in West Galicia, where General von Mackensen's army is pursuing the Russians; a Russian division surrounded near Dukla cuts its way through the surrounding troops and gets to the main Russian lines; all the passes in the Beskid Mountains, except Lupkow, are in the hands of Austro-German forces; Russians take the offensive southwest of Mitau.

May 9--Russians are retreating in Galicia along a front of 124 miles, from the Uzsok Pass to the Vistula; Austro-German forces have passed the line of the Uzsok Pass, Komanoza, Krosno, Debica, and Szezucin; in Southeast Galicia violent battles are developing; Austrians are pursuing Russians across the Dniester; Vienna reports that Hungary is now clear of Russians; German advance northeast of Kovno; Russian attacks on German positions on the Pilica are repulsed; Russians make progress southwest of Mitau.

May 10--Russian Embassy at Washington says that the Russians have retreated thirty miles in Galicia, but that only one division has withdrawn from Hungary; the first stage of the battle in West Galicia has been practically concluded; General von Mackensen's army is reforming for a new offensive; Germans have met a severe check west of Mitau.

May 11--Austro-German troops are still advancing in West Galicia; Russians are attacking in East Galicia and along the eastern section of the Carpathians; Russians have success in Bukowina, taking prisoners and guns; Austrians force Russian south wing in Russian Poland to retreat; Austrians repulse Russian attacks near Baligrod; advance Austrian troops have crossed the San near Dvornik.

May 12--Russians state that their counter-offensive has checked the Austro-Germans in West Galicia, while the Germans and Austrians state that their drive continues successfully; Austro-German troops have occupied Brozozow, Dynow, Sanok, and Lisko; there is severe fighting in the central Carpathians and Southeast Galicia, where the Russians are advancing on a forty-mile front; Austrians are repulsed in the direction of the Uzsok Pass and the Stry River.

May 13--Heavy fighting is in progress east of Tarnow; north of the Vistula the Austrians have forced the Nida line; Russians make progress on the right bank of the Dniester; Russians repulse Germans in the region of Shavli.

May 14--Russians break the Austrian line at various places on a ninety-four-mile front, driving the Austrians from Bukowina positions and forcing them over the Pruth River; Russians check the Austro-German advance in Galicia, and are concentrating on the line of the River San, with the object of occupying a shorter front; the advance guards of General Mackensen's armies are before Przemysl; the Teutonic allies are advancing in Russian Poland.