Chapter III: Front Matter (3)

As unreservedly as we believe that he [Mr. Bryan] is sacrificing high office to a principle--something that seems to be incomprehensible not alone to American politicians; readily as we pay him tribute that a man in public life has again had the courage to act, despite the machinations of editorial offices, pulpits, and the counting rooms of money agents; clearly as we see again his latest act, the old Bryan, who can sacrifice nothing to utilitarianism, everything to an idea, no matter how fantastic it may be, nevertheless it must not be left unmentioned that his exit out of the Wilson Cabinet was under all circumstances only a question of time. Bryan may want to be a candidate in 1916, a rival of Wilson; there may be a political motive at the bottom of the dramatically staged resignation; the fact remains that two hard heads, Wilson and Bryan, could not permanently agree. One had to yield; one had to go. Just as Bismarck had to go when Wilhelm II. felt himself safe in the saddle, so Bryan had to yield as soon as Woodrow Wilson himself took the reins, all the reins, into his hand.

Whether the departure of Bryan will exercise great influence on the course of events, so far as relations with Germany are concerned, is an open question. At all events, the peace party in Congress and in the country as a whole has found a leader who is a fighter, who today still has a large following in Congress and out of it. And in Congress, through the masses, the question must finally be decided. Meanwhile, is it to be assumed without further ado that President Wilson himself stands diametrically opposed to the peace views of Bryan? We do not believe that. We are even today still of the opinion that Wilson desires war with Germany as little as does Bryan, the friend of peace, who has just let his deeds follow his words.

_From the St. Paul Daily Volks Zeitung._

Bryan's stand for fair play forces his resignation. Bryan's resignation at this critical moment is the greatest service the Commoner has ever rendered his country, because it has aroused the people to see the danger of the foreign policy now pursued by the President.

_From the Minneapolis Freie Presse Herold._

It is evident that Mr. Bryan, believing that Wilson and Roosevelt will be the next Presidential nominees, now sees the opportunity to secure the German vote for himself, but Mr. Bryan's hypocrisy will fool no one, particularly the Germans.

_From Alex E. Oberlander, Editor the Syracuse Union._

Mr. Bryan will be a greater power for peace out of the Cabinet than in it. As a member of the Cabinet diplomacy muzzled him, but now as a private citizen he can and will be outspoken, and his voice for peace will carry far more weight than the manufacturers of war munitions, Wall Street, would-be Generals, Colonels, and Captains, and the jingo press.

_From Paul F. Mueller, Editor Abendpost of Chicago._

The people will choose Mr. Bryan's side if the President persists on a way which may lead to war and must lead to dishonor.

_From Horace L. Brand, Publisher Illinois Staats-Zeitung._

Mr. Bryan will have the support of all sane Americans on any reasonable proposition which will keep this country out of war. Mr. Bryan, with all his faults, evidently has his principles.

_From the Waechter und Anzeiger of Cleveland, Ohio._

He would not be a man had he signed the death warrant for what he regarded as the crowning deed and success of his life's work. And, because this was asked of him, many a person will say the Scotch in the President's veins did not deny itself in the manner which compelled Mr. Bryan's resignation, although keeping up the appearance that it came of Bryan's own free will because of a disagreement over principles.

_From the Colorado Herald of Denver._

Bryan's resignation comes as the biggest surprise of the year to all those of pro-German proclivities who were heretofore laboring under the impression that Bryan represented the spirit in the Cabinet that savored of anything but a square deal for Germany.

_From the Illinois Staats-Zeitung of Chicago._

Mr. William Jennings Bryan, by his resignation and by his reasons of his resignation, caused us fear that President Wilson's second note to Germany would be full of thunder and lightning, and would lead at best to a severance of the diplomatic relations between the two countries, the friendship of which grew almost to be a tradition.

Our surprise is just as great as it is pleasant. The note of the President is in its tone sound and friendly, and excludes the possibility of hostilities. Germany, though she had many reasons to complain about a hostile disposition on the part of the people, the press, and the Government of the United States, will readily admit that our Government is in duty bound to protect American lives and American property, even though she should have been justified in torpedoing the Lusitania. President Wilson seems to be willing to admit such justification and invites Germany to submit her evidence. This means an invitation to further negotiations, to which President Wilson was apparently opposed in his first note.

_From Charles Neumeyer, Editor the Louisville Anzeiger._

It is inexplicable why Bryan could reconcile the signing of the first note, which was of a much more assertive tone, with his sentiments and principles, and then refuse his assent to this one, characterized by dignified friendliness. Mr. Bryan must either have become extremely touchy and particular over night, or somebody must have been fooling somebody else. At any rate, the American note is a guarantee of continued peace as to the issues now pending.

Mr. Bryan's Defense

In a statement headed "The Real Issue" and addressed "To the
American People," issued on June 10, 1915; in a second
statement, appealing "To the German-Americans," on June 11;
in a third, issued June 12, on the "First and Second German
Notes," and in a series of utterances put forth on three
successive days, beginning June 16, Mr. Bryan justified his
resignation and offered what he styled a practical working
solution of the problem of bringing peace to Europe. These
statements were preceded by a formal utterance about his
resignation, published on June 10. Their texts are presented
below.

THE REASON FOR RESIGNING.

Washington, June 9, 1915.

My reason for resigning is clearly stated in my letter of resignation, namely, that I may employ, as a private citizen, the means which the President does not feel at liberty to employ. I honor him for doing what he believes to be right, and I am sure that he desires, as I do, to find a peaceful solution of the problem which has been created by the action of the submarines.

Two of the points on which we differ, each conscientious in his conviction, are:

First, as to the suggestion of investigation by an international commission, and,

Second, as to warning Americans against traveling on belligerent vessels or with cargoes of ammunition.

I believe that this nation should frankly state to Germany that we are willing to apply in this case the principle which we are bound by treaty to apply to disputes between the United States and thirty countries with which we have made treaties, providing for investigation of all disputes of every character and nature.

These treaties, negotiated under this Administration, make war practically impossible between this country and these thirty Governments, representing nearly three-fourths of all the people of the world.

Among the nations with which we have these treaties are Great Britain, France, and Russia. No matter what disputes may arise between us and these treaty nations, we agree that there shall be no declaration and no commencement of hostilities until the matters in dispute have been investigated by an international commission, and a year's time is allowed for investigation and report. This plan was offered to all the nations without any exceptions whatever, and Germany was one of the nations that accepted the principle, being the twelfth, I think, to accept.

No treaty was actually entered into with Germany, but I cannot see that that should stand in the way when both nations indorsed the principle. I do not know whether Germany would accept the offer, but our country should, in my judgment, make the offer. Such an offer, if accepted, would at once relieve the tension and silence all the jingoes who are demanding war.

Germany has always been a friendly nation, and a great many of our people are of German ancestry. Why should we not deal with Germany according to this plan to which the nation has pledged its support?

The second point of difference is as to the course which should be pursued in regard to Americans traveling on belligerent ships or with cargoes of ammunition.

Why should an American citizen be permitted to involve his country in war by traveling upon a belligerent ship, when he knows that the ship will pass through a danger zone? The question is not whether an American citizen has a right, under international law, to travel on a belligerent ship; the question is whether he ought not, out of consideration for his country, if not for his own safety, avoid danger when avoidance is possible.

It is a very one-sided citizenship that compels a Government to go to war over a citizen's rights and yet relieve the citizen of all obligations to consider his nation's welfare. I do not know just how far the President can legally go in actually preventing Americans from traveling on belligerent ships, but I believe the Government should go as far as it can, and that in case of doubt it should give the benefit of the doubt to the Government.

But even if the Government could not legally prevent citizens from traveling on belligerent ships, it could, and in my judgment should, earnestly advise American citizens not to risk themselves or the peace of their country, and I have no doubt that these warnings would be heeded.

President Taft advised Americans to leave Mexico when insurrection broke out there, and President Wilson has repeated the advice. This advice, in my judgment, was eminently wise, and I think the same course should be followed in regard to warning Americans to keep off vessels subject to attack.

I think, too, that American passenger ships should be prohibited from carrying ammunition. The lives of passengers ought not to be endangered by cargoes of ammunition, whether that danger comes from possible explosions within or from possible attacks from without. Passengers and ammunition should not travel together. The attempt to prevent American citizens from incurring these risks is entirely consistent with the effort which our Government is making to prevent attacks from submarines.

The use of one remedy does not exclude the use of the other. The most familiar illustration is to be found in the action taken by municipal authorities during a riot. It is the duty of the Mayor to suppress the mob and to prevent violence, but he does not hesitate to warn citizens to keep off the streets during the riots. He does not question their right to use the streets, but for their own protection and in the interest of order he warns them not to incur the risks involved in going upon the streets when men are shooting at each other.

The President does not feel justified in taking the action above stated. That is, he does not feel justified, first, in suggesting the submission of the controversy to investigation, or, second, in warning the people not to incur the extra hazards in traveling on belligerent ships or on ships carrying ammunition. And he may be right in the position he has taken, but, as a private citizen, I am free to urge both of these propositions and to call public attention to these remedies, in the hope of securing such an expression of public sentiment as will support the President in employing these remedies if in the future he finds it consistent with his sense of duty to favor them.

W.J. BRYAN.

"THE REAL ISSUE."

Washington, June 10, 1915.

To the American people:

You now have before you the text of the note to Germany--the note which it would have been my official duty to sign had I remained Secretary of State. I ask you to sit in judgment upon my decision to resign rather than to share responsibility for it.

I am sure you will credit me with honorable motives, but that is not enough. Good intentions could not atone for a mistake at such a time, on such a subject, and under such circumstances. If your verdict is against me, I ask no mercy; I desire none if I have acted unwisely.

A man in public life must act according to his conscience, but, however conscientiously he acts, he must be prepared to accept without complaint any condemnation which his own errors may bring upon him; he must be willing to bear any deserved punishment, from ostracism to execution. But hear me before you pass sentence.

The President and I agree in purpose; we desire a peaceful solution of the dispute which has arisen between the United States and Germany. We not only desire it, but, with equal fervor, we pray for it; but we differ irreconcilably as to the means of securing it.

If it were merely a personal difference, it would be a matter of little moment, for all the presumptions are on his side--the presumptions that go with power and authority. He is your President, I am a private citizen without office or title--but one of the one hundred million of inhabitants.

But the real issue is not between persons, it is between systems, and I rely for vindication wholly upon the strength of the position taken.

Among the influences which Governments employ in dealing with each other there are two which are pre-eminent and antagonistic--force and persuasion. Force speaks with firmness and acts through the ultimatum; persuasion employs argument, courts investigation, and depends upon negotiation. Force represents the old system--the system that must pass away; persuasion represents the new system--the system that has been growing, all too slowly, it is true, but growing for 1,900 years. In the old system war is the chief cornerstone--war, which at its best is little better than war at its worst; the new system contemplates a universal brotherhood established through the uplifting power of example.

If I correctly interpret the note to Germany, it conforms to the standards of the old system rather than to the rules of the new, and I cheerfully admit that it is abundantly supported by precedents--precedents written in characters of blood upon almost every page of human history. Austria furnishes the most recent precedent; it was Austria's firmness that dictated the ultimatum against Serbia, which set the world at war.

Every ruler now participating in this unparalleled conflict has proclaimed his desire for peace and denied responsibility for the war, and it is only charitable that we should credit all of them with good faith. They desired peace, but they sought it according to the rules of the old system. They believed that firmness would give the best assurance of the maintenance of peace, and, faithfully following precedent, they went so near the fire that they were, one after another, sucked into the contest.

Never before have the frightful follies of this fatal system been so clearly revealed as now. The most civilized and enlightened--aye, the most Christian--of the nations of Europe are grappling with each other as if in a death struggle. They are sacrificing the best and bravest of their sons on the battlefield; they are converting their gardens into cemeteries and their homes into houses of mourning; they are taxing the wealth of today and laying a burden of debt on the toil of the future; they have filled the air with thunderbolts more deadly than those of Jove, and they have multiplied the perils of the deep.

Adding fresh fuel to the flame of hate, they have daily devised new horrors, until one side is endeavoring to drown noncombatant men, women, and children at sea, while the other side seeks to starve noncombatant men, women, and children on land. And they are so absorbed in alternate retaliations and in competitive cruelties that they seem, for the time being, blind to the rights of neutrals and deaf to the appeals of humanity. A tree is known by its fruit. The war in Europe is the ripened fruit of the old system.

This is what firmness, supported by force, has done in the Old World; shall we invite it to cross the Atlantic? Already the jingoes of our own country have caught the rabies from the dogs of war; shall the opponents of organized slaughter be silent while the disease spreads?

As an humble follower of the Prince of Peace, as a devoted believer in the prophecy that "they that take the sword shall perish with the sword," I beg to be counted among those who earnestly urge the adoption of a course in this matter which will leave no doubt of our Government's willingness to continue negotiations with Germany until an amicable understanding is reached, or at least until, the stress of war over, we can appeal from Philip drunk with carnage to Philip sobered by the memories of a historic friendship and by a recollection of the innumerable ties of kinship that bind the Fatherland to the United States.

Some nation must lead the world out of the black night of war into the light of that day when "swords shall be beaten into plowshares." Why not make that honor ours? Some day--why not now?--the nations will learn that enduring peace cannot be built upon fear--that good-will does not grow upon the stalks of violence. Some day the nations will place their trust in love, the weapon for which there is no shield; in love, that suffereth long and is kind; in love, that is not easily provoked, that beareth all things, believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things; in love, which, though despised as weakness by the worshippers of Mars, abideth when all else fails.

W.J. BRYAN.

THE GERMAN-AMERICANS.

Washington, June 11, 1915.

To the German-Americans:

Permit me to address a word to you, as one American citizen speaking to fellow-citizens in whose patriotism he has entire confidence. It is natural that in a contest between your Fatherland and other European nations your sympathies should be with the country of your birth. It is no cause for censure that this is true. It would be a reflection upon you if it were not true. Do not the sons of Great Britain sympathize with their mother country? Do not the sons of France sympathize with theirs? Is not the same true of Russia and of Italy? Why should it not be true of those who are born in Germany or Austria? The trouble is that the extremists on both sides have mistaken a natural attachment felt for birthplace for disloyalty to this country.

The President has been unjustly criticised by the partisans of both sides--the very best evidence of his neutrality. If he had so conducted the Government as to wholly please either side it would excite not only astonishment, but misgivings, for partisans cannot give an unbiased judgment; they will of necessity look at the question from their own point of view, giving praise or blame, according as the act, regardless of its real character, helps or hurts the side with which they have aligned themselves.

The fact that the Administration has received more criticism from German-Americans than from those in sympathy with the Allies is due to the fact that, while both sides are at liberty under international law to purchase ammunition in the United States, the Allies, because of their control of the seas, have the advantage of being able to export it.

It is unfortunate that partisan supporters of Germany should have overlooked the legal requirements of the situation and have thus misunderstood the position of the Administration. The Administration's position has not only been perfectly neutral, but it could not have been otherwise without a palpable and intentional violation of the rules governing neutrality.

This Government is not at liberty to materially change the rules of international law during the war, because every change suggested is discussed, not upon its merits as an abstract proposition, but according to the effect it will have upon the contest. Those who wanted to lay an embargo upon the shipments of arms defended their position on the ground that it would hasten peace, but it is strange that they could have overlooked the fact that the only way in which such action on our part could hasten peace would have been by helping one side to overcome the other.

While the attacks made upon the President by the extremists of both sides were very unjust, it was equally unjust to suspect the patriotism of those who took sides. I feel well enough acquainted with the European-born Americans to believe that in a war between this country and any European power the naturalized citizens from that country would be as quick to enlist as native-born citizens.

As I am now speaking to German-Americans, I am glad to repeat in public what I have often said in private, and would have said in public before but for the fact that it would not have been proper for one in my official position to do so--namely, that in case of war between the United States and Germany--if so improbable a supposition can be considered--German-Americans would be as prompt to enlist and as faithful to the flag as any other portion of our people. What I have said in regard to German-Americans is an introduction to an appeal which I feel it my duty to make to them.

First, if any of them have ever in a moment of passion or excitement suspected the President of lack of friendship toward the German Government and the German people, let that thought be forgotten, never again to be recalled. I have, since my resignation, received numerous telegrams from German-Americans and German-American societies commending my action. I think the senders of these telegrams understand my position; but that no one may mistake it let me restate it. The President is not only desirous of peace, but he hopes for it, and he has adopted the methods which he thinks most likely to contribute toward peace.

My difference from him is as to method, not as to purpose, and my utterances since resigning have been intended to crystallize public sentiment in support of his efforts to maintain peace, or, to use a similar phrase, "Peace with Honor." But remember that when I use the phrase "Peace with Honor" I do not use it in the same sense that those do who regard every opponent of war as favoring "peace at any price." Peace at any price is an epithet, not a true statement of any one's position or of the policy of any group. The words are employed by jingoes as an expression of contempt, and are applied indiscriminately to all who have faith in the nation's ability to find a peaceful way out of every difficulty, so long as both nations want peace.

The alarmists of the country have had control of the metropolitan press, and they have loudly proclaimed that the prolongation of negotiations or the suggestion of international investigation would be a sign of weakness--and everything is weakness that does not contain a hint of war. The jingo sees in the rainbow of promise only one color--red.

Second--Knowing that the President desires peace, it is our duty to help him secure it. And how? By exerting your influence to convince the German Government of this fact and to persuade that Government to take no steps that would lead in the direction of war. My fear has been that the German Government might, despairing of a friendly settlement, break off diplomatic relations, and thus create a condition out of which war might come without the intention of either country.

I do not ask you to minimize the earnestness of the President's statement--that would be unfair, both to him and to Germany. The sinking of the Lusitania cannot be defended upon the facts as we understand them. The killing of innocent women and children cannot be justified, whether the killing is by drowning or starving.

No nation can successfully plead the inhumanity of her enemies as an excuse for inhumanity on her own part. While it is true that cruelty is apt to beget cruelty, it cannot be said that "like cures like." Even in war, we are not absolved from the obligation to remedy evils by the influence of a good example. "Let your light so shine" is a precept that knows no times nor seasons as it knows neither latitude nor longitude.

Third--Do not attempt to connect the negotiations which are going on between the United States and Germany with those between the United States and Great Britain. The cases are different, but, even if they were the same, it would be necessary to treat with each nation separately. My personal preference has been to repeat our insistence that the Allies shall not interfere with our commerce with neutral countries, but the difference on this point was a matter of judgment and not a matter of principle. In the note to Great Britain, dated March 30, this Government said:

In view of these assurances formally given to this
Government, it is confidently expected that the extensive
powers conferred by the Order in Council on the executive
officers of the Crown will be restricted by "orders issued
by the Government" directing the exercise of their
discretionary powers in such a manner as to modify in
practical application those provisions of the Order in
Council which, if strictly enforced, would violate neutral
rights and interrupt legitimate trade. Relying on the
faithful performance of these voluntary assurances by his
Majesty's Government the United States takes it for granted
that the approach of American merchantmen to neutral ports
situated upon the long line of coast affected by the Order
in Council will not be interfered with, when it is known
that they do not carry goods which are contraband of war or
goods destined to or proceeding from ports within the
belligerent territory affected.

There is no doubt that our Government will insist upon this position--that is an important thing, the exact date of the note is not material. My reason for desiring to have the matter presented to Great Britain at once was not that Germany had any right to ask it, but because I was anxious to make it as easy as possible for Germany to accept the demands of the United States and cease to employ submarines against merchantmen.

There is no reason why any German-Americans should doubt the President's intentions in this matter. I am sure that every one upon reflection recognizes that our duty to prevent loss of life is more urgent than our duty to prevent interference with trade--loss of trade can be compensated for with money, but no settlement that the United States and Germany may reach can call back to life those who went down with the Lusitania--and war would be the most expensive of all settlements because it would enormously add to the number of the dead.

Fourth--I hope that Germany will acquiesce in the demands that have been made, and I hope that she will acquiesce in them without conditions. She can trust the United States to deal justly with her in the consideration of any changes that she may propose in the international rules that govern the taking of prizes. The more generously she acts in this matter the greater will be the glory which she will derive from it. She has raised a question which is now receiving serious consideration, namely, whether the introduction of the submarine necessitates any change in the rules governing the capture of prizes. The position seemingly taken by Germany, namely, that she is entitled to drown noncombatants because they ride with contraband, is an untenable position. The most that she could insist upon is that, in view of the introduction of this new weapon of warfare, new rules should be adopted, separating passengers from objectionable cargo.

If the use of the submarine justifies such a change in the law of blockade as will permit the cordon to be withdrawn far enough from the shore to avoid the danger of submarine attack, may it not be found possible to secure an international agreement by which passengers will be excluded from ships carrying contraband, or, at least, from those carrying ammunition?

It would require but a slight change in the shipping laws to make this separation, and belligerent nations might be restrained from unnecessarily increasing the contraband list if they were compelled to carry contraband on transports as they now carry troops.

Personally, I would like to see the use of submarines abandoned entirely, just as I would like to see an abandonment of the use of aeroplanes and Zeppelins for the carrying of explosives, but I am not sanguine enough to believe that any effective instrument of warfare will be abandoned as long as war continues.

The very arguments which the advocates of peace advance against the submarine, the aeroplane, and the Zeppelin are advanced for them by those who conduct war. The more fatal a weapon is the more it is in demand, and it is not an unusual thing to see a new instrument of destruction denounced as inhuman by those against whom it is employed, only to be employed later by those who only a little while before denounced it.

The above suggestions are respectfully submitted to those of German birth or descent, and they are submitted in the same spirit to naturalized citizens from other countries. To the naturalized citizen this is the land of adoption, but in one sense it may be nearer to him than it is to us who are native born, for those who come here are citizens by voluntary choice, while we are here by accident of birth. They may be said to have paid a higher compliment to the United States than we who first saw the light under the Stars and Stripes. But, more than that, it is the land of their children and their children's children, no matter for what reason they crossed the ocean. They not only share with us the shaping of our nation's destiny, but their descendants have a part with ours in all the blessings which the present generation can, by wise and patriotic action, bequeath to the generations that are to follow.

W.J. BRYAN.

SEES CHANGE IN TONE OF PRESS.

_On the same day with this outgiving Mr. Bryan issued a statement expressing his gratification over what he termed a change in the tone of the press regarding the note. The statement follows:_

I am glad to note the change in the tone of the press in regard to the note to Germany. From the time the papers began to publish forecasts down to yesterday the jingo editors have been predicting that the matter would be dealt with with "great firmness"; that Germany would be told that there must be no more delay in the acceptance of this country's demands, &c.

Instead of waiting until the note was issued they put their own construction upon it in advance, and colored it to suit their own purposes. It is a relief to find the papers now emphasizing the friendly tone of the note, and pointing out that it does not necessarily mean war.

Something has been gained if the warrior journalists at last realize that the country does not want war, but that, on the contrary, it will support the President in his efforts to find a peaceful solution of the difficult problem raised by the use of the submarine against merchantmen.

_In giving out his statement Mr. Bryan supplemented it with the following anecdote:_

A Congressman replying to a jingo speech recently said:

"While I am personally against war, I am in favor of the country having what it wants. If the country wants war, let it have war, but let it first find out if the country does want war. If it becomes necessary to ascertain the sentiment of the country, I suggest that a ballot be taken; let those who want war vote for war and those opposed to war vote against it, and let the vote be taken with the understanding that those who vote for war will enlist for war and that those who vote against war will not be called upon until after those who want war have exhausted their efforts."

_"I still believe," added Mr. Bryan, "in the right of the people to rule, and think the Congressman's suggestion might insure deliberate action on the part of the voters."_

_Mr. Bryan was reminded of the suggestion of some of his friends that in case of war he would be one of the first to enlist. He replied:_

I do not want to talk about war, but on one occasion I enlisted to defend my country on the first day war was declared.

GERMAN-AMERICAN OPINION.

_Commenting on Mr. Bryan's appeal, the evening edition of the New Yorker Herold on June 12 said:_

The arguments which Mr. Bryan dishes up will not be agreed to by most citizens of German descent, but the open discussion of the various points can only be useful.

So far as influencing the German Government is concerned, we are convinced that in Berlin they will not forget for an instant how terrible a warlike conflict between the two countries would be, particularly for the Germans in America. In view of the many bonds of blood that link the German population of our country with the old Fatherland, a war with the United States would be regarded practically as fratricidal, as a calamity which, if in any way possible, must be avoided. Mr. Bryan may rest assured of this.

The influence of the German-Americans is required less in Germany than here, at this point and place, in the United States. Here the jingo press is raging and seeking to fire minds to war, not in Germany.

_From the Detroiter Abendpost._

Mr. Bryan's proclamation will disappoint only those who hailed him when he published his reasons for leaving the Cabinet; but we find in his last document the confirmation of what we have always thought of the man and the politician Bryan, namely, that he considers all means right if they suit his political intentions.

_From Charles Neumeyer, Editor Louisville Anzeiger._

Mr. Bryan's appeal directed chiefly to American citizens of German birth exhibits an astonishing lack of tact as well as lack of judgment. The former Secretary of State seems to be going on the presumption, like many other native Americans not actuated by a feeling of prejudice or race hatred, that German-Americans have left their hearts behind them in the old country and are, therefore, unable to feel as true American citizens should feel toward their country and everything involving its destiny.

Mr. Bryan's appeal, especially the one directed to German-Americans, will not, can not, and should not meet with the slightest response.

_From the Colorado Herold of Denver._

Bryan's appeal to the Germans, while it may be classed as patriotic, was unnecessary, and Dr. Dernburg, Germany's special envoy, practically voiced the same sentiments in his farewell address in New York Friday night. Bryan's well-known prohibition tendencies, however, preclude the idea that he was bidding for German-American votes.

_From the Waechter und Anzeiger of Cleveland, Ohio._

Mr. Bryan might well have abstained from issuing his statement to the German-Americans. To make any impression he should have explained why he now thinks it the duty of neutrality to furnish contraband to England, when in 1914 he stated in his Commoner that the President had blazed a new way when he, without conference with other nations, committed this nation to the policy that furnishing the "contraband of money" was inconsistent with the spirit of neutrality. What are the influences that have now changed his views? Mr. Bryan is neither frank nor consistent, hence not impressive.

A "SOFTENED" NOTE.

[The First and Second German Notes.]

Washington, June 12, 1915.

My attention has been called to a number of newspaper editorials and articles which, in varying language, asks the question, "Why did Mr. Bryan sign the first note to Germany, and then refuse to sign the second?" The argument presented in the question is based on the supposition that the two notes were substantially the same and that the second note simply reiterates the demands contained in the first. They then declare it inconsistent to sign one and refuse to sign the other. The difference between the two cases would seem obvious enough to make an answer unnecessary, but, lest silence on the subject be taken as an admission of inconsistency, the following explanation is given:

The notes must be considered in connection with the conditions under which they were sent. The first note presented the case of this Government upon such evidence as we then had. It was like the plaintiff's statement in a case, his claim being based on the facts as he presents them. I did not agree entirely with the language of the first note, but the difference was not so material as to justify a refusal to sign it. Then, too, I was at that time hoping that certain things would be done which would make it easier for Germany to acquiesce in our demands.

The three things which I had in mind which, in my judgment, would have helped the situation were: First, an announcement of a willingness upon our part to employ the principle of investigation, embodied in our thirty peace treaties; second, action which would prevent American citizens from traveling on belligerent ships or on American ships carrying contraband, especially if that contraband consisted of ammunition; and, third, further insistence upon our protest against interference of our trade with neutrals. I thought that these three things were within the range of possibilities, and that two, or at least one was probable.

Some weeks have elapsed since the first note was sent, and we have not only failed to do any of these things hoped for, but Germany has in the meantime answered and in her answer has not only presented a number of alleged facts which, in her judgment, justified the deviation which she has made from the ordinary rules applicable to prize cases, but she has suggested arbitration. A rejection of the arguments which she presented and of the allegations made, together with a reiteration of the original demands, creates a very different situation from that which existed when the first demand was made.

As I have before stated, my fear has been that, owing to the feeling existing in Germany, the Government might, upon receipt of such a note under such circumstances, break off diplomatic relations and thus create a situation out of which war might come without the intention of either side. I am sure that the President does not want war and I am confident that our people do not want war; I have no reason to believe that either the German Government or the German people desire war.

But war, a calamity at any time, is especially to be avoided now because our nation is relied upon by both neutrals and belligerents as the one nation which can exert most influence toward bringing this war to an end. If we were, by accident, to be drawn into the conflict, we would not only surrender the opportunity to act as a mediator, but we might become responsible for drawing other nations into this contest. When we see how one nation after another has been dragged into this war we cannot have confidence in the ability of any one to calculate with certainty upon the results that might follow if we became embroiled in the war.

No one would be happier than I if the President's plan results in a peaceful settlement, but no one was in position to say what effect our note would have upon Germany, or what results would follow if she, in anger, broke off diplomatic relations, and I was not only unwilling to assume the responsibility for the risks incurred--risks which no one could with any degree of accuracy measure--but I felt that, having done all I could in the Cabinet, it was my duty to undertake, outside the Cabinet, the work upon which I have entered.

I have no doubt that the country will unanimously support the President during the war, if so great a misfortune should overtake us, but I believe that the chances of war will be lessened in proportion as the country expresses itself in favor of peace--not "peace at any price"--but peace in preference to a war waged for the redress of such grievances as we have against Germany--at least against war until we have given to Germany the opportunity which we are pledged to give to Great Britain, France, and Russia--to have every difference of every character submitted to an international commission of investigation.

I would contend as earnestly for the application of the treaty principle to the Allies as I contend for it in the case of Germany. If the principle is sound, it ought to be applied to every country with which we have a difference, and if it ought to be applied at all I think it is better to suggest it in the beginning than to accept it later after a seeming reluctance to apply it.

I understand that Secretary Lansing has already given out a statement, correcting an inaccuracy which appeared in this morning's paper. I appreciate his kindness.

It is true that I saw the final draft of the note just before my resignation took effect, but it contained an important change. I had no knowledge of this change at the time my resignation was tendered and accepted. This change, while very much softening the note, was not, however, sufficient, in my judgment, to justify me in asking permission to withdraw my resignation.

As Germany had suggested arbitration, I felt that we could not do less than reply to this offer by expressing a willingness to apply the principle of the peace treaties to the case. These treaties, while providing for investigation of all questions, leave the nations free to act independently after the international commission has concluded the investigation.

W.J. BRYAN.

STATEMENTS ON THE WAR IN EUROPE.

_Mr. Bryan on June 16 gave out the first of three statements about the present war, and in it he predicts that a conference will be held at the close of the conflict to revise the rules of international law. The present rules, in Mr. Bryan's opinion, "seem to have been made for the nations at war rather than for the nations at peace."_

_The statement contains a hint to President Wilson in the concluding paragraph which says that "in all history no other peacemaker has ever been in position to claim so rich a blessing as that which will be pronounced on our President when the time for mediation comes--as come it must." Its text follows:_

Washington, June 16, 1915.

I shall tomorrow discuss the origin of the war and the reasons which led the nations of Europe to march, as if blindfolded, into the bloody conflict which now rests like a pall over the fairest parts of the Old World; today let us consider the war as it is and the injury it is doing to the neutral nations.

The war is without a precedent in the populations represented, in the number of combatants in the field, in daily expenditures, in the effectiveness of the implements employed, in the lists of dead and wounded, in the widespread suffering caused and in the intensity of the hatreds aroused.

No class or condition is exempt from the burdens which this war imposes. The rich bear excessive taxation and the poor are sorely oppressed; the resources of today are devoured and the products of tomorrow are mortgaged. No age is immune. The first draft was upon the strong and vigorous, but the Governments are already calling for those above and below the ordinary enlistment zone.

The war's afflictions are visited upon women as well as upon men--upon wives who await in vain a husband's return, and upon mothers who must surrender up the sons whose support is the natural reliance of declining years. Even children are its victims--children innocent of wrong and incapable of doing harm. By war's dread decree babes come into the world fatherless at their birth, while the bodies of their sires are burned like worthless stubble in the fields over which the Grim Reaper has passed.

The most extreme illustrations collected from history to prove the loathsomeness of war are overshadowed by new indictments written daily; the most distressing pictures drawn by the imagination are surpassed by the realities of this indescribable contest. Surely we behold "the pestilence that walketh in darkness and the destruction that wasteth at noonday."

Neutral nations cannot look on with indifference--the ties that bind them together are too strong, the relationship too intimate. This is especially true of the United States. We have a composite population, every nation of Europe having contributed liberally to our citizenship. These our countrymen, themselves born abroad or immediately descended from foreign-born ancestors, cannot but take a likely interest in the conduct as well as in the results of the war, and a still larger circle shares the concern of those directly connected. Not a soldier falls on either side but the sorrow expressed in his home finds an echo at some fireside in the United States.

But, aside from sentimental considerations, neutral nations suffer serious disturbances because of the war. Duelists, when dueling was in fashion, were careful to select a place where they could settle their personal differences without harm to unoffending bystanders, but warring nations cannot, no matter how earnestly they try, avoid injury to neutrals. As the nauseous odors of a slaughterhouse, carried on the breeze, pollute the air in every direction, so the evil influences emanating from these wide-extended battlefields taint the atmosphere of the whole political world. War is an international nuisance. Nearly every neutral nation finds new domestic problems thrust upon it and old problems made more difficult.

No American citizen can note without deep concern the manner in which war questions have intruded themselves into our politics--overshadowing economic issues and stimulating agitation in favor of enlarged appropriations for military and naval purposes. Business is deranged and expensive readjustments made necessary, while commerce with foreign nations is seriously interrupted. Fluctuations in price abroad are reflected in the markets of the United States. A fall of one cent in the price of cotton means tens of millions of dollars to our producers and merchants. Added to this, freight rates and insurance premiums have been increased to cover the greater risks incident to war.

Scarcity of ships is one of the greatest commercial embarrassments caused by the war. We have depended largely upon foreign ships to carry our commerce, and we could not but suffer when the merchantmen of one side were driven from the sea and a part of the merchant fleet of the other side was withdrawn for Government use.

The neutral nations are put to a great expense to preserve neutrality and are constantly in danger of being embroiled in the war without intention or fault on their part.

The rules of international law seem to have been made for the nations at war rather than for the nations at peace. It is almost impossible to alter these rules during the war, because any material change, affecting as it would the interests of belligerents, would be a seeming violation of neutrality. As soon as peace returns there will be a demand for an international conference on the subject. The presumption should then be given to peace, for peace, not war, is the normal condition. If nations are determined to fight they should, as far as possible, bear their burden themselves and not be permitted to transfer it to the nations which avoid war by resorting to reason instead of force.

Under the stress and strain of the titanic struggle in which they are engaged, each side has felt itself justified in encroaching upon the rights of neutrals. The ocean highways, the common property of all, have been to some extent appropriated for war purposes, and delicate diplomatic questions are forced upon the neutral nations. Just at this time, when these questions are most acute, the belligerent Governments are least able to deal with them with the calmness and poise which their great importance demands.

No wonder every neutral nation is increasingly anxious for the war to end; but of all the neutral nations ours has the most reason for the return of peace--most reason to set its face resolutely against participation in this war. This nation, the head of the neutral group and the sincere friend of all the belligerents, is in duty bound to set an example in patience and self-restraint.

In all history no such opportunity has ever come to any other nation as that which is destined to come to the United States. In all history no other peacemaker has ever been in a position to claim so rich a blessing as that which will be pronounced upon our President when the time for mediation comes--as come it must.

W.J. BRYAN.

"PREPAREDNESS" AND WAR.

_That military preparedness provokes war is the conclusion drawn by Mr. Bryan in the second utterance in his series of three concerning the European conflict and war in general. It reads:_

Washington, June 17, 1915.

The conflict now raging in Europe has been described as "The Causeless War," but since no one would be bold enough to lay the blame for such an unholy situation upon an overruling Providence, it must find its origin in acts for which man, and man alone, is responsible.

It is not a race war; on the contrary, the races are quite inexplicably mixed. Latin joins with Saxon; the Frank is the ally of the Slav; while in the opposing ranks Teuton and Turk fight side by side.

Neither is it a religious war. On the Bosporus the Cross and the Crescent make common cause; Protestant Kaiser and Catholic Emperor have linked their fortunes together and hurl their veteran legions against an army in which are indiscriminately mingled communicants of the Greek Church, of the Church of Rome, and of the Church of England.

Nor yet is it a rivalry between families. The leading actors in this unprecedented tragedy are related by blood, but kinship seems to be a negligible factor--it explains neither friendships nor enmities.

No. Race, religion, and family, each with many wars to answer for, can plead not guilty in the present inquiry. So far as can be judged, there appears upon the surface no cause that by any known standard can be regarded as adequate for such a cataclysm as we are now witnessing.

The notes that passed from chancellery to chancellery were couched in most friendly language. These notes could not have been intended to deceive. Sovereigns visited each other and were received with every evidence of cordiality and good-will. This hospitality could not have been insincere.

Each ruler declared that he did not wish war; would they all say this if an adequate cause for war had actually existed? They have all denied responsibility for the war--would they have done so if they had regarded the war as either necessary or desirable?

But there is even better proof, aye, indisputable proof, that no sufficient cause existed, viz., the conclusion to be drawn from inaction.

Would not these rulers have busied themselves trying to save their subjects by the eradication of the cause had they known of the existence of such a cause? Would they have spent their time in social festivities and in exchanging compliments had they known that they were on the brink of war? It is inconceivable! It would be a gross libel on them, one and all, to charge such a wanton disregard of their sacred duty.

What, then, was the cause? If I have correctly analyzed the situation, the war is the natural result of a false philosophy. Theories of life are invisible, but they control for good or for evil. They enter our very being, and may be as deadly to the moral man as germs of disease, taken into the body, are deadly to the physical man. The fundamental precept of this false philosophy is that "might makes right." It is not proclaimed now as loudly as it once was, but it is often acted upon in particular cases by those who would be unwilling to indorse it as a general principle.

The individual makes this maxim his excuse for violating three commandments that stand in his way; this maxim also leads nations to violate these same three commandments for the same purpose, but on a larger scale.

Strange that men should fail to apply to nations the moral principles which are now so generally applied to the individual units of a nation!