Chapter M: H. Holubowicz (7)

Again, Page 339, I cannot agree that it was the night disposition of the fleet that was the crucial decision. It is true it ended the battle for the night, but the decision which gave the battle its character was taken earlier in the day, when the enemy was allowed to open the range under the cover of destroyer attacks and smoke screens. In the existing atmospheric conditions and light it was impossible for gunnery to be effective, even at 12,000 and 9,000 yards and the only terms on which the German fleet could be defeated and sunk would have been those of close action. The refusal of close action was due to the menace of the German destroyer attacks, used on this occasion for purposes of defense and to afford an opportunity of evasion, with masterly skill and decisive effect. The dispositions and tactics of the night action are a different matter, but of these we are still completely ignorant.

Battle of Skagerrak as Germany Sees It

By CAPTAIN VON KUEHLWETTER

_of the German Imperial Navy_

[This article on the battle of Jutland was written during the week
which it was fought, May 31, 1916]

Although Trafalgar, Tsushima, and Skagerrak will be treated and discussed together in future naval histories, it is not yet possible to draw the full historical consequences from the two last-named naval battles. We can estimate the effects of Trafalgar on the history of the world, for we know that it laid the foundations of British naval supremacy. With the exception of the immediate military advantage gained, the full results of the battle of Tsushima have not yet been developed. Still less can the battle of Skagerrak have left its impress upon world history.

For us Skagerrak [Jutland] has been a great, decisive victory, which our whole High Sea Fleet gained after a long, bitterly contested battle on the open sea, far from the home coast and its points of support, against the superior British Grand Fleet. Our naval forces inflicted upon the British fleet losses which, in terms of tons, even according to the British Admiralty, were double ours. But the tonnage does not fully represent the seriousness of the losses, since the British lost three dreadnoughts, as against one of ours, and three armored cruisers, as against one of our old armored cruisers.

If we add to this what our own observations, supported by statements of British prisoners, show, the enemy's losses were three and a half times ours; that is, in terms of fighting units, six dreadnoughts, including two older types, as against one dreadnought and one pre-dreadnought, and four armored cruisers and one small cruiser, as against four small cruisers.

The purpose of a battle is destruction, the victor being the side which goes further in this direction. The figures just quoted can leave no doubt on this point.

The German fleet remained on the battle area. After the repeatedly successful attacks of our torpedo boat flotillas the British fleet was forced to sheer off, and we never saw it again. Although the British ships were superior in speed and were reinforced by the arrival of twelve additional battleships, they made no attempt to recover contact with us and continue the battle. Our numerous torpedo boats searched for the British fleet all night without finding it, and instead utilized the opportunity to rescue a large number of British sailors.

This justifies us in calling the battle an absolute victory for us. It has demonstrated that the German fleet had within it the power to beat the more numerous and more up-to-date British fleet, and it opens up great possibilities for the future.

The battle of Skagerrak did not decide the war. Neither did Trafalgar nor Tsushima, nor did Tannenburg or the battle of the Masurian Lakes. A single battle between great powers will never be ultimately decisive. How much it contributes to the final outcome of a war cannot be estimated. The greatest result so far is not in the fact that Great Britain lost ships, but in the victory.

TRAFALGAR AND JUTLAND

Trafalgar and the name of Nelson stand high in naval history. Let us draw a military comparison between Trafalgar and the battle of Skagerrak. At Trafalgar there were on the British side 27 ships of the line, (of which 8 had 80 guns, 16 had 74 guns, and 3 had 64 guns,) four frigates, and two smaller vessels. On the side of the allied French and Spanish fleet there were 33 ships of the line, (of which 10 had from 80 to 110 guns, 22 had 74 guns, and one had 64 guns,) three frigates, and two smaller vessels. The French and Spanish fleet was not only numerically stronger, but its ships were better built and better armed.

In the battle of Skagerrak we had opposing each other: On the British side, thirty-one dreadnoughts, inclusive of six battle cruisers, and four armored cruisers; on the German side, twenty-one dreadnoughts, inclusive of five battle cruisers, and six older cruisers. Roughly speaking, we had twenty-seven big ships against thirty-five. Here also the better quality, judged by size, up-to-dateness, and armament, was on the side of the larger fleet. Apart from these big ships, there were on each side about fifty smaller vessels.

The total tonnage of the British fleet at Trafalgar was equal to about two modern dreadnoughts, as one of the ships of the line in Nelson's time was of about 2,000 tons. In numbers of guns and of crew there were more at Trafalgar, as at that time the ships were sailing vessels.

The British had between 17,000 and 20,000 men engaged, against 21,000 to 24,000. At Skagerrak we had from 35,000 to 40,000, as against 45,000 to 50,000 men. In this way we can compare the battle in its general aspect with Trafalgar. But if we look into the matter more closely, the French and Spanish fleet had within it an element of weakness arising from the fact that it consisted of two allied forces, between which there is never complete co-ordination. The French were further weakened by effects of the Revolution and exhaustion from previous battles. The French Admiral himself said: "Never before was the French fleet at such a low standard. We had bad masts, bad sails, bad rigging, bad officers, and bad seamen." Of the Spanish, Nelson said: "They have neither seamen nor officers." At the head of the allied forces was a French Admiral who had no confidence in the fleet and who was acting under instructions issued by Napoleon, which he felt incapable of carrying out. Opposed to him was the seasoned and well-schooled fleet of Nelson, so that it was not a battle of equal opponents and the result was annihilation. None of the French or Spanish ships was again seen at sea; nineteen were captured or destroyed, ten were driven into harbor and blockaded; four escaped, only to fall into the hands of the victors a few days later.

COMPARED WITH TSUSHIMA

And now Tsushima, another parallel. A Russian fleet, made up of any old vessels the Russians could get together, and of what ships still remained in the East--supported by Port Arthur--made one last bid against the sea power of the enemy. Without training, without points of support, honeycombed with revolutionary ideas, the Russian fleet started on its trip to the Far East, where it arrived on May 27, after suffering terrible hardships and being more than six months on the way to meet the enemy. Meanwhile, Port Arthur, with its fleet, had fallen. The Russian Admiral knew that he had absolutely no chance, but he did not have enough courage to retreat. Blindly and without confidence he started the battle against an opponent who was superior in numbers, equipment, and training. Of the 38 Russian ships which arrived on the morning of May 27, 1905, in the Strait of Korea, 19 were sunk and 7 captured, including 2 hospital ships. The Russian Admiral, 273 officers, and 5,833 petty officers and men were taken prisoner; 201 officers and 4,344 men were killed. Against this the Japanese lost only three torpedo boats and about 700 men.

Trafalgar was not a battle between equal forces, and still less so was Tsushima; hence, as regards their military value, they cannot be compared with Skagerrak. In this battle for the first time there were two sides equally well trained, equally imbued with the same spirit, equally determined. Here also the smaller force won. The superior force had to quit the battle area, and only the power it retained within itself saved it from annihilation. This battle gave us, in the military sense, a victory such as naval history has never yet recorded. Its moral effect upon our fleet, especially after the long harassing wait, cannot be expressed in words. It did not end the war, but it gave us more confidence and startled England, who always thought she had an invincible fleet.

On the victory of Trafalgar England founded her colonial world power, because she thereby obtained the mastery of the seas, which remained unchallenged. Tsushima gave Japan the sea power in the East which she needed to carry out her military plans on land. It no more ended the Japanese-Russian war than Trafalgar had ended the struggle of that day, but it gave Japan a military success which was of great value to her in peace negotiations. We hope that Skagerrak is a blow against the victory of Trafalgar and the first step toward the smashing of British sea power, and that other mighty hammer blows will fall against the barriers which shut off other peoples from the freedom of the seas.

International Socialists' Peace Campaign

A Message Sent to the Socialists of the Central
Powers by Those of the Entente Nations

Emile Vandervelde and Camille Huysmans, the Chairman and Secretary of the International Socialist Bureau, on March 1, 1918, signed and transmitted a message to the Socialists of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Bulgaria, inviting them to consider the declaration on war aims adopted by the Interallied Labor and Socialist Conference in London, Feb. 23, and asking them to propose conditions of their own for comparison. The communication was printed April 17 without comment in the German Socialist organ, Vorwärts, being reproduced by it from the Paris Humanité. It is as follows:

The third Interallied Socialist Conference, which was held in
London from Feb. 20 to Feb. 23, has commissioned the President
and Secretary of the International Socialist Bureau to communicate
to you the authentic text of the memorandum which has been
adopted by the meeting of delegates of the Labor and Socialist
organizations of Great Britain, France, Italy, and Belgium. The
main ideas of this document have received, or had received in
advance, the approval of the parties of Serbia, Portugal, Greece,
Canada, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand.

A special mission, consisting of Stuart, Bunning, (England,)
Jouhaux and Cachin, (France,) a Belgian delegate, an Italian
delegate, and the Secretary of the International Socialist Bureau,
Camille Huysmans, has gone to the United States in order to obtain
the adhesion of the American working class to this memorandum,
which expresses the point of view of the organized proletariat
of the Entente countries with regard to the necessary foundations
of a democratic peace and the principal conditions for a general
international Labor and Socialist conference, which has been
summoned to a neutral country by "a committee which provides all
guarantees of impartiality toward the various elements which are
called to take part."

In making this communication to you the signatories of this
message consider it profitable to recall objectively the reasons
which determined the acceptance of the procedure proposed by the
London Conference.

The conference was of the opinion that it would be of no use to
assemble a general congress unless its aim had been established in
principle.

The conference was of the opinion that "the principal condition
for the holding of a plenary assembly of the International
consists in its organizers satisfying themselves that all the
organizations to be represented formulate in precise terms and
by a public declaration their peace conditions upon the basis
of the principles of peace without annexations and without
indemnities of a punitive character, and the right of the peoples
to self-determination," and, further, that these organizations
will "work with all their power to obtain from their Governments
the necessary guarantee that these principles shall be applied
honestly and without _arriere-pensées_ in the settlement of all
questions raised at the official peace conference."

In order itself to satisfy these conditions, the London Conference
has considered it necessary to state precisely its views and its
action in the memorandum which we are commissioned to communicate
to you.

The conference expects that your party, following the same idea,
will resolve to issue a public declaration of a similar kind,
whether separately or jointly with the Labor and Socialist
organizations of Central Europe.

In the opinion of those who took part in the London Conference
the comparison of these documents will be of the greatest
importance. It will be a principal means of establishing whether
a sufficient agreement of views exists between the proletariats
of the two belligerent groups to make possible a common action
against imperialism and for a democratic peace. This preliminary
examination is all the more necessary, because it is obvious that
no important party, conscious of its responsibility, will run
the risk of having the resolutions of an international congress
imposed upon it by the will of a majority. Only resolutions which
were the expression of a general and common will would possess
moral authority and practical effect.

The sum of the matter is that the Socialists of the Entente
countries request you in this grave hour, in which it is necessary
to know whether the world is to be freed by democracy or to be
handed over to imperialism, to ask your consciences whether
a real, sincere, and effective agreement of the wills of the
proletariats is possible in order to put an end to the law of
violence, in order to lay the foundations not of a peace, but of
the peace, and in order to help the peoples to liberate themselves
from the endless chain of military war which leads to economic
wars, and of economic wars which will again produce military wars.

We add to the messages only one observation. Since the London
Conference momentous events have taken place which constitute the
gravest menace for the workers of all countries. The principles
to which they appeal have been shamefully violated. The right of
the peoples to self-determination has been openly disregarded. In
Austria and Germany themselves Socialists have expressed the fear
that Russia, disarmed and for the moment impotent, might become
a battleground in which the rival imperialisms and their claims
would meet and ultimately satisfy themselves jointly at the cost
of the defeated revolution.

The working classes have a common interest in protesting against
such events and in preventing the realization of such projects.

That is the wish of the authors and the signatories of the
memorandum. In the same spirit we beg you to subject this document
to a conscientious and thorough examination.

In communicating this request to you we address to you, comrades,
our Socialist greetings.

At a meeting of the Socialist Party Committee in Berlin on May 31, according to the Vorwärts, Friedrich Ebert, Vice President of the Social Democrats, announced that the party leaders had indirectly received a copy of the Entente Socialist memorandum on war aims. Philipp Scheidemann declared that the aims of the Entente Socialists were to a great extent in complete accord with the annexationist aims of the Entente Governments. The committee adopted a resolution pledging continued adherence to the Reichstag peace resolution of July, 1917, which declared for no annexations and no indemnities.

Trade After the War

The State Department at Washington announced on June 5, 1918, that it had appointed an economic representative, who was to join the American Embassy at Rome. This was regarded as the first step in a general policy of more active participation by the United States in preparations of the nations at war with Germany for the after-the-war trade struggle.

The new treaty of alliance between Germany and Austria to control all Central European sources of raw materials, and to exclude other nations from equal trade privileges, with similar restrictions imposed by the new treaties forced on Finland, Ukrainia, and Rumania, changed the attitude of the American Government, which at first had not assented to the proposals of the Paris Economic Conference to interpose artificial obstructions to free commerce with the Central Powers after the war.

The Italian Government recently named a commission to study after-the-war problems, and with this commission the American economic delegate will have close relations. Italian importing and exporting interests in the United States also have taken advantage of the opportunity afforded by the decision of the Italian Government to consider this important subject, and have joined in the dispatch of a committee to Italy to co-operate. Italian industries, though of great potential strength and capable of returning large profits on their capitalization, are said to require substantial assistance from America if they are to go on after the war without relapsing into the control of German financiers.

It is reported that economic representatives will be sent to the American Embassies in all the allied capitals.

On May 14 Mr. Bonar Law, British Chancellor of the Exchequer, announced in the House of Commons that, in order to leave its country's hands free for the time when peace arrived, the French Government had denounced all commercial conventions containing a general clause regarding "most-favored nations"; and that, in view of the probable scarcity of raw material after the war and the necessity for providing for the needs of the British Empire and the Allies, the British Government intended to adopt a similar course.

In answer to other questions, Mr. Bonar Law said that the British Government had not changed its policy expressed in the Paris resolutions since the entrance of the United States into the war; he had every reason to believe that America was very anxious for unity of economic control, and agreed that any useful action would be much more effective if taken in conjunction with our allies.

Lord Balfour of Burleigh's committee considered the question of the denunciation of commercial treaties and reported against it. The report contains a summary of the various commercial treaties which are in existence between Great Britain and other countries. Those with enemy countries have been terminated by the war. In the case of allied countries commercial treaties on the basis of reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment are in force between the United Kingdom and Italy, Portugal, Russia, the United States, Japan, Serbia, and Montenegro. There is a similar treaty with Rumania. United Kingdom goods have most-favored-nation treatment in France, owing to a legislative enactment and not by treaty right, for customs duties were excepted from the scope of the Anglo-French commercial convention of 1882.

Great Britain has commercial treaties on the most-favored-nation basis with Switzerland and Greece. In the case of the Netherlands and Denmark, the general principle of most-favored-nation treatment is subject to minor limitations. The position with regard to Sweden and Norway is doubtful; but the old treaty of 1826 with Sweden and Norway on a reciprocal most-favored-nation basis has continued in operation in practice, in spite of the dissolution of the union between Sweden and Norway in 1905.

Outside Europe, Great Britain has commercial treaties providing for reciprocal and unconditional most-favored-nation treatment with Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Venezuela. Those with Costa Rica and Liberia are conditional.

Nearly all these commercial treaties are subject to a fixed period of notice on either side as a condition of denunciation. The treaty with Japan cannot be terminated before 1923. The treaty with Portugal has only recently been completed, after years of negotiation. Twelve months' notice of termination is required in the case of the treaty with Switzerland and of most of those with neutral countries outside Europe. The Spanish agreement--it is based on an exchange of notes in 1894--is subject to six months' notice.

Before the war there was no commercial treaty between the United Kingdom and Germany. The United Kingdom enjoyed most-favored-nation treatment in Germany in customs matters by virtue of a biennial law.

Exchange of Naval Greetings With England

The following exchange of greetings between the heads of the navies of the United States and Great Britain was made public:

_Washington, April 5, 1918._

MY DEAR SIR: Your references to the splendid spirit of
co-operation between the navies of our two countries, and your
warm praise of the officers and men of the navy who have gone
abroad, have been most grateful to me and to the men in the
navy and to all Americans. The brightest spot in the tragedy of
this war is this mutual appreciation of the men in the naval
service. Our officers who have returned confirm the statements of
Vice Admiral Sims of the courtesies and kindness shown in every
way by the Admiralty and officers of the British fleet, and we
have reciprocated by receiving cordially the able and efficient
officers who have come from your country to confer and work elbow
to elbow with our officers in the difficult work which this war
imposes upon the naval service of all the countries allied in the
war against the submarine menace.

I had hoped to have the pleasure of visiting Great Britain and
personally expressing this feeling of mutual working together
and of exchanging views, but the task here of making ready more
and more units for the fleet is a very serious one, and my duty
chains me here. The order in all the navy is "full speed ahead"
in the construction of destroyers and other craft, and the whole
service is keyed up to press this programme forward as rapidly
as possible. Therefore I shall not have the pleasure until
this program shall materialize better and better of personal
acquaintance and conference, which would be of such interest and
value.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) JOSEPHUS DANIELS.
Sir Eric Geddes, First Lord of the Admiralty, London.

* * * * *

_April 23._

DEAR MR. DANIELS: I am exceedingly grateful to you for your letter
of April 5, in which you thank me for the public reference which
I have made to the very cordial relations which exist between the
navies of our two countries. As you know, we all of us here have
a great admiration for your officers and men and for the splendid
help which they are giving in European waters; and, further, we
find Vice Admiral Sims invaluable in counsel and co-operation.

I fully appreciate how onerous your office must be at the present
time; and much though I regret that you do not see your way to
visiting this country in the near future, I hope that we may some
day have the pleasure of welcoming you here. Yours sincerely,

(Signed) E. C. GEDDES.

* * * * *

_Commander in Chief's Office,_

_Queenstown, May 4._

On the anniversary of the arrival of the first United States
men-of-war at Queenstown, I wish to express my deep gratitude to
the United States officers and ratings for the skill, energy, and
unfailing good nature which they have all consistently shown, and
which qualities have so materially assisted the war by enabling
the ships of the allied powers to cross the ocean in comparative
freedom.

To command you is an honor, to work with you is a pleasure, and to
know you is to know the best traits of the Anglo-Saxon race.

(Signed) LEWIS BAYLY,

Admiral, Commander in Chief.

England and the War's Causes

Prince Lichnowsky's Memorandum a Document of Vital Importance to History

By VISCOUNT BRYCE

_Former British Ambassador to the United States_

[Copyright, 1918, by The New York Times Company]

The secret memorandum which Prince Lichnowsky wrote as a record and vindication of his conduct while German Ambassador in England is the most important single document which has come before the world since the first days of the war. It was not meant to become known during the war, perhaps not within his own lifetime. It was written not to justify England but to criticise the policy which tied Germany to Austria, and was published without, and indeed against, its author's will. It may have been composed partly to relieve the writer's own feelings, from an impulse which those will understand who are prevented by considerations of public duty from vindicating their conduct to the world. It may also be due to the sense, natural to men who have borne a part in great events, that they owe it to posterity to contribute what they can to the truth of history. Anyhow, it has exposed him to the anger and persecution of the German Government; and this persecution is evidence of the importance it attaches to it as a condemnation of its conduct. The truth of its contents has been confirmed, if indeed it needed confirmation, by the statements of Herr von Jagow, late German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and of Herr Mühlon, one of the Krupp directors.

Prince Lichnowsky appears in this document as a man of clear vision and cool judgment, an acute observer of social as well as political phenomena, a good witness both to what he noted during his residence here and to what he knew of the action of his own Government. And now let us see what he records.

When the war began in August, 1914, the German Government entered on two campaigns, which it has ever since prosecuted with equal energy and an equal disregard of honor and humanity.

One of these was the campaign by arms. It suddenly invaded Belgium, a peaceful neutral country, whose neutrality it was pledged to respect, and which it has treated with the utmost cruelty, murdering, or reducing to the slavery of forced labor, its civilian and noncombatant inhabitants. It has similarly enslaved the inhabitants of Poland, and has encouraged its Turkish allies to massacre their innocent Armenian subjects.

A CAMPAIGN OF FALSEHOOD

The other campaign was one of falsehood, conducted by speeches and through the press, and intended to mislead public opinion. It was an effort to deceive both its own people and neutral nations by mendacious misrepresentations of German aims, purposes, and conduct, and by equally false descriptions of the aims, purposes, and conduct of Germany's antagonists, and especially of the British Government and the British people. It tried to represent the war as having been forced upon Germany by Britain. Germany, it said, was merely defending herself against an unprovoked attack. She desired to live at peace with her neighbors, developing her own resources, cherishing no aggressive designs. Her enormous army and navy had been created only to protect her against the jealous and malicious enemies by whom she was surrounded, and especially against Great Britain. Britain, it seems, was envious of Germany. Being herself "a decadent nation"--this was the prevailing German the commercial competition of Germany, and tried to keep the latter out of all foreign markets. British policy--so they said--under the direction of King Edward VII., had formed alliances with France and Russia in order to hem in Germany, and after trying to block Germany's outlets in Africa and Asia, contrived this war to destroy by arms the rival whom she could not face up to in trade and manufacturing industry.

While these accusations were brought against Britain, attempts were made to excuse the invasion of Belgium by the false stories, dropped as soon as they had served their temporary purpose, that French officers had been sent into Belgium to help to organize the Belgian troops against Germany and that French aviators had been flying over German territory.

Grotesque as all these inventions were, they were repeated with such audacity as to produce some effect in neutral countries. But their chief and more lasting influence was on the German people. A large part of the German press, inspired and controlled by the German Government, had for some time past been holding up England as the persistent foe of Germany. It now redoubled its falsehoods, representing Sir Edward Grey as having plotted to bring about a war, and urged Russia to refuse a peaceful solution; and it added equally groundless charges that England had secretly planned with Belgium to attack Germany through Belgian territory. These fables, repeated incessantly by German politicians, as well as by the newspapers, found ready credence with the German people, easily led by their press, always docile to the orders of their Government, and now swept off their feet by a wave of patriotism and by the belief that they were about to achieve a victory as rapid and complete as that of 1870. It was this conviction of the malevolence and the grasping ambition of England that created that ferocious hatred of the English which has continued to display itself in the treatment of English prisoners and in the exultation over such crimes as the sinking of the Lusitania.

ORGANIZED HATE

This sudden outburst of hatred in a nation so intelligent startled and amazed us. It can be understood only when we remember that the German Government did everything in its power not only to create hatred, but also to stifle every voice that was raised to let the people know the truth. They never have been permitted to know the truth, and the disappointment that fell upon them when their march on Paris was arrested with the help of a British Army and their coasts strictly blockaded by a British fleet added fuel to their anger and has made it ever since an easier matter to keep the truth from them.

Now, what was the truth?

The British people bore no hatred whatever toward the German people. King Edward VII. meant no harm to Germany when he showed his liking for the French. Neither did his Ministers when they took steps to remove the differences that had been causing trouble between ourselves and France, and again when they came to a friendly understanding with Russia. These arrangements were made in the interests of European peace and good-will, not in order to damage Germany. British merchants and manufacturers never dreamed of fighting Germany to get rid of her commercial competition. Had such an idea occurred to them, they would have reflected that Germany was England's best foreign customer, not to add that two years of even a successful war would have inflicted far more loss upon them than the extension of German trade competition could have repaired in twenty years. British men of science and learning admired the immense contributions Germany had been making to the progress of knowledge, and they had many personal friends in Germany. British statesmen did not desire to add to British possessions abroad, feeling that we had already all we needed, and that the greatest interest of the British Empire was a universal peace.

No section of our people, neither traders, nor thinkers and writers, nor statesmen, had any idea of the dangers to the mind and the purpose of those who ruled Germany. We did not realize what the feudal aristocracy and military caste of Germany were pondering and planning, nor how little weight they attached to considerations either of good faith or of humanity. Hence, beyond maintaining a strong fleet, the indispensable protection of a country open to sea attack which did not maintain a large army, we had made no preparations for war, and had scarcely bethought ourselves of what action we should have to take on land if we became involved in war. In this belief and attitude there may have been less prudence than was needed. But our absence of suspicion is the best proof of how little we expected aggression. It is an absolute refutation of the calumny that Britain, with her tiny army, was planning an attack on the greatest military power in the world.

All this every Englishman knows. I repeat it only because it has now received not only a confirmation but also a valuable further proof in the Lichnowsky memorandum, a proof unsolicited and uncontemplated, and, moreover, unimpeachable, because it comes from one who bore a leading part in what it records, and who never meant to let it become known.

ENGLAND'S PACIFIC SPIRIT

First--The memorandum bears witness to the pacific spirit of the British people. Here are some of its words:

"The commercial jealousy about which we [in Germany] hear so much is based on a wrong conception of the circumstances. Certainly Germany's rise as a commercial power after 1870 and during the following decades was a menace to British commercial circles which with their industries and export houses had held a virtual monopoly. The increasing commerce with Germany, which was the leading country in Europe as regards British exports, had, however, given rise to the wish to maintain friendly relations with their best customer and business friend, and had driven all other considerations into the background. Notably, in commercial spirit and the effort to further our common commercial interests."

"At the English cities to which I was invited (by the Chambers of Commerce and municipalities) I was well received everywhere. * * * In all other circles I also met with the most friendly reception and co-operation--at Court, in society, and from the Government."

"On account of our fleet alone England would not have drawn the sword any more than on account of our trade, which has been alleged to have produced jealousy and finally war. * * * It was possible to arrive at an understanding in spite of the fleet, and without a 'naval holiday,' [intermission of naval shipbuilding.]"

Second--The memorandum shows that the attitude of the British Government, and in particular of Sir Edward Grey, then Foreign Minister, was entirely pacific. The admirable characterization of Sir Edward it contains is too long to quote, but it testifies to his perfect straightforwardness and constant wish to maintain good relations with Germany, and after describing how "the simplicity and honesty of his ways secured him the respect even of his opponents," it adds: "This is a true picture of the man who is decried [in Germany] as 'Liar Grey' and instigator of the world war."

The memorandum goes on to show how sincerely Sir Edward had worked for peace, first in 1913, during the Balkan troubles, when he went hand-in-hand with Germany, "hardly ever supporting the French or Russian claims. He conducted the negotiations with circumspection, calm, and tact." Frequently, when appealed to by Lichnowsky to use his influence with the Russian Government to arrange difficulties between it and Germany, "Sir Edward gladly did this, and his intervention contributed in no small degree to smooth the matter over."

Third--A still weightier evidence of the good-will of the British Government is supplied by the account given of the concessions made to German wishes in Asia and Africa. "Sir Edward Grey," says the memorandum, "after having outstanding points of difference with France and Russia, wished to make similar agreements with us. It was not his object to isolate us, but to the best of his power to make us partners in the existing association. As he had succeeded in overcoming Anglo-French and Anglo-Russian differences, so he also wished to do his best to eliminate the Anglo-German, and, by a network of treaties, which would no doubt have led in the end to an agreement on the troublesome question of naval armaments, to insure the peace of the world."

THE BAGDAD RAILWAY

"His plan was, in his own words, without interfering with England's existing friendship, which had no aggressive aims and does not entail any binding obligations, to arrive at a friendly rapprochement and understanding with Germany to bring the two groups [of powers] nearer." In pursuance of this policy, the British Government went a very long way to meet German wishes in respect to the Bagdad Railway. They agreed to let it be prolonged to El Basra; they included the whole of Mesopotamia as far as that town in the German sphere of influence, and also the whole district of the Bagdad and Anatolian railway, i.e., all the centre of Asia Minor.

Not less large were the concessions made in South Central Africa. "The new agreement [regarding the interests of Germany and England in the African possessions of Portugal] was fully in accord with German wishes and interests. For these the British Government showed the greatest consideration. Sir E. Grey intended to demonstrate his good-will toward us, but he also wished to assist our colonial development as a whole." These arrangements were embodied in two treaties highly advantageous to Germany, which, however, the German Government, for some reasons of its own, had postponed signing, so that they remained unpublished up till the outbreak of the war. Had we in the inner spirit of the German Government, and the use it would make of our concessions, British Ministers might well have hesitated to go so far as they did. But that they conceded so much is the completest proof of their good-will and the most convincing refutation of the charges which the German Ministers and press have brought against them.

It would take too long to follow out in this article the constant efforts of the British Government during the fateful days before the outbreak of the war to avoid a conflict by means of Sir E. Grey's repeated plans of mediation and adjustment. The memorandum shows how earnestly he labored for peace at Berlin, at Petersburg, at Vienna, and how all his attempts were baffled by the settled purpose of the German Government to force on war.

THE POTSDAM CONFERENCE

Britain may, like other nations, have in the past sometimes indulged her ambition, sometimes abused her strength, sometimes embarked in wars that might well have been avoided. But on this occasion at least she is blameless. Never in her long history has she had so perfectly clear a conscience as in the case of this war. Her people neither contemplated it nor desired it. They were driven into it by the action of the German Government, which persisted in pushing it on even when Austria seemed willing to draw back. All had evidently been settled at that famous Potsdam conference, when (as the German Ambassador at Constantinople, before Italy had declared war against Austria, told his Italian colleague) the Emperor had inquired of his military and naval chiefs whether they were ready for the conflict for which, during some months preceding, preparations had been in progress. Neither when the war began did Britain wish to do more than prevent Germany from destroying Belgium and mortally wounding France. Sir E. Grey spoke truly for the nation when, as the memorandum records, he said: "We don't want to crush Germany."

Germany and Great Britain in 1912

Lord Haldane's Official Report of
His Conciliatory Mission Prior to the War

_Lord Haldane, the British Minister for War in 1912, was sent on a mission to Berlin in that year to confer with the German Chancellor, Dr. von Bethmann Hollweg, in the hope of reaching some agreement with Germany for a mutual reduction of armament, and for the establishment of conditions that would preserve European peace. The hope regarding armaments was not fulfilled, and the conversations that had taken place were not made public by either Government; but late in May, 1918, in view of the revelations of Prince Lichnowsky regarding Germany's responsibility for the war, the British Government at length published Lord Haldane's report. It is in the form of a daily record, beginning Feb. 8, 1912, and is here reproduced in full, with the exception of parts relating solely to British defensive measures:_

"At the interview with the Chancellor, which took place at 2 o'clock and lasted for more than an hour and a half, I began by giving him the message of good wishes for the conversations and for the future of Anglo-German relations with which the King had intrusted me at the audience I had before leaving. He was pleased with this message, and intimated that he would write through the German Ambassador to thank the King. I then said that perhaps it would be convenient if I defined the capacity in which I was in Berlin, and there to talk to him; and I defined it as above intimated. I proceeded to ask whether he wished to make any observations or desired that I should begin. He wished me to begin, and I went on at once to speak to him as arranged in a conversation I had had with Sir Edward Grey before leaving London."

"I told him that I felt there had been a great deal of drifting away between Germany and England, and that it was important to ask what was the cause. To ascertain this, events of recent history had to be taken into account. Germany had built up, and was building up, magnificent armaments, and with the aid of the Triple Alliance she had become the centre of a tremendous group. The natural consequence was that other powers had tended to approximate. I was not questioning for a moment Germany's policy, but this was the natural and inevitable consequence in the interests of security. We used to have much the same situation with France when she was very powerful on the sea that we had with Germany now. While the fact to which I referred created a difficulty, the difficulty was not insuperable; for two groups of powers might be on very friendly relations if there was only an increasing sense of mutual understanding and confidence. The present seemed to me to be a favorable moment for a new departure. The Morocco question was now out of the way, and we had no agreements with France or Russia except those that were in writing and published to the world.

"The Chancellor interrupted me, and asked me whether this was really so. I replied that I could give him the assurance that it was so without reserve, and that in the situation, which now existed I saw no reason why it should not be possible for us to enter into a new and cordial friendship, carrying the two old ones into it, perhaps, to the profit of Russia and France as well as Germany herself. He replied that he had no reason to differ from this view."

"In connection with my remarks as to the events of last Summer, he interposed that we had military preparations. I replied that no preparations had been made which were other than those required to bring the capacity of the British Army in point of mobilization to something approaching the standard which Germany had long ago reached, and which was with her a matter of routine. For this purpose we had studied our deficiencies and modes of operation * * * We could not be caught unprepared."

NO AGGRESSIVE ALLIANCES

The Chancellor seemed much pleased with Lord Haldane's explanation, and said: "There had been much talk of our fleet and our army, and the steps we had taken, but that he understood the position I had indicated." "I said, in reply, that it was a pleasure to me to hear this, and that I hoped I should carry him with me still further in my belief that if Germany had really, which I did not at all suppose, intended to crush France and destroy her capacity to defend herself, we in England would have had such a direct interest in the result that we could not have sat by and seen this done."

"He said he did not dissent from this view, nor did he wish to hamper our freedom in such a case. But he wished to propose a formula; the balance of power was a phrase he did not like, though he admitted that the historical considerations I had referred to made it natural that some grouping should take place, and that England should lean toward the weaker side. He had, however, proposed, in his communication to us, a formula of neutrality which might go a long way to help."

"I said I cordially agreed with the good intention of his formula, the working of which was that neither was to enter into any combinations against the other. If this meant combinations for attack or aggression, I was entirely of his mind. But I must put on spectacles in looking at his words, and, first of all, I would put on German spectacles. How would Germany find herself if, when bound by such a formula, we were so wicked as to attack her ally Austria or to try to grab Denmark, which was of deep strategical interest to her? Again, suppose Germany joined in an attack on Japan or Portugal or Belgium--he then interposed 'or Holland'--but I said I really hadn't all our treaties sufficiently in my head to be as sure about Holland as I was about the others. Or if, I added, Germany were to pounce upon France and proceed to dismember her, what would happen? He answered that these cases were not at all likely, but he admitted that they were fatal to his formula. I asked him whether he would be satisfied with mutual undertakings against aggressive or unprovoked attacks and against all combinations, military and naval agreements, and plans directed to the purpose of aggression and unprovoked attack. He said it was very difficult to define what was meant by aggression or unprovoked attack. I replied that you could not define the number of grains which it took to make a heap, but one knew a heap when one saw one." * * *

QUESTION OF GERMAN FLEET

"We then passed on to the question of the German fleet, as to which he asked me to make any observations. I said I must. He and I had been talking with the most absolute candor and friendliness to each other, and I felt he would regard me as wanting in character were I not very frank with him about the new navy law. What was the use of entering into a solemn agreement for concord and against attack if Germany at the same moment was going to increase her battle fleet as a precaution against us, and we had consequently to increase our battle fleet as a precaution against her? This was vital from our point of view, because we were an island power dependent for our food supplies on the power of protecting our commerce, and for this we needed the two-power standard and a substantial preponderance in battle fleets. He said that it was absolutely essential to Germany to have a third squadron in full readiness for war. At present, owing to her system of recruiting, for three months in the year she had virtually, owing to the necessity for training recruits, no fleet ready at all. I said I did not contest this; she was quite entitled to have it if she thought it necessary, but the result would be that we should not be able to rely on the two battle squadrons and reserve squadrons which had sufficed hitherto, but that we should be compelled to have five, or even six, squadrons ready in home waters, perhaps bringing ships from the Mediterranean to strengthen them."

"He asked me was that necessary if we had a friendly agreement? I said it would be a less convincing proof of friendliness if Germany prepared her third squadron, and we should have no option. Still, I said, this was not so serious as the proposal to add a third ship every second year to the German construction program. This would put us in great difficulties so far as securing the good opinion of the public in England about the value of an agreement. We should certainly have to proceed at once to lay down two keels to each one of the new German additions, and that would cost money and cause feeling. It was true that each country could bear the additional cost without difficulty. They were rich and so were we. If it was for the purpose of the navy our people would not complain, in my opinion, of the addition of another shilling to the income tax, but it would be a great pity. He asked was that really likely to be our program, the laying down of two additional keels for each German one. I said that I had no doubt that it would be the result, and the Government would be turned out if they failed to accomplish it; and therefore some modification seemed to be of the utmost importance, if the agreement was to be a real success."

"After a pause he said he would consider this and 'die Sache überlegen.' The conversation up to this point had been largely in German, I taking to English whenever there was a delicate topic, and the Chancellor occasionally speaking English, but nearly always German. In order to avoid misunderstanding repeated sentences in the other language. I was impressed by his evident desire to meet us wherever he could, and I derived considerable hope from the manner and emphasis with which he said that he would reconsider the question of the ships. But I must add that he went on to say that the question of the new squadron was vital, and that some new ships would be necessary in it. Could I suggest any way out, for they must keep to the plan of a new law. I observed that it was not for me to venture to make any suggestion to his Excellency, but that a spreading out in size of the new program might make a difference. He said, 'Perhaps, eight or nine years'; I added, 'or twelve, if he could not do better.' He again said that he would take this matter into serious consideration and consult his experts. 'My Admirals,' he said, 'are very difficult.' 'That was an experience,' I observed, 'which we sometimes found in England also.'"

THE KAISER AND VON TIRPITZ

On the following day, Feb. 9, Lord Haldane had an interview with the Emperor, the Chancellor, and Admiral Tirpitz on the navy, at which Tirpitz held out for the new German naval program, which was discussed at great length. Lord Haldane wrote:

"I insisted that fundamental modification was essential. The tone was thoroughly friendly, but I felt that I had come to the most difficult part of my task of getting material fit to bring back for the consideration of my colleagues. The utmost I was able to get was this: The Emperor was so disturbed at the idea that the world would not believe in the reality of the agreement unless the shipbuilding program was modified that he asked me what I would suggest. I said that it was a too technical matter for me to discuss here, but that if he would not drop the new law--which I saw he felt he could not--he might at least drop out a ship. This idea was never abandoned, but Admiral Tirpitz combated it so hard that I said: 'Well, can we not spread the tempo?' After much talking we got to this, that, as I insisted that they must not inaugurate the agreement by building an additional ship at once, they should put off building the first ship till 1913, and then should not lay down another till three years after, (1916,) and not lay down the third till 1919."

"Admiral Tirpitz wanted us to give some understanding about our own shipbuilding. He thought the two-power standard a hard one for Germany, and, indeed, Germany could not make any admission about it. I said it was not a matter of admission. Germany must be free and we must be free, and we should probably lay down two keels to their one. In this case the initiative was not with us, but with them. An idea occurred to all of us on this observation that we should try to avoid defining a standard proportion in the agreement, and that, indeed, we should say nothing at all about shipbuilding in the if the political agreement was concluded the Emperor should at once announce to the German public that this entirely new fact modified his desire for the fleet law as originally conceived, and that it should be delayed and spread out to the extent we had discussed. For the rest, each of us would remain masters in our own houses as far as naval matters were concerned."

"The Emperor thought the agreement would affect profoundly the tendency in shipbuilding, and he certainly should not desire to go beyond the three ships. The fact of the agreement was the key to everything. The Chancellor, he said, would propose to me this afternoon a formula which he had drafted. I said that I would see the Chancellor and discuss any further territorial questions with him, and would then return as speedily as I could and report the good disposition which I had found to my colleagues, and leave the difficulties of not being able to stop shipbuilding more completely, and, indeed, all other matters to their judgment. I could only assure the Emperor that I had been much struck with the friendly disposition in Berlin, and that he would find a not less friendly disposition in London."

NO AGREEMENT REACHED