Chapter M: H. Holubowicz (8)

Lord Haldane mentions that he was in communication with M. Jules Cambon, the French Ambassador in Berlin, and recounted his conversations to him. The Ambassador quite appreciated that the purpose of the mission was to create a detente, as distinguished from an entente. M. Jules Cambon reported his conversation with Lord Haldane to M. Poincaré.

Lord Haldane had another conversation with the Chancellor in the hope of arriving at a formula with regard to the navy. The Chancellor said that the "forces he had to contend with were almost insuperable. Public opinion in Germany expected a new law and the third squadron, and he must have these. I said we could not contest Germany's right to do in these matters, and indeed in other matters, as she pleased. But why not postpone the shipbuilding for longer and adapt the law accordingly? * * *"

"The Chancellor said he would try. He asked me to consult the experts in London and make a suggestion. I had said, he remarked, that everything was good only on balance, and Germany must for a greater end give up a minor advantage. The new squadron and the new fleet law she must have, but it was a question for the experts, on which he did not pronounce, whether a retardation of greater magnitude than Tirpitz proposed might not be possible. I promised to let him know privately the state of feeling here about the Tirpitz proposals on my return."

The Ministers then endeavored to arrive at a formula, the whole purpose of which was to bring about conditions which would prevent to endeavor to get a definition of the duty of neutrality; and, in the event of war, to combine in order to localize the conflict.

After Lord Haldane's return to London, negotiations in search of a formula were continued. Prince Lichnowsky preserved a friendly atmosphere, but the German Government never agreed to conditions which would have safeguarded the neutrality of Belgium or maintained her honorable obligations to our allies. The nearest they got at the eleventh hour was, as Lord Grey said, "far too narrow an engagement for us."

British Official Statement Issued in 1915

_The German press in 1915 made certain incorrect allegations regarding the Haldane Mission, whereupon on Aug. 31, 1915, the British Government issued the following official statement:_

THE FOREIGN OFFICE ISSUED THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT RESPECTING THE ANGLO-GERMAN NEGOTIATIONS OF 1912:

An account of the 1912 Anglo-German negotiations was published in the semi-official Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung last month. This account was misleading, and was no doubt intended to mislead, and made it appear that the British Government had at that time rejected what would be regarded in many quarters as a reasonable offer of friendship from Germany.

In these circumstances it may be as well to publish a statement of the facts compiled from official records here. Early in 1912 the German Chancellor sketched to Lord Haldane the following formula as one which would meet the views of the Imperial Government:

1. The high contracting parties assure each other mutually of
their desire of peace and friendship.

2. They will not either of them make or prepare to make any
(unprovoked) attack upon the other, or join in any combination or
design against the other for purposes of aggression, or become
party to any plan or naval or military enterprise alone or in
combination with any other power directed to such an end, and
declare not to be bound by any such engagement.

3. If either of the high contracting parties become entangled
in a war with one or more powers in which it cannot be said to
be the aggressor, the other party will at least observe toward
the power so entangled a benevolent neutrality, and will use its
utmost endeavor for the localization of the conflict. If either
of the high contracting parties is forced to go to war by obvious
provocation from a third party, they bind themselves to enter into
an exchange of views concerning their attitude in such a conflict.

4. The duty of neutrality which arises out of the preceding
article has no application in so far as it may not be reconcilable
with existing agreements which the high contracting parties have
already made.

5. The making of new agreements which render it impossible for
either of the parties to observe neutrality toward the other
beyond what is provided by the preceding limitation is excluded in
conformity with the provisions in Article 2.

6. The high contracting parties declare that they will do all in
their power to prevent differences and misunderstandings arising
between either of them and other powers.

GERMAN PLAN ONE-SIDED

These conditions, although in appearance fair as between the parties, would have been grossly unfair and one-sided in their operation. Owing to the general position of the European powers and the treaty engagements by which they were bound, the result of Articles 4 and 5 would have been that, while Germany in the case of a European conflict would have remained free to support her friends, this country would have been forbidden to raise a finger in defense of hers.

Germany could arrange without difficulty that the formal inception of hostilities should rest with Austria. If Austria and Russia were at war, Germany would support Austria, as is evident from what occurred at the end of July, 1914; while as soon as Russia was attacked by two powers France was bound to come to her assistance. In other words, the pledge of neutrality offered by Germany would have been absolutely valueless, because she could always plead the necessity of fulfilling her existing obligations under the Triple Alliance as an excuse for departing from neutrality. On the other hand, no such departure, however serious the provocation, would have been possible for this country, which was bound by no alliances with the exception of those with Japan and Portugal, while the making of fresh alliances was prohibited by Article 5. In a word, as appeared still more evident later, there was to be a guarantee of absolute neutrality on one side but not on the other.

It was impossible for us to enter into a contract so obviously inequitable, and the formula was accordingly rejected by Sir Edward Grey.

Count Metternich upon this pressed for counter proposals, which he stated would be without prejudice and not binding unless we were satisfied that our wishes were met on the naval question. On this understanding Sir Edward Grey on the 14th of March, 1912, gave Count Metternich the following draft formula, which had been approved by the Cabinet:

England will make no unprovoked attack upon Germany, and pursue no
aggressive policy toward her.

Aggression upon Germany is not the subject, and forms no part of
any treaty, understanding, or combination to which England is now
a party, nor will she become a party to anything that has such an
object.

Count Metternich thought this formula inadequate, and suggested two alternative additional clauses:

England will therefore observe at least a benevolent neutrality
should war be forced upon Germany; or

England will therefore, as a matter of course, remain neutral if a
war is forced upon Germany.

This, he added, would not be binding unless our wishes were met with regard to the naval program.

SIR EDWARD GREY'S VIEW

Sir Edward Grey considered that the British proposals were sufficient. He explained that, if Germany desired to crush France, England might not be able to sit still, though, if France were aggressive or attacked Germany, no support would be given by his Majesty's Government or approved by England. It is obvious that the real object of the German proposal was to obtain the neutrality of England in all eventualities, since, should a war break out, Germany would certainly contend that it had been forced upon her, and would claim that England should remain neutral. An admirable example of this is the present war, in which, in spite of the facts, Germany contends that war has been forced upon her. Even the third member of the Triple Alliance, who had sources of information not open to us, did not share this view, but regarded it as an aggressive war.

Sir Edward Grey eventually proposed the following formula:

The two powers being mutually desirous of securing peace and
friendship between them, England declares that she will neither
make nor join in any unprovoked attack upon Germany. Aggression
upon Germany is not the subject, and forms no part of, any treaty,
understanding, or combination to which England is now a party, nor
will she become a party to anything that has such an object.

Sir Edward Grey when he handed this formula to Count Metternich said that the use of the word "neutrality" would convey the impression that more was meant than was warranted by the text; he suggested that the substance of what was required would be obtained and more accurately expressed by the words "will neither make nor join in any unprovoked attack."

Count Metternich thereupon received instructions to make it quite clear that the Chancellor could recommend the Emperor to give up the essential parts of the Novelle (the bill then pending for the increase of the German Navy) only if we could conclude an agreement guaranteeing neutrality of a far-reaching character and leaving no doubt as to any interpretation. He admitted that the Chancellor's wish amounted to a guarantee of absolute neutrality, failing which the Novelle must proceed.

Count Metternich stated that there was no chance of the withdrawal of the Novelle, but said that it might be modified; it would be disappointing to the Chancellor if we did not go beyond the formula we had suggested.

Sir Edward Grey said that he could understand that there would be disappointment if his Majesty's Government were to state that the carrying out of the Novelle would put an end to the negotiations and form an insurmountable obstacle to better relations. His Majesty's Government did not say this, and it hoped that the formula which it had suggested might be considered in connection with the discussion of territorial arrangements, even if it did not prove effective in preventing the increase of naval expenditure.

Sir Edward Grey added that if some arrangement could be made between the two Governments it would have a favorable though indirect effect upon naval expenditure as time went on; it would have, moreover, a favorable and direct effect upon public opinion in both countries.

A few days afterward Count Metternich communicated to Sir Edward Grey the substance of a letter from the Chancellor, in which the latter said that, as the formula suggested by his Majesty's Government was from the German point of view insufficient, and as his Majesty's Government could not agree to the larger formula for which he had asked, the Novelle must proceed on the lines on which it had been presented to the Federal Council. The negotiations then came to an end, and with them the hope of a mutual reduction in the expenditure on armaments of the two countries.

* * * * *

THE EUROPEAN WAR AS SEEN BY CARTOONISTS

[American Cartoon]

--_From the St. Louis Globe-Democrat._]

[Italian Cartoon]

----_From Il 420, Florence._

ST. PETER: "Why do you not protest against these German
barbarities?"

POPE BENEDICT: "Because I don't want to be a protestant pope!"]

[German Cartoon]

The Statue of Liberty suddenly changed into a Fury!

Referring to President Wilson's "force to the uttermost" speech.]

[German Cartoon]

Poincaré and Clemenceau when the big gun roars.]

[German Cartoon]

--_From Kladderadatsch, Berlin._

A Berlin version of what would happen if the peoples under British rule
could do as they pleased.]

[Dutch Cartoon]

--_From De Amsterdammer, Amsterdam._

JESTER VON BUELOW: "I was discharged because my master talked
too much."

JESTER CZERNIN: "And I because my master wrote
too much."]

[English Cartoon]

--_From Passing Show, London._

"And a smile on the face of the tiger!"]

[English Cartoon]

--_From London Opinion._

THE LAND LADY: "Will you show me to the underclothing
department, please?"

THE SHOPWALKER: "Certainly--er--men's or women's?"]

[Swiss Cartoon]

[ Illustration: The War and the Bread Basket

--_From Nebelspalter, Zurich._]

[Italian Cartoon]

--_From L'Asino, Rome_

Still more blood--by the wish of the Kaiser and his people.]

[American Cartoon]

--_From The St. Louis Post-Dispatch._]

[American Cartoons]

--_St. Louis Republic._]

--_Baltimore American._

--_St. Louis Republic._]

--_Cincinnati Post._]

[German Cartoon]

TROTZKY TO DIPLOMATS: "Nothing doing, gentlemen. I'm deaf in
both ears."

--_From Kladderadatsch, Berlin._

TROTZKY TO ARMY OFFICERS: "Why--yes!-- With pleasure--and
haste! Any peace looks good to me!"]

[American Cartoon]

--_From The New York Times._]

[French Cartoon]

--_From La Victoire, Paris._

"Who said peace?"]

[American Cartoon]

--_From The New York Herald._]

[American Cartoon]

--_From The New York Times._

THE ALLIES: "Perhaps we should save the Bear, even though he
doesn't yelp."]

[German Cartoon]

How "Wily Wilson" and "Juggling John" tried to use the Japanese puma--

--and the result, somewhat different from what they expected.]

[Italian Cartoon]

--_From Il 420, Florence._

ITALY: "Here I am, to lend a hand!"]

[Spanish Cartoon]

--_From Iberia, Barcelona._

TROTZKY AND LENINE: "We have done more than Kerensky!"]

[German Cartoon]

"Damn! I believe I'm too late for the entry into Berlin!"]

[German Cartoon]

[German Cartoon]

A Berlin boast of what the long-range gun will do.]

[American Cartoon]

--_From The Galveston News._

He expected inconvenience; he found difficulty, and is coming
up against impossibility.]

[German Cartoon]

--_From Kladderadatsch, Berlin._

To the Adventurer: Stay at home and remain all write, (right.)]

[Dutch Cartoons]

SHADE OF ADRIAAN VAN DER WERFF: "Has my story taught you
nothing? Look out for yourself. Suffer anything rather than budge."]

--_From De Amsterdammer, Amsterdam._]

[American Cartoons]

--_Chicago Herald and Examiner._]

--_Central Press Association._]

--_Dayton Daily News._]

[American Cartoons]

[The Watch on the Rhine

--_From The San Francisco Chronicle._]