Chapter VI

Is the Act of Contemplation Rightly Distinguished According to the Three Kinds of Motion--Circular, Direct, and Oblique?

S. Denis the Areopagite[378] does so distinguish the acts of contemplation.

The operation of the intellect in which contemplation essentially consists is termed "motion" in the sense that motion is the act of a perfect thing, according to the Philosopher.[379] And since we arrive at a knowledge of intelligible things through the medium of the things of sense, and the operations of the senses do not take place without motion, it follows that the operations also of the intellect are correctly described as a species of motion, and are differentiated according to the analogy of divers motions. But the more perfect and the chiefest of bodily motions are local motions, as is proved by the Philosopher.[380] Consequently the chief intellectual motions are described according to the analogy of these latter.

Now, there are three species of local motion: one is circular, according as a thing is moved uniformly about the same centre; another is direct, according as a thing proceeds from one point to another; and a third is oblique, compounded as it were from the two foregoing.

Hence in intelligible operations, that which simply has uniformity is attributed to circular motion; that intellectual motion by which a man proceeds from one thing to another is attributed to direct motion; while that intellectual operation which has a certain uniformity combined with progress towards different points, is attributed to oblique motion.

All, however, do not agree with this division, thus:

1. Contemplation means a state of repose, as is said in _Wisdom_[381]: _When I go into my house I shall repose myself with Her._ And motion is opposed to repose. Consequently the operations of the contemplative life cannot be designated according to these different species of motion.

But whereas external bodily movements are opposed to that repose
of contemplation which is understood to be rest from external
occupations, the motion of intellectual operations belongs
precisely to the repose of contemplation.

2. Again, the action of the contemplative life pertains to the intellect wherein man is at one with the Angels. But S. Denis does not apply these motions to the Angels in the same way as he does to the soul; for he says that the _circular_ motion of the Angels "corresponds to the illumination of the beautiful and the good." But of the _circular_ motion of the soul he gives several definitions, of which the first is "the return of the soul upon itself as opposed to external things"; the second is "a certain wrapping together of the powers of the soul whereby it is freed from error and from external occupation"; and the third is "the union of the soul with things superior to it." Similarly, he speaks in different terms of the _direct_ motion of the soul as compared with that of the Angels. For he says that the _direct_ motion of an Angel is "according as he proceeds to the care of the things subject to him"; while the _direct_ motion of the soul is made to consist in two things: first of all "that it proceeds to those things which are around it"; secondly, that "from external things it is uplifted to simple contemplation." And lastly, he explains the _oblique_ motion differently in each case. For he makes the _oblique_ motion of the Angels consist in this that, "while providing for those that have less than themselves, they remain in the same attitude towards God"; but the _oblique_ motion of the soul he explains as meaning that "the soul is illumined by Divine knowledge rationally and diffusely."

Consequently it does not appear that the operations of contemplation are fittingly distinguished according to the aforesaid species of motion.

But while man's intellect is generally the same with that of the
Angels, the intellectual powers of the latter are far higher
than in man. It was therefore necessary to assign the aforesaid
motions to human souls and to the Angels in different fashion in
proportion as their intellectual powers are not uniform. For the
Angelic intellect has uniform knowledge in two respects:
firstly, because the Angels do not acquire intelligible truth
from the variety of compound things; and secondly, because they
do not understand intelligible truth discursively, but by simple
intuition. Whereas the intellect of the human soul, on the
contrary, acquires intelligible truth from the things of sense,
and understands it by the discursive action of the reason.

Hence S. Denis assigns to the Angels circular motion in that
they uniformly and unceasingly, without beginning or end, gaze
upon God; just as circular motion, which has neither beginning
nor end, is uniformly maintained round the same central point.
But in the case of the human soul, its twofold lack of
uniformity must be removed before it can attain to the
above-mentioned uniformity. For there must first be removed that
lack of uniformity which arises from the diversity of external
things: that is, the soul must quit external things. And this S.
Denis expresses first of all in his definition of the circular
motion of the soul when he speaks of "the return of the soul
upon itself as opposed to external things." And there must be
removed in the second place that second lack of uniformity which
arises from the discursive action of the reason. And this takes
place when all the operations of the soul are reduced to the
simple contemplation of intelligible truth. This forms the
second part of S. Denis's definition of this circular
motion--namely, when he speaks of the necessity of "a certain
wrapping together of the powers of the soul," with the result
that, when discursive action thus ceases, the soul's gaze is
fixed on the contemplation of the one simple truth. And in this
operation of the soul there is no room for error, just as there
is no room for error in our understanding of first principles
which we know by simple intuition.

Then, when these first two steps have been taken, S. Denis puts
in the third place that uniformity, like to that of the Angels,
by which the soul, laying aside all else, persists in the simple
contemplation of God. And this he expresses when he says: "Then,
as now made uniform, it, as a whole"--that is, as conformed (to
God)--"is, with all its powers unified, led by the hand to the
Beautiful and the Good."

But the _direct_ motion in the Angels cannot be understood in
the sense that, by considering, they proceed from one point to
another; but solely according to the order of their providential
care for others--according, namely, as the superior Angels
illumine the inferior through those who stand between. And this
is what S. Denis means when he says that the _direct_ motion of
an Angel is "according as he proceeds to the care of the things
subject to him, taking in his course all things that are direct"
following--that is, those things which are disposed in direct
order. But to the human soul S. Denis assigns _direct_ motion in
the sense that it proceeds from the exterior things of sense to
the knowledge of intelligible things.

And he assigns _oblique_ motion to the Angels--a motion, that
is, compounded of the _direct_ and the _circular_--inasmuch as
an Angel, according to his contemplation of God, provides for
those inferior to him. To the human soul, on the contrary, he
assigns this same _oblique_ motion, similarly compounded of the
_direct_ and the _circular_ motions, inasmuch as in its
reasonings it makes use of the Divine illuminations.

3. Lastly, Richard of S. Victor[382] gives many other and different kinds of motion. For, following the analogy of the birds of the air, he says of these latter that "some at one time ascend on high, at another swoop down to earth, and they do this again and again; others turn now to the right, now to the left, and this repeatedly; others go in advance, others fall behind; some sail round and round in circles, now narrower and now wider; while others again remain almost immovably suspended in one place." From all which it would seem that there are not merely three movements in contemplation.

But all these diversities of motion which are expressed by, up
and down, to right and left, backwards and forwards, and in
varying circles, are reducible either to _direct_ or to
_oblique_ motion, for they all signify the discursive action of
the reason. For if this discursive action be from the genus to
the species or from the whole to the part, it will be, as
Richard of S. Victor himself explains, motion upwards and
downwards. If, again, it means argumentation from one thing to
its opposite, it will come under motion to right and left. Or if
it be deduction from cause to effect, then it will be motion
backwards and forwards. And finally, if it mean arguing from the
accidents which surround a thing, whether nearly or remotely, it
will be circuitous motion. But the discursive action of the
reason arguing from the things of sense to intelligible things
according to the orderly progress of the natural reason, belongs
to _direct_ motion. When, however, it arises from Divine
illuminations, it comes under _oblique_ motion, as we have
already said (in the reply to the second argument). Lastly, only
the immobility which he mentions will come under _circular_
motion.

Whence it appears that S. Denis has quite sufficiently, and with
exceeding subtlety, described the movements of contemplation.

"For behold my witness is in Heaven, and He that knoweth my
conscience is on high. For behold short years pass away, and I
am walking in a path by which I shall not return."[383]